Poli 410 Exam 3

Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority (1985)

APPELLANT Garcia APPELLEE San Antonio Metro. Transit Authority LOCATION San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority DOCKET NO. 82-1913 DECIDED BY Burger Court (1981-1986) CITATION 469 US 528 (1985) REARGUED Oct 1, 1984 DECIDED Feb 19, 1985 ARGUED Mar 19, 1984 ADVOCATES William T. Coleman, Jr. Argued the cause for the appellees Theodore B. Olson Argued the cause for the appellants Laurence Stephen Gold Argued the cause for the appellant Rex E. Lee Reargued the cause for appellant, Donovan, in No. 82-1951 Facts of the case The San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority (SAMTA), the main provider of transportation in the San Antonio metropolitan area, claimed it was exempt from the minimum-wage and overtime requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act. SAMTA argued that it was providing a "traditional" governmental function, which exempted it from federal controls according to the doctrine of federalism established in National League of Cities v. Usery (1976). Joe G. Garcia, an employee of SAMTA, brought suit for overtime pay under Fair Labor Standards Act. Question Did principles of federalism make the San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority immune from the Fair Labor Standards Act? Conclusion In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that the guiding principles of federalism established in National League of Cities v. Usery were unworkable and that SAMTA was subject to Congressional legislation under the Commerce Clause. The Court found that rules based on the subjective determination of "integral" or "traditional" governmental functions provided little or no guidance in determining the boundaries of federal and state power. The Court argued that the structure of the federal system itself, rather than any "discrete limitations" on federal authority, protected state sovereignty.

Perez v. U.S. (1971)

FACTS Plaintiff was convicted of loan sharking, which violated the Consumer Credit Protection Act. He argued that the law regulating loan sharking was unconstitutional because Congress has exceeded its interstate commerce clause authority. He argued at trial that there was no true "interstate activity" occurring in the act of loan sharking. ISSUE Is the regulation of loan sharking a violation of the interstate commerce clause? HOLDING Yes, affirmed. Congress provided a "rational basis" for believing that the activity they sought to regulate impacted interstate commerce. The court held that "loan sharks who use extortionate means to collect payments on loans are in a class largely controlled by organized crime with a substantially adverse effect on interstate commerce." Congress was provided with reports which stated that these intrastate loan sharking activities were related to national organized crime efforts. It was a way for the national organization to finance its interstate activities at the national level. In regulating interstate commerce, Congress may regulate those activities which obstruct the flow of interstate commerce, such as the destruction of aircrafts; activities that impact interstate commerce, such as loan sharking; and the utilization of "channels" of commerce, such as with stolen goods.

Williamson v. Lee Optical Company (1955)

Facts of the Case An Oklahoma law prohibited persons who were not licensed optometrists or ophthalmologists to fit lenses for eyeglasses. Non-licensed individuals were also prohibited from duplicating optical instruments without written prescriptions from licensed ophthalmologists. The Lee Optical Company challenged the law, bringing a suit against the state Attorney General, Mac Q. Williamson. Question Did the Oklahoma law violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? Conclusion Decision: 8 votes for Williamson, 0 vote(s) against Legal provision: Equal Protection In a unanimous decision, the Court held that while the law may have been "needless" and "wasteful," it was the duty of the legislature, not the courts, "to balance the advantages and disadvantages of the new requirement." The Court emphasized that "[t]he day is gone when this Court uses the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down state laws, regulatory of business and industrial conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of thought."

Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co. (1922)

Facts of the Case As an exercise of its taxing powers Congress enacted the Revenue Act of 1919, also called the Child Labor Tax Law. Under the law, companies employing children under fourteen years of age would be assessed ten percent of their annual profits. During the same year in which the act was passed, Drexel Furniture Company was found in violation of it and required to pay over $6000 in taxes, which it did under protest. Question Did Congress violate the Constitution in adopting the Child Labor Tax Law in attempting to regulate the employment of children, a power reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment? Conclusion Yes. The Court found that the Child Labor Tax Law was in violation of the Constitution as it intruded on the jurisdiction of states to adopt and enforce child labor codes. Chief Justice Taft argued that the tax law in question did much more than simply impose an "incidental restraint" but exerted a "prohibitory and regulatory effect" in a realm over which Congress had no jurisdiction. Taft feared that upholding this law would destroy state sovereignty and devastate "all constitutional limitation of the powers of Congress" by allowing it to disguise future regulatory legislation in the cloak of taxes.

South Carolina v. Baker (1988)

Facts of the Case In 1982, Congress passed the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act (TEFRA). The statute removed the federal income tax exemption for interest earned on publicly offered long-term bonds issued by state and local governments unless they were issued in registered form. South Carolina declared that both bearer and registered bonds issued by states and municipalities had been free from taxation since Pollock v. Farmer's Loan and Trust Co (1895). The federal government claimed that the Act did not eliminate the state's power to issue bonds free from taxation; rather it regulated the types of bonds to be exempt. Question Did the TEFRA violate the Tenth Amendment and intergovernmental tax immunity? Conclusion Decision: 7 votes for Baker, 1 vote(s) against Legal provision: Internal Revenue Code The Court found that its subsequent decisions overruled Pollock so that state bond interest is not immune from a nondiscriminatory federal tax. Therefore, the owners of state bonds have no constitutional authority to exempt taxes on the earned income. TEFRA imposes no direct tax on the states; it is only collected from bondholders. The Act is nondiscriminatory because the regulations are imposed on the federal government as well as the state governments.

The Slaughterhouse Cases (1873)

Facts of the Case Louisiana had created a partial monopoly of the slaughtering business and gave it to one company. Competitors argued that this created "involuntary servitude," abridged "privileges and immunities," denied "equal protection of the laws," and deprived them of "liberty and property without due process of law." Question Did the creation of the monopoly violate the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments? Conclusion Decision: 5 votes for , 4 vote(s) against Legal provision: US Const. Amend. 13, 14, 15 No. The involuntary servitude claim did not forbid limits on the right to use one's property. The equal protection claim was misplaced since it was established to void laws discriminating against blacks. The due process claim simply imposes the identical requirements on the states as the fifth amendment imposes on the national government. The Court devoted most of its opinion to a narrow construction of the privileges and immunities clause, which was interpreted to apply to national citizenship, not state citizenship.

Steward Machine Co. v. Davis (1937)

Facts of the Case The Steward Machine Company challenged the validity of a tax imposed by the Social Security Act. The Act established a federal payroll tax on employers; however, if employers paid taxes to a state unemployment compensation fund (created by the states subject to federal standards), they were allowed to credit those payments toward the federal tax. Question Did the Act arbitrarily impose taxes in violation of the Fifth Amendment or subvert principles of federalism? Conclusion In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that the tax under the Social Security Act was a constitutional exercise of congressional power. The Court found that the tax was uniform throughout the states and did not coerce the states in contravention of the Tenth Amendment. The Court took note of recent unemployment statistics from the years 1929 to 1936, maintaining that "[i]t is too late today for the argument to be heard with tolerance that in a crisis so extreme the use of the moneys of the nation to relieve the unemployed and their dependents is a use for any purpose narrower than the promotion of the general welfare. . .The nation responded to the call of the distressed."

