Philosophy of Science Final Exam

Nicod's Criterion

Meaning: The fact that some object has properties A and B (evidence of the form Ac & Bc) supports the hypothesis that all As are Bs (∀x(Ax → Bx)). Example: A non-black, non-raven supports "All non-black things are non-ravens". Example) It is used as the first premise for the Raven Paradox Quine: NC holds only if A and B are natural kind properties. Hempel: Hempel accepts NC when K = ∅, but not necessarily for any possible K. NC holds only if K = ∅.

Heuristics and Biases

Who: Solomon; Kitcher (?) Meaning: In-group form, biases can actually help. Because the dominant theory faces more resistance which can actually improve it. Significance: In light of these biases, how can we be so successful in science? It's a problem for individuals but as a group we can overcome them.

Perceptual Plasticity

You can change the way you see things based on your background theories. Churchland would maintain that perception is perpetually plastic. Fodor denies it and say no we have the same perceptions. You could talk about the duck/rabbit illusions to suggest perceptual plasticity.

Distribution of Cognitive Labor

→ Kitcher argues that the unanimous "jumping off ship" from the phlogiston theory is not ideal in the colelctive practice of science. → Some competition between theories is good → Evidence for the "superior" theory is not infallible. → The problem is how to have the group split so some scientists pursue the 'inferior" method or theory. → You want to distribute scientists in a means that maximizes utility. Instead of adding 10 more people to method 1, which already has 80 people, you'd probably increase utility by adding those people instead to method 2, which only has 15 people. → Kitcher's decisions are conscious, but Solomon suggests conditions are unconscious biases.

Kitcher's Argument against Free Inquiry

→ There are certain cases where you shouldn't inquire certain questions, such as cases about disadvantaged groups. → Case of IQ/Race: If the results confirm that lower IQ is connected to race, it will not help the minorities and may further disadvantage them, and if the results deny the connection, then the results will be "ignored". → If the inquiry can further disadvantage an already disadvantaged group, there is no rational reason to inquire because it has the potential to make it worse for the group.

Cluster Concept

"It is simply not possible to give a neat definition—specifying necessary and sufficient characteristics—which separates all and only those things that have ever been called "science." The concept "science" is not as easily definable as, for example, the concept "triangle."" "Consider for example the proceedings that we call "games". I mean board-games, card-games, ball-games, Olympic games, and so on. What is common to them all?—Don't say: "There must be something common, or they would not be called 'games' "—but look and see whether there is anything common to all.—For if you look at them you will not see something that is common to all, but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that. [. . . ] And the result of this examination is: we see a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail." (Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations I, p. 66.) "...clusters are needed for what I call "diagnostic definitions": definitions that tell you how to recognize a concept-instance. But I would argue that despite the surface variability, there is an underlying unity in the sorts of concept that are robustly used in everyday and scientific discourse." (Posted by Mohan Matthen) Significance: This is important in the philosophy of science because it means you can't settle the demarcation question in a clear way. Potential problems for cluster concept answers: 1. Cluster concept answers only help distinguish the really clear cases, for which we don't need an answer. 2. Cluster concept answers aren't identifying the essence of science, but rather a cluster of diagnostic symptoms.

Aristotle's Answer to the Demarcation Question

A claim is scientific iff it (a) is established with certainty, and (b) it explains by revealing the true causes of phenomena. The objection is how do we check with certainty and how we know the "true" causes of the phenomena.

Pessimistic Meta-Induction

All the previous conclusions of science have been incorrect so the probability that the current theories are incorrect too. The best response is that well at least we're approaching the truth. → Supposed to make us skeptical about if science can tell us much about the unobservable world. Why should we think science is telling us about the unobservable world now if science has been wrong when telling us about the unobservable world before? → The ancient Greeks thought the atom were made of 4 basic elements, and since then, there have been numerous different (but mistaken) claims about the atom. So why should we think that the current claim about the atom is any better? Significance: The turnover of past theories in favor of new theories in science could be viewed as science is a flawed discipline that shouldn't be trusted. Objection: → (?) [However, others could view this as a virtue of science and why it should be trusted, because there is constant movement and building blocks of knowledge. Just because a theory is shown false does not mean science is flawed. Flasified theories show we have learned something new and that we are closer to the truth. We know something, even if it is false.]

Analytic/Synthetic Distinction

An analytic sentence is one whose truth-value is determined solely by the meaning of its terms. A synthetic sentence is a sentence that is not analytic. Analytics is true in virtue of the meaning of the word. Example: There are no round squares Synthetic is not analytic. Example: The temperature of the water is 85 degrees. Analytic sentence example: Frozen water is ice. Synthetic sentence example: The table in the kitchen is round. In this course, this distinction was important for the logical positivists because they said that the Verifiability Theory of Meaning (VTM) only applies to synthetic claims.

Inference to the Best Explanation

Argument for Design: The world seems to be incredibly well organized and functional, so the best explanation could be that there is a supernatural force that caused it.

Scientific Realism

Discussed by: Kitcher Meaning: The sciences sometimes deliver the truth about a world independent of human cognition, and they inform us about constituents of that world that are remote from human observation. → The thesis ( talked about by Kitcher ) science reveals to us objective truths about a mind-independent world (both observable and unobservable). And the real kinds(ex. periodic table) in nature as well Significance: It is important in the philosophy of science because if true it gives science a strong and objective image. Objections/Related arguments: → Two popular views opposing this are empiricism and constructivism.

