Supreme Court Cases - Pre- Contemplary America

Lochner v. New York (1905 In 1895 the New York legislature passed the Bakeshop Act that limited the number of hours bakers could work to 10 per day and 60 per week. The law was championed as a health measure because breathing flour dust for long periods of time could result in numerous lung-related diseases. Joseph Lochner owned a bakeshop in Utica, New York. He was charged by the state with having allowed an employee to work more than 60 hours per week, tried, convicted, and fined $50. He appealed to higher New York state courts which upheld his conviction, and he then appealed to the U. S. Supreme Court. Lochner challenged the constitutionality of the law by asserting that it violated the due process of law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in that it infringed upon the "liberty of contract." In essence, Lochner argued that the law infringed upon the right of both the employer and the employee to negotiate the terms of the latter's employment. Lochner's position was based on the premise that employer and employee were "equals" in the negotiation of hours and wages. By a 5-4 vote, the Supreme Court struck down the New York law and thus ruled in Lochner's favor. The Court's decision was widely criticized for creating a "substantive" right to contract when no such right to contract exists in the Constitution. It was also seen as a setback for progressive labor laws that tried to protect the rights of workers.

Declared unconstitutional a New York act limiting the working hours of bakers due to a denial of the 14th Amendment rights. I

Marbury v. Madison (1803) Before his term as President ended, a defeated President John Adams appointed William Marbury as a Justice of the Peace for the District of Columbia. Adams' Secretary of State John Marshall failed to deliver Marbury his appointment papers before the new President Thomas Jefferson and the new Secretary of State James Madison assumed office. The new President and the new Secretary of State declined to give Marbury the position. After hiring an attorney and using part of a 1789 law passed by Congress, Marbury filed suit directly with the Supreme Court asking that Court to direct President Jefferson and Secretary of State Madison to give Marbury the position. The Supreme Court did not rule for or against Marbury. In other words, the Court did not order Secretary of State Madison and President Jefferson to give Marbury the position. What the Court did was something far more important. For the first time, in Marbury v Madison, the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional an act of Congress (a section of the Judiciary Act of 1789 under which Marbury had brought his case directly to the Supreme Court). This was an exercise of the power of judicial review—the power of the Supreme Court to interpret laws of Congress and declare them unconstitutional if in the judgment of the Court they are in conflict with the Constitution. Speaking for a unanimous Supreme Court, Chief Justice John Marshall thus established the Court as an equal partner in government with the executive and legislative branches, something it had not been prior to Marshall becoming Chief Justice. The Supreme Court became the final authority on what the Constitution means. Marshall wrote: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is." Marshall continued, "[T]he Constitution of the United States confirms and strengthens the principle... that a law repugnant to the Constitution is void." The Supreme Court, further, was the proper authority to decide if a law is in conflict with the Constitution. He called this responsibility "the very essence of judicial duty."

Established judicial review

Gitlow v. New York (1925) Benjamin Gitlow was a member of the left-wing section of the Socialist Party. The New York legislature had passed a law making it a crime to advocate the violent overthrow of the government. Gitlow was arrested and charged with having violated this law by writing, publishing, and distributing a pamphlet called the Left-wing Manifesto. The pamphlet urged the establishment of socialism by strikes and "class action ... in any form." At Gitlow's trial in a New York court, his famous attorney, Clarence Darrow, argued that the pamphlet was speech and press protected by the First Amendment since it advocated nothing but only urged abstract doctrine. Furthermore, he argued, it did not call for immediate action, but instead called for action at some indefinite time in the future. Even though no evidence was introduced that the pamphlet's publication had led to any unlawful action, Gitlow was convicted, and then appealed to the Supreme Court. By a 7-2 vote, with only Justices Oliver Wendell Holmes and Louis Brandeis dissenting, the Supreme Court upheld Gitlow's conviction. Of great significance, however, the Court, using the "incorporation" doctrine, declared that the freedom of speech and press were "among the fundamental rights and liberties protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the states." Nevertheless, the Court's majority ruled that "states can punish utterances endangering the foundations of government and threatening its overthrow by unlawful means" because such speech would "present a sufficient danger to the public peace and to the security of the State." The majority used the analogy of a smoldering campfire that could burst into flame at any time and noted that the state does not have to wait until the fire starts to take action to prevent it. In their famous dissent, Justices Holmes and Brandeis stuck to the "clear and present danger rule" which Holmes had first enunciated in the 1919 Schenck case. They argued that what they called "the redundant discourse" in the pamphlet had "no chance of starting a present conflagration. Holmes wrote: "Every idea is an incitement. It offers itself for belief and if believed it is acted on unless some other belief outweighs it or some failure of energy stifles the movement at its birth. ... If in the long run the beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship are destined to be accepted by the dominant forces of the community, the only meaning of free speech is that they should be given their chance and have their way."

Established precedent of federalizing Bill of Rights (incorporation doctrine); states cannot deny freedom of speech --protected through due process clause of Amendment 14

Munn v. Illinois (1877) In 1875, the Illinois legislature, dominated by members sympathetic to the Grange (a group supporting agriculture), passed a law creating a commission to set the rates that privately owned grain elevators could charge farmers for grain storage. The law only applied to one city: Chicago. In the city of Chicago nine owners controlled 31 grain elevators thereby having a virtual monopoly over the rates they could charge farmers to store their wheat. Munn, one of these owners, sued on the grounds that the Illinois law denied him his property rights in violation of the due process of law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A majority of the Supreme Court upheld the Illinois law and ruled that it was clearly within the police power of the state to protect public health, safety, and welfare. The majority reasoned that once private property is "affected with a public interest" the state may use its police power to regulate it in the public interest. For example, taxi companies are privately owned but their rates can be regulated by the state in the public interest. The case was considered progressive for its time because the usually conservative Supreme Court was noted for protecting property rights. Munn had argued that the power to set rates, if it existed at all, belonged to Congress under its constitutionally granted power to regulate interstate commerce. While conceding that interstate commerce was affected, the Court's majority held that, in the absence of Congressional action, Illinois was free to do so under its police power.