Allgeyer v. Louisiana (1897)

Facts of the case A Louisiana statute prohibited foreign (out-of-state) insurance corporations from conducting business in Louisiana without maintaining at least one place of business and an authorized agent in the State. Louisiana implemented the statute as an exercise of its police powers, intending to protect its citizens from deceitful insurance companies. Allgeyer and Company violated this statute by purchasing insurance from a firm based in the State of New York which did not meet the requirements of the Louisiana law. Question Does the Louisiana law violate the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause which, according to Allegyer and Company, protects its liberty to enter into contracts with businesses of its choice? Conclusion Yes. In a unanimous decision, the Court found that the Louisiana statute deprived Allgeyer and Company of its liberty without due process of law as protected by the Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment. The Court reasoned that even though the Atlantic Mutual Insurance Company of New York did not maintain an office or agent in Louisiana, Allgeyer and Company could still, as it did, enter into a contract with Atlantic Mutual in the state of New York to insure its Louisiana property. Justice Peckham's opinion makes clear the linkage between an individual's economic liberty and the due process clause.

Cooley v. Board of Wardens (1852)

Facts of the case A Pennsylvania law required that all ships entering or leaving the port of Philadelphia hire a local pilot. Ships that fail to do so would be subject to a fine, which would go to a fund for retire pilots and their dependents. This fund was administered by the Board of Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia. Cooley was a ship owner. He refused to hire a local pilot and he also refused to pay the fine. Question Does the law violate the Commerce Clause of the Constitution? Conclusion According to Justice Curtis, who wrote the majority opinion, the pilotage law did not violate the Constitution. Congress had provided in 1789 that state pilotage laws should govern. Navigation was commerce; and, piloting was navigation. Though the subject to be regulated was commerce, the interesting twist here was whether the Commerce Power was exclusive. Some subjects demand a single uniform rule for the whole nation, while others, like pilotage, demand diverse local rules to cope with varying local conditions. The power of Congress was therefore selectively exclusive.

Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff (1984)

Facts of the case After extensive hearings in the mid-1960s, the Hawaii legislature discovered that while Federal and State governments owned nearly 49 percent of the land in Hawaii, another 47 percent was owned by only 72 private landowners. To combat this concentration of ownership, the legislature enacted the Land Reform Act of 1967. The Act adopted a method of redistribution in which title in real property could be taken from lessors and transferred to lessees. Frank E. Midkiff, a landholder, challenged the Act. Question Did the Land Reform Act of 1967 violate the Public Use Clause of the Fifth Amendment? Conclusion In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the Public Use Clause did not preclude Hawaii from taking title in real property, with just compensation, for the purpose of reducing the concentration of ownership. Noting that Hawaii's statute was rationally related to a conceivable public purpose, the Court argued that "debates over the wisdom of takings" were best carried out by legislatures, not by federal courts. The Court also held that the fact that the property taken by eminent domain was transferred to private beneficiaries did not condemn the law to having a solely private purpose.

BMW of North America v. Gore (1996)

Facts of the case After purchasing a new vehicle from an authorized Alabama BMW dealership, Ira Gore, Jr. discovered that his new vehicle had been repainted. He sued BMW's American distributor (BMW), alleging that it committed fraud by failing to inform him that his car had been repainted. The Alabama Circuit Court entered judgment, following a jury verdict, awarding Gore $4,000 in compensatory damages and $4 million in punitive damages. On appeal from the trial judge's denial of BMW's post-trial petition to set aside the punitive damages as 'grossly excessive,' the Alabama Supreme Court ruled that the punitive damages were not so excessive as to violate BMW's Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. Due to a jury calculation error, however, the Alabama Supreme Court reduced Gore's punitive damage award to $2 million. BMW appealed to the Supreme Court. Question Assuming that Gore's punitive damage award was grossly excessive, does the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause protect BMW from paying the award? Conclusion Yes. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that while a state may impose punitive damages to further its interest in deterring unlawful conduct, the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause prohibits states from imposing grossly excessive punishments on tort-feasors. In the present case, the punitive damage's excessive nature is indicated by the 500 to 1 ratio between the jury's punitive and actual damage awards, the relatively insignificant amount of damage, and the lack of statutory fines that remotely parallel the present award's magnitude. BMW's due process rights were also violated because it could not have possibly anticipated, nor did it receive fair notice, that it might face such a severe punishment.

United States v. Lopez (1995)

Facts of the case Alfonzo Lopez, a 12th grade high school student, carried a concealed weapon into his San Antonio, Texas high school. He was charged under Texas law with firearm possession on school premises. The next day, the state charges were dismissed after federal agents charged Lopez with violating a federal criminal statute, the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990. The act forbids "any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that [he] knows...is a school zone." Lopez was found guilty following a bench trial and sentenced to six months' imprisonment and two years' supervised release. Question Is the 1990 Gun-Free School Zones Act, forbidding individuals from knowingly carrying a gun in a school zone, unconstitutional because it exceeds the power of Congress to legislate under the Commerce Clause? Conclusion Yes. The possession of a gun in a local school zone is not an economic activity that might, through repetition elsewhere, have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. The law is a criminal statute that has nothing to do with "commerce" or any sort of economic activity.

Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways (1981)

Facts of the case An Iowa law restricted the length of vehicles traveling on its highways. Iowa justified the law as a reasonable use of its police power to assure safety on the state's roads. Question Did the law pose an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce? Conclusion The Court held that the law violated the Commerce Clause for two reasons. First, Iowa could not prove that the vehicles it targeted posed potential danger to highway travelers. The safety interest was "illusory." Second, the law was "out of step with the laws of all other Midwestern and Western States" which did not have similar regulations. This placed significant burdens on the flow of interstate commerce

Southern Pacific Company v. Arizona (1945)

Facts of the case Arizona banned operation of trains more than 14 passenger cars of 70 freight cars long. Question Was the Arizona law an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce? Conclusion Yes it was such a burden. The Arizona law imposed a stiff burden on the railroad. It had to operate 30 percent more trains in the state, and it had to break up and remake trains passing through the state. The total cost was several million dollars a year. Moreover, more trains would produce more accidents and the state's safety argument was empirically weak. The innovation in this decision was Stone's use of an "interest-balancing" standard of review, which proved more demanding than the earlier "rational basis" test.

United States v. Butler (1936)

Facts of the case As part of the 1933 Agricultural Adjustment Act, Congress implemented a processing tax on agricultural commodities, from which funds would be redistributed to farmers who promised to reduce their acreage. The Act intended to solve the crisis in agricultural commodity prices which was causing many farmers to go under. Question Did Congress exceed its constitutional taxing and spending powers with the Act? Conclusion The Court found the Act unconstitutional because it attempted to regulate and control agricultural production, an arena reserved to the states. Even though Congress does have the power to tax and appropriate funds, argued Justice Roberts, in this case those activities were "but means to an unconstitutional end," and violated the Tenth Amendment.

McCray v. United States (1904)

Facts of the case At the urging of dairy farmers, Congress passed an act imposing a tax of 10 cents per pound on oleomargarine that was artificially colored yellow. Noncolored margarine was taxed only one-quarter of a cent per pound. McCray, a licensed dealer, did not pay the higher tax while selling the colored product. After losing his case in lower courts, McCray appealed to the Supreme Court. Question Did the congressional act overstep the boundaries of the taxing powers established in the Constitution? Conclusion In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that the taxes levied on colored and noncolored oleomargarine were constitutional. The Court held that the right of Congress to tax within its delegated powers was essentially "unrestrained," and that "no want of due process of law could possibly result" from exercises of that power. The Court argued that to question the purpose and motive of Congress in exerting its delegated powers would be to "usurp the functions of the legislative in order to control that branch of the government in the performance of its lawful duties."

