Test 2 Part 2: readings

Global Commons

Areas that no country is allowed to own or claim as its territory -the US views the South China Sea as global commons -The US seeks to prevent china from unilateral occupying the reefs, constructing artificial islands, and asserting sovereignty, dominance, and/or control over vast swaths of what Washington regards as part of the global commons -in the post-cold war era China has attempted to challenge global hegemony by contesting America's ability to command the global commons which is playing out as a very high-profile conflict in the South China Sea

Wang Xiao Long

Little Dragon

Chinese-Taiwan relationship, according to Heginbotham and Menon

Taiwan's China policy has evolved to reflect changes in nations identity but not in a linear fashion -China has more wealthy and military muscle than it used to and thus had more options for coercing Taiwan -China's economy is ten times larger than I twas in 1992 -China's military still suffers from several shortcomings the might make a successful amphibious invasion of Taiwan difficult to pull off in the immediate future, and the local balance of power no longer overwhelming and unequivocally favors the US -Beijing now has more economic and political levers to pull in order to pressure Taiwan

David Shambaugh

a professor of Political Science and International Affairs at George Washington University and the director of its China Policy Program. He is also a nonresident Senior Fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution.

Asia pivot or rebalance

announced by the Obama administration signaled that the US was intent on focusing more attention in the Asia-Pacific

Non-nuclear variant of the stability-instability paradox

appears to be at place in the South China Sea of the early 21st century, whereby each side tends to feel emboldened to demonstrate stiff resolve and remarkably unconstrained to exert muscular assertiveness because it perceived the likelihood of escalation as negligible (i.e. since both Beijing and Washington seem to recognize that a full-blown conventional conflict would have grave and devastating consequences to their economies, each perceives the resort to war by the other side as illogical and hence highly improbable -the paradox may be more acute in the case of the US and China because of dangerous assumptions held by other side or both 1) both leaders are over confident in their respective abilities to manage crises (China thinks its crisis management has improved since the 2001 cores because of extensive reproach and analysis on the topic of producing new procedures and mechanisms, including a National Security Commission modeled after the US National Security Council) (the US thinks that it must be hard-line in pushing back against Chinese actions in SCS) 2) Chinese elites have convinced themselves that they are skilled at handling maritime issues peacefully and that they understand the security dilemma 3) the US and China aren't food at understanding dealing with the security dilemma for ex: In September 2009, the Deputy Secretary of State Steinberg pointedly identified the security dilemma as a central problem in US and china's relation in a speech -US leaders find it difficult to understand how US policies and actions might be viewed from a Chinese perspective -Beijing finds it equally difficult to apply the security dilemma in concrete situation because, in Chinese minds, China is still a weak country the is routinely bullied by others (i.e. it is not easy for PRC leaders to see that China is now a powerful country and can be perceived as a bully itself)

Scobell's Definition of a "flash point"

areas that could lead to military conflict -"longstanding political dispute that is proximate to adversaries and threatens to involve more powerful actors thereby raising the possibility of a broader war" -these areas do not inevitably entail war but increase the probability of conflict

US's Geostrategic Goals (SCS and Scobell)

as the global hegemon, the US defines its national interests on a global scale -militarily, the US interest is the defense of the homeland and American allies -politically, the US seeks to promote democracy and strengthen human rights around the world (except in the Trump admin) -economically, the US looks to protect the global trading and financial systems -since the end of the Cold War, the US has been the world's dominate naval power -washington has stood firm in principles but somewhat flexible in practice -the us maintains its principle of freedom of navigation and priority of protecting the global commons but on a day-to-day basis the US tends to emphasize subsets of fredomon of the seas like freedom of navigation and freedom of overflight -Washington does not insist on abiding by international law, it has yet to ratify UNCLOS -the US has firm principles but it wavers in practice as it does not abide by international law itself and has not yet ratified UNCLOS

The South China Sea

central to the US china relationship (due to geostrategic linkage and meaning) secondary to the China-Japan, China-India, and China-Taiwan relationship primary to Southeast Asian states

Shanghai Co-operation Organisation (SCO)

created in the late 1990s -China saw it as a way of extending its economic and political influence in Central Asia; it is at an SCO institute in Shanghai that Tajik and other Central Asian officers are trained. -Russia saw it as a way of checking such expansion. -That is why, two years ago, it insisted that India and Pakistan be allowed to join. -Russia also tried to push back against China's attempt to create a free-trade zone within the SCO by setting up a Eurasian Union alongside the Collective Security Treaty Organisation. The purpose was to protect Russia's own market from the flood of Chinese goods. -the Central Asian countries see the SCO as a security guarantee not so much against China as against Russia, particularly after the annexation of Crimea and the war in Ukraine. The fears are particularly palpable in Kazakhstan, the richest of the Central Asian countries and the one with the longest border with Russia

