PSC Final Exam 2018

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Fortin Ethiopia Bretton Woods conflict

"We had pushback from the Bretton Woods institutions, and particularly the World Bank, insisting that we should be talking about diversification of the economy and not so much about industrialisation. Implicit was the notion that the market should be let go," Lopes explains. "Our view is much more forceful. It's to promote industrial policy as the key policy for African countries [...]. Now, four years later, the World Bank is talking about industrialisation all the time."

Huntington, Samuel. (1965) "Political Development and Political Decay" General theme

1. Conflict between political mobilization and institutionalization and the importance of institutional development concerning democratization. 2. A common occurrence in much of the developing world is the fact that political participation is growing much more rapidly than formal political institutions. 3. Samuel Huntington first explores the concept of political development as modernization.

Fukuyama a new class of poor and underprivileged emerged below industrial working class

A new class of poor and underprivileged emerged below industrial working class - immigrants, racial, ethnic minorities and other marginalized people - lower aping service jobs or unemployed and dependent on government benefits -workers in manufacturing sectors who were represented in trade unions became a kind of aristocracy within labor force as vast majority of workers had no representation...hard to organize because scattered across country and are often self employed

Fortin Ethiopia GDP Growth

According to the government of Africa's second-most populous country, average annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth for the past 12 years exceeds 10%. And while economies across the continent are faltering, dragged down by a slump in the prices of the commodities that sustain them, Ethiopia holds out hope. Its economic performance has never been pegged to the price of oil, natural gas or minerals

Seligson on Weyland

If Weyland is right and corruption is on the increase, then when viewed in the light of the findings of this study, one can expect that the nascent democ- racies in the region will have an even more difficult time establishing their right to govern.

Fortin Ethiopia process rationalization

In response to critics, officials say the state is pouring investments into initiatives that will create jobs. They emphasise how much spending - about a quarter of the budget, according to deputy planning commissioner Abraham - goes toward education. They point out that Ethiopia's record for inclusive growth is much better than that of other African countries. And they fall back on one more key slogan, one that officials deploy regularly as they lay the foundations to turn Ethiopia into a pioneer of African manufacturing: 'We are on the right track.

Fukuyama Nigeria oil

Made economy dependent on oil and other sectors diminished Made 400 billion but taken by government not reinvested - poverty very high and growing lacking investment in community like Asia

Fortin Ethiopia protests

People protesting against government policy - government shuts it down - either ignoring the protests or labeling as terrorists

Fukuyama pre modern nation building

Pre modern - clear identity and social structure - now less so started with emergence of capitalism Writing - imagined community Agrarian no uniformity in culture

Fortin Ethiopia how to maintain growth

The target for GDP growth this fiscal year is 11.2%. And to achieve similar rates in the years to come, officials argue, the government must stay the course in prioritising one key sector: industry - agri growing levels of industrialization and manufacturing

Fukuyama Locke and Hayek

What governmental aid if it just allows people to be lazy an incompetent - moral hazard But also cant justify no help at all because no society has level playing field Inherited advantage increases over time State function and capacity to undertake the function

Hiskey

While democratization is often seen as a national‐level process, we argue that there is important scope for local effects. Through analysis of Mexican public opinion data collected on the eve of that country's historic 2000 elections, we demonstrate that local context greatly affects evaluations of the legitimacy of the system, and these evaluations, in turn, help to shape the willingness of citizens to engage with the system. Citizens are more willing to participate in politics if they think the process is fair, and direct evidence of the fairness of the system is provided by the local political context. This local connection, then, becomes critical in the process of individuals becoming, in Almond and Verba's classic term, "participatory" citizens (1963).

Fukuyama entry civil service:

Two-tier system opened up employment for offspring middle and upper bourgeoisie while also preserving places for old aristocracy that could use their Oxbridge educations to pass new exam

Seligson 3 main arguments

1. Dispersion of power in the hands of many that has occurred as dictatorships have been replaced by democracies has widened the opportunity for bribery.In effect, there are many more "veto players" today than under the military, and therefore there has been an increase in the number of palms that need to be greased. 2. Neoliberal reforms have involved opening many areas of the economy to bribery, especially those in- volving sales of public corporations. 3. Increasing number of neopop- ulist leaders, who win elections based on personalist appeals via television, are driving aspiring politicians to corruption in order to collect the funds needed to pay for TV time.

