Property 1: Themis Questions Final Exam Review Professor DeGroff

A lawyer owns land in fee simple absolute that is improved with an office building. The lawyer executed a deed that conveyed the improved land "to my son when he passes the bar exam." The deed was delivered to the son and properly recorded. While still in law school, the son transferred his interest in the improved land to a classmate. What interest does the classmate have in the improved land? A. A mere expectancy until the son passes the bar. B. A remainder. C. A springing executory interest in fee simple. D. Nothing, because the son could not transfer his interest in the improved land.

C. A springing executory interest in fee simple. Answer choice C is correct. A future interest is an ownership interest in presently existing property, which may commence in possession or enjoyment sometime in the future. An executory interest is a future interest in a third party that is not a remainder and that generally cuts the prior estate short upon the occurrence of a specified condition. A springing executory interest in fee simple is a specific type of executory interest that divests the interest of the grantor or fills a gap in possession in which the estate reverts to the grantor. Here, the lawyer gave her son a future interest in the improved land. The son's interest is an executory interest because her son will cut short her interest in the property if he passes the bar exam. And it is specifically a springing executory interest in fee simple since the lawyer is the grantor. That is the interest that the son transferred to his classmate. Answer choice A is incorrect because the son has a springing executory interest, which is a valid property interest, not a mere expectancy. Answer choice B is incorrect because a remainder, although a future property interest like an executory interest, follows upon the natural termination of the preceding estate (e.g., a life estate, an estate for years). Here, the property interest cuts short the lawyer's fee simple subject to the son's springing executory interest. Answer choice D is incorrect because an executory interest is property interest that its owner can transfer during his lifetime to someone else (as in this case).

A woman conveyed a tract of land "to my friend, [name of friend], for life, and then to my heirs." A few years later, the woman conveyed all of her real property interests to a charity. Each conveyance was promptly recorded. The woman died intestate; her son was her only heir. Shortly thereafter, the friend died. The applicable jurisdiction still applies the Doctrine of Worthier Title. Who is entitled to the tract of land? A. The son, because he was the woman's sole heir. B. The son, because the remainder created by the woman's initial conveyance of the land was a vested remainder. C. The charity, because the Doctrine of Worthier Title creates a presumption of a reversion to the grantor. D. The charity, because the woman retained a possibility of reverter when she initially conveyed the land.

C. The charity, because the Doctrine of Worthier Title creates a presumption of a reversion to the grantor. Answer choice C is correct. The Doctrine of Worthier Title provides that when there is an inter vivos conveyance by a grantor that creates a remainder in the grantor's own heirs, the court will presume that no future interest in the heirs is created; rather, a reversion is retained by the grantor. Here, when the woman transferred her property interests to the charity, she also transferred her reversion to the charity. Therefore, since the friend's life estate has ended, the charity is entitled to the land. Answer choice A is incorrect. Although the initial conveyance purported to create a remainder in the woman's heirs, the Doctrine of Worthier Title transformed this future interest into a reversion in the woman, which she subsequently transferred to the charity. Answer choice B is incorrect. Although the wording of the initial conveyance created a vested remainder in the woman's heirs, the Doctrine of Worthier Title transformed this future interest into a reversion in the woman, which she subsequently transferred to the charity. Answer choice D is incorrect because a possibility of reverter is a future interest retained by a grantor who transfers a fee simple determinable to a grantee. Here, the woman did not transfer a fee simple determinable to anyone.

A couple was moving to a new city. They contracted with a moving company to pack and transport their belongings to a new home for $3,000. They paid the company $1,500 upfront. When the workers from the moving company arrived at their current home, the couple allowed the workers to pack up the couple's belongings and load the boxes on a truck. The workers then transported the belongings to the new home and unloaded the boxes there. The couple then gave the workers a check for the remaining $1,500. The following day, upon unpacking a box of crystal glassware at her new home, the couple discovered that the crystal in the box was broken and none of it was salvageable. If the couple sues the moving company in a negligence action to recover the value of the broken crystal, in a jurisdiction that follows the common law approach in determining the standard of care required of a bailee, what standard is applied to the moving company's conduct? A. The moving company is strictly liable for the broken crystal. B. The moving company is liable if its workers were even slightly negligent in handling the crystal. C. The moving company is liable only if its workers failed to exercise ordinary care in handling the crystal. D. The moving company is liable only if its workers were grossly negligence in handling the crystal.

C. The moving company is liable only if its workers failed to exercise ordinary care in handling the crystal. Answer choice C is correct. A bailment exists when the owner of personal property (the bailor) delivers that property to another person (the bailee) to hold for a period of time. Here, the couple, by providing the moving company's workers with access to their belongings, effectively delivered their belongings to the moving company for the purpose of packing and transporting the belongings to the couple's new home. Since both the couple and the moving company received a benefit from this bailment, the proper standard for determining whether the company is liable to the couple is ordinary negligence. Answer choice A is incorrect because it states the standard for determining the bailee's liability when the bailee fails to deliver the property that is the subject to the bailment or misdelivers the property. Here, the moving company delivered the crystal to the couple's new home. Answer choice B is incorrect because it states the standard for determining the bailee's liability when only the bailee receives a benefit from the bailment. Answer choice D is incorrect because it states the standard for determining the bailee's liability when only the bailor receives a benefit from the bailment.

A business owner held title to land with his spouse as tenants by the entirety. Without informing his spouse, the owner obtained a loan from a bank and granted the bank a mortgage on the land as security for the loan. The bank promptly recorded its mortgage. Subsequently, the couple transferred the land to their children as a gift. Recently, the business owner defaulted on the bank loan. The owner and his spouse are alive. The applicable jurisdiction follows the majority position regarding a tenancy by the entirety. Can the bank foreclose on its mortgage on the land? A. No, because only the business owner granted the mortgage on the land. B. No, because the owner's spouse is alive. C. Yes, because the children received the land as a gift. D. Yes, because the owner defaulted on the bank loan for which the land served as security.

A. No, because only the business owner granted the mortgage on the land. Answer choice A is correct. For jurisdictions that recognize a tenancy by the entirety, the majority position is that one spouse acting alone cannot mortgage property held in a tenancy by the entirety; a mortgage granted by one spouse is void. Consequently, the bank cannot enforce the mortgage granted by business owner. Answer choice B is incorrect because, regardless of whether the owner's spouse is alive, the mortgage granted by the business owner was void because his spouse did not join in granting the mortgage. Moreover, since the spouse joined with the business owner in transferring the land to their children, the spouse no longer has an interest in the land. Answer choice C is incorrect because, even though the children received the land as a gift rather than by purchase, the mortgage granted to the bank by the business owner was void. Answer choice D is incorrect because, while a mortgagee generally can enforce a mortgage through a foreclosure sale upon the borrower's default, here the mortgage granted by the business owner was void because his spouse did not join in granting the mortgage.

A brother and sister own land as joint tenants with the right of survivorship. The brother lives in the only house on the land. The sister rarely visits him and otherwise has no contact with the land. She has demanded that the brother make rental payments to her for his occupancy of the property, but he has refused her demand. How much can the sister compel her brother to pay for his occupancy of the land? A. Nothing, because he has the right to possess and use the entire property. B. One-half of the fair rental value of the property, because they are joint tenants. C. The full fair rental value of the property, because he is currently in exclusive possession of the property. D. The full fair rental value of the property, because she has demanded that he pay her rent for his occupancy of the property.

A. Nothing, because he has the right to possess and use the entire property. Answer choice A is correct. Each co-tenant of a concurrent real property estate has the right to possess and use the entire property. A co-tenant who exercises this right does not owe rent to another co-tenant who has chosen not to do so. Accordingly, the brother does not owe the sister rent for his occupancy and use of the land. Answer choice B is incorrect because, whether property is held in a tenancy in common or a joint tenancy with the right of survivorship, each co-tenant has the right to possess and use the entire property. Answer choice C is incorrect because, although the brother is in exclusive possession of the property, he does not owe rent to his sister because he is merely exercising his right to possess and use the property. Answer choice D is incorrect. A co-tenant who is denied access to real property held in a concurrent estate by another co-tenant who is in possession of the property can seek rental payments from the co-tenant in possession of the property. However, there are no facts to suggest that the brother has prevented the sister from occupying the property, and, in the absence of such facts, the brother does not owe the sister rent for his occupancy of the property.

An individual who owned a tract of land in fee simple died. His will devised the land to "my spouse for life." Subsequently, the spouse executed a will devising all her real property interests to a charity. After executing her will, the spouse conveyed her interest in the land to her child by a quitclaim deed. The child later sold his interest in the land to a buyer, giving the buyer a quitclaim deed. The spouse, child, and buyer are alive, and the charity is a viable entity. Who owns the current possessory interest in the tract of land? A. The buyer. B. The charity. C. The child. D. The spouse.

A. The buyer. Answer choice A is correct. A life estate is a present possessory estate that is limited in duration by a life. A life estate is transferable while the person by whom the life estate is measured is alive. Here, the spouse, who is alive, transferred her life estate to her child as a gift, who in turn sold it to the buyer. Consequently, since the spouse is alive, the buyer owns a life estate measured by the spouse's life (i.e., a life estate "pur autre vie"). Answer choice B is incorrect. A will takes effect when the testator dies, not when the will is executed. Additionally, because a life estate ceases to exist upon the end of the measuring life, a life estate that is held by the individual who is the measuring life cannot be transferred by that individual's will. Answer choice C is incorrect because, although the child did own the life estate as measured by the spouse's life, the child transferred the life estate to the buyer. Answer choice D is incorrect because, although the life estate is measured by the spouse's life, she gave her life estate to her child. Consequently, she no longer owns the life estate.

A married couple purchased a residence and took title as tenants by the entirety. Each had been previously married. The wife executed a will leaving her property to her daughter from her prior marriage. The husband likewise executed a will leaving his property to his son from his prior marriage. The husband died. Several months later, the wife died. Who owns the residence? A. The daughter in fee simple. B. The son in fee simple. C. The son and daughter as joint tenants. D. The son and daughter as tenants in common.

A. The daughter in fee simple. Answer choice A is correct. A tenancy by the entirety is a joint tenancy between married individuals with the right of survivorship. Here, since the wife survived her husband, she took full ownership of the residence on his death. On her death, the residence passed pursuant to the terms of her will to her daughter. Answer choice A is incorrect because, on the death of the husband, his interest in the residence ceased. Consequently, he did not have an interest in the residence that he could pass to his son. Answer choices C and D are incorrect because a devise (i.e., a conveyance by will) by a tenant by the entirety of his property interest is not given effect. Instead, the property passes automatically to the surviving spouse due to the right of survivorship. Consequently, the husband's son does not have an interest in the residence.

A childless man married a woman with one child. He immediately conveyed a tract of land "to my spouse, [spouse's name], for life, then to her children, regardless of when born, who reach the age of 35." At that time, his spouse was 70 years of age, and her only child, a son, was 33 years of age. Five years later, the man's spouse died. She was survived by her only son. The applicable jurisdiction has adopted the Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities, and there are no other relevant laws that apply to this situation. Is the son entitled to the land? A. No, because the class gift to the spouse's children is void. B. No, because the man's spouse could have had a second child. C. Yes, because of the rule of convenience. D. Yes, because the son's future interest vested within the period required by statute.

D. Yes, because the son's future interest vested within the period required by statute. Answer choice D is correct. If a transfer to a class is conditioned on the class members surviving to an age beyond 21 and the class is open, the transfer to the class would violate the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities. Here, although the conveyance of the remainder interest to the spouse's children would violate the common law Rule Against Perpetuities, the Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities (USRAP) provides that an otherwise invalid future interest is valid if it does in fact vest within 90 years after its creation. The son had a vested remainder because his future interest followed his mother's life estate and he has satisfied the condition precedent of reaching age 35. His vested remainder was subject to open because the law presumes that anyone, regardless of age or physical condition, is capable of having children. However, since the son's remainder interest was a valid future interest, the son was entitled, on his mother death, to ownership of the tract of land in fee simple. Answer choice A is incorrect. If the transfer of a future interest is made to a class and the Rule voids a transfer to any member of a class, the transfer is void as to all class members, even those whose interests are already vested (i.e., "bad as to one, bad as to all" ). Here, the possibility that the son's mother could have a second child whose contingent remainder interest would violate the common law Rule would also invalidate the son's vested remainder subject to open under the common law. However, since the son's remainder interest did irrevocably vest two years after it was created, it was "saved" by the USRAP. Answer choice B is incorrect. Regardless of whether the spouse may have another child, the son's remainder interest did irrevocably vest two years after it was created, and therefore it was "saved" by the USRAP. Answer choice C is incorrect. The rule of convenience, which is a rule of interpretation, can operate to prevent the application of the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities to a class transfer. Under this rule, membership in a class closes whenever any member of the class is entitled to immediate possession of a share of the class gift. However, the rule does not apply when the grantor specifies that the class should remain open even though a member of the class is entitled to immediate possession of a share of the class gift. Here, the rule does not apply to close the class because the man specifically indicated that he wanted all of his spouse's children, regardless of when they were born, to have an interest in the land. Regardless, the rule of convenience is not required to save the son's interest here because the son's remainder interest was "saved" by the USRAP when it irrevocably vested two years after it was created.

