Political Science 377
6 Clauses of NPT
1. Nuclear states don't transfer technology 2. Do not create nukes if you haven't 3. Allow inspections (ISE) 4. Everyone can build peaceful nuclear technology 5. Everyone can do peaceful nuclear explosions 6. Nuclear states work towards disarmament -differs from CBT (not ratified) that bans testing
3 goals of arms control
1. Reduce likelihood of war -reduce first strike advantage -increase second strike capability -decrease likelihood of accidents -spies 2. Reduce costs of war -move missiles away from cities BUT this makes it counterforce which makes first strike and thus war more likely 3. Reduce costs of preparing for war -secondary to reducing likelihood
Catalytic Nuclear Posturing
3rd party compellence, ability to assemble a handful of nuclear weapons, recessed and opaque management political gamble to accelerate third party assistance
Carrots and Sticks model
Applies to incomplete protection. Sticks is when a strong ally threatens to abandon its protection if a weak state tries to proliferate. Carrots is when a strong ally claims to be even more protective in order to convince the weak state not to proliferate.
2 Kinds of Nuclear Bombs
Fission bomb (atom bomb)=gun-type fission bomb similar to the one used on Hiroshima. Used to fire a piece of uranium at another, compressing them sufficiently. More commonly produced, dropped on nagasaki. Consists of sphere of plutonium and uranium surrounded by a shell of conventional explosives. When the explosives detonate, the shock compresses the central sphere of nuclear material to critical density , while at the same time an initiator releases several free neutrons to begin a chain reaction. Fusion bomb (hydrogen bomb)=occurs when 2 lighter elements combine with each other to form a single heavier atom, releasing large amounts of energy. Use 2 isotopes of hydrogen, tritium and deuterium, in their fusion. Requires extremely high temperatures and pressures to occur successfully, which is achieved in fusion bombs by including a smaller fission bomb that detonates first. Fusion bombs are much more destructive than fission bombs because they have a greater range. Fusion bombs are harder to make.
Fuhrmann, 2009
Main Argument: sharing nuclear technology is bad and can jump start a nuclear weapons program; lowers cost of weapons program -Participation in at least one nuclear cooperation agreement increases chances of starting bomb program by 500% Counterargument: Atoms for Peace speech by Eisenhower which encourages nuclear suppliers to share nuclear technology for peaceful purposes Empirical case: -nuclear program began in 1950s w help from US and Canada in 60s. -US trained scientists from Pakistan, UK and other countries helped too. -Defeat at hands of India in 1971 war→ initiated nuclear program. -Prime minister said that the population would starve if it meant they could get a bomb because they were scared of India's nuclear testing. - -Accumulation of help allowed Pakistan to develop technical base that was "equally adept" to India's. -Scientist stole blueprints from Netherlands and brought them to Pakistan. Stolen blueprints+know-how info from US and others→ proliferation
Tannenwald, 1999
Main Argument: there is a taboo against nuclear weapons (norms model) -Policy surrounding both weapons: first use banned in Geneva protocol of 1925 -Moral associations (for biological) disease is universally feared, doctors are supposed to cure illness so work on weapons is especially repugnant -Moral associations (for chemical) stigma from the Geneva protocol and association with bad states makes people less likely to use 3 normative effects: 1. Regulative: How norms constrain 2. Constitutive: Norms actor practices creates forms of behavior, roles, identities (defines 'civilized states') 3. Permissive: unintended consequences of the norm Casual mechanisms: -domestic public opinion, world opinion, personal conviction -No taboo until 1945, 1991 embeds it further Case: Nukes not used in Vietnam/Korea
Sagan, 1996
Main argument: 3 different models of explanation for bomb building -Security Model-build for security reasons (realism) -strong states build nuclear weapons -weak states join a nuclear alliance -policy implication: states will proliferate unless credible alliance exists ex. India and Pakistan -problem with this is you can't tell if a state is security seeking or expansionist -Domestic Policy Model-build as a tool to advance political interests (liberalism) 1.nuclear energy establishment 2. unites within military 3. individual politicians/mass public ex. South Africa regime change and legislators no longer wanted weapons; change from apartheid government they didn't want new government to have nuclear weapons ex. Libya discarded bomb because they were struggling economically and political elites encouraged build up -policy implications: intl financial institutions demanding military cuts for aid, provide more technical information to bring new members into anti proliferation, strict civilian control of military, NPT supports domestic anti proliferation groups -Norms Model-obtain nukes because it is the norm ex. France choosing to proliferate to retain great power status ex. Ukraine gave up weapons because didn't want to be considered rogue state Counterargument: each model counters the others -US readjust policy because they influence -symbol of power -NPT is good