National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (2012)

Facts of the case Check out Oyez's deep-dive into the background of the Affordable Care Act cases. Amid intense public interest, Congress passed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), which became effective March 23, 2010. The ACA sought to address the fact that millions of Americans had no health insurance, yet actively participated in the health care market, consuming health care services for which they did not pay. The ACA contained a minimum coverage provision by amending the tax code and providing an individual mandate, stipulating that by 2014, non-exempt individuals who failed to purchase and maintain a minimum level of health insurance must pay a tax penalty. The ACA also contained an expansion of Medicaid, which states had to accept in order to receive Federal funds for Medicaid, and an employer mandate to obtain health coverage for employees. Shortly after Congress passed the ACA, Florida and 12 other states brought actions in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida seeking a declaration that the ACA was unconstitutional on several grounds. These states were subsequently joined by 13 additional states, the National Federation of Independent businesses, and individual plaintiffs Kaj Ahburg and Mary Brown. The plaintiffs argued that: (1) the individual mandate exceeded Congress' enumerated powers under the Commerce Clause; (2) the Medicaid expansions were unconstitutionally coercive; and (3) the employer mandate impermissibly interfered with state sovereignty. The District Court first addressed whether the plaintiffs had standing to bring the lawsuit. It determined that Brown had standing to challenge the minimum coverage provision because she did not have health insurance and had to make financial arrangements to ensure compliance with the provision, which would go into effect in 2014. The court further determined that Idaho and Utah had standing because each state had enacted a statute purporting to exempt their residents from the minimum coverage provision. The court also concluded that the Anti-Injunction Act did not bar the suit. The District Court then addressed the constitutional questions. It ruled that the individual mandate provision was not a valid exercise of Congress' commerce or taxing powers. The court held the entire act invalid because the mandate could not be severed from any other provision. The court dismissed the states' challenge to the employer mandates and granted judgment to the federal government on the Medicaid expansions, finding insufficient support for the contention that the spending legislation was unconstitutionally coercive. A panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed 2-to-1 the District Court's holdings as to the Medicaid expansions and the individual mandate. But it also reversed the District Court, holding that the individual mandate could be severed without invalidating the remainder of the ACA. Question Is the suit brought by respondents to challenge the minimum coverage provision of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act barred by the Anti-Injunction Act, 2 U.S.C. 7421(a)? Does Congress have power under Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, specifically under the Commerce Clause or the Taxing and Spending Clause, to require most Americans to purchase health insurance? Is the individual mandate severable from the ACA? Did Congress exceed its enumerated powers and violate principles of federalism when it pressured States into accepting conditions that Congress could not impose directly by threatening to withhold all federal funding under Medicaid, the single largest grant-in-aid program? Conclusion No; Yes, under the Taxing and Spending Clause; Unanswered; Yes. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., largely joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen G. Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan, authored the majority opinion. The Court reached the following conclusions: The justices unanimously agreed that the Anti-Injunction Act did not bar the suit. Congress did not intend that the payment for non-compliance with the Individual Mandate be a tax for purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act. Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, concluded that the Individual Mandate penalty is a tax for the purposes of the Constitution's Taxing and Spending Clause and is a valid exercise of Congressional authority. The payment is not so severe as to be coercive, is not limited to willful violations like fines for unlawful acts, and is collected by the Internal Revenue Service by normal means. As part of a jointly written dissenting opinion, Justices Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel Alito disagreed, arguing that because Congress characterized the payment as a penalty, to instead characterize it as a tax would amount to rewriting the Act. Chief Justice Roberts, with Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, concluded that the Individual Mandate was not a valid exercise of Congress' power to regulate commerce. The Commerce Clause allows Congress to regulate existing commercial activity, but not to compel individuals to participate in commerce. This would open a new realm of Congressional authority. Justice Ginsburg, as part of an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan disagreed with this conclusion, arguing that the Chief Justice's distinction between economic "activity" and "Inactivity" is ill-defined and unsupported by either the Court's precedents or the text of the Constitution. Furthermore, even if the distinction were permissible, individuals who fail to purchase insurance nonetheless frequently participate in the healthcare marketplace, substantially impacting healthcare commerce, and may therefore be regulated by Congress. Justice Thomas, in a separate dissent, added that the "substantial effects test" has encouraged Congress to push the limits of its power. The majority did not address the serverability question after concluding that the Individual Mandate was constitutional. Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito argued that the Individual Mandate and Medicaid expansion are inserverable, and that the entirety of the ACA is therefore unconstitutional. The provisions of the Act, they argue, are "closely interrelated," with the two unconstitutional provisions serving as "pillars." Chief Justice Roberts, with Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Breyer, Alito, and Kagan, concluded that the Medicaid expansion provisions was unconstitutionally coercive as written. Congress does not have authority under the Spending Clause to threaten the states with complete loss of Federal funding of Medicaid, if the states refuse to comply with the expansion. Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor disagreed, arguing, "Congress' authority to condition the use of federal funds is not confined to spending programs as first launched. The legislature may, and often does, amend the law." Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, concluded that the remainder of the Medicaid expansion provision, without the unconstitutional threat to completely withdraw Medicaid funding, could stand as a valid exercise of Congress' power under the Spending Clause. Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito argued that the Court does not have the power to remedy the unconstitutional expansion as written. Such power should be vested exclusively in Congress.

Penn Central Transportation Company v. New York City (1978)

Facts of the case The New York City Landmarks Preservation Law of 1965 empowered the city to designate certain structures and neighborhoods as "landmarks" or "landmark sites." Penn Central, which owned the Grand Central Terminal (opened in 1913), was not allowed to construct a multistory office building above it. Question Did the restriction against Penn Central constitute a "taking" in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments? Conclusion No. The Court held that the restrictions imposed did not prevent Penn Central from ever constructing above the terminal in the future. New York's objection was to the nature of the proposed construction and not to construction in general implemented to "enhance" the Terminal. Preventing the construction of a 50-plus story addition above the station was a reasonable restriction substantially related to the general welfare of the city.

Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857)

Facts of the case Dred Scott was a slave in Missouri. From 1833 to 1843, he resided in Illinois (a free state) and in an area of the Louisiana Territory, where slavery was forbidden by the Missouri Compromise of 1820. After returning to Missouri, Scott sued unsuccessfully in the Missouri courts for his freedom, claiming that his residence in free territory made him a free man. Scott then brought a new suit in federal court. Scott's master maintained that no pure-blooded Negro of African descent and the descendant of slaves could be a citizen in the sense of Article III of the Constitution. Question Was Dred Scott free or slave? Conclusion Dred Scott was a slave. Under Articles III and IV, argued Taney, no one but a citizen of the United States could be a citizen of a state, and that only Congress could confer national citizenship. Taney reached the conclusion that no person descended from an American slave had ever been a citizen for Article III purposes. The Court then held the Missouri Compromise unconstitutional, hoping to end the slavery question once and for all.

West Coast Hotel v. Parrish (1937)

Facts of the case Elsie Parrish, an employee of the West Coast Hotel Company, received sub-minimum wage compensation for her work. Parrish brought a suit to recover the difference between the wages paid to her and the minimum wage fixed by state law. Question Did the minimum wage law violate the liberty of contract as construed under the Fifth Amendment as applied by the Fourteenth Amendment? Conclusion In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that the establishment of minimum wages for women was constitutionally legitimate. The Court noted that the Constitution did not speak of the freedom of contract and that liberty was subject to the restraints of due process. The Court also noted that employers and employees were not equally "free" in negotiating contracts, since employees often were constrained by practical and economic realities. This was found to be especially true in the case of women. This case explicitly overruled the Court's decision in Adkins v. Children's Hospital (1923).