The owner of an antique desk that was slightly damaged in a fire arranged with an antique furniture dealer to restore the desk. The dealer agreed to pick up the desk from the owner's home the following day and to return the restored desk within a month. Six weeks later, a customer browsing at the dealer's store saw the desk. Without revealing how the desk came into his possession, the dealer sold the desk to the customer at its fair market value. When the owner of the desk contacted the dealer the next day, the dealer stated that he had sold it to a customer and revealed the customer's identity. Can the owner recover the desk from the customer? A. No, because the customer was not aware that the owner had entrusted the desk to the dealer for repair. B. No, because a transferee cannot acquire better title to property than the transferor had. C. Yes, because the dealer, lacking title to the desk himself, could not transfer good title to the desk to the customer. D. Yes, because the dealer's right to possess the desk had expired at the time of the purported sale to the customer.

A. No, because the customer was not aware that the owner had entrusted the desk to the dealer for repair. Answer choice A is correct. A good-faith purchaser of goods in the ordinary course of business from a merchant takes good title to the goods if the goods have been entrusted by the owner to the merchant and the merchant deals in the same kind of goods. Here, the customer bought the antique desk for its fair market value at the antique furniture dealer's store where it had been left by the owner for repair; the customer was unaware that the desk belonged to the owner. Consequently, the customer was a buyer in the ordinary course of business who takes good title to the desk. Answer choice B is incorrect. While generally a transferee cannot acquire better title to property than the transferor had, here the owner's entrustment of the desk to an antique dealer for repair permitted the customer who purchased the desk in good faith and without knowledge of the owner's interest to take good title to the desk. Answer choice C is incorrect. Although the dealer did not have title to the desk, the dealer's customer has good title to it because the owner had entrusted the desk to a dealer who sells antique furniture, and the customer purchased the desk in good faith from the dealer. Answer choice D is incorrect. Although the dealer's right to possess the desk had expired under his arrangement with the owner, the customer was not aware of this. Consequently, the customer's status as a buyer in the ordinary course of business was not affected.

A grandmother devised her residence to her granddaughter and grandson as joint tenants with the right of survivorship. The granddaughter, with the grandson's consent, moved into the residence. In exchange, the granddaughter agreed to pay the grandson rent for her use of the residence. Subsequently, the grandson was involved in an automobile accident. He was sued by the driver of the other automobile, who obtained a judgment against him. The driver recorded the judgment, thereby making it a lien against the residence. Shortly thereafter, the grandson died, and the granddaughter decided to sell the residence. Can the driver enforce the lien by levying the proceeds from the sale of the residence? A. No, because the granddaughter became the sole owner of the residence when the grandson died. B. No, because the grandson's interest in the residence was severed when the driver's judgment became a lien against the residence. C. Yes, because the driver obtained a judgment against the grandson before the grandson died. D. Yes, because the grandson died owning a one-half interest in the residence.

A. No, because the granddaughter became the sole owner of the residence when the grandson died. Answer choice A is correct. The interest of a joint tenant with the right of survivorship terminates on the death of the joint tenant, and the interests of the remaining joint tenants are increased accordingly. Here, since the grandson's interest in the residence terminated on his death and the granddaughter became the sole owner of the residence at that time, the driver, as a judgment creditor of the grandson, no longer has a claim against the residence. Answer choice B is incorrect because, although the driver cannot enforce his lien against the residence, the grandson's joint tenancy interest in the residence was not severed from the granddaughter's interest when the judgment against the grandson became a lien against the residence. A joint tenancy is only severed by a judgment lien when the lien is enforced (i.e., levied) against a joint tenant's interest. Answer choice C is incorrect because the driver's judgment against the grandson did not sever the joint tenancy between the grandson and granddaughter. Since the driver did not levy on his judgment lien before the grandson died, the joint tenancy between the grandson and granddaughter remained in effect at the time of the grandson's death. Answer choice D is incorrect because, due to the right of survivorship, the grandson's joint tenancy interest terminated upon his death and the granddaughter's interest increased accordingly, leaving her as the sole owner of the residence.

A man inherited a pocket watch from his grandfather. Four years ago, the watch was stolen, along with other items, when the man's residence was burglarized by a neighbor. Since then, the neighbor has worn the watch hidden in a pocket of his vest each day to work, except for a six-week period two years ago when he lent the watch to a local theatrical company for use as a prop in a play. Three years ago, the man was diagnosed with a mental disease and was confined to a mental hospital for 18 months before being released. Recently, the man learned that the neighbor has the watch. The man has filed suit for its return. The applicable statute of limitations for adverse possession of personal property is three years, and the jurisdiction does not require good faith or follow the discovery rule. Has the neighbor gained ownership of the watch by adverse possession? A. No, because the neighbor's possession of the watch has not been notorious. B. No, because the neighbor's possession of the watch has not been exclusive. C. No, because the neighbor's possession of the watch has not been continuous. D. No, because the neighbor's possession of the watch has not been adverse

A. No, because the neighbor's possession of the watch has not been notorious. Answer choice A is correct. Among the requirements for adverse possession is that the possession be open and notorious. Here, the man can argue that, while the neighbor did wear the watch to work each day, he did not do so in a manner that would have alerted the man to the neighbor's possession of the watch because it was hidden in a pocket in the neighbor's vest. Answer choice B is incorrect because, although the neighbor did lend the watch to a local theatrical company for six weeks, the company's use of the watch was not in conflict with the neighbor's assertion of ownership of the watch because the company used it with the neighbor's permission. Consequently, that use did not interrupt the neighbor's exclusive possession of the watch for purposes of adverse possession. Therefore, answer choice C is also incorrect. Answer choice D is incorrect because the neighbor stole the man's watch (i.e., without the man's consent). Therefore, the neighbor's possession of the watch has been adverse (i.e., hostile).

A widow devised her home to her two children, a daughter and a son, as joint tenants with the right of survivorship. The son resided in the home. The daughter seldom visited the home, and when she did, it was always at the invitation of the son. The son, without first informing the daughter, employed a contractor to add a deck to the home. The deck has increased the value of the home. If the son sues the daughter in a contribution action to recover one-half of the cost of the deck, will he be successful? A. No, because the son does not have a right to contribution from the daughter for the cost of improvements made to the property. B. No, because the son failed to inform the daughter of his plans to add a deck to the house. C. Yes, because the daughter, as a joint tenant, enjoys the right of survivorship. D. Yes, because the deck increased the value of the home.

A. No, because the son does not have a right to contribution from the daughter for the cost of improvements made to the property. Answer choice A is correct. A co-tenant does not have a right to contribution from the other co-tenants for improvements made to the property. Here, the son cannot recover one-half of the cost of the deck from the daughter. [Note that the son might be able to get an equitable adjustment at partition, but cannot recover in contribution before then.] Answer choice B is incorrect because, even had the son informed the daughter of his plans to add a deck to the home, she would not be liable in a contribution action for one-half of the cost of the deck unless she agreed to bear that cost. Answer choice C is incorrect because the non-contribution rule with regard to improvements applies whether the co-tenant is a joint tenant with the right of survivorship or a tenant in common. Answer choice D is incorrect because, even though the deck did increase the value of the home, the daughter, as a co-tenant, is not obligated to contribute to the cost of the deck.

Twenty-five years ago, the fee simple owner of land transferred it "to [name of a charity] while the property is used as a hospital, and then to [name of friend] and his heirs." Ten years ago, the owner died and her real property interests were inherited by her only child. Presently, the charity continues to maintain a hospital on the land, and the owner's child is alive. The applicable jurisdiction continues to follow the common law Rule Against Perpetuities. What interest does the owner's child have in the land? A. Possibility of reverter. B. Reversion. C. Right of entry. D. Nothing.

A. Possibility of reverter. Answer choice A is correct. A fee simple determinable is a present fee simple estate that is limited by specific durational language (e.g., "so long as," "while," "during," "until"). Here, the charity's estate is limited by durational language ("while the property is used as a hospital"). Consequently, the charity has a fee simple determinable. Although the conveyance gave the owner's friend an executory interest, this interest violated the common law Rule Against Perpetuities. Under that rule, an executory interest, as well as a contingent remainder and a vested remainder subject to open, is valid only if it must vest or fail by the end of a life in being plus 21 years. The future interest is tested as of the time of creation. Here, it is possible that the friend's executory interest would vest more than 21 years after all lives in being at the time of the conveyance have died. Consequently, that interest is void. Since the future interest in a grantor that follows a fee simple determinable is a possibility of reverter, which is not subject to the Rule Against Perpetuities, this interest was effectively retained by the owner and passed on her death to her only child. Answer choice B is incorrect. A reversion is the future interest held by the grantor who grants a life estate or estate for years but does not convey the remaining future interest to a third party. Here, since the charity's present estate is a fee simple determinable, the owner's child does not have a reversion. Answer choice C is incorrect. A right of entry is the future interest retained by a grantor after conveying a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent. Here, the owner did not impose a conditional limitation (e.g., "provided that") on the charity's present interest, but instead a durational limitation. Moreover, a right of entry must be reserved by the grantor, which the owner did not do. Answer choice D is incorrect. Although the owner purported to transfer all of her interests in the land to others, the executory interest granted to her friend was void because it violated the Rule Against Perpetuities. Consequently, the owner had a possibility of reverter, and the owner's child, as her successor in interest, has inherited that possibility of reverter.

In the most recent deed in the chain of title to a tract of land, a woman conveyed the property as follows: "To my nephew and his heirs and assigns until my nephew's son becomes chief executive officer of the family-owned business corporation, and then to my nephew's son and his heirs and assigns." The nephew and his son were specifically identified by name in the deed. At the time the deed was executed, the nephew was 45 years old and the son was 12 years old. Twenty-five years have passed, and the son is not involved with the family-owned business. The applicable jurisdiction continues to follow the common law Rule Against Perpetuities and has no other relevant statute. Which of the following is the most accurate statement concerning the title to the land? A. The nephew has a fee simple determinable and the son has an executory interest. B. The nephew has a fee simple and the son has no interest, because the grant of a fee simple precludes additional gifts of the property. C. The nephew has a fee simple and the son has no interest, because the son has not become chief executive officer of the family-owned business corporation within 21 years of the conveyance. D. The nephew has a life estate subject to complete divestment and the son has a contingent remainder.

A. The nephew has a fee simple determinable and the son has an executory interest. Answer choice A is correct. A fee simple determinable is a present fee simple estate that is limited by specific durational language (e.g., "so long as," "while," "during," "until"). Here, the nephew has a fee simple determinable because the durational limitation in the conveyance will terminate the nephew's interest when the son becomes chief executive officer of the family-owned business corporation. An executory interest includes a future interest that follows a fee simple determinable and is held by a third party. Consequently, the nephew's son has an executory interest. Answer choice B is incorrect because, although the conveyance did grant the nephew a fee simple interest, the conveyance did not grant a fee simple absolute interest. Instead, the conveyance limited the fee simple interest by specific durational language, thereby making it a fee simple determinable. Answer choice C is incorrect. The conveyance of the executory interest to the nephew's son does not violate the Rule Against Perpetuities because the nephew's son was a life in being at the time of the conveyance. Since it will be known within the son's lifetime whether he becomes chief executive officer of the family-owned business corporation, the conveyance satisfies the Rule Against Perpetuities. Answer choice D is incorrect because the conveyance does not limit the nephew's interest to a life estate. Additionally, the future interest in the nephew's son is not a remainder because a remainder never follows a defeasible fee.

A flock of wild turkeys roamed at will over acres of wooded lands. During the hunting season, a hunter shot but did not kill a wild turkey while the turkey was on public lands. The hunter tracked the mortally wounded bird onto nearby privately owned land that was posted with "no trespassing"signs, where the hunter found the immobilized bird. As the hunter approached to finish off the wild turkey, a second hunter, who had permission to hunt on the privately owned land, spotted the wild turkey, quickly took aim, and shot and killed the turkey. The second hunter knew that the turkey was wounded, but did not know that the first hunter was pursuing the bird and was unaware of the first hunter's presence. As between the two hunters, who has superior rights to the wild turkey at common law? A: The first hunter, because the first hunter exercised constructive control over the turkey by mortally wounding it and continuing pursuit. B; The first hunter, because he had begun to pursue the wild turkey before the second hunter was aware of its existence. C. The second hunter, because she was unaware of the first hunter's presence or pursuit of the turkey. D. The second hunter, because the first hunter was trespassing on private land where the second hunter had permission to hunt.

A: The first hunter, because the first hunter exercised constructive control over the turkey by mortally wounding it and continuing pursuit. Answer choice A is correct. A wild animal becomes a possession when an individual manifests the intent to own it by exercising actual or constructive dominion and control over the animal. For example, an animal that is hunted, trapped, and caught is in the constructive possession of the person who caught it. The act of hunting a specific animal by itself it does not constitute constructive possession unless a vested property right has been created by mortally wounding the animal and continuing pursuit so that capture is inevitable. Here, the first hunter had constructive possession of the wild turkey because the hunter had mortally wounded it and maintained pursuit before the second hunter intervened. Answer choice B is incorrect because, while the first hunter may have been the first hunter to pursue the wild turkey, he did not gain constructive control over the wild turkey until he mortally wounded it. Answer choice C is incorrect. Even though the second hunter did not intend to interfere with first hunter's rights, the first hunter's right to the wild turkey is superior to that of the second hunter because the first hunter exercised constructive control over the wild turkey by mortally wounding it before the second hunter killed the wild turkey. Answer choice D is incorrect. Although the right of the owner of the land on which the turkey was ultimately killed may be superior to the right of the first hunter to wild turkey because the first hunter was trespassing on the owner's land when the wild turkey was killed, the first hunter's right to the wild turkey is superior to that of the second hunter because the first hunter exercised constructive control over the wild turkey by mortally wounding it before the second hunter killed the wild turkey. This is true regardless of whether the second hunter had permission to hunt on the privately owned land.