Narang, 2010
Main argument: 3 types of nuclear posturing 1. Catalytic: Pakistan past 2. Assured Retaliation: China and India 3. Asymmetric Escalation: Pakistan now Pakistan changed Shift from catalytic to asymmetric→ first use strategy designed to blunt indian offensive and inflict unacceptable costs on india→ india's cold start doctrine=designed to launch immediate conventional counter strikes into pakistan→ many fear this will lead to terrorist attack on india→ indian invasion of pakistan triggering nuclear use by pakistan and nuclear retaliation by india
Hymans, 2006
Main argument: Argentina was a sportsmanlike nationalist and France was an oppositional nationalist -Argentina never actually proliferated -rivalry with Brazil but both operated based on actions of other -worked together to reach agreement when regimes changed -didn't want to join NPT because of nationalism -France was nationalist to retain power lost after WW2 and oppositional because of tensions with Germany Counterargument: domestic politics and norms
Kennedy, 1984
Main argument: Arms races do not cause war and the spiral model can be muted Deterrence Model: arms races do not cause war, fear causes war -preemptive war to counter short term threat -preventive war to counter long term threat Counterargument: Spiral Model: arms races cause war -upward spiral is not inevitable and can be muted Case: WW1 was a deterrence failure by Britain -Britain was suspicious of Germany but did not launch preventative war
Braut-Hegghammer, 2011
Main argument: Israel bombing Osirak triggered Saddam to launch weapons program that did not previously exist -most likely would have been able to create bomb had they not invaded Kuwait -preventative attacks can increase long-term risks: 1. solidify consensus among ruling elites about need for nukes 2. create a false sense of security in international community Counterargument: Israeli bombing delayed Iraq nuclear program
Kydd, 2015
Main argument: Korean unification will not happen unless China wants it to 2 drawbacks of unification: -possible contagion effect on China after NK collapse -fear US alliance on border 3 strategies for dealing with NK post Cold War: -negotiations aimed at freezing/eliminating with carrots or sticks -normalization of relations with SK -SK urged to pursue political/economic reform Strategies failed because: -NK wants to survive as a normal state -NK knows US and SK want its collapse -negotiations doomed from start Outline for deal: -NK leadership offered asylum in China -SK agree to unification and dismantle of nuclear program -US reduces role in Kore (withdraw military and scale back alliance) -problem of mistrust How to overcome mistrust: 1. negotiations kept secret 2. eventual agreement written down and made public 3. SK accepts reducing US role 4. conventional Korean capability retained; willingness to use and avoid encroachment Counterargument: wait for NK collapse -unplanned regime collapse could lead to war -China prefers NK to remain/reform/come closer to China-possibility of war with SK
Miller, 2001
Main argument: NMD is unnecessary -rogue states are not that different and can still be deterred -even the best NMD isn't perfect -may provoke more sophisticated arsenals from adversaries -abandoning ABM treaty Counterargument: NMD is good Case: Russia and China may build up arms
Payne, 2000
Main argument: National Missile Defense (NMD) is good because MAD deterrence no longer works -rogue states are more likely to take risks -technology of rogue states less advanced and make NMD success, technology, cost more feasible -people support it now more then before Counterargument: NMD is bad Case: North Korea is unpredictible
Lieber, Press, 2013