Wickard v. Filburn (1942)

Facts of the case Filburn was a small farmer in Ohio. He was given a wheat acreage allotment of 11.1 acres under a Department of Agriculture directive which authorized the government to set production quotas for wheat. Filburn harvested nearly 12 acres of wheat above his allotment. He claimed that he wanted the wheat for use on his farm, including feed for his poultry and livestock. Filburn was penalized. He argued that the excess wheat was unrelated to commerce since he grew it for his own use. Question Is the amendment subjecting Filburn to acreage restrictions in violation of the Constitution because Congress has no power to regulate activities local in nature? Conclusion According to Filburn, the act regulated production and consumption, which are local in character. The rule laid down by Justice Jackson is that even if an activity is local and not regarded as commerce, "it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce, and this irrespective of whether such effect is what might at some earlier time have been defined as 'direct' or 'indirect.'"

Munn v. Illinois (1877)

Facts of the case Illinois regulated grain warehouse and elevator rates by establishing maximum rates for their use. Question Did the state-imposed rates deny the warehouse and elevator owners equal protection and due process under the 14th Amendment? Conclusion No on both counts. Waite, for the Court, took a broad view of the state's police power. He argued that the states may regulate the use of private property "when such regulation becomes necessary for the public good." Waite resurrected an ancient legal doctrine to support his view: "When property is affected with a public interest, it ceases to be juris privati only."

Proprietors of Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of Warren Bridge (1837)

Facts of the case In 1785, the Massachusetts legislature incorporated the Charles River Bridge Company to construct a bridge and collect tolls. In 1828, the legislature established the Warren Bridge Company to build a free bridge nearby. Unsurprisingly, the new bridge deprived the old one of traffic and tolls. The Charles River Bridge Company filed suit, claiming the legislature had defaulted on its initial contract. Question Did the legislature enter into an economic contract with the Charles River Bridge Company that was impaired by the second charter in violation of Article I Section 10 of the Constitution? Conclusion In a 5-to-2 decision, the Court held that the state had not entered a contract that prohibited the construction of another bridge on the river at a later date. The Court held that the legislature neither gave exclusive control over the waters of the river nor invaded corporate privilege by interfering with the company's profit-making ability. In balancing the rights of private property against the need for economic development, the Court found that the community interest in creating new channels of travel and trade had priority.

Fletcher v. Peck (1810)

Facts of the case In 1795, the Georgia state legislature passed a land grant awarding territory to four companies. The following year, however, the legislature voided the law and declared all rights and claims under it to be invalid. In 1800, John Peck acquired land that was part of the original legislative grant. He then sold the land to Robert Fletcher three years later, claiming that past sales of the land had been legitimate. Fletcher argued that since the original sale of the land had been declared invalid, Peck had no legal right to sell the land and thus committed a breach of contract. Question Could the contract between Fletcher and Peck be invalidated by an act of the Georgia legislature? Conclusion In a unanimous opinion, the Court held that since the estate had been legally "passed into the hands of a purchaser for a valuable consideration," the Georgia legislature could not take away the land or invalidate the contract. Noting that the Constitution did not permit bills of attainder or ex post facto laws, the Court held that laws annulling contracts or grants made by previous legislative acts were constitutionally impermissible.

Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward (1819)

Facts of the case In 1816, the New Hampshire legislature attempted to change Dartmouth College-- a privately funded institution--into a state university. The legislature changed the school's corporate charter by transferring the control of trustee appointments to the governor. In an attempt to regain authority over the resources of Dartmouth College, the old trustees filed suit against William H. Woodward, who sided with the new appointees. Question Did the New Hampshire legislature unconstitutionally interfere with Dartmouth College's rights under the Contract Clause? Conclusion contract between private parties, with which the legislature could not interfere. The fact that the government had commissioned the charter did not transform the school into a civil institution. Chief Justice Marshall's opinion emphasized that the term "contract" referred to transactions involving individual property rights, not to "the political relations between the government and its citizens."

Stone v. Mississippi (1880)

Facts of the case In 1867, the provisional state legislature of Mississippi chartered the Mississippi Agricultural, Educational, and Manufacturing Aid Society. The Society was chartered to run a lottery for the next 25 years; however, in 1868, a new constitution ratified by the people outlawed lotteries in the state. John Stone and others associated with the Society were arrested in 1874 for running a lottery. The Society claimed they were protected by the provisions of their charter while the state declared that the subsequent enforcement legislation had repealed the grant. Question Did Mississippi violate the Contract Clause by repealing the Society's grant? Conclusion A unanimous Court found that the Mississippi classification of lotteries as outlawed acts was valid. The State legislature do not have the power to bind the decisions of the people and future legislatures. The Court stated that no legislation had the authority to bargain away the public health and morals. The Court viewed the lottery as a vice that threatened the public health and morals. The contracts protected in the Constitution are property rights, not governmental rights. Therefore, one can only obtain temporary suspension of the governmental rights (in this case, the right to outlaw actions) in a charter which can be revoked by the will of the people.

Adkins v. Children's Hospitals (1923)

Facts of the case In 1918, Congress enacted a law which guaranteed a minimum wage to women and children employed in the District of Columbia. This case was decided together with Children's Hospital v. Lyons. Question Did the law interfere with the ability of employers and employees to enter into contracts with each other without assuring due process of law, a freedom guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment? Conclusion The Court found that upholding the statute would dangerously extend the police power of the state and, thus, found it unconstitutional. Justice Sutherland recognized that the freedom of individuals to make contracts is not absolute and curtailments of this right may be justified in the face of "exceptional circumstances." However, in this case, the statute's implementation procedures were overly vague and did not act to regulate the character or method of wage payments, or the conditions and hours of labor, areas in which regulation to protect the public welfare were legitimate. The Congress simply had enacted a "price-fixing law."

Home Building & Loan Assoc. v. Blaisdell (1934)

Facts of the case In 1933, Minnesota enacted the Mortgage Moratorium Law in an effort to combat the economic emergency posed by the Great Depression. The law extended the time period in which borrowers could pay back their debts on property to lenders. The state argued that this was a legitimate use of its police powers since Minnesota faced massive economic difficulties. Question Did the Minnesota law violate both Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution which prevents a state from "impairing the Obligation of Contracts" and the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment? Conclusion The Court held that the law did not violate the Constitution. In his opinion, Chief Justice Hughes explored the relationship of emergency to constitutional power, the historical setting in which the Contract Clause was adopted, and its judicial development. Hughes argued that the sanctity of contracts in the United States and the Contract Clause, while important, had never been absolute or meant to be interpreted literally. Thus, in an attempt to "safeguard the vital interests of its people" a state could adopt legislation which had the effect of "modifying or abrogating contracts already in effect." Since the demands of the Great Depression were vital to all of the state's citizens, the law was a legitimate use of Minnesota's police power.

Berman v. Parker (1954)

Facts of the case In 1945, Congress passed the District of Columbia Redevelopment Act, creating the District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency, whose purpose would be to identify and redevelop blighted areas of Washington, D.C. Congress gave the new agency the power of eminent domain - the ability to seize private property with just compensation. Berman and the other appellants owned a department store in one blighted area targeted by the commission and objected to the seizing of their property solely for beautification of the area. The landowners brought a civil suit in federal district court challenging the constitutionality of the Act. Their case was dismissed. They then appealed directly to the U.S. Supreme Court. Question Did the seizing of Berman and the other appellants' property for the purpose of beautification and redevelopment of the community violate the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment? Conclusion No. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice William O. Douglas, the Court found that the Fifth Amendment does not limit Congress' power to seize private property with just compensation to any specific purpose. The Court concluded that the power to determine what values to consider in seizing property for public welfare is Congress' alone. "If those who govern the District of Columbia decide that the Nation's Capital should be beautiful as well as sanitary, there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment that stands in the way."

