Torts MBE Prep

The plaintiff brought his car to a mechanic for a tune-up. During the tune-up, the mechanic removed the fuse for the brake lights and inadvertently failed to replace it, causing the lights to stop working. As the plaintiff was driving his car home from the mechanic, he was involved in an accident. The plaintiff, seeing a friend walking along the road, slammed on his brakes to give the friend a ride. The defendant, who was driving the car behind the plaintiff, hit the plaintiff. The plaintiff sustained severe whiplash from the accident and has sued the defendant and the mechanic. At trial, the jury determined that the plaintiff's damages were $10,000 and that the defendant was 50% at fault, the mechanic was 25% at fault, and the plaintiff was 25% at fault. The jurisdiction recognizes pure several liability and partial comparative negligence. How much can the plaintiff collect from the defendant? A. $5,000. B. $7,500. C. $10,000. D. The plaintiff cannot recover from the defendant.

A. $5,000. *Under modified (or partial) comparative negligence, recovery is reduced by the plaintiff's percentage of fault and barred if it exceeds 50%. If multiple defendants cause the plaintiff indivisible harm, then several liability limits the plaintiff to recovering the portion of damages that corresponds to each defendant's share of fault.*

A defendant, intending to frighten the plaintiff, went to the plaintiff's place of work, a toy store. When the plaintiff was alone in the store, the defendant waved a knife at the plaintiff, saying, "I'm going to make sure you don't molest any more children!" It turns out that the defendant had mistaken the plaintiff for someone else, who the defendant believed to have molested his nephew. The plaintiff, however, assumed that the knife was just one of the toys from a shelf in the store and that the defendant was just making a tasteless joke, so he laughed it off and told the defendant to get lost. Only later did the plaintiff realize that the knife had been real and that he had actually been in serious danger. As a result of looking back on the distressing event, the plaintiff has suffered from severe anxiety, leading to illness, which has caused him to miss work. Which of the following tort doctrines offers the plaintiff the best chance to recover? A. Intentional infliction of emotional distress. B. Assault. C. Battery. D. Slander.

A. Intentional infliction of emotional distress. *For intentional infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant intentionally or recklessly caused the plaintiff severe emotional distress by acting in an extreme and outrageous manner.* **(Choice D) When the defendant falsely tells a third party that the plaintiff committed a serious crime (e.g., child molestation), the defendant can be liable for defamation based on slander per se. But the defendant is not liable here because no one else was in the store when he made the false statement.** ***Here, the defendant went to the plaintiff's place of work and threatened to harm him with a knife (extreme and outrageous conduct) based on a mistaken belief that he had molested the defendant's nephew. In doing so, the defendant knew (intent) or was indifferent to the obvious risk (recklessness) that his conduct would cause the plaintiff severe emotional distress. And because this conduct caused the plaintiff to experience severe anxiety and illness (severe emotional distress), IIED offers the plaintiff the best chance for recovery.***

The owner of a restaurant was responsible for printing new dinner menus every day after speaking with the restaurant's chef in the morning. The menu always indicated in a footnote that all dishes were prepared in a kitchen that also worked with nuts and animal products. One morning, after speaking with the chef, the owner created a dinner menu that labeled a chicken dish as "soy, nut, and dairy free." However, the chicken dish contained pecan crumbs. That evening during dinner service, a patron of the restaurant told his waiter that he was allergic to nuts. Based on the menu, the waiter suggested that he order the chicken dish. The patron noted the warning in the footnote on the menu, but knowing that his own allergy was not severe enough to react to mere trace amounts of nuts, he ordered the chicken dish. After eating a few bites of the dish, he suffered a severe allergic reaction and was rushed to the hospital. The patron filed a negligence suit against the owner of the restaurant to recover damages for his injuries. The above facts are undisputed at trial, and at the close of the patron's case, the owner filed a motion for a directed verdict. The jurisdiction has abolished traditional rules of landowner liability. If no other evidence has been introduced, should the owner's motion be granted? A. No, because a jury could conclude that the owner breached her duty of reasonable care to the patron. B. No, because the court cannot grant the owner's motion until she has presented her case. C. Yes, because the patron assumed the risk by eating restaurant food that may contain nuts. D. Yes, because the patron consented to ordering the chicken dish based upon the waiter's suggestion.

A. No, because a jury could conclude that the owner breached her duty of reasonable care to the patron. *Assumption of the risk is a defense to negligence if the plaintiff voluntarily accepted a known risk of harm. Here, the patron voluntarily accepted the risk that all dishes were prepared in a kitchen that used nut products. However, he did not voluntarily assume the risk that the chicken dish contained nuts since it was labeled "nut ... free" on the menu.*

A woman hired a personal trainer to help her lose weight. In addition to enforcing a rigorous workout regimen, the trainer gave the woman appetite suppressant pills that the trainer claimed to have formulated himself. The trainer told the woman that the pills contained a combination of natural herbs that would safely curb her food cravings. The trainer did not charge the woman for the pills. The woman took the pills for a week. Although she stopped having food cravings, she also started to feel dizzy and had a hard time breathing. The woman showed the pills to a pharmacist, who identified them as store-bought pills containing a drug that suppressed one's appetite but had potentially dangerous side effects such as dizziness, headaches, and respiratory difficulty. The woman immediately stopped taking the pills, and within a day she stopped feeling dizzy and having difficulty breathing. If the woman files suit against the trainer for intentional misrepresentation, will she succeed? A. No, because she suffered no pecuniary loss. B. No, because the pills suppressed her appetite. C. Yes, because she relied on the trainer's statement that the pills were safe. D. Yes, because she suffered dangerous side effects when she took the pills.

A. No, because she suffered no pecuniary loss. *Liability for intentional misrepresentation arises when (1) the defendant knowingly or recklessly misrepresents a material fact with the intent to induce the plaintiff's reliance and (2) the plaintiff reasonably relies on the misrepresentation and suffers pecuniary loss as a result.* **Here, the trainer knowingly misrepresented that he had formulated the pills and that they would safely curb the woman's food cravings, with the intent that she use the pills to lose weight. The woman reasonably relied on the trainer's statement when she took the pills for a week, which caused her to suffer dangerous side effects. However, the woman suffered no pecuniary loss (e.g., medical expenses) due to the misrepresentations, so she will not succeed in a suit for intentional misrepresentation against the trainer.**

A man knew that his brother's most prized possession was his favorite hunting rifle. The man, who was very competitive with his brother, believed that he would achieve more hunting success with a rifle as nice as his brother's. One day when the brother was at work, the man went to the brother's house and borrowed the rifle. The man took it hunting, fired one shot, and shot an eight-point buck. He returned the rifle to the brother's house before the brother returned home from work. Later that night, the man told his brother that he had proved his theory about the rifle, and he explained what he had done. The brother was furious, and he sued the man for trespass to chattels. At trial, the brother testified that he was upset about the man's use of his rifle. He did not provide other evidence of damages. Is the brother likely to prevail on his claim? A. No, because the brother cannot show that the man's interference caused him actual damages. B. No, because the man borrowed the rifle and did not demonstrate the requisite intent. C. Yes, because the brother need not prove actual damages. D. Yes, because the man used the brother's chattel.

A. No, because the brother cannot show that the man's interference caused him actual damages. *Trespass to chattels by intentional use of or intermeddling with the plaintiff's chattel requires proof of actual damages through (1) actual harm to the chattel, (2) substantial loss of use of the chattel, or (3) bodily harm to the plaintiff.*

A chef agreed to purchase a rare bottle of wine from a wine collector's personal collection. The wine collector immediately shipped the bottle overnight to the chef through a delivery company that specialized in shipping wine. The next evening, the chef served the bottle of wine, but the wine had been spoiled, making him and his guests ill and rendering the wine worthless. The chef sued both the wine collector and the delivery company in negligence to recover damages. At trial, the chef established that the bottle of wine had been subjected to high temperatures that were inappropriate for preserving wine. However, the chef was unable to establish which defendant had improperly stored the wine before it reached him. As a result, the chef did not present any evidence that allowed the jury to allocate the amount of damages between the two defendants. The jurisdiction follows the doctrine of joint and several liability as well as the traditional standard for res ipsa loquitur. Is the chef likely to succeed in his negligence suit? A. No, because the chef cannot prove that both of the defendants acted negligently. B. No, because the chef could not present evidence to allow the jury to allocate the damages between the two defendants. C. Yes, because the wine collector and the delivery company contributed to an indivisible harm. D. Yes, because the wine would not have been damaged if not for the negligence of at least one of the two defendants.

A. No, because the chef cannot prove that both of the defendants acted negligently. *If multiple defendants were negligent and any one of them could have caused the plaintiff's harm, joint and several liability allows the plaintiff to recover even if it is impossible to prove which defendant actually caused the harm. But the plaintiff must first show that each of the defendants was negligent.*

A customer purchased a chainsaw from a retail store. The chainsaw was made by a well-known manufacturer of quality tools. It was part of a new line of power tools that were being offered at a significantly lower price than other comparable tools. Although the chainsaw included a "kill" switch, the switch was defective. Prior to removing the chainsaw from its container, the customer unexpectedly received a better chainsaw as a gift. As a result, he sold the first chainsaw to his neighbor. While using the chainsaw to cut down a tree in his backyard, the neighbor lost his balance and fell onto his wife, who was standing next to him. Due to the defective kill switch, the chainsaw did not turn off and the neighbor's wife suffered serious injuries. The neighbor's wife has brought an action based on strict products liability against the customer. Will the neighbor's wife likely prevail? A. No, because the customer was not in the business of selling chainsaws. B. No, because the neighbor's wife did not purchase the chainsaw from the customer. C. Yes, because the customer failed to inspect the chainsaw prior to selling it. D. Yes, because the kill switch on the chainsaw was defective.

A. No, because the customer was not in the business of selling chainsaws. *Strict products liability is only imposed on commercial suppliers (i.e., persons who regularly manufacture, distribute, or sell products as part of their business)—not casual sellers (i.e., persons not in the business of selling the type of defective product that caused the plaintiff harm).*

A mother sent her daughter, who had a severe nut allergy, to a cooking camp that focused on teaching young children how to cook in healthy and fun ways. To protect children with food allergies, a local ordinance required that food ingredients used at camps for children not contain soy or nuts. On the day the daughter went to the camp, the campers were going to learn how to make a shrimp stir-fry. The camp counselor on duty forgot about the ordinance and added soy sauce to the stir-fry. Later that day, the daughter was rushed to the hospital for severe abdominal pain. At the hospital, it was discovered that the bottle of soy sauce used by the counselor was contaminated with an unusual strain of bacteria, which caused the daughter to develop a bacterial infection. However, the daughter showed no signs of an allergic reaction to the soy sauce. If the mother sues the camp counselor under the doctrine of negligence per se, is the mother likely to prevail? A. No, because the daughter did not suffer the type of harm that the ordinance was intended to prevent. B. No, because the daughter was not in the class of people intended to be protected by the ordinance. C. Yes, because the camp counselor put soy sauce into the food in violation of the ordinance. D. Yes, because the daughter was within the class of people intended to be protected by the ordinance.

A. No, because the daughter did not suffer the type of harm that the ordinance was intended to prevent. *Under the doctrine of negligence per se, duty and breach are presumed if (1) the defendant violated a statute, (2) that statute was intended to prevent the type of harm suffered by the plaintiff, and (3) the plaintiff is within a class of persons that the statute was intended to protect.*

To facilitate the plowing of major streets, a city ordinance prohibited parking on major streets, defined in the ordinance, weekdays between 4:00 a.m. and 9:00 a.m. on days when it snowed more than one inch. The defendant left his car parked on a major street near his house while he went on an overnight business trip during the middle of the week. Contrary to the weather forecast, it snowed five inches on the night the defendant was gone. The next morning, the plaintiff walked to work along the same busy major street. She decided to walk in the street, as it had been plowed but the sidewalks were still covered with snow in spots where residents had neglected to shovel. When the plaintiff walked around the defendant's car at around 8:00 a.m., she was hit by a city bus and injured. The plaintiff has sued the defendant for negligence for her injuries. The jurisdiction recognizes pure comparative negligence. Is the plaintiff likely to prevail? A. No, because the defendant's act did not proximately cause the plaintiff's injuries. B. No, because the plaintiff's negligence contributed to her injuries. C. Yes, because the defendant's violation of the ordinance amounts to negligence per se. D. Yes, because the jurisdiction recognizes pure comparative negligence.

A. No, because the defendant's act did not proximately cause the plaintiff's injuries. *To prove causation in a negligence action, the plaintiff must show that the defendant's actions were the actual and proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries. Proximate cause occurs when the plaintiff's harm was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendant's conduct.*

A man shopped at a large discount store for approximately an hour before paying for his purchases. As the man was leaving the store, two store employees stepped in front of him and blocked his path to the exit. The employees believed that the man was shoplifting because his appearance was similar to a suspect who had been shoplifiting at the store earlier that day. The employees then proceeded to dump the contents of his bag onto the floor and used the store's intercom system to request that security come to the front of the store because the shoplifting suspect had been apprehended. After a few minutes, the store's security officer arrived and told the employees that the man was not the suspect who had been caught shoplifting earlier. The employees apologized for their mistake, and the man left the store. The man has brought a claim for false imprisonment against the employees. In response, the employees assert that they are not liable for false imprisonment on the basis of the shopkeeper's privilege. Will the employees' defense likely succeed? A. No, because the employees' detention of the man was unreasonable. B. No, because the employees used greater force than was necessary to detain the man. C. Yes, because the employees only detained the man for a few minutes. D. Yes, because the employees reasonably believed that the man had shoplifted.

A. No, because the employees' detention of the man was unreasonable. *To successfully assert the shopkeeper's privilege as a defense to false imprisonment, the plaintiff's detention must have been conducted for a reasonable amount of time and in a reasonable manner—e.g., did not cause the plaintiff unnecessary humiliation, embarrassment, or discomfort.* **The employees did not use greater force than was necessary to detain the man (e.g., by handcuffing him) because they simply stepped in front of him to block his path to the exit.**

A woman ordered a hamburger at her favorite restaurant. When she took a bite of it, she felt something hard and sharp pierce her tongue. Upon inspection, she discovered a shard of glass embedded in the burger patty. The woman needed stitches and was unable to eat solid foods until the wound healed. The woman filed a negligence suit against the restaurant for damages stemming from the cut on her tongue. At trial, the woman introduced evidence establishing that the shard of glass was embedded in the burger patty when she bit into the hamburger. The woman also established that all of the burger patties were made in the restaurant's kitchen and only the restaurant's employees had access to the kitchen. Following the presentation of the woman's case, the restaurant moved for a directed verdict. Is the restaurant's motion for a directed verdict likely to succeed? A. No, because the fact finder may infer that the restaurant was negligent. B. No, because the restaurant is strictly liable for the woman's injuries as a seller of the hamburger. C. Yes, because the woman did not prove that the restaurant failed to use reasonable care when making the hamburger. D. Yes, because the woman failed to produce direct evidence of the restaurant's negligence.