NOMA

Explanation of Concept: Non-Overlapping Magisteria, a view advocated by Stephen Jay Gould that suggests "Religion and science make claims that are about two different domains, and so no conflict between these claims is possible." (Handout) "The lack of conflict between science and religion arises from a lack of overlap between their respect domains of professional expertise - science is the empirical constitution of the universe, and religion in the search for proper ethical values and the spiritual meaning of our lives." ("Two Separate Domains", Gould) NOMA.1 - Religion and science make claims about two literally different realms. (Handout) NOMA.2 - Religious claims are made only about the things science is silent about. (Handout) NOMA.3 - Religion makes claims about how things ought to be; science about how things are. (Handout) Objections to NOMA: Worrall believes NOMA misclassified religion and that NOMA strips religious faith "of any substantive descriptive claim about the universe, its history and its creation," which include claims like the Virgin Birth, Adam and Eve, or the possession of souls. ("Does Science Discredit Religion?", Worrall) Richard Dawkins argues that it is "completely unrealistic to claim...that religion keeps itself away from science's turf, restricting itself to morals and values...Religion makes existence claims, and this means scientific claims." "Either Jesus had a corporeal father or he didn't. This is not a question of 'values' or 'morals,' it is a question of sober fact. We may not have the evidence to answer it, but it is a scientific question..." (Dawkins, pg. 561) Related Concepts/Theories/Arguments: John Worrall: "Science and religion are in irreconcilable conflict...there is no way which you can be both properly scientifically-minded and a true religious believer." ("Does Science Discredit Religion?", Worrall) Overlap Thesis: Religion and science both make claims about the way that things are in reality. (Handout) Unlike Gould, Worrall thinks the two domains overlap AND are in conflict. Epistemic Priority of Science Thesis: The scientific way of knowing the way that things are is better than other ways of knowing the way that things are in reality. (Handout) 3 Types of Religious Belief: (I) Claims directly contradicted by scientific work. ("The universe is 6,000 years old.") (II) Claims contra-indicated by scientific work. ("Humans have immaterial souls.") (III) Very general claims about the world. ("There is a creator of the universe.") Worrall's Argument Reconstructed: 1. The Overlap Thesis is true. 2. If the Overlap Thesis is true, then science and religion make claims about the same reality. 3. If science and religion make claims about the same reality, then these claims are to be judged by the same set of standards. 4. When judged on the same set of standards, scientifically supported claims are more reputable than religiously supported claims. 5. If scientifically supported claims are more reputable than religiously supported claims, then science discredits religion. ∴ Science discredits religion. (Handout) Importance in Context of Philosophy of Science Drawing the line between fact and value: NOMA [and the related concepts] attempt to delineate the relationship/interactions between science ("fact") and religion ("value").

Condorcet Jury Theorem

If you've got a bunch of people independently voting and they're better than chance then the majority vote is like to be correct. And it increases in likelihood as you increase the number of people voting. It's important because groups would be more accurate than individuals.

Inductive Argument/Deductive Argument

Inductive Argument: In an inductive argument, the truth of the premises would at best make the conclusion may or may not be true, but not certain. They are weaker than deductive argument. The following is an example of an inductive argument: 1. Most mammals are placentals. 2. This kangaroo is a mammal. C. ∴ This kangaroo is a placental Deductive Argument: A deductive argument is that in which if the premises were true, the conclusion would have to be true as well. That is, the argument is valid. It is important because deductive arguments are extremely strong arguments in the philosophy of science. The following is an example of a deductive argument: 1. All mammals have hair. 2. This kangaroo is a mammal. C. ∴ This kangaroo has hair.

Informational Cascade

Introduced by Surowiecki: An informational cascade happens when the following conditions are met usually: There is a decision to be made. Decisions are made sequentially; later decision makers observe earlier decisions. Each decision maker has some private information relevant to the decision. Decision makers cannot view the private information of others, but they can make inferences about it based on the observation mentioned in 2. This shows how group decisions can be effected by a follow the herd mentality. It is important in the philosophy of science because it shows how group consensus can be weak sometimes.

Underdetermination Thesis

Meaning: → The Strong Underdetermination Thesis (SUD): The evidence allegedly in support of a theory does not support that theory over any of its contraries. → The Underdetermination Thesis (UD): For any theory and evidence allegedly in support of that theory, there is at least one other theory that is equally well supported by that evidence. → The Weak Underdetermination Thesis (WUD): For some theories and evidence allegedly in support of that theory, there is at least one other theory that is equally well supported by that evidence. UD in Practice: 1. Different versions of Newtonian Dynamics with different absolute reference frames. • Response: Future observations. • Response: T1 predicts O, T2 predicts O. This doesn't mean O equally confirms T1 and T2. 2. Heisenberg/Schrodinger versions of quantum mechanics. • Response: Same theory, different formalism. 3. Watson & Crick model of DNA. • Response: No plausible alternative theory, except radically skeptical ones. Kitcher's Claim: sometimes there is real underdetermination (Newton), sometimes we decide there is not real underdetermination (QM), and sometimes no plausible case can be made for underdetermination (DNA). There are alternative theories, which are equally well supported by the available evidence. The weak version of the underdetermination thesis says that for any theory and set of evidence in support of that theory, there is at least one other theory that is equally well supported by that evidence. Significance: This is important in the philosophy of science because it takes away from the inherent merit of science and concludes that the scientific conclusion choses was due to something other than the evidence like socio-political factors.