Main argument: Nuclear terrorist attacks are unlikely because states are unlikely to sponsor them -Why nuclear terrorism is unlikely: 1. only reason state would sponsor terrorism attack would be to remain anonymous but this is unlikely; attribution rates for conventional terrorist attacks are higher in US; relationship with number of fatalities and likelihood of attribution -Pakistan is only nuclear state that sponsors terrorism -US can deter state sponsored nuclear terrorism because of likelihood of tracing attack back to sponsor -doubtful a state would trust terrorist group this much 2. extreme difficulty acquiring fissile material 3. stealing weapons is also extremely difficult 4. smuggling is almost impossible with customs Counterargument: Loose Nukes: state sponsors give material and claim it was stolen -fear is exaggerated only 5 countries have worrisome nuclear security and not all are potential sources for theft Nuclear terrorism may be harder to identify -easier because victim would use all resources, high level of international assistance, relationship between fatalities and identification, highly restricted list of subjects, complex planning necessary would be difficult to keep secret Case: nuclear terrorism has never occurred
Ahmed, 1999
Main argument: Pakistan proliferated because of Indian security threat; unravelling relations with US led to test after Cold War Pakistan strategy: 1. require recognition for new nuclear status quo 2. encourage international efforts to prevent deployment of nuclear decisions in South Africa 3. Convince actors to stop punishment and replace with a policy of engagement based incentives Counterargument: domestic policy model and norms model -unstable government leader who distrusts India led to proliferation. -adversaries in the region gained nuclear weapons, it set the norm to have nuclear weapons
Risse-Kappen 1991
Main argument: Peace through strength didn't end the Cold War -change in leadership explains + SU arms were declining so US trusted them more = INF was signed -3 Crucial Factors 1. Favorable environment agreement (bargaining will rarely work on its own) 2. domestic politics in the USSR are crucial to explanations of the fundamental changes in world politics (Gorbachev) while western behavior was not irrelevant but did not determine the outcome 3. contribution of western societal and political actors outside the policy making elites to ending the cold war (supporters of arms control pressured) Counterargument: Deterrence: US was suffering economically and had to cut back on weapons -had been suffering for awhile and US bargaining strategies did not dramatically change
Koblenz, 2016
Main argument: Saddam did not admit to having nuclear weapons because of fear of internal threats -audio recordings show him repeatedly worrying that inspectors were foreign intelligence agencies attempting to overthrow him Counterargument: Saddam did not admit to having nukes because of outward threats -cultivated uncertainty -Israel/Iran were not urgent threats
Brands and Palkki, 2011
Main argument: Saddam wanted to create a united Arab nation and nuclear weapons would be a coercive tool against Israel to start conventional war -attempting to go against the stability-instability paradox and create instability and conflict with Israel -nuclear weapons forces Israel to go to conventional war instead of threaten nuclear Counterargument: Stability-Instability Paradox -It states that when two countries each have nuclear weapons, the probability of a direct war between them greatly decreases, but the probability of minor or indirect conflicts between them increases. This occurs because rational actors want to avoid nuclear wars, and thus they neither start major conflicts nor allow minor conflicts to escalate into major conflicts—thus making it safe to engage in minor conflicts -Saddam wanted large scale conflict not small scale
Gavin, 2004
Main argument: The Johnson administration had a strong nonproliferation policy (shift from Kennedy's administration which did little to halt proliferation) -China was about to proliferate, worries of copycats -Johnson treated proliferation as huge threat 4 options 1. Do nothing 2. Let states that are not threatening proliferate 3. Stop all states from proliferating without force 4. Stop all states from proliferating with force -creates NPT -Gilpatric Committee: experts deliberating under Johnson about proliferation issues; rejected preemptive war on China
Ganguly 1999
Main argument: The perception of external threats is and absence of security guarantees from ally nuclear states drove India towards weapon development (security threat) -Pakistan got nukes because India got nukes because China got nukes -they all represent 2nd strike capability so they have peace -5 stages of development 1. Creation of atomic energy commission in 1948 2. Chinese nuclear test in 1964 3. Build up and execution of India's first nuclear test in 1974 4. Consequences of first nuclear test 5. Indian collapse following Soviet Union tests in 1991 and 1998 -leadership has mixed views towards the bomb but eventually changes; unpopular conflicts steers leaders toward bomb Counterargument: domestic policy and norms model d. policy: constant change in leadership and structure of bureaucracy norms: prestige and status with a post-colonial complex; nuclear states refusal to disarm
