Philosophy of the mind

What is the causal closure of the physical (also known as the causal completeness of the physical)?

"Every physical event that had a cause is caused by an event that is fully physical. In other words, there are no non-physical causes of physical events." o "Highly confirmed by modern science" - examples of continental formation and rust accumulation as "systems of physical objects operating under physical laws." Can a bodily motion (raising the hand) be similarly explained? o Closure thesis follows from (i) the conservation of energy and (ii) the relation between causation and energy transfer. -The relation in (ii): "Causation requires energy transfer" - examples of kinetic energy transfer in the rock dropped in water and thermal energy transfer in boiling water. -The principle in (i) holds that there can be increases of energy only in regions of the universe - example of the earth warming as the sun cools. -Nonphysical causes of physical events would transfer energy into the universe, contra (i).

What is idealism?

"Everything is either a mind or something that depends on a mind." On this position, there can be many minds. (By contrast, panpsychists say that everything has a mind.)

What is the purpose of the Chinese room experiment?

"No matter how much a computer's outward behavior might resemble a human's it will never have genuine intelligence or understanding." -Searle challenges the idea that intelligence is at its most basic level following instructions. -However sophisticated the interface, all that is taking place is input-output matching. Note the relevance of multiple realizability here.

How would you apply the distinct property results to the case of pain and c-fibres firing?

"The two distinct referring expressions are 'pain' and 'c-fibres-firing.'" What distinct properties could plausibly be associated with these distinct expressions? In the case of 'c-fibers' firing, the relevant property is some electrochemical property detected via scientific methods. And plausibly, the crucial property associated with the term 'pain' is the subjective painfulness of pain - a pain quale. But here's the problem: If a pain quale is distinct from neuro-scientifically specifiable electrochemical properties, then that's property dualism."

Eliminative materialism says we should "eliminate talk of mental entities ... in attempting to truly describe what exists in the universe." This program of elimination can be directed at ______ ______ or some limited range of _______ ________.

"anything mental" or "some limited range of mental phenomena."

The reasons that Davidson gives for preferring token-physicalism to type-physicalism are tightly connected with the reasons why his monism is "anomalous." Reasoning that Davidson develops in favor of anomalous monism grows from an attempt to resolve what seems to be a conflict between three independently plausible propositions. What are these 3 propositions?

(1) "mental causation," (2) "nomic subsumption," and (3) "the anomalism of the mental."

What are 3 arguments for substance dualism?

(1) Leibniz's law arguments, (2) explanatory gap arguments, and (3) modal arguments.

How would you describe how mental causation, nomic subsumption, and the anomalism of the mental support anomalous monism?

(i) Mental causation: Mental events cause physical events, and enter into other causal relationships. (ii) Nomic (=having to do with laws) subsumption: "For each instance of one event causing another, there is some description of those events under which there is a law that events of the one type cause events of the other type." In other words, a causal relation is not a one-off event. If A really causes B then there is some principle to the effect that it does so. In this principle A and B must be described in suitably general terms. Example: description of a window-breaking baseball in terms of mass, velocity, momentum, instead of in terms of my uncle's having owned it. (There is no strict - exceptionless - law "relating ball movements to their colors." Note the bull example.) (iii) The anomalism of the mental: "The only strict laws are found in physics ... One important kind of description that fails to subsume events under strict laws is mentalistic or psychological description, such as descriptions of an event as being an episode of believing or desiring." So "there are no strict laws that relate events in terms of their being an episode of believing or desiring." The latter point is related to the Geach-Chisholm objection to behaviorism Accordingly, "whatever law related belief to action will not be a strict law." -If (ii) and (iii) are true then (i) would seem to be false. -The problem seems to be resolved by token-physicalism. "Mental events do enter into causal relations. They just don't enter into causal relations under their mental descriptions, but only under their physical descriptions."

What are the 3 problems of Mental Causation?

(i) Mental events cause non-mental events. (ii) Non-mental events cause mental events. o Intention to buy pizza " going to a pizzeria. o First bite is too hot " pain receptors are activated and a state of pain results. • (iii) Mental events cause other mental events. • Here we are most interested in the first of the three relationships. o Its cultural importance -- plays a major role in determining criminality in cause of death cases (self-defense or attempted theft?). o Eyewitness evidence at trial show the cultural importance of the second.

What is The Turing test?

- Designed to bypass factors irrelevant to intelligence (such as physical appearance). -The test involves "multiple conversations via a text-based interface ... with multiple participants, one of which is a machine." The machine passes the test if it is indistinguishable from the humans involved in the procedure. -If it passes the test then it qualifies as intelligent.

What is Max Black's "distinct property" argument?

-"Consider the a posteriori identity statement, "The morning star is the evening star" [in other words, the planet Venus presents itself both in the evening sky and the morning sky.] -The two referring phrases "the morning star" and "the evening star" both refer to Venus. -But they do so via different properties of Venus: • "The property of being a bright heavenly object ... in the morning." • "The property of being a bright heavenly object ... in the evening." -The example illustrates this point: "The key factor allowing an identity statement to be a posteriori is something about how the two different referring ... expressions are each related to their referent ... <so> there always have to be two distinct properties associated with every a posteriori identity statement."

How does the zombie argument post against functionalism?

-"If functionalism [physicalism in general] is true then it is impossible for there to be two beings exactly alike functionally but differing in that only one of them is a zombie." [In other words, it is impossible to be in a functional state claimed to be a particular experience, and yet not be having that experience.] -"It is conceivable that two beings are alike functionally but only one of them is a zombie." [In other words, it is conceivable that something could be in a functional state claimed to be a particular experience, and yet not be having that experience.] -"If something is conceivable, then it is possible." -"[Therefore,] functionalism [physicalism in general] is false." o The third premise is controversial. [It works against analytic functionalists, because they are claiming to establish what mental state terms actually mean.] o In particular, analytic functionalism cannot easily contest it: - "If analytic functionalism is true, then it is inconceivable that two beings can be alike functionally but differ in that only one of them is a zombie." -"It is conceivable for there to be two beings exactly alike functionally but differing in that only on of them is a zombie." -"[Therefore,] analytic functionalism is false." o "Empirical functionalism, in contrast, is less vulnerable to such considerations."

Danial Dennett wants to quine (to deny the existence or significance of) qualia with what kind of argument?

-(P1) If qualia exist, then they are things that have properties W, X, Y and Z. -(P2) Nothing has properties W, X, Y and Z. (C) Qualia do not exist.

What is a finite state machine?

-A finite state machine (=can only be in one of a finite number of states at a given time). -The transitions between states are "controlled by a finite look-up table" which "specifies what, for any given state the machine is in, its next state should be." -The machine "controls a read/write head that can move back and forth along an infinite tape and read, write, and erase symbols on that tape." -[Example instructions: "If machine reads 0 on current square then erase and replace with 1 and move two squares to the right" ... "If machine reads 1 on current on current square then erase and replace with 0 and move one square to the left."] -[Note that this is intended to model the human action of solving a math problem on paper.]

What is a Turing machine?

-A thought experiment to model a computing machine that could follow an effective procedure.

What are some examples of eliminated posit theories?

-Caloric (theory of heat) -Élan vital (theory of life) -Phlogiston (theory of combustion) -Luminiferous ether (theory of electromagnetism) o Propositional attitudes are likewise posits [=hypothesized theoretical entities] of an outdated theory: folk psychology.

Why is the causal closure theory a problem for substance dualists?

-Its prior form was raised against Descartes by Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia: the problem of interaction. o Causal closure suggests another form of the problem: if "nothing mental is also physical, then it follows that nothing that has a cause has a mental cause." • The problem for property dualists: o Property efficacy: "With respect to the pane's shattering, causally efficacious properties of the ball include its mass and velocity, but not its color or its history of owners." o The causal closure thesis suggests that "everything that is caused to happen happens solely because of physical properties ...The only efficacious properties are physical properties." o So "nothing ever happens because of mental properties." o This is the point about epiphenomenalism discussed in chapter 3: consider the quale pain when stubbing your toe; "You are not crying or swearing because of the painfulness of the pain."

What did the Chinese room experiment involve (what happened)?

-Searles sits in a Chinese room. The room has slots for processing cards with Chinese symbols, and instructional books for processing these cards which give rules in English for "what cards to send out of the room in response to cards sent into the room." -"The room will thus pass a Turing test for Chinese comprehension." But Searles does not understand Chinese. o Summary of argument: -If strong AI is true then running the Chinese-understanding program implies an understanding of Chinese. -But Searle can run that program without understanding Chinese. -So strong AI is false.

Different Turing machines "have different look-up tables." A universal Turing machine "can emulate the behaviour of any other Turing machine" by incorporating the content of its look-up table into its own. [In other words, is a machine designed to perform a wider and wider range of tasks. It thus models an extensive rule-processing ability.] What did turing prove by this?

-With this model Turing proved that there is no effective procedure for determining provability. -But he also proved that "anything that can be computed can be computed by a universal Turing machine The Turing machine models following "rules to read and write symbols and thus arrive at the solution to a problem." -[So it seems to represent the most basic structure of intelligent behavior, and Turing naturally wondered whether an apparatus build according to this model would actually be intelligent.]

