Civil lib court case summary

United States v. Lee

Appellee, a farmer and carpenter, is a member of the Old Order Amish, who believe that there is a religiously based obligation to provide for their fellow members the kind of assistance contemplated by the social security system. During certain years when he employed other Amish to work on his farm and in his carpentry shop, appellee failed to withhold social security taxes from his employees or to pay the employer's share of such taxes because he believed that payment of the taxes and receipt of benefits would violate the Amish faith. After the Internal Revenue Service assessed him for the unpaid taxes, appellee paid a certain amount and then sued in Federal District Court for a refund, claiming that imposition of the taxes violated his First Amendment free exercise of religion rights and those of his employees. The District Court held the statutes requiring appellee to pay social security taxes unconstitutional as applied, basing its holding on both 26 U.S.C. § 1402(g), which exempts from social security taxes, on religious grounds, self-employed Amish and others, and the First Amendment. Held: 1. The exemption provided by § 1402(g), being available only to self-employed individuals, does not apply to employers or employees, and hence appellee and his employees are not within its provisions. P. 455 U. S. 256. 2. The imposition of social security taxes is not unconstitutional as applied to such persons as appellee who object on religious grounds to receipt of public insurance benefits and to payment of taxes to support public insurance funds. Pp. 455 U. S. 256-261. (a) While there is a conflict between the Amish faith and the obligations imposed by the social security system, not all burdens on religion are unconstitutional. The state may justify a limitation on religious liberty by showing that it is essential to accomplish an overriding governmental interest. Pp. 455 U. S. 256-258. (b) Widespread individual voluntary coverage under social security would undermine the soundness of the social security system, and would make such system almost a contradiction in terms, and difficult, if not impossible, to administer. Pp. 455 U. S. 258-259. Page 455 U. S. 253 (c) It would be difficult to accommodate the social security system with myriad exceptions flowing from a wide variety of religious beliefs such as the Amish. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205, distinguished. There is no principled way, for purposes of this case, to distinguish between general taxes and those imposed under the Social Security Act. The tax system could not function if denominations were allowed to challenge it because tax payments were spent in a manner that violates their religious belief. Because the broad public interest in maintaining a sound tax system is of such a high order, religious belief in conflict with the payment of taxes affords no basis for resisting the tax. Pp. 455 U. S. 259-260. (d) Congress, in § 1402(g), has accommodated, to the extent compatible with a comprehensive national program, the practices of those who believe it a violation of their faith to participate in the social security system. When followers of a particular sect enter into commercial activity as a matter of choice, the limits they accept on their own conduct as a matter of conscience and faith are not to be superimposed on the statutory schemes that are binding on others in that activity. Granting an exemption from social security taxes to an employer operates to impose the employer's religious faith on the employees. The tax imposed on employers to support the social security system must be uniformly applicable to all, except as Congress explicitly provides otherwise. Pp. 455 U. S. 260-261.