Heartland Theory (Mackinder)

early 20th c. theory that claimed whichever state controlled the resource-rich "heartland" of Eastern Europe could eventually dominate the world. It would suggest that not the United Kingdom (an ocean-based empire), but Russia (which was becoming communist) would be in a position to achieve this dominance. -according to Scobell creates a bias toward continental thinking and limits people for looking to the South China Sea or predicting it as a flash point

China adapted a grand strategic naval strategy (scobell)

first set out in the early 1980's in which the PLA navy would gradually extend its reaching the Pacific Ocean in a phased expansion of Chinese sea power -the first phase was important because it involved (in 2000) extending its area of operations to the Near Seas including SCS, ECS, and the Yellow Sea -the third phase, by 2050, China would become a global sea power and hence on par with the US Navy

One Belt, One Road Program (Scobell)

has underscored the South China Sea -in 2013, by President Xi Jinping announces the initiative -proposed the development of an overland belt of road, rails, and pipelines from China into Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Central Asia, stretching onward to Europe and the Middle East -also proposed the development of a maritime silk road from China through the SCS and into the India Ocean and beyond -the plan emphasized the importance of two regions: maritime Southeast Asia and the Middle East -and the March West

Scobell's Main Conclusion (The South China Sea and US-China Rivalry)

in the second decade of the twenty-first century, the South China Sea meets the criteria of a flash point

Cross-Straight Rivalry

between Beijing and Taipai is primary to the china-taiwan relationship/rivalry

Heginbotham and Menon's main argument

the US and China must come to view each other as strategic competitors -China will use force if Taiwan attempts to declare independence which will precipitate a war -Continued strategic ambiguity by the US is Washington's best course of action. Maintaining it will, however, require adjustments that adapt to changing circumstances

According to Scobell the US and China are geopolitical rivals

-two countries at risk of being drawn into unintended war

What happened to the flash point of Taiwan

1) China evolved from being a purely continental power in the mid-20th century to a maritime one by the turn of the twenty-first century 2) China's economic center of gravity has shifted southward's from northeast China 3) the waters in the Taiwan Straight became calmer with the election in 2008 of the Nationalist Party candidate, Ma Ying-jeou who was pro-unification which improved relations between Beijing and Taipei

Why, according to Scobell, has the South China Sea become such a contentious issue in US-China relations? (The South China Sea and US-China Rivalry)

1) China has growing interests in the body of water and Beijing's economic clout and military might are rising 2) Washington determined that the South China Sea is a high-priority body of water for US maritime interests in the Asia-Pacific and an important symbol of the US commitment to broader principles of international law 3) 90% of the world's commerce is transported by ships and approximately half of this trade either terminates on the rim of, traverses, the South China Sea making it the fulcrum of world trade and the crucible of conflict

Other flash points (Scobell)

-during the first four decades of the PRC's existence, flash points were squarely continental -in the 1950's it was the Korean Peninsula -in the 60-80s it was the land border with the Soviet Union -by the 1990's it was Taiwan with the East China seas as a secondary hot spot -as Beijing resolved most land disputes, the switch to maritime hotspots occurred with the exception of New Delhi -the south china sea was not the only hot spot in 2010s. Although China has been distinctly subdued in the rhetoric and restrained in its actions vis a vis North Korea, where the SCS is concerned, Beijing has been increasingly hard-line assertive

Scobell's Examples of Other Flash Points (The South China Sea and US-China Rivalry)

-the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan Strait, or Vale of Kashmir (different kind of flash point from the South China Sea)

The Trump Administration on China (Scobell)

-the Trump administration has been trying to rethink US policy toward the region -the Trump Amin is preoccupies with events on the Korean Pensisnusla -Trump publicly criticized Chinese action in the South China Sea in December 2016 in a tweet -SOS Rex Tillerson indicated that he favored a harsh US response to China in the South China Sea in 2017 -the administration has been remarkably blunt when characterizing Chinese actions in the South China Sea as provocative and expansionist

Why the South China Sea might surprise some as a flash point, according to Scobell