Social Constructivism

Meaning: → Social Constructivism (truth): Claims are true when they are defended by the most people, and those who have the most powerful allies. ("He who as the most, and the most powerful, allies wins" (Shapin and Schaffer)) → Social Constructivism (rationality): The persuasive force of a scientist's claim is solely a function of the number of allies marshaled on its behalf That science is not objective but is arrived at through our own non-objective lens. IV.i . . . so we only see what our theories train us to see. (p. 14) IV.ii . . . so we cannot tell what aspects of our observations are due to the world and what aspects are due to our concepts. (p. 14) This weakens the ground of science and is also an important objection against scientific realism. Constructivists arguments: 1. If scientific claims are true, then we can be 100% certain of them. 2. We cannot be 100% certain of anything. C. ∴ Scientific claims are not true. 1. If we have good reason to think that success betokens truth, then we must have a way of checking whether a theory is successful and whether it is true. 2. We can check whether a theory about mind-independent objects is successful but cannot check whether a theory about mind-independent objects is true. C. ∴ We do not have good reason to think that success betokens truth about a mind-independent world.

Hempel's Raven Paradox

Meaning: Sometimes called the paradox of confirmation. The heart of the RP says that finding a white shoe is evidence that all Rs are Bs. Nicod's Criterion: The fact that some object has properties A and B (evidence of the form Ac & Bc) supports the hypothesis that all As are Bs (∀x(Ax → Bx)). → A non-black, non-raven supports "All non-black things are non-ravens" The Equivalence Condition: If H1 is logically equivalent to H2, then if E supports H1, then E equally supports H2. Note: EC is not the same as: The Special Consequence Condition: If E supports H, then E supports anything entailed by H The Logical Point: The statement "All As are Bs" [∀x(Ax → Bx)] is logically equivalent to the statement "All non-Bs are non-As" [∀x(∼ Bx →∼ Ax)]. → "All non-black things are non-ravens" is logically equivalent to "All ravens are black" [Probabilistic Confirmation] Bayesian Confirmation: Some evidence E supports H (relative to background knowledge K) just in case P r(H|E & K) > P r(H|K). • Given some plausible assumptions, we can show that (i) evidence that something is a black raven supports the hypothesis that all ravens are black, (ii) evidence that something is a non-black non-raven supports the hypothesis that all ravens are black, but that (iii) the former evidence supports the hypothesis much more strongly than the latter. Hempel's Raven Paradox uses the following argument to show that all false hypotheses can be confirmed: 1. A non-black, non-raven supports "All non-black things are non-ravens". (NC) 2. "All non-black things are non-ravens" is logically equivalent to "All ravens are black". (LP) C. ∴ A non-black, non-raven supports "All ravens are black". (from 1,2, EC) The RP has two limitations: 1) The rule only works with (what Hempel calls lawlike statements) which combine a universal quantifier with a purely qualitative terms. 2) Can only work when background knowledge on object in question = 0. So if I tell you I am holding something white behind my back, no matter what I reveal the object as it will not confirm that all ravens are black. Significance: It is important for the philosophy of science because it shows that almost anything can be confirmed by anything. For example, in this case, a white shoe in your closet could confirm "All ravens are black". Objections: → Nelson Goodman's "Indoor Ornithology": It seems to show that finding a white shoe in your closet provides confirmation for the hypothesis that all ravens are black.

Natural Kinds

Meaning: The idea is that natural kinds all share some genuinely common qualities. Kitcher: argues against natural kinds saying there is no privileged way of cutting up the world. According to Kitcher, there are multiple ways of dividing the world into kinds, and which way one chooses depends on one's interests or goals. On Kitcher's view, then, we first divide the world into kinds based on our interests, and then discover via science the objective truths that are expressible by appealing to those kinds. Kitcher's view is thus one that grants that our interests have some influence on our scientific theorizing, but without giving up the objectivity of science. W. V. O. Quine: "Philosophical or broadly scientific motives can impel us to seek still a basic and absolute concept of similarity. . . This drive for a cosmic similarity concept is perhaps identifiable with the ageold drive to reduce things to their elements. It epitomizes the scientific spirt, though dating back to the pre-Socratics: to Empedocles with his theory of four elements, and above all to Democritus with his atoms. The modern physics of elementary particles, or of hills in space-time, is a more notable effort in this direction." Natural Kinds: - biological species - chemical elements - atoms Not Natural Kinds: - Neurasthenia - Jade (jadeite/nephrite) - the thing composed of: the manuscript of Finnegan's Wake, Queen Victoria, and the number 2 Significance: Many philosophers of science have thought that we need to appeal to natural kinds to understand various aspects of science, including laws of nature, explanation, and probability. → Natural kind terms (e.g., 'green') are good for inductive inferences; terms like 'grue' are not. → Helps to fix the reference of our terms independent of intentions Arguments against natural kinds: 1. There are many (infinitely many?) possible languages that express truths about nature although they cut up nature differently. (p. 45) 2. If each of these languages expresses truths, then each way of cutting up the world is equally privileged. 3. ∴ No one way of cutting up the world is privileged. 1. To say that nature has joints is a metaphor for saying that certain ways of describing things makes the describing easy, or useful. 2. But 'easy' or 'useful' "can only be understood in relation to beings with particular capacities and particular aims." (p. 46) 3. ∴ To say that nature has a language or joints, is just to say that relative to our capacities and aims, there are better ways of describing things

