US Military Final

What are some of the U.S. military's top shortcomings when it comes to fighting in an urban environment?

Failure to minimize civilian casualties, destruction of historical architecture, and reducing the vulnerability of US soldiers (and collateral damage leads to rise in insurgents)

What are the various goals, in your opinion, of military training? Be able to cite specific elements of training and explain how they might be expected to help achieve one or more of these goals

Fostering unity among recruits Eliminating individuality/selfishness in operations that could harm a mission's objectives Instilling the values of the various military branches Training includes history and recruits also learn branch ethics, like the warrior creed This creed is then reaffirmed and used throughout many parts of the training (for example, in the gas chamber training that marines have to go through) Establishing a baseline of warrior combat fitness and starting the process of teaching basic technical capabilities All Marines have rifle training Basic fitness tests for each branch that must be passed to move on to subsequent phases Addressing systematic issues the military faces Intraforce issues like suicide, substance/alcohol abuse, sexual assault → (attempting to) address these issues through education and training Cultural competency → we've seen in Iraq and Afghanistan the shortage of cultural/language knowledge of many deployments. Training can be used to give these forces a framework and language base to conduct better interactions to "win hearts and minds"

What are the differences between geographic and functional commands?

Geographic commands are responsible for regions of the world, functional commands are in charge of a responsibility of the military like strategy or transportation

How, in your opinion, might increased reliance on contractors affect civil-military Relations?

The military's ability to hire contractors without congressional, presidential, or popular approval sways the balance of control towards the military and away from civilian leadership. This is dangerous considering that the constitution and military doctrine is designed to enforce civilian control over the military, but contractors are a way around that. The military can deploy contractors anywhere in the world, even in countries that the U.S. hasn't declared war with.

What are some shortcomings of attempting to defend ourselves against nuclear missiles by shooting them out of the air?

The nuclear weapons will break apart in the air and nuclear remnants will be scattered across large swaths of land. Air streams would scatter them further. The US might not be aware of a nuclear missile until it is too late to shoot them down. Additionally we cannot be sure that we have the defense capabilities to shoot a fleet of missiles out of the air; requires quick reaction + technological precision that is incredibly advanced

Why do the State Department and other agencies rely on private security contractors for protection instead of the U.S. military?

The military is not large enough to do all these jobs themselves. They can hire contractors for security protection, allowing soldiers to focus on offensive tasks like tracking down enemies. There is also an argument that PMSCs are cheaper than soldiers. This is up for debate.

What are the functions of USNORTHCOM?

partners with DOD to conduct homeland defense, civil support, and security cooperation to defend and support the US and its interests

What is strategy?

Military strategy is a set of ideas implemented by military organizations to pursue desired strategic goals. These ideas and plans, and all the military, economic, social aspects of the plan all ultimately drive toward a political objective

What are some effects that moving to the AVF (All Volunteer Force) has had on military culture in the U.S.

Pro: Tactically effective Passionate individuals (lack of dissent) Con: Increasingly partisan and insular

What are the shortcomings of SHARP training?

There are still huge issues with sexual harassment and sexual assault within ranks Sexual harassment per year: 22 percent of women, 7 percent men Sexual Assault: 5 percent women, close to 5500 reported incidents in 2014 SHARP approaches it with pamphlets, powerpoints, posters, etc., rather than changing the culture In similar vein as non-tolerance for bigotry bc of Equal Opportunity laws, commanders and all ranks of the force need to adopt non-tolerance for sexual harassment/assault issues Harsher penalties for perpetrators

What are the various main rationales for the current UCP (the system of regional and functional commands)? What are some of the most effective criticisms of our command organization?

There is no perfect system but this is the best we can do. Allows people to specialize in certain areas and departments, especially among spec ops. However, it is very bureaucratic and ineffective at times. "Since the end of the cold war, the US government has responded to the changing security and political environment by buying more and larger hammers" - the reading

What types of technological solutions to the problem of urban battle seem, in your opinion, most likely to work and why?

-Opinion-based question, but the point I made in the presentation was that the military is aiming for way too high tech things (like the 2025 Urban Warfighter System that was like an Iron Man suit) but not going for basic tech like foam guns to fill up sewers and tunnels so that people can't come out of them to ambush us. These are what soldiers are actually calling for.

What are the pros and cons of a siege approach to urban warfare?

-Pros: fewer deaths of American forces because we aren't trapped inside the city facing all the perils of urban terrain; fewer civilian deaths as collateral from American attacks (because we are using precision-guided attacks and only return fire when we know where the enemy is); city will eventually collapse and be "liberated" by US forces (according to the theory); better for leadership and WMD targeting because fewer resources being used just to make sure we don't get ambushed; -Cons: Where are the civilians supposed to go? We claim we can make refugee camps outside the city, but we haven't really done this before. We are literally trapping people inside the city with the enemy. In general it seems a bit naive in terms of whether it will be successful--the city collapsing might take a long time: people may not revolt against the enemy, the enemy might be too strong, or the enemy might just kill all the people, the coalition may be unable to hold the siege line. Carroll liked the question of: Is this really the American way of fighting wars?

What percentage of the U.S. military overall, and the officer class specifically, is female?

15.5% of active duty are female. 16.6% of the officer class

How many companies, approximately, won contracts to send private security contractors to Iraq and Afghanistan? Be able to name three of them. What is Blackwater's name Today?

170-180. Some examples are Triple Canopy, GRS, CACI, SOC, Aegis, Dyncorp, Hart Group, Academi. Blackwater's name now is Academi.

Are our nuclear weapons reliable? Do we know? Why or why not?

2017- the NNSA assessed that the stockpile is safe, secure, reliable, and effective but we cannot be sure if they are truly reliable because we have not conducted nuclear tests since the 1950s, modernization programs for warheads and delivery systems are uncertain, and the infrastructure that supports nuclear programs is outdated.

What is Counterinsurgency? Is it a strategy? Why or why not?

A counter-insurgency or counterinsurgency can be defined as "comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes". - US Government Counterinsurgency Guide COIN is not a strategy but rather a package of tactics. It is an operational approach to be used against another operational approach (insurgency). See TX Hammes' article "Counterinsurgency: Not a strategy but a necessary capability." He makes the point that to say you have a counterinsurgency strategy is like saying you have an anti-submarine strategy. COIN ultimately just moves us closer to some desired political end state, such as a functioning and independent Iraqi state

What are some potential reasons that, outside of that provided by Special Forces, these efforts have not generally been successful?

Advisory roles did not lead to promotions and so did not attract the best people for the roles Only 15% of advisors were selected from active duty in Korea/Vietnam, most were reserves No long term unit created:efforts have been ad hoc so lessons learned have been forgotten with every new conflict BCTs converted to advisory role for a temporary deployment Ill-suited advisors sometimes created from friction on the ground than effectively build up foreign forces Having 2000+ infantry who are not officer and do not train, leave them with little to do Little to no language training (0 in Korea, 2 days in Vietnam, not much recently) Cultural incompetency Not always trained to be experts in their field and not trained to teach/advise Often assigned from below their rank to advise higher-ranking counterparts Not volunteers, i.e. they don't want to be there

Do nuclear weapons make us safer? Why or why not?

Costs- sanctions, Expensive, Risk and cost of attack (especially nuclear terror attack-that would be catastrophic), Environmental hazards, Incidents, accidents, mistakes, miscalculations, Morality argument, Have they actually prevented any wars? Do nuclear weapons deter terrorism, which is arguably a stronger threat to Americans? Benefits- Security, Damage, Deterrence, Bargaining power, Domestic and international status, Jobs, National Pride (?)

