12. Political Regimes: Authoritarianism and Democratic Backsliding

Institutions, cont. - Does this mean that institutions under authoritarian rule are so weak as to be irrelevant (e.g. that elections are just "meaningless decorations" or exercises in futility?) So what purposes do authoritarian elections serve?

- First, let's consider elections: "Elections under authoritarianism serve many purposes, none of which involve the peaceful rotation of power, the imposition of accountability on elites, or the representation of citizen interests." So what purposes do authoritarian elections serve? - overwhelming election victories depend on the regime's ability to compel the population to turn out, and as such demonstrate its strength and deter opposition, especially from other elites - elections are useful for gauging the competence of officials in mobilizing the population, and to observe incipient resistance if actual turnout doesn't match expectations - elections may be used to facilitate orderly circulation of elites as a way of managing succession problems (i.e. the dictator may use a fake election to get rid of a competitor or to anoint a successor) - voters may participate or abstain (in some authoritarian regimes participation is not mandatory or not enforced) to express support or dissatisfaction, and thus provide the regime with useful information about the level of support it has in society

Institutions, cont. What about legislatures and parties? What functions do they serve?

- What about legislatures and parties? What functions do they serve? "...nominally democratic institutions - especially legislatures, parties, and even some elections - serve distinctively authoritarian ends: They help dictators resolve the problems of power-sharing and control... Whereas legislatures serve to represent the diversity of political interests in democracies ... their role in dictatorships is to enhance the stability of authoritarian power-sharing by alleviating commitment and monitoring problems among authoritarian elites... Whereas parties in democracies coordinate the political activities of like-minded citizens (see, e.g., Aldrich 1995), regime parties under dictatorship serve to co-opt the most capable and opportunistic among the masses in order to strengthen the regime."

4. Barriers to Collective Action ?

- authoritarian regimes maintain themselves through a combination of carrots and sticks: there are benefits for individuals and groups that cooperate, and costs imposed on those who challenge the rulers - while a regime is strong, the cost/benefit ratio is very much in favor of cooperation (or at least passive acceptance), but this can change very quickly in times of crisis - in other words, rational calculations and personal incentives can explain both the persistence of repressive regimes, as well as their sudden collapses: as long as the number of challengers is low, there is the "free rider" problem: the costs are high and benefits uncertain, so rationally it makes sense to let others take the risk (i.e. go out and demonstrate at the cost of persecution, imprisonment or even death) but when the challenge (e.g. street protests) gathers momentum, it becomes risky not to join in because if the challengers win, you may face sanctions as a collaborator of the former regime so eventually there comes a "tipping point" at which the regime's supporters — including the police and military — suddenly quit or defect to the opposition - the problem lies in getting the protest started in the first place: in the absence of effective coordination (which the rulers do their utmost to prevent, e.g. by censoring the news or limiting Internet access in times of crisis), an authoritarian regime can remain intact

3. Political culture ?

- just as with cultural traditions and democracy, the argument here is that is that some countries have cultural traditions more suited to authoritarianism, in that e.g. they emphasize authority, obedience and the good of the group over individual liberty - if a particular way of understanding authority is deeply embedded in national culture (e.g. preference for a "father of the nation" figure at the top), this may also affect the type of authoritarianism, e.g. personalistic rather than, say, bureaucratic.

List the Theories of authoritarian emergence and persistence ...

1. Historical Institutionalism 2. Poverty and Economic Inequality 3. Political culture 4. Barriers to Collective Action 5. Institutions

So what is it about? Authoritarian regimes must address a variety of problems, sometimes referred to as "dictator's dilemmas": NAME ALL OF THE DILEMMAS

1. The Problem of Authoritarian Power-Sharing 2. The Problem of Authoritarian Control 3. The Information Control Problem. 4. Accountability Problem 5. Loyalty vs Merit Problem 6. Escalating Predation Problem 7. Succession Problem

2. The Problem of Authoritarian Control

An authoritarian system cannot be run by coercion alone because coercion is costly (soldiers and police need to be equipped and paid), and because ramping it up brings diminishing returns (too much repression and the economy will crash). So all such systems require the cooperation of at least some portion of the general public. Dictators address this by offering so-called "authoritarian bargains," whereby citizens reconcile themselves to giving up civil and political rights in exchange for: economic benefits: promises of redistributing wealth from the "haves" to the "have nots," promises of secure employment, access to various state-run services (health, education), cheap food and housing, etc. non-economic benefits: dictators can also promise to "redistribute status", i.e. to elevate the esteem of some groups at the expense of others (e.g. in communist systems the workers and peasants were celebrated, while the middle and upper classes were vilified in official propaganda). In both cases (authoritarian control and authoritarian power-sharing) balancing co-optation (payoffs) vs. repression is difficult because: Too little repression may facilitate popular revolt; Too much repression may lead to catastrophic economic damage; Payoffs that are too small give regime supporters little reason to stay loyal; Payoffs that are too big may be crippling for the economy, and may make some elites strong enough to challenge the dictator in a coup (and it's coups that dictators fear the most.)