Ideal Deliberators

Not researchers only. Everyone that is well educated (at least enough to make an informed decision). Related to perfectly well-ordered science. Q: what would enlightened citizens who engage in ideal deliberation recommend? Transform current preferences to tutored preferences (opinion vs. informed opinion) Formulate group preferences after comparing individual tutored preferences (get a group preference ranking based on individual preferences) Specifies very specific goals Assess probabilities of achieving the goals in 2 via different projects via appeal to experts (plausibility of goals) Formulate the best distribution of resources to projects on the basis of the preferences in 2 and the probabilities in 3, subject to the moral constraints in 5 (where do the resources go?) Reach consensus on the moral principles that constrain inquiry Problems with ideal deliberators: Unlikely that deliberators will reach agreement at step 2 if the set of deliberators are truly diverse (voting can be arbitrary) consider Arrow's Theorem (establishes that there is NO way to aggregate entire groups preference in a way that reflects whole group) Tyranny of the minority (at step 5). If anyone and everyone has veto power, then moral permissibility dismisses a lot of research (if you need 100% consensus vote) What if the deliberators value the wrong things? Also encourages conservatism in values. Does not specify who the deliberators should be.

Ockham's Razor

Ockham's Razor states that if some idea can be done away with without subtracting anything from the current explanation, then such an idea should be disregarded. This means that ideas, which do not add anything to the current explanation, should be disregarded and the simpler explanation should be adopted instead. For Worrall, Ockham's Razor creates problems for religious claims like that of the existence of soul. This is because Worrall believes that not only has neurophysiology so far shown that there is no need for a soul to explain phenomena but also that the soul cannot be proven. Therefore, since doing away with the belief in a soul does not reduce our explanatory or predictive power in any way, Ockham's Razor implies doing away with the idea of the existence of a soul. → Prefer the theory that is, in some sense, the simplest. → Shave off the extra stuff → Used when science and religion make different claims. Worrall uses this to argue that religious views make scientific views but add extra supernatural or religious bits, so Worrall uses Ockhams Razor to say that those religious claims are being discredited by science.

Cumulativity of Science

Science is cumulative if it continually adds information to a big store of information, with none (or very small amounts) of it ever being removed. Popular Objection: Anomaly Argument Against Cumulativity "But if new theories are called forth to resolve anomalies in the relation of an existing theory in nature, then the successful new theory must somewhere permit predictions that are different from those derived from its predecessor. That difference could not occur if the two were logically compatible.

Vulgar Democracy

Scientific projects should be pursued just in case they would be favored by a majority vote of all citizens. Objection: bad information, tyranny of ignorant (won't have all the information), tyranny of the majority (neglected minority view) Related to ideal goals of well-ordered science. We subject every decision to a popular vote. This is where then the Problem of the Tyranny of the Ignorant would come into play again because so many people would be uninformed about a significant number of the things being voted on.

Enlightened Democracy

Scientific projects should be pursued just in case they would be favored by enlightened citizens who engage in ideal deliberations. Related to ideal goals of well-ordered science.

Peer Review

Suppose 75% of scientists support theory A, and 25% support theory B. Thus, journals recieve approximatelty three times

Holism about Testing

Test whether lake is specific temperature. Use thermometer. Confirmed using instrument. Does not conclusively determine whether the lake is that specific temperature. → The idea that you aren't testing one claim in isolation, but that you are testing a whole constellation of claims. → Ex. If you are testing the temperature of water and the thermometer shows that it's 58 degrees, there could be a lot of factors impacting the temperature of the water at the moment of testing that impacts the reading of the temperature, such as if the thermometer was warmer than the water and impacted the temperature of the water, or that the thermometer is not calibrated very well, etc. → Nothing is conclusively established when something is tested, because there is a larger network of claims involved.

Reflective Equilibrium

The "Reflective Equilibrium" method involves a constant negotiation between our intuitions (or particular instances we observe) and principles or theories that govern our observation, revising them in such a way that we can live with an acceptable coherence between them. Reflective equilibrium then answers Hume's problem of induction by showing that although inductive logic is not purely formal, we can justify good inductive inferences by adopting the "Reflective Equilibrium" method. "The method of reflective equilibrium consists in working back and forth among our considered judgments (some say our "intuitions") about particular instances or cases, the principles or rules that we believe govern them, and the theoretical considerations that we believe bear on accepting these considered judgments, principles, or rules, revising any of these elements wherever necessary in order to achieve an acceptable coherence among them." Example: Rule 1: Always tell the truth. Judgment: But that's not right when the Nazis ask you where Anne Frank is. . . Rule 2: Always tell the truth, unless doing so leads to something bad for someone. Judgment: But that allows me to lie if it will save me a bit of money. . . Rule 3: Always tell the truth, unless the the total consequences are better if you do not. Judgement: This means you can lie to someone on their deathbed in certain cases. . . okay, I can live with that.