Established that states may regulate privately owned businesses in the public's interest

Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States (1936) In 1933, using its constitutional power to regulate interstate commerce, Congress passed the National Industrial Recovery Act as part of President Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal to help stimulate the economy and reduce unemployment. This was Roosevelt's first and major instrument for dealing with the Great Depression. Under the law, all industry groups were authorized to draw up "codes of fair competition" for businesses, including standard and acceptable practices in business and fair wages, hours, and working conditions for workers. The Live Poultry Code was one such example. The Schechter brothers operated slaughterhouses in New York City which received live chickens from outside the state, slaughtered them, and then sold them to local stores. They were charged, prosecuted, and found guilty in a U. S. District Court of violating the wage and hour provisions of their industry's code and with selling an "unfit chicken." (For this reason, the case is sometimes called "the Sick Chicken case.") After their conviction was affirmed by an appellate court, they appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court unanimously ruled in favor of the Schechters. The Court found that the Schechters were engaged in intrastate commerce which had only an indirect effect on interstate commerce and thus was beyond Congress' regulatory power over interstate commerce. Second, the Court found that the law which empowered groups outside Congress to make the codes was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. The Court's decision in the Schechter case was considered a major blow to the New Deal and Roosevelt's plan for recovery from the Great Depression.

Established that the National Industrial Recovery Act created during the New Deal was unconstitutional.

Muller v. Oregon (1908) In 1903, the state legislature of Oregon passed a law limiting to a maximum of ten hours per day that women could work in factories and laundries in the state. Curt Muller's Grand Laundry in Portland, Oregon, required a female employee to work more than ten hours. Previously, in 1905 in Lochner v. New York, the Supreme Court had ruled that a state law restricting the number of hours bakers could be employed per day and per week was an unconstitutional violation of the "liberty of contract" of the due process of law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Lochner the Supreme Court reasoned that employers and employees should be free to contract for wages and labor free of state interference. However, in Muller v Oregon, the Court unanimously upheld the Oregon law. The Court reasoned that women were not as capable of negotiating terms of employment as were men and that the state had a valid interest in protecting women from harsh labor conditions. The Court's decision was an example of the patronizing attitude which courts had at this time toward women. Apparently of great influence on the Court's decision in Muller was a brief filed by a well-known attorney (and future Supreme Court justice) named Louis Brandeis who argued the case for Oregon before the Supreme Court. Brandeis utilized a very innovative strategy that became known as "the Brandeis Brief" and led to significant changes in future legal analysis and Supreme Court litigation. Brandeis devoted only two pages to his discussion of the legal issues. In the over one-hundred pages of the remainder of his brief, Brandeis presented evidence of the harmful effects of long hours of labor on the health, safety, morals, and welfare of women. He included evidence from a great variety of sources such as medical reports, psychological and sociological writings, and statistical reports which he used to show that there was basis for the Oregon law.

First case to use the "Brandeis brief"; recognized a 10-hour work day for women laundry workers on the grounds of health and community concerns.

Insular Cases (1901) Scholars who have written about the so-called Insular Cases identify between three and thirty-five Supreme Court decisions between 1901 and 1922. The cases developed after the United States acquired certain territory as a result of the outcome of the Spanish-American War. Three important questions involving the U. S. Constitution and laws of Congress were involved in these cases: (1) Can the government of the U. S. acquire territory by treaty? (2) Do certain congressional laws apply to American territories? and (3) Does the Bill of Rights apply to U. S. territories? or, put another way, Does "the Constitution follow the flag"? The Supreme Court in 1901 in one of the earliest Insular Cases ruled that the U. S. did have the power to acquire territory by treaty. In other Insular Cases, a very divided Supreme Court ruled that American territories were of two types: "incorporated" and "unincorporated." "Incorporated" territories were those which were supposedly destined for eventual statehood while "unincorporated" territories were those which were not destined for statehood. A majority of the Court determined that in the so-called "incorporated" territories, all the rights and privileges of the Constitution apply except those clearly available only to state citizens. In the so-called "unincorporated" territories, on the other hand, a majority of the Court concluded that only certain "fundamental" rights are guaranteed. Since Congress' admission of Alaska and Hawaii to the union as states in the 1950s, there are no "incorporated" territories.

Full constitutional rights are not granted to all citizens in places under American control.

Worcester v. Georgia (1832) In 1830, at the urging of President Andrew Jackson, the U. S. Congress passed the Indian Removal Act which authorized the President to grant the Indians unsettled land west of the Mississippi river in exchange for Indian land within existing state borders. The U. S Supreme Court under Chief Justice John Marshall first addressed the Indian lands question in an 1831 case Cherokee Nation v. Georgia. That case developed out of Georgia's attempt to assert its jurisdiction over Cherokee land within the state of Georgia that was protected by federal treaty. The Supreme Court in that case ruled that it had no jurisdiction to hear the Cherokee request to prevent Georgia's attempt. Marshall and the Court determined that the Cherokees were "a domestic, dependent nation (a ward of the United States), rather than "a sovereign nation." By refusing to hear the case, the Court left the Cherokees at the mercy of the land-hungry state of Georgia. The Georgia legislature meanwhile passed a law requiring anyone other than Cherokees who lived on Indian territory to obtain a license from the state. Samuel Worcester and some other non-Cherokee missionaries settled and established a mission on Cherokee land at the request of the Cherokees but without a license from the state. The state then charged them with violation of the Georgia law. They were tried, convicted, and sentenced to four years of hard labor. Worcester and the other missionaries then appealed to the U. S. Supreme Court. Speaking through Chief Justice John Marshall in Worcester v. Georgia, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of Worcester and the Cherokees. Marshall wrote that citizens of Georgia had no right to enter Cherokee land "but with the assent of the Cherokees themselves, or in conformity with treaties, and with the acts of Congress. The whole intercourse between the United States and this nation, is, by our Constitution and laws, vested in the government of the United States." Therefore, Marshall concluded, "the acts of Georgia are repugnant to the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States." The Indians thus achieved a significant legal victory. However, this significant legal victory became an unfortunate chapter in American history. When President Andrew Jackson heard of the Supreme Court's decision, he supposedly remarked, "John Marshall has made his decision, now let him enforce it." In one of the dark pages in American history, the Indians were compelled to leave their native land and move west to Oklahoma Territory. In what is referred to as "the Trail of Tears," many did not survive the move.