Grutter v. Bollinger

Brief Fact Summary. When Barbara Grutter (Plaintiff), a white Michigan resident with a 3.8 grade average and 161 LSAT score, was denied admission to the University of Michigan Law School (Defendant), she sued the latter in federal district court, alleging racial discrimination against her in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment on the basis of the law school's (Defendant) direct consideration of race as a factor in the admissions process Synopsis of Rule of Law. Diversity is a compelling interest that can justify the narrowly tailored use of race when public universities select applicants for admission. Facts. The University of Michigan Law School (Defendant) receives more than 3,500 applications each year for a class of 350 students. The Law School's (Defendant) admissions committee tried to achieve diversity in the student body by requiring admissions officials to evaluate each applicant based on all the information in the file, including a personal statement, letters of recommendation, a student's essay, GPA score, LSAT score, as well as so-called "soft variables." Plus, the admissions policy specifically stressed the Law School's (Defendant) longstanding commitment to racial and ethical diversity. In this regard, the official admission policy noted that by enrolling a "critical mass" of underrepresented minority students, Defendant sought "to ensure their ability to make unique contributions to the character of the Law School." When Barbara Grutter (Plaintiff), a white Michigan resident with a 3.8 grade average and 161 LSAT score, applied for admission but was denied, she sued the Law School (Defendant) in federal district court, claiming racial discrimination against her in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Following a 15-day bench trial, the district court upheld Plaintiff's claim. The court of appeals reversed. Plaintiff appealed Issue. Is diversity a compelling interest that can justify the narrowly tailored use of race when public universities select applicants for admission? Held. (O'Connor, J.) Yes. Diversity is a compelling interest that can justify the narrowly tailored use of race when public universities select applicants for admission. In this case, the Law School's (Defendant) admissions program bears the hallmarks of a narrowly tailored plan. Truly individualized consideration demands that race be used in a flexible, non-mechanical way. It follows from this mandate that universities cannot establish quotas for members of certain racial groups or put members of those groups on separate admission tracks. Universities also cannot insulate applicants who belong to certain racial or ethnic groups from the competition for admission. However, as was done here, universities can consider race or ethnicity more flexibly as a "plus" factor in the context of individualized consideration of each and every applicant. The Law School's (Defendant) goal of attaining a critical mass of underrepresented minority students does not transform its program into a quota. The evidence indicated that the Defendant engaged in a highly individualized, holistic review of each applicant's file, giving serious consideration to all the ways an applicant might contribute to a "diverse educational environment." In addition, evidence showed that the Defendant gives substantial weight to diversity factors besides race by frequently accepting nonminority applicants with grades and test scores lower than underrepresented minority applicants. There was no Law School (Defendant) policy, either de facto or de jure, of automatic acceptance or rejection based on any single "soft" variable. Narrow tailoring does not require exhaustion of every conceivable race-neutral alternative. It also does not require a university to choose between maintaining a reputation for excellence or fulfilling a commitment to provide educational opportunities to members of all racial groups. Affirmed Dissent. (Rehnquist, C.J.) The Law School's (Defendant) means are not narrowly tailored to the interest it asserts. Stripped of its "critical mass" veil, the program is revealed as an obvious effort to achieve racial balancing. As the numbers demonstrate, the Defendant plainly employs racial preferences in extending offers of admission. It engages in precisely the type of racial balancing that the Court itself calls "patently unconstitutional." (Kennedy, J.) The Law School (Defendant) has not demonstrated how individual consideration is, or can be, preserved at this stage of the application process given the instruction to attain what it calls critical mass. (Scalia, J.) Unlike a clear constitutional holding that racial preferences in state educational institutions are not permitted, or even a clear anticonstitutional holding, today's decision seems willfully designed to prolong the controversy and the litigation. The Constitution proscribes government discrimination on the basis of race and state-provided education is no exception. (Thomas, J.) I believe blacks can achieve in every avenue of American life without the meddling of university administrators. The majority upholds the Law School's (Defendant) racial discrimination not by interpreting the people's Constitution, but by responding to a faddish slogan of the cognoscenti. Concurrence. (Ginsburg, J.) From today's vantage point, one may hope, but not know for sure, that over the next generation's span, progress toward nondiscrimination and genuinely equal opportunity will make it safe to sunset affirmative action Discussion. As shown in Grutter and predecessor Supreme Court decisions, not every decision influenced by race is equally objectionable, and "strict scrutiny" is designed to provide a framework for carefully examining the importance and the sincerity of the reasons advanced by the governmental decisionmaker for the use of race in any given context.