Well-Ordered Science

The big question: When is science functioning well? When is it well-ordered? Classic answer: Science is well ordered when each scientist is individually rational. Each scientist pursues the hypotheses that are best supported by the evidence. Problems (conflicts with the classic answer): No context independent set of truths worth pursuing. Pursuit of truth can conflict with values we hold. Science consisting of individuals researching hypotheses best confirmed may not be efficient at discovering truth (need diversity in science, division of cognitive labor) Individuals cannot find significant truths by themselves. Kitcher's approach: 1. Identify goals of ideal scientific inquiry (come to an agreement on values BUT there are not objective values) Science's goal should be whatever is useful for all other goals. We need to be able to distinguish truth and use these truths for specific goals. 2. Identify the structural constraints necessary to obtain these goals. Kitcher wants a standard objective for values but doesn't know how it would work. Perfectly well ordered science is a science that 1) assigns resources to projects just as the ideal deliberators would 2) adopts the maximally effective strategies for completing the projects, and 3) translates the results from inquiry to practical applications in the way that the ideal deliberators (not researchers only, everyone gets a vote) would decide they should be applied.

Empiricism

We should only believe the empirically observable parts of scientific theories. Regarding the unobservables, we should remain agnostic about them. The argument is that when we inspect the historical record of inquiry, we find, however, that the past is littered with discarded theories whose proponents took them to be successful in just the ways we view our contemporary sciences. Therefore, we should only believe the observable parts of our theories. It's one of the important arguments against scientific realism. Empiricists hold that the only route to knowledge is through experience. Other claims may be meaningful even though they cannot be tested. Empiricists just believe that you cannot KNOW something unless it is tested/experimented, but if it cannot be tested, it is not rendered meaningless.

Hume's Problem of Induction

Who: David Hume Hume's Challenge: rationally justify inductive inferences. E.g., show that the good inductive inferences yield true conclusions from true premises most of the time, and the bad ones don't. Hume's Answer: Hume believes that inductive inferences are just habits of the mind. → Hume's problem of induction shows that there is no good way to justify inductive inferences. It ends up becoming a circular argument because you must rely on induction in order to prove induction. Formally, we can make the following argument: 1. To justify good inductive inference you must show that good inductive inferences are reliable (IIR). 2. To show IIR, you can either give a good deductive or good inductive argument for IIR. 3. There is no good deductive argument for IIR since IIR is (a) in part about unobserved things and (b) it is not a priori. 4. There is no good inductive argument for IIR since any good inductive argument depends on IIR. C. ∴ There is no way to justify good inductive inference. → Induction cannot be supported deductively, because the dilemma concerns contingent conclusions; that is, deductive arguments cannot prove anything that is not explicitly within the premises. Inductive arguments cannot be proved through inductive reasoning because it will always result in circular reasoning, which is a logical fallacy. This means there is no comprehensive theory for how inductions actually work or how they can be proved. Hume illuminated this problem when asked how he could know that bread that has nourished him in the past will also nourish him in the future. What motivation is there, other than relying on past experiences, to accept that the past will mirror the future? Things that are known contingently cannot be known in the future i.e synthetic truths, because nothing will support that claim other than relying upon past. Significance: This argument is important in the philosophy of science because it challenges conclusions arrived at through the method of induction.

Anomalies

Who: Discussed by Kuhn Meaning: Observations and evidence that don't fit in with or go against what the current scientific theory was predicting. Significance: They are important in the philosophy of science because Kuhn uses them to show that anomalies cause a breakdown in normal science, until such that they can't be ignored anymore leading to a scientific revolution if accompanied by an alternative paradigm. 1. Paradigms are necessary for the discovery of anomalies. 2. Discovery of anomalies are necessary for crises. 3. Crises are necessary for the adoption of new theories. 4. Thus, paradigms are necessary for the adoption of new theories.

Pragmatic Justification of Induction

Who: Hans Reichenbach Meaning: Relying on inductive inference will work if anything will. (Hans Reichenbach) → Ex. You're taken into a locked room with a device with three lights on it. Either all, some, or none of the lights will come on. You must choose one light. If that light comes on, you live; otherwise you die. Extra info: neither 1 nor 3 will come on without 2 coming on. What is reasonable to choose? 1. Nature is uniform enough for induction to be reliable. • If this is true, then IIR is true. We should use inductive arguments. 2. Nature is not uniform enough for induction to be reliable. . . (a) . . . but some other method will work. • This isn't a real possibility. If some other method works, then at least one inductive argument will work. (b) . . . and no other method will work. • If this is true, then there is no hope. Nothing will work Significance: We have a reason to use inductive inferences. The reason isn't that they're right. Maybe they aren't going to work but if they won't nothing will work. Basically, it's the best method we have.