Held that Native Americans were entitled to federal protection from the actions of state governments which would infringe on the tribe's sovereignty; ignored by the Jackson administration.

Near v. Minnesota (1931) Jay Near was the editor of a newspaper in Minneapolis, Minnesota, called The Saturday Press in which he often displayed his anti-Semitic, anti-African American, anti-Catholic, and anti-labor views. He also used it to attack public officials such as the mayor and police chief in the city of Minneapolis for corruption. In 1927, his newspaper was closed down under a Minnesota Public Nuisance Abatement Law (called by some the Minnesota Gag Law). This law permitted a judge, acting without a jury, to stop the publication of a newspaper if the judge found it "obscene, lewd, and lascivious" or creating a public nuisance by "malicious, scandalous, and defamatory" publication. Minnesota courts all upheld the closing of Near's newspaper under the law, and Near appealed to the Supreme Court. By a 5-4 vote, the Supreme Court declared the Minnesota law unconstitutional as a violation of the freedom of the press guarantee of the First Amendment. Using the so-called "incorporation doctrine," the Court thus used the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to apply the First Amendment's freedom of the press to the states. In his opinion for the majority, Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes wrote: "In determining the extent of the constitutional protection, it has been generally, if not universally, considered that it is the chief purpose of the guaranty to prevent previous restraints upon publication." Hughes went on to note that, while the prohibition against previous restraint of the press is not absolute, it is allowed "only in exceptional cases." The remedy, Hughes pointed out, for those who feel that they have been wronged by false accusations in the press is a suit for libel.

Held that the 1st Amendment protects newspapers from prior restraint.

Korematsu v. United States (1944) After the Japanese Empire's attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, there was a fear among some Americans that the West Coast might be invaded. Adding to that fear was the fact that there were thousands of Japanese Americans living on the nation's West Coast, and some Americans feared that they might become spies for the Japanese Empire. Acting on the advice and recommendation of military advisors, President Franklin D. Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9066 directing the forced internment of all persons of Japanese descent living on the West Coast in relocation centers located in the interior of the country. Fred Korematsu, an American born citizen of Japanese descent refused to leave his home in California, was arrested, and was convicted in District Court of violation of the exclusion order. By a 6-0 vote, the Supreme Court ruled that the President's action was a constitutional exercise of government power during a time of "emergency and peril" for the nation. Writing for the majority, Justice Hugo Black explained that the internments had "a definite and close relationship to the prevention of espionage and sabotage." He went on to explain that the government needed to act quickly in wake of the attack on Pearl Harbor. Black wrote: "There was evidence of disloyalty on the part of some, the military authorities considered that the need for action was great, and time was short." One of the dissenting justices wrote that he dissented "from this legalization of racism" and went on to assert that racial discrimination "is unattractive in any setting but it is utterly revolting among a free people who have embraced the principles set forth in the Constitution of the United States."

Internment of Japanese-Americans during WWII does not violate 14th Amendment Equal Protection Clause (gets strict scrutiny but national security is a good enough reason to justify the racial discrimination).

Civil Rights Cases (1883) Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment added to the Constitution in 1868 authorized the U. S. Congress to enforce the amendment by appropriate legislation. Using this enforcement clause as its constitutional authority, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1875 which made it unlawful to discriminate on the basis of race in hotels, theatres, places of amusement, and other places of public accommodation. African Americans in five cases from lower courts in California, Kansas, Missouri, New Jersey, and Tennessee sued theaters, hotels, and railroads that refused to serve them. The issue in the five cases, which the Supreme Court consolidated and decided together as The Civil Rights Cases, was the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1875. By a vote of 8-1, with only Justice John Marshall Harlan I dissenting, the Supreme Court declared the Civil Rights Act of 1875 unconstitutional on the grounds that the Amendment was added only to outlaw public, not private, discrimination. The Court's majority introduced the concept of "state action" for purposes of showing discrimination. The majority pointed out that the amendment provides that "no state" shall deny a person the equal protection of the law. The majority interpreted this to mean that states may not adopt laws that discriminate on the basis of race, but the refusal of a hotel owner to serve African Americans is private discrimination, and the Amendment has nothing to do with that. In a powerful dissent, Justice Harlan wrote that in his view "the substance and spirit of the recent amendments to the Constitution have been sacrificed by a subtle and ingenious verbal criticism." In 1964, the U. S. Congress adopted the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which, like the 1875 Civil Rights Act, outlawed racial discrimination in public accommodations. However, recalling the reasoning of the Supreme Court's majority in the 1883 Civil Rights Cases, this time Congress based its constitutional authority for passing the law not on the Fourteenth Amendment but on the commerce clause of Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution. When the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was challenged as to its constitutionality, unlike the Civil Rights Act of 1875, the Supreme Court unanimously upheld its constitutionality.

Name attached to five cases brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1875. In 1883, the Supreme Court decided that discrimination in a variety of public accommodations, including theaters, hotels, and railroads, could not be prohibited by the act because such discrimination was private discrimination and not state discrimination.