What are the 3 arguments for Propositional Attitude Eliminative Materialism?

1. "Folk psychology is a stagnant research program." 2. "Folk psychology is committed to propositional attitudes having a sentential structure that is unsupported by neuroscientific research." 3. "Folk psychology makes commitments to features of mental states that lead to an unacceptable epiphenomenalism."

Is there a property possessed by the mind, but not by the body (or, indeed, by any physical object)? Or vice versa - a property possessed by the body but not the mind? • Five proposals are considered. The Law can be applied in each case. What are these laws?

1. According to Descartes, physical bodies are spatial and minds are not. Do minds have spatial parts - is a belief in one part of the mind and not another? A belief's being about something spatially located does not make it spatially located. Compare the false sense of located pain (phantom limb example). ◦ 2. According to Descartes, minds think and physical bodies do not, where thinking is understood as reasoning. ◦ 3. We think about things - we achieve intentionality in relation to them. The strangeness of intentionality: thinking about non-experienceable things (too far away for light to reach), non-present things (past and future), non-existent things (20-foot dog) and impossible things (four-sided triangles). Could something purely physical achieve intentionality? ◦ 4. Only mental substances can have phenomenal properties (sensory experiences: pain of stubbing a toe, taste of lemon - i.e., qualia). "There is something it is like to be a conscious human being biting into a lemon." We can even have hallucinatory phenomenal properties. ◦ 5. Sensory-based claims about physical objects can always be incorrect. But some claims you might make about your own mind - such as that it exists - must be correct. [In other words, your insight into the features of a sensory experience you are having right now is totally reliable in a way that your insight into the features of the world around you is not. That means there is something fundamentally different between your mind and the world around you.]

What are some main points about the history of functionalism?

1. Aristotle (384-322 BC): o The form of a thing is that which allows it to perform its function (examples of sword, eye). o It is an inseparable aspect of a thing (correlative to matter). Note the distinction between Aristotle and Plato on this point. o For Aristotle, the soul is the form of the body, and as such inseparable from it. o "If the eye were an animal then sight would be its soul." 2. Hobbes (1588-1679): -Espouses "a mechanistic view of living systems including humans." Suggests that automata have artificial life. -Held a "computational view of cognition" in which he described reasoning as "nothing but reckoning, that is adding and subtracting, of the consequences of general names agreed upon for the marking and signifying of our thoughts." 3. Twentieth-century functionalism: -From behaviourism, inherits "an emphasis on the important relations between mental states and behavior. -From mind-brain identity theory, inherits "an emphasis on mental states as being distinct from behaviors." -From artificial intelligence research, inherits "the view that mental states can equally be had by creatures with brains and entities controlled by non-brainy machines."

Dennett's argument involves two thought experiments, what are they?

1. Consider the case of hating beer when first drinking it, and then liking it after drinking it some more. • Say the flavor quale changes (otherwise it would still be distasteful). • That means the flavor quale is relative to something external - the number of times we have tasted beer. • But if the judgement about the flavor quale is changing then the flavor quale is in some way relative to the propositional attitude "desiring that." 2. Consider the case of two people who come to dislike a brand of coffee. One says that it tastes the same, but that they don't "enjoy that taste any more." The other says that the taste has changed. • How can we tell which has changed, the flavor quale or the judgement about it? • If there is a factual answer to this question then (presumably) there would be "some empirical test to ascertain this." But the presence of such a test would bring into question the claim that the quale is directly knowable. • If there is not a factual answer to this question then direct knowability is again brought into question.

What are the advantages of the mind brain identity theory? (3 theories that it has advantage over)

1. Dualisms: Epiphenomenalism, the interaction problem, exceptions to laws of physics. Substance and property dualism lead to epiphenomenalism and serious problems concerning mind-body interaction. Further, they make exceptions to the scientific worldview whereby everything is bound by the laws of physics. 2. Idealism and the related theories of solipsism and panpsychism are deeply contrary to common sense. Unlike idealism and solipsism, identity theory takes a more commonsensical approach to existence. There are many physical objects that exist independently of our minds because our minds are just our brains and there are many physical objects that exist besides brains. Unlike panpsychism, which draws no strict division between physical systems that have minds and physical systems that do not, identity theory is able to draw a strict division. Physical systems lacking brains thereby lack minds. 3. Behaviorism: Challenges intuition that some mental states cause behavior. Behaviorism doesn't preserve the commonsense idea that many of our mental states are causes of behaviors.

What are 3 advantages of the mind-brain identity theory over duelism?

1. How can the mind move the body? In the usual way physical things are moved by other physical things. 2. Why are qualia causally efficacious? For the same reason - thus avoiding the problem of epiphenomenalism. 3. Why does my mind affect my body? Because my brain is connected to it.

What are 4 properties "traditionally attributed to qualia"?

1. Ineffable: Not describable in language. Smith and Jones say the same things about their red qualia, and cannot express what is different about their qualia. 2. Intrinsic: Independent "of any relations it bears to any other object." (Contrast "parent", a relational property which is extrinsic.) Smith and Jones behave the same way relative to their environment and each other, showing their qualia to be non-relational. 3. Private: "Only you can have knowledge of your qualia." (If others could, they would be public.) First person vs. third person point of view. 4. Directly knowable: "Your knowledge of your qualia is not in any way mediated." Compare our knowledge of scientific posits (such as electrons) via instruments and theory to interpret the instruments.

What are two key ideas about kinds (=groupings in terms of shared feature(s))?

1. Multiply realizable kind: diamonds (=tetrahedral lattices of carbon atoms vs. mousetraps). Contrast with mousetraps. 2. Functional kinds are defined as such by what they do and are characterized by multiple realizability. Mousetraps are an example. -Computers are an example. They are defined by "reading and writing rules in a rule-governed way" (=computing), and can be variously constructed (transistors, gears). -Mind can be thought of in terms of software, which "can be run on physically distinct computers ... A program is not identical to the activity of a particular computer."

What are the two responses to the Chinese room experiment?

1. Systems reply: -The room with its contents as a whole understands Chinese. -Searle replies that he can make himself be essentially equivalent to the room by memorizing all the rules (by rote). Of course he would still not understand Chinese. 2. Robot reply: -The Chinese Room argument works for disembodied rule-following. -If the room functioned as the brain in a robot, the robot would have genuine understanding. [Note the behavioristic quality of this response.] -Symbols need to be grounded by being connected to "the behaviors of a body and, through that, to items in the body's environment."

Localization studies have partially mapped functions onto different regions of the cortex; what are the two main subsections and what do they do?

1. The posterior section is dedicated to sensory processing, especially visual. 2. The anterior section is dedicated to motor processing and executive functions ("planning and control of voluntary behaviors").

What are the 4 steps of the argument from analogy?

1. You know your own mind and mental states. 2. You note a correlation between your mental states (happiness, sadness, belief that 2+2=4) and certain behaviors (smiling, frowning, saying that 2+2=4). 3. You note that there are other human bodies that exhibit the same behaviors. 4. You make an analogical inference from this similarity to a similarity of mental states.

What are three main arguments for panpsychism?

1.An analogy is drawn between nonhumans and humans to expose behavioural similarities. 2.The principle that nothing can come from nothing is invoked. 3.An evolutionary argument is proposed which challenges the demarcation between beings with minds and beings without minds.

What is a category mistake?

A category mistake is the mistake of treating something that belongs in one logical or conceptual category as if it belongs in another.

What is a hasty generalization?

A claim about all peanuts is a generalization about peanuts, and in basing his generalization on only a small amount of evidence, George is making a hasty generalization. Given the Cartesian assumption that you only have direct access to your own mental states, the only mind you "observe" is your own mind. But there are billions of human beings alive on the planet Earth. The crucial flaw of the argument from analogy is that it is making a generalization about what must be true of billions of people based on "observable" correlations between the behaviors and mental states of only one person.

What is A priori identity vs. a posteriori identity? And how do we apply distinction to identity?

A priori knowledge (like mathematics) does not depend on sensory experience. A posteriori knowledge does. Putting this very roughly, we can say that the distinction concerns kinds of knowledge and that a priori knowl- edge is knowledge one can obtain prior to having a sensory experience whereas a posteriori knowledge is knowledge one can obtain only by having a sensory experience. -White House example: "How many people are in the White House right now? ... Is it true of the number of people in the White House that it is either equal to or greater than zero?" In the first case the knowledge sought is a posteriori. In the second case it is a priori. Applying the distinction to identity: "The murderer of Jones is the owner of the grocery store" vs. "The murderer of Jones is the murderer of Jones." Another example: "The oldest son of Sandra Mandik is identical to the oldest male offspring of Sandra Mandik." o Key thesis based on above points: All "identity statements relating mind and brain are a posteriori identity statements." For example, "Pain is identical to c-fibers firing" is not a priori, and not obvious, based on meanings." It is similar to other cases requiring scientific investigation: -"Water is identical to H2O"

What is a synapse?

A synapse "is the site of connection between a neuron and another cell via which the neuron relays" an electrical or chemical "signal to the target cell." o The signal is called an "action potential," "nerve impulse" or "spike," and the neuron is said to "fire" when it generates it.