Fukuyama problems with corruption

1. Distorts economic incentives by channeling resources not into most productive uses but into pockets of officials with political power to extract bribes 2. Acts as a highly regressive tax - while petty corruption on the part of mirror poorly paid officials exists in many countries vast bulk goes to elites who can use positions of power to extract wealth from population 3. Rent seeking - gaming political system for private gain 4. Perceptions that officials and politicians are corrupt reduces legitimacy of government in eyes of ordinary people and undermines the sense of trust that is critical to the smooth operations of the state 5. Charges of corruption not reform but political weapons - power grab

Fukuyama Three bills transformed Britain during 19th century from oligarchy to democracy

1. Expansion franchise to vote 2. British labor party mobilized working class and eventually replace liberals as second party in British politics 3. Growing out of various left wing movements with a strong socialist ideology, the labor party was an externally organized party that rallied supporters around programmatic issues like working conditions, wages, state control of industry rather than doling out government resources Tony Blair - New Public management

Fukuyama - why some government corrupt 1-3

1. First - was always patrimonial states - staffed friend sand family of the ruler or those of the elites who dominated society - more on this page 198 2. Can be stable - build power through management of patronage chains legitimizing a particular form of elite rule rest of society poverty stricken agrarian - but have access to violence 3. As scale society increases transition to formally organized clientelistic hierarchies

Fukuyama unexpected developments on the way to the proletarian revolution:

1. Labor incomes began to rise 2. Education investment - not just generosity but fueled by new industries that required skill and high labor costs could be justified if they were marched by enhanced productivity which in turn the result of better technology and increasing human capital 3. Spread of franchise of politics 4. Working class in 20th century 5. A new class of poor and underprivileged 6. Political left

Fukuyama - why some government corrupt 4-7

4. Once achieve political power elites running this system can be displaced by other better organized elite groups but not usually by non elites 5. Military competition - not much worth anything if family is going to be killed at end of war - need taxes, organization, logistics, non elites serve for army of state 6. War - critical as well - nationalism 7. Economic growth often drives social mobilization through an expanding division of labor 8. Industrialization - urbanization, need for higher levels education, occupational specialization, and other changes not necessary agrarian society Why clientelism popular in some nations but not others

Rawlence - refugee British gov human rights violations gov quote

A former chief economist of DfID, who did not want to be named, told me, "If you're asking, 'Am I prepared to tolerate a certain level of human rights abuses in exchange for progress on development?', the answer is yes." The question, then, is who decides what constitutes a "tolerable" level of repression in the absence of a democratic system? On 14 July 2014, after two years of resistance by DfID, Mr Justice Warby granted permission for a judicial review upholding Mr O's claim that DfID "has in effect ignored, or chosen not to enquire further into, factual allegations which are plainly relevant to the [human rights] assessment."

Huntington, Samuel. (1965) "Political Development and Political Decay" argument

A more balanced view of contemporary politics in the developing world instead requires more attention to the growth of political institutions and that it is useful to distinguish political development from modernization and to instead identify political development with the institutionalization of political organizations and procedures. Additionally, Huntington states that rapid increases in political mobilization and participation instead undermine political institutions and lead to political decay

Esarey Theme "Women's Representation, Accountability, and Corruption in Democracies"

At the turn of the twenty-first century, an important pair of studies established that greater female representation in government is associated with lower levels of perceived corruption in that government. But recent research finds that this relationship is not universal and questions why it exists. This article presents a new theory explaining why women's representation is only sometimes related to lower corruption levels and provides evidence in support of that theory. The study finds that the women's representation-corruption link is strongest when the risk of corruption being detected and punished by voters is high - in other words, when officials can be held electorally accountable.

Collier: why is bad governance sometimes so persistent?

Because some benefit. The leaders of many of the poorest countries in the world are themselves among the global superrich. They like it that way. Many of them are simply villains. But beyond villainy, there is a shortage of people with the requisite knowledge, brave reformers get overwhelmed by the resistance, and there is often not much popular enthusiasm for reforms. Turnarounds are rare because reformers are often suppressed and in danger.

Fortin Ethiopia - are the numbers real?

Civil servants and aid workers whisper that the government's accounting is flawed - that agricultural output figures, for instance, are skewed by false assumptions about the volume of crops in storage; that low-level officials are incentivised to exaggerate progress; and that this level of GDP growth suggests productivity increases that are, quite literally, incredible. Still, many agree that the rate of expansion is impressive. Over the past decade, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has typically projected growth of between 7% and 9% annually. Hard year with low output in agri due to drought

Fukuyama Nigeria - corruption example

Clientelism and corruption very different magnitude - resulting in tragic development failures Man opens soy bean farm in Nigeria - pay off official for a bit then refuse arrested and to get out of it had to pay off everyone - they eventually left and with it disappeared the 200 jobs Should have been win win - jobs, tax revenue, food When he left - no jobs and no one to exploit Huge boom in commodity decade Largest sub-Saharan but population 160 million 1960-2010 - per capita rose 90%