Ex parte Milligan (1866) In 1864 during the Civil War, U. S. Army officers in Indiana where there was no fighting occurring arrested Lambdin P. Milligan and some other anti-war Democrats. They were charged with conspiracy to seize munitions at a federal arsenal and to free Confederate prisoners being held in northern prisons. The defendants could have been tried in civilian courts in Indiana which were open and operating, but military officials chose to have them tried instead by military commissions. These military commissions found Milligan and two other defendants guilty and sentenced them to be hanged. On appeal to the Supreme Court, all nine justices agreed that the military courts had no jurisdiction to hear the cases and that Milligan and the other defendants had to be released. In his opinion for the Court, Justice David Davis noted that the Constitution was not suspended in time of emergency and wrote that it was "a law for rulers and people, equally in time of war and peace." He pointed out that military trial of civilians was not permitted where civilian courts were open and operating and that neither the president nor Congress could otherwise authorize such trials. The Court's ruling also defined conditions necessary for martial law to be declared and asserted civilian power over the military. "Martial law cannot arise from a threatened invasion. The necessity must be actual and present; the invasion real, such as effectually closes the courts and deposes the civil administration....As necessity creates the rule, so it limits its duration; for, if this government is continued after the courts are reinstated, it is a gross usurpation of power. Martial rule can never exist where the courts are open, and in the proper and unobstructed exercise of their jurisdiction. It is also confined to the locality of actual war."

Ruled that a civilian cannot be tried in military courts while civil courts are available.

Slaughterhouse Cases (1873) Based on its power to protect the public health, safety, and welfare, the Louisiana legislature passed a law that put about a thousand local slaughterhouses out of business by granting a monopoly in New Orleans to the Crescent City Landing and Slaughterhouse Company. The butchers who were put out of business were white, and they argued that their right to pursue a lawful profession was protected from state interference by either the Privileges and Immunities Clause or the Due Process of Law Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This was the Supreme Court's first opportunity to interpret the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment which had only recently been added to the Constitution in 1868. When the Slaughterhouse Cases reached the Supreme Court on appeal in 1873, a majority of the Court began its decision by declaring that the meaning of the recently added Fourteenth Amendment needed to be considered in light of its original purpose: namely ensuring the freedom of former slaves. The majority then proceeded to define the scope of the Privileges and Immunities Clause very narrowly by arguing that the clause referred only to "very few express limitations which the Federal Constitution imposed upon the States-such, for instance, as the prohibition against ex post facto laws, bills of attainder, and laws impairing the obligation of contracts," along with seeking the government's protection while "on the high seas" as well as a general right to interact with government. However, the majority continued, the clause did not "bring within the power of Congress the entire domain of civil rights heretofore belonging exclusively to the States." This severe limitation of the meaning of the privileges and immunities clause remains controversial and has never been overruled. As a result, the clause is hardly ever invoked in litigation today. Next, the majority of the Court dismissed the due process of law claim. Even assuming a liberty interest in the right to pursue a lawful profession, the Court's majority held that the legislature's monopoly law was a legitimate regulation as a public health measure. Using its so-called "police power," a state could legitimately decide that the concentration of the slaughterhouse business in one area would reduce the spread of disease associated with the slaughtering of animals.

Ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment safeguarded a person's rights only at a federal level, not at a state level.

Sweatt v. Painter (1950) Heman Sweatt was a 33 year old African-American from Houston, Texas, who wanted to be a lawyer. He applied for and was denied admission to the University of Texas Law School because he was an African-American. He sought and received assistance of the NAACP and its chief legal counsel, Thurgood Marshall (a future Supreme Court justice). At this time, the Supreme Court's decision in 1896 in Plessy v Ferguson allowing states to segregate by race as long as the separate facilities were equal was still the law of the land. The problem in Texas was that the state had no law school for African-Americans. In 1947, the Texas legislature authorized the University of Texas to establish a law school for African-Americans in four rooms at a building in Austin. Sweatt declined to accept the offer, arguing that while this law school for African-Americans was certainly separate, it was not equal to the University of Texas Law School. After losing his argument in Texas courts, Sweatt appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court unanimously ruled against the state of Texas and in favor of Heman Sweatt and declared that "the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that petitioner be admitted to the University of Texas Law School." The Court found that in terms of volumes in the library, reputation of faculty, offering of courses, and available scholarships, the University of Texas Law School was far superior. Even in terms of intangibles like the ability to interact with his colleagues in the legal profession and the reputation of the University, the new law school for African-Americans was lacking. The Court thus held that Texas had not met the "equal" part of the "separate but equal" requirement.

Segregated law school in Texas was held to be an illegal violation of civil rights, leading to open enrollment.

Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) In 1890, the Louisiana legislature passed the Separate Car Act which required railroads "to provide equal but separate accommodations for the white and colored races" in order to protect the safety and comfort of all passengers. In 1891, a group of African Americans and Creoles formed the "Citizens Committee to Test the Constitutionality of the Separate Car Law." The Committee chose Homer Plessy, who was one-eighth African American, to test the law by violating it. He bought a first-class ticket on the East Louisiana Railway that traveled from New Orleans to Covington, Louisiana. He boarded the train, walked past the coach clearly marked "For Coloreds Only," and took a seat in the coach clearly marked "For Whites Only." When the train conductor asked Plessy to move to the other coach, he refused, was arrested, and charged with violation of the Separate Car Act. Tried in a Orleans Parish court, Plessy was found guilty and sentenced to jail. After his conviction was upheld by the Louisiana Supreme Court, he appealed to the U. S. Supreme Court. By a 7-1 vote, with only Justice John Marshall Harlan I dissenting, the Supreme Court upheld the Louisiana law and Plessy's conviction. The majority concluded that the Louisiana law requiring "separate but equal" facilities for African Americans and whites did not violate either the Privileges and Immunities Clause or the Equal Protection of the laws Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The law mandating racial segregation, the majority reasoned, was in line with "the established usages, customs and traditions of the people, and with a view to the promotion of their comfort, and the preservation of the public peace and good order." In his powerful solo dissent, Justice Harlan I wrote: "In view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste here. Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens." The Supreme Court's decision in Plessy v Ferguson upholding racial segregation by law under the so-called "separate but equal rule" led more states to enact such laws. Plessy remained the law until the Supreme Court overruled the decision in 1954 in the case of Brown v Board of Education.