Glaser and Fetter, 2016
Main argument: US building up arms to reach nuclear primacy would cause unnecessary arms race with China -this would lead to brinkmanship and a more aggressive China who may consider first strike -prospects for preserving damage limitation is poor and deterrent benefits small -fuel strategic nuclear competition and strain relations Counterargument: US should increase/preserve damage limitation -not likely to maintain damage limitation and costs Case: conflict with China vs SU -balance of power in South China Sea not as clear
Sagan, Valentino, 2017
Main argument: US citizens views on using nukes have not changed much like many scholars have assumed -majority of respondents willing to use nuclear weapons against Iranian city killing 100,000 -even larger percent willing to kill using conventional weapons -belief in retribution Counterargument: US citizens morally oppose the use of nukes more now then in 1945 -survey shows that in present context this is false Case: uses Iranian city/attack
Burr and Richardson, 2000
Main argument: US considered preventative attack against Chinese nuke development but decided against it based on costs; restraint is always the best choice -preventative attack likely to fail due to knowledge gap of locations of weapons (leaves China with second strike capability) -possible Chinese retalliation against SK or Taiwan -international backlash -China had minimal arsenal compared to US; china won't be more aggressive with bomb, long term: China won't have delivery capability for a long time and US would retain first strike capability
Jentleson, Whytock, 2005
Main argument: US diplomacy and stability of Libya worked together (rough one) -coercive diplomacy: forceful diplomacy convincing state to change course -3 phases 1. Reagan: force regime change (failed) -stability in Libya, too much US force 2. Clinton: multilateral sanctions and less regime change (failed) -strong stability in Libya 3. Bush: less forceful -converged with less forceful diplomacy and less stability in Libya -Difference in results because: 1. the extent of "balance" in coercer state's strategy between credible force and diplomacy consistency 2. vulnerability of target state as shaped by domestic policies/economy Counterargument: ???
Wilson, 2007
Main argument: US dropping the nuclear bomb on Japan did not end WW2 -Japan had more casualties from conventional war, made nuke look less extreme -When Russia entered war, Japan lost that neutral ally; already knew they were defeated just wanted better terms --Japan had 2 strategies before Russia entered: 1. convince Soviets to mediate 2. fight one last battle with so many casualties US would agree to more lenient terms --once Russia entered war these were no longer possible --Japan wanted to fight on after Hiroshima but drew up martial law once SU entered -Claimed bomb was reason for surrender: --many would face war crime trials after war wanted to make US look better --easy explanation for loss Counterargument: Japan surrendered in WW2 because of the nuclear bomb -easily confused because of time frame between dropping bomb and surrender
Anderson
Main argument: US faces trilemma in North Korean proliferation (can only pick 2/3 options) 1. denuclearization of NK 2. Maintain SK alliance and position of forward deployment to Korean Peninsula 3. Avoid costs associated with counterproliferation by force option 1 and option 2: cannot attain both of these without force option 2 and 3: will not denuclearize if US remains on Peninsula option 1 and 3: NK will only abandon program without force is if US leaves Peninsula Counterargument: US can get all three if: -China reasons with NK (unlikely to do so because of own interests) -New policy (NK never willing to abandon program as international sphere is now) -Wait until NK collapse (unwise to place policy on an assumption) -Double Freeze Proposal (US freezes military on peninsula and NK freezes proliferation efforts)
Christensen, 2012
Main argument: US first strike bad idea because Chinese modernization makes their arsenal more survivable -increased second strike capability made China more aggressive -Chinese fear of US attempting to destroy with conventional forces
Sagan, 1989