Connectionist representations "cannot be_______ in any one part" of the network.

A: localized For example, information for facial recognition does not encode information for one face in a single neuron, but does so via distributed representation.

Each kind of functionalism can be viewed as a theory of mental states wherein mental state definitions are descriptions of what?

A: the roles those states play [in other words, of the functions they perform]. o Some roles that a mental state plays are essential to it. -For example, the current mental state of thinking is not essentially characterized by its playing the role of keeping my mind off an impending dental appointment. -It is essentially characterized by the role it plays of being about something and being stimulated by perceptual inputs (such as perceptual inputs about what I am doing now - "writing this paragraph," for example).

According to the multiple realizability argument, are minds and mental states more like water or more like drinking vessels?

According to the multiple realizability argument, they are more like drinking vessels. -Compare the nervous system of an octopus with that of a human; the neural type corresponding to pain in the former can be expected to differ from the one corresponding to pain in the latter. But both feel pain. -[Even more dramatically, consider a silicon-based alien who feels pain. Then consider a computer ...] -[If there is no neural type corresponding to the type pain then identity theory is false.]

What are the mind-brain identity advantages over idealism, solipsism, and panpsychism?

Advantages over idealism, solipsism and panpsychism: o Against idealism and solipsism, identity theory holds that minds are physical things among other physical things. o Against panpsychism, identity theory is able to distinguish physical systems that do have minds (ones that have brains) from ones that do not. • Ockham's Razor: o The Razor prefers identity theory over dualism. Cutting out the unnecessary things

Why is Folk psychology a stagnant research program?

After thousands of years, folk psychology has failed to make progress in explaining a significant number of issues. Examples: -Sleeping, dreaming. -Head traumas affecting memory but not language. -Mental illness such as schizophrenia. -"Why can't you tickle yourself?" -The size of the full moon at the horizon "even though there's no change in the size of the optical image that reaches the eye." o Abandonment is the typical response to inert research programs

What does Intellectualism about behavior mean?

Any act that anyone does intelligently must be preceded by some episode of thinking."

What is the arguement again the explanatory gap (property dualism)?

Argument: If qualia are identical with physical properties then they should be solely explainable in terms of them by some scientific theory. There can never be such a theory. So qualia are not identical to any physical properties - they are non-physical. o Back to Leibniz's thought experiment. You would be seeing neural events, but not consciousness.

What is the problem of consciousness?

Beyond the problem of explaining thought, there is the problem of explaining conscious sensations (=qualia). What about conscious sensations like a feeling of pain or a visual sensation of a bright shade of red? How can a mechanical or physical system have those aspects of mentality most distinctive of con- sciousness? Some philosophers have held that those aspects of consciousness, like the quale that goes along with seeing a bright shade of red, will never be explained by any kind of physical process. Some philosophers hold that there's an explanatory gap—no matter how much you may know about the physical processes in some creature's brain, you'll never be able to explain why there's a red sensation versus either a green sensation or no sensation at all.

What the arguments against LOT?

By contrast, "the language of thought hypothesis seems committed to a thesis of discrete physical implementation." Refrigerator magnet comparison. "If that means ... there are spatially distinct portions of the brain for distinct representations, then that is a hypothesis for which we have little direct evidence." There is no evidence of "a CATS brain chunk," and brain chunks are not just "moved around." - "Many adherents of LOT regard connectionism as not ... offering a genuine alternative. They see connectionism as instead supplying a mere description at the level of implementation." • One argument for this point: in principle, any computational process can be computed by a Turing machine, which itself "only manipulates symbols in s rule-governed process."

What is Berkeley's argument from pain?

Consider the pain of being burnt or cut. " Where does the painfulness exist?" In theknife or flame? Or in the mind of the person who is cut or burnt? It is more plausible to say the latter. Now consider a light so bright it becomes painful to look at. "If painfulness exists in the mind, and very bright light is a kind of painfulness, then very bright light exists in the mind too," and therefore so does dull light.

What are the criticism of the modal arguments?

Does conceivability really entail possibility? While many critics of modal arguments think that the move from conceivability to possibility can never be justified, many fans of the modal arguments try to defend such a move ◦ For example, I can think of a math proposition and conceive it to be true. But it doesn't follow that its truth it possible. (In other words, it can be a self-contradicting statement which, because I do not fully grasp it, looks conceivably true.) ◦ Maybe the criticism can be defended against if we think in terms of an ideal conceiver ("maybe not someone as smart as God is supposed to be, but still someone pretty reliable in their conceptions")

Epiphenomenalism about qualia is considered to be what?

Epiphenomenalism about qualia is considered "one of the worst possible kinds of epiphenomenalism." Consider the qualia of pain and pleasure and how they are associated with behavior (hot stove and reward examples).

What is Epiphenomenalism?How does Epiphenomenalism relate to interaction?

Epiphenomenalism: The mental does not cause the physical but the physical does cause the mental. o Example of sea foam: the wave moves the foam, not the other way. Your mental states "are similarly merely along for the ride." o What causes your physical states (limping and crying) is not a mental state (pain) but other physical states (c-fibres firing). o The physical states also occasion non-physical states, and correlation is explained on this basis. o But occasioning non-physical states cannot be causing them, because this would involve energy transfer, and thus "a flow of energy out of the physical universe," contra the law of conservation of energy. o So, perhaps, "the effect that they physical had on the mental is a kind of effect that is noncausal" - a problematic way of addressing the correlation problem.

What is epiphenomenalism in relation to qualia?

Epiphenomenalism: qualia are not causally efficacious (compare the problem of interaction for substance dualism). Epiphenomenalism about qualia is the view that qualia do not count among the causally efficacious properties of people (or anything). In short, the epiphenomenalist thinks that qualia don't do anything. We can use the idea of causally efficacious properties to understand the debate over epiphenomenalism about qualia.

Which kinds of functionalism does the Chinese room propose against?

Especially affects machine and analytic functionalism: o Most applicable to Turing machine functionalism, "because both the Chinese room argument and Turing machine functionalism can be stated in terms of programs." The Chinese room can always and easily be given an element equivalent to a machine table. o Also applicable to analytic functionalism "because Searle's central claim can be interpreted as a conceivability claim. While it is far-fetched that anyone will actually do what Searle invites us to imagine him doing, it is conceivable." • Empirical functionalism seems less affected. "From the point of view of empirical functionalism, what Searle can or cannot conceive of seems hardly relevant to the question of what mental states really are." • [But note that empirical functionalism does get accused of chauvinism - privileging human psychology.]

What is solipsism?

Everything that you take to be real is really just an idea in your own mind, and your experience of this so-called reality is no different from a very long and realistic dream. Solipsism is a version of a more general view that we can call idealism. According to idealism, everything is either a mind or something that depends on a mind. Solipsistic versions of idealism hold that there is only one mind. Nonsolipsistic versions of idealism hold that there are multiple minds.

What is the explanatory gap argument (substance dualism)?

Explanatory gap arguments identify some aspect of the mind that cannot be explained in terms of physical substances and then conclude that this aspect of the mind must be due to the mind's being a nonphysical, wholly mental substance.

What is the explanatory gap argument?

Explanatory gap: being able to explain brain processes does not seem likely to offer and explanation of why they involve one quale and not another.

What is folk theory? What is folk psychology?

Folk theory: "A theory, implicitly held, concerning a domain for which there is often a nonfolk, fully scientific, and explicit theory." Example: folk physics, which "contains implicit and commonsensical views about how objects move," as in "the view that an object moving in a curved path tends to remain moving in a curved path." -Folk psychology refers to beliefs and desires as "causes or reasons for behavior." Note the example of George's opening the refrigerator. o Folk theories are tacit/implicit; "there is no clearly marked time in which one comes to learn a piece of folk physics ... One just picks it up by 'osmosis.'" Compare "E=mc2."

What is Leibnz's argument?

For our purposes, we can represent Leibniz's law as the indiscernibility of identicals, the principle that if x and y are one and the same, then x and y must have all of their properties in common. And if there is some property that the one has and the other lacks, then x and y are distinct. They are two distinct things, not one and the same thing.

What are the 4 arguments against Propositional Attitude Eliminative Materialism?

Four arguments: o "Eliminative materialism is self-refuting." o "The 'theory' theory is false." o "Folk psychology is indispensable." o "Introspection reveals the existence of propositional attitudes."

So how is mental causation explained? What are the 4 theories?

Four theories: 1. One based on substance dualism. 2. Qualia-based property-dualistic epiphenomenalism. 3. Anomalous monism (Donald Davidson). 4. Explanatory exclusion argument (Jaegwon Kim).

What are the 4 basic views of Interaction?

Four views: interactionism, parallelism, epiphenomenalism and reductionism. Only the fourth is physicalist.

GOFAI ("Good old fashioned artificial intelligence") is otherwise known as what?

GOFAI ("Good old fashioned artificial intelligence"), otherwise known as symbolicism, which is applied to natural and artificial intelligence equally.

What did Alan Turing do?