1) Very few scholars thought South China Sea would become a focal point for the US-China relationship because the Taiwan Straight and Korean Peninsula looked to be more important to china -some, like Brzezinski, believed that it is the least significant flashpoint for China compared to the Korean peninsula and Taiwan straight 2) there is a tendency toward continental thinking as scholars seem to emphasize landmass and focus on the geostrategic importances of Central Asia and the Caucasus - "heartland" thesis For EX: hot wars in WWI and WWII played out on continental landmasses and people tend to forget about the maritime battles such as Midway that were also very important to the wars -but oceans are important, they have played a key role in the process of globalization For EX: Columbus and Vasco De Gaza's explorations were due to maritime travel -the significance of oceans had increased only really because of shipping and trade 3) the body of water seems geographically well removed from great powers (appears peripheral to recognized geopolitical centers of gravity causing it to be overlooked but this is mistaken because new advances in weaponry have dramatically shrink the distances (i.e. ballistic and cruise missiles make the sea in range)

Heginbotham and Menon's 3 principles that should guide the recalibration

1) Washington should strengthen and reiterate its commitment to deterrence (the most important principle) 2) DC should avoid measures that edge towards granting Taiwan formal recognition 3) DC should avoid overreacting to political moves that China males in tit-for-tat exchanges between Beijing and Taipei -The US' policy of strategic ambiguity has worked will for decades by sending a clear warning to bot sides, not to attempt fundamental changes to the status quo but changing circumstance in China, Taiwan and the US require non-fundament adjustments to elements of the US policy based on these three principles -the US should also maintain the military capability to make the message credible and clear to Beijing Strengthening niche capabilities particularly relevant to a Taiwan scenario -they DO not advocate for heavy handed strategy by the US because it may spark more consequential moves by China for which the US may not have an adequate response, which is to say one that avoids creating a crisis

geopolitical rivals

two countries that are at risk of being drawn into unintended war according to scobell

middle income trap

A condition in which an economy begins development to reach middle-income status but is chronically unable to progress to high-income status. Often related to low capacity for original innovation or for absorption of advanced technology, and may be compounded by high inequality. -describes newly industrializing economies that reach a mean income threshold (usually about $11,000--- China is at $7,593 or $11,850 PPP equivalent according to the World Bank) which begins to compromise the economy's competitive advantages in low-wage manufacturing -at this point in the development process the comparative advantage of countries like China begin to erode -in order to escape the trap, the economy needs to transition up the productivity ladder by producing more knowledge-intensive goods, investing in innovation, and retaining workers from production to service and other value-add industries -governments must have a more modern financial system, a more open political system, and make more efficient use of factor endowments (land, labor, and capital)

Grand Strategy

An overarching vision that defines and guides a nation's foreign policy.

China's Geostrategic Goals (SCS-Scobell)

Beijing's policy stand on the SCS has been consistent across many decades -the PRC has long claimed sovereignty over virtually all the islands, reeds, and atolls in this body of war on the basis of historical presence and activity in maritime area -their claims are consistent with the territorial claims of the ROC on Taiwan (ironic) -uses nine-dashed line map from the ROC -Beijing's approach is grounded in historical fundamentalism and slow creeping assertiveness or slow intensity conflict (SLIC) -China has a gradualist long-term approach to improve its claim in the features in as low-key manner as possible but they are getting more assertive

According Chen Weiss, the China model is not made for export

China's economic situation is unique because 1) it has an enormous international market, 2)abundant labor, and 3) a hierarchical authoritarian government committed to a transition away from a planned economy (according to economist, Barry Naughton) which is why it's model is well suited for China specifically and not for export -none of the aforementioned conditions will be easy for other developing states to copy -the general principle underlying China's development is pragmatism and a willingness to experiment -although other authoritarian-minded leaders look to the CCP with longing and envy, they will have trouble emulating China's political system -the CCP has been particularly successful by using the CCP's persuasive reach in Chinese society to maintain their rule. Responsiveness to public criticism has also helped the CCP survive policy mistake and improve governance and because of these things, China's system cannot be easily copied abroad EX: Promoting "Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism With Chinese Characteristics for a New Era" to the Chinese people with a smartphone app

Summary of China's Future by David Shambaugh

China's future is arguably the most consequential question in global affairs. -Having enjoyed unprecedented levels of growth, China is at a critical juncture in the development of its economy, society, polity, national security, and international relations. -The direction the nation takes at this turning point will determine whether it stalls or continues to develop and prosper. -Will China be successful in implementing a new wave of transformational reforms that could last decades and make it the world's leading superpower? Or will its leaders shy away from the drastic changes required because the regime's power is at risk? -If so, will that lead to prolonged stagnation or even regime collapse? Might China move down a more liberal or even democratic path? -Or will China instead emerge as a hard, authoritarian and aggressive superstate? -David Shambaugh argues that these potential pathways are all possibilities - but they depend on key decisions yet to be made by China's leaders, different pressures from within Chinese society, as well as actions taken by other nations. -Assessing these scenarios and their implications, he offers a thoughtful and clear study of China's future for all those seeking to understand the country's likely trajectory over the coming decade and beyond.