Fukuyama clientalism

Clientelism thus exists primarily in democratic counties where large numbers of voters need to be mobilized - benefits in exchange for votes Government in particular not supposed to give a benefit to specific individuals baed on whether or not the supported it In a clientelistic state politicians provide individualized benefits only to political supporters in exchange for votes Clientelism reciprocal altruism - found in democratic political systems in which leaders must contest elections to come into power But clientelism should not be considered corruption- degree of democratic accountability between the politician and those who vote for him or her - even thou benefit is given individually there is still accountability

Fukuyama Tutor late medieval England practices

Common law as a source of authority, one higher than executive, with a correspondingly strong role for courts in governance; a tradition of local self rule, sovereignty divided among host of bodies not concentrated in centralized state, government with deivided powers not divided functions (judicial also quasi legislative) and reliance on popular militia not standing army

Fukuyama corruption and state

Corruption once seen as inevitable and probably wouldn't impede growth Having a strong ad efficient state involves more than just controlling corruption but highly corrupt government usually have big problems delivering services, enforcing laws, and representing public interest

Miller

Do autocratic institutions matter for the welfare of average citizens? Despite the large literature comparing democracies and autocracies, we know little about how human development outcomes differ among autocratic types. Contrary to conventional wisdom, this article argues that contested autocratic elections promote human development by improving state accountability and capacity. The presence and history of multiparty autocratic elections predict significantly better outcomes on health, education, gender equality, and basic freedoms relative to non-electoral autocracy. In fact, the effects on health and education are as strong as the effects of democracy. In contrast, legislatures and parties without multiparty elections produce slightly negative outcomes because these institutions chiefly concern elite cooptation.

Fukuyama labor incomes began to rise

Early gains result economic growth with people mobilized out of agrarian population - but reached limits when price of labor relativize to capital began to increase - happening in China

Fukuyama elimination patronage system

Elimination patronage system straight forward but same not true in US with checks and balances US did not go from elite patronage to modern civil service but took a century long detour through party dominated clientelism Suggests - first patronage and clientelism are not culturally specific nor do they represent pre-modern practices that somehow survived as societies modernized rather natural outgrowth of political mobilization in early stage democracies

Fortin Ethiopia inspiration in the east

Ethiopia finds its inspiration in the East and seeks to take advantage of rising labour costs there. It seeks to emulate countries like South Korea, which rose from poverty in the 1960s to become a global manufacturing hub. Ha-Joon Chang, a South Korean economist at Cambridge University, acknowledges that Ethiopia still has a long way to go but says the country can succeed if it stays the course. Doesnt consider state owned enterprises to be a threat - has worked for china

Huntington, Samuel. (1965) "Political Development and Political Decay" two characteristics of political development

Even though definitions of political development are varied, most share two closely related characteristics. 1. Growth is synonymous with the idea of modernization. As such, political development is also defined as political modernization. 2. There exist many ways to measure political development because modernization and development are broad topics that cover many different areas.

Fukuyama externality

Externality - benefit or harm imposed on third parties

Fukuyama Marx emergence of middle class

First four of six developments unanticipated by Marx center around single phenomenon - which was the conversion of the working class into broad middle class No longer oligarchs vs. poor - old oligarchs evolved into more entrepreneurial capitalist elites or had been physically eliminated through revolution and war Working classes through unionization and political struggle won greeted privileges for themselves and became middle class in political outlook Median voter no longer a poor person demanding systemic changes to social order but middle class individual with stake in existing system Marx believed working class would be small - but reality is that large in modern societies - undercutting appeal Marxism Emergence middle class societies increased legitimacy of liberal democracy as political system Not always pro-democracy - Thailand and China

Huntington, Samuel. (1965) "Political Development and Political Decay" four categories of political development

Four categories occur in all of the definitions of political development. 1. Rationalization, which highlights the focus on functional differentiation and achievement criteria. 2. Nationalism, which emphasizes nation-states and nation-building as fundamental aspects of political development. 3. Democratization, which is essentially a focus on competition and equalization of power. 4. Mobilization, which is a focus on political participation. Political participation stipulates that the greater the level development, the greater the level modernization. As such a higher level of modernization results in increased political mobilization and political participation.