He developed the idea of "effective procedure" in trying to answer the question whether there is a method "for determining, for any particular mathematical proposition, whether that proposition can be proven." [This idea is similar to the idea of an algorithm.] -Turing defined effective procedures "in terms of reading and writing symbols according to certain rules."

What is the problem of personal identity?

Here's a general problem about identity: How much can a single thing change without becoming a second thing? An adult is no longer a baby. But is the adult one and the same person as the baby? Did you used to be a baby, or are you instead some other person who has replaced the baby?

What are 2 historical precursors?

Historical precursors: denial of free will and denial of the existence of the self.

What is the evolution argument?

Human traits have evolved incrementally through past generations. This is clearly the case with physical traits. o Either a creature with mentality originated from a creature without it, or "mentality has always been present." In the former case, where do we draw the line? o So the panpsychist concludes that "there's a continuity of mentality running through evolutionary history from our earliest unicellular ancestors to us."

What is Berkeley's "Nothing but an idea can resemble an idea" idea?

Ideas represent by resembling what they represent." But how can an idea be like a horse enough to resemble a horse? Ideas can only resemble other ideas. In that case, "you can form no idea that would resemble" and thus represent a material object. If your idea does represent a horse, that means the horse is something in the nature of an idea. [There is much truth in this; in fact science teaches us that the world is very different from the sort of thing that our ideas tell us it is.]

How does Folk psychology make commitments to features of mental states that lead to an unacceptable epiphenomenalism?

If every bodily motion is caused by a brain state that no mental state is identical to, then whatever mental states are posited by folk psychology" have no explanatory role.

What is the nothing from nothing argument?

If something comes to be, it cannot have come from nothing. Babies come from parents, apples come from trees, fire comes from fuel, oxygen, and heat. The idea that something could just pop into existence without having come from anything — something from nothing. Emergentists believe that mentality emerges from special arrangements of non-mental fundamental particles. But is this not a "a case of something - your consciousness -coming out of nothing"?

What is monism?

If we describe dualism as the view that there are fundamentally two sorts of things in the universe, the mental and the physical, then we can describe monism as the view that there is only one sort of thing

What is Berkeley's master argument?

If you try to conceive that something exists without the existence of any mind you will fail. If realism is true, and idealism is false, then it ought to be possible for something like a tree to exist even if no mind exists. If realists are right about trees, then trees are mind-independent—they do not depend on minds for their existence. The gist of Berkeley's master argument is to try to show that we cannot even conceive of anything existing mind independently.

What are the implications of the thought experiment?

Implication of thought experiment: it seems possible to imagine a Turing machine which replicates human experience. If a human brain "can only be in a finite number of states (which is plausible because it is built out of a finite number of particles) then it is theoretically equivalent

What are the two kinds of knowledge known as "knowing-that" and "knowing-how"?

In knowing-that (what others have called propositional knowledge) there is some thought or proposition that you know to be true. In contrast, in knowing-how (what others have called procedural knowledge), your knowledge is had by having an ability, a disposition to behave in a certain way. When you know how to ride a bike, you are, for example, disposed to move forward while pedaling the wheels and not falling off.

What is the problem of artificial intelligence?

In science fiction stories we are often presented with futuristic machines capable of thinking and behaving intelligently. Could there ever be, in real life, artificial forms of genuine intelligence? Can a machine think? Some philosophers answer "yes." They say that humans themselves are a kind of machine, and that our own brains are a kind of computer. ◦ They may also argue that thinking is essentially linguistic - it is a liner, rule-governed string of symbols. ◦ They may alternatively argue that thinking is better understood "as highly connected networks - artificial neural networks composed of parallel distributed processors."

What is Interactionism?How does Interactionism relate to interaction?

Interactionism: There is interaction between mental and physical, and the mental is non-physical. It holds no credible account of how something spatial interacts with something nonspatial.

What is the modal argument?

It involves the idea of possibility ("modalities" refer to possibility and necessity): if it is possible for there to be a mind without a body then they are different substances. One especially prominent sort of argument for dualism is what philosophers have called a modal argument, for it hinges on the notion of possibility, and philosophers refer to possibility and necessity as modalities and study them by using modal logic. Crucial to a modal argument for substance dualism is a premise concerning the possibility of a mind existing without any body existing.

Is eliminative materialism the same as mind brain identity theory?

It is not the same as mind-brain identity theory, which claims that mental states are nothing but physical states ("pain is nothing but c-fibres firing"). The eliminative materialist claims that "pains aren't identical to anything at all - they don't even exist." • Key focus: denial of propositional attitudes (beliefs, desires), and secondarily denial of qualia.

What's epiphenomenalism about qualia?

It is the view that qualia are not causally efficacious properties. For instance, the painful quale associated with stubbing your toe is not the reason you cry or cuss. What causes those behaviors are certain nerve impulses leading to the relevant muscles, and the causally efficacious prop- erties are physical properties like the mass and charge of the particles that make up those nerves and their electrochemical signals. The painful quale—the very painfulness of the painful experience—is irrelevant in causing your various behaviors.

What is mind brain identity theory? (Aka type-identity theory, psycho-neutral reductionism, central-state materialism, or the identity theory- all names meaning the same thing)

It is the view that the mind is the brain and that mental states are brain states. Mind and brain are one and the same—they are identical. o The mind is the brain and mental states are brain states. o Denies non-physical substances and properties (so qualia are brain properties). o The behaviorist thinks of a mental state as something outer; the mind-brain identity theorist thinks of it as something inner.

does this lead to epiphenomenalism as regards mental properties?

It may (unless we deny the existence of properties). "Mental events are identical to physical events, but are subsumed under laws only in virtue of their physical properties and not in virtue of their mental properties." That means that "mental events don't cause anything in virtue of their mental properties, but only in virtue of their physical properties."

What is the knowledge argument?

Just as in the modal arguments for property dualism, a thought experiment plays a central role in discussions of the knowledge argument. The knowledge argument receives much of its force from a widely held view about how we know about our own qualia, namely, that they cannot be known by description but only by acquaintance.

What is the central nervous system vs. The peripheral nervous system?

Major parts and functions of the nervoussystem: o Central nervous system: brain, spinal cord, the part "most directly involved in cognition and consciousness." o Peripheral nervous system: relays signals from sensory organs through the central nervous system to muscular systems.

What is the negative part of functionalism?

Negative part of functionalism: "Mental states are not defined in terms of the material substances of which they are composed." This is, of course, the multiple realizability thesis. o Remember the contrast example: water and its chemical composition. o C-fibre firing as only one possible realization of pain. o (There can even be a dualistic functionalism - one which holds that mental states can have nonphysical realizations.) • Another negative part of functionalism: mental states cannot be defined solely by reference to behaviour.

_________"relay electrochemical signals to one another"; these are distinct from ______, "which are largely dedicated to supporting the function of neurons."

Neurons: glia

What does it mean for things to be identical?

Numerical vs. qualitative identity: Moby-Dick example. Two copies are in a relation of similarity only, not identity. In other words, they only share qualities without being one and the same. Likewise, identical twins are only qualitatively identical. [Identity theory is claiming that a pain event is numerically identical with a c-fibres firing.]

What is Occam's razor?

Occam's razor, which is often expressed as the idea that simpler hypotheses are more likely to be true than complex hypotheses.

What are some criticisms for the explanatory gap argument in substance dualism?

One basis for calling them into doubt is a general principle concerning how we can never be absolutely certain about what the future will bring. Another basis for doubting the predictions at the heart of explanatory gap arguments is to look at past cases of scientific ignorance that were followed by breakthroughs and then draw an analogy between those past episodes and our current situation. These arguments often depend on making predictions on what will never happen. ◦ "No mechanical system will ever generate language." ◦ "No physical explanation will ever explain perception."

What was the criticism for the knowledge argument?

One problem with the knowledge argument: is full factual knowledge of a domain actually full knowledge of it? Note the distinction between "knowledge-that" and "knowledge-how." Mary does not acquire new knowledge of color when she is released; she only starts to know how to identify colors. Likewise she does not acquire any new descriptive knowledge, just acquaintance with the color phenomena she already fully knows descriptively. We can describe the first premise as depending on the idea that if one knows all the factual knowledge about some domain, then one has all of the knowledge that pertains to that domain. Another way of putting this idea is that all knowledge is knowledge of facts, or all knowing is knowing-that. Some philosophers have sought to deny this premise and put forward the idea that some knowledge is not knowledge of facts. Another problem with the knowledge argument: Maybe we think that Mary would not understand red just because of the limitations of our own scientific knowledge. (Comparison to "an ancient Greek trying to imagine what Einstein meant by saying that E=mc 2.) Another sort of suggestion along these lines concerns a notion of knowledge by acquaintance that is allegedly distinct from knowledge of facts. If you know some facts about Barack Obama, but you have never met him in person, we might say: "You know about him, but you don't know him." If knowledge by acquaintance is a genuinely distinct form of knowledge, then it is logically possible to know all of the facts about a person without "knowing" that person in the acquaintance sense of the term.

What is Parallelism?How does Parallelism relate to interaction?