Horne v. Department of Agriculture (2015)

Facts of the case In 1949 the U.S. Department of Agriculture implemented the Marketing Order Regulating the Handling of Raisins Produced from Grapes Grown in California (Marketing Order). The Marketing Order authorized the federal government to reserve a percentage of the yearly California raisin crop to stabilize the supply, and thus the price, of California raisins. Under the Marketing Order, farmers are entitled to a share of the proceeds acquired when, or if, the government sells the reserved raisins. Marvin Horne, a farmer and raisin producer, attempted to skirt the Marketing Order by processing his own raisins, which he claimed exempted his raisins from the Marketing Order's reserve requirement. The Department of Agriculture claimed Horne's raisins were still subject to the Market Order, and following administrative proceedings, Horne was fined nearly $700,000. Horne sued the Department of Agriculture and claimed that the Marketing Order violated his Fifth Amendment rights against uncompensated takings. The district court found in favor of the Department of Agriculture. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that it lacked standing to address Horne's claim, because Fifth Amendment takings claims are within the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims. The United States Supreme Court held that the appellate court did have jurisdiction and remanded the case. On remand, the appellate court found for the Department of Agriculture by holding that the reserve requirement did not act as a per se taking because Horne's raisins constituted personal property rather than real property. The appellate court also held that the Marketing Order did not constitute a taking because there was a sufficient nexus, and rough proportionality, between the reserve requirement and the specific interest the government seeks to protect, which in this case is the government's interest in stabilizing raisin prices. Question (1) Does the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment apply only to real property? (2) Can the government avoid the duty to pay just compensation for the physical taking of property by reserving the property owner a contingent interest in the value of the property? (3) Does a per se taking occur when the government mandates the relinquishment of specific, identifiable property as a condition of permission to engage in commerce? Conclusion No, no, yes. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 8-1 majority. The Court held that the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment applies with equal force to personal as well as real property; therefore the Marketing Order's reserve requirement constituted a taking under the Fifth Amendment because it deprives the owners of their property rights to "possess, use, and dispose of" the raisins. Because a physical taking has occurred, returning the net proceeds of the sale of the raisins to the owners does not exempt the government from paying just compensation for the taking itself. The Court also held that making the reserve requirement a condition on legally participating in the raisin market effects a per se taking because it cannot be properly characterized as a voluntary exchange for a governmental benefit. Therefore, the government should pay a just compensation for the taking, which the government has already calculated in its attempt to fine the Hornes the fair market value of the raisins at issue, by rescinding the fine it had imposed. In his concurring opinion, Justice Thomas wrote that the Takings Clause only requires the government to pay just compensation when the taking results in a public legal right to the property. Because it is not clear that such a right is being granted when the government enforces the reserve requirement, there is no reason to calculate what such "just compensation" would be in this case. Justice Stephen G. Breyer wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in which he argued that the Court should remand the case to the appellate court to calculate what "just compensation" should be in this case. If the Marketing Order is determined to afford just compensation, when taking into account the benefit to the market that the reserve requirement confers, then the reserve requirement does not violate the Takings Clause. Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Elena Kagan joined in the partial concurrence and partial dissent. Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote a dissent in which she argued that a per se taking only occurs when the government deprives an individual of every property right regarding the property in question. Because the reserve requirement allows the owner to retain interest in the property in the form of the net proceeds from the disposition of the raisins, the Marketing Order does not deprive the individual of all property rights and therefore is not a per se taking. Justice Sotomayor also argued that precedent establishes that the government may require an individual to give up some property rights as a condition of engaging in regulated commerce.

U.S. v. Kahriger (1953)

Facts of the case In 1951, Congress adopted the Gamblers' Occupational Tax Act which required gamblers to register with the Collector of Internal Revenue and levied a tax on their gambling income. Question Did the Act violate the Fifth and Tenth Amendments? Conclusion The Court upheld the law. Justice Reed argued that the law did not violate a person's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination because under its registration provisions, individuals were "not compelled to confess to acts already committed." The statute simply informed people who wanted to "engage in the business of wagering" that they would be required to "fulfill certain conditions." The Tenth Amendment was not offended as Reed found that the tax produced revenue and was not inconsistent with similar taxes which the Court had previously approved.

Champion v. Ames (1903)

Facts of the case The defendants in the case were arrested and convicted under an Act of Congress of 1895 that made it illegal to send or conspire to send lottery tickets across state lines. Question Did the transport of lottery tickets by independent carriers constitute "commerce" that Congress could regulate under the Commerce Clause? Conclusion In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that lottery tickets were indeed "subjects of traffic," and that independent carriers may be regulated under the Commerce Clause. The Court emphasized the broad discretion Congress enjoys in regulating commerce, noting that this power "is plenary, is complete in itself, and is subject to no limitations except such as may be found in the Constitution." The Court argued that Congress was merely assisting those states that wished to protect public morals by prohibiting lotteries within their borders.

Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission (1977)

Facts of the case In 1972, the North Carolina Board of Agriculture adopted a regulation that required all apples shipped into the state in closed containers to display the USDA grade or nothing at all. Washington State growers(whose standards are higher than the USDA) challenged the regulation as an unreasonable burden to interstate commerce. North Carolina stated it was a valid exercise of its police powers to create "uniformity" to protect its citizenry from "fraud and deception." Question Did the North Carolina regulation violate the Commerce Clause by placing an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce? Conclusion The Court voted unanimously that the North Carolina regulation was an unconstitutional exercise of the state's power over interstate commerce. Although the regulation was facially neutral, it had a discriminatory impact on the Washington growers while shielding the local growers from the same burden. The regulation removed the competitive advantage gained by the Washington apples from stricter inspection standards. The regulation produced a leveling effect that works to the local advantage by "downgrading" apples from other states unjustly. Therefore, the regulation places an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce.

Allied Structural Steel Company v. Spannaus (1978)

Facts of the case In 1974, Minnesota adopted legislation which required private employers to pay a fee if they terminated employee pension plans or if they moved their offices from the state, leaving insufficient funds to cover pensions for ten-year employees. This law affected Allied Structural Steel as the company began closing offices in Minnesota. Even though the employees affected by the closing were not entitled to pensions under the terms of their employment with the company, according to the Minnesota law, they were. The company was ordered to pay approximately $185,000 to comply with the statute's provisions. Question Did Minnesota's Private Pension Benefits Protection Act violate the Contract Clause of the Constitution? Conclusion The Court found that the Minnesota law did violate the Constitution as it "substantially altered" the provisions of pension agreements which Allied Steel had with its employees. Citing the importance that the Framers placed on private contracts in the conduct of business, Justice Stewart found that the act's effect was "severe" as it nullified terms of t he company's obligations to its employees and imposed an "unexpected liability in potentially disabling amounts." Furthermore, the law was narrowly targeted at employers who had decided to establish employee pension plans, and it did not seek to deal with broad economic and social problems.