A violinist who was a member of a local orchestra stole a violin from a theater company. The violinist began playing the violin at orchestra performances at a local concert hall. After the violinist had been using the violin for a year, the violin was stolen from the violinist. The violinist suffered severe emotional distress from the loss of the violin. Shortly thereafter, the violinist learned that a security guard at the concert hall where the local orchestra regularly performs had taken the violin. The violinist has filed a replevin action against the security guard seeking the return of the violin. The applicable statute of limitations for adverse possession of personal property is five years. For whom should the court rule? A: The violinist, because he did not transfer possession of the violin to the security guard who otherwise had no right to it. B: The violinist, because he suffered harm in the form of emotional distress as a consequence of the loss of the violin. C: The security guard, because the violinist is not the true owner of the violin. D: The security guard, because the guard has possession of the violin.

A: The violinist, because he did not transfer possession of the violin to the security guard who otherwise had no right to it. Answer choice A is correct. The security guard took possession of the violin from the violinist without the violinist's permission or a right to do so. The violinist is therefore entitled to regain possession of the violin. Answer choice B is incorrect because, in a replevin action, the plaintiff is merely seeking the return of personal property. The plaintiff in such an action is not required to prove that the loss of the property caused him harm. Answer choice C is incorrect because, while the violinist is not the true owner of the violin, as between the violinist and the security guard, violinist has a superior right to possess the violin. Answer choice D is incorrect because, although the security guard does currently have possession of the violin, the guard did not lawfully acquire possession of the violin from the violinist.

Several years ago, a collector lent a valuable historical document to a local museum, which displayed the document with the collector's permission. Recently, the collector, who wanted to use the document as collateral for a loan, arranged with the museum director for an appraiser to have access to the document the following week. A conman who was visiting the museum overheard the conversation between the collector and museum director. The next week, the conman arrived at the museum, pretending to be the appraiser. At the museum director's request, the conman presented a forged identification to museum director. The museum director gave the conman access to the document, and, upon the conman's request, permitted him to take the document to allegedly perform several tests to verify its authenticity. The conman has absconded with the document, and neither he nor the document has been located. If the collector sues the museum director for conversion of the document, how should the court rule? A. For the collector, because the museum director failed to exercise the proper care over the document. B. For the collector, because the museum gave the document to the conman. C. For the museum director, because he exercised ordinary care regarding the conman's identity. D. For the museum director, because collector had requested that the director provide access to the document.

B. For the collector, because the museum gave the document to the conman. Answer choice B is correct. The lending of the document by the collector to the museum for it to display created a bailment. A bailee who delivers the property that is the subject of the bailment to the wrong party is strictly liable for conversion. Here, since the museum director permitted the conman who pretended to be an appraiser to take the document, the museum director is strictly liable for its loss. Answer choice A is incorrect because when a bailee permits a person other than the bailor to take the bailed property, the bailee is strictly liable. The exercise of proper care will not protect the bailee from liability in such situations. Answer choice C is incorrect because, even if the museum director did exercise at least ordinary care in verifying the identity of the conman as the collector's appraiser, the museum director is nevertheless strictly liable to the collector in a conversion action for giving the document to the conman. Answer choice D is incorrect because, although the collector did request that the museum director provide an appraiser with access to the document, the museum director not only provided the appraiser with access to the document but also permitted the appraiser to take the document itself, which exceeded the collector's directions regarding the document.

A physician and a lawyer who became friends during college purchased undeveloped land as an investment. They took title to the property as tenants in common, with the physician owning a 40 percent share and the lawyer a 60 percent share. The lawyer paid the annual property taxes on the land for the first year, which totaled $10,000. During that time, neither the physician nor the lawyer made use of the property. If the lawyer brings a lawsuit against the physician seeking contribution for the property tax payment she made, how will the court rule? A. For the lawyer, requiring the physician to contribute $5,000 as a tenant in common with equal rights to possess and use the property. B. For the lawyer, requiring the physician to contribute $4,000 based on the physician's share of the tenancy in common. C. For the lawyer, requiring the physician to contribute $2,000 based on the 20 percent difference in ownership interests between the lawyer and the physician. D. For the physician, requiring the physician to contribute nothing because the physician did not make use of the property.

B. For the lawyer, requiring the physician to contribute $4,000 based on the physician's share of the tenancy in common. Answer choice B is correct. A co-tenant who pays more than his share of necessary property related expenses (e.g., property taxes) can compel the other co-tenants to contribute based on the ownership interest of each co-tenant. Here, since the physician owns 40 percent of the tenancy in common, the physician is required to reimburse the lawyer for 40 percent of the $10,000 in property taxes ($4,000) on the land paid by the lawyer. Answer choice A is incorrect because the contribution required of a co-tenant when another co-tenant pays necessary property related expenses is based on that co-tenant's ownership share of the concurrent estate; it is not based on an equal share of such expenses unless the co-tenants' ownership shares are equal. Answer choice C is incorrect because a contribution of only 20 percent of the property taxes paid by the lawyer does not correspond to the physician's 40 percent interest in the property. Answer choice D is incorrect because a co-tenant is not excused from contribution solely on the basis that he did not possess or use the property.

One evening, a man was a guest at his co-worker's house. While there, he placed his earphones on a table and forgot about them. After he left, the co-worker discovered the earphones. She emailed the man that she had found them and would bring them to work. She placed them in a bag she used to transport things back and forth to work. However, the following morning at work, the co-worker was unable to find the earphones in her bag. She surmises that they fell through a hole in her bag, of which she was unaware until she tried to find the earphones. In a jurisdiction that follows the common law, is the co-worker liable to the man for the loss of the earphones? A. No, because the man did not intentionally give the co-worker the earphones. B. No, because the co-worker's conduct did not constitute gross negligence. C. Yes, because the co-worker failed to return the earphones to the man. D. Yes, because the co-worker's possession of the earphones created a quasi-bailment.

B. No, because the co-worker's conduct did not constitute gross negligence. Answer choice B is correct. When a person comes into possession of lost or mislaid personal property and exercises physical control over it, a bailment is created by operation of law. This type of bailment, which is known as a constructive or quasi-bailment, differs from a true bailment in that the chattel has not been delivered by or with the permission of its owner to the bailee. Typically, the bailee is a gratuitous bailee because she is not compensated. A gratuitous bailee is required to act with slight diligence and is consequently liable only if she acts with gross negligence. Here, the co-worker's possession of the man's earphones created a quasi-bailment, which was gratuitous because she was not compensated. Since at most she failed to exercise ordinary care by placing the man's earphones in her bag, which unbeknownst to her, had a hole, she is not liable to the man for the loss of his earphones. Answer choice A is incorrect because when a person comes into possession of lost or mislaid personal property and exercises physical control over it, a bailment is created by operation of law regardless of whether the true owner intended to deliver the property to the bailee. Answer choice C is incorrect because the co-worker's possession of the man's earphones did not make her an insurer of the earphones, but merely a gratuitous bailee. As such, since her conduct did not rise to the level of gross negligence, she is not liable to the man for their loss. Answer choice D is incorrect because, although the co-worker's possession of the earphones did create a quasi-bailment, she, as an uncompensated possessor of the earphones, was only a gratuitous bailee. As such, since her conduct did not rise to the level of gross negligence, she is not liable to the man for the loss.

A college student borrowed a suit from his roommate with the roommate's permission to attend an awards ceremony. The student was not aware that the roommate kept a locket that belong to his grandmother in a pocket of the suit jacket. The college student, while celebrating at the conclusion of the ceremony, took off the jacket and carelessly swung it around. The jacket pocket, catching on the edge of a table, ripped. The locket was lost as a result. Is the college student liable as a bailee for the loss of the locket? A. No, because the roommate gave his permission for the student to borrow the suit. B. No, because the student was not aware that the locket was in the suit. C. Yes, because the student failed to exercise ordinary care. D. Yes, because the student was a gratuitous bailee.

B. No, because the student was not aware that the locket was in the suit. Answer choice B is correct. For a bailment to exist, the bailee must knowingly physically possess the property, know exactly what is possessed, and consent to the possession. Here, while the college student consented to a bailment with respect to his roommate's suit, he was not aware of the locket's presence in a pocket of the suit jacket. Thus, he is not liable as a bailee for the loss of the locket. Answer choice A is incorrect because, while the roommate's permission for the college student to borrow the suit was necessary to create a bailment with respect to the suit, this permission would not absolve the student, as a gratuitous bailee, from his failure to exercise great care with respect to the suit. However, the student's lack of awareness that there was a locket in a pocket in the suit jacket precludes him from being a bailee with respect to the locket. Answer choice C is incorrect because, even though the college student's carelessness with respect to the suit jacket indicates his failure to exercise ordinary care regarding the jacket, his lack of awareness of the locket precludes him from being a bailee of any kind with respect to the locket. Accordingly, answer choice D is incorrect.

A woman devised 90 acres of timberland to her three nephews as equal tenants in common. Soon after the woman's death, the youngest nephew harvested and sold a third of the timber on the land. The timber is of uniform quality throughout the land. Neither of the two older nephews ever set foot on the land. When they learned of what the youngest nephew had done, they brought an action against the youngest nephew for an accounting, seeking damages based on the harvested timber. The jurisdiction permits an action for accounting to be brought independently from a partition action. Will the older nephews be successful? A. No, because the youngest nephew was entitled to possess and use the entire property. B. No, because the youngest nephew only harvested one-third of the timber on the land. C. Yes, because the older two nephews owned a majority of the interests in the timberland. D. Yes, because the older two nephews did not consent to the harvesting of the timber.

B. No, because the youngest nephew only harvested one-third of the timber on the land. Answer choice B is correct. Each co-tenant of concurrently owned real property has the right to possess and use the entire property and is entitled to natural resources found on or in the property in proportion to his share of the tenancy. Here, since the youngest nephew has a one-third interest in the timberland as an equal tenant in common with the older two nephews, he was entitled to harvest one-third of the timber on the land he received from the woman. Answer choice A is incorrect. Although the youngest nephew was entitled to possess and use the entire property, he was entitled to harvest only the amount of timber on the property that equals his tenant-in-common share of the property. Answer choice C is incorrect. Since each co-tenant is entitled to natural resources in proportion to his share of the tenancy, the two older nephews could not prevent the youngest nephew from harvesting his share of the timber on the property, even though together the two older nephews held a majority of the concurrent interest in the timberland. Answer choice D is incorrect because a co-tenant is not required to seek permission from the other co-tenants before exercising the right to harvest natural resources found on the property.

Twenty-five years ago, an alumna of a private college deeded land to her alma mater. The granting clause in the deed provided, "to [college name] and its successor forever so long as the land is used for educational purposes." The deed was promptly recorded. The college converted a building on the land into a classroom building. Ten years ago, the alumna, having taken no further actions with respect to the land, died without leaving a will. A nephew was her only heir. Recently, the college sold the land and building to a developer. The developer immediately demolished the building and cleared the land. The developer plans to construct residential homes on the land and subdivide the property into single-family residential lots. Upon learning of the developer's decision, the alumna's nephew filed a lawsuit seeking a declaratory judgment that he owns the land. Who owns the land? A. The alumna's nephew, because he has asserted his right to the land in a lawsuit. B. The alumna's nephew, because he is the alumna's heir. C. The developer, because the alumna died and did not leave a will. D. The developer, because the deed failed to specify a person to whom the land would pass if the land is not used for educational purposes.

B. The alumna's nephew, because he is the alumna's heir. Answer choice B is correct. A fee simple determinable is a present fee simple estate that is limited by specific durational language (e.g., "so long as," "while," "during," "until"). A possibility of reverter is a future interest retained by a grantor when a fee simple determinable is conveyed unless the conveyance provides otherwise. A fee simple determinable terminates automatically upon the happening of the stated event. Upon the occurrence of the stated event, the estate automatically reverts to the grantor or her successors unless the conveyance provides that the estate passes to a third party; no legal action by the holder of the possibility of reverter is required. Here, the college had a fee simple determinable ("so long as") and the alumna had a possibility of reverter which passed to her heir, the nephew, upon her death. Since the land is no longer being used for educational purposes, the land automatically reverted to the alumna's nephew. Answer choice A is incorrect because, upon the occurrence of the stated event, a fee simple determinable automatically reverts to the holder of the possibility of reverter. Here, the nephew immediately became the owner of the property when it was no longer used for educational purposes; he did not need to file a lawsuit to become the owner. Answer choice C is incorrect because a possibility of reverter passes to the grantor's heirs when, as here, the grantor does not transfer it during her life or devise it in her will. Answer choice D is incorrect because a possibility of reverter is retained by a grantor when a fee simple determinable is conveyed, unless the conveyance provides otherwise.