Parallelism: The mental does not cause the physical and the physical does not cause the mental. Parallelism interaction: Embraces dualism, but denies interaction. Mental and physical events "form two distinct noninteracting streams."

How do you deny asymmetry between self-knowledge and knowledge of other minds?

Perhaps what makes the problem of other minds especially problematic is the Cartesian assumption that there's asymmetry between the way you know you own mind and the way you know the minds of others." One way of denying this asymmetry strategy is to affirm behaviorism. In that case the problem of other minds disappears. But behaviorism is, as we have seen, in some ways problematic. Another way of denying the symmetry strategy is to hold that knowledge of other minds is available based on inference to the best explanation. [In other words, we infer minds exist based on the explanatory usefulness of doing so.] That inference informs a theory that we implicitly accept, a theory which is referred to as "folk psychology." Folk psychology is reasonably effective at explaining "certain patterns of behavior." But folk psychology is inconsistent with behaviourism.

What is phenomenal consciousness, and what are 2 cases that explain it?

Phenomenal consciousness is "that aspect of our mental lives in virtue of which 'something it's like to be us." The clearest cases: the qualia of sensory perception.

What is the positive part of functionalism?

Positive part of functionalism: "A mental state is defined by certain causal relations it bears to input states (sensory states), output states (verbal and nonverbal behaviors), and other mental states."

What is property dualism?

Property dualism holds that mental properties are a distinct kind of property, a kind of property not identical to or "reducible" to any kind of physical property. To get the feel of what property dualism is all about, it helps to focus on two key ideas in philosophy of mind, and notice an apparent tension between them. The first idea is the idea of mental properties known collectively as qualia. The second idea is a simple kind of physicalism that we can express simply as the view that all properties are physical properties.

What would be key to proving solipsism wrong?

Proving solipsism wrong requires proving some other mind exists, or that some sensorily perceptible thing does.

What is qualia?

Qualia explains what it is like to have qualitative experiences. What it's like to ..." (colour, warm, appetizing, for example). "Subjective aspects of experiences." Ex.What it's like to see red or feel pain is something I know only from the inside. No amount of investigation of my brain from the outside seems sufficient to reveal the nature of my qualia.

What is Reductionism?How does reductionism relate to interaction?

Reductionism: There is interaction between mental and physical, and the mental is a special case of the physical. o Certain physical events - brain events - "are identical to mental events," as in the firing of c-fibres and pain. o This makes sense of interaction. o Correlation is easily explained by that identity. o But this approach is challenged by the qualia arguments (knowledge, explanatory gap and modal - zombie, inverted spectrum - arguments)

What is universal idealism?

Simply put, everything that exists is either itself a mind or is some idea depending on a mind. The version of idealism that we are primarily interested in presently is a version that we can call a universal idealism. It is universal because it holds that everything that exists is either itself a mind or is some idea depending on a mind (or some other mentally dependent thing). The universal idealist denies that anything can exist without some mind existing. Universal idealism is not very popular these days, so it's likely that you don't believe it. However, there probably is a version of idealism that you do believe in, and we can call it a version of limited idealism. It's limited in holding that some (though not all) things are either minds or depend for their existence on minds.

Why is Berkeley is not a solipsist?

So-called material things like rocks, trees, and horses are really just collections of ideas. However, describing idealism that way is to describe a view that is fully consistent with solipsism, since these collections of ideas may very well just be my ideas. Perhaps there are no other minds or spiritual substances besides my own. However, Berkeley argues that there must be minds other than my own. "Sometimes I am the cause of the patterns of my ideas, sometimes not." In the latter case, "the causes must be mental substances distinct from my own."

What is limited idealism?

Some things are either minds or depend for their existence on minds (such as mental states, or even beauty).

How can you describe Kim's argument?

Start with the following abbreviations: -P1: Some physical property involving bodily motion. -M: The intention that generates P1. -P2: The property that realizes M. o So which properties do something in this situation? o Not M, because "if we assume the thesis of causal closure, then that would exclude M from being the property that is efficacious with respect to P1." o "Since P2 explains why P1 occurred, it excludes M from being the explanation of why P1 occurred." Note the "hand-going-up" example. The explanatory exclusion argument gets its name from the idea that since P2 explains why P1 occurred, it excludes M from being the explanation of why P1 occurred. If having such-and-such a brain state explains your hand going up, then that excludes your intention to raise your hand from being the explanation of your hand raising.

Strength of synapse = what?

Strength of synapse = "how much the firing of one neuron (the 'presynaptic neuron') can influence the firing of another neuron that it is connected to via a synapse (the 'postsynaptic neuron')." Changes in the strength of firing relationships constitute synaptic plasticity.

What is Systematicity?

Systematicity: "thoughts bear certain systematic relations to one another." -Anyone who can think MARY KISSED JOHN is capable of thinking JOHN KISSED MARY. Why? Same representations, same rules of construction - and so "you automatically have the raw materials and abilities required for the second thought."

"Many arguments that we've discussed in connection with other issues can be adapted for use as arguments against functionalism." Why is this?

That is because they are anti-materialist arguments; behaviorism, identity theory are materialist theories, and so are the usual forms of functionalism.

How does property dualism lead to epiphenomenalism?

The basic thought here is that scientific explanations of various events can supply fully physical explanations—explanations that mention only physical properties. There's no causal work to do, then, for any properties that are non- physical. If qualia are nonphysical, they can't help make anything physical happen. One way we can spell out how property dualism leads to epiphenomenalism is in terms of zombies. If it is possible for a creature to be just like you physically and behave just like you in response to physical stimuli without any qualia, then none of your qualia are causally responsible for your responses to physical stimuli.

Why is the ghost in the machine a category mistake?

The body and body are not two separate things bc they are both part of one thing that makes up your being and work together. Note the example of dance and the dancer. [In general, it is not conceptually fruitful to distinguish the activity of a thing from the thing that engages in the activity.]

What is panpsychism?

The concept that everything has its own mind. Ie. not just humans but even inanimate objects. panpsychism leaves open whether there might be nonmental physical properties of the things that have minds. So, in addition to having a mind with its various mental properties, perhaps a rock also has nonmental aspects

What 3 claims about mental states can be said for behaviourism?

The first claim is epistemological. The first is a claim about how to gain knowledge of mental states. Ie. you know someone is sad bc you see them frown or cry, etc. The second is semantic. The second is about the meanings of what we say when we use terminology like "belief " and "desire." Ie. what does the word sad mean? Behaviourists describe this using terms of behaviour, such as them being prone to frowning or crying. The third is metaphysical. The third is about what mental states are, that is, what their ultimate nature is. There are two versions to this claim, one that we can call reductionist and the other that we can call eliminativist. The reductionist version says that sadness just is a kind of behavior or behavioral disposition. The eliminativist version says that, there really is no such thing as a mental state of sadness, and that what exists instead are certain behaviors or dispositions. How does behaviourism differ from psychology to philosophy? Psychological: focused on scientific methodology and opposed to introspection. Philosophical: focused on ordinary language and verificationism What is the private language argument? Wittgenstein believes we only think terms of words with shared public meaning. Whatever private things accompany our public uses of 'sensation,' they might as well not be there." "It is impossible for there to be a language that referred to private things, a language about sensations that could only be understood by a single person." The point of this argument is to suggest that you would never have a qualitative experience of green if you were not already exposed to the word "green" in the first place. Our internal experiences are made possible by the external, behavioral stimuli provided by words. Private experiences are actually based on public words.

What are the 4 steps of the argument of analogy?

The first step is to note the existence of one's own mind. You know that you have a mind and various mental states. The second step is to note that on many occasions, certain kinds of your mental states are correlated with certain kinds of behaviour. The third step is to notice the other human bodies in the world and to note the various behaviors they engage in. The fourth step is the step that gives the argument its name. The fourth step involves reasoning by drawing an analogy and then making an analogical inference. Here the analogy is between your own body and the bodies

What two strategies do behaviourists use to solve the problem of other minds?

The first strategy accepts that there is an important asymmetry between the way one knows one's own mind and the way one knows the minds of others. The second strategy denies any deep asymmetry—the way each of us knows our own mind is not importantly different from the knowledge of the minds of others.

What is the problem of other minds?

The fundamental difficulty we have of perceiving the consciousness of others. ◦ There is a "contingent relationship between our inner mental lives and our outward behaviors," which a good actor demonstrates. How do you know if someone is conscience? Just because they tell you they are? And how can you tell if another person's experience is anything like yours? ◦ One approach (behaviorism) attempts to define mental states to some extent in terms of behavior.

What is the ghost in the machine?

The ghost represents the mind and the machine represents your body. "Ghost is in the machine"

What is stellar's objection to behaviourism?

The gist of Sellars's point is that (1) it is part of our very concept of a mental state like a belief that it is the cause or explanation of certain behaviors, and (2) genuine causal explanations cannot be circular, but (3) behaviorism would make the resulting causal explanations circular. We view mental states as causing and explaining behaviors. Verbal example: imagine a human saying, "Turnips taste best when harvested in August" as opposed to a parrot saying this; "what makes it a genuine speech act as opposed to merely the production of sound?" Answer: it is caused by an underlying belief state. Non-verbal example: the difference between intentionally and unintentionally kicking you leg out. But behaviorism would make these causal explanations circular. Example: "Why is Mary frowning and crying?" It turns out to be circular to say she is doing so because of the mental state of sadness.