Chen Weiss' example of how China is not trying to spread democracy

China's inconsistent votes in the UN Security Council -it has not always used its power to defend authoritarian states -it has voted several times for UN sanctions resolutions against Iran and North Korea -in 2011, Ending surprised many international observers by voting for sanctions against Libya and in favor of referring the Libyan dictator al-Qaddafi to the International Criminal Court -China chose not to block a UN security Council resolution authorizing the military interaction in Libya that led to Qaddafi's violent ouster -China's overall approach to the UN reflects a conservative position on the balance between sovereignty and human rights, tempered by a desire to avoid the political costs of taking unpopular stands

Chen Weiss on China making the world safer for authoritarianism

China's model cannot be replicated by others so it poses no threat to the international order/status quo BUT it has made it easier for authoritarianism to thrive because of it's own successes. -it was not China's aim to do so, but by making successes with the CCP, other states, like those in Africa and Latin America that trade heavily with China, join Beijing in opposing human rights resolutions in the UN General Assembly -China rightly gets heat from Western observers for exporting surveillance and censorship technologies because China's investment in these technologies have made it cheaper for other authoritarian and "would-be authoritarian regimes" to monitor their citizens. -China unintentionally has made it easier for authoritarianism to thrive because of it's own success -the diffusion of digital authoritarian ism is not the same thing as an international effort to remake other governments in China's image AND it is important to note that China is the only exporter of electronic identification systems EX: British-made electronic ID cards allow Rwandans to efficiently access government services and the US has done so

Asiatic mode of production

Found in least developed societies according to Marx for example in India. According to Marx Asiatic mode of production explains the stagnation of oriental societies. Basic features of society having Asiatic mode of production are absence of private property, self-sufficient village economy, control of public works by state, absence of class and thus class- struggle which causes a stagnant society in absence of social change.

Second Thomas Shoal (The South China Sea and US-China Rivalry)

In march 2014 one of the most dangerous South China Sea crises flared up between china and the Philippines over this island -Chinese coast guard vessels harassed philippine supply ship[s attempting to offload processions to a ramshackle Philippine outpost on the shoal -The PRC coast guard cutter approached perilously close to the Philippine vessel while Chinese, Philippine, and the US military aircraft all buzzed around at low altitudes in close proximity -the incident could have easily escalated into military conflict between China and the US because of the combination of aggression actions by Beijing and risk-acceptant behavior by Manila and Washington

Putin and China

Mr Putin's actions diverted Western attention from China; they also made Russia much more dependent on China. In May 2014, weeks after the invasion, Mr Putin and a retinue of businessmen and officials flew to Shanghai to forge a new partnership. The deals reached included a $400bn 30-year gas contract, to be enabled by a far-eastern pipeline called "The Power of Siberia". This dependence should not be mistaken for an alliance. Russian propagandists, at home and in China, have taken advantage of the current trade war to fan the flames of conflict and offer their nation as a fellow victim of America's aggression. But China is sticking with its professed position of avoiding both alliances and enmities. "The most important relationship for us is the one with America. We don't want to repeat the mistakes of Stalin and Mao," says Feng Yujun, the head of the Centre for Russian and Central Asian Studies at Fudan University. "Russia is more dependent on China than China is on Russia." -If China does not seek alliance, it relishes that dependency, and wants to ensure its continuation. Russia may in time try to turn again westward, either because of a change in power in the Kremlin—which tends to cause such reversals, as it did when Khrushchev succeeded Stalin—or because the people start to resent Chinese actions, as some in Siberia already do. "Russia will push back when China encroaches on the psychological definition of what it means to be a Russian society

Washington's determination that the South China Seas a high priority body of water and a symbol of the US commitment to broader principles of international law (Scobell)

One reason why Scobells believes the South China Sea had become a contentious issue in the US-China Relations -The US seeks to prevent china from unilateral occupying the reefs, constructing artificial islands, and asserting sovereignty, dominance, and/or control over vast swaths of what Washington regards as part of the global commons -as a matter of principle, the US is adamant about maintaining freedom of the seas, freedom of navigation, and peaceful resolution of maritime territorial disputes around the world -because of this, the US has persisted in a tough, unwavering approach to the South China Sea even though it has appeared to be ineffective at altering Chinese behavior