Fukuyama governments purpose

Governments - social regulation and controlling elites by engaging in certain amount redistribution like equal application of law

Fukuyama nation building

Identity, risk life for state as in war, loyalty - does government hold up social contract - is there corruption, Includes some people excludes others 1. Moving borders to fit posited national identities 2. Moving or eliminating populations to fix existing boarders 3. Cultural assimilation of subpopulations into dominant culture 4. Modification of concept of national identity to fit what is politically feasible given social and physical endowments of the society The first three violence and coercion World never existed of compact homogenous nations ready to be turned into political units Conquest, migration, trade all societies complex mixture of tribes ethnicities classes religions and regional identities Exclusion from state or community based violence

Stokes bad effects of clientalism

If most scholars of the topic are right, political clientelism slows economic development, vitiates democracy, and allows dictators to hold onto power longer than they otherwise would. It slows economic development by discouraging governments from providing public goods and by creating an interest in the ongoing poverty and dependency of constituents. Its vitiates democracy by undermining the equality of the ballot, allowing some voters to use their votes to communicate policy preferences while others use their votes only as an exchange for minor side payments. And it keeps dictators in power by allowing them to stage elections in which competition is stifled in which voters who would prefer to vote against the regime are kept from doing so by fear of retaliation.

Fukuyama - understanding rise clientelism

Impossible to understand rise of clientelism except in context emergence of modern democracy and the appearance of first mass political parties Only the advent of electoral democracy that created incentives to form what we recognize today as modern political parties

Mickey pt. 1

In 1944, the U.S. Supreme Court in Smith v. Allwright shocked the southern body politic by invalidating the white-only Democratic primary. Interpreting the eleven states of the old Confederacy as enclaves of authoritarian rule, this article views Smith as beginning a long process that culminated in the early 1970s with the consolidation of democratic rule in America. Smith v. Allwright transformed the politics of all eleven enclaves, challenging rulers in their roles both as party officials and as lawmakers. Filtered through various configurations of intraparty conflict, political institutions, and black insurgency, however, the ruling shaped the politics of each enclave differently.

Fukuyama class and clientelism

In America by contrast clientelism was a way for ambitious but non-elite politicians to become wealthy and increase socials status Real issue was class - since clientelism has more erects appeal to poorer and less educated citizens America 1880s many similarities to contemporary developing countries - democratic institutions and competitive elections but votes were bought with currency of public office These conditions changed dramatically as country began to industrialize in last decades of 19th century

Rawlence - Decisions by World Bank

In November 2014, the World Bank Inspection Panel that had been requested by the Anuak reported that "given the magnitude of the financing", donors had ignored the risks of inadvertently funding villagisation, and it pointed out that the donors' monitoring and evaluation systems were all but useless. The donors' assertions that their expensive and controversial programme was delivering "development", the panel found, were not supported by evidence. After six months, the Ethiopian government arrested a pastor who had worked as translator for the World Bank Inspection Panel in Gambella, and two other indigenous rights activists raising awareness of land grabs, and charged them with terrorism.

Fukuyama jacksonianism and party function

Jacksonian tradition of populism - found in 2008 tea party British immigrants came from violent area - caused intense individualism, love for guns Jackson - decided who would be appointed to federal offices - changed out often and created basis for mobilizing political followers in campaigns - converted existing elite patronage into beginning of mass clientelistic one With expanded franchise politicians needed a way to get supporters to the polls and persuaded them to demonstrate their beliefs at parades, marches, and rallies - majority of people wanted jobs or personal favors - happened in US so natural outgrowth of political mobilization in early stage democracies

Collier three characteristics encourage a turnaround:

Larger populations, higher proportion of people with a secondary education, and recent emergence from a civil war. (70) Whether the state was a democracy or granted political rights did not seem to matter. The impetus for change must come from the heroes in the society. (71) The probability for a turnaround in any given year is 1.6%, so they are likely to stay as failing states for a long time.

Fukuyama Nigeria elections/poltics

Little national identity Elections - needs spread from regions - preventing ruling ethnic cultural or religious group from ruling Alternating rule northern Muslim southern Christian - kept peace last few years

Fukuyama Mark on proletariat

Marx - capitalist use of technology would extract surpluses from the labor of the proletariat leading to greater concentrations of wealth and the progressive commiseration of works Upper class could not consume everything and poor were too poor to buy Inequality would lead to shortfall in demand and system would come crashing down on itself Only solution would be revolution that would give political power to proletariat and redistribute fruits of capitalist system

Fukuyama foundations of modern bureaucracies

Modern bureaucracies are built on a foundation of merit, technical competence, and impersonality - when staffed by cronies - poor performance Strengthens existing elites and blocks democratic accountability - between unequal - benefits wealthy When modern institutions begin to break down we revert to patronage and nepotism as a default form of sociability

Fukuyama on Moorse

Moorse- democracy could emerge if a rapidly enlarging bourgeoisie succeeded in displacing the older order of land owners and peasants - happened in England

Seligson recent research on corruption

More recent research, however, points in the opposite direction toward an erosion of public support for corrupt regimes. A series of serious methodological problems has prevented the testing of these contradictory assertions about the impact of corruption. This article uses national sample survey data, with a total N of over 9,000, from four Latin American countries to test the effect of corruption experiences on belief in the legitimacy of the political system. It finds that independent of socioeconomic, demographic, and partisan identification, exposure to corruption erodes belief in the political system and reduces interpersonal trust. The evidence seems clear, at least for these four countries, that corruption carries with it important political costs.