What is the Geach-Chisholm objection?

The gist of this objection is that mental states cannot be individually connected with behaviors, but can only be connected to behaviors in concert with other mental states in a way that makes behaviorism an intractably complex theory. Ex. Tiger-avoiding behavior is connected with various mental states - not just fear of tigers, but belief that a tiger is nearby. But note that tiger-seeking behavior can also be connected with the belief a tiger is nearby, if accompanied by a fondness for tigers.

What is behaviourism?

The idea that you can determine others mental states of mind using observation.

What is the difference between mind-brain identity theory and behaviourism?

The main difference might be put like this: Where the behaviorist defines mental states directly in terms of outward behavior, the mind-brain identity theorist defines mental states as something literally inner, since a person's brain is something literally inside of their body.

What is the mind-body problem?

The main problems in this cluster are: ◦ How to explain the difference. ◦ How to explain their relation. ◦ If it turns out that minds are physical, how to explain this physicality. 1. The problem of explaining what the real difference is, if any, between the mental and the physical. 2. The problem of explaining, if the mental and the physical are very dif- ferent, how they can possibly relate to each other in the ways we com- monly suppose them to relate. For example, how can minds have effects on bodies and vice versa? 3. The problem of explaining, if minds are really just a kind of physical thing, how that can be. How can it really make sense to treat minds as just another physical thing in the universe? Descartes thought that the mind was radically different from physical bodies. He held that minds were essentially thinking things that didn't take up any space and that physical bodies were essentially unthink- ing things that did take up space.

What is anomalous monism? What is the difference between type-type and token-token?

The monism here "is a physicalist monism." o Not type-type (as in identity theory) but token-token. In other words, "every mental token is a physical token." [Every mental particular state is a physical state, but not always the same kind of physical state - seemingly, in fact, a different kind of physical state every time.] Mind-brain identity theory is a kind of type-physicalism whereas anomalous monism is a kind of token-physicalism. Type-physicalists affirm that mental types are identical to physical types. Token-physicalism is consistent with the denial of type-physicalism. The core assertion of token-physicalism is that every mental token is identical to a physical token.

What is occasionalism and parallelism?

The most famous versions of these views, the version of occa- sionalism proposed by Malebranche and the version of parallelism proposed by Leibniz, bring God into the picture. The role that God is hypothesized to play is that he's responsible for the ordered relationship between the mental events and the physical events. In the case of occasionalism, God is hypothesized to intervene at each step in a version of continual creation. When, for instance, you form an intention to raise your hand, God steps in and makes your hand go up. And when a heavy object falls on your toe, God steps in to make sure that you suffer a pain. In the case of Leibniz's parallelism, God does not step in at every moment, but instead sets up two parallel streams of events from the beginning of the universe. When he created the universe, he created a physical stream and a mental stream that run in parallel. The ordered relationships between the two are predetermined.

There are two main arguments for functionalism, which also are "arguments against its main physicalistic competitors." What are they?

The multiple realization argument: o The Putnam quotation (p. 114) suggests two versions of the argument. 1. Argument based on actual multiple realization: -It is assumed that there are creatures who have some mental states in common with humans, but whose physical properties give rise to these states in very different ways - as in the case of molluscs and pain. -But do they feel pain when they writhe or withdraw when a stimulus damages tissue or, if they do, whether they feel pain in the same way (a dull pain as opposed to a sharp one)? (Note the relevance of the problem of other minds.) -Do molluscs have nervous systems that sufficiently differ from those of humans? Both contain neurons which operate via the same electro-chemical linkages (though molluscs have fewer neurons and more limbs). -So the actual multiple realization argument is based on incomplete empirical evidence, which seems inappropriate for philosophical argument. 2. Argument based on possible multiple realization: - "It is possible that mental states have multiple realizations" - as in the cases of strong artificial intelligence and intelligent extra-terrestrial life. -Remember that a mere possibility argument is a not impossible argument. Identity theory (if it commits to the claim that "kinds of mental state are one and the same as kinds of physical state") holds that "it is necessary that mental states do not have multiple physical realizations" (=it is impossible that they have multiple realizations). -To prove the possibility of multiply realized mental states we consider their conceivability.

What is the combination problem against panpsychism?

The panpsychist regards the atoms of a human as having "their own consciousness, albeit a simpler form of consciousness." This creates a new, panpsychist emergence problem: how does the human's mentality emerge from a combination of those? o The nothing-from-nothing argument can be applied here: when a human mind emerges from non-human minds, it looks like something-from-nothing.

What are zombies in philosophy?

The philosopher's zombie is a person who has no qualia, but is nonetheless similar to normal people in various ways. For instance, zombies are sometimes hypothesized to lack qualia while nonetheless behaving just like normal humans. (The question, "How do you know other people are not zombies?" is a version of the problem of other minds. • This gives us another modal argument: Zombies (beings without qualia) are conceivable, and therefore possible, and therefore it is possible "for there to be a being that has all my physical properties while lacking qualia." So qualia are not physical properties.

What is the problem of perception?

The problem of perception involves a conflict between two individually plausible ideas about the nature of perception: The first is that when we perceive, we are thereby in a direct sort of relation to some object in the world. Ex. When I open my eyes and see a red book on the table before me, I am thereby in a relation with that red book. The second idea about perception is an idea that comes from philosophi- cal reflection on misperceptions and hallucinations. Ex. Perhaps you seem to see a pink elephant in the room with you, but as a matter of fact you are really dreaming or hallucinating. ◦ What is in common between the "accurate perceptual case" and the "false hallucinatory case" is direct awareness of "an idea in one's mind." ◦ Does this mean that what we primarily have perceptual awareness of is ideas of things? In that case "the so-called external world starts to sound like some extra stuff that might as well not be there anyway."

What differences are similarities are there to solipsism and panpsychism in short?

The solipsist and the panpsychist agree that everything has a mind. They disagree about whether there is more than one mind. According to solipsism, there's only one.

What are the 3 objections to behaviourism?

The three objections to behaviorism are: (1) the qualia objection, (2) Sellars's objection, and (3) the Geach-Chisholm objection.

What is the zombie arguement against the mind-brain identity problem?

The zombie argument: Arguments for property dualism can often be pressed into service against identity theory. o If identity theory is true then any quale would have "a certain pattern of neural activation." So it should be impossible for that pattern to occur without the quale. But zombies are conceivable, and therefore possible, so it is in fact possible for that to happen. It follows that identity theory is false.

What is the inverted spectrum problem related to property dualism?

There are different qualia associated with the two experi- ences, and these different qualia help make up the subjective differences in the way the white paper looks through the two different eyes. • Inverted spectrum thought experiment: "Whereas Norma sees colors in the normal way, Ingrid sees them in the opposite way" (for example green for red, red for green, and similarly with the other opposed colors on the wheel). • This amounts a modal argument: Spectrum inverts are conceivable, and therefore it is possible "to have all of my physical properties while having different qualia." So qualia are not physical properties.

What is the purpose of The Explanatory Exclusion Argument?

This argument (from Jaegwon Kim) "attempts to show that a certain kind of physicalism leads to epiphenomenalism. This kind of physicalism is what we'll here call 'multiple-realizability based on non-reductive physicalism,' or just 'nonreductive physicalism' for short."

What are the 3 variations of functionalism?

Three varieties of functionalism: Turing machine, analytic, empirical.

To be is to_____

To be is to be perceived. Based on his empiricism (=the view that "all knowledge and all ideas arise from our sensory perception), Berkeley argues that "existence itself depends on sensory perception"

What is realism?

To be realist about something is to believe that it is mind-independent (such as beauty).

What is Turing machine functionalism and what are the problems with it?

Turing machine functionalism (=machine state functionalism): o All minds are Turing machines. This thesis shows "how a purely physical and mechanistic system can engage in processes we regards as mental," especially problem-solving ones. o "Mental states can be defined by reference to instructions in a machine table" (=a look-up table). o Unlike behaviourism, this theory makes "provision for the way that mental states are related to inputs and outputs in virtues of also being related to other mental states." [These are defined by the discrete states of a Turing machine.] o Problem with this kind of functionalism: it makes no provision for simultaneous mental states. Compare usual parallel-processing in human experience, for example, smelling smoke and thinking, "Maybe something is burning in the kitchen."

What are two distinctly contrasting views in relation to panpsychism?

Two contrasting views: eliminativism: ("there is no mentality at all") emergentism: (minds "emerge from the more fundamental aspects of reality, aspects usually taken to be physical and not mental").

What two ideas feed into the multiple realizability argument? Explain them.