1. Historical Institutionalism ?

At critical historical junctures (i.e. moments of great change sparked by war, natural catastrophe, technological progress, discovery and exploration of new lands, etc.) coalitions of social groups create political institutions to serve their interests (i.e. these groups band together in order to reap benefits or to prevent losses of material wealth, status or core values). These institutions then last until another disruptive event comes along. - Historically, the key groups have been: - Traditional elites (churchmen, nobles, state officials) - Economic elites (landowners, industrialists) - Urban middle classes (the "bourgeoisie") - Working classes (peasants and, later industrial workers) - Soldiers, police and state security forces - For example, the European feudal model—a type of traditional authoritarianism—emerged in the 9th century as an alliance of the "throne, altar and sword" (i.e. state elites, religious elites and warrior elites) and lasted until it was gradually undermined by economic, social and technological changes of the Age of Discovery (from the16th century onward). REFER TO PIC

6. Escalating Predation Problem

Corruption is inherent in authoritarian rule (dictators use payoffs to keep their allies loyal), but can get worse over time: Authoritarian regimes founded by groups formed in an ideologically-driven, violent struggle (e.g. guerrilla combat) are quite resilient at first (see last slide for data) However, successive generations may be both more cynical and more preoccupied with amassing personal wealth before the systems collapses: "One-party regimes, however sophisticated, suffer from organizational ageing and decay. Leaders get progressively weaker (in terms of capabilities and ideological commitment); such regimes tend to attract careerists and opportunists who view their role in the regime from the perspective of an investor: they want to maximize their returns from their contribution to the regime's maintenance and survival. The result is escalating corruption, deteriorating governance, and growing alienation of the masses." Minxin Pei, "5 Ways China could become a democracy" http://thediplomat.com/2013/02/5-ways-china-could-become-a-democracy Also, turning a blind eye to escalating corruption by top elites is often accompanied by extremely unpopular crackdowns on corruption by everyone else (It's one thing to allow the dictator's top cronies to evade taxes, but if everyone does it, state finances will collapse. However, going after the little guys while the fat cats keep stealing with impunity is deeply unpopular.)

3. The Information Control Problem.

Dictators claim to "know best" how to lead the country, but since they do not in fact have any superior knowledge, they suppress debate and discussion (by officials, media outlets, even individual citizens) to prevent criticism of their regimes Fear of reprisals for speaking the truth leads to widespread preference falsification (i.e. a situation where "everyone is lying to everyone about everything"), so no one really knows the true state of the economy, the mood of the public, etc., and consequently dictators end up making decisions on the basis of false or poor information Dictators try to address it by making lying more costly by forcing individuals to engage in public displays of loyalty, the more over the top, the better ("Stalin in the heyday of his personality cult wished to be recognized as superlative in everything - philosophy, linguistics, military strategy - like an omniscient deity." Source: Nina Tumarkin. 1983. Lenin Lives! The Lenin Cult in Soviet Russia, p. 60)

4. Accountability Problem

Dictators often claim to know which policies are best and they are in a position to actually carry them out without the messiness of democratic checks and balances. But dictators don't really have any superior knowledge or insight (i.e. they do not really possess the super-human skills they often claim to have). And since no democratic accountability or constraints imposed by public opinion, the media or the courts exist, there is no way to stop really bad policies before they lead to disaster (e.g. in the Chinese political tradition, this is called the "bad emperor" problem).

5. Loyalty vs Merit Problem

Dictators often reward loyalty rather than competence because they fear competent individuals as potential rivals or threats. Consequently, authoritarian systems tend to degenerate over time as incompetent loyalists (rather than "the best and brightest") rise through the ranks. This happens because loyalty turns into a kind of currency with which ambitious individuals buy their way to the top. But as more and more people do it, flattery becomes devalued, leading to ever more elaborate, over-the-top displays (this is called in the political science jargon "flattery inflation"). EXAMPLE CARTOON DESCRIPTION: A cartoon from a Polish satirical magazine; the caption reads: "I'm keeping him away from important departments." This is a reference to Emperor Caligula, who made his horse a Consul in the Roman Senate. He did it in part to humiliate other senators, but also to send a signal to ambitious outsiders: stick with me and you'll go far, even if you lack the necessary qualifications. There is no historical evidence, however, that Caligula appreciated the dangers of appointing incompetents (or horses) to important positions...

Authoritarianism ?