A grantor conveyed a tract of land improved with a residence by a deed that contained the following language: "To my friend, [friend's name], and his heirs, but if the residence ceases to be used and occupied as a dwelling, then I and my heirs and assigns can reenter and retake the property." The grantor died shortly after the conveyance. He devised his real property interests to an unrelated neighbor rather than his child, who was the grantor's sole heir. The friend lived in the residence until he died. The friend's niece was named in the friend's will as the devisee of the friend's real property interests. Following the friend's death, the niece moved into the residence. The niece's mother, who was the friend's sister and only heir under intestacy, resides in a nursing home. Currently, the grantor's neighbor and child are alive, and the niece lives in the residence. Which of the following best describes the current property interests in the land? A. The friend's niece has a fee simple determinable, and the grantor's child has a possibility of reverter. B. The friend's niece has a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent, and the grantor's neighbor has a right of entry. C. The grantor's child has a fee simple because the friend's sister is not residing the residence. D. The grantor's neighbor has a fee simple, as the successor to the grantor's future interest.

B. The friend's niece has a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent, and the grantor's neighbor has a right of entry. Answer choice B is correct. A fee simple subject to a condition subsequent is a present fee simple that is limited in duration by specific conditional language (e.g., "provided that," "on condition that," "but if"). Upon the occurrence of the condition, the grantor (or his successor interest) has the right to terminate this estate, provided the grantor has explicitly retained the right to terminate the fee simple subject to a condition subsequent. This future interest is known as a "right of entry," "right of reentry," or "power of termination." Here, the grantor conveyed a fee simple to his friend, subject to the condition that the residence on the land be used and occupied as a dwelling. Consequently, the friend held a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent, which he devised to his niece. Therefore, the friend's niece currently has a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent. The grantor also explicitly reserved a right of entry. Although the grantor used the phrase "and his heirs," this language did not create a right in the grantor's heirs. Instead, it merely reiterated that the grantor's right of entry was devisable and descendible. The grantor then devised this right of entry to his neighbor by will. Answer choice A is incorrect. A fee simple determinable is a present fee simple estate that is limited by specific durational language (e.g., "so long as," "while," "during," "until"). Here, the friend's interest was not limited by specific durational language, but instead by language that imposed a condition on the friend's fee simple. Therefore, the interest was a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent. In addition, the grantor's future interest was a right of entry rather than a possibility of reverter, and that right of entry passed to the grantor's neighbor under the grantor's will; the grantor's child does not have an interest in the property. Answer choice C is incorrect because the friend transferred his fee simple subject to a condition subsequent to his niece. While the deed used the phrase "to my friend and his heirs," this did not create a right in the friend's heirs (i.e., the friend's sister), but instead created a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent that the friend could transfer by will to his niece. Answer choice D is incorrect. The grantor's neighbor has a right of entry, not a fee simple, as successor to the grantor's future interest. Although this right of entry could provide the grantor's neighbor with a fee simple interest in the property at some point, the friend's niece is currently using the property as a residence. As such, the condition subsequent has not been triggered and thus the friend's niece retains a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent.

A woman purchased an undeveloped lot in a subdivision as a joint tenant with the right of survivorship with her brother. The woman gifted her interest in the lot to a friend, who in turn sold it to a buyer. The buyer held his interest in the lot until his death. The woman and her brother, who has retained his interest in the lot, are currently alive. Which of these events resulted in the severance of the joint tenancy? A. The death of the buyer. B. The gift by the woman of her interest in the lot to her friend. C. The sale by the friend of her interest in the lot to a buyer. D. None of these events, because the woman and her brother are still alive.

B. The gift by the woman of her interest in the lot to her friend. Answer choice B is correct. The transfer of property by a joint tenant during the life of the joint tenant results in the severance of the joint tenancy and its conversion into a tenancy in common. Consequently, when the woman gifted her interest in the lot to her friend, the joint tenancy between the woman and her brother was severed, and the friend and the brother held the lot as tenants in common. Answer choice A is incorrect. Although the death of the buyer would have terminated the buyer's interest in the lot had that interest been a joint tenancy with the right of survivorship with the brother, who survived the buyer, the joint tenancy was already severed when the woman gifted her interest in the lot to her friend. Answer choice C is incorrect. Although the sale by the friend of her interest in the lot to the buyer would have resulted in the severance of the joint tenancy had it still existed at that time, the joint tenancy was already severed when the woman gifted her interest in the lot to her friend. Answer choice D is incorrect because the woman no longer holds an interest in the lot. Therefore, the fact that she is still alive does not preserve her joint tenancy with her brother.

An individual conveyed lakeside property to his son and two daughters "as equal co-tenants." The elder daughter mortgaged her interest to a bank. The son leased his interest to a friend for a year. The younger daughter contracted to sell her interest to a buyer. Which act resulted in the property being owned in a tenancy in common by the son and daughters? A. The elder daughter's mortgage of her interest to a bank. B. The initial conveyance. C. The son's lease of his interest to a friend. D. The younger daughter's contract to sell her interest to a buyer.

B. The initial conveyance. Answer choice B is correct. When a conveyance of a concurrent estate is ambiguous, the resulting co-owners take the property as tenants in common. Here, the conveyance by the individual to his son and two daughters "as equal co-tenants" created a tenancy in common. The subsequent events, which would have resulted in the severance of an existing joint tenancy with the right of survivorship in some jurisdictions, had no effect on the characterization of the ownership rights of the individual's children as tenants in common. Answer choice B is incorrect because, while granting a mortgage can sever a joint tenancy in title theory states, it has no effect on the ownership rights of tenants in common. Answer choice C is incorrect because, while a joint tenant's lease of his interest can result in the severance of the joint tenancy in some states, it has no effect on the ownership rights of tenants in common. Answer choice D is incorrect because, while a joint tenant's execution of a contract to sell her interest can result in the severance of the joint tenancy in some states, it has no effect on the ownership rights of the individual's children as tenants in common.

A man devised land to his nephew and niece as tenants in common. Until the nephew's death nine years later, there was no contact between the nephew and the niece. For those nine years, the nephew occupied the land while the niece resided in a distant city. The nephew did not leave a will and his daughter is his sole heir under intestate succession. The applicable jurisdiction denies an action for ejection after the land has been adversely possessed for seven years. Who owns the land? A. Only the niece, because she takes the land by right of survivorship. B. The niece and the daughter share ownership, because the land was held in a tenancy in common. C. Only the daughter, because she is the nephew's sole heir. D. Only the daughter, because the nephew acquired the entire property by virtue of adverse possession.

B. The niece and the daughter share ownership, because the land was held in a tenancy in common. Answer choice B is correct. On the death of the owner of property held as a tenant in common, the deceased owner's interest passes according to the terms of the owner's valid will, or if the owner did not leave a valid will, in accordance with intestate succession. Here, since the nephew did not leave a will and his daughter is his sole heir, she takes his tenant in common interest in the land, while the niece continues to hold the other tenant in common interest. Answer choice A is incorrect because tenants in common do not possess the right of survivorship; the right of survivorship exists in a joint tenancy. Answer choice C is incorrect. Although the nephew's daughter was his sole heir and thereby entitled to inherit his interest in the land, since he held an interest as a tenant in common in the land at his death, she takes only that interest, and the niece continues to hold her own interest as a tenant in common. Answer choice D is incorrect. Mere possession of the property does not constitute adverse possession because each co-tenant has the right to possess the co-owned property. Unless a co-tenant, by word or deed, denies the other co-tenants possession of the property, a co-tenant's possession is not adverse. Here, since the nephew did not deny the niece possession of the property, as there was no contact between the nephew and the niece for the past nine years during which they owned the land as co-tenants, the nephew's sole possession of the land has not been adverse.

A brother and sister owned a residence as joint tenants with the right of survivorship by virtue of the terms of their mother's will. The sister had exclusive possession the residence with the brother's permission. Shortly before her death, the sister, with the intent of securing an interest in the residence for her children after her death, executed a deed transferring her interest in the residence to herself. The day before the sister died, her attorney recorded the deed and informed the brother of the deed. The applicable jurisdiction has abandoned the traditional four unities test with respect to joint tenancies with the right of survivorship in favor of the modern approach. Which of the following is the strongest argument that a tenancy in common existed between the sister and brother at the time of the sister's death? A. The sister had exclusive possession of the residence at her death. B. The sister intended to create a tenancy in common by executing the deed. C. The sister's attorney informed the brother of the deed before the sister's death. D. The sister's interest and the brother's interest arose from different instruments at different times.

B. The sister intended to create a tenancy in common by executing the deed. Answer choice B is correct. Under the modern approach to ascertaining whether a joint tenancy with the right of survivorship exists, the focus is on intent rather than the existence of the four unities. Here, the strongest argument that the sister and brother held the property as tenants in common at the time of her death is that the sister intended to sever the joint tenancy by the execution of the deed before her death. Answer choice A is incorrect because exclusive possession of real property subject to a joint tenancy is not required for a joint tenant to sever the joint tenancy. Answer choice C is incorrect because there is no requirement that a joint tenant be notified before the joint tenancy is severed by another joint tenant. Answer choice D is incorrect. Since the jurisdiction no longer follows the four unities test, the argument that the sister's interest in the residence is created by a different instrument and at a different time from her brother's interest does not dictate whether the residence is held in a joint tenancy.

Shortly before his death, a testator executed a will devising a tract of land "to my son for life, then to my daughter for life, and then to my son's heirs." A few years later, the son died, having executed a will that left his entire estate to a friend rather than the son's only child and heir. Shortly thereafter, the daughter died. The applicable jurisdiction continues to adhere to the common law. Who is entitled to the tract of land? A. The son's friend, because the son died before the daughter. B. The son's friend, because the son had a vested remainder in the tract of land that he devised to his friend. C. The son's only child, because the child was the son's only heir. D. The son's only child, because the son's heirs had a contingent remainder in the tract of land that vested on the son's death.

B. The son's friend, because the son had a vested remainder in the tract of land that he devised to his friend. Answer choice B is correct. As worded, the devise by the testator purports to transfer a life estate to the son, a vested remainder to the daughter for life, and a contingent remainder interest in the son's heirs. At common law, the Rule in Shelley's Case prevented a contingent remainder in the grantee's heirs. Defeating the grantor's intent, the rule changed the interest that the grantor purported to give to the grantee's heirs to a vested remainder in the grantee. Here, applying the rule, the son received not only a life estate but also a vested remainder following the daughter's life estate. When the son died, the daughter's vested remainder for life became the presently possessory interest, but the son's vested remainder interest passed pursuant to the terms of the son's will to his friend. Subsequently, when the death of the daughter terminated her life estate, the vested remainder that the son's friend inherited became possessory. Therefore, the son's friend is now entitled to possess the land. Answer choice A is incorrect. Even if the daughter had predeceased the son, the son would have been the owner of both a life estate and a vested remainder in the tract of land. Under the doctrine of merger, the son would have then owned the tract of land in fee simple, which the son would have been free to devise to his friend. Answer choice C is incorrect because, while in a jurisdiction that has abolished the Rule in Shelley's Case, the son's child as his only heir is entitled to the remainder interest, here the common law applies. Consequently, the son's child is not entitled to the tract of land because the son devised his vested remainder to his friend. Answer choice D is incorrect. In a jurisdiction that has abolished the Rule in Shelley's Case, the testator's intent to create a contingent remainder in the son's heirs would have been recognized, and the son's child would have had a contingent remainder in the tract of land that vested on the son's death. Instead, the Rule in Shelley's Case converted the contingent remainder in the son's heirs into a vested remainder in the son, which he devised to his friend.

A woman was diagnosed with a fatal disease and informed that she likely had only two months to live. She contacted her nephew and asked him to come to her home. When he arrived, she told him that, in light of her impending death, she wanted him to have her autographed first edition of the first novel by a famous author she had known. The nephew, not wanting to offend his aunt, took the book, but did so reluctantly since he thought the book had only sentimental value to his aunt. Miraculously, the woman recovered. Having had a change of heart regarding the book, she has demanded that her nephew return it. He has refused to return the book because he recently learned that the book is very valuable. Who is entitled to the book? A. The woman, because the nephew did not accept the book with knowledge as to its value. B. The woman, because she recovered from the illness that placed her in contemplation of death. C. The nephew, because the woman gave him the book and he accepted it. D. The nephew, because an inter vivos gift, once made, is irrevocable.

B. The woman, because she recovered from the illness that placed her in contemplation of death. Answer choice B is correct. A gift causa mortis, as a gift given in contemplation of death, is a conditional gift. If the donor does not die, the gift is revoked automatically as a matter of law when the donor recovers. Since the woman did not die, her gift of the book is revoked and she is entitled to the return of the book. Answer choice A is incorrect because, although the nephew may not have appreciated the gift because he was unaware of the book's monetary value, the nephew physically accepted the book from his aunt. While a donee has the right to reject a gift, a donee's misunderstanding as to the value of the gift at the time of acceptance does not negate the donee's acceptance of the gift in the absence of fraud. Answer choice C is incorrect. While the elements for a gift causa mortis were met in this case, the condition on which the gift was made (i.e., the death of the woman by the disease) did not occur. Consequently, the gift was revoked. Answer choice D is incorrect because, although an inter vivos gift generally is irrevocable, an inter vivos gift that is subject to a future condition is revoked if that condition does not occur. Here, the woman's gift of the book to her nephew was a gift causa mortis and as such was conditioned on her death by the anticipated cause. Since she recovered from her illness, the gift is revoked and she is entitled to the return of the book.