Normal Science

Who: Introduced by Kuhn. Meaning: Normal science is tasks or operations that concern most scientists. That is most scientific tasks don't offer novel discoveries, but simply fill in parts of the current theory. For example: Investigation of a class of facts the paradigm says will be particularly revealing of the nature of things. e.g: specific gravities of materials, conductivity of materials, boiling points of liquids. Investigation of how to bring a theory into contact with observations. E.g. Atwood machine, Large Hadron Collider Investigation aimed at better articulating the paradigm theory. e.g.: finding the gravitational constant, finding the charge of the electron, finding the means by which hereditary features are passed down This is important because Kuhn uses "Normal Science" and contrasts it with the anomalies that begin to occur than finally lead to scientific revolutions and paradigm shifts.

Informational Encapsulation

Who: Jerry Fodor (comes from his idea of modularity of mind) Meaning: Observation (i.e. visual, audible, language) are not impacted by theory. This idea comes from Fodor's modularity of mind. Refers to the way the mind categorizes information. Information is sorted in the mind in different compartments. Encapsulation refers to the restricted movement of information across modular borders. Separate compartments in the brain. His conclusions from this are that observations, or our perceptual parts of the brain, are independent of the parts of the brain that handle theories. So, he says, observations are theory neutral. input---> sensory organs ----> His idea follows a line of thought that originates in routes to belief. Fodor distinguishes between types of conclusions; those we draw from direct observation, and those we draw from inferential experiences. The first kind of belief is much reliable than the latter. However, there are times when optical illusions deceive us, like in the Muller-Lyre. We all know that the lines are equal length, however, it still appears that A is longer than B upon first glance. Because it still appears to be longer, we can deduce that perceptual modules are informationally encapsulated, and that how a person conceives the world is independent of the theories that person holds. Meaning, observations are theory neutral. Significance: Scientists see things in experiments and investigations that are not impacted by theories or outside knowledge. Our visual perception will function the same, so everyone will be viewing the same observations. Example: The Muller-Lyre, where even though we are aware of the theory and how the direction of the end arrows change our perception, it does not alter how we observe the length of the lines. Objections/Related Arguments: → Paul Churchland's argument → Things can be learned over time

Goodman's New Riddle of Induction

Who: John Goodman Meaning/Significance: Shows how there are no formal rules of induction. Instead Goodman suggests that inductions work through a negotiation between the induction rules and the results of the inference. He says, "a rule is amended if it yields an inference we are unwilling to accept; an inference is rejected if it violates a rule we are unwilling to amend." Goodman's New Riidle is thought to be interesting for two main reasons: It seems to show that inductive logic is not purely formal It raises a puzzle: what distinguishes the "good" terms (like green and blue) from the "bad" terms (like grue and bleen)? Example? → Hypothetico-Deductivism: If H implies E, then E confirms H. → Special Consequence Condition: If E confirms H, then E confirms everything that H implies. → Problem: That a card is the Jack of Hearts implies that it is red; thus, that it is red confirms that it is the Jack of Hearts. That the card is the Jack of Hearts implies that the card is a Jack. So, H-D + SCC says that the fact that a card is red confirms that the card is a Jack. Significance: This is important because it gives a justification for using inductive inferences while not committing to formal rules of induction

Popper's Falsificationism

Who: Karl Popper Meaning: A theory is scientific if and only if it has the potential to be refuted by some possible observation. (Scientific → Falsifiable and Falsifiable → Scientific). Significance: This is important in the philosophy of science because it's one way of answering the demarcation question of what separates science from non-science. Objections: → In the statements formed "some f's are g's" (ex. some ravens are black) you can't really falsify them since it says "some" unless you could prove that NONE existed. → Probabilistic theories are not falsifiable. Ex. there is a 90% chance it will rain tomorrow. You can't show this to be false. → Almost any theory is false with cleverly chosen background assumptions. → Holism about Testing shows that scientific theories can be maintained in spite of any observation by blaming the background assumptions. → If we believe claim (F), the following falsifiable claim (S) would be considered scientific: "There is a man called Santa Claus who loves the color red so he makes everything red on Christmas". However, we can intuitively sense that claim (S) is not a scientific claim. Claim (S) then shows that falsifiability is not a sufficient criterion for science since a claim can be falsifiable - like claim (S) - but not scientific. Related: Falsificationism*: A way of handling a theory is scientific iff it is held up to a refutation by observation, and then rejected if the observations tell against it

Different Worlds Thesis

Who: Kuhn Meaning: Extreme version: As paradigms change, the world literally changes. Mild version: There is no theory-neutral observation; as paradigms change, there is a change in the basic evidence that scientist have. It is as if they live in different worlds. Proposed by Kuhn. Start about by the normal view of science. Scientists before and after a paradigm change live in different worlds. The extreme view is that they actually live in different worlds. Whereas, the weaker view is that it is as if they live in different worlds. Perceptual Argument For DWT 1. "What a man sees depends both upon what he looks at and also upon what his previous visual-conceptual experience has taught him to see." (113) 2. The world is what you see. 3. ∴ What the world is like depends on what your paradigm is. External Standard Argument For DWT 1. "Unless there were an external standard with respect to which a switch of vision could be demonstrated, no conclusion about alternate perceptual possibilities could be drawn." (114) 2. There is no external standard with respect to which a switch of vision could be demonstrated across paradigm changes. 3. ∴ No conclusion about alternate perceptual possibilities can be drawn. 4. ". . . in the absence of some recourse to that hypothetical fixed nature that he "saw differently," the principle of economy will urge us to say that after [a paradigm change, the scientist] worked in a different world." (118) 5. ∴ After paradigm changes, scientists work in different worlds. Ease of Discovery Argument For DWT 1. Before a paradigm change, new discoveries are hard to come by. 2. After a paradigm change, new discoveries come quickly and easily. 3. This is best explained by the hypothesis that the world changes with paradigm changes. 4. ∴ The world changes with paradigm changes. The Contrasting View: all scientists at all times have the same basic evidence; scientific change occurs when the same evidence is categorized in new and better ways.