A. No, because the fact finder may infer that the restaurant was negligent. *Under the traditional standard for res ipsa loquitur, negligence is inferred if (1) the plaintiff's harm would not normally occur absent negligence, (2) the defendant had exclusive control over the thing that caused the harm, and (3) the plaintiff did nothing to cause the harm.*

The friend of a teacher owned a pumpkin patch that was not open to the public. The friend invited the teacher and his schoolchildren to enter the patch to pick their own pumpkins as part of a class trip. While the teacher was on the friend's property, a wild snake bit him as he reached into the patch to pick a pumpkin. Nearby, the friend had posted a large sign that stated, "Danger: Snakes and rodents may be present in the patch - exercise caution when picking pumpkins." The teacher brought a suit for negligence against the friend to recover damages for his injury. The jurisdiction applies the traditional rules of landowner liability. Is the friend likely to be held liable? A. No, because the friend warned the teacher of possible snakes. B. No, because the teacher's negligence contributed to his injury. C. Yes, because the friend allowed the teacher onto his land. D. Yes, because the friend is strictly liable for harm caused by wild animals.

A. No, because the friend warned the teacher of possible snakes. *A land possessor traditionally owes licensees (e.g., social guests) a duty to warn them about concealed dangers that are known or should be obvious to the land possessor.*

A mother and father who recently divorced had one child. As part of their custody agreement, the judge awarded primary custody of the child to the mother and granted weekend visitations to the father. Soon after the divorce, the mother remarried another man, who treated the child like his own. The father became extremely angry when he learned about the mother's remarriage, so he decided to cause her emotional distress. The father appeared at the mother's house when he was supposed to return the child from a weekend visitation. When the mother and the stepfather answered the door, the father told them that the child had been in a car accident and was in a coma. In fact, the child was neither in an accident nor in a coma. Both the mother and the stepfather suffered severe emotional distress as a result of the father's news. Each of them sued the father for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The father has moved to dismiss the stepfather's claim, arguing that his conduct was directed at the mother alone. Should the judge grant the father's motion to dismiss? A. No, because the stepfather is a close relative of the mother. B. No, because the target of the father's conduct is irrelevant for such a claim. C. Yes, because the father intended to cause distress to the mother alone. D. Yes, because the stepfather did not suffer bodily injury.

A. No, because the stepfather is a close relative of the mother. *A defendant whose extreme and outrageous conduct has harmed a third party may be liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress if (1) the plaintiff contemporaneously perceived that conduct, (2) the plaintiff was closely related to the third party, and (3) the defendant knew of the plaintiff's presence and that relationship.* **Severe emotional distress is often accompanied by bodily injury (e.g., heart attack). Although this helps prove that the emotional distress is genuine, recovery for IIED is not limited to cases in which bodily injury occurs.**

Immediately before leaving a party, a college student ate a cookie that, unknown to her, was laced with a hallucinogen. On the drive home, she lost control of her car as a consequence of the hallucinogen and struck another vehicle. The driver of the other vehicle sued the student under a negligence theory to recover for damages caused by the accident. At trial, the judge instructed the jury that, under the reasonable-person standard, the student's driving was to be judged in light of the care that a sober person in her situation would have exercised. Has the judge correctly instructed the jury? A. No, because the student unknowingly ingested the hallucinogen. B. No, because the student was intoxicated at the time of the accident. C. Yes, because a sober person is a reasonable person. D. Yes, because the student's physical disabilities cannot be considered in determining whether she violated the reasonable-person standard.

A. No, because the student unknowingly ingested the hallucinogen. *In negligence cases, a voluntarily intoxicated person is held to the same standard as a reasonably prudent sober person. In contrast, the conduct of an involuntarily intoxicated person will be measured by the standard of a reasonably careful person with the same level of intoxication.*

A woman left a grocery store and was walking to her car when she saw a man lying in the middle of the parking lot. The man was passed out from excessive drinking. The woman had never seen the man before and looked closely at him to see if he was sleeping, injured, or dead. Unable to tell what was wrong with him and being very late to pick up her kids at school, the woman left the man in the middle of the parking lot, got in her car, and left. Fifteen minutes later, a shuttle bus driver who did not see the man ran over him and broke both of his legs. The man sued the woman for negligence. Does the man have a valid claim for negligence? A. No, because the woman did not owe a duty to the man. B. No, but only because the man's drinking caused his injuries. C. Yes, because the woman owed a duty to the man. D. Yes, because the woman was negligent in leaving the man lying in the middle of the parking lot.

A. No, because the woman did not owe a duty to the man. *Although a defendant generally has no affirmative duty to act, such a duty arises when (1) the defendant's conduct created a foreseeable risk of harm to the plaintiff or (2) the defendant and the plaintiff share a special relationship.*

A man and a woman lived directly across the street from each other. Early one morning before sunrise, the man and the woman backed their cars out of their driveways too quickly and simultaneously struck the other person's car. Neither suffered physical injuries, but the woman's car sustained $10,000 in damage and the man's car sustained $1,000 in damage. The woman filed a negligence action against the man to recover for the damage to her car. In his answer, the man filed a counterclaim to recover for the damage to his car. At trial, the jury determined that the woman was 55% at fault and the man 45% at fault for the accident and that both parties successfully established their claims. The jurisdiction follows a rule of modified comparative negligence. What is the total amount of damages that the woman can recover? A. Nothing. B. $3,950. C. $4,500. D. $9,000.

A. Nothing. *In a pure comparative-negligence jurisdiction, the plaintiff's or the defendant's recovery is reduced by that party's percentage of fault. The same is true for a modified comparative-negligence jurisdiction, except that the plaintiff or the defendant is barred from recovery if his/her percentage of fault exceeds 50%.*

A woman was driving at 55 miles per hour through a residential area in her pickup truck even though the posted speed limit was 40 miles per hour. Suddenly, a man driving a sport utility vehicle (SUV) negligently pulled out from an alley and in front of the woman. The woman was able to slow down and veer away from the SUV as soon as she saw it, but the two vehicles collided. Neither driver suffered serious physical injuries, but the accident caused $10,000 in damage to the woman's truck and $1,000 in damage to the man's SUV. The woman filed a negligence action against the man to recover for the damage to her truck. In his answer, the man filed a counterclaim to recover for the damage to his SUV. At trial, the jury determined that the woman was 25% at fault and the man 75% at fault for the accident. Traditional defenses based on the plaintiff's conduct apply in the jurisdiction. What is the total amount of damages that the woman can recover? A. Nothing. B. $7,250. C. $7,500. D. $9,000.

A. Nothing. *Under traditional common-law rules, the plaintiff's contributory negligence (i.e., failure to exercise reasonable care for his/her own safety) is a complete defense to negligence and bars the plaintiff's recovery of damages.* **In traditional common-law jurisdictions (as seen here), the plaintiff's contributory negligence is a complete defense to negligence and bars the plaintiff's recovery of damages—regardless of the percentage that the plaintiff's own negligence contributed to the harm.** ***Here, the man negligently pulled his SUV out of the alley and in front of the woman's truck, causing the two vehicles to collide. However, the jury found that the woman contributed to her harm, likely because she was negligently speeding in a residential area when the accident occurred. Due to her contributory negligence, the woman can recover nothing from the man.***

A driver was traveling in his car one evening when he heard his cell phone ring. The phone was located on the console of the car, so the driver reached out to grab it. While the driver was looking at his caller identification display, a pedestrian walked into a crosswalk directly in front of his car. When the driver saw the pedestrian, he immediately swerved the car and slammed it into a utility pole. The utility pole crashed to the ground and caused a power outage in the area. One block away from the accident site, a child was watching television when the power went out, and her house became pitch black. The child, who was afraid of the dark, ran out of the house and into the street, where she was struck by a bicyclist and seriously injured. The child's parents have sued the driver for negligence to recover damages for the physical injuries suffered by the child. In a jurisdiction that follows the majority view on the duty of care, which party will likely prevail? A. The driver, because he owed no duty of care to the child. B. The driver, because his actions were not the cause in fact of the child's injuries. C. The parents, because the driver owed a duty of care to the child. D. The parents, because the driver's conduct was the legal cause of the child's injuries.

A. The driver, because he owed no duty of care to the child. *Under the majority rule, a duty of care is owed only to persons who might be foreseeably harmed by the defendant's negligent conduct.*

A skier was skiing down a mountain at a ski resort. As the skier turned a corner, she noticed an injured snowboarder lying unconscious and half-covered with snow at the edge of a difficult trail. Due to her reasonable speed, the skier was able to approach the snowboarder and stop without hitting him. She saw that he appeared to have suffered a compound fracture of his leg. The skier also recognized that the snowboarder was in grave peril, but because she had no cell phone and did not know how to administer first aid, she simply continued to ski down the mountain. Less than an hour later, another skier came down the trail. Because he was skiing at an unsafe speed, he was unable to stop and struck the snowboarder. The injured snowboarder suffered a concussion from the crash. It was later established that the snowboarder had broken his own leg when he recklessly tried to do a flip on the difficult trail. If the snowboarder sues the first skier to recover damages for his concussion, what is the first skier's best defense? A. The first skier took no action to place the snowboarder in greater peril than when she found him. B. The second skier had the last clear chance to avoid injury to the snowboarder. C. The second skier's negligence caused the snowboarder's concussion. D. The snowboarder recklessly put himself in peril by trying to do a flip on a difficult trail.

A. The first skier took no action to place the snowboarder in greater peril than when she found him. *A defendant generally has no duty to aid a plaintiff who is at risk of physical harm unless the defendant's conduct created that risk. When this occurs, the defendant has a duty to use reasonable care to prevent further harm to the plaintiff.*

A chef who worked in a restaurant purchased an electric knife from a knife manufacturer that was specially designed to cut through meat. The instructions for the electric knife clearly stated that it should not be used on raw, hard vegetables, such as carrots or potatoes, because the moving blades on the electric knife would malfunction and could cause serious injury. One day, the chef's friend asked to borrow the electric knife. The chef lent the electric knife to the friend and told him, "Don't use the electric knife to cut raw vegetables." Thinking that the advice was only to avoid dulling the blades, the friend disregarded the chef's advice. When the friend used the electric knife to cut raw carrots, the moving blades on the knife malfunctioned, causing the friend to sustain a serious knife wound. The friend filed a negligence suit against the chef to recover damages for his injuries. The jurisdiction applies the common-law rules for contributory negligence and assumption of the risk. Which of the following is the chef's best defense? A. The friend was contributorily negligent. B. The friend voluntarily assumed the risk. C. The chef did not owe a duty to the friend. D. The knife manufacturer is strictly liable for the friend's injuries.

A. The friend was contributory negligent. *Under the common-law rule for contributory negligence, the plaintiff's failure to use reasonable care for his/her own safety is a complete defense to negligence—regardless of the percentage that the plaintiff's own negligence contributed to the harm.* ** Traditional contributory negligence jurisdiction: Plaintiff's negligence completely bar recovery; Pure Comparative negligence jurisdiction: Plaintiff's negligence reduces recovery by plaintiff's proportionate fault (eg., plaintiff 90% at fault can recover 10% of damages).**

Two actors playing a hero and a villain in an action movie were acting out a fistfight. Both the hero and the villain understood that, due to the violent nature of action scenes, punches and kicks were frequently used. During the fistfight, as directed by the script, the hero punched the villain in the stomach. The punch caused the villain pain but did not cause any permanent injury. Both actors had caused similar injuries to one another during the shooting of the movie. If the villain sues the hero for battery as a result of the punch, which of the following would be the hero's strongest defense? A. The hero did not use force that exceeded the villain's consent. B. The hero was instructed by the movie script to punch the villain during the scene. C. The villain struck the hero in a similar way while filming the movie. D. The villain was not seriously injured by the hero's punch.

A. The hero did not use force that exceeded the villain's consent. *Apparent consent is a defense to battery when consent can be reasonably implied from the plaintiff's conduct or from custom—e.g., participation in a movie action scene. However, consent is only a defense when the defendant's conduct falls within the scope of the plaintiff's consent.*

A famous singer hired a bodyguard to protect her before and after her music concerts. Their employment contract authorized the bodyguard to use reasonable force to protect the singer from any dangerous situations that put her safety at risk. However, the singer also told the bodyguard that she preferred that he use a reasonable amount of force to get fans out of the way only if they are within a one-foot radius of her. Otherwise, the singer told him he should just help her maneuver through crowds and watch for anyone who might try to harm her. After one of her concerts, the bodyguard guided the singer through an area heavily crowded with her fans. Most fans moved out of the way. However, one man kept pushing his way toward the singer and would not relent when the bodyguard politely asked him to move back. The man ignored the bodyguard and continued to push toward the singer. When the man was three feet away from her, the bodyguard punched the man in the face. The man has filed a claim against the singer, claiming that she is liable for the battery committed by her bodyguard. If the jury determines that the bodyguard committed battery against the man, which party is likely to prevail? A. The man, because the bodyguard's conduct was within the scope of his employment. B. The man, because the singer will always be liable for any tortious conduct by the bodyguard as force is inherent in the job. C. The singer, because she gave the bodyguard specific instructions that he did not follow. D. The singer, because she is not liable for the intentional tort of the bodyguard.