An individual owned a tract of land in fee simple absolute. She devised the land "to my spouse for life, and when he dies, to my daughter for life, and then to her children and their heirs." The individual was survived by her spouse and nine-year-old daughter. Which of the following accurately describes the current ownership interest in the tract of land held by the daughter and her descendants? A. The daughter has a contingent remainder for life, and her children have a contingent remainder in fee simple. B. The daughter has a life estate, and her children, since they do not exist, have nothing. C. The daughter has a vested remainder for life, and her children have a contingent remainder in fee simple. D. Neither has an interest in the land because the daughter may die childless before the spouse dies.

C. The daughter has a vested remainder for life, and her children have a contingent remainder in fee simple. Answer choice C is correct. A future interest is an ownership interest in presently existing property, which may commence in possession or enjoyment sometime in the future. A remainder is a future interest created in a grantee that is capable of becoming a possessory estate upon the natural expiration of a prior estate (e.g., a life estate, estate for years) that is created in the same conveyance in which the remainder is created. A vested remainder is a remainder that is not subject to any conditions precedent and is created in an ascertainable grantee. A remainder is contingent if it is created in a grantee that is unascertainable, or if it is subject to an express condition precedent to a grantee's taking. Here, the daughter has a remainder for life because it is a future property interest in a grantee for the life of the grantee that is capable of becoming possessory upon the natural expiration of a prior estate; in other words, her life estate will become possessory when the spouse's life estate ends. It is a vested remainder because she is an ascertainable grantee whose interest is not subject to a condition precedent. The daughter's children have a remainder interest because it is a future interest that is capable of becoming an estate that is presently possessory upon the natural expiration of the daughter's life estate. It is contingent because their identities are not presently ascertainable, as they have not been born. Answer choice A is incorrect. Although the devise qualifies the daughter's interest with the phrase "when he dies," which refers to the death of the individual's spouse, this does not subject the daughter's interest to a condition precedent. Instead, it merely explicitly states that the daughter's interest will take effect naturally on the termination of the spouse's life estate. Answer choice B is incorrect because the daughter does not currently possess a life estate. Instead, since the spouse is still alive, the daughter still has a remainder for life, and the children, while not currently identifiable, possess a contingent remainder. Answer choice D is incorrect because, although it is not certain that either the daughter or her children will come into possession of the land, each currently possesses a remainder interest in the land.

A landowner transferred his property via a deed. The deed read, "to my spouse for life, then to my daughter, but if she dies without children, to my nephew and his heirs." The deed identified the spouse, daughter, and nephew by name. At the landowner's death, he is survived by his spouse, childless daughter, and childless nephew. The landowner devised all of his real property interests to his brother. Which of the following most accurately reflects the ownership of the future interests in the land? A. The daughter and the nephew each have an alternative contingent remainder in fee simple. B. The daughter has a contingent life estate, and the nephew has a shifting executory interest in fee simple. C. The daughter has a vested remainder in fee simple subject to divestment in fee simple and subject to an executory limitation, and the nephew has a shifting executory interest in fee simple. D. The landowner's brother has a reversion.

C. The daughter has a vested remainder in fee simple subject to divestment in fee simple and subject to an executory limitation, and the nephew has a shifting executory interest in fee simple. Answer choice C is correct. A remainder is a future interest created in a grantee that is capable of becoming an estate that is presently possessory upon the natural expiration of a prior estate (e.g., a life estate, estate for years) that is created in the same conveyance in which the remainder is created. A remainder is vested if it is created in a grantee that is ascertainable and it is not subject to an express condition precedent to the grantee's taking. Here, the daughter's future interest follows the spouse's life estate, the daughter is ascertainable, and her future interest is not subject to a condition precedent. Consequently, she has a vested remainder. However, it is subject to divestment through a condition subsequent and subject to an executory limitation. That is because the daughter's future interest will cease if she dies without children before or after the spouse dies. Therefore, her future interest is a vested remainder subject to divestment in fee simple and subject to an executory limitation. An executory interest is a future interest in a third party that is not a remainder and that generally cuts the prior estate short upon the occurrence of a specified condition. A shifting executory interest divests the interest of the grantee by cutting short a prior estate created in the same conveyance. The estate "shifts" from one grantee to another on the happening of the condition. Here, since the nephew's future interest does not follow a life estate, it is an executory interest. The nephew's interest is a shifting executory interest because it will cut short the daughter's estate if she dies without children. Answer choice A is incorrect. The daughter's remainder is not a contingent remainder because she is ascertainable and the condition imposed on her future interest is a condition subsequent, not a condition precedent. The nephew's future interest is not a remainder interest because it will not follow on the natural termination of the daughter's estate. Instead, his interest will cut short her fee simple if she dies without children. Answer choice B is incorrect. Although the conveyance merely stated, "to my daughter" rather than "to my daughter and her heirs," such a conveyance creates a fee simple estate rather than a life estate. Answer choice D is incorrect. Although the daughter does not currently have children, her interest in the land will terminate only if she dies childless. In addition, the nephew's future interest does not depend on him having heirs.

Two friends, an unrelated man and woman, purchased land as an investment, taking title as equal tenants in common. The man executed a will leaving his real property interests to his siblings, a brother and a sister, as joint tenants with the right of survivorship. The woman did not execute a will. The woman died first, and her real property interests passed by law to her daughter. Recently, the man died. Who owns the land? A. The brother and sister own the land as joint tenants with the right of survivorship, and the daughter does not have an ownership interest in the land. B. The brother, sister, and daughter each own an equal interest in the land as tenants in common. C. The daughter owns a one-half interest in the land as a tenant in common with the brother and sister, and the brother and sister each own a one-fourth interest in the land, which is held between themselves as joint tenants with the right of survivorship. D. The daughter owns a one-half interest in the land, and the brother and sister each own a one-fourth interest in the land, all three as tenants in common with respect to each other.

C. The daughter owns a one-half interest in the land as a tenant in common with the brother and sister, and the brother and sister each own a one-fourth interest in the land, which is held between themselves as joint tenants with the right of survivorship. Answer choice C is correct. On the death of the owner of property held as a tenant in common, the deceased owner's interest passes according to the terms of the owner's valid will, or if the owner did not leave a valid will, in accordance with intestate succession. Here, the man and the woman each owned a one-half interest in the land as equal tenants in common. On the death of the woman, her one-half tenant in common interest in the land passed by law to her daughter. On the recent death of the man, his one-half tenant in common interest passed under the terms of his will to his brother and sister as joint tenants with the right of survivorship, with each thereby owning a one-fourth interest in the land. Answer choice A is incorrect. Unlike an interest held as a joint tenant with the right of survivorship, an interest held as a tenant in common passes on the death of its owner as the owner directs in his will or as the law prescribes. Thus, neither the death of the woman before the man nor her failure to execute a will terminated her one-half tenant in common interest in the land. Answer choice B is incorrect. Although the property was initially owned by the two friends as tenants in common, the man provided in his will that his one-half tenant in common interest would pass to his brother and sister as joint tenants with the right of survivorship. Moreover, the man could not devise greater than a one-half interest in the land to his brother and sister since he only had a one-half interest as a tenant in common with the woman. Answer choice D is incorrect. Although the man could have devised his one-half interest in the land to his brother and sister as tenants in common, his tenancy-in-common interest did not preclude him from devising his interest to his siblings as joint tenants with the right of survivorship.

A woman conveyed a subdivision lot on which a house had been built, "to my daughter, [name of daughter], for life, then to my daughter's children who reach 18 years of age." At the time of the conveyance, the woman's daughter did not have children. When the woman died, she devised her real property interests to her husband. At the time of the daughter's recent death, she was survived by her only child, a 16-year-old son. The jurisdiction has abolished the Destructibility of Contingent Remainders Doctrine. No other applicable laws govern this property interest. Who has an interest in the subdivision lot? A. The husband has a fee simple determinable, and the son has a possibility of reverter. B. The husband has a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent, and the son has a contingent remainder. C. The husband has a fee simple subject to an executory limitation, and the son has a springing executory interest in fee simple. D. The husband owns the lot in fee simple absolute.

C. The husband has a fee simple subject to an executory limitation, and the son has a springing executory interest in fee simple. Answer choice C is correct. Under the common-law doctrine of the destructibility of contingent remainders, a contingent remainder was destroyed if it had not vested by the time the preceding estate terminated. In most jurisdictions today (and in this one), if a contingent remainder has not vested by the time the preceding estate terminates, the grantor's reversion becomes possessory, and the person holding the contingent remainder takes a springing executory interest which becomes possessory if the condition precedent is met. Here, immediately prior to the daughter's death, her son had a contingent remainder because the woman had created a remainder in her "daughter's children who reach 18 years of age," and the son was only 16 years old. On the death of the daughter, the son's contingent remainder became a springing executory interest. A reversion is the future interest held by the grantor who grants a life estate or estate for years but does not convey the remaining future interest to a third party. A reversion is fully transferable, devisable, and descendible. Here, although the woman did create a future interest in her daughter's children, that interest had not yet vested at the end of the daughter's life estate. Consequently, the woman had a reversion that followed her daughter's life estate, and the woman devised that reversion to her husband. Upon the daughter's death, the husband's reversion became a present possessory estate in fee simple subject to the son's springing executory interest. Answer choice A is incorrect. A possibility of reverter is a future interest retained by the grantor upon the creation of a fee simple determinable in a grantee. Here, the future interest is held by the son, not the woman. Answer choice B is incorrect. While the son did have a contingent remainder prior to the death of the daughter, on her death his contingent remainder became an executory interest. Moreover, the present interest held by the husband is not a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent because that designation is reserved for a present possessory interest transferred by a grantor to a grantee that includes specific conditional language, which was not present here, and is followed by a right of entry in the grantor. Answer choice D is incorrect. Under the doctrine of the destructibility of contingent remainders, a contingent remainder is destroyed if it has not vested by the time the preceding estate terminates. Had this doctrine not been abolished, the husband would have taken the property in fee simple.

A nephew and his uncle owned a parcel of land as joint tenants with the right of survivorship. The uncle operated a business. Needing funds to continue the business, the uncle borrowed money from a bank in exchange for a mortgage on his interest in the parcel of land. The uncle defaulted on the loan, and the bank now has the right to initiate a foreclosure action against the uncle's interest in the parcel. The applicable jurisdiction adheres to the lien theory of mortgages. What is the current ownership status of the parcel of land? A. The nephew and the bank own the parcel of land as joint tenants with the right of survivorship. B. The nephew and the bank own the parcel of land as tenants in common. C. The nephew and the uncle own the parcel of land as joint tenants with the right of survivorship. D. The nephew and the uncle own the parcel of land as tenants in common.

C. The nephew and the uncle own the parcel of land as joint tenants with the right of survivorship. Answer choice C is correct. Since the applicable jurisdiction adheres to the lien theory of mortgages, which a majority of states do, the mortgage is only a lien on the property and does not sever the joint tenancy absent a default and foreclosure sale. Although the uncle has defaulted on the loan, the uncle's interest in the parcel of land has not yet been sold at a foreclosure sale. Consequently, he and his nephew continue to own the parcel of land as joint tenants with the right of survivorship. Should the uncle die before the foreclosure sale, the nephew would own the parcel of land in fee simple and the property would not be subject to the bank's mortgage. Answer choice A is incorrect because the nephew and the bank will never own the parcel of land as joint tenants with the right of survivorship. Even if the bank was to purchase the uncle's interest in the parcel at the foreclosure sale, this would result in the severance of the joint tenancy and the nephew and the bank would own the parcel as tenants in common. Answer choice B is incorrect because the nephew and the uncle continue to the own the parcel of land as joint tenants with the right of survivorship until the interest is severed by a foreclosure sale. If the bank purchases the uncle's interest in the parcel of land at the foreclosure sale, the nephew and bank will own the parcel of land as tenants in common. Answer choice D is incorrect. Since there has not yet been a foreclosure sale, the nephew and the uncle continue to the own the parcel of land as joint tenants with the right of survivorship. When the foreclosure sale is held, the joint tenancy will be severed, and the nephew and successful bidder at the sale will own the parcel of land as tenants in common.

A vendor at a flea market displayed a ring for sale. A woman, admiring the ring, slipped it on her finger. After bargaining with the vendor, the woman reached an agreement with him as to the price. The woman indicated that a nearby, well-known antique dealer was her husband and that he would pay for the ring when they all returned to the flea market tomorrow. The vendor agreed that the woman could take the ring and pay for it tomorrow, since the well-known antique dealer would certainly be there the next day. When the woman didn't return the following day, the vendor approached the well-known antique dealer to request the payment; the dealer truthfully responded that the woman was not his wife and he had no idea what the vendor was talking about. Several weeks later, the vendor saw the ring advertised for sale on an online site. When the vendor contacted the online seller, the online seller revealed that he had purchased the ring from a woman who fit the description of the woman with whom the vendor had dealt. The online seller also revealed that he had paid the same amount for the ring that the vendor had asked the woman to pay for it. The online seller did not know how the woman had acquired the ring. When the vendor explained his dealings with the woman, he demanded that the online seller return the ring, which online seller refused to do. The vendor sues the online seller for the return of the ring. Who will be successful? A. The vendor, because the woman never paid for the ring. B. The vendor, because a transferee cannot acquire better title to property than the transferor had. C. The online seller, because he was a good-faith purchaser for value of the ring from the woman. D. The online seller, because he currently has possession of the ring.