Capital Cities Cable v. Crisp (1984)

Facts of the case In 1980, Oklahoma's Attorney General determined that the re-broadcasting of out-of-state alcoholic beverage commercials by Oklahoma cable television stations violated the State's ban against advertising alcoholic beverages. Richard Crisp, the Director of Oklahoma's Alcoholic Beverage Control Board, warned the offending cable operators that their continued transmission of banned beverage commercials would result in criminal prosecution. In response, and on behalf of other cable operators, Capital Cities Cable challenged the constitutionality of Oklahoma's advertising ban. On appeal from the Tenth Circuit's reversal of a district court decision favoring Capital Cities Cable, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. Question Did Oklahoma's ban against retransmitting out-of-state cable signals containing alcoholic beverage commercials violate the Supremacy or Commerce Clauses? Conclusion The Court held unanimously that Oklahoma's ban on local cable transmissions of out-of-state alcoholic beverage commercials violated both the Supremacy and Commerce Clauses. While Oklahoma can regulate local cable aspects, such as franchise formation and construction, it cannot tamper with the flow of information from other states. Such tampering violates the Federal Communication Commission's guidelines prohibiting the censorship or alteration of interstate broadcast signals. As such, in the interest of maintaining diverse program offerings and encouraging competition among cable providers, the FCC's guidelines supercede Oklahoma's local regulatory authority. Moreover, despite its broad power under the Twenty-first Amendment to regulate the importation and use of intoxicating liquor, the Court held that the federal government retains final authority under the commerce clause to regulate all aspects of interstate liquor commerce. Therefore, Oklahoma's continued ban on interstate alcoholic advertising violated the Commerce Clause.

South Dakota v. Dole (1987)

Facts of the case In 1984, Congress enacted legislation ordering the Secretary of Transportation to withhold five percent of federal highway funds from states that did not adopt a 21-year-old minimum drinking age. South Dakota, a state that permitted persons 19 years of age to purchase alcohol, challenged the law. Question Did Congress exceed its spending powers, or violate the Twenty-first Amendment, by passing legislation conditioning the award of federal highway funds on the states' adoption of a uniform minimum drinking age? Conclusion No. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that Congress, acting indirectly to encourage uniformity in states' drinking ages, was within constitutional bounds. The Court found that the legislation was in pursuit of "the general welfare," and that the means chosen to do so were reasonable. The Court also held that the Twenty-first Amendment's limitations on spending power were not prohibitions on congressional attempts to achieve federal objectives indirectly. The five percent loss of highway funds was not unduly coercive.

Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council (1992)

Facts of the case In 1986, Lucas bought two residential lots on the Isle of Palms, a South Carolina barrier island. He intended to build single-family homes as on the adjacent lots. In 1988, the state legislature enacted a law which barred Lucas from erecting permanent habitable structures on his land. The law aimed to protect erosion and destruction of barrier islands. Lucas sued and won a large monetary judgment. The state appealed. Question Does the construction ban depriving Lucas of all economically viable use of his property amount to a "taking" calling for "just compensation" under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments? Conclusion Yes. In a 6-to-2 decision, the Court relied on the trial court's finding that Lucas's lots had been rendered valueless by the state law. "[W]hen the owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good...he has suffered a taking."

Katzenbach v. McClung (1964)

Facts of the case The owner of Ollie's Barbecue, in Birmingham Alabama, refused to serve blacks in apparent violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Part of the Act prevented restaurants serving interstate travelers, or receiving a substantial amount of their food from interstate commerce, from discriminating on the basis of race. Question Does a restaurant's refusal to serve blacks burden interstate commerce to an extent that Congress can legitimately prohibit such discrimination? Conclusion The Court found that discrimination in restaurants posed significant burdens on "the interstate flow of food and upon the movement on products generally." Furthermore, argued Justice Clark, discrimination also posed restrictions on blacks who traveled from state to state. Congress's solution to this problem was appropriate and within its bounds to regulate interstate commerce.

United States v. Morrison (2000)

Facts of the case In 1994, while enrolled at Virginia Polytechnic Institute (Virginia Tech), Christy Brzonkala alleged that Antonio Morrison and James Crawford, both students and varsity football players at Virginia Tech, raped her. In 1995, Brzonkala filed a complaint against Morrison and Crawford under Virginia Tech's Sexual Assault Policy. After a hearing, Morrison was found guilty of sexual assault and sentenced to immediate suspension for two semesters. Crawford was not punished. A second hearing again found Morrison guilty. After an appeal through the university's administrative system, Morrison's punishment was set aside, as it was found to be "excessive." Ultimately, Brzonkala dropped out of the university. Brzonkala then sued Morrison, Crawford, and Virginia Tech in Federal District Court, alleging that Morrison's and Crawford's attack violated 42 USC section 13981, part of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA), which provides a federal civil remedy for the victims of gender-motivated violence. Morrison and Crawford moved to dismiss Brzonkala's suit on the ground that section 13981's civil remedy was unconstitutional. In dismissing the complaint, the District Court found that that Congress lacked authority to enact section 13981 under either the Commerce Clause or the Fourteenth Amendment, which Congress had explicitly identified as the sources of federal authority for it. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals affirmed. Question Does Congress have the authority to enact the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 under either the Commerce Clause or Fourteenth Amendment? Conclusion No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that Congress lacked the authority to enact a statute under the Commerce Clause or the Fourteenth Amendment since the statute did not regulate an activity that substantially affected interstate commerce nor did it redress harm caused by the state. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court that [i]f the allegations here are true, no civilized system of justice could fail to provide [Brzonkala] a remedy for the conduct of...Morrison. But under our federal system that remedy must be provided by the Commonwealth of Virginia, and not by the United States." Dissenting, Justice Stephen G. Breyer argued that the majority opinion "illustrates the difficulty of finding a workable judicial Commerce Clause touchstone." Additionally, Justice David H. Souter, dissenting, noted that VAWA contained a "mountain of data assembled by Congress...showing the effects of violence against women on interstate commerce."

Gonzales v. Raich (2005)

Facts of the case In 1996 California voters passed the Compassionate Use Act, legalizing marijuana for medical use. California's law conflicted with the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA), which banned possession of marijuana. After the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) seized doctor-prescribed marijuana from a patient's home, a group of medical marijuana users sued the DEA and U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft in federal district court. The medical marijuana users argued the Controlled Substances Act - which Congress passed using its constitutional power to regulate interstate commerce - exceeded Congress' commerce clause power. The district court ruled against the group. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ruled the CSA unconstitutional as it applied to intrastate (within a state) medical marijuana use. Relying on two U.S. Supreme Court decisions that narrowed Congress' commerce clause power - U.S. v. Lopez (1995) and U.S. v. Morrison (2000) - the Ninth Circuit ruled using medical marijuana did not "substantially affect" interstate commerce and therefore could not be regulated by Congress. Question Does the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 801) exceed Congress' power under the commerce clause as applied to the intrastate cultivation and possession of marijuana for medical use? Conclusion No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the commerce clause gave Congress authority to prohibit the local cultivation and use of marijuana, despite state law to the contrary. Stevens argued that the Court's precedent "firmly established" Congress' commerce clause power to regulate purely local activities that are part of a "class of activities" with a substantial effect on interstate commerce. The majority argued that Congress could ban local marijuana use because it was part of such a "class of activities": the national marijuana market. Local use affected supply and demand in the national marijuana market, making the regulation of intrastate use "essential" to regulating the drug's national market. The majority distinguished the case from Lopez and Morrison. In those cases, statutes regulated non-economic activity and fell entirely outside Congress' commerce power; in this case, the Court was asked to strike down a particular application of a valid statutory scheme.