Main argument: US policy combination between counter value and counterforce policies that led to negotiations with SU; exaggeration of US policy change -Assured Destruction effected US policy: 1. shaped quality and quantity of weapons overtime 2. nuclear war planning 3. targeting policy -2 central objectives in US nuclear strategy 1. every administration used threat of nuclear retaliation to deter SU 2. each admin has created plans to protect US property and limit damage is war does occur (1945-1950) Early war planning with US nuclear monopoly (1949-1961) Massive retaliation Soviet tests first bomb, US builds up stockpile Us no longer has sole power to start war and SU nukes pose the greatest threat to US Preventive war not possible but preemptive was (1961-1974) Assured destruction/damage limitation Nuclear escalation as late as possible with limited nuclear response US first strike potential was unlikely Counterargument: US was counter value and switched to counterforce US was always counterforce -it was always a mix
Hymans, 2006
Main argument: a state will proliferate based on its leaders national identity conceptions (NIC) -NIC is constantly developing -identity conception vs perception of contemporary reality -types of NICss 1. sportsmanlike nationalists 2. oppositional nationalists 3. sportsmanlike subaltern (Australia) 4. oppositional subaltern -oppositional nationalists most likely to seek nuclear weapons (fear+pride) -state has some level of nuclear experience -engaged in reasonably intense relations -degree of control Counterargument: NPT regime change has prevented states from acquiring nuclear weapons -doubtful: proliferation should have been rampant pre-NPT, proliferation should be limited only to rogue states, regime's survivability questionable, loopholes and erratically enforced rules Case study: North Korea=oppositional nationalist
Lieber and Press, 2017
Main argument: advanced technology takes away deterrence threats and starts arms races -advanced technology makes counterforce more likely which make MAD less likely -creates arms race of weapons for defensive purpose; erodes deterrence -intense competition based on possible future insecurity -technological advancement is eroding second strike ability Counterargument: basic deterrence model -advancement of nuclear weapons removes threat of retaliation making attacks more likely
Liberman, 2001
Main argument: applies the security model, domestic policy model and norms model to South African disarmament -applies Levite argument
Hymans, 2012
Main argument: different kinds of leaders are what lead to proliferation; oppositional nationalist leaders push for the bomb while others do not neopatrimonial: authoritarian, unrealistic expectations between program and leader, can't get bomb; Iraq; rogue states neorational: US -Desire for weapons arises from: 1. Need to match power 2. Desire to reinforce national self esteem 3. Selfish demands of narrow domestic leaders according to sagan -Oppositional subalterns cannot imagine getting nuclear weapons but want the protection afforded by a superpower nuclear deterrent -Sportsman nationalists see no reason to build bomb but see reason to build significant nuclear tech base and even to oppose intl non-proliferation regime Counterargument: Sagan doesn't solve why proliferation has been so limited; Iraq -made bomb but shouldn't have been able to Case study: Iraq wasn't supposed to be able to make bomb but they were
Schelling, Halperin
Main argument: diplomacy, intelligence, technology, reduction of arms is essential in preventing accidents and preemptive war -restraint leads to war -strategic stability: makes accidental war less likely --war can arise if one side feared preemptive attack from other side Counterargument: deterrence: arms control is impossible when relations are bad and irrelevant when relations are good -building up arms leaves room for accidents, false alarms, and most importantly causes increased distrust and possibility of brinkmanship
Miller, 2017
Main argument: nuclear energy does not always lead to proliferation; helps technologically but not politically; things like NPT have been successful -restraints counterbalance proliferation motivations: high likelihood of detection, increased international scrutiny, heightened cost from sanctions Counterargument: Fuhrmann Case study: Iran program halted because they were caught by US
Levite, 2002
Main argument: nuclear hedging and national strategy lie between nuclear pursuit and nuclear rollback -worries about proliferation in developing world -no clear reason for nuclear reversal -3 factors the drive nuclear reversal: 1. the external security situation of a state improves or alternatives to nuclear weapons emerge that make them unnecessary 2. a change occurs within the domestic regime and the state's security and/or economic orientation (central planning v. market economy) 3. systematic or state-specified incentives, such as new norms, emerge that diminish the appeal of nuclear weapons (international pressure from norms or the U.S.) -born nuclear states willing to give up weapons for guaranteed protection Characteristics of nuclear reversal (states share 1/3) 1. programs shut down gradually (SA only exception) 2. No clearly articulated objective 3. Rarely assume reversal is permanent and irreversible Counterargument: it is just one of three -too much variety to claim that Case: Japan