C. The online seller, because he was a good-faith purchaser for value of the ring from the woman. Answer choice C is correct. Generally, a purchaser of goods can only acquire the same title to those goods as the seller had or had the authority to obey. Consequently, a person who purchases goods from a thief cannot acquire good title to the goods. However, when the true owner of goods sells them to another, but the sale is voidable because of fraud, because of lack of capacity, or because it was a cash sale and the buyer failed to pay or paid with a dishonored check, the buyer may transfer good title to a good-faith purchaser. Here, the vendor agreed to sell the ring to the woman for a specific cash price, but allowed the woman to retain possession of the ring before she paid him. Consequently, although the woman did not have good title to the ring, she could transfer good title to the ring to the online seller who, as the purchaser of ring for its market value without knowledge as to how the woman acquired the ring, was a good-faith purchaser for value of the ring. Answer choice A is incorrect. Although the woman did not pay for the ring, the vendor permitted her to obtain possession of the ring in an agreed-upon cash sale before she had paid for the ring. Consequently, she could transfer good title to the ring to the online seller, who purchased the ring from the woman in good faith without knowledge as to how she came to possess the ring. Answer choice B is incorrect. While a purchaser of goods generally can only acquire the same title to those goods as the seller had, here the online seller, as a good-faith purchaser of the ring from the woman, obtained good title to the ring because she had obtained possession of the ring from the vendor in a cash sale in which she failed to pay for the ring. Answer choice D is incorrect because the online seller's mere possession of the ring does not make his right to the ring superior to the vendor's right.

A woman, who frequently flew for business but never completely overcame her fear of plane crashes, wrote a letter to her only grandchild before boarding a plane. The letter read: "I'm sorry that business prevents me from attending your graduation from college today. But, in recognition of your achievement, I hereby give you the emerald necklace that you have often admired, which is in the safe in my home office." The woman planned to mail the letter when she arrived at her destination, but the woman developed a blood clot while on her flight and suffered a fatal stroke. According to the terms of the woman's will, the necklace was to be sold at auction and the proceeds distributed among several charities. The grandchild has filed an action against the woman's estate asserting ownership of the necklace. Which of the following is the best argument that the woman died owning the necklace? A. The woman did not die in a plane crash. B. The woman lacked the intent to make a present gift to her grandchild. C. The woman did not deliver the necklace to her grandchild. D. The grandchild did not accept the woman's gift of the necklace.

C. The woman did not deliver the necklace to her grandchild. Answer choice C is correct. For an inter vivos gift of personal property to occur, three requirements must be met. First, the donor must have the mental capacity and intent to make a present gift of the property. Second, the donor must deliver the property. Third, the donee must accept the property. Delivery can be accomplished by actual physical delivery, constructive delivery, delivery in writing, and symbolic delivery. Here, there is an issue as to whether the necklace was delivered to the grandchild. The grandchild did not take actual possession of the necklace before the woman's death, and a mere declaration of intent to give a gift is insufficient to constitute constructive delivery. If a donor clearly expresses written intent to give a gift, clearly describes the subject being gifted, signs the document, and passes the writing out of his control with the intention that it reach the donee, then that is a sufficient method of delivery by writing, but the woman did not pass the writing out of her control, and there is no indication as to whether the letter was signed. Consequently, while not necessarily a winning argument, the lack of delivery is the best argument against the existence of a gift of the necklace prior to the woman's death. Answer choice A is incorrect. In order for a gift causa mortis to be valid, it must be given in anticipation of impending death, such as an actual life-threatening illness. An abstract fear of death, such as someday drowning or dying in a plane crash, is not enough to be considered impending death. Therefore, this argument is inapplicable because even if the woman had died in a plane accident instead of due to a stroke, her fear of plane crashes would not have been sufficient to make this a valid gift causa mortis. Additionally, this argument does nothing to counter the grandchild's claim to the necklace as an inter vivos gift. Answer choice B is incorrect because the woman's letter clearly expresses the intent to make an immediate gift of the necklace to her grandchild. Moreover, the woman does not condition the transfer of ownership of the necklace on any future event. Answer choice D is incorrect because, when a gift is beneficial to the donee, as is the case here regarding the necklace, the donee's acceptance is presumed. Since the grandchild is contending that she owns the necklace, there is no evidence that would refute this presumption.

A woman who owned a ranch in fee simple absolute transferred it to her nephew by a deed, which stated, "to my nephew and his heirs and assigns until cattle are no longer raised on the ranch, and provided that if that occurs this deed is void and title shall revert back to the grantor." At the woman's death, her only child inherited her real property interests. The nephew raised cattle on the ranch until he died, at which time his daughter inherited the ranch. The daughter, who had not been born when the woman transferred the ranch to the nephew, continued to raise cattle for another 25 years. However, due to unavoidable economic changes, raising cattle on the ranch was no longer profitable, and the daughter ceased doing so last month. The woman's child is still alive. The applicable jurisdiction continues to follow the common law Rule Against Perpetuities and has no other relevant statute. Which of the following is the strongest argument that the daughter is the current owner of the ranch? A. The future interest retained by the woman could not be devised to the woman's child. B. The future interest retained by the woman violates the Rule Against Perpetuities. C. The woman's child has taken no action to assert his ownership of the ranch. D. There is a presumption that the interest the woman conveyed to her nephew is a fee simple determinable.

C. The woman's child has taken no action to assert his ownership of the ranch. Answer choice C is correct. A fee simple determinable is a present fee simple estate that is limited by specific durational language (e.g., "so long as," "while," "during," "until"). A fee simple determinable terminates automatically upon the happening of the stated event, and ownership of the property immediately reverts back to the grantor or his successor in interest. A fee simple subject to a condition subsequent is a present fee simple that is limited in duration by specific conditional language (e.g., "provided that," "on condition that," "but if"). Upon the occurrence of the condition, the grantor or his successor interest has the right to terminate this estate, but ownership of the property does not revert back to the grantor or his successor in interest until the grantor or his successor in interest asserts that right. When there is ambiguity as to whether the conveyance creates a fee simple determinable or a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent, there is a presumption in most jurisdictions that the latter was created. Here, there is an ambiguity as to the type of defeasible fee created due to the language used in the conveyance— "until," "provided that," and "revert back", so there is a presumption that the daughter has a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent. Since the woman's child has yet to assert his right to reclaim ownership of the ranch, the daughter continues to own the ranch despite her failure to raise cattle on it. Answer choice A is incorrect because the future interest retained by the woman, whether it is a possibility of reverter or a right of entry, can be devised. Answer choice B is incorrect because a future interest retained by a grantor is not subject to the Rule Against Perpetuities. Answer choice D is incorrect because the presumption in most jurisdictions is that when there is ambiguity as to whether the conveyance creates a fee simple determinable or a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent, the latter was created. Moreover, the question asks for the strongest argument that the daughter is the current owner of the ranch, and a presumption that favored the creation of a fee simple determinable would result in the ownership of the ranch resting with the woman's child.

A man who repaired and upgraded computers stole a new desktop gaming computer valued at $4,000 from a dealer. He then stripped it of its parts, which he primarily used to repair or upgrade other computers, and sold the remaining parts online to various individuals. He kept the empty computer case, which was worth $150, among the spare parts in his workshop. When an artist visited the man's workshop to pick up her own repaired laptop, she noticed the computer case and asked whether she could take it to use it in a work of art. When the man explained that the case had been stolen, the artist replied that the origin of the case would reinforce the artistic message she wanted to make with her work of art. The man gave her the case at no cost. The artist transformed the computer case into a work of art valued at $10,000. The dealer learned what had transpired from a news article containing an interview where the artist revealed the whole backstory of the work of art. Assuming the applicable jurisdiction follows the modern/civil law approach, can the dealer acquire the work of art through a lawsuit? A. No, because the value of the artwork exceeds the value of the stolen computer. B. No, because the computer case has been transformed into a work of art. C. Yes, because the artist knew that the computer case had been stolen. D. Yes, because the artist had acquired the computer case by gift rather than purchase.

C. Yes, because the artist knew that the computer case had been stolen. Answer choice C is correct. Accession is the process of adding value to property by the expenditure of labor or adding new materials. Generally, the accession of materials to an owner's goods transfers ownership of the materials accessed to the owner of the original goods. A willful trespasser cannot gain rights to title by accession. The original owner is entitled to keep the property in its enhanced state, regardless of how much added value the accession may have created. Answer choice A is incorrect because, although an innocent trespasser who adds materials to an owner's goods may acquire title to goods themselves if the value of the goods as altered greatly exceeds the value of the original goods, the artist is not an innocent trespasser. Answer choice B is incorrect because, although an innocent trespasser who adds materials to an owner's goods may acquire title to goods themselves if there is a complete change in the nature of the goods, the artist is not an innocent trespasser. Answer choice D is incorrect because, while a good-faith purchaser may acquire title to goods in certain instances that a donee may not, such as pursuant to the entrustment doctrine, the artist, as a willful trespasser, cannot acquire title to the computer case regardless of whether she acquired the computer case by gift or purchase.

A 90-year-old widow moved to a nursing home. She conveyed her residence that she owned in fee simple absolute "to my daughter for life, then to my daughter's surviving spouse for life, and then to my daughter's children then living." At the time of the conveyance, the daughter was 65 years of age and married to a man who was 70 years of age. They had two children, a daughter and a son, who were respectively 40 and 38 years of age. Does the conveyance to the daughter's children violate the common law Rule Against Perpetuities? A. No, because each of the daughter's two children, as a life in being at the time of the conveyance, has a vested remainder. B. No, because the identities of all of the daughter's children would be known when the daughter, a life in being at the time of the conveyance, died. C. Yes, because the interests of the daughter's children may not vest within 21 years of the end of a life in being at the time of the conveyance. D. Yes, because the widow conveyed the residence during her lifetime rather than devising the residence upon her death.

C. Yes, because the interests of the daughter's children may not vest within 21 years of the end of a life in being at the time of the conveyance. Answer choice C is correct. The Rule Against Perpetuities generally requires a contingent remainder, as well as a vested remainder subject to open and an executory interest, to vest or fail by the end of a life in being plus 21 years. A remainder is a future interest created in a grantee that is capable of becoming an estate that is presently possessory upon the natural expiration of a prior estate (e.g., a life estate, estate for years) that is created in the same conveyance in which the remainder is created. A remainder is contingent if it is created in a grantee that is unascertainable, or if it is subject to an express condition precedent to a grantee's taking. Here, the daughter's children, including not only her two living children but also any unborn children, have a remainder in the residence because their future interests will take effect on the natural termination of the previous estate (i.e., either the daughter's life estate or her surviving spouse's remainder life estate). The remainder is contingent because it requires the daughter's children to survive either the daughter's life estate if her spouse dies first, or the surviving spouse's remainder life estate if the daughter dies first. This remainder will not necessarily vest or fail within a life in being at the time of the conveyance plus 21 years. Although the daughter currently has a spouse, he could die or they could divorce, and the daughter could then remarry someone who was not alive at the time of the conveyance. The daughter's second spouse could then survive her by more than 21 years. In that circumstance, the remainder interest in the daughter's children would not vest or fail within 21 years of the death of a life in being (i.e., the daughter). Thus, the children's remainder interest violates the Rule Against Perpetuities. Answer choice A is incorrect. The remainder is a contingent remainder, even with respect to the daughter's two living children, because the interest is contingent on the daughter's children surviving until the end of the prior estate. Answer choice B is incorrect because, although it is true that the identities of the daughter's children will be ascertainable no later than her death, their remainders would still be contingent on their survival until the end of the preceding estate. Therefore, since it is possible that their interests will not vest within 21 years of the daughter's death, these contingent remainders violate the Rule Against Perpetuities. Answer choice D is incorrect. Even if the widow had transferred the residence by will, the Rule Against Perpetuities would have applied to the contingent remainder of the daughter's children.

A husband and wife purchased land using funds that the wife earned while married. The land was titled in both their names. The wife died, devising all her real property interests to her nephew. The applicable jurisdiction is a community property jurisdiction. Does the husband have an interest in the land? A. No, because the land was purchased with money earned by the wife. B. No, because the wife devised her real property interests to her nephew. C. Yes, because the land was community property. D. Yes, because the wife made a gift of half of the property to the husband by titling it in both their names.