Two ideas feed into this argument: "type" and "realization." o Type vs token: -There are four types of word in "The dog bit the cat" but five individual words, i.e., five word-tokens. -So when we ask, "How many," the answer will vary depending on whether we are counting types or tokens. -[A type is a kind; a token is a single instance of a kind.] -Jones and Smith both have toe-pain. There is one type of mental state in this example (being in pain), and two tokens (Jones' being in pain and Smith's being in pain): two mental-state tokens of the same mental-state type. -When identity theory says (for example) that pain is "c-fibres firing" it is making a claim about types. "It is not saying simply that Jones' pain is identical to Jones' c-fibres firing." That would leave open the possibility that Smith's pain is identical to something else - q-fibres maybe." o Realization: -"There's only one way of arranging subatomic particles to give rise to water ... However, there is no single way of arranging micro-physical particles to give rise to a drinking vessel." -In other words, "containers are multiply realizable. Water is not." -"The type sample of water is identical to the type sample of H2O. Every token of the type sample of water will also be a token of the type sample of H2O." -"The type vessel for drinking is not identical to any chemically specifiable type. For instance, the ... type container made from aluminum is not one and the same as the type vessel for drinking since not every token of the type vessel for drinking will also be a token of the type container made from aluminum. [In other words we can find a chemical type equivalent to water, but cannot find a chemical type equivalent to a cup. Water is not multiply realizable, but a cup is. The issue in the following argument is whether we can find a neural (=chemical) type equivalent to a mental state.]

What are the 2 key ideas behind the basic ingredients of contemporary eliminative materialism?

Two key ideas: that folk psychology is a theory, and the distinction between elimination and reduction.

What is Berkeley's argument from perceptual relativity: Berkeley's bucket?

Warm one hand, cool the other, and put both in a bucket of tepid water. The same tepid water will be felt as having different temperatures, which cannot both be objectively accurate. Neither can by itself be considered accurate. The idealistic conclusion: the temperature "is a property of the experiences or sensory ideas, but not a property in the so-called material object."

What are 3 components the are involved with the explanatory gap argument of property dualism?

We can break this explanation down into three components: (1) the target phenomenon, (2) the explaining theory, and (3) the identification of items from the target with items in the theory in a way that closes an explanatory gap. First, there is the target phenomenon, the thing that needs to be explained. We can describe this in terms of key properties and relations between them. Second, there is the explaining theory. It is spelled out in terms of the kinetic energy of molecules, which also involves properties. Third, there is the closing of an explanatory gap. In the explanation, the properties of the target phenomenon are identified with properties in the explaining theory. For example, temperature is identified with average molecular kinetic energy. Finally, once we see how all the parts fit together, the explanation makes sense. We see why increasing heat would result in more pressure (instead of less pressure or no pressure change). Thus, the gap between the target and the theory is closed.

How do you know you are not a zombie?

We've already seen the first step, and it's the idea that property dualism about qualia leads to doubts about whether others are zombies, since they would behave in all the same ways regardless of whether or not they have qualia. One such reason is that one can have such mental states without being conscious at the time. • The above focus on qualia leaves "open the possibility that zombies can have lots of other aspects of mentality, aspects such as thought, judgement and belief." [In other words, dualists are often willing to say that computers can have beliefs.] • Note that these latter states can be unconscious (and achievable by a physical system). [So a computer belief could be like what we experience as an unconscious belief.] • I believe that "I am enjoying a visual quale right now" - but a physical system, or a zombie, could have the same belief. • So how do I know I am not just a zombie (or physical system) having a belief to this effect (i.e., that I am experiencing a quale).

What is weak and strong AI? Which does functionalism closely associate with?

Weak AI: "So-called artificially intelligent computers will never be anything more than mere simulations of intelligence." o Strong AI: Computers in principle can be really intelligent. o Checklist: -Think and understand? -Consciously experience qualia? -Have free will? -Learn and modify behaviour autonomously? o The same answer to each? o How would proponents of the theories covered so far answer these questions? o Functionalism would answer yes to each, and is thus most closely associated with strong AI.

What sorts of things depend for their existence on minds?

Well, mental states themselves, perceptions and beliefs for example, pretty clearly depend on minds. But this is not as interesting an example of a limited idealism as some other examples. Consider, for example, idealism about beauty. Such a view is encoded in the saying "beauty is in the eye of the beholder." According to this view no one is beautiful unless someone perceives him or her as beautiful.

What is the qualia objection to behaviourism?

Wittenstein argues that qualia is very culturally physical experiences and can differ depending on cultural background. Mental states are understood as connected to behaviour. Ex. Being afraid of dogs is inconceivable without a disposition to certain "dog-avoiding behaviors." But how does this connection work for the quale red? Are any behaviors "conceptually linked to it"? The inverted spectrum thought experiment suggests not.

An _______and _______ protrude from the body of each neuron, and facilitate synaptic connections between cells.

axon: dendrites

Synaptic strengthening is thought to be the basis for learning by __________.

conditioning

Scientific theories change and their posits often come to be seen as ___ ______.

not existing (=eliminated)

How is "The 'theory' theory is false"?

o "Let us call the proposal that folk psychology is a theory the 'theory' theory." o Is our "folk psychological grasp" of the minds of others the result of a (tacit) theory about mental states? -Possible response: no, it is the result not of theorizing but of simulating. "If I see George opening the refrigerator, I don't consult a theory" to infer he wants a beer; I just simulate myself in his position. -[In other words, I can process what he is doing without framing it in the form, "He desires ... he believes ... therefore he opens the door."] o Note that even if this last point is correct, and we don't actually use propositional attitude folk psychology to understand human motivations - it still doesn't follow that the theory is false. -Note the examples of unicorn theory and the theory of electrons. - "The failure to hold a theory of X is irrelevant to whether X exists, since the failure to hold a theory of X is consistent both with the existence of X (as in the case of electrons hundreds of years ago) and with the non-existence of X (as in the case of unicorns)."

What can be said about whether qualia-based epiphenomenalism conflicts with phenomenal self-knowledge?

o "To have knowledge of a property, that property must be causally efficacious." o "Thoughts are distinct from qualia both in the sense that thoughts aren't themselves qualia and in the sense that thoughts themselves don't have any qualia." o These principles are problematic for property-dualistic qualia-based epiphenomenalism (i.e., the zimbo problem).

What is a Zimbo and what problems do they propose?

o A zimbo, is behaviorally identical to humans, lacks qualia, but possesses thoughts. o Imagine your "zimbo duplicate" [remember, epiphenomenalism is being assumed to be true]: -Consider your "thoughts about your own consciousness and the qualia that accompany your conscious states." -You and your zimbo-counterpart both bite your tongues and think, "I am now experiencing a painful quale." -"Whatever it is that causes you thoughts, it's not qualia doing the causing. Thus, there's nothing to prevent you zimbo duplicate from having the very same thoughts that you have." -So "how can you know that you really do have qualia?" In fact, you yourself might be a zimbo. Possible answer: reject "the assumption that properties have to causally efficacious to be knowable." But how are they to be known, then?

Why is Folk psychology committed to propositional attitudes having a sentential structure that is unsupported by neuroscientific research?

o Folk psychology is committed to the language of thought hypothesis, as opposed by "neuroscientific research inspired by connectionism." o It analyzes "The moon is round" as involving two representations, one of the moon, the other of roundness. o According to connectionism, "the representations of the moon and roundness are spread out across a large number of neurons, no subset of which constitutes ... distinct representations."

What is the contrast between reduction and elimination?

o In reduction, "the posits of the old theory are reduced to the posits of the new theory." o In elimination, "the posits of the old theory are eliminated in favor of the posits of the new theory." o Example of reduction: the old theory of chemistry spoke of elements like oxygen and hydrogen; the new theory reduces those to electrons, neutrons and protons. o Example of elimination: the old theory of combustion cited the release of plogiston; the new theory replaces this by citing the combination of oxygen. • Putting the ingredients together: o "Folk psychology will be surpassed by a superior theory, one that neither posits mental states nor posits anything that mental states can be reduced to." It "will be surpassed by the neurosciences."

What is localism and holism?

o Localism: brain functions are relegated to specific regions (so a region for language, another for memory, another for vision.) o Holism: the denial of this view. "The entire brain subserves each cognitive function." Contrary evidence: "Damage to a specific part of the brain can destroy a person's ability to consciously perceive the shapes of objects while leaving intact other aspects of vision as well as nonvisual cognition."

What does non-reductive physicalism propose?

o Mental properties exist, but "each instance of a mental property has a physical property as its realization." o So the mental is always realized in some way by the physical. -In short, nonreductive physicalism holds that the mental is realized by the physical. The reason the mental is not reducible to the physical, that is, the reason that no mental property is identical to any physical property is that each mental property is multiply realizable. Given that there are two (or more) distinct physical properties that can realize a given mental property, the mental property cannot be identical to either one of the physical properties.

What is symbolicism and the language of thought?

o Minds are "mechanical systems that manipulate symbols in accordance with a set of rules." Thinking ("cognition") is symbol manipulation. o LOT ("Language of thought hypothesis"): -"A finite number of mental symbols are combined in rule-governed ways to form thoughts." -CATS, DOGS, BARK, MEOW are mental symbols = mental representations = concepts. -From them various thoughts may be generated: CATS MEOW, DOGS BARK, CATS BARK, DOGS MEOW. -The language of thought has its own grammatical rules (like spoken language), which suppress thoughts like CATS DOGS, but not CATS BARK. The latter "gets the world wrong" but not the grammar of the language of thought.