Describe some potential political and/or strategic costs and benefits of military humanitarian aid missions?

Costs: monetary value, committing US resources to a potentially hostile area, worries of mission creep, concerns about US overbearing position, conservative opposition in Congress, taking the place of indigenous support structures Benefits: alleviate suffering, strengthen ties with countries affected, positive PR responses, good deployment experience for soldiers in low danger environment, helps military justify enormous budget.

How should cultural training be structured? Give two recommendations for elements of cultural training

Cultural focus over language, if there has to be a choice; foreigners tend to forgive language mistakes since our forces are obviously non-native speakers, but cultural gaffes can create huge issues that breed insurgent recruiting (such as burning the Qur'an) Training frameworks to understand cultural terrain; helps soldiers to recognize the role of culture in foreign operating environments, which will lead to multidimensional takeaways that can allow troops to be ready to operate in various external environments Utilizing existing resource centers to gain curricula: the Training and Doctrine Command Center and the Marine Corps Center for Advanced Operational Learning provide strong training programs

Why is urban warfare likely in the future? Give at least three reasons.

Growth of already large cities into megacities Development of new urban areas Transition from conventional warfare to large-scale civil wars that manifest with insurgency Enemies know we are bad at urban warfare and try to force us into cities

Why are some of the geographic boundaries of the COCOMs confusing?

They are constantly changing and conflicts are rarely confined by the boundaries

What are some ways you might measure success in COIN and why are these measures more useful than others

Weddings, other social events afforded to the people when they feel safe Number of broken windows - broken windows theory Cleanliness of streets, efficiency of essential services number of government officials who reside in the district, the number of meetings between these officials and local elders that take place in the district center, and the number of development projects Construction of strategic bases → Restrepo in Korengal valley Confirmed casualties of major insurgent leaders

Are the U.S. and North Korea likely to come to an agreement that limits North Korea's nuclear capacity? Why or why not in your opinion?

Yes Steps taken so far positive Summit between SK and NK → Kim has agreed to de-nuclearzie No Why would Kim give up his arsenal NK may fear losing international attention/fear from other nations

What are some of the benefits of having these specific diagnosis for symptoms or groups of symptoms that veterans and others may suffer from?

having a name for the diagnosis links VA benefits to the care that a mental injury needs. It's already difficult enough for many soldiers to seek help for mental problems let alone have to pay for the expensive treatment out of pocket. Applying VA benefits to psychological treatment at least lowers the financial hurdle for seeking treatment. Having a formal name for a diagnosis can also help people by giving them a specific group of people to empathize with. Helps create an identity.

How might the establishment of conditions such as PTSD and moral injury exacerbate the civil-military divide?

hough PTSD and moral injury aren't an exclusive ailment of service members, the media and literature on the subject certainly makes it feel as if that's the case. Mental damage becomes a tool to distinguish between veterans and civilians. Civil leaders will fail to address the condition because they don't experience it

What is moral injury and why might veterans be much more likely than civilians to suffer from it?

moral injury is caused by "perpetrating, failing to prevent, or bearing witness to acts that transgress deeply held moral beliefs". In military circles, moral injury can also take place when someone who holds legitimate authority betrays "what is right" in a high stakes situation. This causes a lack of trust in superiors and institutions as a whole. Military members are more likely to be exposed to situations that violate moral beliefs, such as murder and rape. They are also subject to a more disciplined and strict chain of command system, so if something occurs that causes them to lose trust in one of the most formalized and powerful chain of command systems and institutions it would be reasonable for them to take issue with trusting other institutions and authorities in civilian life.

What types of things/capabilities should our nuclear weapons target and why?

talk about general shift from Cold War thinking to a nuclear posturing that better represents the current environment. The article said something about 5 different potential strategies: Abolition of nuclear weapons Aggressive reductions and dealerting Business as usual, only smaller More aggressive nuclear posture Nuclear emphasis I don't think she'll ask us this but just maybe talk through the need to shift from Cold War thinking and modernize nuclear force IF the U.S. strongly believes that nuclear weapons serve as a deterrent

What is Shay's objection to the "D" in PTSD?

the "D" stands for disorder. Shay views psychological injuries as wounds, not a disorder like an illness. It is viewed as honorable to receive an injury in war. Getting sick isn't viewed as dishonorable but it is viewed as unlucky and people don't want to fight next to someone they think is unlucky. There's a stigma against it. People with an illness or a disorder are viewed as no longer fit for service and therefore their accomplishments are limited. Whereas a person who has an injury and has been deemed to be fit for the fight can continue to accomplish what a non-injured person could.

How is the SFAB "sold" to potential recruits? Why does it seem to be such a struggle to recruit as quickly as they need?

$5,000 signing bonus (considered meager) and promotion opportunities Its biggest seller is its purpose-flashy campaign to get people interested, propaganda You will do what you joined the Army to do - deploy, shoot, and help people. Not exactly what people sign up for when they enlist, hard to sell to those who want to just get over there and "kill the bad guys" Must draw only from officers (Sgt. and above), who are experienced and have career path set out High deployment tempo - guaranteed to be needed in the beginning stages with only one active, and a second in training Specifically looking for/appeals to teaching-oriented, service-minded, outgoing, culturally-aware soldiers

Why is studying urbanization difficult? (Refer to your article.)

-The definition of "urban" vs "rural" is not uniform across countries or across time. Urban communities can be defined in any number of ways including by population size, population density, administrative or political boundaries, or economic function. Some countries define their urban population as those people living within certain administrative boundaries—such as in administrative centers or municipios (as in El Salvador), municipality councils (as in Iraq), or in places having a municipality or a municipal corporation, a town committee, or a cantonment board (as in Bangladesh or Pakistan). Other countries prefer to classify their urban population using either population size or population density as the primary consideration. -Also the lack of reliable and up-to-date demographic data. Censuses occur rarely, and large populations are difficult to enumerate accurately. -Urban and rural can be a poor and misleading dichotomy.

What are the top three challenges that battle in an urban environment poses for the U.S. Military?

-The top three challenges with battling in an urban environment for the US are: Dangerous terrain: 1) buildings limit observation and field of fire, which decreases engagement range and limits knowledge of enemy and friendly location. 2) Terrain negates our technological superiority because of size and mobility constraints 3) communications are weakened (potential for signal blockage or interception) 4) tactical mobility because rotary-wing aircraft cannot land (low power lines, vulnerability, and building height variability) 5) population may be unfavorably disposed to the US 6) isolation from logistics teams mean fewer ammunitions and resources 7) multi-dimensionality of the fight (tunnels, sewers, snipers→ soldiers' unease, decreased motivation and efficacy) 8) enemy familiarity and potential to set up booby traps and trip wires 9) high concentration of soldiers Human element: 1) presence of collateral, both in terms of city's population and infrastructure 2) inevitable destruction (deaths, refugees, and dismemberment of basic social services) 3) PR aspect--desire for short conflict and low collateral Nature of urban warfare: 1) Complexity--fighting a war of humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, and highly lethal battles 2) more soldiers needed 3) extremely expensive (rebuilding) 4) slow 5) enemy strategy--they don't have to win, just avoid defeat and we will eventually pull out, which puts the enemy at a distinct advantage

According to Auerswald and Campbell, what four main tools are available to Congress to provide direction to the military? Of these, which do you think is the most important and Why?