Fukuyama corruption and scarcity

Most definitions center around appropriation of public resources for private gain Governments have any number of ways of creating artificial scarcities and thus the most basic form of corruption involves abuse of this kind of power

Rawlence - refugee British gov -

Officials from the regional government in Gambella, accompanied by soldiers from the Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF) had come to tell Opik and the other inhabitants of the village to leave. It was not the first time they had come. Earlier in the year there had been several meetings. The government had arrived with police and militias and informed the residents that they were to be moved to a new location. There was a national plan called "villagisation" and Gambella was in the first phase. The officials had explained that the purpose of the relocations was to cluster communities together in places where the government promised to provide a new school, a clinic, a borehole and a grinding mill. In time, the new settlements would be better-connected to the rest of the country via new roads, they said. The officials also promised to provide a grader to clear the land at the new site and make it ready for planting. Villagisation plan

Fukuyama - American exceptionalism

One group that did face caste like restrictions to its mobility - African Americans - more likely to favor strong state to advance interests much like working class Europe But us didn't inherit British strong central state At least part of the reason for strong leadership was that amerce was not yet full democracy but highly elitist society - Harvard and Yalies 1789-1828 US patronage system and then later clientelistic

Fukuyama on Marx

Out of old feudal order he first new social classes to mobilize if bourgeoisie, townsmen who regarded contemptuously by the old land owners but accumulated capital and used tech to bring about industrial revolution Revolution mobilized second new class - proletariat whose surplus labor the bourgeoisie unjustly appropriated Each of these classes wanted different political outcome - land owners preserve authoritarian order, burg liberal regime protecting property rights maybe or maybe not with elections, proletariat with consciousness would want dictatorship of proletariat and socialize means of production abolish private property and redistribution of wealth - maybe democracy with universal sufferance but means to end control over means of production not an end itself

Fukuyama patronage

Patronage relationship is a reciprocal exchange of favors between two individuals of different status and power - usually involving favors given by the patron to the client in exchange for the clients loyalty and political support The favor given to the client must be a good that can be individual appropriated not a public good Patronage - distinguished from clientelism by scale - face to face between patrons and clients

Stokes clientelism's internal dynamics, its causes, and its consequences.

Political clientelism, the giving of material resources as a quid pro quo for political support, is best understood as part of an ongoing exchange between patron and client, with threats of defection instead of, or perhaps in addition to, norms of reciprocity sustaining it. Incorporating the old observation that patron—client linkages are face to face and ongoing allows us to model the exchange as a repeated game, and hence one that can overcome problems of commitment and defection on either side. Theoretical and empirical studies identify conditions under which both core and marginal voters will be the targets (or beneficiaries) of clientelist parties. Clientelism is intimately linked to poverty and inequality, of which it is probably both a cause and a consequence. Institutions such as personalized campaigns, ballot design, and legal restrictions may also influence whether parties deploy clientelist or programmatic strategies.

Fukuyama political left throughout world

Political left throughout world lost its focus on economic and class issues and became fragmented as result of the spread of identity politics Working class solidarity was undermined by nationalism during WW1 but the rise of new forms of identity in the developed world by mid 20th century around black empowerment, indigenous and gay rights etc. created a new set of causes that cut across class lines - leadership came from economic elites and their cultural preferences often stood at cross purposes to those of the working class electorate that had once been the bulwark of progressive politics

Fukuyama political parties functions

Political parties perform a number of critical functions - collective action like minded people, aggregate disparate social interests around common platform, provide valuable information to voters by articulating positions and polices of common concern, and they create a stability of expectations in a way that contests between individual politicians cannot, most importantly is the fact that they are primary mechanisms by which ordinary citizens are mobilized to participate in competitive democratic politics

Seligson problems with corruption political scientists

Political scientists, on the other hand, ever the realists, have had a much more ambivalent view of the problem. Indeed, much classic literature focusing on the Third World saw corruption as functional for political development, enabling citizens to overcome intransigent, inefficient bureaucracies while increasing loyalty to the political system.

Fukuyama Political system that emerged in 1870s-80s US

Political system that emerged in 1870s-80swas far more organized form of clientelism than the antebellum one Spontaneous emergence of political machines in response to an expanding base of relatively poor voters suggests that clientelism is efficient way to energizing this type of population and therefore should be seen as early form democratic participation

Fukuyama Need governments to provide...