Missouri v. Holland (1920)

Facts of the case In December 1916, the United States and Great Britain entered into a treaty to protect a number of migratory birds in the U.S. and Canada. Congress passed the Migratory Bird Treaty Act in 1918 in order to facilitate enforcement of the treaty. When Ray P. Holland, the U.S. Game Warden, threatened to arrest citizens of Missouri for violating the Act, the state of Missouri challenged the treaty. Question Did the treaty infringe upon rights reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment? Conclusion No. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that the national interest in protecting the wildlife could be protected only by national action. The Court noted that the birds the government sought to protect had no permanent habitats within individual states and argued that "[b]ut for the treaty and the statute there soon might be no birds for any powers to deal with." The Court thus upheld the exercise of the treaty power and thus found no violation of the Tenth Amendment.

Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co. (2009)

Facts of the case In October 1998, Hugh Caperton filed suit against A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc. (Massey) for tortious interference, fraudulent misrepresentation, and fraudulent concealment. A state trial court in West Virginia rendered judgment against Massey and found it liable for $50 million in damages. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia granted review. However, prior to hearing, Mr. Caperton motioned for Justice Brent Benjamin to recuse himself. He argued that since Massey's C.E.O. had donated $3 million to Justice Benjamin's campaign to win a seat on the Supreme Court of Appeals, Justice Benjamin's participation would present a "constitutionally unacceptable appearance of impropriety." The motion was denied. In a 3-2 decision with Justice Benjamin voting in the majority, the Supreme Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and ordered it to dismiss the case. After its decision, the court granted Mr. Caperton's motion for rehearing, but once again denied his motion for Justice Benjamin to recuse himself. On rehearing, the court maintained in a 3-2 decision that the trial court should be reversed and the case dismissed. It reasoned that a forum selection clause in a contract between the parties made the trial court in West Virginia an improper venue. It also concluded that because the parties had previously adjudicated the dispute in a Virginia state trial court, the doctrine of res judicata did not allow this case to be retried. Question Did Justice Brent Benjamin's failure to recuse himself from participation in a case where one of the parties donated $3 million to his election campaign violate the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment? Conclusion Yes. The Supreme Court held that due process required that Justice Brent Benjamin recuse himself from participation in the case in question. With Justice Anthony M. Kennedy writing for the majority and joined by Justices John Paul Stevens, David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen G. Breyer, the Court stated that it need not find that Justice Benjamin was actually biased in his decision making in order to find invalid the decision in which he took part. Rather, it need merely be shown that "under a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and human weakness," Justice Benjamin's interest posed "a risk of actual bias" and thus he should have recused himself if his participation threatened the adequate implementation of due process. The Court stated that such a risk of bias exists where a judge has a "direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest," as Justice Benjamin did. Therefore, the Court reasoned, he improperly failed to recuse himself. Chief Justice John G. Roberts dissented and was joined by Justices Antonin G. Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel A. Alito. He argued that the majority imprudently expanded the standard for which a judge need recuse himself by merely showing a "probability of bias." He raised forty points of uncertainty that arise because of the majority's vague standard. Justice Scalia also wrote a separate dissenting opinion. He argued that the majority performed its duties poorly as a clarifying body by making an area of the law vastly more uncertain.

Maine v. Taylor (1986)

Facts of the case In order to protect its fisheries from parasites and non-native species, the state of Maine prohibited the importation of live baitfish. Robert J. Taylor, the owner of a bait business, violated the law and was prosecuted by Maine authorities. Question Did the Maine law unconstitutionally burden interstate commerce, violating the Commerce Clause? Conclusion No. In an 8-to-1 decision, the Court held that the limitation imposed by the Commerce Clause on state regulatory power was not absolute and that the States "retain[ed] authority under their general police powers to regulate matters of 'legitimate local concern.'" The Court found that Maine's ban on the importation oflive baitfish served a legitimate local purpose that could not adequately be served by available nondiscriminatory alternatives. The Court argued that the ban was not a simple case of "arbitrary discrimination against interstate commerce."

Granholm v. Heald (2005)

Facts of the case Michigan and New York laws allowed in-state wineries to directly ship alcohol to consumers but restricted the ability of out-of-state wineries to do so. In separate cases groups sued the states and argued the laws violated the U.S. Constitution's "dormant" commerce clause. The dormant commerce clause prohibited states from passing laws affecting interstate commerce, particularly laws favoring in-state business over out-of-state business. The states argued the laws were valid exercises of state power under the 21st Amendment, which ended federal Prohibition and allowed states to regulate alcohol importation. A federal district court ruled for Michigan. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ruled the Michigan law violated the dormant commerce clause and did not advance the core concerns of the 21st Amendment (such as temperance). A separate federal district court ruled against New York. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ruled the 21st Amendment allowed New York's law. Question Does a state law that allows in-state wineries to directly ship alcohol to consumers, but restricts the ability of out-of-state wineries to do so, violate the dormant commerce clause in light of the 21st Amendment? Conclusion Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court held that both states' laws violated the commerce clause by favoring in-state wineries at the expense of out-of-state wineries and did so without the authorization of the 21st Amendment. State authority to engage in such economic discrimination was not the purpose the 21st Amendment. Moreover, in modern cases, that amendment did not save state laws violating other provisions of the Constitution.

Lochner v. New York (1905)

Facts of the case The state of New York enacted a statute forbidding bakers to work more than 60 hours a week or 10 hours a day. Question Does the New York law violate the liberty protected by due process of the Fourteenth Amendment? Conclusion The Court invalidated the New York law. The majority (through Peckham) maintained that the statute interfered with the freedom of contract, and thus the Fourteenth Amendment's right to liberty afforded to employer and employee. The Court viewed the statute as a labor law; the state had no reasonable ground for interfering with liberty by determining the hours of labor.

Kelo v. City of New London (2005)

Facts of the case New London, a city in Connecticut, used its eminent domain authority to seize private property to sell to private developers. The city said developing the land would create jobs and increase tax revenues. Susette Kelo and others whose property was seized sued New London in state court. The property owners argued the city violated the Fifth Amendment's takings clause, which guaranteed the government will not take private property for public use without just compensation. Specifically, the property owners argued taking private property to sell to private developers was not public use. The Connecticut Supreme Court ruled for New London. Question Does a city violate the Fifth Amendment's takings clause if the city takes private property and sells it for private development, with the hopes the development will help the city's bad economy? Conclusion No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the majority held that the city's taking of private property to sell for private development qualified as a "public use" within the meaning of the takings clause. The city was not taking the land simply to benefit a certain group of private individuals, but was following an economic development plan. Such justifications for land takings, the majority argued, should be given deference. The takings here qualified as "public use" despite the fact that the land was not going to be used by the public. The Fifth Amendment did not require "literal" public use, the majority said, but the "broader and more natural interpretation of public use as 'public purpose.'"

United States Trust Company of New York v. New Jersey (1977)

Facts of the case New York and New Jersey had established a Port Authority to enhance water-bound business between the two states. In 1974, the states repealed a 1962 bond agreement which limited the Authority to administer commercial and passenger railroad subsidies. Question In repealing the 1962 agreement, did the states violate the Contract Clause? Conclusion The repeal violated the Constitution. Justice Blackmun argued that the states could have implemented a less drastic solution to encourage people to use commuter train services in lieu of driving their cars. (State leaders thought the increase in bridge fares that would occur with the agreement's repeal would cause this to occur.) Furthermore, since the need to facilitate mass transportation in the New York metropolitan area had been a concern long before 1962, the states could not justify their action as a response to unforeseen circumstances.