A. The man, because the bodyguard's conduct was within the scope of his employment. *Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer is vicariously liable for its employee's intentional torts only when (1) reasonable force is inherent in and committed during the employee's job or (2) the employee is authorized to act on the employer's behalf and has a position that provides an opportunity to commit the tort.* **An employer may be vicariously liable for a tort committed by its employee acting within the scope of employment, even if the employee did not follow the employer's instructions. Therefore, the fact that the bodyguard did not follow the singer's specific instructions is no defense.**

A professional football player injured his knee during a football game. The player delayed seeking medical attention for his injury for several days, which aggravated that injury. When the player finally sought treatment from an orthopedic surgeon, she negligently performed the operation on the player's knee. After surgery, the player failed to follow the surgeon's post-operative instructions. All of the player's actions, coupled with the surgeon's negligence, contributed to a permanent injury to the player's knee. As a consequence of the injury, the player's ability to continue to play professional football has been adversely affected and the player has suffered emotional distress which has not manifested itself as a physical injury. The player sued the orthopedic surgeon for damages attributable to the surgeon's medical treatment of the player's knee injury. Assume that each factor affecting the player's injury can be quantified as a dollar amount with reasonable certainty. If the player sues the surgeon for negligence, which of the following factors would the fact finder NOT consider in determining the player's damages? A. The player's delay in seeking medical attention for his injury for several days. B. The player's emotional distress. C. The player's failure to follow the surgeon's post-operative instructions. D. The player's inability to continue playing professional football due to his injury.

A. The player's delay in seeking medical attention for his injury for several days. *In a negligence action, a plaintiff can recover compensatory damages based on: (1) the plaintiff's initial physical harm, (2) any subsequent harm traceable to that initial harm, and (3) steps taken to mitigate the initial harm. But the plaintiff's actions prior to the defendant's negligent act are not a factor in determining damages.* **Here, the player suffered a permanent knee injury (initial physical harm) when the surgeon negligently performed the operation. This left the player unable to continue playing football, which caused him emotional distress (as well as economic harm) traceable to the initial harm. As a result, the fact finder will consider the player's inability to play football and his emotional distress in determining his damages.**

A bus company operates routes between major cities. These buses are popular with students because they are inexpensive and reliable. The bus company does not have bus stations, but picks up and drops off passengers at designated, well-lit public parking areas. The plaintiff, a 20-year-old female college student, recently rode the bus. On that occasion, however, heavy traffic threatened to delay the bus, so the driver decided to let the passengers off at an unlit spot about a half-mile from the designated drop-off lot. While walking from this spot to the designated drop-off lot where her ride was waiting, the plaintiff was attacked and robbed by an unknown assailant. The plaintiff brought an action for negligence against the bus company. Could the plaintiff recover from the bus company for her injuries? A. Yes, if she can demonstrate that the driver failed to meet the relevant standard of care. B. Yes, because common carriers are strictly liable for injuries to passengers. C. No, because the intervening criminal conduct of the assailant severs the chain of causation. D. No, because the bus company no longer owed the plaintiff a duty of care once she got off the bus.

A. Yes, if she can demonstrate that the driver failed to meet the relevant standard of care. *Under the common-law approach to common-carrier liability, common carriers owe the highest duty of care to their passengers and can be liable for slight negligence. Under the modern approach, common carriers only owe a duty to use reasonable care to protect passengers from harm that arises within the scope of that relationship.*

In a mall parking lot, two drivers simultaneously backed up and struck the other's car. Neither driver suffered physical injuries, but the plaintiff's luxury sedan sustained $10,000 in damage and the defendant's oversized pickup truck sustained $1,000 in damage. The plaintiff filed a negligence action against the defendant to recover for the damage to her sedan. In his answer, the defendant filed a counterclaim to recover for the damage to his truck. At trial, the jury determined that the plaintiff was 70% at fault and the defendant 30% at fault for the accident and that both parties are entitled to recover damages. The applicable jurisdiction has enacted a pure comparative-fault statute. What is the total amount of damages that the plaintiff can recover? A. Nothing. B. $2,300. C. $3,000. D. $9,000.

B. $2,300. *In a pure comparative-fault jurisdiction, when the plaintiff and the defendant are both entitled to recover damages, the plaintiff's recovery is reduced (i.e., offset) by the defendant's recovery (and vice versa).* **The plaintiff's recovery would have been $3,000 had the jury determined that only she was entitled to recover damages.** ***Here, the jury determined that the plaintiff was 70% at fault and the defendant 30% at fault for the accident. Since this is a pure comparative-fault jurisdiction, the plaintiff's recovery will be reduced by her proportionate share of fault ($10,000 - $7,000 = $3,000)*** ****And the defendant's recovery will be reduced by his proportionate share of fault ($1,000 - $300 = $700). Since the jury determined that both parties are entitled to recovery, the plaintiff's recovery will be reduced by the defendant's recovery ($3,000 - $700), for a total recovery of $2,300.****

The plaintiff was injured in a car accident with the defendant. At trial, the jury found that the plaintiff was 60% at fault and the defendant was 40% at fault. The plaintiff's total damages were $100,000. In a pure comparative-negligence jurisdiction, what is the maximum amount of damages the plaintiff can recover? A. The plaintiff cannot recover because he was more at fault than the defendant. B. $40,000. C. $60,000. D. $100,000.

B. $40,000. *In a pure comparative-negligence jurisdiction, a plaintiff's recovery is reduced by his/her share of the fault—even if it exceeds 50%.* **Had the jurisdiction adopted modified comparative negligence, the plaintiff would have recovered nothing because he was more at fault than the defendant—i.e., the plaintiff's fault exceeded 50%.**

Two pranksters threw ice from a soda cup over a shopping mall railing onto the heads of patrons two floors below. They intended to post videos of the ice hitting these patrons and the patrons slipping on the ice on a website known for displaying pranks. After a while, the pranksters became bored and left the railing to walk to the food court. As they walked away, they heard a scream and saw a mall patron fall after slipping on the remnants of the ice. The pranksters had not seen or targeted this mall patron prior to his fall but walked over to help him up. The patron cried hysterically and was visibly shaken to the point of needing medical care for his emotional as well as physical injury. If the pranksters are found liable for the patron's injuries, which of the following is the most plausible basis? A. Assault. B. Battery. C. Negligent infliction of emotional distress. D. Intentional infliction of emotional distress.

B. Battery. *Under the doctrine of transferred intent, an actor's intent to commit an intentional tort against one person transfers to the actor's commission of (1) a different intentional tort against that same person, (2) the intended tort against a different person, or (3) a different intentional tort against a different person.*

As a safety measure, a city enacted an ordinance imposing a fine for trespassing on construction and roadwork sites marked with orange caution tape. The city's construction team marked a city block with orange caution tape to divert all cars and pedestrians while the team repaired potholes. A pedestrian wanted to walk down the marked-off street. The street was full of construction equipment, but because it appeared that construction had not yet started, the pedestrian stepped over the orange caution tape and walked down the street. Distracted by the equipment around him, the pedestrian stepped into an open manhole and landed on a construction worker who was inspecting the sewer under the construction site. Both parties were injured in the accident. The construction worker has sued the pedestrian for negligence to recover damages for his injuries in a jurisdiction that applies the minority approach to negligence per se. What is the legal effect of the pedestrian's walking on a street marked with caution tape? A. It creates a conclusive presumption that the pedestrian breached a duty. B. It creates a rebuttable presumption that the pedestrian breached a duty. C. It will bar the pedestrian from recovering damages from the city in a future negligence action. D. It will have no legal effect because the construction worker's act was the proximate cause of the accident.

B. It creates a rebuttable presumption that the pedestrian breached a duty. *Under the minority approach for negligence per se, a defendant's violation of a statute or ordinance creates a rebuttable presumption (as opposed to a conclusive presumption) that the defendant breached a duty of care.*

A man and his friend decided to drive downstate to watch the homecoming football game at their alma mater. The man drove the friend to the game and refused any compensation from her. On the way home, the man failed to notice a stoplight and ran it, which caused a collision with another vehicle. The friend was severely injured as a result of the collision and sued the man for her injuries. The jurisdiction where the friend's suit was filed recently enacted a guest statute with regard to a driver's duty to persons riding in the driver's vehicle. Will the friend be likely to recover damages for her injuries? A. No, because a driver is only liable for injuries to paying passengers. B. No, because the man was merely negligent. C. Yes, because the man owed his friend a duty to exercise ordinary care. D. Yes, because the man was strictly liable for the friend's injuries.

B. No, because the man was merely negligent. *In most jurisdictions, automobile drivers owe a duty of ordinary care to guests (who ride free) and passengers (who pay money for the ride). But a minority of jurisdictions have enacted "guest statutes," under which an automobile driver's only duty to guests is to refrain from gross or wanton and willful misconduct.* **Here, the friend was a guest because she rode in the man's car for free. In most jurisdictions, the man would have owed the friend a duty to exercise ordinary care. However, since this jurisdiction enacted a guest statute, he only owed her a duty to refrain from gross or wanton and willful misconduct (Choice C). And since the man was merely negligent when he failed to notice the stoplight and ran it, the friend is unlikely to recover damages for her injuries from the car accident.**

A politician suffered from chronic social anxiety that caused him to have debilitating panic attacks before public speaking events. During an election year, the politician embarked on an extensive campaign tour across the country and asked his doctor about possible medications to alleviate his social anxiety. The doctor prescribed a popular prescription drug called CalmX that had helped many of her patients overcome their anxiety disorders. The manufacturer of CalmX had warned all prescribing doctors about its side effect, which caused "extreme flatulence" when patients consumed a rare imported cheese while using the drug. The manufacturer's instructions that accompanied the drug did not warn consumers about this side effect because it was extremely rare. The politician successfully took CalmX during the campaign tour. However, on the day of a critical televised debate, he consumed a large amount of the rare imported cheese. As a result, the politician experienced extreme flatulence during the debate. The video of the debate went viral and caused him to lose the election. The politician has brought a strict products liability action against the manufacturer of CalmX. Is the politician likely to prevail? A. No, because CalmX's side effect is extremely rare. B. No, because the manufacturer informed prescribing doctors about CalmX's side effect. C. Yes, because the manufacturer did not directly warn the politician about CalmX's side effect. D. Yes, because the manufacturer is strictly liable for any harm caused by CalmX.

B. No, because the manufacturer informed prescribing doctors about CalmX's side effect. *Under the learned-intermediary rule, a manufacturer of a prescription drug or medical device will not be held strictly liable for inadequate warnings or instructions if the manufacturer warned the prescribing physician about the risk of harm associated with that product.*

The owner of an abandoned building knew that many persons experiencing homelessness stayed in the building for shelter. Because he sympathized with their plight, the owner decided not to have the homeless removed from the building and left it in its current state because he had no plans to remodel it. Despite knowing that the building had dilapidated, rotting, and uneven floors, the owner never posted signs or informed those who stayed in the building about its uneven floors. A man experiencing homelessness who tripped on an uneven floor and sprained his ankle brought suit against the owner to recover damages for his injury. In his defense, the owner argues that he had no obligation to take action to provide a safe environment to the man. The jurisdiction has abolished traditional rules of landowner liability. Will the owner's defense likely be successful? A. No, because the owner did not prohibit trespassers from entering the building. B. No, because the owner had a duty to protect the man from unsafe conditions. C. Yes, because the floors did not involve a risk of serious harm or death. D. Yes, because the owner did not have a duty to protect trespassers.

B. No, because the owner had a duty to protect the man from unsafe conditions. *Under the modern approach to land-possessor liability, land possessors owe a duty of reasonable care to all land entrants (except flagrant trespassers).* **Here, the man was a trespasser because he intentionally entered the building without the owner's permission. However, the man was not a flagrant trespasser because he entered the building to seek shelter—not commit a crime. And since the owner knew that the building's floors were dilapidated, the risk of injury to the man was foreseeable. As a result, the owner owed a duty to protect the man (and other trespassers) from the building's unsafe conditions, so the owner's defense will likely be unsuccessful.**

A celebrity and her neighbor were constantly arguing over the celebrity's dog, which incessantly barked during the day when the celebrity was not home. One afternoon, the celebrity was followed by paparazzi while she walked her dog. When she returned from her walk, the neighbor came out of his house and screamed at her, "You abuse your dog; that's the only reason she would bark all day like that!" A paparazzo broadcast a video of the incident on his celebrity gossip website with the following headline: "Celebrity accused by neighbor of animal abuse." The broadcast caused the celebrity severe emotional distress. If the celebrity sues the paparazzo for intentional infliction of emotional distress, will the celebrity likely prevail? A. No, because the celebrity did not suffer any physical harm from the video broadcast. B. No, because the paparazzo did not act with actual malice. C. Yes, because the celebrity suffered severe emotional distress after the video was broadcast. D. Yes, because the neighbor's conduct was extreme and outrageous.

B. No, because the paparazzo did not act with actual malice. *A public figure may recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on the defendant's publication if the defendant (1) acted in an extreme and outrageous manner, (2) intentionally or recklessly caused the public figure severe emotional distress, and (3) published a false statement of fact with actual malice.* **IIED requires that the plaintiff suffer severe emotional distress—not physical harm. Therefore, the celebrity can prevail on her IIED claim even though she did not suffer any physical harm.**

The plaintiff, while driving his car, had been stopped at a red light at a busy intersection for approximately 15 seconds when he was struck from behind by a speeding taxicab. The plaintiff did not see the taxicab coming toward him in his mirrors because he had been looking down to send a text message. The jurisdiction where the accident took place, which is a contributory negligence jurisdiction, has enacted a statute prohibiting drivers from texting while driving. The statute was enacted after a study showed that most car accidents in the jurisdiction were caused by driving while texting. The plaintiff brings suit against the taxicab driver for damages for injuries resulting from the accident. The taxicab driver asserts the defense of contributory negligence, arguing that because the plaintiff was texting in violation of the statute, he was negligent per se. Is the contributory negligence defense likely to be successful? A. No, because the taxicab driver was not in the class of people the statute was designed to protect. B. No, because the plaintiff's own negligence was not the cause of the accident. C. Yes, because car accidents are the type of harm that the statute is meant to prevent. D. Yes, because the plaintiff's own negligence, however slight, is a complete bar to recovery.