1) Selection of military officers 2) Determining how much authority is delegated to the military 3) Oversight of the military 4) Establishing incentives for appropriate military behavior In sum, Congress has at least four significant tools at its disposal to affect US civil-military relations, and the legislature has played a vital role in the exercise of each tool. Lawmakers influence the choice of military officers via the Senate confirmation process. They delegate authority to the military through the budget process and regulations in the annual defense authorization bills. Congress conducts both regular and episodic oversight of the military in publicly accessible hearings, closed-door briefings, staff investigations, and special commissions. And finally, Congress has a long track record of using incentives to influence military behavior on everything from acquisition policies to social welfare issues The success of such congressional initiatives depends on a variety of factors internal to congressional deliberations. What type of change is desired has a large influence on the chances of a proposal's success. Legislating changes in military regulations requires a two-chamber majority (and a supermajority if opposed by the president), a high hurdle to overcome. Confirming a military officer is easier, requiring the support of a majority of senators present and voting.

Should we be concerned about the ways in which the military differs from the U.S. population as a whole? Why or why not?

4 Dimensions of Civil-Military Gap Cultural- There is a widespread culture of disdain in the military for civilian culture. Don't have respect for their unwillingness to take responsibility and lack of initiative to understand military culture. Soldiers have a warrior ethos that isn't shared by the civilian community- the warriors are the best of society, they are the strongest, most ethical and moral, and have a calling for service to their country. Soldiers also move around frequently from base to base or are overseas, which doesn't allow for much close interaction between soldiers and civilians. In many ways the military enforces this cultural gap by perpetuating the idea that no one can understand the military unless they have served. Ex. White House conference where only relatives of service members were allowed to ask questions (The Warrior at the Mall by Phil Klay) Demographics- The demographics of service members is not representative of the country as a whole. African Americans and women are underrepresented, Hispanics, Catholics and Southerners are overrepresented. The proportion of Hispanics in the military is continuing to grow. One reason for this is that active duty is a pathway to citizenship. The rise of the warrior caste ensures that the groups that are already overrepresented will continue to be. People are more likely to serve if they come from a military family, so military service is being condensed into a smaller number of families. Policy Preference- Didn't really talk about this one, but the military likes to be strong on national defense but this policy is not equally supported by all commanders in chief or members of congress. Institutional- the military is unlike any civilian institution. It has much stricter rules about appearance and physical attributes and standards that seem foreign to those who have never had such stringent physical requirements placed on them. The military emphasises uniformity, discipline, rules, and ceremony.

What is a mass army? Why are there few mass armies today?

A mass army is a conventional army where the number of troops is large and highly correlated to win probability. Think the armies of WW1 and WW2. Technology has diminished the need for mass armies, as militaries would now rather rely on replaceable technology rather than mass amounts of human life to achieve military goals. A mass army would be the mass mobilization product you think of that happened in the US post-Pearl Harbor. Also, few mass armies today due to large human/capital cost of maintaining a standing mass army. Only country that might have something even remotely close to mass army is China, but theirs is hella disorganized.

Why was AFRICOM created? How has AFRICOM evolved since its creation?

Africa gained strategic importance as it became involved in conflicts in the Middle East and China. Military said it is to secure freedom of African people. Has taken on many roles since creation. Definitely geared towards development and stability ops

What are some differences in training (events, standards, timing, etc.) across the various service branches? What are some commonalities?

All have physical requirements Typically have culminating training event before a very prideful graduation Include technical skills-learning that is specific to the branches Naval nomenclature + drills Air force procedures, etc. Marines = arguably the most intensive branch Differences in terms of length and location

What is insurgency? What are the strengths of the insurgent?

An insurgency is a rebellion against authority (for example, an authority recognized as such by the United Nations) when those taking part in the rebellion are not recognized as belligerents. Strengths Support of population - usually Knowledge of home territory Camouflage in population, civilian and insurgent indistinguishable Propaganda Are not tied to truth/institutional laws of the area Can lie, subvert, and break laws in aims of disrupting establishment

Why was USCYBERCOM recently elevated to a full, unified command? Was this a good idea?

Cyber is becoming increasingly important in warfare and this change reflects that. Good idea is an opinion, but you could probably argue either way

Is the U.S. military not allocating enough time for training, especially for the Reserves?

Article makes point that a lot of the time is spent on powerpoint presentations about HR-type knowledge, which is not addressing root processes that perpetuate issues More time should be spent language/cultural learning; quickened deployment timelines lead to shortened training and less effective troops; for example, with the quickened deployments of SFABs they are not getting full training and thus may not be as capable Reserves point depends on their intended usage

What are some of the problems (large and small-scale) that could come from reliance on private security contractors? What are the benefits? (Be able to discuss in depth as many as you can for each.)

Benefits Flexibility in contracts can accelerate mobilization in ways that military organizations cannot deliver Less restricted by SOPs or organizational bias that may slow down responsiveness Highly effective Services allow soldiers to focus on core functions Could be cheaper than using soldiers Don't renew contracts in peacetime Soldiers have more expensive health benefits Increased political adaptability → President does not have to make an announcement about increased troop numbers, rather it can be a quick and decisive decision to inc. the force structure Problems Goals for contractors have not been upheld Actions inhibit COIN effort Locals conflate PMSCs with American presence PMSCs loyal to whom? Private mission is different from public opinion Reduction of military effectiveness Communication limitations - "unity of effort" Disparate organizational accountability and goals Disproportionately high pay rates generate negative morale in the military PMSCs might not really be cost effective Implications in human rights violations Lack of civilian oversight/accountability for PMSC contingencies Lack of information Overreliance could: Reduce the size of the military Contribute to international disorder by blurring the lines between sovereign states and proto-state actors I.e., matching Russia's strategy of hybrid warfare, paramilitary in Crimea, poisonings

Is it a problem that Congress has almost entirely lost its role in declaring war?

Certainly It Severely reduces civilian oversight and removes democratization of civilian control of the military Cutting congress out may reduce the time it takes to make a decision and some bureaucratic challenges of declaring war, but was written into our constitution for a reason. While Congress's ability to declare war in any significant sense has diminished, it still strongly influences what conflicts the US gets involved in by controlling the funding the military

What type of warfare is mostly likely in an urban environment and why?

Civil wars and guerrilla wars typically take place in these small areas because these war tactics involve maneuvering through urban or dense areas. Guerrilla warfare consists of the similar personnel as would civil or insurgent groups (armed civilians, rebels, etc.) and they incorporate the necessary hit and run tactics to accomplish their military objective while also minimizing damage that would typically be caused by larger scale military forces. Guerilla war units are most likely and more equip to fight in urban environments because of their smaller more mobile sabotage tactics and their lack of large scale military weaponry.

How did American soldiers implement COIN on the ground in Iraq from 2007 through 2008? What were some of the things they did to protect the population and legitimate the host government?

Clear, hold and build" Preparation stage Planning, training, organizing and equipping civil and military forces Assess the situation and conduct planning Clear stage (offensive ops) Priority here is offense Cordon and search, raid/attack guerrillas Hold Stage (defensive ops) Priority is defense Block axis routes, traffic control points, curfews T walls Build Stage (stability ops) Promote political and social reforms, promote mobilization of workforce, train civil defense forces Completion and transition stage "Hearts and minds" Establish connections with local leaders Use money as a weapon → rebuild infrastructure projects Engineer patrol tactics to be more accessible to the people CERP funds = pay offs$$$

How has the role of the Coast Guard changed since 9/11 and why?