Muller v. Oregon (1908)

Facts of the case Oregon enacted a law that limited women to ten hours of work in factories and laundries. Question Does the Oregon law violate a woman's freedom of contract implicit in the liberty protected by due process of the Fourteenth Amendment? Conclusion There was no constitutional violation. The factory and laundry owners claimed that there was no reasonable connection between the law and public health, safety, or welfare. In a famous brief in defense of the Oregon law, attorney Louis Brandeis elaborately detailed expert reports on the harmful physical, economic and social effects of long working hours on women. Brewer's opinion was based on the proposition that physical and social differences between the sexes warranted a different rule respecting labor contracts. Theretofore, gender was not a basis for such distinctions. Brewer's opinion conveyed the accepted wisdom of the day: that women were unequal and inferior to men.

Davis v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury (1989)

Facts of the case Paul Davis, a resident of Michigan, worked for the federal government and upon retirement received benefits. Michigan law exempts state retirement benefits from state taxes. Smith unsuccessfully petitioned for a refund on the state taxes he paid on his federal retirement benefits. He then filed suit in the Michigan Court of Claims arguing that the state's tax policy violated 4 U.S.C. 111 by taxing benefits paid to federal employees but not to state employees. The court dismissed his suit and so did the Michigan Court of Appeals. Question Did Michigan violate federal law when it exempted state and local government pensions from taxation but levied taxes on federal government pensions? Conclusion Yes. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion for an 8-1 court. The Court emphasized the principles of intergovernmental tax immunity, which work to keep one part of the government from hindering the operations of another part. Section 111 allows a state to tax income paid by the federal government "if the taxation does not discriminate against the officer or employee because of the source of the pay or compensation." Because the Court found no "significant differences between the two classes [federal and state employees]," it held that the Michigan tax distinguished between employees solely on "the source of the pay."

Nollan v. California Coastal Commission (1987)

Facts of the case The California Coastal Commission required owners of beachfront property wishing to obtain a building permit to maintain a pathway on their property open to the public. Question Did the requirement constitute a property taking in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments? Conclusion Yes. The Court agreed that a legitimate interest may be served by maintaining a "continuous strip of publicly accessible beach along the coast." However, reasoned Justice Scalia, if California wished to use its power of eminent domain to do so, it must provide just compensation to the Nollans and other beachfront property owners for the public use of their land.

Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. (1895)

Facts of the case The Constitution gave the states the power to impose direct taxation. The federal government could impose direct taxes as well, but only if those taxes were apportioned among the states in proportion to their representation in Congress. In this case the Court examined a national income tax passed by Congress in 1894. This case was decided together with Hyde v. Continental Trust Company of the City of New York. Question Was the income tax a direct tax in violation of the Constitution (Article I, Section 9)? Conclusion Yes. The Court held that the act violated the Constitution since it imposed taxes on personal income derived from real estate investments and personal property such as stocks and bonds; this was a direct taxation scheme, not apportioned properly among the states. The decision was negated by the adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913.

United States v. Causby (1946)

Facts of the case Thomas Lee Causby owned a chicken farm outside of Greensboro, North Carolina. The farm was located near an airport used regularly by the United States military. According to Causby, noise from the airport regularly frightened the animals on his farm, resulting in the deaths of several chickens. The problem became so severe that Causby was forced to abandon his business. Under an ancient doctrine of the common law, land ownership extended to the space above and below the earth. Using this doctrine as a basis, Causby sued the United States, arguing that he owned the airspace above his farm. By flying planes in this airspace, he argued, the government had confiscated his property without compensation, thus violating the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The United States Court of Claims accepted Causby's argument, and ordered the government to pay compensation. Question Did the flying of planes by the United States military over Causby's farm constitute a violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment? Conclusion Yes, to an extent. In a 5-2 opinion authored by Justice William O. Douglas, the Court concluded that the ancient common law doctrine "has no place in the modern world." Justice Douglas noted that, were the Court to accept the doctrine as valid, "every transcontinental flight would subject the operator to countless trespass suits. Common sense revolts at the idea." However, while the Court rejected the unlimited reach above and below the earth described in the common law doctrine, it also ruled that, "if the landowner is to have full enjoyment of the land, he must have exclusive control of the immediate reaches of the enveloping atmosphere." Without defining a specific limit, the Court stated that flights over the land could be considered a violation of the Takings Clause if they led to "a direct and immediate interference with the enjoyment and use of the land." Given the damage caused by the particularly low, frequent flights over his farm, the Court determined that the government had violated Causby's rights, and he was entitled to compensation. (Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone died on April 22; Justice Robert H. Jackson took no part in the consideration or decision in the case, leaving the court with 7 members.)

Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States (1964)

Facts of the case Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbade racial discrimination by places of public accommodation if their operations affected commerce. The Heart of Atlanta Motel in Atlanta, Georgia, refused to accept Black Americans and was charged with violating Title II. Question Did Congress, in passing Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, exceed its Commerce Clause powers by depriving motels, such as the Heart of Atlanta, of the right to choose their own customers? Conclusion The Court held that the Commerce Clause allowed Congress to regulate local incidents of commerce, and that the Civil Right Act of 1964 passed constitutional muster. The Court noted that the applicability of Title II was "carefully limited to enterprises having a direct and substantial relation to the interstate flow of goods and people. . ." The Court thus concluded that places of public accommodation had no "right" to select guests as they saw fit, free from governmental regulation.

Nebbia v. New York (1934)

Facts of the case To combat the effects of the Great Depression, New York adopted a Milk Control Law in 1933 which established a board empowered to set a minimum retail price for milk. Nebbia was a store owner who violated the law. Question Did the regulation violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? Conclusion No. In a case which included a lengthy discussion of the Due Process Clause, the Court held that since the price controls were not "arbitrary, discriminatory, or demonstrably irrelevant" to the policy adopted by the legislature to promote the general welfare, it was consistent with the Constitution. There was nothing "peculiarly sacrosanct" about prices which insulates them from government regulation, argued Justice Roberts.

Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal (1973)

Initially, where local regulation of airports was at issue, aviation interests, like the oil and gas interests in Pennsylvania, claimed that Interstate Commerce was being damaged by a patchwork of local regulation of airport noise and other impacts. Local authorities responded by calling upon the long tradition of local control of land use within their jurisdictions, including the use of the land by airports. In response, the United States Supreme Court in City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 U.S. 624 (1973) found that there was a need for "a uniform and exclusive system of federal regulation," Id. at 638-639, to protect Interstate Commerce. Despite this benchmark, the court in Burbank, as well as later courts, also upheld a local airport proprietor's right to impose reasonable, nondiscriminatory regulation on noise and land use to protect itself from liability for adverse noise and safety impacts. That right was only abrogated 17 years later, not by the Supreme Court, but by Congress' passage of the Airport Noise and Capacity Act, 49 U.S.C. § 47521, et seq., which effectively preempted any action that might be taken by local jurisdictions or airport sponsors to control the impacts of airports. The Pennsylvania court's decision on fracking in Pennsylvania may face the same fate. If the Pennsylvania Appellate Court's decision upholding local zoning withstands the scrutiny of the Pennsylvania State Supreme Court, the potential difference of that high court's opinion with those of other state high courts will open the way to the United States Supreme Court, and, ultimately, for Congressional intervention, either of which may have the unintended consequence of sealing the fate of local regulation of land use throughout the United States.

U.S. v. 50 Acres of Land (1984)

case regarding whether a public condemnee is entitled to consequential damages measured by the cost of acquiring a substitute facility if it has a duty to replace the condemned facility. The Court declined to award the costs of the substitute facility, holding that the Fifth Amendment does not require consequential damages when the market value of the condemned property is ascertainable and when there is no showing of manifest injustice. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_v._50_Acres_of_Land