B. No, because the plaintiff's own negligence was not the cause of the accident. *In traditional contributory negligence jurisdictions, a plaintiff's failure to use reasonable care for his/her own safety is a complete defense to negligence. The defendant can establish the plaintiff's negligence under the doctrine of negligence per se, but still must prove that the plaintiff's negligence proximately caused the plaintiff's harm.* **(Choice D) The plaintiff's own negligence, however slight, is a complete bar to recovery—as long as that negligence caused the plaintiff's injuries. Since the plaintiff's negligent texting did not cause the accident (the speeding taxicab did), the plaintiff's negligence does not bar his recovery.**

A woman consulted with a plastic surgeon about liposuction treatment. The surgeon reviewed with the woman the cost, procedure, and risks associated with liposuction. However, the surgeon did not tell the woman that many patients who undergo liposuction feel numbness in the treated area for several months after treatment. After obtaining the woman's consent, the surgeon successfully performed the liposuction. The woman suffered no numbness or other physical harm due to the liposuction. However, when the woman learned of the risk of numbness associated with liposuction, she was outraged that the surgeon had failed to disclose this information to her. The woman would have refused the operation had she been informed of the risk. If the woman files a negligence suit against the surgeon, will the woman likely prevail? A. No, because the surgeon did not breach his standard of care. B. No, because the surgeon's conduct did not cause the woman physical harm. C. Yes, because the surgeon failed to disclose the risk of numbness following the procedure. D. Yes, because the surgeon was the proximate cause of the woman's outrage.

B. No, because the surgeon's conduct did not cause the woman physical harm. *Under the informed-consent doctrine, a physician who fails to disclose the risks of a medical treatment or procedure to a patient is liable for negligence if (1) the failure to disclose caused the patient to consent and (2) the undisclosed risk materialized and resulted in physical harm.*

Late one night, a 25-year-old woman climbed over her next-door neighbor's fence to get a look at a new deck that the neighbor had recently built. The neighbor was on vacation and unaware that the woman was on his property. After climbing over the neighbor's fence, the woman tripped and fell on leftover lumber that the neighbor's builder had left in some tall grass after building the deck. The neighbor was aware that the builder had placed the lumber in the grass, but the neighbor had placed no warning sign in the area. The woman broke her ankle and filed a negligence action against the neighbor seeking damages. Does the woman have a valid claim for negligence against her neighbor? A. No, because the neighbor did not create the artificial condition. B. No, because the woman was a trespasser. C. Yes, because the neighbor owes trespassers a duty to warn of hidden dangers. D. Yes, because the woman suffered an injury caused by an artificial condition.

B. No, because the woman was a trespasser. *A land possessor owes a duty of reasonable care to foreseeable land entrants. But no such duty is owed to unforeseeable land entrants (e.g., undiscovered or unanticipated trespassers).* **Land possessors must warn known or anticipated trespassers about hidden, artificial dangers on the land of which the land possessor is aware. Although the neighbor did not create the artificial condition, he would have owed the woman a duty to warn her about the hidden lumber had she been a foreseeable entrant. But since the woman was an undiscovered and unanticipated trespasser, the neighbor owed her no duty.**

A pool cleaner at a country club used chlorine purchased from a company to kill the harmful bacteria that grew in his customers' pools. The company sold its chlorine in plastic containers with plastic screw-tops. The containers had a warning that stated, "Caution: Chlorine," but the warning did not specifically state that chlorine fumes were harmful if inhaled. The label also warned that the containers may leak if not stored upright. Despite the warning, the pool cleaner haphazardly stacked the containers on their sides and stored them in a small shed. A maintenance worker assigned to organize the shed sustained injuries after inhaling excess fumes that had built up in the shed from the leaking containers. The maintenance worker filed suit against the company under a theory of strict products liability. At trial, the company established that a completely leak-free container for the chlorine was too expensive to manufacture and that an ordinary user of its product would be aware of the dangers of chlorine fumes, without an additional warning. The jurisdiction applies the risk-utility test to determine whether a design defect exists. Is the maintenance worker likely to succeed on his claim? A. No, because the maintenance worker was not the appropriate plaintiff to bring this action. B. No, because there was no economically feasible alternative design for the containers. C. Yes, because the pool cleaner's negligence contributed to the maintenance worker's injury. D. Yes, because the warning label did not warn of the dangers of chlorine fumes.

B. No, because there was no economically feasible alternative design for the containers. *Under the risk-utility test, a product is defectively designed if (1) the design creates a foreseeable risk of physical harm and (2) that risk could have been mitigated by a reasonable alternative design—e.g., a safer design available at a reasonable cost.* **Commercial suppliers may be strictly liable for not providing adequate warnings about a product's risk of harm—but only if that risk was not obvious to an ordinary user. Here, the company established that an ordinary user of its containers would be aware of the dangers of chlorine fumes. Therefore, a failure-to-warn claim would likely fail.**

An acrobat went to a chiropractor when he pinched a nerve in his neck while practicing an acrobatic routine. The chiropractor had the acrobat lie down on a custom-made chiropractic table. The table could be tilted such that the acrobat was angled with his head toward the floor, allowing the chiropractor deeper access to the acrobat's neck muscles. During the session, the table malfunctioned due to a manufacturing defect and tilted all the way down, causing the acrobat to bang his head on the floor. The chiropractor attempted to adjust the table to return it to an upright position, but the table malfunctioned again and wrenched the chiropractor's shoulder, causing serious injury. If the chiropractor brings a strict liability action against the manufacturer of the table to recover damages for her injury, who will likely prevail? A. The chiropractor, because she was within the zone of danger of a threatened physical impact. B. The chiropractor, because the chiropractic table was used for its intended purpose. C. The manufacturer, because the chiropractor is not the proper plaintiff for this action. D. The manufacturer, because the chiropractor's injury did not occur in a reasonably foreseeable way.

B. The chiropractor, because the chiropractic table was used for its intended purpose. *A commercial seller is subject to strict products liability when (1) a defective product harms a foreseeable plaintiff when it was used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable way and (2) the defect existed at the time the product left the commercial seller's control.* **The chiropractor is a proper plaintiff in this action since it was foreseeable that she would likely suffer harm if the table malfunctioned during a session with one of her clients.**

A vending machine company contacted a manufacturer about leasing space in the manufacturer's employee lunchroom for the company's vending machines. The company was unaware that the manufacturer had entered into a similar lease with a competitor, and the company offered the manufacturer terms that were much more favorable than the competitor's terms. As a result, the manufacturer breached its oral two-year contract with the competitor and entered into a contract with the company. Upon learning of the manufacturer's action, the competitor sued the company for intentional interference with a contract. Which party will likely prevail? A. The company, because it enjoys an absolute privilege to compete. B. The company, because it was unaware of the competitor's dealings with the manufacturer. C. The competitor, because its contract with the manufacturer was unenforceable. D. The competitor, because the manufacturer breached its contract with the competitor.

B. The company, because it was unaware of the competitor's dealings with the manufacturer. *Intentional interference with a contract requires proof that (1) a valid contract existed between the plaintiff and a third party, (2) the defendant knew of that contractual relationship, (3) the defendant intentionally and improperly interfered with the contract's performance, and (4) that interference caused the plaintiff pecuniary loss.* **A defendant usually interferes with a contract by inducing a third party to breach its contract with the plaintiff. And though the company induced the manufacturer to breach its contract with the competitor, the company's interference was not intentional. Therefore, the competitor will not prevail.**

An on-duty firefighter responded to a 911 call from a tenant about a fire in his apartment. The fire was caused by the tenant when he fell asleep while smoking a cigarette in his bed. The firefighter who responded to the tenant's call injured her ankle when she slipped and fell on a defective walkway outside the apartment building. The maintenance of the walkway was the responsibility of the apartment building owner, who knew the walkway needed to be repaired. Despite her ankle injury, the firefighter entered the tenant's apartment to extinguish the fire, where she was further injured when a section of the apartment wall that was burned by the fire fell on her. If the firefighter files an action for negligence against the tenant and the owner, which of the following best describes the likely outcome? A. The firefighter can recover from the owner or the tenant. B. The firefighter can recover from the owner, but not the tenant. C. The firefighter can recover from tenant, but not the owner. D. The firefighter cannot recover from the owner or the tenant.

B. The firefighter can recover from the owner, but not the tenant. *Under the firefighter's rule, professional rescuers are barred from recovering in negligence for harm that resulted from the special dangers of their jobs. But that rule does not bar professional rescuers from recovering for harm that resulted from a land possessor's failure to warn them about concealed dangers known to the land possessor.*

A manufacturer of hot water heaters contacted a supplier of a new type of plastic resin about using the resin to line the water heaters. The supplier gave the manufacturer technical advice about how to mold the resin lining for the hot water tank. The supplier told the manufacturer that, in order to withstand the temperatures specified by the manufacturer, the resin would need to be at least one-inch thick. The manufacturer ordered the resin from the supplier but made the liner for the hot water tanks only one-half-inch thick using the supplier's resin. A plumber purchased a hot water heater made by the manufacturer from a local plumbing supply store and installed it in a homeowner's residence. The homeowner used the tank for a short time during which, due solely to the lining of the tank being too thin, the tank melted, allowing the chlorine and flouride in the water to come in contact with and corrode the metal tank. One day, as a consequence of the compromised tank, scalding water burst out of the tank, causing the homeowner to suffer severe burns as he tried to shut off the tank and substantial property damage when he was unable to do so. The homeowner initiated a strict products liability action against the manufacturer of the water tank, the resin supplier, and the local plumbing store for damages suffered as a consequence of the melted hot water tank. The manufacturer of the water tank admitted liability and settled with the homeowner. Of the remaining parties, which is likely to be held liable for the homeowner's injuries and property damage? A. Both the store and the supplier. B. The store only. C. The supplier only. D. Neither the store nor the supplier.

B. The store only. *The commercial supplier of a component that is integrated into a defective product is subject to strict liability when (1) the component is defective or (2) the supplier substantially participated in the process of integrating the component into the product's design and the component's integration caused that product to be defective.* **Strict liability is imposed even if the commercial seller did not create or know about that defect. Here, the hot water heater tank's thin lining caused the tank to corrode, which allowed scalding water to burst out of it. The homeowner suffered injuries and damage to his property when he attempted but failed to shut off the tank. Although the store neither created nor knew about this manufacturing defect, it existed at the time the store sold the water heater to the plumber for installation in the homeowner's residence. Therefore, the store is likely to be held liable for the homeowner's injuries and property damage.**

A musician's brother borrowed the musician's electric guitar. The brother told the musician that he was going to use it the next day to teach the children in his second-grade class about different musical instruments. Instead, the brother went to a rowdy bar that evening and played the electric guitar with his rock band all night long. A drunk bar patron got on stage during one of the songs, grabbed the guitar from the brother, and smashed it against the ground. The brother took the guitar to a repair shop the next day and was told that it would cost $750 to restore the guitar to its original condition. At the time of the incident, the guitar was worth $1,500. The musician asserts a claim against his brother for conversion. What is the musician entitled to recover? A. Nothing. B. $750. C. $1,500. D. $1,500 plus damages for loss of use.

C. $1,500. *A defendant who has permission to use the plaintiff's chattel commits conversion when he/she (1) intentionally uses the chattel in a way that exceeds the scope of permission and (2) seriously violates the plaintiff's right to control the chattel. The defendant is liable for the fair market value of the chattel at the time of the conversion.* **Trespass to chattels v. conversion** Trespass to chattels: (1) Minor intentional interference with plaintiff's right to control chattel; (2) Liable for actual damages -- e.g., cost of repairs, loss of use. Conversion: (1) Substantial intentional interference with plaintiff's right to control chattel; (2) Liable for fair market value of chattel at time of conversion. ***Conversion is an intentional exertion of dominion or control over the plaintiff's chattel that so seriously interferes with the plaintiff's ownership rights that the defendant is liable for the fair market value of the chattel at the time of the conversion. -> A defendant who initially uses the plaintiff's chattel with permission commits conversion when the defendant: (1) intentionally uses the chattel in a manner that exceeds the scope of permission; AND (2) seriously violates the plaintiff''s right to control the chattel. ****Choices B and D are incorrect because the musician sued for conversion; he can recover the fair market value of the guitar.****

Two drivers, a man and a woman, were each texting while they were driving on a highway. Not paying attention, they accidentally slammed their cars into each other, causing significant injuries to the man. The man sued the woman for negligence. At trial, after hearing the evidence from both sides, the jury concluded that the man was 30 percent negligent and the woman was 70 percent negligent in the accident. If the jurisdiction has adopted pure comparative negligence and the jury determined that the man had $1,000,000 in damages, what will the man recover in his suit against the woman? A. Nothing. B. $300,000. C. $700,000. D. $1,000,000.

C. $700,000. *In a pure comparative-negligence jurisdiction, the total amount of damages that the plaintiff can recover is reduced by his/her share of the fault.*

A plaintiff purchased a new car from a car dealer. A computer chip in the engine of the car had been defectively manufactured, such that the plaintiff lost control of the car, causing the plaintiff to suffer injuries. Several entities were involved in the process through which the defective chip ended up in the plaintiff's car. The defective computer chip was manufactured by a component company and then purchased by an engine builder. The engine builder then incorporated the chip into the engine and sold the engine to a car manufacturer. The car manufacturer then incorporated the engine into the car and sold the car to the car dealer. The plaintiff brought an action for strict products liability against the component company, the engine builder, the car manufacturer, and the car dealer. From whom can the plaintiff recover for his injuries? A. The car dealer only, because the plaintiff was not in privity with the other parties. B. Any of the parties who had negligently failed to inspect the product. C. Any of the parties, regardless of whether the party was negligent. D. The component company only, because the component company is the party that manufactured the defective chip.

C. Any of the parties, regardless of whether the party was negligent. *Strict products liability is imposed on any commercial seller in the chain of distribution if (1) the commercial seller's product contained a defect when it left the commercial seller's control and (2) that defect caused the plaintiff harm.* **(Choice B) Since strict liability is imposed without proof of the defendant's culpability, any party in the chain of distribution is strictly liable regardless of whether it could have discovered the defect by a reasonable inspection of the computer chip.**

A consumer bought a can of chicken soup from her neighborhood grocery store. The soup was manufactured by a large food company. Approximately two weeks later, the consumer's son ate the soup and soon became violently ill. At the hospital, the attending physician diagnosed the illness as botulism poisoning, a serious disease that can arise from defects in the manufacturing process of canned foods or be brought on after manufacturing through temperature fluctuations in storage of the canned foods. Tests later confirmed that the can of soup was tainted with botulinum bacteria. The consumer sued the large food company for negligence on behalf of her son. At trial, she produced no direct evidence of negligence on the part of the food company, but invoked the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to prove liability. The applicable jurisdiction has adopted a traditional standard for res ipsa loquitur and a comparative-negligence standard. The food company filed a motion for a directed verdict. How should the trial judge rule on the motion? A. Deny the motion, because canned goods do not contain bacteria in the absence of negligence. B. Deny the motion, because the food company was along the chain of distribution. C. Grant the motion, because there is no evidence that the food company was negligent. D. Grant the motion, because the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has been abolished in comparative-negligence jurisdictions.