Separate but equal

Schenck v. United States (1919) After the United States entered World War I, the U. S. Congress in 1917 instituted a military draft when it passed the Selective Services Act. Also in 1917, Congress passed the Espionage Act which made it a crime to cause or attempt to cause insubordination in the military and naval forces or to obstruct the recruitment or enlistment of persons into the military service of the United States. Charles Schenck, the General Secretary of the Socialist Party, opposed U. S. participation in World War I. He was arrested and prosecuted for violation of the Espionage Act after 15,000 leaflets traced to Socialist Party headquarters urging resistance to the draft were sent to men who had been drafted. The leaflet quoted the Constitution's Thirteenth Amendment prohibiting slavery or involuntary servitude, asserted that the Selective Service Act violated the amendment, and that a draftee was little better than a convict. It suggested that the draft was despotism in its worst form and was a wrong against humanity in the interest of "Wall Street's chosen few." It urged draftees not to submit to intimidation and to assert their rights. It described even silent consent to the draft law as helping to support an infamous conspiracy. Schenck was convicted in a U. S. District Court and appealed his conviction to the Supreme Court where he argued that the leaflets should be protected by the First Amendment's freedom of speech and press. A unanimous Supreme Court upheld Schenck's conviction. In one of the most memorable Supreme Court opinions in history, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote for the Court: "We admit that in many places and in ordinary times the defendants in saying all that was said in the circular would have been within their constitutional rights. But the character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done. The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic. ... The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent." Thus, the Court ruled that speech can be limited in wartime. The so-called "clear and present danger rule" first enunciated by Justice Holmes in Schenck quickly became the test by which a majority of the Supreme Court judged freedom of speech cases for many years to come.

Speech may be punished if it creates a clear-and-present-danger test of illegal acts

Fletcher v. Peck (1810) A corrupt Georgia legislature sold millions of acres of public lands for pennies per acre to four land companies which in turn sold the land to private individuals. When the corruption was discovered, the voters of Georgia defeated the corrupt members of the state's legislature and chose a new legislature. This new Georgia legislature then passed a law rescinding the sale of the land. Fletcher had purchased land from Peck and wanted to make sure he had legal title to it so he challenged the constitutionality of the new Georgia legislature's rescinding law. Speaking through Chief Justice John Marshall, the Supreme Court ruled that the original sale, even though tainted by corruption, was legal because the Georgia legislature legally had the right to sell public lands. In addition, both Fletcher and Peck were innocent third parties untainted by the corruption. Most importantly, however, the Court ruled that the contracts clause of Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution applies to states as well as private parties. For the first time, in Fletcher v Peck, the Supreme Court declared a state law unconstitutional, thus establishing the Court's power under judicial review to do so.

Supreme Court case that established the Court's power to invalidate state laws contrary to the Constitution; in this case, the Court prevented Georgia from rescinding a land grant even though it was fraudulently made.

United States v. E.C. Knight Co. (1895) Showed the limitations of the Sherman Antitrust Act and led to the Clayton Antitrust Act in 1914. In 1890 Congress passed the Sherman Antitrust Act which made it illegal for businesses to contract, combine, or conspire to create a trust or monopoly for the purpose of restraining free trade and monopolizing interstate or foreign commerce. The American Sugar Refining Company, which already controlled a majority of the sugar-refining companies in the U. S., purchased stock in and sought to control four other companies, including E. C. Knight. As a result, the American Sugar Refining Company would then control over 98 % of the nation's sugar refining. The U. S. Department of Justice sought a court order forbidding the sale as a violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act. A lower federal court denied the Justice Department's request. The lower court held that the companies were engaged in manufacturing, not interstate commerce, and thus were not subject to the Sherman Antitrust Act. By an 8-1 vote, with only Justice John Marshall Harlan I dissenting, the Supreme Court, while conceding that this was a monopoly, ruled that Congress had exceeded its power under the commerce clause. The Court held that the manufacture of an item was done entirely within a state and therefore was properly a matter of intrastate commerce. While the sugar was intended eventually to move in interstate commerce, until it did so the power to regulate its manufacture was within the state's police power. The majority held that any effect on interstate commerce was "indirect" and Congress could only regulate those activities that had a "direct effect" on interstate commerce.

Supreme Court case that limited the government's power to control monopolies by ruling that the regulation of manufacturing was a state, not federal, matter.

Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge (1837 In 1785, to provide the public better access from Charlestown to Boston the state legislature of Massachusetts granted the Charles River Bridge company the right to operate a ferry and then a toll bridge across the Charles River from Charlestown to Boston for 70 years. In 1828, before the 70 years had elapsed, the state legislature authorized merchants in Charlestown to build another bridge known as the Warren Bridge virtually next to the Charles River bridge. The merchants were authorized to collect tolls on the Warren Bridge until they had been reimbursed at which time Warren Bridge would become a free bridge and revert to state ownership. With Daniel Webster as its attorney, the Charles River Bridge company sued the state citing the clause of Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution which forbids states to impair the obligation of contracts. Speaking through Chief Justice Roger Taney, a majority of the Supreme Court invoked the so-called "four corners" doctrine which holds that a court must interpret only what is actually written in a contract, not what might be implied from it. Massachusetts had not granted the Charles River Bridge company an exclusive right to operate a toll bridge across the river. A ruling in favor of the Charles River Bridge company would infringe upon a state's right to build its own roads, bridges, canals and other forms of transportation to the detriment of the public good. Taney asserted that while "the rights of private property must be sacredly guarded," at the same time "the object and end of all government is to promote the happiness and prosperity of the community ...; and it can never be assumed, that the government intended to diminish its power of accomplishing the end for which it was created."