Coast Guard takes on more protective role of the American mainland, reduced role in expeditionary missions. Coast Guard become military wing of homeland security mission; not actually a part of Dept. of Homeland Security. Coast Guard usually now saves ships in US waters rather than protecting forward postings of the US. As US has become more concerned with protecting the homeland, the US military has transitioned the Coast Guard to being a protective branch of the military rather than an expeditionary one i.e. Coast Guard tries to catch drug smugglers and help sinking ships rather than clearing streets or doing patrols in Iraq.

What was CERP and how did it theoretically advance population security?

Commander's emergency response program Water and sanitation biggest expenses

What factors hinder Congress's ability to oversee the U.S. military? Think broadly about this and draw on Rep. Cooper's presentation as well as the reading.

Congress makes decisions slowly. They need a lot of time to debate and compromise. This means for the military to be effective it makes a lot of its own decisions that congress is just too slow to oversee all the time. Additionally, as Rep. Cooper said, not even the Pentagon people know what is going on with the military bureaucracy, and we also have a number of congress members who have served in the armed forces that is much lower than in the past. Thus, some congress members cannot oversee the military bc they don't know what is going on. Congressmen and Senators are also heavily motivated by reelections, so their motivations are often self-serving and pandering to influential constituents.

Should cultural training play a greater role in U.S. military training or should this type of expertise be purchased on as "as needed" basis (or both)? What are the pros and cons of each option? Be specific about the benefits if studying culture deeply, not just perfunctorily (do and don't lists).

Currently with the HTS, it could be argued that the military is trying to "outsource" its cultural competency to academics/external members of the HTT's One thing that almost everyone agrees on is that the US military has a shortcoming in the area of cultural/language knowledge, which has had harmful implications for COIN ops in Iraq and Afghanistan Pros of HTS system rather than full-scale branch culture-training installation: Likely cheaper Involves external academic figures (like KBC), which can foster a bridge between military and academic institutions HTS designates responsibility and ensures there is an "expert" with each unit; thus, in situations where units need an expert, they already have that role figured out Pros of full force integration vs. HTS system Cannot be expected to have HTTs communicate and foster relationships with all foreign community members HTS Creates a sense of shirked responsibility among officers and staff with an HTT; why do I need to be the one who knows about the culture/language if I have an expert to do it for me? Such a large part of successful COIN is avoiding cultural gaffes and working with locals -> this requires language/cultural training to enable all soldiers to do so Cultural frameworks can be adaptable → helps army personnel understand that cultural terrain will be different, enables them to react better and be able to further react better in future foreign cultural environments In long run, cultural competency improvements could lead to lower costs; will create more connections to community members, avoid cultural gaffes that lead to increases in insurgent populations, and decrease combat incidents that require munitions, supplies, etc.

Why, according to Rep. Cooper, is the Air Force not the best place to house a Cyber Corps?

Cyber is the future of warfare. The air force even opposed drones, so cyber should be its own unit with its own rules and traditions to attract bright candidates from other opportunities in the private sector. Also the Air Force is led mostly by former pilots, so the top generals and leaders do not have the knowledge or expertise in that particular field. Also, for best tech talent, there aren't great incentives to work in the Air Force-why should I make less money and have to wear a uniform/do drill exercises when those cyber skills can be used in the private sector to garner much more $$$

What factors assisted in the development of the U.S. military's understanding of the neighborhoods of Baghdad? Why was this greater understanding important for successful COIN?

Daily walking patrols Mugshots and records of residents Hiring friendlies to guard neighborhood sites Greater understanding could more easily identify locals and non-locals Better manage who was going in and out of neighborhoods Keep records of residents

How does Restrepo (through its structure, individual scenes, etc.) convey the moral ambiguity of much modern warfare? Describe at least three ways that you feel the movie does this.

Documentary style- camera was often shaky and it was unclear what was happening. Reflected the feeling of confusion about being there. There was a feeling of randomness to the violent episodes and a lack of control. Never saw any insurgents- the soldiers never saw any insurgents and the movie reflected this. Soldiers would shoot at distant targets in the hopes of hitting something but they were never face to face with the people trying to kill them so that was morally ambiguous Interviews with soldiers- didn't acknowledge he had killed kids, just said there were some civilian casualties to their airstrikes Exploring reasons for their actions- op restrepo was abandoned in the end so what was the point of fighting insurgents there and killing locals if that was just going to be the result.

Related to above: What is the 1973 War Powers Resolution and how did President Obama's lawyers get around it during our intervention in Libya?

Enacted at the end of the Vietnam War, the WPR "requires the president to cease unauthorized military actions after 60 days in any situation where U.S. forces are engaged in hostilities or likely hostilities, unless Congress authorizes the mission." The Obama administration used the opinion described above to reason that congressional approval was not required for the Libya campaign because there were no ground troops and the nature of the conflict was limited in "nature, scope, and duration." The actions taken against the Libyan army didn't count as hostilities under the WPR because the mission was limited and involved limited risk to U.S. military personnel. This loophole carves out a legal standing for light-footprint warfare as a method that does not require congressional approval and is not subject to the WPR's restrictions.

Why did the adoption of COIN in Iraq require the surge? Why was the surge only in and around Baghdad?

Implementing COIN and securing the population, especially during a civil war, requires a ton of troops. We only had so many to send, so we deployed them in Baghdad with the hope of fixing things there and then letting the effects hopefully radiate outward. If the capital was a mess we weren't going to get much done elsewhere (also from war in iraq class notes) - Bush, after the midterm elections, made the key decisions that population security in Baghdad would be the top priority in US forces bc a sectarian civil war had begun here (JAM was brutal esp.). The surge strategy flowed from this firm and courageous decision. What allowed for the surge at this time? Bush had won re-election and now has a better opening to change the course of the war. He also finally got rid of Rumsfeld who was adamantly against the surge if we left iraq at this point it was a clear loss we had seen by hr mcmaster in tal afar that it had the possibility to succeed. They had lived with the population and treated detainees well Showed that if you did COIN right it would work Problem? Mcmaster had enough troops to do this in tal afar but we did not have enough troops to do this anywhere else → takeaway from mcmaster and tal afar success is you need more troops to implement a surge. somewhere there is data (maybe the FM?) that actually lays out a suggested ratio of COIN troops: insurgents but i don't remember what is was...

How is it possible that the 2001 AUMF continues to authorize U.S. military (and other) actions against Islamic extremists in 2018?

In 2001 Congress enacted the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), which authorized the president to use "all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons." The Obama administration expanded the mandate of the AUMF to the Islamic state since that is the successor of al-Qaeda, which the U.S. fought against under the AUMF. This is problematic because the Islamic State didn't exist in 2001 when the AUMF was enacted. "The executive branch has thus understood Congress to have delegated to the president extremely broad discretion to use air and cyber attacks and to deploy Special Operations forces against al-Qaeda, its many associates, the Taliban, the Islamic State, and any other group that the president deems to fall under the AUMF."

What (probably) happened in Nisoor Square and what were some of the consequences that flowed from that event?