C. Grant the motion, because there is no evidence that the food company was negligent. *Under the traditional standard for res ipsa loquitur, negligence is inferred if (1) the plaintiff's harm would not normally occur unless someone was negligent, (2) the defendant had exclusive control over the thing that caused the harm, and (3) the plaintiff did nothing to cause the harm.* **Here, the son was poisoned with botulism after he ate a can of soup manufactured by the food company. Although soup is not normally tainted with botulism absent negligence, the company did not have exclusive control over the defective can. The grocery store and the consumer both possessed it after manufacturing, when improper storage could have caused botulism. Therefore, the company's negligence cannot be inferred (Choice A). And since there is no evidence that the company was negligent, it should be granted a directed verdict.**

A plaintiff is a candidate for state treasurer. The defendant has a long-standing grudge against the plaintiff. In an effort to dig up dirt on the plaintiff, the defendant hacked into the plaintiff's personal email account and discovered emails that contained lewd pictures of the plaintiff engaging in sexual conduct with a former staff member, taken while the plaintiff was married. The defendant called the plaintiff on the phone and said to the plaintiff, "I hate you. I have always hated you. I just emailed your wife and your two top advisors, telling them that you are an adulterer. And tomorrow, I am going to drive over to your house and punch you right in the nose." The plaintiff later confirmed that the defendant had emailed his wife and two top advisors to inform them that the plaintiff had committed adultery. Under which of the following tort doctrines will the plaintiff be likely to recover? A. Assault. B. Defamation. C. Intrusion upon seclusion. D. Public disclosure of private facts.

C. Intrusion upon seclusion. *Intrusion upon seclusion (a type of invasion of privacy) occurs when the defendant intentionally intrudes on the plaintiff's private affairs in a manner that would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.* **Truth is a complete defense to defamation. Since the defendant's statement in the email to the plaintiff's wife and advisors was true, the plaintiff cannot recover for defamation.**

A shopper was a frequent customer of a local handbag store. One afternoon, the shopper went into the store, carrying a handbag she had purchased from the manufacturer's online site two weeks earlier. The shopper set her handbag on one of the store's merchandise racks and then looked around the store. After she was finished looking around the store, the shopper retrieved her handbag from the merchandise rack and proceeded to leave. The store's security guard, who had observed the shopper pick up the handbag, stopped her and discreetly asked if she had purchased the handbag from the store. When the shopper replied that she had not, the guard indicated that he would have to call the police if she did not follow him to the back of the store. The guard took the shopper to a locked office where he detained her for 10 minutes while he reviewed the store's security camera footage. After determining that the shopper had entered the store with the handbag, the guard released her. If the shopper sues the guard for false imprisonment, is she likely to prevail? A. Yes, because she had no reasonable means of escape. B. Yes, because the confinement resulted from an improper threat. C. No, because the time and manner of the detention were reasonable given the guard's reasonable belief that the shopper was shoplifting. D. No, because she suffered no actual or physical injury as a result of her confinement.

C. No, because the time and manner of the detention were reasonable given the guard's reasonable belief that the shopper was shoplifting. *Under the shopkeeper's privilege, the defendant is not liable for false imprisonment when the defendant (1) reasonably believed that the plaintiff was shoplifting and (2) detained the plaintiff for a reasonable amount of time and in a reasonable manner to investigate the facts.*

The owner of a bed-and-breakfast catered to wealthy city residents hoping to get some rest near the beach. His bed-and-breakfast had doors and windows that opened out directly onto the beach. On a busy holiday weekend, a guest at the bed-and-breakfast threw a party during which he fell out of a second-story window onto the sand below. His injuries were minor, but he filed suit against the owner, alleging that the owner was negligent in allowing the window to fully open on an upper-level floor. During the proceedings, the guest provided evidence that within that same beach town, there were six bed-and-breakfasts, and all of them contained locks on their upper-level windows preventing them from opening more than four inches, although there was no statute requiring this precaution. The owner countered with evidence that no other guest had ever fallen out of a window, and that the windows had recently been inspected and given a positive safety rating. The guest then moved for judgment as a matter of law. In a jurisdiction that has abolished the traditional rules of innkeeper liability, is the court likely to grant the guest's motion? A. Yes, because the owner allowed the windows to open wide enough for a guest to fall through. B. Yes, because other bed-and-breakfasts in the area did not allow windows to open more than four inches. C. No, because the windows were recently inspected and noted to be safe. D. No, because there was no statute requiring window locks.

C. No, because the windows were recently inspected and noted to be safe. *In most jurisdictions, an innkeeper owes a duty to use ordinary care to protect its guests while they are on the premises. Evidence that the innkeeper complied with (or deviated from) community or industry custom is relevant to—but not conclusive on—the issue of negligence.* **(Choice D) The owner owed a duty to use ordinary care to protect the guest while he was on the premises—regardless of whether there was a statute requiring window locks.** ***To determine whether a defendant has used ordinary care, the trier of fact (e.g., the jury) may consider all relevant factors—including compliance with community or industry custom. But compliance with (or deviation from) custom is not conclusive on the issue of negligence. That is because custom is merely one factor considered by the fact finder to determine whether the defendant acted as a reasonably prudent person.*** ****Here, the guest produced evidence that the other bed-and-breakfasts in town had locks on their upper-level windows to prevent them from fully opening. Although this was the area's custom, the owner's failure to follow it did not conclusively establish his negligence—especially since his windows had been recently inspected and received a positive safety rating (Choice B).****

A plaintiff was injured when a roller coaster she was riding at an amusement park ran off the rails and crashed. After conducting a thorough investigation of the accident, the plaintiff was unable to determine what had caused the accident, but she did learn that the amusement park had failed to register with the county tax commission as required by state law. Which of the following would be the strongest basis for the plaintiff's tort claim? A. Negligence per se. B. Public nuisance. C. Res ipsa loquitur. D. Strict products liability.

C. Res ipsa loquitur. *Res ipsa loquitur permits an inference of negligence when the plaintiff's harm was the type usually caused by negligence and evidence tends to eliminate other potential causes of that harm.*

A professional football player was one of the most popular and well-known athletes on television. He regularly appeared in commercials endorsing sports equipment, cars, and performance-enhancing vitamins. After a recent drug test was administered to all professional football players, the football player's test results were leaked to the public by an unknown source. The results showed that he tested positive for illegal performance-enhancing drugs. A local political activist, who campaigned against professional football players because she believed all of them used illegal drugs, stated in a televised interview that the leaked results showed that the football player was an "illicit drug user who will be suspended from playing professional football." A few days later, the drug-testing facility announced that it had mistakenly reported the football player's test results and that he had not actually tested positive for the use of illegal drugs. By that time, however, the football player had already lost a number of lucrative advertising contracts. If the football player sues the activist for defamation, who will prevail? A. The football player, because the activist believed that all professional football players used illegal drugs. B. The football player, because he did not test positive for the use of illegal performance-enhancing drugs. C. The activist, because the professional football player is a public figure. D. The activist, because she was not the proximate cause of the damage to the football player's reputation.

C. The activist, because the professional football player is a public figure. *A plaintiff who is public figure or official can recover for defamation only if the plaintiff proves that the defendant made a false statement about the plaintiff with actual malice—i.e., with knowledge or reckless disregard of the statement's falsity.* **Defamation: If Plaintiff is a private person -> Defendant must act with (1) knowledge that statement is false; OR (2) negligent disregard for its falsity. If Plaintiff is a public figure (eg, celebrity, social activist) OR public official (eg., congressperson, governor) -> Defendant must act with malice (1) knowledge that statement is false; OR (2) reckless disregard for its falsity.**

While his trial was in recess, an attorney went to grab a cup of coffee from a stall located outside of the courthouse building. While exiting the building, the attorney walked past an elevator and noticed a woman whose foot was stuck in the elevator doors. As he walked past her, the woman begged for him to get help because the elevator doors were stuck and she was in pain. Despite the woman's pleas, the attorney continued on his way to the coffee stall and did not contact anyone to assist her. The woman has filed a negligence claim against the attorney for the injuries she sustained as a result of her foot being stuck in the elevator doors. It was determined that the woman suffered a broken leg because she did not receive immediate assistance. Which of the following statements most accurately describes the attorney's liability? A. The attorney is liable because he assumed a duty to act with reasonable care. B. The attorney is liable because his failure to get help for the woman was unreasonable. C. The attorney is not liable because he did not have a duty to act. D. The attorney is not liable because the woman assumed the risk of riding the elevator.

C. The attorney is not liable because he did not have a duty to act. *Although a defendant generally has no affirmative duty to act, such a duty arises when (1) the defendant's conduct created a foreseeable risk of harm to the plaintiff or (2) the defendant and the plaintiff share a special relationship.*

A man was playing a round of golf at a miniature golf course. On the 13th hole, the man noticed that the golf course was developing a new hole that included a giant mechanical shark's jaws over a water pond. The new hole was marked off with a fence and a sign that stated, "Danger! Site Under Construction: Authorized Personnel Only." Curious to see the new hole, the man ignored the sign and climbed over the fence. The course manager happened to see the man enter the prohibited area on his security camera. Knowing that the electrical work for the new hole was incomplete and that the concealed live electrical wires made the construction site unsafe, the manager immediately went over to the new hole. The manager called over the fence and told the man to "come back here and don't touch anything!" When the man ignored the manager's command and reached down under the shark's jaws to touch the water pond, he received severe electrical burns due to a stray wire that was touching the water. The man sued the golf course for negligence to recover damages for his electrical burns. The jurisdiction applies the traditional rules of landowner liability. Who will likely prevail? A. The golf course, because the man was a trespasser on the new hole. B. The golf course, because the manager commanded the man to leave the construction site. C. The man, because the golf course owed a duty to warn the man about or protect him from the live electrical wires. D. The man, because the live electrical wires were defective.

C. The man, because the golf course owed a duty to warn the man about or protect him from the live electrical wires. *A land possessor owes a duty to known or anticipated trespassers to (1) warn them about, or protect them from, hidden, artificial dangers that are known to the land possessor but unlikely to be discovered by trespassers and (2) use reasonable care in activities conducted on the land.* **Although the manager commanded the man to leave the construction site, that did not satisfy the duty to use reasonable care since the manager merely warned the man about trespassing—not the concealed electrical wires.**

A motorcyclist traveling along a hilly road through the woods at dusk experienced sudden engine trouble. He stopped his motorcycle in the middle of the road and, as he was unable to get it started again, left it there and walked to find assistance. Two drivers, who were approaching the motorcycle from opposite sides of the road, failed to see the motorcycle because the motorcyclist had neglected to turn on his hazard lights and neither car's automatic headlights had come on. As a result, both drivers simultaneously clipped the motorcycle, causing damage so significant that the motorcycle was totaled. The motorcyclist subsequently filed a negligence action against the two drivers to recover damages for the loss of his motorcycle, which had been damaged beyond repair. At trial, it was established that both drivers had failed to act as reasonably prudent persons under the circumstances because their headlights were off. It was also established that the impact of either car alone would have been sufficient to total the motorcycle and that the motorcycle would have been visible to both drivers if its hazard lights had been turned on. Is the motorcyclist likely to recover damages from the drivers? A. No, because neither driver's conduct was the "but for" cause of the motorcyclist's damages. B. No, because the motorcyclist's contributory negligence is a complete bar to recovery. C. Yes, because each driver's conduct was a substantial factor in causing the motorcyclist's damages. D. Yes, because the drivers had the last clear chance to avoid the motorcyclist's harm.

C. Yes, because each driver's conduct was a substantial factor in causing the motorcyclist's damages. *Where multiple forces combined to cause the plaintiff's harm and any one alone would have been sufficient to cause the harm, the test for actual causation is whether the defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in causing the harm.* **A negligence action requires proof that the defendant's conduct was the actual cause (i.e., cause in fact) of the plaintiff's damages. This is often established under the but-for test, which is satisfied if the plaintiff's harm would not have occurred without the defendant's conduct. However, this test does not apply when multiple forces combined to cause the plaintiff's harm and any one alone would have been sufficient to cause the harm. Instead, the test is whether the defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in causing the harm.**

A woman was riding her valuable racing bike and ran over a nail in the street. The bike developed a flat tire, so the woman negligently left the bike in the middle of the street and went into her garage to get something to patch the tire. A man who was driving down the woman's street saw the bike in the road. Although there was sufficient space for the man to go around the bike, he refused to swerve his car and hit the bike, which destroyed it. The woman has filed a negligence claim against the man in a jurisdiction in which contributory negligence is a bar to recovery. Is the woman permitted to bring a claim for negligence against the man? A. No, because the accident occurred in a contributory-negligence jurisdiction. B. No, because the woman was a direct cause of her own damages. C. Yes, because of the last-clear-chance doctrine. D. Yes, because of the theory of comparative fault.

C. Yes, because of the last-clear-chance doctrine. *In contributory-negligence jurisdictions, the last-clear-chance rule allows a plaintiff to recover despite his/her contributory negligence if the defendant (1) had the last clear chance to avoid the plaintiff's injury and (2) failed to use reasonable care to do so.*

A mechanic at an auto shop accidentally spilled some gasoline in the shop's parking lot and failed to clean it up. A customer walking across the parking lot ignited the gasoline when he accidentally dropped his cigarette lighter onto the ground while trying to light a cigarette. A nearby pedestrian suffered severe burns to her legs as a result of the fire caused by the ignited gasoline. Can the mechanic be held liable for negligence for the harm to the pedestrian? A. No, because the customer's conduct was a superseding cause that cut off the mechanic's liability. B. No, because the mechanic was not the actual cause of the pedestrian's injuries. C. Yes, because the chain of proximate causation was not broken. D. Yes, but only if the customer is unable to be sued.