China has growing interests in the body of water and Beijing's economic clout and military might are rising (Scobell)

One reason why Scobells believes the South China Sea had become a contentious issue in the US-China Relations -these "hard power resources" provide China with the ability to advance its claims to the region from a position of far greater strength vis-a-vis the US and other states -Beijing has become considerably more assertive in the South China Sea and elsewhere in recent years -Very few scholars thought South China Sea would become a focal point for the US-China relationship because the Taiwan Straight and Korean Peninsula looked to be more important to china -But China has long exhibited a preference for a low-key, gradualist approach toward the South China Sea (salami slicing/grey zone activities) building facilities such as docks and runways and constructing artificial islands and China has stepped up its harassment and intimidation of the fishing boats and maritime enforcement vessels *since 2013, China has invested greater, time, energy, resources, and prestige in the South China Sea

How Vladimir Putin's embrace of China weakens Russia

Putin needs XI Jinping more than Xi needs him PRC gives gift to Dushanbe: China has built schools, paved roads, bored tunnels, and lent Tajikistant $1.3bn (half of its foreign debt Dushanbe (the capital of the former soviet republic of Tajikistan) is the poorest of Central Asian states -important to the one belt, one road Silk Road in 2016, Chinese army units stationed in Tajikistan to watch over the Wakhan Corrider (as strop of Afghanistan that separates Tajikistan from Pakistan -russia cannot confront China because it depends on it -military posturing provides a rare glimpse of tension that underlies the official friendship between Russia and China -Russian Chinese Brother for ever (written 70 years ago to celebrate the unending friendship between Jospeh Stalin and Mao Zedong -Russia and China justify their authoritarianism on the basis of civilizational difference (they do not claim their values are universal and do not accept western values -Mao was a junior partner of Stalin and now Stalin is a junior partner of Xi -Russia is economically and politically dependent on China -For China Russia is a matter of statecraft -For Russia, it is a question of national identity (it is no longer looking west after the 1990s but looking east to Asia because it is threatened by the West) -Russia's pivot towards China, by this logic, followed a Western failure to accept Russia, with all of its shortcomings and assimilate into the civilized world

US-China Geopolitical Rivalry (Scobell)

Rivalry between the two countries in the Asia-Pacific region is framed by geography -Whereas China was once predominantly a continental power and the US a maritime one, during the first two decades of the 21st century, China has become a major maritime power and the South China Sea has emerged as a central flash point because of the geography of conflict because china is more maritime oriented now -this is because global hegemony in the post-cold war era is being challenged by China *china is challenging America's command of the commons

Difference between the approached Russia and China take to Central Asia

Russia brandishes sticks, China offers carrots. -It is using every tool in its sometimes rather seedy soft-power toolbox to win over the governing elites in Central Asia and offset public resentment of China that has been strengthened by China's increasing abuse of Muslims -Russia always talks about alliances, which implies a confrontation with a third party, whereas China talks of friendship -Ironic: In the 19th century Central Asia wanted to stay as it was, but Russia wanted to Westernise it by force. Today Russia wants to keep things as they were, but Central Asian elites want to Westernize -Unlike Russia, China puts its money where its mouth is. Two years ago, China Ocean Shipping Company became a 49% owner of the "dry port" of Khorgos (central to the BRI) -China sees Central Asia first and foremost as a way of stabilising Xinjiang. But it is also a testing ground for China's foreign policy and the country's ability to push into Russia's normative space -Russia still has a cultural, linguistic and political hold on Central Asia. It employs millions of its migrant workers, controls the media and information space, and believes that it can make or break governments there

Russia and China

Russia's central bank's yuan holdings now account for 14% of its total reserves, even though the yuan is not fully convertible. That is ten times more than at any other central bank, according to Mr Gabuev. Russia is growing dependent on China in technology, too. Huawei, a company deeply distrusted by America, is rolling out its 5G telecoms equipment in Russia. Alibaba, a Chinese e-commerce giant, has entered into a joint venture with Mail.ru, the owner of Russia's largest social-media networks. Russia's draconian law on the "sovereignty of the internet", currently before parliament, is copied from China, and it is hoping to use Chinese technology to implement it -Russian officials are aware of security risks associated with China's penetration and are trying to use Russian-made software and algorithms. But they cannot get away from the Chinese hardware -Russia's AI is highly likely to come almost entirely from China