Public good Public good: my enjoyment does not prevent you from enjoying it as well No one provides them because they cannot prevent everyone from using and benefiting from them

Boix

Resolving a controversy on the relationship of development to democratization, this article expands the time period under study with panel data running from the early nineteenth century (a time where hardly any country was democratic) to the end of the twentieth century, and shows a positive and significant effect of income on the likelihood of democratic transitions and democratic consolidations. The estimations hold after I control for country and time effects and instrument for income. Results reveal that the effect of income varies across income levels and across eras. First, income has a decreasing marginal effect on democratization. In already developed (and democratized) countries, any extra growth has no further effect on the level of democracy. Second, the structure of the international system affects the resources and strategies of pro-authoritarian and pro-democratic factions in client states. The proportion of liberal democracies peaks under international orders governed by democratic hegemons, such as the post-Cold War period, and bottoms out when authoritarian great powers such as the Holy Alliance control the world system.

Fukuyama return to patronage

Return to traditional patronage would constitute huge improvements in functioning of political system as in societies where incomes and educational levels low it is easier to garner supporters to polls based on promise of individual benefit not broad programing agenda Supply patronage more important than demand for it - patronage can only exist when politicians have access to state sources that they can distribute

Fukuyama working class in 20th century

Stopped growing both in absolute numbers and as a share of workforce - proletariat shank as workers saw increase standards of living that allowed them to become members of the middle class - owned property, had educations, more likely to vote for political parties that could protect their privileges not pushing to overturn status quo

Stokes poverty and clientelism

The affinity between poverty (inequality) and clientelism is settled fact, but the mechanisms linking the two, and the direction of causality, are not. We tend to treat clientelism as involving a dyadic link between patron and client, in an electoral context, between party and voter. But really the strategic interactions of at least three actors should be considered: party leaders, party brokers, and voters.

Rawlence - refugee British gov human rights violations

The first report, which has since disappeared from the parliament website, noted that more than half of respondents had said they did not want to move. The report warned of a "potential humanitarian crisis" due to the people's "limited livelihood options". It also warned of "reputational risks" to donors' aid programmes. This, then, was the heart of the matter.

Edward Kenya vs. Tanzania

This article examines how government policies affect ethnic relations by comparing outcomes across two nearby districts, one in Kenya and one in Tanzania, using colonial-era boundary placement as a "natural experiment." Despite similar geography and historical legacies, governments in Kenya and Tanzania have followed radically different language, education, and local institutional policies, with Tanzania consistently pursuing more serious nation building. The evidence suggests that nation building has allowed diverse communities in rural Tanzania to achieve considerably better local public goods outcomes than diverse communities in Kenya. The Kenya-Tanzania comparison provides empirical evidence that serious reforms can ameliorate social divisions and suggests that nation-building should take a place on policy agendas, especially in Africa.

Stokes - clientelism

This article studies political clientelism. In the first section, the term clientelism can be defined as giving material goods in return for electoral support, where the criterion of distribution that the patron uses is simply: did you/will you support me? The discussion tries to determine if clients are swing voters or core supporters, and looks at the causes and consequences of clientelism.

Esarey Argument "Women's Representation, Accountability, and Corruption in Democracies"

Two primary mechanisms underlie this theory: prior evidence shows that (1) women are more risk-averse than men and (2) voters hold women to a higher standard at the polls. This suggests that gender differences in corrupt behavior are proportional to the strength of electoral accountability. Consequently, the hypotheses predict that the empirical relationship between greater women's representation and lower perceived corruption will be strongest in democracies with high electoral accountability, specifically: (1) where corruption is not the norm, (2) where press freedom is respected, (3) in parliamentary systems and (4) under personalistic electoral rules. The article presents observational evidence that electoral accountability moderates the link between women's representation and corruption in a time-series, cross-sectional dataset of seventy-six democratic-leaning countries.

Fukuyama democracy and economic development

Unclear if there is a link - there are anomalies India should not be democracy and Singapore should be Maybe via social mobilization and division of labor - as markets expanded through increased trade in commercial and later an industrial economy a new division of labor would arise and deepen. Division of labor require creation of new social groups - demand share political power pressuring for democracy

Berwick and Fotini

What state capacity is and how to strengthen it remain open questions, as the underlying incentives of the state, its citizens, and its agents align in some areas of state activity and diverge in others. State capacity is an interactive process, the product of institutions governing relations between the state, mass publics, and bureaucrats. We argue that the institutions ensuring capacity and the processes that bring them into being vary. Our review highlights trends in recent research, as well as relevant differences in opportunities for and obstacles to empirical work on the subject.