Monteiro and Debs 2014
Main argument: only strong states that are highly threatened and weak states with weak/bad allies (not likely to offer reliable future protection) are likely to proliferate -carrots and sticks model -if there is no carrots or sticks weak states will proliferate Counterargument: norms or domestic policy models Case: North Korea -no reliable ally South Korea -exchanged weapons for US protection
Schultz
Main argument: opportunity for US leadership in nuclear weapons abolition -reliance on nukes for deterrence is becoming increasingly hazardous -Reagan/Gorbachev wanted to end nukes -strong nonproliferation efforts underway (CBRP) -major effort through US 1. Turn goal of world without nukes into joint world enterprise 2. achieving goal will also require effective measures to conquering nuclear related activity security 3. reassertion of vision of world free of nukes/pratical measures to achieve this perceived as consistent with US moral heritage Case: NK, Iran, terrorism
Mueller, 1988
Main argument: proliferation is inconsequential in international relations -WW2 was drastic enough to deter Great War; -all nukes do is stabilize things Counterargument: deterrence model of nukes; MAD prevents war Case: Nukes were not used in Korean or Vietnam War
Soligen, 1994
Main argument: rulers pursuing liberalization more likely to embrace NPT than radical counterparts -Nationalist coalition: ISI (import interests of liberal political coalitions generally internationalist (global) generally extremist, reject global markets (inward); don't care as much about citizens makes them more open to proliferation -Liberalist coalition: EOI (export) want economy based on internal economy, open to wold market, less willing to proliferate Counterarguments: neorealism-states strive to increase their power relative to power of other states -this is not consistent; domestic politics make some states more receptive then others Case Study: Argentina and Brazil -both states started path to proliferation with peaceful nuclear technology -1980s→ transition to democracy→ presidents signed contract barring use of nuclear tech for weapons → ultimately Argentina ratified treaty of tlatelolco and brazil ratified NPT and joined coalition for elimination of nukes -new regimes democratic and protrude
Bunn, 2010
Main argument: terrorists want nuclear weapons and it is possible that they could obtain them -terrorist group could plausibly build a nuke is they require fissile materials -bad security of fissile materials and weapons could pose huge problem (ex. Russia, Pakistan) -terrorists would be able to deliver the bomb -29% chance of terrorist nuke attack in 10 years, 50% in next 10 years, 1/billion -cyberattacks are possible Strategy for prevention: 1. Improving security and reducing nuclear stockpiles 2. Counter terrorist nuclear plots with intense international focus 3. Prevent/Deter state transfers of nuclear weapons because it creates opportunity for theft 4. Work with other states to police cooperation focused on nuclear smuggling -convince international community that nuclear terrorism is realistic threat Counterargument: implausible that terrorist group would actually be able to get material and create a nuke Case: Al Qaida made attempts to purchase nuclear material
Jervis, 1976
Main argument: theoretical explanations of the Spiral and Deterrence models
Samore, 2015
Main argument: whats in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action -prevent nuclear weapon creation for 10-15 years at declared facilities -close plutonium reactors and get rid of material -dismantle 2/3 of reactors and eliminate 98% of stock -verification regime will make covert activities difficult -many safeguards supporters: rejection will lead to Iran resuming nuclear activities opponents: want to hold out for better deal 8 member joint commission/dispute resolution -US, UK, France, Germany, Russia, China, Iran, EU -dispute resolution: triggered by member of Joint Commission believe Iran is disobeying -3 day recess to review concert -retrigger reimposition of sanctions -security council would have to vote in 30 days -US has pulled out
Nuclear Weapon Elements
Raw elements: plutonium or enriched uranium Either need uranium ore and enrichment capability or nuclear reactor and reprocessing plant for plutonium - both are expensive and large scale, beyond the reach of non-state actors Uranium - commonly found in U-238 but you need U-235 which is difficult to find because less than 1% from the ore is U-235, or must be enriched Plutonium - produced in nuclear reactions from uranium, but must be separated from spent reactor fuel Fissile material needs uranium or enrichment capability, expensive, requires resources