Paradigm

Who: Kuhn Meaning: The concept of paradigm in science was introduced and popularized by Thomas Kuhn. He uses it to show how scientific revolutions entail a paradigm shift. → A paradigm (in the broad sense) is the entire cluster of problems, methods, theoretical principles, metaphysical assumptions, concepts, and evaluative standards that are present to some degree or other in a mature scientific community (i.e., the way of doing that kind of science). → A paradigm (in the narrow sense) is a concrete achievement in science that is unprecedented, attracts other scientists, and is sufficiently open-ended so as to permit elaboration (e.g., Newton's mechanics, Franklin's theory of electricity, Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection, Copernicus's heliocentric model of the solar system). Two Features: 1. Unprecedented achievement. 2. Open-ended. Significance: 1. Paradigms are necessary for the discovery of anomalies. 2. Discovery of anomalies are necessary for crises. 3. Crises are necessary for the adoption of new theories. 4. Thus, paradigms are necessary for the adoption of new theories.

Holism about Meaning

Who: Kuhn and Quine Concept 1 (Kuhn) Holism about Meaning: The meaning of a term is determined by its structural role in a language. 1. Newtonians and Einsteinians make different, incompatible claims about mass. 2. A term's meaning is determined by its structural role in language. C. ∴ Newtonians and Einsteinians mean something different by 'mass'. This is important in the philosophy of science because it says that comparing current scientific theory with a previous scientific theory is incompatible. Godfrey-Smith's Objection: we should see evidence of failures of communication in the history of science, but we don't. Concept 2 (W.V.O Quine) Statements are tested in big bunches, rather than one-by-one by simple observations. Example. Suppose you look at a thermometer to test that the water in glass A is warmer than the water in glass B. It reads 75 for glass A and 65 for glass B. What other statements must be held true if this test is to verify that the water in A is warmer than the water in B? You'd have to check that water didn't change, accuracy of thermometers, and 85>75. It is used as an objection against logical positivism. How?

Lakatos's Answer to the Demarcation Question

Who: Lakatos Meaning: A research program is scientific if [?] and only if it has stunning, unexpected successful predictions. (Scientific → Prediction and Prediction → Scientific). → Focuses on research programmes rather than theories. → Hard Core (Newton's laws of motion, gravitation; Claim that species are related by descent and gradual evolution) → Protective Belt/Heuristic (Claims about matter, measuring devices, mathematical techniques; Claims about the specific relationships between species, dating methods) Example: For example, the Newtonian programme led to novel facts; the Marxian lagged behind the facts and has been running fast to catch up with them Objection: Lucky success, e.g., astrological prediction, Nostradamus. (Objection to: Prediction → Scientific.). This would be science on Lakatos's criteria. Significance: It is important in the philosophy of science to settle upon the nature of science. Helps us distinguish between what hypotheses/claims/statements should be considered scientific or non-scientific.

Verifiability Theory of Meaning

Who: Largely upheld by (Logical) Positivists Only applies to synthetic statements "The meaning of a synthetic statement is completely captured by the way in which you can observationally test the truth of the statement." If you can't do this at least in principle, then it's meaningless to talk about such statements. VTM is only applied to synthetic statements. 1. If VTM is false, then there is a meaningful description of a situation that cannot be tested. 2. If situation is describable, then it can be tested whether or not that situation occurs. 3. ∴ If VTM is false, then there is a situation whose occurrence can be tested and cannot be tested. 4. It is impossible for there to be a situation whose occurrence can be tested and cannot be tested. C. ∴ VTM is true. → Suppose that testability is in practice: Then "there are mountains on the far side of the moon" was meaningless before the 19050's. → Conclusion: Positivism/VTM is too strong → Suppose that testability is in principle: Then almost everything is testable, and so almost everything is meaningful. → Conclusion: Positivism/VTM is too weak.

The Millian Argument for Free Inquiry

Who: Mill The Millian Argument: "When dissenters' positions are prevented exposure in high-impact journals and excluded from conferences, the dominant side goes unchallenged, and eventually its rationale is forgotten, forestalling the evolution of crucial ideas." "We have now recognized the necessity to the mental well-being of mankind (on which all their other well-being depends) of freedom of opinion, and freedom of expression of opinion, on four distinct grounds. . . "First, if any opinion is compelled to silence, that opinion may, for aught we can certainly know, be true. To deny this is to assume our own infallibility. "Secondly, though the silenced opinion be an error, it may, and very commonly does, contain a portion of truth; and since the general or prevailing opinion on any subject is rarely or never the whole truth, it is only by the collision of adverse opinions that the remainder of the truth has any chance of being supplied. "Thirdly, even if the received opinion be not only true, but the whole truth; unless it is suffered to be, and actually is, vigorously and earnestly contested, it will, by most of those who receive it, be held in the manner of a prejudice, with little comprehension or feeling of its rational grounds. And not only this, but, fourthly, the meaning of the doctrine itself will be in danger of being lost, or enfeebled, and deprived of its vital effect on the character and conduct: the dogma becoming a mere formal profession, inefficacious for good, but cumbering the ground, and preventing the growth of any real and heartfelt conviction, from reason or personal experience."