South Sudan Violence

When South Sudan's leaders interpreted their freedom as the freedom to kill each other, and the world reacted with horror, Kiir and others accused the world of misunderstanding what it had helped create. Freedom meant freedom from everyone - from Khartoum, yes, but also from erstwhile friends. Even in a partially-¬formed state like South Sudan, the world had far less influence than it imagined. So far, the UN has been unable even to protect its own bases, let alone venture out to stop the killing. "These forces were sent for state building, not war," said Prendergast. "You need to get troops that are willing to fight." Even emergency relief has been insufficient.

Hanson

When it comes to social welfare, we do not have clear understanding of whether it is more important to have democracy or a capable state. Specifically, most studies do not consider the possibility that effects of democracy are conditioned or obscured by differences in the capabilities of states to deliver services effectively. This article contends that better developmental outcomes can result from either democracy or state capacity, but the combination of high levels of both democracy and state capacity is not synergistic. Once accounting for state capacity, we find that democracy leads to better development outcomes.

Collier characteristics likely to help outside interventions to work:

higher income, larger population, greater proportion of population with education Interventions less likely to work if Leader has been in office a long time, the country experiences a favorable shift in trade, and, if it recently emerged from a civil war (72)

Perry George Clooney South Sudan

• In October 2010, Clooney was in Sudan with Prendergast trying to work out ways to hinder the bloodshed when, lying out in the desert and looking up at the stars, the pair came up with an idea even more outlandish than helping to create a new country in Africa: their own spy satellite. "I was like: 'How come you could Google Earth my house and you can't Google Earth where war crimes are being committed? It doesn't make sense to me. And John was like: 'I don't know. You know, maybe we can'." • On their return to the US, the pair contacted Google Maps and a satellite photography specialist, DigitalGlobe. They rented time on three of DigitalGlobe's satellites stationed in the stratosphere over Sudan and processed the images and overlayed them with Google Maps in minutes. "The trick was not just to get the images but to get them in close to real time and get the analysis done quickly," said Clooney. "Then you can say 'Well, five days ago this is what this place looked like. And this is what it looked like two days ago'."

What does Seligson prove about corruption?

Corruption has been shown in this article to erode the legiti- macy of the political system. It follows that if corruption is increasing, such erosion should also be on the rise. It is also shown here that corruption lowers interpersonal trust, presumably negatively affecting civil society relations.

Fukuyama Colonization Nation Building

Created issues of identity - could not unite around language or culture because so fragmented - no dominant group

Fukuyama democracy works or doesnt...

Democracy not expression of an idea of cultural values but by-product of deep structural forces within societies - high levels economic development and stable democracy While countries may transition from authoritarian to democratic at any level must more likely to remain if they rise above threshold per capita income

Fukuyama spread of franchise of politics

Legalize and expand grade unions, political parties, appealing to middle class, effect working conditions, welfare, pensions etc.

Fukuyama education investment

Not just generosity but fueled by new industries that required skill and high labor costs could be justified if they were marched by enhanced productivity which in turn the result of better technology and increasing human capital

Fukuyama Nigeria - corruption

Ogas - political elite - big men - patronage networks - got all the money Email scams Weak property laws - go on vacation and return with someone living in house - SIGNS NOT FOR SALE

Rawlence - outcomes

September 2015 the European Commission released more documents that detailed a horrific picture of the death of a whole way of life for thousands of indigenous peoples being evicted from the Omo valley. News came from Mr O's family that soldiers had repeatedly questioned his wife about his whereabouts. Then more news: his former farm had been ploughed by tractors and now belonged to an Ethiopian businessman, who was growing rice and beans along the riverbank.

Lipset

The conditions associated with the existence and stability of democratic society has been a leading concern of political philosophy. In this paper the problem is attacked from a sociological and behavioral standpoint, by presenting a number of hypotheses concerning some social requisites for democracy, and by discussing some of the data available to test these hypotheses. In its concern with conditions—values, social institutions, historical events—external to the political system itself that sustain different general types of political systems, the paper moves outside the generally recognized province of political sociology.

Fukuyama the third wave of democratization

Theories of why democratic waves occur, how democracy is rooted in the interests of specific social groups, social mobilization as the link between economic change and democracy, political parties as key agents in the struggle over democracy East Asia - government old, before highly unequal agrarian societies with elite control, state society balance began to change wit onset rapid economic growth - systems will face challenges as new social groups are mobilized

Pye, Lucan W. (1965) "The Concept of Political Development" - what are characteristics related to?

These three characteristics are generally related to certain aspects of political development: equality to the political culture, the problems of capacity to authoritative governmental structures, and the question of differentiation to non-authoritative structures. This suggests a final analysis that the problems of political development revolve around the relationship between the political culture, the authoritative structure, and the general political process.