C. Yes, because the land was community property. Answer choice C is correct. In a community property jurisdiction, each spouse's earnings during the marriage as well as property acquired with those earnings are community property. Upon the death of a spouse, under traditional community property principals, the surviving spouse is the owner of one half of the community property, and the other half passes in accord with the decedent spouse's will. Here, since the land was purchased with money earned by the spouse during her marriage, the land is community property, and the husband is entitled to one-half of the land upon her death. The nephew, as the devisee of the wife's real property interests, is entitled to the other one-half. Answer choice A is incorrect because, although the land was purchased with money earned by the wife, since the money was earned during the marriage, the money was community property and the land purchased with that money will also be community property. Therefore, the husband was entitled to one-half of the land after the wife died. Answer choice B is incorrect. Although the wife was entitled to devise her one-half interest in the land to her nephew, the other one-half interest in the community property passed on her death to the husband. Answer choice D is incorrect. Although a spouse may make a gift of separate property owned by the spouse to the other spouse, here the land was community property since it was purchased with money that the spouse had earned during the marriage.

A man conveyed wooded property on which a cabin was situated to his daughter for life, with the remainder to his grandson. The property was in a sparsely populated rural area. After making limited use of the property for many years, the daughter decided to tear down the existing cabin and replace it with a far larger residence that she planned to make her primary home. The change will significantly increase the value of the wooded property and the surrounding lots. There have been no recent changes to the rural area surrounding the wooded property. The grandson, preferring the rustic cabin, has filed a lawsuit seeking an injunction to prevent the daughter from tearing down the cabin and erecting a larger residence. The applicable jurisdiction follows the common law approach to ameliorative waste. Is the court likely to grant the injunction? A. No, because the planned change is reasonable considering the daughter's needs. B. No, because the planned change would significantly increase the value of the property. C. Yes, because the planned change constitutes ameliorative waste. D. Yes, because the planned change is not triggered by changed conditions in the surrounding area.

C. Yes, because the planned change constitutes ameliorative waste. Answer choice C is correct. When the life tenant's affirmative action substantially changes the condition of the property and thereby does not diminish the value of the property, this is known as ameliorative waste. In most jurisdictions today, ameliorative waste is permitted when the change results in reasonable use of the property. However, under common law, this was prohibited because the condition of the property was changed. Since this jurisdiction applies the common law rule, the court is likely to grant the injunction. Answer choice A is incorrect because, even though the daughter's planned change is reasonable in light of her future use of the property, it still constitutes ameliorative waste under the common law. Answer choice B is incorrect because, although the daughter's planned change would significantly increase the value of the property, this change still constitutes ameliorative waste and therefore is not likely to be permitted by the court. Answer choice D is incorrect. Under the modern approach to ameliorative changes by a life tenant, ameliorative waste is permitted when the change results in reasonable use of the property. This can include changes in response to a substantial and permanent change in surroundings that make the change necessary to continue reasonable use of the property. However, under the common law rule, such changes to the surrounding neighborhood would not permit ameliorative waste by a life tenant.

A man owned a parcel of land in fee simple absolute. As a gift, he conveyed the land to his daughter for the life of her son. Recently, the daughter died as a widow, having survived her husband. She left a will in which she devised her entire estate to her son. Does the son own a life estate in the parcel of land? A. No, because the daughter could not hold a life estate based on the life of her son. B. No, because a life estate is never transferable by will. C. Yes, because the son was the devisee of his mother's estate and survived her. D. Yes, because the son, as the measuring life, is entitled to the life estate.

C. Yes, because the son was the devisee of his mother's estate and survived her. Answer choice C is correct. A life estate is a present possessory estate that is limited in duration by a life. A life estate may be owned by an individual other than the individual whose life determines the duration of the estate. Here, the man could convey a life estate to his daughter based on the life of her son. The daughter, in turn, could transfer the life estate to her son on her death because her son, who was the measuring life of the life estate, survived her. Answer choice A is incorrect. The duration of a life estate may be measured by the life of an individual other than the grantee. In such cases, the life estate is known as a "life estate pur autre vie." Answer choice B is incorrect. Although a life estate measured by the life of the owner of the life estate is not transferable by will because it terminates on the death of the owner, a life estate measured by a third party's life—here, the son—can be devised by the owner of the life estate to someone else as long as the individual whose life is the measuring life for the life estate is alive when the owner of the life estate dies. Answer choice D is incorrect because the individual whose life serves as the measuring life of the life estate is not automatically entitled to ownership of the life estate.

In her will, an individual devised a tract of land that she owned outright to her only child. The devising clause read as follows: "To my son and his heirs." At the time of the individual's death, the son had an infant child. Unfortunately, the child died at the age of six. Currently, the son is alive, but unmarried and without any living relative. Under the intestacy law of the applicable jurisdiction, property owned by an individual who dies unmarried and without a living relative escheats to the state. What is the son's ownership interest in the tract of land? A. Nothing, because he is unmarried and has no living relative. B. A life estate, because he is unmarried and has no living relative. C. A fee simple estate, because he had a son when his mother devised the land to him. D. A fee simple estate, because the will devised the land "to my son and his heirs."

D. A fee simple estate, because the will devised the land "to my son and his heirs." Answer choice D is correct. Under early English common law, a conveyance of a fee simple estate required words of limitation to indicate that the estate was devisable and descendible to the grantees heirs (e.g., "to B and his heirs."). Under modern law, words of limitation are no longer required, and conveyances that are ambiguous are now considered to convey a fee simple by default. However, many conveyances still use this traditional language to refer to a fee simple absolute. When a conveyance does contain a reference to the grantee's heirs, this language does not restrict the ability of the grantee to transfer or devise that interest. Consequently, the son owns the tract of land in fee simple, regardless of whether he will have heirs at the time of his death. Answer choices A and B are incorrect because the fact that the son is unmarried and has no living relative does not affect the son's current fee simple ownership interest of the tract of land. These facts are only relevant upon his death to whether the property will escheat to the state under the applicable rules of intestate succession. Answer choice C is incorrect because the phrase "and his heirs" in this conveyance is interpreted as words of limitation that define the property conveyed or devised as a fee simple absolute interest, not a requirement that any future owners of the interest be the heirs of the grantee. Consequently, the existence of a potential heir (i.e., the son's child) at the time that the tract of land was transferred to the son is not necessary to make the son's ownership a fee simple interest.

A buyer purchased a residence from a seller for its fair market value. By deed, the seller conveyed the residence to the buyer as follows: "To [buyer's name] and her heirs." The buyer's husband has died and her only child is an adult son. Before the conveyance, a plaintiff sued the son for negligence and obtained a judgment for damages against him. After the conveyance, the son borrowed money from a lender, which he is now unable to pay back. Who may successfully assert a lien against the residence? A. Both the plaintiff and lender, because the residence was acquired for its fair market value. B. Only the lender, because the lender loaned money to the son after the conveyance. C. Only the plaintiff, because the plaintiff had secured a judgment against the son before the conveyance. D. Neither the plaintiff nor the lender, because the son does not have an interest in the residence.

D. Neither the plaintiff nor the lender, because the son does not have an interest in the residence. Answer choice D is correct. The son has no legal interest in the residence while the buyer is alive, even though the seller's deed included the phrase "and her heirs" when describing the buyer's property interest. In a conveyance of real property, the phrase "and his (her) heirs" that follows the identification of the recipient (e.g., the recipient's name) of the property is interpreted as words of limitation that define the property conveyed or devised as a fee simple absolute interest. These words do not grant any potential heirs of the named recipient a present legal right to the property. Therefore, the son's creditors—the plaintiff and the lender—cannot attach a lien to the buyer's property at this time, and answer choices A, B, and C are thus incorrect.

A woman owned land in fee simple absolute. Six years ago, she conveyed the land "to my spouse, [spouse's name], for life, and then to my granddaughter and her heirs when she reaches 18 years of age." At the time of the conveyance, the granddaughter was ten years of age. Recently, the woman's spouse died, survived by the woman and her granddaughter. The applicable jurisdiction continues to follow the common law regarding contingent remainders. What interest does the granddaughter have in the land? A. Contingent remainder B. Fee simple absolute C. Vested remainder D. No interest in the land

D. No interest in the land Answer choice D is correct. A remainder is a future interest created in a grantee that is capable of becoming an estate that is presently possessory upon the natural expiration of a prior estate (e.g., a life estate, estate for years) that is created in the same conveyance in which the remainder is created. A vested remainder is an interest that is not subject to any conditions precedent and is created in an ascertainable grantee. A remainder is contingent if it is created in a grantee that is unascertainable, or if it is subject to an express condition precedent to a grantee's taking. Here, the woman conveyed to her granddaughter a remainder because it followed the spouse's life estate. That remainder was contingent because it depended on the granddaughter reaching 18 years of age. Under the common law, when a contingent remainder has not vested by the time the preceding estate terminates, the contingent remainder terminates. Here, the granddaughter was only 16 years of age when the spouse holding the life estate died. Since her remainder interest in the land would not vest until the granddaughter turned 18 years of age, her remainder interest terminates, and ownership of the land reverts back to the woman. Answer choice A is incorrect. Although immediately prior to the spouse's death, the granddaughter did possess a contingent remainder in the land, on the spouse's death her contingent remainder terminated due to the common law rule on the destructibility of a contingent remainder. Answer choice B is incorrect. If the granddaughter's interest had been a vested remainder, it would have been transformed into a fee simple absolute on the death of the spouse, who was the life tenant. Instead, because her interest was still contingent at the time of the spouse's death, the granddaughter's unvested interest is destroyed under the common law rule on the destructibility of contingent remainders. Answer choice C is incorrect. Although the granddaughter's contingent remainder would have been transformed into a vested remainder had she reached 18 years of age before the spouse died, the spouse died before the granddaughter's remainder vested. Consequently, under the common law rule on the destructibility of a contingent remainder when the preceding estate terminates, the granddaughter has no interest in the land.

A man and his long-time friend were hunting deer with crossbows on unfenced private land with thepermission of the landowner. The man and his friend each had a valid hunting license, and each was an experienced hunter who rarely missed. When they spotted a stag that roamed free throughout the area, the man incorrectly insisted that it was his turn to take the shot. The man took aim, but just before the man released his arrow, the friend shouted, causing the man to miss the stag. The stag then fled the unfenced private land before either could ready a second shot.A state statute provides, "It is unlawful to willfully and intentionally impede the lawful hunting or trapping of wild animals." Who owns the stag? A. The man B. The friend C. The landowner D. None of the three

D. None of the three Answer choice D is correct. The general rule is that a person must occupy a wild animal before the person can claim ownership of it. A wild animal becomes a possession when a person manifests the intent to own the animal through the exercise of actual or constructive control over it, such that the person deprives the wild animal of its natural liberty. This usually occurs through capture. Here, the stag was never subject the control of any of the three individuals. Answer choice A is incorrect because, although the man would own the stag had he shot it because he had a valid hunting license and the permission of the landowner to hunt on land, he did not kill or mortally wound it, and thus did not exercise control over the stag. While the friend may be liable for scaring away the stag in violation of the statute, the friend's act does not confer ownership of the stag on the man. Answer choice B is incorrect because, although the friend can assert that he had a superior right to the stag by virtue of the agreement he had with the man to take the next shot, neither he nor the man exercised actual or constructive control over the stag. Answer choice C is incorrect. Although the landowner may have a claim to the stag while it remained on the landowner's property that is superior to a trespasser, the landowner has not exercised control over the stag by killing, mortally wounding, or confining it. In addition, since the stag has left the landowner's property, there are no grounds to argue that the landowner has constructive possession of the animal.

A woman devised an undeveloped lot in a suburban development to her two nieces as tenants in common. Upon the woman's death, the older niece received a two-thirds interest in the lot and the younger niece received a one-third interest. The lot was one and a half acres in size. Zoning regulations for the development require property to be at least an acre in size to construct a house on a lot. The older niece has initiated a legal action to partition the lot. She seeks partition in kind to divide the lot into a one-acre portion and a half-acre portion in accord with the nieces' ownership interests. The younger niece opposes any physical partition of the property. Instead, she asks the court to order partition by sale and to divide the proceeds between the nieces in accord with their ownership interests. In a jurisdiction that applies the common law, is the court likely to order partition in kind or by sale? A. Partition in kind, because a physical partition is the preferred method of dividing jointly held property. B. Partition in kind, because the lot can easily be divided in a way that reflects the nieces' ownership interests. C. Partition by sale, because a sale is the preferred method of dividing property owned as tenants in common. D. Partition by sale, because the zoning regulation would preclude the construction of a house on the younger's niece half-acre portion.

D. Partition by sale, because the zoning regulation would preclude the construction of a house on the younger's niece half-acre portion. Answer choice D is correct. In jurisdictions applying the common law, a division in kind is generally the preferred method of dividing jointly held property, including property held in a tenancy in common. But here, the zoning regulation would prevent the construction of a house on the younger niece's half-acre parcel and thereby significantly reduce its value. Therefore, a court would be likely to order a partition by sale instead. Answer choice A is incorrect because, although a division in kind is generally the preferred method of dividing jointly held property in jurisdictions that follow the common law, here a division in kind would cause an inequitable result that would leave the younger niece with a lot on which a house could not be constructed. Answer choice B is incorrect. Although a division in kind can easily be effected because of the size of the lot and the interests of each niece, here that would cause an inequitable result for the younger niece. Answer choice C is incorrect because a sale is not the generally preferred method for dividing a tenancy in common in jurisdictions that apply the common law.

