Remoteness in Negligence

The original C sued by his victims, sues D for compensation he had to pay out. Claim failed. Held, struck out on public policy grounds, BUT in any case unreasonable and broke the chain. Interesting observation that the victims couldn't sue the drunk driver due to lack of a duty and foreseeability (remoteness).

Meah v McCreamer (No 2)

Claim brought by widow. Husband injured physically by D's negligence, began to suffer PTSD from surgery. Had previously been of "equable termprament". Became depressed and committed suicide. Held, claim upheld in HoL. Depression had been direct and foreseeable consequence of the accident for which the D had been responsible. Although suicide was a voluntary act, it was caused by his inability to make reasoned judgments due to depression. Since accident caused depression, and depression caused death, there was no break in the chain.

Corr v IBC Vehicles (2008)

Decided just after Hughes. Worker in a factory who uses molten metal in his job. Fellow worker knocks asbestos lid off cauldron into the molten metal. Unforeseeable chemical reaction between the two causes an explosion. C hit with molten metal and burnt. Argues burning reasonably foreseeable even if precise manner not. Held CA no. Burning caused by a splash of hot liquid was foreseeable, but burning caused by an explosion was not. This shows that the principle in Hughes can be undermined by construing the harm more or less broadly.

Doughty v Turner Manufacturing (1964)

C had had 3 children, wants no more, sterilised by D's hospital. Discovers following year she is 20 wks pregnant and has the child. Child has congential disorders and requires constant supervision. Claims for cost of raising the child; D argues she behaved unreasonably by not having an abortion. Held, there is not break in the chain of causation, not unreasonable (omission less likely than acts, leaving aside policy). Not contrary to public policy to award damages for the birth of a child.

Emeh v Kensington and Chelsea AHA (1984)

C passenger on a train which crashes, suffers PTSD, changed his personality. Voluntary MS -- diminished responsibility. Criminal law conviction of homicide. Tort law argued the crash changed his personality, but for which he would not have killed. Claim for total loss: of earnings while imprisoned, loss of liberty, reputation damage, guilt, indemnity in case of claims brought against him. Held, claim failed. Ground was ex turpi causa -- cannot recover in respect of losses caused by criminality, irrespective they would not have occurred but for the negligence of another. Consistency across the legal system is part of the justification of the illegality principle in this area.

Gray v Thames Trains (2009)

Manhole left open and unguarded, tent covered, parafin lamps. C, 8, and his ten year old uncle knocked a lamp into the manhole, causing an explosion. This led to C being burned. Held, HoL, if the type of damage was reasonably foreseeable it does not matter that the sequence of events that actually brought the harm about was not. On these facts it was reasonably foreseeable that if a boy entered the tent he would take a lamp, that if it fell he would be burned. Not foreseeable that it would be this bad but it is type of damage not extent that must be foreseeable.

Hughes v Lord Advocate (1963)

D crashes car while drunk driving, C's personality changes as a result of the crash. Because of this change in personality, C showed, he committed violent crimes against two women. Convicted and sentenced to life. Proved to the civil standard he was not a violent criminal before accident -- wanted compensation for being imprisoned. Held, High Court, D liable. Whether C's conduct was reasonable (so didn't break the chain) was to be judged against the changed personality brought about by the crash. Damages reduced to take account of free board in prison, pre-existing criminal tendencies and contributory negligence for getting in the car with a drunk driver. Divergence of culpability between criminal law and tort law.

Meah v McCreamer (1985)

Boat left abandoned for two years by D. Had planned to remove the boat, but did not. Two boys try to repair it, use a car jack to hold it. Boat fell off and crushed P, who suffered serious spinal injuries, paraplegic. Occupiers' liability claim. Held, HoL, reasonably foreseeable that children would play around with the boat if left Lord Hoffman: not precise injury, but injury of a given description, must be reasonably foreseeable. The "genus". The case turned on the appropriate genus of injury, this is the approach. Was it meddle with the boat at risk of injury, or would incur injury if rotten planks gave way.

Jolley v Sutton LBC (2000)

D negligently overturned his car in a traffic accident in a tunnel. One way traffic in the tunnel, with a sharp bend in the middle. P was a police officer who arrived to deal with the accident. Officer in charge did not close off the tunnel when police arrived. 3rd party then orders P to go against the flow of traffic to close the tunnel. P's claim against the driver failed. Series of reasons offered: i) Acts more likely than omissions to break the chain ii) Negligent actions more likely to break the chain than non-negligent ones iii) D must be the 'real cause' of the accident iv) Mere carelessness by 3rd party will not suffice v) Intervention must not be "natural and probable".d

Knightly v Johns (1982)

Ds alleged to have been negligent in causing bursting of a water main flooding P's house. While property vacated for repairs, squatters enter the building and cause more damage. The natural claim was against the squatters, but either long gone or had no money. Held, claim failed on appeal. Oliver LJ proposed a special test where third parties contribute to damage -- it must have been "very likely to occur" to have been reasonably foreseeable. This is not in step with general principles in the law of negligence. Lord Denning: starts by asking whose "job" it was to prevent squatters entering: owner, not the council. Then argues that the criminal acts in question are normally covered by insurance. This ensures that the risk can be spread throughout society. Remoteness on this view is just a way of allocating the loss caused on policy grounds.