Incident: A convoy of State officials was being transported north through Nisour square by Blackwater agents. The square was crowded and an IQi policeman was directing traffic. Many other IQi police were stationed in the square. The convoy was stopped by a white kia sedan driving on the wrong side of the road, toward the convoy. IQi police whistled at the kia sedan to clear the road for the convoy. Blackwater agents fired off warning shots, but the car continued proceeding. The agents then throw a stun grenade to clear the scene. The IQi police mistook the stun grenade for a fragmentation grenade, and opened fire on the convoy. The agents responded with fire. Consequences: Immediate aftermath incident left 17 dead and 20 injured President maliki suspended blackwater's right to conduct operations. He also pushed the US government to end its contract with Blackwater, but this didn't happen until 2009 House passed a bill that would immediately make all contractors working in Iraq and other combatant commands subject to prosecution in U.S. courts, called the military extraterritorial jurisdiction act Turning point in the employment of PMSCs in Iraq, where questions about legal status, management, oversight, and accountability of PMSCs were brought into Congressional and public discussion It was the culmination of a long list of poor performances by blackwater, who was involved in the abu ghraib scandal and who prompted the defeat at Fallujah 1 Long term It was recognized that the use of private military contractors appears to have harmed, rather than helped, the COIN efforts of the U.S. mission in Iraq It has also brought up questions whether the US military has an overreliance on private outsourcing, because This outsourcing has created dependency on private firms like Blackwater which has given rise to dangerous vulnerabilities.

How does the structure and culture of the SFAB (Security Force Assistance Brigade) seek to replicate SFA success and avoid SFA failure of the past? (What elements of the SFAB make it more likely to succeed?)

Instead of forcing people without interest or aptitude for the role, it is voluntary and attempts to recruit only those who will do the job well Also recruiting internally, so those who are already good at the skills Culture of volunteerism and passion to help others Recruit saying "You will do what you joined the Army to do - deploy, shoot, and help people" Officers only 800 officers can integrate and deploy side-by-side with foreign units No 'dead-weight' of 2000 or so infantry with nothing to do Easier to deploy and less intrusive because of their far lower numbers, but capable of doing the same job Tours will full length, to build up relationships and skills Though, there may still be hiccups when Brigades are rotated out from their tours... The training will be very specific with cultural and language components Meant to last 13 months Training in foreign weapons and vehicles Training on how to be an advisor

In what ways is the SFAB a new type of institution within the U.S. Army? What factors made it possible for this innovation to occur?

It is the first long-term unit with an advisory objective Departure from the BCT structure 800 officers, with no basic infantrymen (standard BCT is 3000 people) Army Chief of Staff Gen. Mark Milley- his brainchild, in the position to make xit happen Recognition by the US armed forces and government that previous efforts for SFA have been ineffective Recognition that SFA is important, but has been dragging on with no successful end in sight Commitment to effective, intentional training of foreign forces rather than ad hoc

Why did the Clinton administration release PDD 25 concerning peace operations?

It was issued following the Battle of Mogadishu and the Black Hawk Down incident where US troops were killed during a firefight in Somalia. Strong public backlash followed and Clinton withdrew US forces from the UN mission. Did not want to risk any more American lives in similar operations.

Give four changes in war films that took place in the post-Vietnam era - these may be new structures, technological approaches or themes.

Kennedy Chapter 7 pg. 157-158 Themes Reflects the moral ambiguity with which the public has come to view war Has become difficult to construct moral certainties about the meaning of war War is not immoral, but it is always out of control and leaves men and women broken in its wake Positive themes Visualizes camaraderie, courage, and sacrifice of warriors The spectacle of war became less important in cinematography than the pathos of victimhood and predicament of the warrior. Heroic warrior -> troubled warrior War became individualized Individual experience and liberties rather than collective rights and shared experienced Espionage More cynical and critical view of spies Sardonic antidote to the cult of espionage Structures **war films have developed from studies of conflict to studies of combatants, their loves, their hatreds, their inner lives** Moved from "war cinema realism" - war as it actually is - to "War cinema indirection" War cinema indirection A style of filmmaking that never lets the viewer leave behind the knowledge that the violence and destruction on-screen are staged, and never lets the viewer accept the illusion, while watching it, that the film is portraying "war as it actually is" Technological Approaches Films before WWII were perforce (necessary) not realistic Indirect, allusive, suggestive, performative The sounds of war could not be reproducible Showed images of battle rather than showing war as it really was Winter makes the point that silent films were very productive, since it put onus on audience to imagine sounds and sensory impacts of war Films of WWII were too realistic Conclusion: Dignity without Voyeurism Soldiering is framed more darkly, tragic, morally ambiguous, and focused on victims rather than heroes. Portrait of soldier became more important than the war he served in

In what ways, and where, has the U.S. military provided security force assistance throughout history (including recent history)?

Korean War- had advisory groups attached to local forces, poorly planned and executed Vietnam War- better but since the positions didn't lead to promotions, staff wasn't motivated or effective Philippians in 2000s Iraq and Afghanistan- units attached to BCTs, redesigned in 2017 with the Security Force Assistance Brigade

What are MEDCAPs and MEDRETEs?

MEDCAP= Medical Civil Assistance Program; MEDRETE= Medical Readiness Training Exercises. "Most occur in South and Central America, Sub- Saharan Africa, Southeast Asia, and Central Asia. Unlike a disaster relief mission, these can be planned months in advance. They are designed and executed by medical professionals, though not necessarily ones equipped with a background in humanitarian work or public health..." MEDCAPS and MEDRETEs are short term aid projects undertaken by US military in conjunction with the USAID (US Agency for International Development) where the US military brings medical supplies, civilian and military doctors, and diagnostic machinery to a location for temporary medical care. This is a smaller scale approach to something such as docking one of the US Naval medical ships at a port, which does happen (such as Operation Unified Assistance in Indonesia post-2004 earthquake).

What are the general demographic characteristics of private security contractors?

Males in their 30s. Ex-military or police. Most have attempted to return to civilian life after serving but find that they prefer adrenaline rush and camaraderie that comes with being in a warzone.

What is urban warfare (MOUT)?

Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain. From this acronym military warfare can be described as any military action that takes place on an Urban area: which consists of typically a "...complex man-made physical terrain; a population of significant size and density; and an infrastructure that supports the population and perhaps the region or nation." (Chang 1)

What accounts for the over-representation of the South in the U.S. military?

Most bases are now located in the south. Guns are also a bigger part of the culture in rural southern areas, so people in that demographic are more likely to go into a profession that involves guns. The rise of the warrior caste- see demographics in next question This can be summed up with- veteran populations, school accessibility, recruiter distribution and goaling, and the location of military bases

Discuss the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). What are the strengths and weaknesses of this agreement?

NPT is a landmark international treaty whose objective is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament. Every 5 years, Parties to the NPT gather for a review conference. Nuclear powers have not disarmed nukes as the treaty stipulates

What is PTSD? What year did it become an official diagnosis?

Post Traumatic Stress Disorder - 1980

What legal innovations have been developed to expand the president's power to wage war without the consent of Congress? (these are related to light-footprint warfare)

Obama's justice department issued a legal opinion creating the precedent that "the President has the constitutional power to use unilateral force in order to protect 2 national interests: 'preserving regional stability' in North Africa and supporting the UNSC's 'credibility and effectiveness.' Only "if the President's planned military action involved 'prolonged and substantial military engagements, typically involving exposure of U.S. military personnel to significant risk over a substantial period,' the Constitution might require the president to seek approval from Congress." "President Obama has established that the president can deploy significant unilateral military force whenever s/he perceives a threat to regional stability and human rights or other established international norms, even when the threat poses no direct danger to the United States. If these oft-satisfied circumstances are present, the Libya opinion and practice establish that a president can use force for many months as long as the force is no more intensive in "nature and scope" than the very intensive seven-month aerial bombardment in Libya. Under this rationale, air strikes, especially by drone, or powerful cyber attacks would often lack the "nature and scope" that require congressional approval. The Obama precedents also allow a future president to deploy Special Operations forces unilaterally in many discrete mission contexts. In these and other ways, President Obama has clarified and strengthened the constitutional space for light-footprint warfare."