Supreme Court ruled that a charter granted by a State to a company cannot work to the disadvantage of the public. A State could not make laws infringing on the charters of private organizations. This company protested when the this Company was authorized in 1828 to build a free bridge where it had been chartered to operate a toll bridge in 1785. The court ruled that the 1st company was not granted a monopoly right in their charter, and the 2nd company could build its bridge. Began the legal concept that private companies cannot injure the public welfare.

Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857), The question whether slavery should be allowed in territories acquired by the U.S. was a controversial one prior to the Civil War. Dred Scott, a slave, was taken by his master from Missouri (a slave state) first to Illinois (a free state) and then to Wisconsin Territory where slavery under the Missouri Compromise of 1820 was forbidden. Later, with his owner, Dred Scott returned to Missouri. Dred Scott and his wife filed a petition in a Missouri court requesting permission to file suit in order to establish their right to be freed since they had resided on free soil. After two trials and the Scotts temporarily winning their freedom, the Missouri Supreme Court reversed the lower court's judgment and held that the Scotts' residence on free soil had not changed their status as slaves. The Scotts then brought suit in a U. S. Circuit Court where the verdict once more was that they were still slaves. The case was then appealed to the U. S. Supreme Court. Seven of the nine Supreme Court Justices concluded that the Scotts remained slaves. Chief Justice Roger Taney authored the most important opinion for a majority of the Court. Taney first addressed the question of whether the Scotts were citizens and thus entitled to bring suit in a U. S. court. He wrote: "We think they are not, and that they are not included, and were not intended to be included, under the word 'citizens' in the Constitution and can, therefore, claim none of the rights and privileges which that instrument provides for and secures to citizens of the United States." Still writing for a majority of the Court, Taney also wrote: "...it is the opinion of the Court that the Act of Congress (the Missouri Compromise of 1820) which prohibited a citizen from holding and owning property of this kind in the territory of the United States north of the line therein mentioned, is not warranted by the Constitution, and is therefore void." The Court thus declared the Missouri Compromise unconstitutional and in the process emphasized the importance of protecting property rights, in this case property being slaves. The first sentence of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment added to the Constitution in 1868 declares that "all persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside." It was written and added to the Constitution for the specific purpose of overruling the Supreme Court's decision in Dred Scott v Sanford.

The Supreme Court concluded that the U.S. Congress lacked the constitutional authority to bar slavery in the territories. This decision narrowed the scope of national power, while it enhanced that of the states.

Gibbons v. Ogden (1824) In 1808 the New York Legislature awarded Robert Fulton's steamboat company the exclusive right to issue licenses to steamboats operating in New York waters. In 1811, Fulton in turn granted Aaron Ogden a license to operate steamboats between New York and New Jersey. In 1818, the U. S. Congress, using the power given Congress by the commerce clause of Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, granted Thomas Gibbons a license to engage in the coastal trade and operate steamboats between New York and New Jersey. Ogden sued and won an injunction in a New York state court forbidding Gibbons from operating his boats in New York waters. After obtaining the services of Daniel Webster as his lawyer, Gibbons appealed to the U. S. Supreme Court. Speaking through Chief Justice John Marshall, the Supreme Court unanimously ruled in favor of Gibbons and thus Congress' power. Writing about Congress' power under the commerce clause, Marshall stated: "This power, like all others vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the Constitution." According to Marshall, one important purpose of the new Constitution was to "rescue [the United States] from the embarrassing and destructive consequences, resulting from the legislation of so many different States, and to place it under the protection of a uniform law." Furthermore, Marshall and the Court invoked the supremacy clause of Article VI, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution and affirmed that state laws that contradict constitutional acts of Congress must yield. The Court acknowledged that states can enact laws that regulate interstate commerce but only if these laws do not interfere with national laws. If a state law does interfere, national law preempts state law and the state law is invalid.

The Supreme Court upheld broad congressional power to regulate interstate commerce. The Court's broad interpretation of the Constitution's commerce clause paved the way for later rulings upholding expansive federal powers.

Barron v. Baltimore (1833) In the process of making improvements to the city's streets, the city of Baltimore essentially destroyed access by large ships to a deep-water wharf owned by Barron. Barron believed his private property had thus been "taken for a public purpose" and that, as a result, he was entitled to just compensation under the Constitution's Fifth Amendment which provides that "nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation." Barron won in a lower state court, but the decision was reversed by the Maryland Supreme Court. Barron then appealed to the U. S. Supreme Court. Speaking through Chief Justice John Marshall, the Supreme Court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction because the Fifth Amendment's "takings clause" did not apply to state governments. Marshall explained that because the Bill of Rights only applied to the national government "[T]he provision in the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution declaring that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation is intended solely as a limitation on the exercise of power by the Government of the United States, and is not applicable to the legislation of the States." In the late 1890s the Supreme Court overturned its decision in Barron v Baltimore and ruled that the Fifth Amendment's "takings clause" does apply to the states. Decades later, a majority of the Supreme Court in a series of cases used the due process of law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and a doctrine called "incorporation" to hold that most of the specific rights of the Bill of Rights are now also limitations on the states.

The guarantee in the 5th Amendment that private property shall not be taken "for public use, without just compensation" is not applicable to state governments as well as the federal government.