Mickey pt. 2

This article compares the ruling's effects on three similarly-situated enclaves—Georgia, Mississippi, and South Carolina. It suggests how Smith v. Allwright positioned these enclaves differently as they faced several other democratization challenges over the next three decades. The article closes with a discussion of how southern enclaves ultimately took divergent paths out of Dixie, why these different modes of democratization matter today, and how the reframing of southern political history developed here engages with recent research on America's distinctive democratic development.

Fukuyama Nigeria violence

Violence - Boko Haram - 1960 end colonial rule British Igbos - east Muslim north Igbos tried to separate- Biafra war Then military government till 1979 but then military take over aging till 1999 Elections marked by fraud and violence Economic growth just linked with commodity prices Shouldn't democracy make a different Prebendal - rent seeking, clientelism, ethnicity State access revenue from oil wish 70% population below poverty line 250 ethnic communities don't want to work together

Epstein Sudan

• In November, the U.S. finally began pushing for sanctions against Kiir in the Security Council, but by then it was too late to persuade Russia and China to go along. In her 2002 book, "A Problem from Hell," Ambassador Power called for a global responsibility to protect people everywhere from crimes against humanity. Now that she's about to retire, perhaps she'll explain why this is easier said than done, but here's some advice for the Trump Administration: genocide doesn't happen overnight. It begins with small injustices, power grabs, and callous dismissals of the rule of law. Even more important than the responsibility to protect is the responsibility to prevent, using negotiation, diplomacy, and sanctions long before the killing starts. By then, it is far, far too late.

Fukuyama After Jacksonian revolution

After Jacksonian revolution came two institutions of constraint - rule of law and accountability most developed but did not have centralized, bureaucratic, and autonomous state of the sort that France Britain and Prussia had Without pressure to reform, party-managed clientelism developed over time Doling out bureaucratic offices was an integral part of building political coalitions War was good for state building - civil war

Fukuyama Nigeria economy

Biggest economy - only emerged with commodity boom Roots problems institutional - weak and bad government trapping a nation in poverty Political institutions, state, rule of law, accountability - NOT lack democracy Weak because extractions - not worried about building infrastructure, nation, or even much of a state

Fukuyama democracy stability

Democracy will be confronted with instability and disorder if all groups do not have institutionalized channels of participation

Fukuyama patronage vs. clientalism

Differentiated from clientelism by scale - clientelism is larger scale exchanges of favors between patrons and clients often requiring hierarchy of intermediaries

Fukuyama Clientelism related to economic development

Economies develop and cost clientelism increases Many voters in rich countries have issues like environment or immigration that matter more than bribes

Seligson problems with corruption economics

Economists have long warned about the pernicious impacts of corruption, arguing that it increases transaction costs, reduces investment incentives, and ultimately results in reduced economic growth.

Seligson in order for political systems to function reasonably well...

In order for political systems to function reasonably well, actions taken by leaders need to be viewed as legitimate. If not, the "degrees of freedom" with which decision makers have to operate are reduced considerably. Immobilism is a potential outcome of political systems in which the mass public does not believe in the legitimacy of the system. Weyland (1998) argues forcefully that corruption has increased a great deal under democracy in Latin America and points to several factors that are responsible for the increase.

Fukuyama modernization and nation building

Modernization - labor working together - social cohesion especially in language necessary Movement to cities But in non industrial societies nationalism still exists Nationalism by product modernization - socially created for sure

Seligson positive side on corruption?

On the positive side, there is some recent evidence that over the very long run democratic countries become less corrupt, but the observed effect took place over half a century, more years than many fragile democracies may have to spare (Treisman 2000). It would be the ultimate irony that an artifact of the rise of democracy itself may contribute to its own weakening in the developing world. This is all the more reason to be concerned about the problem of corruption and to find ways of reducing its prevalence

Fukuyama rent

Rent - cost of keeping a good or service in production and its price - ability to grant or withhold regulatory power generates a rent

Pye, Lucan W. (1965) "The Concept of Political Development." - general argument

Ten definitions of "political development" are analyzed in this article Three broadly shared characteristics of political development are outlined: concern with equality, with the capacity of the political system, and with the differentiation or specialization of governmental organizations.

Collier government policy and economy

Terrible governance and policies can destroy an economy with alarming speed. Governance matters, conditional upon opportunities. Differences in opportunities can make a big difference. Countries who have done better since 1980 have generally exported labor-intensive manufactures and services. The government simply has to avoid doing harm. Exporters need an environment of moderate taxation, macroeconomic stability, and a few transport facilities.


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