What is the U.S.'s most successful humanitarian aid mission? Why?

Operation Unified Assistance in Indonesia in 2004; the United States was the first responders on the ground but were quick to cede authority to UN officials and cooperate with NGOs such as the Red Cross, allowing for effective response to the disaster on all fronts. The US military was willing to serve in a support role after transitioning from the lead role that had been established as they arrived on scene first. Also, the US immediately committed one of its 3 US Naval hospital ships to the scene, a previously unprecedented move. This style of disaster response was very effective, leading to a huge PR success for the US and its military along with a nearly 50 point swing in favorable public opinion of the US among Muslims in Southeast Asia. (This is contrasted with Operation Unified Response in Haiti where US did not release lead command and caused the relief efforts to be dysfunctional and bad PR for the US.)

Should the U.S. military remain prepared for Counterinsurgency? Why or why not?

Opinion (Danielle) - Yes, also, because (sorry round about way of getting there): As much as the US military would like to run away from insurgents and never see them again, the fact remains that insurgents, in a variety of forms, will threaten US national interests and thus our forces must be prepared to respond. One key point: insurgency is as old as warfare itself Aka history suggests insurgencies will continue so we might as well be prepared to fight them Its important to note that in the last 60 years the primary drivers of insurgency have changed Prob not poverty or a lot more poor countries would have insurgencies Not anticolonialism bc that is gone and colonial powers have been driven out This led to next prob → who will rule the state after the colonists leave New driver maybe: the desire to change the colonial borders that were drawn without any consideration of local ethnic, cultural, and religious networks In short, insurgencies have changed their drivers, organizations, and approaches to gaining power, but all have used force to achieve their goals We have seen the rise of Jihadist insurgencies (not based as much in political underrepresentation but instead in extreme ideology, often with global objectives i.e. establishing the new caliphate) Whether the conflict is over the control of existing borders or the need to change borders, some of these conflicts will impact the strategic interests of the US Ie destabilizing important allies, impinging on world energy supplies

Should the U.S. military remain prepared for Counterinsurgency? Why or why not?

Opinion question: I (Bill) think yes for the following reasons: Politicians decide where to send military. Military needs to go and do what it is sent to do HR McMaster's RSVP Fallacy: you don't get to pick and choose your fights: the enemy has a say in it, too There will be more and more megacities (see Urban Warfare presentation) in coming years. Many of these cities will have terrible poverty and inequality, and foster radicalism. These cities provide convenient venues for the enemy to launch an insurgency. We may have to fight there and thus should be prepared New technologies constantly make insurgencies easier to carry out, as groups become more connected and informed. It's not good enough to take the lessons we learned from past insurgencies, because new ones will be different. Even if there's not training being done for COIN, people in places like TRADOC should continue to study the issue so we have informed experts when the need arises Possible reasons against: We really suck at it. Need to accept that Americans can't do it and stop wasting our blood and treasure. These wars aren't generally within our "national interest." We're not the host government. We can only go so far in legitimating it if it isn't interested in doing this work itself and instead just wants to be corrupt or divise It's a freaking impossible task! COIN ops are fighting an uphill battle from the beginning, because even the smallest insurgency tactics (terror events) can sow widespread fear. Insurgents do not have to play by the rules and they are often guided by extremist, jihadist ideals which they are able to radicalize into others; a COIN op has a tiny window for error bc any amount of collateral damage will breed new insurgents. Furthermore, to do COIN and stand in for the government, we have to take the place of the government. To do so in a culture we are completely unfamiliar with (the Middle East cultures are not hospitable to Western culture) would take extreme amounts of culture and language training in combination with superbly executed COIN tactical ops to rid insurgent leaders. That is so hard to do.

What was the average daily pay of a private security contractor in Iraq and Afghanistan? What factors might have influenced that pay?

Pay ranges from $400-$700+ per day. Someone with more experience in special operations is valued more highly than people with other specialities in the military or police force.

What factors might account for the high rate of confidence that the U.S. military enjoys in America?

People view the military as a professional organization. There is a high moral standard (ex. DUI and drugs get you kicked out). The media also reinforces confidence in the military because it either reports good news or nothing at all because everything is so secret. There has also historically been the view that the military is above politics and is a neutral party, but this view is degrading a bit since a substantial part of the military is right-leaning. Also the service and self-sacrifice element of military figures

What are the two main pillars of U.S. counterinsurgency? Why is each important for fighting insurgency? Why is each difficult?

Protect the population and legitimate the host government. The two are intertwined. If the people are not safe, they will not see the host government as legitimate. If the host government is not legitimate, it will have trouble enacting reforms, rebuilding the country, or setting policies that will make the people safe and happy. Protecting the population is difficult because of the above-listed advantages that insurgents have. They live and fight among the people, and make the common people afraid of them and afraid to report them to government forces. Legitimating the host government is difficult for a number of reasons. In countries like Iraq with fierce ethnic tensions, people often don't support any leaders other than those from their own groups. Insurgents make the case that the Iraqi government is just a puppet of the U.S., since it is the U.S. that provides most of the government's funds and controls security operations. Groups may boycott elections, leading them to claim the the results are invalid. Most new governments have weak controls and are rife with corruption and patronage appointments. There are surely many more reasons why a new government like Iraq's or Afghanistan's would appear illegitimate, and the U.S. appears not to be able to do much to improve these governments.

What is a Red Team? What is a Human Terrain Team (HTT)? What is a Foreign Area Officer (FAO)?

Red Team → similar to a scout team in football. Independent group that challenges an organization to improve its effectiveness by assuming the adversarial point of view In video of SFAB trainings, you can see Red Teams modeling Afghani citizens Human Terrain Team → five member team that injects civilian academic and military cultural expertise into operations. They serve as special advisors to the Brigade Commander Foreign Area Officer → a specified officer who has studied the specific regional culture/language (they oftentimes work with the PSYCH ops) and they can help the COIN ops

What are some potential benefits from establishing a diagnosis of or concept of moral injury in particular?

Removes stigma of "disorder"? → moral injury seen somewhat as more heroic, poetic, versus stigmatized PTSD "Injury" suggests recovery is possible

Why is it difficult to reduce our stockpile of nuclear weapons?

Requires substantial capital investment to house de-weaponized warheads; uranium 238 from retired warheads is not reusable. Public fear of attack on US (high concern recently due to Iran and North Korea) makes it easier for politicians to ignore our obligations to reduce our nuclear arsenal. US worried about shifting global power, seeing new foes that are not part of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968, as Pakistan, India, South Sudan, North Korea, and Israel have not signed. (LJB)

What is a RMA and how did the first Gulf War strengthen proponents of a RMA in the U.S. defense establishment?