Strong Operationalism

Who: Operationalism outlook is better associated with B.F. Skinner and Percy Bridgman Meaning (of Strong Operationalism): replacing a scientific term/concept C with a description of the operation for measuring C results in sentences that are equivalent. → The meaning of the term is the way of measuring it. e.g: x has length n would be described as the following under strong operationalism: when a tape measure is stretched along the length of x, it reads n). The problem with this as Hempel points out is an explosion of concepts, so we can't talk about things in some unified way which science aspires to do. → Operationalism views that primitive terms should be observational. → It implies Operationalism+ → Operationalism is used for scientific terms, whereas VTM is used for all terms. Related/Objections: → Weak Operationalism: a scientific term/concept C is meaningless unless there is at least some way of measuring whether C is present. → Strong Operationalism+: (i) Replacing a scientific term/concept C with a description of the operation for measuring C results in sentences that are equivalent, and (ii) for any operations if it is possible that they give different measurements, then the operations define different concepts. Objection: One notable feature of science is that it unifies diverse phenomena, and Strong Operationalism betrays this. 1. If Strong Operationalism is true, then there are not multiple ways of getting at the same concept. 2. If there are not multiple ways of getting at the same concept, then science cannot systematize and unify phenomena. 3. Science can (and does) systematize and unify phenomena. C. ∴ Strong Operationalism is false

Phlogiston

Who: Priestly upheld the phlogiston theory; Lavoisier used Priestley's methods and found different conclusions. Meaning: Often used by Kuhn as an example to demonstrate paradigm shifts. The phlogiston theory is an obsolete scientific theory that postulated that a fire-like element called phlogiston is contained within combustible bodies and released during combustion. Significance: → This was a direct competitor to Lavoisier's oxygen theory at the time and is just one example of how science changes over time. → Kuhn also used this example to demonstrate that the discovery of something is not a singular event. → Kuhn also questions if Lavoisier particularly discovered oxygen because: he did not have the same understanding of oxygen that we do now and further questions if our understanding of oxygen now is render bogus if a new understanding of oxygen come up in 2060. → Also demonstrates how observation evidence influences theory and is influenced by theory. Objections/Related arguments: → Kitcher argues that the unanimous "jumping off ship" from the phlogiston theory is not ideal in the colelctive practice of science. → Some competition between theories is good → Evidence for the "superior" theory is not infallible.

Inductive Justification of Induction

Why should we trust inductive inferences? Because they've worked so far. Hume's worry is that it's just circular. You're taking for granted the very inference you want to defend.

The Problem of the Tyranny of the Ignorant

→ What you end up getting in a pure democracy (like voting) is that within the majority, there are a huge number of uninformed voters so they vote for policies that do not make sense or are not the logical response. If that same type of democracy was transferred into science, there would be a similar problem. → If I were to be asked to vote on what action to take in Syria, what I voted on may not be the most logical thing to do because I am not informed enough about the situation and relevant information.

The Problem of Inadequate Representation

Think about the birth control option (why are there only female birth control options and not male ones)

Prediction Markets

study

The Wisdom of Crowds

study

Demarcation Question

→ What makes something scientific rather than non-scientific? → we want an answer that is normatively relevant. → We want a criterion that provides necessary and sufficient conditions. → Ex: If x is scientific then x has feature P. (Scientific → P) If x has feature P then x is scientific. (P → Scientific) What Should an Answer to the DQ Look Like? 1. Provides epistemically relevant features that accurately distinguish intuitive cases of science from intuitive cases of non-science. 2. Provides necessary and sufficient conditions. 3. Is based on solid reasons, since the science/non-science distinction is used in important ways. Laudan's Positive View There are two independent questions we might ask of claims or theories: 1. Are the claims/theories scientific? 2. What is the epistemic standing of those claims? → Epistemic demarcation criteria versus semantic demarcation criteria: Epistemic criteria would be based on knowledge and semantic criteria would be based on language. Semantic criteria would question things like "can the statement be tested"? → Significance: It is important in the philosophy of science to settle upon the nature of science. Helps us distinguish between what hypotheses/claims/statements should be considered scientific or non-scientific. Possible Answers to DQ: Aristotle: A claim is scientific iff it (a) is established with certainty, and (b) it explains by revealing the true causes of phenomena. Method: A claim is scientific iff it is based on the scientific method. Verifiability/Falsifiability: A claim is scientific iff it is verifiable/falsifiable. Well-Tested: A claim is scientific iff it is well-tested. Progress: A body of knowledge is scientific iff it is consistently making progress. Cumulative: A theory is scientific iff it accounts for all (or most) of what earlier theories accounted for.