Sagan/Waltz, 2012
Sagan main argument: military organizational behavior led to not meeting 3 requirements -India: civilian control Pakistan: military control Case: War in 1999-nuclear states can fight wars; Pakistan military major source of conflict -India argued for preventive war but it was ultimately rejected -likelihood for accidents/false alarms -Nuclear forces have low likelihood of survivability -future military crises likely to be nuclear -Pakistan more aggressive Waltz main argument: nukes preserve imperfect peace between India and Pakistan -Pakistan needs nukes because of India threat
Nuclear Triad
The combination of nuclear land-, sea-, and air-based retaliatory weapons. (ICBMs, SLBMs, bombers)
Sagan/Waltz, 2012
Waltz main argument: nuclear proliferation is good because it raises the costs of war making war less likely -believes actors have rational decision making process -system level: individual actors -just need some kind of arsenal Case for Waltz: great power peace since 1945 Sagan main argument: nuclear proliferation is bad because it creates more circumstances for preemptive and preventative war -for Waltz to be correct 3 things must be true: 1. Must not be preventive war when state is nuclear and state is building 2. must be a level of unacceptable damage possible for both sides 3. nuclear arsenals not prone to accidental/unauthorized use -organizational critique: government must be in civilian control because military government may act irrationally -organizational level (domestic politics): institutional Case for Sagan: Pakistan and potential for accidents or terrorism sponsorship -even US and USSR had nuclear crises
Nuclear Hedging
a national strategy lying between nuclear pursuit and nuclear rollback (have the materials/technology/leadership/manpower to make a weapon quickly if desired) ex. Japan
Second Strike Capability
a state's capacity to retaliate after absorbing an adversary's first-strike attack with weapons of mass destruction
Assured Retaliation Posture
deter nuclear use and coercion, survivable second-strike forces, assertive civilian control management, unambiguous capability but ambiguous deployment
Types of Deterence
deterrence: convince other not do something competence: convince other to do something deterrence by denial: conventional war deterrence by punishment: nuclear war direct deterrence: deter attack upon homeland extended deterrence: deter attack on ally
Damage Limitation
incentive for first-strike useful to have counterforce targeting
Nuclear Reversal
states embark on a path leading to nuclear weapons acquisition but then reverse course, though not necessarily abandoning their nuclear ambitions ex. South Korea; stopped building but maintains secrecy of program
Deterrence Model
supports arms buildup (everyone is safe if everyone has nukes; hawkish string dominates the weak and it is better to be strong; strength through nuclear buildup Building is good because if the other side is expansionist it prepares you for war and makes aggression less likely from the other side Case: India and Pakistan: each state is deterring the other and preventing war
Spiral Model
supports arms control (believes everyone is peaceful but they continue to arm to ensure they are safe and seen as equal) Arms buildups cause mistrust Two types of states: security seekers ("status quo", nice guys) and expansionists (aggressive, revisionist, bad guys) One state building up defense for security can be seen by another as building up for an arms race/leading to an attack, so fear causes new buildups that lead to a spiral Reach cooperation through reducing arms; no uncertainty no spiral Case: US and SU in Cold War: huge arms buildup
Decapitation
target enemy capital -makes negotiation difficult but helps prevent coordinated second strike
Nuclear restraint
the state undertakes a policy that falls short of nuclear rollback but still slows down nuclear proliferation
Brinkmanship
the willingness to go to the brink of war to force an opponent to back down -increased likelihood for accidents and false alarms
Asymmetric Escalation Posture
threat of escalation is high, regardless of the type of attack, use will escalate to nuclear weapons usage if you are attacked
Splendid first strike
to attack and destroy your adversary without fear of a retaliatory attack
Counterforce Strategy
type of nuclear strategy that targets an adversary's military and nuclear capabilities -first strike
Countervalue Strategy
type of nuclear strategy that threatens assets that are valuable to an adversary, such as cities with industrial assets and large populations -second strike