Revolution in Military Affairs The United States' victory in the 1991 Gulf War renewed interest in RMA theory. In the view of RMA proponents, American dominance through superior technology emphasized how the United States' technological advances reduced the relative power of the Iraqi military, by no means an insignificant rival, to insignificance. New technologies enhanced Coalition forces' ability to exchange and use information, and highlighted the imperative of denying the adversary the ability to communicate with his forces. There was a belief that this new technology somehow fundamentally changed the nature of war. The United States and its technological superiority would be so overwhelming that no form of opposition or fighting style could withstand them

Explain the beret controversy. What is it really about?

SFABs have brown berets as part of their uniform, appear similar to the green berets special ops wear Active duty and veteran spec ops became incredibly angry A way for SFABs to create a culture and reputation overnight Army Chief of Staff Gen. Mark Milley's ideas Heavily influenced by Spec Ops and even copying units Milley commanded "The Legion" like the 5th SO Group Might be related to the perceived threat of SFABs to Spec Ops Spec Ops has a training and advising component but Spec Op soldiers are very costly and time intensive to make Some believe that SFABs will be able to do most of the work of Spec Ops for much less money

Why might opportunities for moral injury be greater in COIN fights than in others?

Since insurgents are mixed in with the general population it can be a difficult moral question about what to do about people who could be insurgents or could be innocent. There may be violent action taken against people who turn out to not be insurgents and this could be morally injurious. Additionally, COIN is more morally ambiguous; don't know who the enemy is in all cases, it's not clear cut like in conventional warfare

What policies, if any, should we reinforce or adopt to ensure the ongoing political neutrality of our armed forces?

Some have argued for a return to a draft to fix the divide between the military and society, arguing it will foster more responsible uses of US force abroad both by making the military more rapidly expandable and by making the stakes of armed intervention more palpable to politicians. Could also be representative to the nation politically and regionally However conscription would influence enlisted forces more than officer crops Without a dramatic and costly increase in the size of the military, the military's isolation from society would not change significantly, at the chances each citizen faced of being conscripted would be quite small. Dramatically increasing size of the military rn seems impractical and useless Though a draft would do more good than harm with that view, it would likely not be worth the financial cost The draft seems a quick fix. But it is in fact a poor response to the problems the military faces. Civilian leaders largely reject the draft owing to meager popular support, military leaders owing to professional pride. → So what alternatives might be better? Reasserting nonpartisan norms in the military Current restrictions on political involvement are insufficient They have failed to address underlying political biases and they have done little to change the public perceptions of partisan imbalances in the military The professional must embrace significant cultural change and return to traditional norms of strict non-partisanship, even going so far as to communicate that it is acceptable for military officers not to vote. Why this is difficult too: a norm of nonpartisanship and nonidentification does not imply disengagement from political issues or grant officers an opportunity to remain aloof from domestic considerations. They should stay abreast of the political questions of the day This is similar to asking one to watch the super bowl but not cheer for a team Difficult also because you still want military personnel to come back and be engaged civilians. This was the crux of George Washington's statement to his troops after the Rev. war

How did the battles of Mosul and Fallujah illustrate those shortcomings (have at least one reason for each battle)?

The Battle of Fallujah illustrated the shortcomings that the US military has in conducting urban warfare by the fact that 35 airstrikes were launched in a span of 5 hours on 24 targets causing over 15 billion dollars in architectural damage. Mosul illustrated the shortcomings of urban warfare in the fact that roughly 40,000 civilian deaths took place.

Go into more depth than you do in the question above in describing and discussion the function of one of the major culminating training exercises (the Crucible, Battle Stations, BUD/S Hell Week)?

The Crucible is a Decathlon of Marine Training: ●Wire crawls ●Boxing and pugil stick fighting ●Setting up combat sites ●Trench experience/helping comrade Battle Stations, consists of 12 different scenarios incorporating all boot camp topics. "Recruits are trying to save a ship the engineers are trying to sink it BUDS/Hell Week Overall function → serves as an assessment of physical and technical trainings that recruits have received. Additionally, these training exercises typically require significant teamwork to complete tasks → thus, it imbues a sense of unit cohesion and commitment to a greater aim. Lastly, serves as a rallying cry for members of the force: "we made it through the Crucible, the toughest of the tough-now we can do anything"

Describe, briefly, the process by which the president launches a nuclear attack. What are some potential criticisms of this system?

The President convenes a conference with military and civilian advisers, decides to launch, the order is verified, the order goes out, launch crews take over, and missiles are launched.

What is the U.S. Nuclear Triad? Describe it in some detail.

The US Nuclear Triad consists of Sea (submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs)), Land (intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)), and Air nuclear missiles (heavy bombers). Sea is the most survivable leg of the nuclear triad, provide a worldwide launch capability, and is virtually undetectable. Consists of Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). Land launches intercontinental ballistic missiles from stationary silos. They are on continuous alert, provide immediate reaction if necessary, can strike their intended targets within 30 minutes of launch, and has a minimum range of 5,500. They. contribute to stability and ensure a secure second-strike capability Air has strategic bombers carrying gravity bombs or cruise missiles. Serves as a visible, flexible, and recallable national strategic asset.

Why is security force assistance (SFA) likely to be an "enduring mission" of the U.S. Army (one sufficiently important to merit the creation of 6 SFABs)?

The US has interests all over the world Instead of using our costly, conventional forces all over the world, we can train and arm local forces More economically and political viable The SFAB is a smaller unit of only 800 officers, rather than the typical BCT 3000

Why do many Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that provide aid object to the military taking on humanitarian missions?

The US military has a history of attempting to supersede the authority of NGOs on the ground. Rather than provide the most effective response, the US military would rather provide the response that puts their soldiers in the least amount of risk and gets them home as quickly as possible. Also, US military leaders commonly intentionally miscommunicate/fail to communicate with NGO leaders, leading to ineffective and often contradictory mission sets

For Shay what is the primary psychological injury of war and how does it affect veterans?

The primary psychological injury is bringing back the physiological, psychological, and social adaptations needed for survival in war zones back into the civilian world when one's life isn't in immediate danger.

Why is a member of the U.S. military more likely to be Republican than an average Citizen?

The shift away from a conscription army and the increased representation of rural southerners in the military are the 2 primary reasons that the military is becoming more conservative. Now that people self-select to enter the military only the people that actually want to be there and who have values that align with the military will be soldiers, or they see no other option for economic mobility in their current situation (i.e. poor, rural people without ability to afford college/trade school). Most southerners are already Republicans when they enter the military due to the alignment of southern culture and Republican conservatism (guns, freedom of speech, lower education level, lower socioeconomic status). Their overrepresentation may be what's driving the military to be more conservative. An alternative explanation is that the military itself is conservative and influences members to be more conservative regardless of what they're political views were before enlisting (lack of support for homosexuals, strict disciplined culture, historical lack of support for female soldiers and officers though that's changing now). ROTCS centers and military bases are also located in the south, which both attracts southerners to join and exposes other enlisted personnel to southern conservative culture. Liberal democrats, especially those of the Vietnam era, have persistently opposed the military and the lack of trust and respect they developed for the military after Vietnam has been perpetuated in similar circles of the next generation, leaving conservatives to take their place in the all-volunteer force. Republicans also more frequently support increased military spending and having a more offensive military. Southern states, where most military bases are, are typically Republican. The Republican representatives are the ones that support these bases and military jobs the most so military members there are more likely to support Republican candidates.

Generally, what laws and regulations govern the operation of private security contractors?