As a wedding present, the bride's parents conveyed a house to the married couple¬—a husband and wife—as co-owners. Several years later, the wife sought and was awarded a divorce. The court, in its divorce decree, did not address the ownership of the house. The applicable jurisdiction recognizes tenancies by the entirety. Applying the presumptions adopted by a majority of the jurisdictions that recognize a tenancy by the entirety, who owns the house? A. The wife, because her parents gave the house to the couple. B. The wife, because she sought and was awarded the divorce. C. The husband and wife as tenants in common, because they acquired the house as a married couple. D. The husband and wife as tenants in common, because they are now divorced.

D. The husband and wife as tenants in common, because they are now divorced. Answer choice D is correct. When individuals acquire property as co-owners while married, there is a rebuttable presumption that they take the property as tenants by the entirety. Upon divorce, ownership of the property is converted into a tenancy in common. Therefore, the divorced couple now owns the house as tenants in common. Answer choice A is incorrect. Since the wife's parents gave the house to the couple as co-owners rather than to the wife individually, there is a presumption that they took title to the house as tenants by the entirety. Upon divorce, ownership of the property is converted into a tenancy in common. Answer choice B is incorrect. Regardless of which spouse seeks a divorce, there is a presumption that property owned as tenants by the entirety is transformed into a tenancy in common upon divorce. Answer choice C is incorrect because when individuals acquire property as co-owners while married, there is a rebuttable presumption that they take the property as tenants by the entirety, not as tenants in common.

A man who owned a residence in fee simple conveyed it "to my son for life, and then to my daughter when she reaches 25 years of age." When the daughter was 23 years of age, she conveyed her interest in the residence to the man. Three years later, the son died, survived by the man and the daughter. The son has willed all of his property to a charity. The applicable jurisdiction follows the modern trend that all remainders and executory interests are alienable during life. Who now owns the residence? A. The charity, because it was named as the beneficiary of the son's property in his will. B. The daughter, because she has reached 25 years of age. C. The man, because he held a reversionary interest in the residence immediately before his son died. D. The man, because he held a vested remainder interest in the residence immediately before his son died.

D. The man, because he held a vested remainder interest in the residence immediately before his son died. Answer choice D is correct. A remainder is a future interest created in a grantee that is capable of becoming an estate that is presently possessory upon the natural expiration of a prior estate (e.g., a life estate, estate for years) that is created in the same conveyance in which the remainder is created. A vested remainder is an interest that is not subject to any conditions precedent and is created in an ascertainable grantee. A remainder is contingent if it is created in a grantee that is unascertainable, or if it is subject to an express condition precedent to a grantee's taking. Here, the man conveyed to his daughter a remainder because it followed the son's life estate, and that remainder was contingent because it depended on the daughter reaching 25 years of age. She conveyed that remainder interest to the man, which she was permitted to do in this jurisdiction. When she reached 25 years of age, the contingent remainder that she conveyed to the man vested. When the son died, the man's vested remainder became a present possessory estate in fee simple absolute. Answer choice A is incorrect because, since the son held a life estate that was measured by his own life, his interest in the residence terminated on his death. Therefore, he did not have an interest in the residence that he could devise to the charity. Answer choice B is incorrect because, although the daughter's interest did not vest until she met the condition precedent (i.e., reached 25 years of age), she had already conveyed her interest to the man. Consequently, the daughter had no interest in the residence at the son's death. Answer choice C is incorrect. Typically, a future interest held by a grantor after a life estate is a reversion. However, here the man conveyed to his daughter a contingent remainder rather than retaining a reversion for himself. When the daughter conveyed her interest in the residence back to him, it retained its character as a contingent remainder until it vested upon the daughter turning 25 years of age.

Fifteen years ago, a man conveyed land improved with a house "to my son and his heirs while the house is maintained as a residence." The son moved into the house with his wife and daughter. The man is still alive.Five years ago, the son divorced his wife and transferred his interest in the house by a quitclaim deed to her. The son vacated the premises, and the ex-wife and their daughter remained in the house. One year ago, the son died, leaving his entire estate to a charity. The son was survived by his adult daughter, his only heir. Several months ago, the daughter and her mother moved out of the house and established a residence in another city. The house has remained vacant since that time. Who has present ownership of the house? A. The charity. B. The daughter. C. The ex-wife. D. The man.

D. The man. Answer choice D is correct. A fee simple determinable is a present fee simple estate that is limited by specific durational language (e.g., "so long as," "while," "during," "until"). A fee simple determinable terminates automatically upon the happening of the stated event. Here, the man conveyed a fee simple determinable interest in the improved land to his son because the interest exists only while the property is "maintained as a residence." The grantor of a fee simple determinable retains an implied future interest in the estate, which is known as a possibility of reverter, unless the conveyance provides otherwise. Upon the occurrence of the stated event, the estate automatically reverts to the grantor or his successors. The Rule Against Perpetuities does not apply to a possibility of reverter. Here, the man has a possibility of reverter. Therefore, when the property was no longer "maintained as a residence," it automatically reverted to the man. Answer choice A is incorrect because, although the owner of a fee simple determinable can transfer that interest by will, here the son had already transferred his interest to his ex-wife while he was alive. Answer choice B is incorrect. Although the initial conveyance transferred the property to the "son and his heirs," the phrase "his heirs" does not limit the persons to whom the property can pass to the son's heirs. While a fee simple determinable can descend on the owner's death to the owner's heirs by intestacy, here the son had already transferred his interest to his ex-wife while he was alive. Answer choice C is incorrect because, although the son could and did transfer his present interest to his ex-wife when they divorced, that interest ceased to exist when the house was no longer used as a residence.

An individual who owned land in fee simple decided to gift the land to his friend by a quitclaim deed. The deed stated that the land was conveyed "to my friend, [friend's name]." The friend died shortly thereafter, devising all her property "to my nephew, [nephew's name] and his heirs." The following year, the nephew died due to a sudden illness, leaving no will. His property passed by intestate law to his sole heir. The individual is still alive and has taken no other actions regarding the land. Who owns the land? A. The friend's estate, because a fee simple cannot be transferred by will. B. The individual, because his friend only had a life estate. C. The nephew's estate, because a fee simple cannot be inherited. D. The nephew's heir, because the friend had a fee simple, which can be devised and inherited.

D. The nephew's heir, because the friend had a fee simple, which can be devised and inherited. Answer choice D is correct. A conveyance of real property during the owner's life or at death by the owner's will using the language "to [transferee's name]" is sufficient to transfer a fee simple absolute interest to the transferee. The conveyance need not include the phrase "and his heirs" for a fee simple absolute to be transferred. A fee simple absolute interest in real property may be conveyed during the life of the owner and may be devised by the owner in a will or inherited by the owner's heirs when the owner does not devise the interest. Answer choice A is incorrect because a fee simple absolute interest in real property can be transferred by the owner's will (i.e., devised). Answer choice B is incorrect because the deed contained no language that would limit the duration of the friend's estate to the duration of a measuring life. Answer choice C is incorrect because a fee simple absolute interest in real property can be inherited by the owner's heirs when the owner does not transfer that interest by will.

A brother and sister inherited land as joint tenants with the right of survivorship. The brother executed a will devising his entire estate to his son. The sister executed a will devising all of her real property interests to her daughter. The brother died, and six weeks later, the sister died. Who now owns the land? A. The brother's son in fee simple. B. The brother's son and the sister's daughter as tenants in common. C. The brother's son and the sister's daughter as joint tenants with the right of survivorship. D. The sister's daughter in fee simple.

D. The sister's daughter in fee simple. Answer choice D is correct. When property is held by two individuals in a joint tenancy with the right of survivorship, upon the death of the first individual, that individual's interest in the property ceases and the surviving individual becomes the outright owner of the property (i.e., holds a fee simple interest). Here, since the brother predeceased his sister, he did not have an ownership interest in the land to pass to his son. Instead, upon the brother's death, the sister became the owner of the land in fee simple pursuant to the right of survivorship. Upon the sister's death, her fee simple interest in the land passed according to the terms of her will to her daughter. Answer choice A is incorrect. The execution of a will has no effect on the testator's property because a will only takes effect on the testator's death. Here, although the brother executed his will before the sister executed her will, neither execution affected their interests in the land at that time. Instead, the sister's right of survivorship did not take effect until the brother's death. Answer choice B is incorrect because the brother's death did not sever the joint tenancy between himself and his sister. Instead, the brother's death terminated the brother's interest in the land and left the sister as the sole owner of the land in fee simple. Answer choice C is incorrect because a joint tenancy with the right of survivorship between two individuals does not survive the death of one of them.

A woman owned an acre of land in fee simple absolute. She conveyed the land "to my daughter for life." The daughter died without leaving a will or an heir. The daughter is survived by the woman. What is the reason that ownership of the land returns to the woman? A. The daughter died without leaving an heir. B. The daughter failed to leave a will. C .The woman held a remainder interest in the land. D. The woman held a reversionary interest in the land.

D. The woman held a reversionary interest in the land. Answer choice D is correct. When a grantor creates a life estate in property in someone else and fails to name a subsequent taker of the property, the grantor is deemed to have retained a reversion with respect to the property, as in this case. Answer choice A is incorrect because, since the daughter held only a life estate in the land, it is irrelevant to the subsequent ownership of the land that she did not leave an heir. Answer choice B is incorrect because, since the daughter held only a life estate in the land, it is irrelevant to the subsequent ownership of the land that she did not leave a will. Answer choice C is incorrect. A remainder interest is created in a grantee, not the grantor, with respect to an interest in the land that follows a life estate.

A man had a fashionable and expensive wristwatch. When the man's nephew was 16 years old, the nephew took the watch without asking the man's permission. The man learned of his nephew's action when the nephew wore the watch in front of him, but he did not confront his nephew or otherwise seek to regain possession because he believed that the nephew would return the watch eventually on his own. When the nephew left for college at the age of 18, the nephew gave the watch to his twin sister, the man's niece. The niece was aware that the nephew had taken the watch from their uncle. The man saw his niece wearing the watch a few days later, but took no action to regain possession of it. Four years later, the man died. According to the terms of the man's will, the watch was devised to the man's brother. Three months after the man's death, the executor of the man's estate has sued the man's niece for the return of the watch. The applicable statute of limitations for adverse possession of personal property is five years. In a jurisdiction that does not require good faith and does not follow the discovery rule, can the niece successfully claim ownership of the watch by adverse possession? A. No, because the niece did not possess the watch for five years. B. No, because five years have not passed since the man died and his brother became entitled to the watch pursuant to the will. C. Yes, because the niece possessed the watch at the time of the man's death. D. Yes, because the man did not seek to recover his watch for more than five years.

D. Yes, because the man did not seek to recover his watch for more than five years. Answer choice D is correct. For adverse possession of personal property to ripen into ownership of the property, possession of the property must be actual, open, notorious, adverse (without consent), exclusive, and continuous throughout the entire statutory period. The current possessor of the property may tack a prior possessor's period of possession when in privity with the prior possessor (i.e., the prior possessor sold, gave, or devised the property to the subsequent possessor). Here, the man's nephew and niece each actually possessed the watch, did so openly and exclusively, and with the knowledge of the man but without his consent. While neither alone possessed the watch for the requisite five years, together they have possessed the watch for more than five years. Since the man has not taken action to recover the watch during that period, the niece can successfully assert ownership by virtue of adverse possession. Answer choice A is incorrect because, while the niece has not possessed the watch for five years, the niece can tack the time that the nephew possessed the watch. Since total time of possession exceeds five years, the niece can satisfy the statutory five-year possession period. Answer choice B is incorrect because, at the time of the man's death, the niece had satisfied the five-year statutory adverse possession period through tacking. Consequently, the man did not own the watch at his death and therefore could not devise it to his brother. Answer choice C is incorrect. The fact that the niece possessed the watch when the man died does not establish that she can successfully claim ownership of it by adverse possession. Had the man died before the five-year statutory period, then the niece would not have obtained title to the watch through adverse possession. But since the man did not seek to recover his watch for more than five years, the niece obtained such title.

An unmarried couple acquired a residence as joint tenants with the right of survivorship. Several years later, when one of them accepted a job offer from a business located in another state, the couple decided to separate. The individual who is moving out of state sued to partition the residence. The other individual opposed this lawsuit. Will the individual who is moving out of state succeed? A. No, because all co-tenants must agree to the partition of a co-tenancy. B. No, because the property is a residence which cannot be easily divided. C. Yes, because the individual who is moving away will no longer be in possession of the residence. D. Yes, because the property is owned as a joint tenancy with the right of survivorship.

D. Yes, because the property is owned as a joint tenancy with the right of survivorship. Answer choice D is correct. A joint tenant with the right of survivorship as well as tenant in common generally has the right to unilaterally partition the property unless the co-tenants have agreed not to partition the property. Answer choice A is incorrect because a co-tenant in a tenancy in common or a joint tenancy with the right of survivorship may, through a legal action, force the involuntary partition of property held in a co-tenancy. Answer choice B is incorrect because property that is held in a co-tenancy need not be physically divided among the co-tenants in a partition action but instead may be sold and the proceeds divided among the co-tenants. Answer choice C is incorrect. The individual who is moving away is not required to surrender physical possession of the property in order to seek partition of the property. Therefore, the fact that the individual moving away will no longer be in possession of the residence does not determine whether the individual can seek a partition.