C. Yes, because the chain of proximate causation was not broken. *Superseding causes—i.e., unforeseeable, intervening acts that occur after the defendant's negligence and contribute to the plaintiff's harm—break the chain of proximate causation. But negligent intervening acts are typically regarded as foreseeable and therefore do not cut off the defendant's liability.* **Negligence requires proof of the following elements: duty, breach, causation, and damages. To prove causation, the plaintiff (the pedestrian) must show that the defendant (the mechanic) was the actual and proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries: Actual (factual) cause - the plaintiff's harm would not have occurred "but for" the defendant's actions. Here, the pedestrian's burns would not have occurred but for the mechanic's failure to clean up the gasoline spilled in the parking lot. Proximate (legal) cause - the plaintiff's harm was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendant's conduct. Here, it was reasonably foreseeable that not cleaning up spilled gasoline could result in it igniting and injuring someone nearby.**

A facility operated an indoor playground consisting of several large rooms that housed equipment, including inflatable slides upon which children can play. In the corner of one of the rooms, the facility stored damaged inflatable slides for repair. Since children played on the damaged inflatable slides in the past, the storage area was cordoned off with a rope and was clearly marked with numerous "DO NOT ENTER" signs. While his father was at the facility's concession stand, an eight-year-old child wandered to the storage area and saw the damaged inflatable slides. The child slipped under the rope and began to play on one of the inflatable slides, which had an attached air tube. The child grabbed the air tube and began to play with it. Because the air tube was connected to an active air machine, the child lost control of it. The air tube struck the child in the face and caused permanent damage to one of his eyes. An action has been brought against the facility on the child's behalf to recover damages for the injury to his eye. In its answer, the facility denies liability for the child's injury because the storage area was cordoned off with a rope and prominently displayed warning signs. Is the child likely to prevail? A. No, because the child entered the storage area without the facility's permission. B. No, because the storage area was cordoned off with a rope and prominently displayed warning signs. C. Yes, because the damaged inflatable slides were an attractive nuisance. D. Yes, because the storage of damaged inflatable slides is abnormally dangerous.

C. Yes, because the damaged inflatable slides were an attractive nuisance. *Under the attractive-nuisance doctrine, land possessors have a duty to protect child trespassers from artificial conditions on their land under certain circumstances. A land possessor that breaches this duty of care and causes the child trespasser physical harm is liable for negligence.*

A large oil company purchased a plot of land in a rural area and erected an oil well in compliance with local zoning codes. Many families living in the surrounding acres could hear the oil well operating loudly at all hours of the day and night. Although the noise from the oil well disturbed the entire neighborhood, only a small for-profit botanical garden nearby suffered economic loss as a result. For years, the garden had drawn most of its customers with a bird-watching hike during the migration period of a rare type of songbird. The persistent sounds of operations at the oil well drove the songbirds to avoid the garden during their migration. The noise from the oil well and the lack of songbirds caused the garden to lose most of its visitors, and it faced bankruptcy as a result. If the garden brings a public nuisance claim against the oil company for damages for its economic loss, is the garden likely to succeed? A. No, because the garden suffered only economic damages without any related personal injury or property damage. B. No, because the oil well was in compliance with the local zoning codes. C. Yes, because the garden suffered harm that was different from the public at large. D. Yes, because the oil company installed the oil well after the garden had established a business.

C. Yes, because the garden suffered harm that was different from the public at large. *A private plaintiff can sue for public nuisance—i.e., an unreasonable interference with a right common to the general public—only if the plaintiff sustained special damage different from that suffered by the public at large.*

An elderly woman living alone in a city was diagnosed with a heart condition that required her to avoid excitable situations. On hearing the news, her grandson told her that he wished he could move closer to help her with housework and errands but that he could not afford the rent. To help the grandson afford to move into her apartment complex, the elderly woman offered to cosign the grandson's lease as a surety. The grandson agreed and moved into the neighboring apartment. Even before his first rental payment was due, the grandson started asking the elderly woman for money to cover his rent and living expenses. When she refused to give him money directly, he began to bang on the adjoining wall of their apartments at all hours of the night, yelling and threatening to move away and leave her to fend for herself if she did not pay his rent. His threats terrified the woman, and her health deteriorated from the nightmares and chronic anxiety she suffered as a result of his abusive conduct. One night when the grandson banged on the wall and yelled that he would stop picking up her prescriptions unless she gave him money, the woman had a heart attack. If the woman files a claim against the grandson for intentional infliction of emotional distress, is she likely to prevail? A. No, because liability for emotional distress does not extend to mere abusive language. B. No, because the woman had a preexisting susceptibility to emotional distress. C. Yes, because the grandson knew about the woman's age and heart condition. D. Yes, because the woman's heart attack satisfies the physical-injury requirement.

C. Yes, because the grandson knew about the woman's age and heart condition. *Intentional infliction of emotional distress requires proof of extreme and outrageous conduct. Abusive language or conduct is more likely to be extreme and outrageous if the defendant knew about and deliberately exploited the plaintiff's heightened susceptibility to emotional distress.* **Severe emotional distress is often accompanied by bodily injury (e.g., heart attack). Although this helps prove that the claimed emotional distress is genuine, recovery for IIED is not limited to cases in which bodily injury occurs.**

A woman wanted to reduce the wrinkles on her face and consulted a dermatologist for advice. The dermatologist prescribed a new prescription cream with a high level of lactic acid. After the woman used the skin cream for two weeks per her dermatologist's instructions and the label on the cream, she developed first-degree burns all over her face. The woman brought a strict products liability claim against the manufacturer of the skin cream under a failure-to-warn theory. At trial, it was revealed that in order to avoid burns, the skin cream must be used in conjunction with a sunscreen with a Sun Protection Factor (SPF) of 40 or higher. The woman only used a sunscreen with an SPF of 25. The SPF requirement was not listed on the skin cream label, and the manufacturer did not directly inform the dermatologist or the woman of the SPF requirement. Will the woman likely succeed in a strict products liability action against the manufacturer? A. No, because the risk of burns was a foreseeable harm that would be obvious to an ordinary user of the skin cream. B. No, because under the learned intermediary rule, the dermatologist is liable for not warning the woman about the need to use sunscreen with a SPF of 40 or higher. C. Yes, because the manufacturer could have avoided the foreseeable and nonobvious risk of burns by providing a warning about the SPF requirement. D. Yes, because the manufacturer had a duty to directly warn the woman of potential problems with the skin cream, and the woman suffered an injury.

C. Yes, because the manufacturer could have avoided the foreseeable and nonobvious risk of burns by providing a warning about the SPF requirement. *To avoid strict products liability, a commercial seller must provide reasonable warnings or instructions regarding any nonobvious, foreseeable risk of harm posed by its product if doing so will reduce that risk. Failure to provide adequate warnings or instructions renders the product defective.*

A patient who was experiencing severe back pain saw his family physician, who prescribed a drug to alleviate the pain. The physician told the patient to call her immediately if he had any problems with the drug. The patient took the drug and experienced an allergic reaction. Despite this reaction, the patient waited two weeks to contact the physician, during which time he continued to take the drug. When the patient called the physician, she ordered him to stop taking the drug immediately. The patient sustained permanent liver damage from taking the drug. The patient sued the physician for negligence. At trial, the patient established that the physician was negligent in prescribing the medication because she did not exhibit the same skill, knowledge, and care as an ordinary practitioner. The physician established that the patient's injuries were significantly exacerbated by the length of time that he took the drug. The jurisdiction recognizes pure comparative negligence. Can the patient prevail in his claim against the physician? A. No, because the patient failed to mitigate his damages by continuing to take the drug after suffering an allergic reaction. B. No, because the patient was required to show that the physician did not exhibit the same skill, knowledge, and care as an ordinary physician with similar experience. C. Yes, because the patient's failure to mitigate his damages does not completely bar him from recovery against the physician. D. Yes, because the physician did not act as a reasonably prudent person would under the circumstances.

C. Yes, because the patient's failure to mitigate his damages does not completely bar him from recovery against the physician. *Under the doctrine of avoidable consequences, the plaintiff's failure to mitigate damages reduces the plaintiff's recovery by the amount of damages that could have been avoided had the plaintiff used reasonable care after the defendant's tort was committed.*

A petting zoo in a city park kept a number of docile goats in a pasture surrounded by a short chain-link fence. The zoo charged one dollar per person to let people enter the pasture and pet the goats. The zoo built a miniature playground of colorful, steep wooden ramps over painted boulders to give the goats obstacles to climb and a stable that looked like a miniature painted castle to house the animals when the petting zoo was closed. Knowing that these features might encourage children to trespass because they looked like a children's playground and that unsupervised children could be seriously injured by playing on the ramps and boulders, the zoo posted "NO TRESPASSING" signs at regular intervals around the perimeter of the fence. One evening, after the petting zoo had closed and the animals were put away, two nine-year-old sisters decided to climb the fence to visit the animals and play on the obstacles. The children scaled the fence quite easily. While one sister was attempting to unlock the castle to release the animals, the other sister climbed one of the wooden ramps. The sister climbing the ramp fell onto one of the boulders and broke her wrist. The sisters' parents subsequently brought a claim for negligence against the petting zoo on behalf of the injured sister. Is this claim likely to succeed? A. No, because land possessors owe no duty to trespassers. B. No, because the goats were safely and reasonably restrained in their castle. C. Yes, because the petting zoo did not exercise reasonable care. D. Yes, because the petting zoo is strictly liable for injuries sustained by visiting children.

C. Yes, because the petting zoo did not exercise reasonable care. *Under the attractive nuisance doctrine, land possessors have a duty to protect child trespassers from artificial conditions on their land under certain circumstances. A land possessor who breaches this duty of care and causes the child trespasser physical harm is liable for negligence.* **Owners or possessors of wild animals or domestic animals with dangerous propensities may be strictly liable for any injuries caused by those animals. But strict liability does not apply in this negligence action.**

A homeowner lived in a residential area and raised several chickens and a rooster in her backyard so that she could have fresh eggs for breakfast every morning. The chickens were kept in a chicken coop, but the rooster was allowed to roam freely within a carefully constructed fenced-in area surrounding the coop. The homeowner had adopted the rooster through an organization that rescues former fighting roosters. When she was around the rooster, the homeowner wore heavy pants and knee boots because the rooster had attacked the back of her legs with sharp talons. One morning when the homeowner opened the fence to gather eggs, the rooster escaped and ran into the front yard, where it attacked the mailman's legs as he attempted to put mail in the homeowner's mailbox. The mailman suffered physical injuries as a result of the rooster's attack. In a suit by the mailman against the homeowner based on strict liability in tort to recover for his injuries, will the mailman likely prevail? A. No, because the homeowner took adequate precautions to secure the rooster. B. No, because the rooster was a domesticated animal. C. Yes, because the rooster had attacked the homeowner in the past. D. Yes, because the rooster was the proximate cause of the mailman's injuries.

C. Yes, because the rooster had attacked the homeowner in the past. *The owner of a domestic animal is strictly liable for any physical harm caused by the animal when (1) the owner knew or had reason to know about the animal's dangerous propensities and (2) the plaintiff's harm arose from those dangerous propensities.*

The stunt double for a famous movie star had tried and failed to start his own acting career for many years. The movie star was known for a signature outfit from which he rarely strayed: a blue leather jacket, white pants, red boots, and a cowboy hat. The stunt double owned the same outfit because, with the movie star's consent, he once posed as the movie star for a picture at a publicity event. Hoping to make a name for himself, the stunt double wore the movie star's signature outfit to a club. At the bar, he pulled his cowboy hat over his face, punched another man in the face, and then yelled obscenities to the paparazzi before fleeing. The paparazzi filmed the entire incident, and the footage appeared on every news and social media outlet. Because everyone believed that the stunt double was the movie star, the movie star's reputation was tarnished by the incident, even after he publicly claimed that he had been impersonated by the stunt double. The controversy made the stunt double incredibly popular, and he subsequently received a few roles in independent movies and on reality television. If the movie star sues the stunt double for misappropriating his right to publicity, is he likely to succeed? A. No, because the movie star consented to the stunt double impersonating him. B. No, because the stunt double did not use the movie star's name or claim to be the movie star. C. Yes, because the stunt double's misappropriation of the movie star's likeness for his own benefit harmed the movie star's reputation. D. Yes, because the stunt double placed the movie star in a false light in the eyes of the public.

C. Yes, because the stunt double's misappropriation of the movie star's likeness for his own benefit harmed the movie star's reputation. *Liability for invasion of privacy based on misappropriation of the right to publicity arises when a defendant (1) uses the plaintiff's name, likeness, or an item closely associated with the plaintiff without authorization, (2) obtains a benefit, and (3) causes the plaintiff an injury.*

A married man abruptly ended an affair with a woman when his wife learned about it. The woman was livid that the man had ended the affair. One night, when the woman knew that the man and his wife were home, the woman rang the home's doorbell. When the man opened the door, the woman attacked him with a baseball bat. Hearing the man's cries for help, the wife contacted the police, who arrived soon thereafter and arrested the woman. The wife suffered severe emotional distress from the attack. If the wife sues the woman for intentional infliction of emotional distress, is the wife likely to prevail? A. No, because the woman's behavior did not rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct. B. No, because transferred intent does not apply to intentional infliction of emotional distress. C. Yes, because the wife suffered severe emotional distress due to the woman's intentional behavior. D. Yes, because the woman's attack placed the wife in the zone of danger.

C. Yes, because the wife suffered severe emotional distress due to the woman's intentional behavior. *A defendant whose extreme and outrageous conduct has harmed a third party may be liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress if (1) the plaintiff contemporaneously perceived that conduct, (2) the plaintiff was closely related to the third party, and (3) the defendant knew of the plaintiff's presence and that relationship.*

An amateur golfer was practicing his swing with a new golf club at a driving range. The golfer's caddy handed the golfer the wrong club, which was longer than the golfer expected. As the golfer took his backswing, he miscalculated how far back to swing the club and accidentally hit the woman in the stall next to him. The woman was standing too close to the barrier that separated them, failing to heed the safety instructions posted by the driving range. The woman sustained $10,000 in resulting medical bills. The woman brought a negligence action against the golfer and the caddy for damages totaling $10,000. The jury determined that the woman was 60% at fault, the golfer was 30% at fault, and the caddy was 10% at fault. In a jurisdiction that follows the doctrine of pure comparative negligence and applies joint and several liability, what is the maximum amount that the woman can recover from the golfer? A. Nothing, because the woman contributed to her own injuries. B. Nothing, because the woman was more at fault than the total combined fault of the defendants. C. $3,000. D. $4,000.