Northern Securities Company v. United States (1904) By the end of the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court had begun to provide some support for enforcement of the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890. However, it was not until President Theodore Roosevelt sought to use the law to break up the Northern Securities Company that the question arose whether the law reached stock ownership. The Northern Securities Company had acquired the stock of three major railroads: the Great Northern Railway, the Northern Pacific Railway, and the Burlington Railroad. This gave Northern Securities a monopoly over the routes that the three had previously competed for as separate companies. At Roosevelt's urging, the U. S. government sought to prevent the merger by invoking the Sherman Antitrust Act. The Act forbids actions that will result in a loss of competition. In a victory for the government and Congress' 1890 Sherman Antitrust Act, the Court held that the merger did result in a restraint of trade in violation of the Act. The Court's decision in the Northern Securities case breathed new life into the Sherman Antitrust Act. Prior to this case, the government had not enthusiastically enforced the law, and when the government had attempted to do so, the Supreme Court had not provided great support for the government's action.

This case is beginning of the supreme courts support of the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 by allowing the law to break up monolopy-like stock ownership.

Dartmouth College v. Woodward (1819) After a dispute over the governance of Dartmouth College, the New Hampshire legislature enacted legislation that essentially converted Dartmouth from a private college to a state operated college. The state argued that Dartmouth's charter had been granted by the British king and that, as heirs to British sovereignty, like the king before it, the state now had the right to cancel contracts. The Supreme Court reasoned that while that may have been true in the past, the adoption of the new U. S. Constitution changed things. Speaking through Chief Justice John Marshall, the Court held that New Hampshire could not seize Dartmouth College and turn the institution into a state school. The school's private charter with the British Crown involved private property and was a contract. Marshall and the Court invoked the Contracts Clause of Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution which provides that "no state shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts." The prohibition against impairing the obligation of contracts thus applies to states as well as to private parties. In one of his numerous appearances before the Supreme Court, a young Daniel Webster successfully argued and won the case on behalf of Dartmouth College.

case in which the Supreme Court prevented the New Hampshire from changing Dartmouth's charter to make it a public institution; the Court held that the contract clause of the Constitution extended to charters and that contracts could not be invalidated by state law. The case was one of a series of Court decisions that limited states' power and promoted business interests

Hernandez v. Texas (1954) Pete Hernandez, a 21 year-old Mexican American, was drinking at a bar in Edna, Texas, when he became disruptive and was removed from the bar. He left, obtained a gun, returned, and shot another man in the presence of a number of eyewitnesses. He was indicted for murder by an all-white grand jury. His lawyers sought to quash the indictment and the empaneling of an all-white trial jury because persons of Mexican American descent were excluded from both panels. In the previous 25 years, in fact, no person of Mexican American descent had been selected to serve on a grand or trial jury or as a jury commissioner in Jackson County. The trial judge denied the motions, and Hernandez was found guilty by an all-white jury and sentenced to life in prison. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that because Mexican American citizens were classified as "white" under Texas law, no discrimination was found, and thus that court affirmed Hernandez' conviction. The Supreme Court agreed to review that decision. Chief Justice Earl Warren delivered the opinion for a unanimous Supreme Court which agreed with the arguments made by Hernandez' attorneys and thus overturned his conviction. Warren wrote: "In numerous decisions, this Court has held that it is a denial of the equal protection of the laws of the Fourteenth Amendment to try a defendant of a particular race or color under an indictment issued by a grand jury, or before a petit jury, from which all persons of his race or color have, solely because of that race or color, been excluded by the state, whether acting through its legislature, its courts, or its executive or administrative officers. ... Petitioner's only claim is the right to be indicted and tried by juries from which all members of his class are not systematically excluded - juries selected from among all qualified persons regardless of national origin or descent. To this much, he is entitled by the Constitution."

extended protection against discrimination to Hispanics

West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette (1943) In 1940, in Minersville School District v Gobitis, the Supreme Court upheld a public school district's policy requiring students to salute the flag and recite the pledge of allegiance. The Court did so over the objections of Jehovah's Witnesses who argued that saluting the flag was tantamount to worshiping "graven images" which the Bible forbids and thus a violation of their free exercise of religion of the First Amendment. Following that Supreme Court decision, the West Virginia State Board of Education directed all teachers and students to salute the flag as part of daily school activities. Failure to comply could lead to students being expelled. Like the Gobitis family, the Barnettes were Jehovah's Witnesses who believed that flag saluting was a violation of their First Amendment's free exercise of religion. The Barnettes sought and won an injunction in a U. S. District Court against enforcement of the Board's directive, and the Board then appealed to the Supreme Court. By a 6-3 vote, the Supreme Court overruled its prior decision in the Gobitis case. The Court ruled that the West Virginia Board's policy was an unconstitutional violation of the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech, rather than its guarantee of free exercise of religion. In what is regarded as one of the truly great, passionate opinions in Supreme Court history, Justice Robert Jackson wrote for the majority: "The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials... Those who begin coercive elimination of dissent soon find themselves exterminating dissenters. Compulsory unification of opinion achieves only the unanimity of the graveyard. ... If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein."

overruled Minersville School Distrinct v Gobitis -saluting the flag was a violation of first amendment rights, not freedom of religion

Everson v. Board of Education (1947) Following a New Jersey law, the Board of Education of Ewing Township adopted a plan to reimburse parents, including those whose children attended private and parochial schools (most of which in the area were Catholic), for the costs of bus transportation to and from school. Arch Everson, a local resident and taxpayer, filed a suit challenging this policy for including students attending parochial schools as a violation of the no establishment of religion clause of the First Amendment. A lower New Jersey court struck down the program, but a higher New Jersey court reversed that judgment, and Everson then appealed to the Supreme Court. By a 5-4 vote, the Supreme Court held that New Jersey's reimbursement to parents of parochial and private school students for the costs of busing their children to school was constitutional because the assistance went to the child, not the church. This became known as the "child benefit theory." The majority reasoned that as long as the child or his parents were the beneficiaries, and not the church itself, the reimbursement was constitutional. Writing for the majority, Justice Hugo Black made clear that the First Amendment's no establishment of religion clause now applied to the actions of state governments through the due process of law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the doctrine of incorporation. Black continued by writing: "In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect 'a wall of separation between Church and State. ...The First Amendment has erected a wall between church and state. That wall must be kept high and impregnable. We could not approve the slightest breach. New Jersey has not breached it here."

the Supreme Court upheld a local government program that provided free transportation to parochial school students. No establishment of religion now applies to the states as under incorporation doctrine.