The Asiatic mode of politics

Russian rent-seekers and their short-term interests play a central role in the Sino-Russian relationship. -The same is not true in reverse. -Private Chinese firms are reluctant to invest in Russia. Some fear American sanctions; others worry about the lack of property rights and clear rules. To operate in Russia, you need what Chinese businessmen now call bao hu san—a protective umbrella provided by siloviki. For such a small market, why bother? -There is an irony here. Russia's regime has opted for the East; but Chinese people and investors are interested in Russia only to the extent that it is Western. -Following Tiananmen Square China's main task thus became ensuring that a reassured Russia would act as a buffer, at best a friendly and at least a neutral one, between itself and America. It did not want a weak neighbour; but nor did it want a mighty one. It invested; it smiled; it bought oil and weapons (though it was not, then, allowed the best). It tended to vote with Russia in the UN Security Council, except when it would cause additional problems with America. Thus, for example, it did not criticise Russia's annexation of Crimea. But it did not recognise it either.

SLOCs

Sea Lines of Communication -often serve to obscure the reality that bodies of water matter as much, if not more, than narrow straits and straight-line shipping lanes

Taiwan's changing identity, according to Heginbotham and Menon

Taiwan's success in creating a prosperous, vibrantly democratic society had produced a distinctive identity -seventy years of separate political existence from the PRC and consolidation of democratic rule -Taiwan's 2018 GDP was ranked twenty-second in the world in terms of purchasing parity which is extraordinary because Taiwan ranks 56th in population size These factors have made for a Taiwan that has an identity quite separate from China EX: in 1992 only 17.6% of the poll respondents saw themselves as Taiwanese only -in 2018, 55.8% saw themselves as Taiwanese only

Chen Weiss on China

The CCP's primary purpose is NOT to undermine democracy BUT its activities threaten the healthy function of democratic civil society and the public's access to alternative sources of information, unintentionally -BUT Western countries should recognize that the threat comes from the CCP not the Chinese people or the Chines diaspora -If government pass and enforce laws against foreign interference, Chinese efforts need not constitute an existential threat to liberal democracy -If Beijing were truly bent on destroying democracy and spreading authoritarianism, containment might be the right response BUT the US strategy of countering Chinese influence everywhere it appears in the name of fighting an ideological battle against a hostile civilization would be dangerously misguided -such a strategy would damage US economic growth and innovation, limit the freedom and openness of US society, and risk becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy

According to Scobell, why does China care about the South China Sea?

The SCS, China's maritime dispute, has increased in importance over time while Beijing's border disputes have been resolved through peaceful negation -China has become a major maritime power primarily in the Asia-Pacific *SCS has been elevated to an issue of vital national interest and central to domestic political legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party which is important because maintain the CCP is China's number one foreign policy priority

Conclusion of Heginbotham and Menon's Taiwan Balancing Act

The Taiwan dispute will not be resolved anytime soon, but it should be managed prudently until that proves possible -the consequences of intemperate words and deeds in the Taiwan Strait could prove deadly, especially now, as discord between Washington and Beijing continued to deepen A sensible strategy requires that the US not use Taiwan as a hammer with which to beat Beijing or treat it as a traceable commodity that can be used to mollify the Chinese Leadership

The US and the Taiwan Strait, according to Heginbotham and Menon

The US has interest in avoiding war with China -the triangular relationship between the US, China, and Taiwan necessitates a policy of dual deference based on conditional assurances and strategic ambiguity -one part of the strategy involves discouraging Taiwanese actions that could pull the US into conflict in the Taiwan Strait -the other part requires using military and diplomatic means to prevent China from going war to achieve unification -the US MUST seek to maintain a function, and preferably multifarious and robust relationship with China -Where interstate's coincide or overlap, cooperation can yield benefits to both sides, as it had recently on issues ranging from North Korea to removing highly enriched uranium from Nigeria and Ghana

Chen Weiss' resolution

The best approach for those who wish to counter the spread of authoritarian is to defend and restore democracy -The US should recommit itself to certain basic principles like the rule of law, fail elections, free speech, and freedom of the press and where Chinese actions violate these principles, the US should confront those responsible and join other like-minded governments to protect shred values -by recommitting to working with democratic allies and multilateral institutions, the US could renew faith in its leadership -When Chinese actions do not violate democratic principles, the US should work with China to address common problems. Other countries will not be able to solve the greatest called humanity faces, Climate Change, without China's help -The US and its allies need to be more precise about what exactly China is doing. -The BEST way to respond to China is to make democracy work better and would set an example for others to follow and all the democratic world to compete with the true sources of China's international power: its economic and technological might