How does Folk psychology make commitments to features of mental states that lead to an unacceptable epiphenomenalism?

o Reliable indicator of physical objects nearby (such as pieces of furniture): perception. This point does not depend upon any special theory. -Presumably introspection: internal perception - is an equally reliable indicator of the existence of objects. Of what objects? Mental states, including propositional attitudes. -In fact introspection may be stronger grounds for the existence of propositional attitudes than neuroscience is against. o On the other hand, compare what modern physics says about the solidity of objects ("rocks, trees, tables, and chairs") with what common sense says when it comes to solidity vs relative vacuity. -It seems we have to reject the view of one or another. -But what if we interpret what commonsense tells us in such a way as to render it consistent with science? • Solidity could be interpreted as simply impenetrability. • Likewise, what introspection tells us might be able to be re-interpreted in such a way as to render it consistent with neuroscience.

How is "Folk psychology indispensable"?

o Unlike the previous objection, which denies that folk psychology is a theory, this objection grants that this is indeed a theory, and one we definitely need. It is, instead, indispensable. o Essential for predicting, explaining the behaviour of others. -It needs to be shown that the virtues of folk psychology are such that we simply could not do without it. It needs to be shown that there will not be a future neuroscientific theory that more simply and powerfully accounts for behavior than does folk psychology. o But can we claim that future neuroscience will never do a better job?

What is the analogy argument?

o We attribute mentality on the basis of perception (sensory organs to detect stimuli),memory (information storage) and will (decision-making). What are the important analogies between humans and other animals that make it appropriate to think that the other animals have minds? For starters, we can draw analogies in three areas of mentality (although there are likely analogies that can be drawn beyond these three areas): (1) perception, (2) memory, and (3) will. Like humans, other animals are (1) equipped with sensory organs that allow them to detect stimuli, some of which are beneficial to the organism, others of which are harmful. Like humans, other animals (2) can learn and store information in their memories for use at a later time. Like humans, other animals (3) can make decisions and act in ways based on sensed and remembered information. Application of these criteria to single-celled organisms and plants: Panpsychists extend such analogies beyond animals to include single- celled (unicellular) organisms and plants. Single-celled organisms such as bacteria have ways of sensing their environments and moving through them. Scientists have even demonstrated simple forms of learning in bacteria! Plants move on much slower timescales, but they move nonetheless. Application to inanimate objects, such as heated metal: So-called inanimate objects can even be brought into consideration under such analogies. A piece of metal reacts to being heated—it will change its size and even color. A panpsychist can view this as the metal's perceptual response to the hot stimulus. And a piece of metal can be bent or stamped with a certain shape that it will retain over time. This might be viewed as a kind of memory.

How is "Eliminative materialism is self-refuting"?

o When you assert, and not just quote, "The cat is on the mat," you believe it to be true. o Likewise when you assert, "Beliefs do not exist." That makes eliminative materialism "self-undermining." o But perhaps eliminativists can appeal to neural states (perhaps in connectionist terms) in way of explaining assertion, and speak of "holistic patterns of neural activation."

What is analytical functionalism vs empirical functionalism?

o [These kinds of functionalism are not based on a computational model.] o [Analytic functionalism focuses on mental states referred to in everyday language. It defines the meaning of those mental terms in a functional way.] -Analytic functionalism defines the meaning that in everyday life we do attribute to mental state terms.] -o Analytic functionalism is a priori. It tries to "capture what is meant by commonsense uses of mental terms such as 'belief' and 'desire.'" [It sees functionalism as representing what we actually mean by those terms.] o Empirical functionalism (sometimes called "psycho-functionalism") is a posteriori. [It's content is understood to depend on the current state of psychological research. It sees functionalism as the best way to interpret that research.] o [Empirical functionalism focuses on mental states as defined by psychological research. It interprets the findings of psychology in a functionalist way. -So, for example, it might construct a theory of memory in terms of a concept of memory trace, and functionally explain memory traces (in terms of perceptual inputs, behavioural outputs and other mental states.] [Empirical functionalism defines the meaning that scientists should attribute to mental state terms.

How do pain and C-fibres correlate?

o [This brings us to a common example in the debate over neural correlates.] o One possible correlation for pain is "c-fibre firing." This is now regarded as a simplistic account, and has been superseded. Also, technically speaking, c-fibres are in the peripheral nervous system. Nonetheless, c-fibre firing has been used in discussion as a standard example of a neural correlate representative of brain states.

The brain is modelled by __________"in which large numbers of simplified neurons are connected to each other by connections with varied and modifiable connection 'weights.' Such weighted connections can be though of as emulations of synapses of varying strengths." Learning is modelled by introducing changes in_________.

via artificial neural networks (ANNs): "connection weights."

What are the dualistic alternatives the Cartesian interactionism?

• Denial of interaction means that your intention exerts no control over your body (hand-raising example), and that perceptions are not caused by external events (toe-stubbing example). One option explored by substance dualists is to deny that there is any mind-body interaction. From the point of view of common sense, the denial of mind-body interaction is downright disturbing. It looks like, on such a proposal, your intention to raise your hand has no effect on whether your hand gets raised. That you have control over your body would then be a kind of illusion. Note, however, that a substance dualist who denies causal interaction does not have to affirm that it is a mere coincidence that certain mental happenings are synchronized with certain physical happenings. Historically, there have been two developments of the idea that there is no causal interaction between mind and body, both of which don't make it a mere coincidence that there's an ordered pattern of relationships between mental events and physical events. These two views are known as occasionalism and parallelism.

What was princess Elisabeth's objection?

• How can something non-spatial causally interact with something spatial? ◦ Spatiality is an aspect of being material. But if something immaterial (the mind) is in a causal relation with something material, that would seem to mean that something non-spatial is in that relation with something spatial. ◦ Consider how being located in space is involved in the collision of two billiard balls. ◦ There is no "action from a distance," even in cases which suggest otherwise, such as magnetism.

What is the Silicon Chip Thought replacement experiment? (Description and hypothesis)

• In favor of Strong AI • Imagine having each of the "neurons in your brain replaced by a silicon microchip" that copies the function of the cell it replaces (i.e., receiving and sending electro-chemical impulses). o Analogy to body replacement parts - functionally equivalent mechanical analogs for eyeballs (cameras), ears (microphones), hands (robotic mechanisms with sensors), etc. All signally functionality is replicated. "There would be no difference in the way things look through the eyes," etc. Say only your central nervous system remains; you would still "perceive the world in all the same ways as before." • If only one neuron is replaced, there would likely be "no noticeable change in you mental life" - you would have the "same sorts of thoughts and experiences." • Say all trillions of them were replaced, one by one. What would be the felt effect? o Hypothesis 1: At some point you feel your mental life change. o Hypothesis 2: At no point do you feel your mental life change. • In other words, "will there be a mental difference between neural-you and microchip-you"? o Same behaviour; responses to stimuli will not change ("blue coffee mug" example). o Same memories; information storage capability and learning capability will not change. o Your capacity to notice changes will itself not change. This is because there will be no change to your ability to store memories (see above) or your ability to process information (see stoplight example: "You will notice no change in the light"). -Suppose Hypothesis 1 is true, and you "undergo a change in your mental life and perhaps a qualia inversion during the series of neural replacements ... You wouldn't notice any such change ... Your memories will all be the same as before, including you memories of what qualia you had" because, as per the thought experiment, chip replacement will not affect your memories and "you won't gain any information that you wouldn't have gained with just a neural brain." -This suggests that a chip mind is theoretically possible and that having one would be indistinguishable from a neural mind.

What is the problem of intentionality?

◦ "Intentionality" refers to the relationship between a thinker and what they think about. ◦ This is a complex relation which, for example, we can hold to things that do not even exist. What sort of relation is it that takes place between a thinker and the things the thinker thinks about? This problem is the problem of intentionality. Another way of stating the problem is in terms of "aboutness." When we think, we think about things. I'm thinking about the planet Jupiter right now. Jupiter is one thing; my thought about it is another. But what is this "aboutness"? Is it a relation between Jupiter and me? If aboutness is a rela- tion, then it looks like it's a very weird sort of relation. One thing that's really weird about "aboutness" is that I can think about things that don't even exist.

What is the substance dualism of Rene Descartes (mind body problem)?

◦ Minds are zero-volume thinking things. ◦ Physical bodies have volume but do not think. ◦ Problem of interaction: minds and bodies seem to affect each other (exploding car example). Causation requires proximity (lighting fuse, boiling water, healing wound, even turning on a television with a remote). But minds are not located in space. ◦ Avoiding this problem seems to call for one of the two kinds of monism. ◦ Problem with physical monism: "No amount of investigation of my brain from the outside seems sufficient to reveal the nature of my qualia."

What is the problem of free will?

◦ The idea of free will is an important element of our idea of moral responsibility. ◦ But if everything is predetermined then we do not even have free will, and the very idea of it is mistaken. Everything that a person does is actually something that they were made to do by a complicated network of causes involving both biological and societal factors. Or maybe not. The problem of free will, is the problem of whether there is any, and if so, what its nature is.