McCulloch v. Maryland (1819) The U. S. Congress' constitutional power to create a national bank had been controversial since Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton first successfully argued for it during President George Washington's first term as President. Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson, also in Washington's Cabinet, had argued against Congress' power to create the bank. The charter of the first Bank of the United States had been allowed to expire, but in 1816, Congress chartered the Second Bank of the U. S. The largest branch of this bank was located in Baltimore, Maryland. Like Jefferson at an earlier time, Maryland did not believe that Congress had the power under the Constitution to create banks. The state decided to drive the bank out of business by passing a law placing a tax on all banks "not incorporated by the state" which meant the Baltimore branch of the Bank of the United States. Maryland asserted that Congress had no constitutional power to charter banks and that even if it did, a state could tax the bank. In this early federalism case, speaking through Chief Justice John Marshall, the Supreme Court unanimously ruled that Congress had the power to create a national bank. The creation of a bank was an implied power of Congress. Marshall pointed out that while the power to charter banks does not appear in the list of Congress' enumerated powers found in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, the creation of a bank was a means of executing its enumerated powers: "Although, among the enumerated powers of government, we do not find the word 'bank,'...we find the great powers to lay and collect taxes; to borrow money; to regulate commerce..." Those enumerated powers, when combined with the power given Congress in Paragraph 18 of Section 8 "to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers," authorized Congress' action. This interpretation broadly expanded the power of Congress to enact laws over subjects not specifically mentioned in the Constitution. Marshall asserted that the people, not the states, were the agents of the Constitution's establishment. He invoked the supremacy clause of Article VI, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution in the Court's ruling that Maryland could not tax the national bank. Marshall noted that "the power to tax involves the power to destroy." By that he meant that a state could impose a tax so burdensome that the entity, in this case the national bank, would not be able to survive.

the Supreme Court upheld the power of the national government and denied the right of a state to tax the federal bank using the Constitution's supremacy clause. The Court's broad interpretation of the necessary and proper clause paved the way for later rulings upholding expansive federal powers

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (1952) In 1951, a dispute between the owners of the nation's steel mills and the steelworkers union during the nation's involvement in the Korean War eventually led to the union calling for a strike to shut down all of the nation's steel mills. President Truman issued Executive Order 10340 directing Secretary of Commerce Sawyer to seize control of and operate the mills. Although there was no congressional statute authorizing the President to take such action, Truman based his authority to do this on his constitutional power as Commander-in-Chief. After a U. S. District Court ruled against the President's action, the case was appealed to the Supreme Court. By a 6-3 vote, the Supreme Court ruled that the President had exceeded his power and thus could not take possession of the country's steel mills in order to avert a nation-wide strike. Speaking for the majority, Justice Hugo Black wrote: "The President's power, if any, to issue the [executive order] must stem either from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself...The Order cannot properly be sustained as an exercise of the President's military power as Commander-in-Chief ....Nor can the Order be sustained because of the several provisions of Article II which grant executive power to the President... The power here sought to be exercised is the lawmaking power, which the Constitution vests in the Congress alone, in both good and bad times."

the president does not have the authority to seize private steel mills even in wartime

Brown v. Board of Education (1954) A Kansas law permitted cities with more than 15,000 population to maintain separate public schools for African-American and white students. The Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas, maintained segregated elementary schools. Linda Brown, an African-American third grader, and her family lived a few blocks from an all-white school in Topeka but was required to travel twenty-one blocks from her home to attend a school reserved for African-American children only. The NAACP chose this case to be a "test case" for several reasons. First, the case came from a northern state, not a southern state. Second, for all practical purposes Linda Brown's school was equal to the white schools in Topeka. Linda Brown's parents joined with parents of other African-American children and brought suit against the Topeka Board of Education. Thurgood Marshall, chief legal counsel for the NAACP and a future Supreme Court justice, represented the African-American parents. At the same time, class action suits were filed in three other states - South Carolina, Virginia, and Delaware - where African-American children were also compelled by state law to attend racially segregated public schools. The Kansas case and the cases from the other three states were consolidated and appealed to the Supreme Court where they were argued and decided together. Marshall argued that the African-American and white schools were not equal in a number of ways, but more than that, he argued that segregated schools were harmful to African-American children. The Supreme Court unanimously ruled in favor of the African-American parents and their children. In doing so, the Court overruled the Court's 1896 decision in Plessy v Ferguson and its "separate but equal" rule. Speaking through Chief Justice Earl Warren, the Court declared: "We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal. Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs and others similarly situated for whom the actions have been brought are, by reason of the segregation complained of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment." On the same day the Court handed down its decision in Brown, the Court also ended racial segregation in the public schools of the District of Columbia in Bolling v Sharpe. In 1955, the Supreme Court heard reargument in Brown v Board of Education II. The Court was again unanimous, and this time, directed the public schools involved to admit "with all deliberate speed" students on a racially nondiscriminatory basis.

unanimously held that the racial segregation of children in public schools violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. Brown claimed that Topeka's racial segregation violated the Constitution's Equal Protection Clause because the city's black and white schools were not equal to each other and never could be. Overruled Plessy v. Ferguson's "separate but equal" doctrine and would eventually led to the desegregation of schools across the South