In a generic sense, in political science the term "authoritarian" refers to any political regime that is not democratic. In other words, authoritarian regimes may be defined negatively, by the absence of things—free elections, rule of law, independent media—that are associated with democracy. Alternatively, authoritarian regimes may be defined qualitatively and classified into discrete types:

How Authoritarian Regimes Work ?

It is easy to caricature dictators as unhinged, power-mad egomaniacs, but it is important to remember that not all authoritarian regimes are personalistic, and even in those that are, the dictator's personality is not the whole story. In short, "dictatorship is not about the dictator" (Robertson, "Think Again: Dictators")

1. The Problem of Authoritarian Power-Sharing

Like all regimes, authoritarian systems need to perform the basic tasks of statehood: raising revenues, maintaining order, defending borders, providing public goods, managing the economy, etc. These tasks are complex and require the cooperation of many individuals and groups: bureaucrats, soldiers, bankers, judges, business and labor leaders, etc. Dictators gain cooperation by offering outsize benefits (very rapid promotions, access to lucrative government contracts, opportunities to profit from corruption) to those who agree to serve the system; on the flip side, those who do not cooperate are shut out (or worse). However, these promises lack credibility (i.e. the dictator can renege on a promise and there is no independent authority - like a proper court of law - to do anything about it). Both sides know this, so dictators attempt to solve these commitment problems by creating institutions (e.g. political parties) to regulate access to benefits (see finding on last slide that party-based regimes are more durable) Hence one of dictator's dilemmas is that stronger institutions (i.e. more predictable, more rules-based) help to solve commitment problems, but weaken the dictator's ability to act unfettered.

7. Succession Problem

No dictator lives forever, so authoritarian regimes - with their weak institutions and often no clear rules for succession - face the problem that no one really knows what will happen after he passes on: close allies of an aging ruler may want to strike first to keep their place at the top; those who have been sidelined sense an opportunity to gain power and may also want to strike first, so authoritarian systems (especially of the "personalistic" type) often experience a period of turmoil after the dictator dies. (The recent movie The Death of Stalin is very good on this.)

5. Institutions ?

One argument is that states with weak or deficient institutions (e.g. legal systems that fail to uphold the rule of law, electoral commissions unable to secure free and fair elections, bureaucracies crippled by bribery and clientelism, etc.) are likelier to turn authoritarian and stay that way: - Weak institutions result in more "predation" (i.e. corrupt self-enrichment) by regime insiders, particularly in the presence of natural resources. Some argue that the so-called "resource curse" (i.e. that states rich in natural resources are more likely to be authoritarian) is really the curse of states with weak institutions. - But since dictators need to allow predation to sustain their coalitions (i.e. to pay off their social base, their administrators, soldiers, police), they deliberately keep things that way. The price is economic stagnation and continuing underdevelopment, but it's the price dictators are willing to pay. In other words, pervasive corruption in authoritarianism is not accidental (it is not a "bug in the system," it is the system). These regimes "get it wrong" on purpose, because stronger institutions would make predation more difficult.

Types of Authoritarianism?

TRADITIONAL: (e.g. hereditary monarchies or aristocratic oligarchies), where power is justified with a reference to a customary way of doing things (e.g. limiting access to political power to those with noble status, transmitted through heredity); such regimes generally seek to preserve the existing social order. The majority of political regimes in human history have been of this type. THEOCRATIC: the key characteristics of theocratic regimes are the justification of political power on the basis of religious authority and the use the state to enforce religious orthodoxy TOTALITARIAN: regimes which are revolutionary in nature, are guided by an overarching ideology; which aspire to absolute, total control of their societies; and which tend to use violence on a massive scale PERSONALISTIC: their key characteristic is the role of a single individual (the "dictator") who exercises power relatively free from institutional constraints (i.e. does not have to bother with a constitution, laws, procedures, etc.) BUREAUCRATIC AUTHORITARIAN: run on the basis of impersonal rules and procedures by organizations (e.g. parties) that have the key characteristics of bureaucracy (hierarchical organization, functional specializations, standard operating procedures, etc.), often in conjunction with some kind of "technocratic" (i.e. performance-based ) legitimation. ELECTORAL AUTHORITARIAN / COMPETITIVE AUTHORITARIAN / HYBRID: they allow some freedoms and hold multi-party elections, but the rules are "rigged" so that incumbents are at no risk of losing.

2. Poverty and Economic Inequality ?

just as economic growth is correlated and perhaps causally connected to democracy, poverty and inequality may lead to authoritarianism poverty leads to greater concern with economic issues than with political liberties, and provides opportunities for would-be authoritarians to seek power either to protect the "haves," or to help the "have nots" economic inequality leads to fear and mistrust between groups: the wealthy and the middle classes want to protect what they have traditional elites (nobility, churches) want to defend their status and privileges the poor want redistribution the first two groups fear losing out under democracy and thus might favor authoritarian rule