According to Jessica Chen Weiss, the china threat

is perceived by Western politicians as an authoritarian turn and "conclude that China is engaged in a life and death attempt to defeat democracy" -In the US there is a move from a consensus supporting engagement with China to one calling for competition ir even containment in a new Cold War because it is concerned that the emboldened China is seeking to spread its own model of domestic and International order EX: VP Pence decried China's WHOLE of government effort to influence US domestic politics and policy and the director of the FBI said that China is not just a whole of government threat but a whole of society threat as well -these reflect mounting fear in the US that China represents a threat not just to US interests but also to the very survival of democracy and the US-led international order (i.e. the US perceives china as a threat to the status quo) **Chen Weiss believes that these fears are misguided

Importance of geopolitical analysis according to Scobell

it considers the influence of geography in international politics and offers the most thorough interpretation -necessary for calculating balances of power and assessing national interests -the geographic proximity of adversaries and allies as well as the location of topographical and maritime features of critical strategic importance (including uninhabited rocks and shoals) should not be ignored/are very important -highlights the geostrategic importance of the globe's "rimland regions" (littoral areas) -90% of the world's commerce is transported by ships and approximately half of this trade either terminates on the rim of, traverses, the South China Sea *geopolitical analysis suggests that the future of this body of water is likely to be choppy, and the potential for unintended escalation is greater than has been assumed

Heginbotham and Menon on unification through diplomatic means

might be a lost cause as suggested by the frustration over the inability to prevent the reelection of Taiwan's pro-indepence president Chen Shui-Ban in 2004 led China to pass the 2005 Anti-Seccesion Law which threatened the use of non-peaceful means if separatist forces pursed indolence or if the possibilities for a peaceful reunification were to be completely exhausted -might compel Beijing to up the Ante -even if China does not resort to military force against Taiwan-the riskiest of its options-fundamental changes in US Taiwan policy will almost certainly transform Beijing from a competition that is also a partner into an outright adversary and spoiler

According to Scobell, what does the future hold for geopolitical competition between the US and China in the SCS?

neither side is likely to back down from its position on this semi closed sea BUT neither side desires a state of heightened tensions in bilateral relations, let along outright military conflict -this all but guarantees a continued slow boil in the SCS BUT there is a real possibility of heightened great-power rivalry and even escalation to interstate war 3 factors that suggest cause for worry: 1) the existance of multiple overlapping interstate regional rivalries 2) the emergence of a variant of the stability-instability paradox and 3) mounting security dilemma

continental thinking

people remember continental wars like Waterloo, there was an equally important maritime confrontation that occurred off the Cape of Trafalgar near the strait of Gibraltar also people think about Stalingrad in WWII but forget about the significant maritime components with corresponding epic sea battles like the Batt for The Atlantic and Battle of Midway in the Pacific Ocean -many battles in world history have significant maritime dimensions that are often over looked but specific bodies of water invariably serve as focal points or cradles of conflict

East China Sea

primary focus to the China-Japan relationship (the Senkaku Islands)

Indian Ocean

primary tp the China-India relationship with the SCS being a subset of the Indo-Pacific

Chen Weiss' main argument

she argues that China is not attempting to make the world safer for other authoritarian governments as to undermine liberal values BUT simply secure the CCP at home and abroad (i.e. there is no grand strategic plan to undermine liberalism and instate authoritarianism internationally) -China is not YET an existential threat to the status quo all it wants to do is make the world safer for the CCP and authoritarian states to coexist -we should NOT overreact by framing competition with China in civilizational or ideological terms because ti risks backfiring by turning China into what many in Washington fear it already is -furthermore, we should not worry that China is attempting to undermine liberal values by spreading it's authoritarian system of government because China's model cannot be exported an maintained by other countries

Evidence of Changing Policy/Relationship between US and Taiwan, according to Heginbotham and Menon

since the election of Trump, Washington's Taiwan policy has changed in style and substance, and influential members of Congress and pressing for even more pronounced shifts -Trump sent some early signals like accepting a phone call from President Tsai in December 2016 -but since then, Trump has significantly pulled back and moved toward a more traditional Taiwan policy but the administration contains a number of influential Taiwan supporters and China hawks -this had encouraged pro-Taiwan individuals and organizations to double down and demand more fundamental changes in support of Taipei -Congress had long regarded itself as an important and legitimate player, even watchdog, when it comes to the US Taiwan relationship -Congressional backers of Taiwan have been emboldened due to mounting suspicion worried the deep state since Trump's election EX: The Taiwan Travel Act (TTA) introduced by Representative Steve Chabot and Senator Marco Rubio, which permitted American government official at all levels to travel to Taiwan for mutual consultations, was passed unanimously by both houses of Congress and signed into law by President Trump. The Taiwan Travel Act has been condemned by Chinese officials and academic scholars as a violation of the one China policy. In response, Xi said that the US should not expect China to offer help on big international issues -there is also a looming Sino-American Trade War