D. $4,000. *Under pure comparative negligence, a negligent plaintiff's recovery is reduced by his/her proportionate share of fault. And if multiple defendants cause the plaintiff indivisible harm, joint and several liability allows the plaintiff to recover the total amount of damages from any defendant.* **Had the jurisdiction adopted contributory negligence, the woman would have recovered nothing because she contributed to her own injuries and was partially at fault for the accident. Had the jurisdiction adopted modified comparative fault, the woman also would have recovered nothing because her fault exceeded 50%, which was more than the total combined fault of the defendants.**

A water skier filed a negligence action for neck injuries he sustained while water skiing against the driver of the boat and the "spotter," the person responsible for informing a boat driver when a water skier falls. At trial, the jury determined that all three parties were negligent. The water skier was 10% at fault for attempting a very difficult move, the driver was 30% at fault for making a sharp turn while the water skier was attempting the move, and the spotter was 60% at fault for not paying attention and failing to inform the driver when the water skier fell into the water. The jurisdiction in which the court is located recognizes pure several liability. The jury awarded the water skier $100,000 in damages. If the water skier only tries to collect from the spotter, what is the most the water skier can recover? A. $90,000, and the spotter can collect $30,000 from the driver. B. $90,000, and the spotter can collect $45,000 from the driver. C. $60,000, and the spotter can collect $30,000 from the driver. D. $60,000, and the spotter cannot collect anything from the driver.

D. $60,000, and the spotter cannot collect anything from the driver. *Under pure comparative negligence, a negligent plaintiff's recovery is reduced by his/her proportionate share of fault. And if multiple defendants cause the plaintiff indivisible harm, several liability limits the plaintiff to recovering from each defendant the portion of damages that corresponds to his/her proportionate share of fault.* **Pure comparative negligence: (default rule on MBE) - when the plaintiff's own negligence contributes to his/her harm, the plaintiff's recovery is reduced by his/her proportionate share of fault. Several liability: when multiple defendants cause the plaintiff indivisible harm, the plaintiff can only recover from each defendant the portion of damages that corresponds to that defendant's proportionate share of fault (e.g., 15% of the damages for 15% of the fault). -> The prompt specifies that we are in a pure several liability jurisdiction.**

A kayaker on a lake did not notice when a boat towing a water skier approached him from behind. As the boat passed the kayaker, the boat driver thought it would be funny to swerve quickly around the kayak, causing a violent wake in that area of the lake that he hoped would knock the water skier into the water. The boat driver quickly turned in front of the kayak, alarming the kayaker and causing a wave that almost flipped the kayak. In attempting to keep his balance, the water skier behind the boat involuntarily struck the back corner of the kayak. The impact, combined with the wake, flipped the kayak. The boat driver saw the incident but did not stop. The kayaker was terrified when his kayak flipped over, and he was trapped under the kayak for a few moments before he was able to free himself. He subsequently had to see a therapist to get over his new fear of water after suffering nightmares from the incident. If the kayaker files suit against the boat driver, for which of the following might the kayaker recover? A. Only intentional infliction of emotional distress. B. Only negligent infliction of emotional distress. C. Battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress. D. Battery and negligent infliction of emotional distress.

D. Battery and negligent infliction of emotional distress. *Under the doctrine of transferred intent, an actor's intent to commit an intentional tort against one person transfers to the actor's commission of (1) a different intentional tort against that same person, (2) the intended tort against a different person, or (3) a different intentional tort against a different person.* **Here, the driver intended to cause harmful contact with the skier by swerving the boat and knocking him into the water (intent to commit battery). Because the driver caused the skier to hit the kayaker (same intentional tort; different person), the driver's initial intent to commit a battery against the skier transferred to the kayaker. Therefore, the kayaker may recover for battery.**

A woman in great pain from a toothache made an emergency appointment with a dentist. The dentist removed her tooth. Later, she returned and the dentist implanted a new tooth. This tooth, which was made from synthetic materials by a dental laboratory, contained a defect. The dentist was unaware of the defect because he failed to exercise reasonable care in examining the tooth before implanting it. Several weeks later, when the woman bit down on an apple, the implanted tooth broke. A piece of the broken tooth caused substantial damage to her mouth. The woman brought a strict products liability action against the dentist. Is the woman likely to prevail? A. Yes, because the dentist did not exercise reasonable care. B. Yes, because the implanted tooth was defective. C. No, because the dentist did not know that the implanted tooth was defective. D. No, because the dentist was a service provider.

D. No, because the dentist was a service provider. *Strict products liability claims can be brought against commercial suppliers or sellers—i.e., those in the business of manufacturing, selling, or otherwise distributing products of the type that harmed the plaintiff. However, service providers are not subject to strict products liability.* **(Choice C) The woman is unlikely to prevail in her strict products liability action against the dentist because he is a service provider—not because he did not know that the implanted tooth was defective.**

A country club hosted a celebrity golf tournament to raise money for a local hospital. The country club had a strict policy of requiring any person not currently engaged in a golf match to stay off the course while a tournament is in session. The country club made an announcement to this effect, adding that entering the course during play could result in serious injury. An adult club member, who was aware of the policy, walked onto the course during a match in order to procure the signature of a famous golf star. While on the course, the member was struck in the head by a golf ball and injured. The jurisdiction applies the traditional rules of landowner liability. In a suit against the country club by the member to recover for his injuries, how will the court likely hold? A. Liable, because the member was a business invitee. B. Liable, because the presence of famous golf stars constituted an attractive nuisance. C. Not liable, because the country club enjoys charitable immunity. D. Not liable, because the country club did not breach its duty to the member.

D. Not liable, because the country club did not breach its duty to the member. *A land possessor owes a duty to known or anticipated trespassers to (1) warn them about hidden, artificial dangers that are known to the land possessor but unlikely to be discovered by trespassers and (2) use reasonable care in active operations.* **Invitees: Inspect for unknown dangers, make safe or warn, & prevent harm from active operations. Licensees: Warn of known latent defects & use reasonable care in active operations. Known or anticipated trespassers: warn of known artificial dangers & use reasonable care in active operations. Unknown or unanticipated trespassers: No duty

A 12-year-old boy had trouble controlling his temper and was prone to violence. The boy and his father attended family therapy together to address the issue, where their therapist stressed the importance of parental supervision while the boy learns to apply new skills for handling anger. As part of his treatment plan, the boy was also required to take medication on a daily basis. The boy's father filled the boy's monthly prescription, but he did not check to make sure that the boy took the pills. The boy soon decided that he did not like taking the medication and stopped taking it entirely. Shortly thereafter, the father dropped the boy off at a bowling alley and drove to meet his coworkers at a nearby bar. While unsupervised at the bowling ally, the boy got into a fight with a man in the next lane and intentionally dropped a bowling ball on the man's foot, resulting in a broken foot. If the man brings a negligence action against the boy's father, who will likely prevail? A. The father, because he did not know that the boy was not taking his medication. B. The father, because the boy intentionally harmed the man. C. The man, because parents are vicariously liable for the torts of their minor children. D. The man, because the father failed to adequately supervise the boy.

D. The man, because the father failed to adequately supervise the boy. *Parents owe a duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent their minor child from causing foreseeable harm to others.* **Parents are generally not vicariously liable for their child's tort unless the child was acting as their agent or a state statute imposes liability on the parents for their child's tortious conduct. Since neither exception applies here, the father is not vicariously liable for the boy's conduct—even though the boy intentionally harmed the man. However, the father is still directly liable for his own negligence.**

A motorcyclist was brought to a local hospital with significant injuries to his leg and spine following a motorcycle accident. The doctor who treated him at the hospital was drowsy and inattentive after an all-night shift in the emergency room. Due to his exhaustion, the doctor poorly set the motorcyclist's leg. The doctor also administered a medication that, although alleviating the pain in the motorcyclist's leg, caused swelling in his spinal column. As a result, the motorcyclist suffered further nerve damage. Even after his leg healed, the motorcyclist suffered from drastically limited mobility due to the nerve damage in his spine. The motorcyclist has brought a medical malpractice action against the doctor to recover personal-injury damages related to his limited mobility. In addition to establishing that the doctor violated the relevant standard of care, what must the motorcyclist establish in order to recover damages for his limited mobility? A. The doctor acted in an outrageous, malicious, or evil manner. B. The motorcyclist did not negligently contribute to his own injuries. C. The motorcyclist had no preexisting conditions that made treatment of his injuries more difficult. D. The motorcyclist would have better mobility but for the doctor's treatment of his injuries.

D. The motorcyclist would have better mobility but for the doctor's treatment of his injuries. *To recover damages in a medical malpractice action, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant's conduct was the actual and proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries. Actual cause exists when the plaintiff's harm would not have occurred but for the defendant's conduct.*

A homeowner owned a cat that had a dangerous propensity to try to attack individuals who attempted to play with it. Although the cat had never injured anyone, the homeowner warned his neighbor not to play with the cat because it had a history of wandering the neighborhood and trying to attack other neighbors. One day, despite the homeowner's best efforts to confine the cat in his home, the cat escaped. When the neighbor walked into her yard and saw the cat sitting there, she attempted to play with it. As a result, the neighbor sustained lacerations on her arms. If the neighbor brings an action in strict liability against the homeowner, which of the following is the homeowner's best defense? A. The animal trespassing on the neighbor's property was a cat. B. The cat had not previously injured anyone. C. The homeowner was not at fault for the cat's escape. D. The neighbor was aware of the cat's dangerous propensities.

D. The neighbor was aware of the cat's dangerous propensities. *Assumption of the risk is a defense to strict liability claims based on injuries caused by wild or abnormally dangerous domestic animals when the plaintiff voluntarily engaged the animal despite knowing of its dangerous propensities.*

A public defender was working on a high-profile involuntary-manslaughter case involving a defendant who hit and killed a pedestrian while driving drunk at night. The public defender had struggled with emotional problems for many years because her husband had also been killed by a drunk driver while he was walking at night. At the close of the case, the defendant was found guilty and given the maximum sentence. The defendant then properly sued the public defender for tortious professional malpractice. Of the following, which is the most appropriate standard of care to apply to determine whether the public defender exercised the proper standard of care when representing the defendant? A. The public defender had a duty to act as a reasonable person in the same situation, taking into account the public defender's emotional state. B. The public defender had a duty to act as a reasonable person of similar intelligence and experience. C. The public defender had a duty to act as a reasonably prudent person under the circumstances. D. The public defender had a duty to act with the same skill, knowledge, and care as another lawyer in the same community.

D. The public defender had a duty to act with the same skill, knowledge, and care as another lawyer in the same community. *Most professionals (e.g., lawyers) are required to demonstrate the same knowledge, skill, and care as a normal member of the profession in a similar community.* *The standard of care generally imposed upon a child, age five or older, is that of a reasonable child of similar age, intelligence, and experience.*

A construction company was using a crane to remove air conditioning equipment from a truck parked on a residential street. The equipment weighed several hundred pounds. A half-block away, the mother of a seven-year-old boy was standing on her front porch, watching her son walk to the school bus stop at the end of the block. As the boy walked past the construction site, the air conditioning equipment fell, landing mere inches away from the boy, who calmly continued walking to his bus. While the boy suffered no ill effects from the incident, his mother, who had a clear view of the incident, immediately fainted after seeing her son so close to certain death. For the next 48 hours, the mother was unable to function due to shock over the event. In the following months, the mother had difficulty sleeping due to nightmares as a result of the incident. On behalf of her son, the mother brought an action against the construction company for negligent infliction of emotional distress and produced evidence at trial conclusively establishing that the construction company was negligent in allowing the air conditioning equipment to fall. Which of the following is the construction company's best defense against this action? A. The construction company's actions were not extreme and outrageous. B. The mother did not suffer a physical impact to her person. C. The mother was outside the zone of danger. D. The son suffered no ill effects.

D. The son suffered no ill effects. *Negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) liability arises under the zone-of-danger theory when (1) the defendant negligently placed the plaintiff at risk of immediate bodily injury and (2) that risk caused the plaintiff serious emotional harm.*

The owner of an apartment complex employed a pest control company as an independent contractor to remove unwanted insects from one of the two buildings in the complex. The pest control company fumigated the building with a toxic gas. Even though the company exercised reasonable care, the gas escaped into the owner's other building, which adjoined the fumigated building, where the gas caused serious illness to a tenant therein. The tenant had received a written advance notice about the fumigation that advised the tenant of the need to vacate his apartment during the hours the fumigation was conducted. The tenant had intended to leave his apartment, but he fell asleep just prior to the fumigation due to a medication he was taking for a medical condition. The applicable jurisdiction treats fumigation as an abnormally dangerous activity and adheres to the rule of contributory negligence. The tenant brought a strict liability action against the owner of the apartment complex to recover damages for his harm. Who will likely prevail? A. The owner, because the fumigation was conducted by an independent contractor. B. The owner, because the pest control company exercised reasonable care. C. The owner, because the tenant's own negligence bars recovery. D. The tenant, because the owner is vicariously liable for the harm that resulted from the fumigation.

D. The tenant, because the owner is vicariously liable for the harm that resulted from the fumigation. *A person who hires an independent contractor is generally not vicariously liable for the independent contractor's torts. However, vicarious liability will be imposed when the person had a nondelegable duty of care—e.g., when the contractor's work involved an abnormally dangerous activity.* **In contributory negligence jurisdictions (including this one), the plaintiff's own negligence is a complete bar to recovery in a negligence action, but it is no defense to strict liability. Therefore, the fact that the tenant's failure to vacate his apartment contributed to his illness does not bar his recovery.**

The defendant purchased a tiger in the hope of achieving his life's ambition of performing in a Las Vegas show. The defendant kept the tiger locked in a cage specifically designed for such animals. Unbeknownst to the defendant, however, there was a manufacturing defect in the cage that caused the lock to spring open. The tiger escaped from the cage and ran onto the defendant's yard, where the plaintiff, a painter hired by the defendant, was on a ladder painting the exterior of the defendant's home. The plaintiff panicked when he saw the tiger, causing him to fall off the ladder. The tiger ran off the property without approaching the plaintiff. The plaintiff sustained significant injuries as the result of his fall. The plaintiff has sued the defendant. At trial, the defendant provided evidence that he exercised reasonable care in containing the tiger. The jurisdiction recognizes the doctrine of contributory negligence. Is the plaintiff likely to prevail at trial? A. No, because the plaintiff's own negligence on the ladder contributed to his injuries. B. No, because the tiger was not a direct cause of the plaintiff's injuries. C. Yes, because the plaintiff was an invitee and was therefore owed the highest duty of care. D. Yes, because the defendant is strictly liable for the plaintiff's injuries.