There's a shit ton... but I would guess Carroll would want us to talk about the laws and regulations that came out of IQ. My take (Zach): laws and regulations that govern PMSCs are too diffuse over government agencies and legislative bodies that they have little effect on how PMSCs operate. Lack of regulation is an important consequence of using PMSCs Jurisdictional statutes Deal with how PMSCs can be tried Procurement National Defense Authorization Acts Every fiscal year, aims for more regulation Agency regulations DOD, DOS, DOJ, DOCommerce, USAID, US memorandum of understandings Status of forces agreements Afghanistan, columbia, iraq Contract laws - outline provisions of individual contracts DOS DOD (I suggest reading these on the study guide, there are more figures and stuff)

Why were geographic commands created and what are some ways that they have changed over time. How has the Unified Command Plan (UCP) otherwise changed over time?

They were created after WWII because the military realized it needed a way to effectively manage all of the services when fighting, so they created a single commander that each service reports to in that region. New geographic commands have been added as the need arises, recently USNORTHCOM and USAFRICOM. In 1987 two functional commands were added in Special Operations and Transportation, with Strategy added five years later. The structure of the UCP has also changed overtime. Goldwater Nichols did a lot to contribute to this.

Describe three factors that make Counterinsurgency difficult for the U.S. military? Where do these factors originate?

This question seems closely tied to the above one about why the military prefers conventional. A few reasons again and their roots: American way of war of winning with might and firepower comes from all our history Don't like risk-taking--military thinks that avoiding casualties is key after huge protests in Vietnam. Believe (probably incorrectly) that we could have won Vietnam had military been allowed to stay there Hard to gauge progress → insurgents are always recruiting more and more, especially in ambiguous environments like Afghanistan, military cannot brag about defeating X force in Y battle The Civil-Military cooperation COIN requires is hard for the military to do Military may be uncomfortable being involved in operations that involve a political aspect. Deeply ingrained in them to be apolitical. Think nation-building things aren't their job Paradoxes of COIN: Sometimes doing nothing is the best reaction Difficult for our military Some of the best weapons for counterinsurgents do not shoot If a tactic works this week, it might not work next week, if it works in this province, it might not work in the next Tactical success guarantees nothing Many important decisions in COIN are not made by generals

By what authority have presidents sent the National Guard to the U.S. border with Mexico?

Title 32 of US Code is what Trump called for; this leaves troops under control of their respective states and leaves it up to the states to decide whether or not to send in National Guard troops; the other option would be Title 10 of the US Code, which would federalize some National Guard troops and put them under direct control of the Secretary of Defense, this would be mandatory participation for the states.

Give three things that are considered, according to PDD 25, when making the decision to commit U.S. forces to peace operations. Do you think the requirements set in the directive are too strict or too loose

U.S. participation is necessary for the success of the operation, there is domestic and congressional support already or it is possible to obtain it, there are clearly defined objectives and a plan in place to achieve them. These requirements are a bit too constricting and for this reason the directive was criticized as the reason why President Clinton did not send troops to mediate during the Rwandan Genocide. Designed specifically to reduce US participation in peace operations.

What role did the U.S. military play after Hurricane Katrina?

US military on the ground almost immediately. Army handled supplies distribution, Marines went door-to-door to evacuate people. Army/Air Force do helicopter rescues. Navy is stationed near New Orleans as source of rescue supplies but does not take much of presence on ground. National Guard units from around the country help with cleanup. Generally positive response to military presence from New Orleans residents and America at large.

What are some elements of light-footprint warfare?

Using special operations forces, intelligence assets, drones, and cyber attacks to fight the enemy as opposed to heavy deployments. The purpose is to utilize America's technological superiority. These methods of attack attract much less congressional and public scrutiny than conventional warfare does, which is a defining feature of light-footprint warfare. Came to spotlight of defense when obama was elected Wanted to venture from bush era of heavy and expensive deployments Could also probably be tied into COIN warfare / departure from conventional warfare and decrease in need for a ton of troops and large scale mil occupations

What types of roles to private security contractors play? Why might it be difficult within these roles (provide an example related to one or two) to remain entirely defensive?

VIP protection details Armed escorts Site security Military advice + training Local force training (police, military) Intelligence (29% of U.S. intelligence community is private) Support for weapons systems Story from "The Other Army": PMSCs are typically tasked with guarding people, buildings, and convoys. They may be transporting a client from point A to point B. To avoid being a sitting duck in traffic they will often speed and drive on sidewalks or postpone the trip until there is less traffic. They are constantly on the lookout for potential attacks on their client. If they see a car coming at them they will fire warning shots. If those don't deter the oncoming vehicle PMSCs will take action to stop the vehicle which include causing it to crash or shooting the driver. All PMSCs are armed and prepared to take action. Though they are only supposed to be armed to take defensive action the attitude among contractors is that the best defense is a good offense. Big 3 from Kennedy readings: Logistics Security Reconstruction

Can the U.S. military prepare for both conventional war and counterinsurgency? If yes, how can it do that - what specific steps should it take and why?

Very difficult, but could be done to some extent As TX Hammes says, can either have "utility infielders" who are ready to handle any kind of fight or "division of labor" where certain forces specialize in certain things so that military has experts for all different kinds of fights The SFAB is a kind of "division of labor" approach, offering special training for forces who will then train host nation forces on how to do COIN. Important that being in SFAB not seen as detrimental to career so that top people will want to do it Offering more professional military education and chances for officers to get advanced degrees at non-military schools will create a better army of thinkers who can figure out what to do in facing new fights (utility infielders) The number of soldiers serving in an SFAB or getting advanced degrees will still remain relatively few in the force. For the rest, the military may need to just focus on being more flexible and able to train its people on new concepts to fight new challenges as they arise SFAB + cultural competency frameworks will allow for better COIN interacts and help build a force that is better at civil affairs ops.

What accounts for the U.S. military's preference for conventional warfare over irregular warfare?

We have never lost a conventional war. We lost or are losing in Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan American wars, from the Civil War through WW2 and Korea to a lesser extent, were fought using a "strategy of annihilation" where the military seeks to overwhelm the opponent and totally crush them. This is what US can do best, use superior training, numbers, weapons and funding to beat opponent. But you can't kill your way out of an insurgency COIN requires risk-taking. Have to get out of the MRAPs and Strykers and walk among the people. Military learned lesson from Vietnam, Lebanon, and Somalia that force protection is key for retaining public support, so they don't like risk taking The military doesn't work well w/ civilian orgs like State and USAID. Have different cultures and organizational structures. But in COIN need civilian orgs to work on legitimating the host government and doing reconstruction COIN is slow. Military likes to do things quickly like in the Gulf War. Public opinion doesn't support long wars, and the operation tempo/repeated deployments wear down on the AVF Military thinks it can just avoid insurgencies by not preparing for them Military has to balance between preparing for COIN and conventional conflicts. Conventional conflicts with a great power seem much more threatening to our way of life/the American homeland, so if military has to choose they prefer to be ready for these conflicts Additional, COIN ops tend to be much more ambiguous; American public can get on board with a conventional war vs. another world power; COIN ops, which are longer and more unclear in terms of seeing progress, are a harder sell

How did the U.S. military deal with the problem of fighting an insurgency in a dense urban environment in the second battle of Fallujah? Why is that solution not likely to work in other urban battles?

We tried to get civilians out (which kinda worked) and then just destroyed things Airstrikes Checkpoints Psy-ops Cutting off power before operation Reconnaissance