Chen Weiss on the CCP

the CCP welcomes democratic dysfunction abroad, as it makes the party look better by comparison BUT democratic back slinging does not reflect a grand strategic plane in Beijing -The best approach for those who wish to counter the spread of authoritarian is to defend and restore democracy

Scobell's Conclusion

the SCS has grown in importance to China and the US, emerging in the early 21st century as a principle node of global power politics -China has adapted a geostrategic approach to Southeast Asia and the South China Sea -The US has adopted a geostrategic approach in its early 21st century grand strategy: which is why the Obama Admin initiated the Asia pivot -it remains unclear what policy the Trump administration will adopt, Washington will likely be obligated to respond to geopolitical realities and likely pursue a hard-line vis-a-vis Beginning in the SCS -The US and China are geopolitical competitors and are playing this rivalry out in maritime domain -The US is determined to sustain its worldwide oceanic preeminence and states as chief prosecutor of the global commons, and seems to view the South China Sea as a central arena for this struggle -China views this maritime region as China's rightful sphere of influence, but the intensity and determination are driven by the logic of geostrategic rivalry with the US

March West (Scobell)

the intellectual predecessor of the One Belt One Road initiative articulated in 2012 by a Beijing university academic -argued that china need a geostrategic rebalance which required putting greater efforts into developing relationships and linkages with its western neighbors. It was a call for a more balanced approach to china's domestic and foreign development strategies

Tipping point for the South China Sea (SCS) as a flash point

the late 2000s -the global financial crisis of 2008 hit the US hard but left China relatively unscathed and because of this when Obama took office he was consumed with addressing the economic fallout, was less committed to Asia and more prepared to acclimate Chinese interests -In March, Beijing probed US intentions by harassing the USNS impeccable in the SCS but Washington did not push back -in May, China submitted documents supporting its extensive claims to the SCS to the Un -In November, during the US china summit, the Obama administration agreed to a joint agreement with language stating that each country should respect the other's core interests BUT the cordial relationship ended when at a global summit in Copenhagen, China appeared intent on sabotaging US initiatives and embarrassing Obama -By 2010, Washington concluded that Beijing's growing assertiveness in the SCS and elsewhere required a firmer US response and China interpreted the US's tougher actions as a complete u-turn and reacted angrily -led to a diplomatic face-off at ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) when SOS Hiliary Clinton articulated US policy toward the SCS and implicitly criticized Chinese actions -PRC foreign minister responded heatedly seeking to intimidate the smaller states of SE Asia

The existence of multiple overlapping interstate regional rivalries

the rivalries between Japan and china and India and China also involve posturing and conception over this body of water, though secondary -there is also competition among multiple southeast Asian states and between these states and china, including allies and partner of the US (the Philippines and Taiwan)

The South China Sea as Flash Point according to Scobell (The South China Sea and US-China Rivalry)

this Southeast Asian flash point has smoldered for decades at low levels of combustible agitation, punctuated by periodic sprays fo confrontation, and elevated on occasion to flashes of armed confrontation for example: -one of the most dangerous South China Sea crises in recent years flared up in March of 2014 between China and the Philippines over the Second Thomas Shoal -each side (China and the US) seeks at minimum to manage the issue of the South China Sea or ideally, to persuade the other side to concede or at least compromise

According to Scobell, the US's first priority in the US-China relationship should be

to address the risk of an incident at sea escalating into a major conflict

Main Objective of Taiwan's Balancing Act (Heginbotham and Menon)

to assess the challenges facing US policy toward Taiwan and propose adjustments intended to improve the prospects for peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait

Scobell's main objective (The South China Sea and US-China Rivalry)

to examine the South China Sea from a geopolitical perspective to show that it is a significant flash point in the US-China rivalry the article: 1) illuminates how geopolitical analysis provides the best explanation for growing US-China tensions in the South China Sea 2) examines the geopolitics of great-power rivalries and highlights the tendency for these rivalries to have significant maritime dimensions 3) explores the implications of this analysis for the US-China rivalry and the future of the South China Sea flash point