Lamb v Camden LBC (1981)

C injured at work, employer D admits liability. Initial injury not too bad. Went on a house viewing with steep stairs, felt leg about to give way. Threw his daughter up the stairs and jumped down the stairs fearing he would hit his head. Broke leg and claimed against employer. Held, C's unreasonable conduct will break the chain of causation. It was unreasonable to descend the stairs without adult assistance. In the alternative, jumping down the stairs was unreasonable. If he had done so and nonetheless fell down the stairs, the chain would not have been broken.

McKew v Hollan & Hannen & Cubitts (1969)

Ds left premises unsecured due to a broken lock. Burglars gained access and made their way into adjoining premises by breaking a hole in the wall. Those premises were let by Ds to Ps, sellers of knitwear, some of which was stolen. Goff LJ held there was no liability. He founded his reasoning on the duty of care. There is no duty to your neighbour to keep your own property secure, no matter how reasonably foreseeable it is that someone may cause damage to your neighbour's property through your own negligence. No degree of foreseeability will lead to liability for the acts of a third party. This accords with general principle in this area.

Perl (Exporters) Ltd v Camden LBC (1984)

Negligence of stevedores caused a board to fall into the hold of a ship where tins of fuel were, burst into flames destroying the ship. Spark caused ignition, not foreseeable that plank falling into hold would cause this to happen. CA holds chrtrs liable for the full amount. Held, foreseeability only relevant to establihsing whether conduct negligent, if it is, all damages which are a "direct consequence" are recoverable. Davis: "one of the most unpopular cases in the legal world"

Re Polemis (1921)

Administratrix of prisoner who committed suicide in custody. Claim brought against the police for failing to prevent the suicide. Police argued they did not owe a duty to someone of sound mind wanting to commit suicide. Deceased had no mental illness. Held, HoL, police have a duty to those in custody to take reasonable care, whether they are of sound or unsound mind. This was breached. The purpose of the duty was in part to prevent self harm. If but for negligence it would not have happened, the fact that suicide was a free and voluntary choice did not enable police to rely on novus actus as a defence.

Reeves v Metropolitan Police Commissioner (1999)

Authority for the thin skill rule in this area. C's lip burnt by splashing molten metal. Being burnt be metal caused malignant cancer to which C was predisposed. Held, negligent D must take victim as they find them. Test was not whether cancer and death foreseeable, but rather the burn. The cancer was merely an extension of the burn, and the employers were accordingly liable for it.

Smith v Leech Brain and Co Ltd (1962)

C suffered a knee injury caused by D's negligence in a minor accident but it deteriorated. 3 years later the leg needed to be amputated and D admitted liability. Subsequently, one legged D was hopping around at a petrol station without a walking aid, tripped and the resulting injury left him in a wheelchair for life. Held, too harsh for C to get no compensation. Got damages but reduced for contributory negligence. Level of unreasonableness way below 'McKew unreasonable'.

Spencer v Wincanton Holdings Ltd

D negligently allowed large quantities of oil to escape from the ship into the harbour. Oil spread to a wall, cotton waste acted as a wick, ignited due to welding. Wharf area, owned by Cs, went up in flames. Held, it was not reasonably foreseeable that the ignition of the oil and fire damage would come about as a result of oil in the harbour. The type of damage must be reasonably foreseeable. Viscount Simonds: "It is a principle of civil liability...that a man must be considered to be responsible for the probable consequences of his act". It is about those types of loss within the scope of his duty.

The Wagon Mound No 1

C contracted Weil's Disease from working surrounded with rats. injury from rat bites foreseeable. Weil's disease, hardly known at the time, not.

Tremain v Pike

This is Glanville Williams' idea. Foreseeability is a way of distinguishing between normal and abnormal consequences. Argues that this area of the law of negligence is finally unreliable because it rests heavily on policy (as acknowledged by Lord Denning in Lamb).

Ulterior harm

C suffered a neck injury through D's negligence. She was given a neck collar which meant she couldn't use her bifocal glasses. Went to see her son and asked him to take her home. Son tried to take her home, as they left his office she fell down the stairs. Held, here the P was behaving reasonably in seeking the son's help, no unreasonable behaviour to break the chain and D liable.

Wieland v Cyril Lord Carpets (1969)