D. Yes, because the defendant is strictly liable for the plaintiff's injuries. *The owner of a wild animal is strictly liable for harm that is caused by a plaintiff's fearful reaction to the sight of an unrestrained wild animal or directly results from the wild animal's abnormally dangerous characteristics.* **(Choice C) Land possessors generally owe a duty of reasonable care to land entrants, including invitees who enter the land for a business purpose (e.g., to paint the exterior of a home). Here, the defendant exercised reasonable care locking the tiger in a cage specifically designed for such animals. But he is still liable for the plaintiff's injuries since strict liability claims do not require proof of fault.**

During a football game, the plaintiff was severely injured by the defendant, a player on the opposing team, when the defendant ripped off the plaintiff's helmet and intentionally elbowed the plaintiff in the head to obtain possession of the football. The plaintiff brought a battery action seeking compensation from the defendant. During the trial, the defendant introduced evidence demonstrating that all of the players, including the plaintiff, use rough tactics when tackling players on the opposing team to obtain possession of the ball. The plaintiff introduced evidence that intentionally hitting a player once his helmet had been removed was beyond the scope of the game. Will the plaintiff likely prevail in an action for damages against the defendant? A. No, because having used rough tactics during the football game, the plaintiff was estopped from suing. B. No, because the defendant did not intend to cause harmful or offensive contact with the plaintiff. C. Yes, because the defendant intentionally removed the plaintiff's helmet. D. Yes, because the defendant's reckless disregard for the plaintiff's safety exceeded the scope of consent.

D. Yes, because the defendant's reckless disregard for the plaintiff's safety exceeded the scope of consent. *Apparent consent is a defense to battery when consent can be reasonably implied from the plaintiff's conduct or from custom. However, consent is only a defense where the defendant's conduct falls within the scope of the plaintiff's consent.* **Intent is an essential element of battery. But even when the defendant's conduct was clearly intentional, the plaintiff's apparent consent to such conduct is a defense. Therefore, the outcome of this case depends on whether the plaintiff's apparent consent to some rough tactics negated the defendant's liability, making Choice D the better answer.** ***Consent (actual, apparent, or implied) is a defense to battery. Apparent consent exists when a reasonable person would have understood the plaintiff's conduct or custom to indicate consent (e.g., participation in a contact sport).***

Two college roommates were driving back to their dormitory after attending a party. The roommates were in a hurry to return to the dorm because it was late and curfew was approaching. To hasten the trip back, the driver began speeding on a poorly lit stretch of winding road. As the car sped around a tight corner, the car lost its traction on the wet road and crashed into a tree. Although the driver was uninjured in the accident, the passenger sustained multiple fractures to her right arm. The driver called an ambulance and then attempted to place the passenger's arm in a makeshift sling over the passenger's repeated objections. Due to the driver's inexperience, she dislocated the passenger's shoulder and exacerbated her arm injuries in the process. The ambulance arrived shortly thereafter. The passenger subsequently sued the driver for negligence for her injuries. At trial, it was established that the passenger's injuries would have been lessened had the driver waited for the ambulance to care for the passenger's arm. Is the passenger likely to prevail? A. No, because the driver did not owe the passenger a duty to render aid after the car accident. B. No, because the driver is exempt from liability for attempting to render emergency aid. C. Yes, because the driver had a unique relationship with the passenger and, therefore, had a duty to render aid. D. Yes, because the driver was under a duty to prevent further harm when she rendered aid to the passenger.

D. Yes, because the driver was under a duty to prevent further harm when she rendered aid to the passenger. *Although a defendant generally has no affirmative duty to act, such a duty arises when (1) the defendant's conduct creates a foreseeable risk of harm to the plaintiff or (2) the defendant voluntarily aids or rescues the plaintiff. When this occurs, the defendant must use reasonable care to prevent further harm to the plaintiff.*

A man got into an argument with another patron while drunk at a bar. Incensed, the man shoved the patron. The patron picked up a water glass and threw it at the man. The glass narrowly missed the man's head and broke on the floor behind him. The patron then shouted at the man, "You have messed with the wrong person. I have a gun at home, and I'm coming back to kill you." Hearing the patron's words, the man's friend pulled out his revolver and shot the patron, seriously injuring him. The patron filed suit against the friend. Will the friend be held liable for the patron's injuries? A. No, because an individual may use deadly force in the defense of another. B. No, because the friend responded to the threat of deadly force with deadly force. C. Yes, because deadly force is not permitted in the defense of another. D. Yes, because the harm threatened by the patron was not imminent.

D. Yes, because the harm threatened by the patron was not imminent. *A defendant is privileged to use reasonable force in the defense of others when the defendant reasonably believes that (1) the plaintiff is about to inflict harmful or offensive contact upon a third party, (2) the third party has the right of self-defense, and (3) the defendant's action is necessary to protect the third party.*

A hotel owner maintained a patio with an outdoor pool. The area was for hotel patrons' use only, but local residents would frequently sneak in to use the pool at night. The hotel owner knew that residents were using the pool, but the "No Trespassing" sign she posted at the patio's entrance had little effect in deterring trespassers. As winter approached and temperatures dropped at nighttime, the hotel owner installed high-powered heat lamps so that hotel patrons would stay warm when they used the patio furniture by the pool. The hotel owner did not want the heat lamps to distract from the aesthetic beauty of the area, so they were camouflaged by heat-proof plastic plants and installed in very discreet locations so that hotel patrons could not see them in the dark without close inspection. One night, an adult resident who had trespassed onto the patio to access the pool accidentally backed into one of the concealed heat lamps and suffered third-degree burns. Will the resident prevail if he brings a negligence claim against the hotel owner? A. No, because the heat lamps were not an abnormally dangerous condition for a patio. B. No, because the resident was not a hotel patron. C. Yes, because the aesthetic benefit of having the heat lamps hidden does not outweigh the risk of harm. D. Yes, because the heat lamps were a hazard that the resident was not likely to discover.

D. Yes, because the heat lamps were a hazard that the resident was not likely to discover. *A land possessor owes a duty to known or anticipated trespassers to (1) warn them about hidden, artificial dangers that are known to the land possessor but unlikely to be discovered by trespassers and (2) use reasonable care in activities conducted on the land.* **The high-powered heat lamps arguably were an abnormally dangerous condition for the patio because they could not be detected in the dark without close inspection. Regardless, a land possessor still has a duty to warn a trespasser about hidden, artificial conditions—even if they are not abnormally dangerous.**

A yoga instructor, whose yoga license met the highest standards for the yoga profession, established her own studio in a building that abuts a large park. She became so popular that there was a waiting list to attend her classes. A potential student, who could not get into the instructor's class, regularly watched the instructor's lessons from behind a tree in the park adjacent to the studio and mimicked the instructor's movements. The instructor knew of the potential student's activity and was annoyed that he was taking advantage of her classes without paying for them. During a morning class, she explained the situation to her paying students and warned them that she planned to perform silly poses that were not part of the normal lesson in the hope that the potential student would stop observing the class. The instructor asked the paying students not to perform the silly poses because they could result in injury. The potential student mimicked the instructor's silly poses and sustained a serious back injury as a result. The potential student has sued the instructor for negligence. In a jurisdiction that follows the majority view of the duty of care, will the potential student likely prevail? A. No, because the instructor never physically touched or directly spoke to the potential student. B. No, because the potential student was not a paying customer. C. Yes, because the instructor is a licensed professional in her field and, as such, is strictly liable for harm caused in her professional capacity. D. Yes, because the instructor was aware that the potential student was copying her poses, and the resulting harm was foreseeable.

D. Yes, because the instructor was aware that the potential student was copying her poses, and the resulting harm was foreseeable. *Under the majority rule, a duty of care is owed only to persons who might be foreseeably harmed by the defendant's negligent conduct.* **Here, the instructor owed a duty of care to persons who might be foreseeably harmed by her negligent yoga instruction. The potential student was not a paying customer and the instructor had never physically touched or directly spoken to him. However, it was reasonably foreseeable that he would mimic her silly poses (since she knew that he had previously copied her poses) and that he would be harmed thereby (since she knew that the poses could result in injury). Therefore, the potential student will likely prevail.**

A landowner who lived on a steep hill hired a landscaping company to install a retaining wall in his backyard. A week after the wall was installed, it collapsed and damaged the landowner's fence and flower garden. The landowner sued the landscaping company for negligence. At trial, it was established that the retaining wall collapsed because it was negligently installed by an employee of the landscaping company. As a result, the court found the landscaping company vicariously liable for the employee's negligence and issued a judgment in favor of the landowner for $25,000 in damages, which was paid by the landscaping company. There is no indemnification agreement between the employee and the landscaping company. Can the landscaping company successfully bring a suit for damages against the employee? A. No, because the landscaping company negligently supervised the employee. B. No, because there was no indemnification agreement between the landscaping company and the employee. C. Yes, because the employee performed a nondelegable duty. D. Yes, because the landowner recovered a judgment based on vicarious liability.

D. Yes, because the landowner recovered a judgment based on vicarious liability. *An employer who is vicariously liable for a tort committed by its employee may be liable to the plaintiff for the harm caused by the employee's tortious conduct. When the employee's liability has been discharged by the employer, the employer can seek full compensation (i.e., indemnity) from the employee for its loss.*

A gym owns 10 treadmills. Eight of the treadmills are newer, fully functional models while the other two treadmills are older models that abruptly slow down without warning. The gym continues to use the older treadmills due to the high demand for treadmills at the club, and no gym member has been injured using them. While using one of the older treadmills, a gym member's headphones slipped off her head and fell toward the treadmill's belt. The member reached down to grab the headphones to prevent them from getting caught in the belt. As she reached down, the treadmill abruptly slowed down, causing her to slam into the treadmill's handrails and suffer bruised ribs as a result. If the member sues the gym for negligence for her injuries, will the member likely prevail? A. No, because the injury was not caused by the abrupt slowdown. B. No, because the member was not using the treadmill properly. C. Yes, because the gym is strictly liable for her injuries. D. Yes, because the member's bruised ribs were a foreseeable injury.

D. Yes, because the member's bruised ribs were a foreseeable injury. *To prove causation in a negligence action, the plaintiff must show that the defendant's conduct was the actual and proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries. Proximate cause occurs when the plaintiff's harm was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendant's conduct.*

A landowner was having trouble growing the grass in his backyard lawn. After consulting some gardening websites, he purchased a large amount of manure and spread it over his lawn. Whenever the weather was windy, the manure's noxious odor drifted to the neighbor's backyard, which contained a sandbox. To avoid sand getting into her young son's mouth and eyes, the neighbor only allowed her son to play in the sandbox when it was not windy. The neighbor never used her backyard for any other purpose and had not noticed the smell until a visiting friend mentioned it to her. If the neighbor sues the landowner for private nuisance, is she likely to succeed? A. No, because a private nuisance requires a physical invasion of the plaintiff's property. B. No, because the odor never actually interfered with the neighbor's use of her property. C. Yes, because the neighbor suffered harm that was different in kind from that suffered by members of the general public. D. Yes, because the odor would be offensive to a normal, reasonable person in the community.

D. Yes, because the odor would be offensive to a normal, reasonable person in the community. *Private nuisance is a substantial and unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of the plaintiff's property. An interference is substantial if a normal person in the community would find the interference offensive, annoying, or intolerable—even if the plaintiff is not personally bothered by it.* **A private citizen (e.g., the neighbor) has a claim for public nuisance only if he/she suffers a different kind of injury than the general public. But this limitation does not apply to private nuisance actions like the one here.**

Two college students, dressed as robbers for Halloween, were playing hide-and-seek outside of their dormitory. One of the students hid behind a shrub and waited to surprise the other. Before the other student appeared, an elderly woman passed the shrub. The student, hearing footsteps and thinking it was the other student, jumped in front of her and shouted, "Got you!" The elderly woman shrieked and jumped backward. She dropped a bag of groceries but was otherwise unharmed. The woman sued the student for assault. Will the woman prevail in her suit against the student? A. No, because the student did not have the necessary intent to commit a tort. B. No, because the woman sustained no damages that she could collect. C. Yes, because the student's conduct was extreme and outrageous. D. Yes, because the woman was placed in reasonable apprehension of imminent contact.

D. Yes, because the woman was placed in reasonable apprehension of imminent contact. *Under the doctrine of transferred intent, an actor's intent to commit an intentional tort against one person transfers to the actor's commission of (1) a different intentional tort against that same person, (2) the intended tort against a different person, or (3) a different intentional tort against a different person.* **Here, the student intended to frighten the other student by hiding behind a shrub and waiting to surprise him (intent to cause imminent apprehension of contact) (Choice A).* Because the student frightened the woman instead (same intentional tort; different person), the student's intent to commit assault against the other student transferred to the woman.**

A newly retired chemist bought a house in a small but densely populated rural town. The chemist still enjoyed conducting experiments in her spare time. Because the chemist used very strong chemicals, she always experimented with her windows open to keep fresh air circulating in her home. A computer programmer who lived next door to the chemist kept his home office windows open as well because his network of servers and computers generated a lot of heat when he worked. The programmer suffered from a rare disease known as anosmia, which blocked his sense of smell. As a result, the programmer could not smell the unpleasant, but ultimately harmless, fumes when they entered his office after the chemist conducted an experiment. However, visitors to the programmer's home and his neighbors regularly complained about the loathsome smell. Ignoring the issue of damages, could the programmer prevail in a private nuisance action against the chemist? A. No, because the programmer assumed the risk of encountering fumes by keeping his windows open. B. No, because the programmer could not smell the fumes emanating from the chemist's home. C. Yes, because the programmer suffered harm that is different from that suffered by other community members. D. Yes, if the fumes unreasonably interfered with the programmer's use and enjoyment of his home.

D. Yes, if the fumes unreasonably interfered with the programmer's use and enjoyment of his home. *Private nuisance is a substantial and unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of the plaintiff's property. An interference is substantial if a normal person in the community would find the interference offensive, annoying, or intolerable—even if the plaintiff is not personally bothered by it.* **Here, the fumes from the chemist's experiments interfered with the use and enjoyment of the programmer's home by entering his office while he worked. Although the programmer could not smell the fumes, the interference was substantial since a normal person in the densely populated rural town would likely find their smell offensive, annoying, or intolerable, as evidenced by the reactions of his visitors and neighbors (Choice B). Therefore, the programmer will prevail if the interference was also unreasonable.**