Lynch v. Donnelly

Brief Fact Summary. A city's Christmas display in a park located in the heart of the city's shopping district was held by the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) to not be in violation of the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution (Constitution). Synopsis of Rule of Law. In this case, the inquiry must be on the display in the context of the Christmas season. Viewed in this context, the question is whether there is sufficient evidence to establish that the inclusion of the display is a purposeful or surreptitious effort to express some kind of governmental advocacy of a particular religious message. Facts. Each year, in cooperation with the downtown retail merchants' association, the City of Pawtucket, Rhode Island, erects a Christmas display as part of its observance of the Christmas holiday season. The display is situated in a park located in the heart of the city's shopping district and is owned by a nonprofit organization. The display reads, "SEASONS GREETINGS" and includes many figurines including Mary, Jesus and Joseph. Costs for erecting and maintaining the display are nominal to the city. The District Court held that the city's inclusion of the display violated the Establishment Clause of the Constitution and a divided panel of the First Circuit Court affirmed. Issue. Whether there is sufficient evidence to establish that the inclusion of the display is a purposeful or surreptitious effort to express some kind of governmental advocacy of a particular religious message? Held. No. Judgment of the First Circuit Court reversed. The Government has long recognized and subsidized holidays with religious significance. Rather than mechanically invalidating all governmental conduct or statutes that confer benefits or give special recognition to religion in general or to one special faith, the Supreme Court has scrutinized challenged legislation or official conduct to determine whether, in reality, it establishes a religion or religious faith, or tends to do so. In this case, the inquiry must be on the display in the context of the Christmas season. Viewed in this context, there is insufficient evidence to establish that the inclusion of the display is a purposeful or surreptitious effort to express some kind of governmental advocacy of a particular religious message. Here, whatever benefit to one faith or religion or to all religions, is indirect, remote and incidental. To forbid the use of this display, at the very time people are singing hymns and carols i n our public schools, is contrary to our history and our holdings. Dissent. The city's maintenance and display of these symbols cannot be squared with our prior cases. There is no evidence that the framers would have approved a Federal celebration of the Christmas holiday. The city's action is a coercive step toward establishing the sectarian preferences of the majority at the expense of the minority. The import of this decision is to encourage the use of such displays in a municipally-sponsored fashion, a setting where Christians feel constrained in acknowledging its symbolic meaning and where non-Christians feel alienated by its presence. Concurrence. There needs to be a clarification of the Establishment Clause of the Constitution. Further, the display at issue cannot be fairly understood as to convey a message of government endorsement of religion. Discussion. Interestingly, the majority upheld a Christmas display erected and maintained by a municipality and not being in violation of the Establishment Clause of the Constitution. This case shows how the Supreme Court looks at each challenge based on the Establishment Clause of the Constitution individually.

Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena

Brief Fact Summary. A federal policy offered contractors working for the government extra compensation for hiring minority businesses. A construction company awarded a subcontract to a minority owned business, despite the fact that a non-minority owned business offered to do the work for less money. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Federal racial classifications must serve a compelling governmental interest and must be narrowly tailored to further that interest. Facts. The United States Department of Transportation awarded a prime contract to Mountain Gravel & Construction Company (Mountain Gravel). Mountain Gravel then solicited bids from subcontractors for the guardrail portion of the prime contract. The Petitioner, Adarand Constructors, Inc. (Petitioner) submitted the low bid. But, Gonzalez Construction Company (Gonzalez) was awarded the subcontract. Mount Gravel's prime contract provided that Mount Gravel would receive extra compensation if it hired subcontractors qualified as small "socially and economically disadvantaged" businesses. Federal law presumed that Blacks, Hispanics, Native Americans and Asian Pacific Americans ran socially and economically disadvantaged businesses. Gonzalez had qualified as a small socially and economically disadvantaged business. The Petitioner had not. Issue. What standard of review applies to the federal program, to the extent that it defined disadvantage by race? Did the presumption defining disadvantage partly by race violate the Fifth Amendment constitutional obligation not to deny anyone the equal protection of the laws? Held. Strict Scrutiny and maybe. The case is remanded to the lower courts for determination of whether the program passes the test of strict scrutiny. Strict scrutiny of all governmental racial classifications is necessary because (1) it may not always be clear whether a so-called benign classification is in fact benign; (2) the courts should take a skeptical view of all racial classifications and (3) there should be consistency of treatment regardless of the race of the person burdened or benefited. "Strict in theory" does not necessarily imply "fatal in fact". When race-based action is necessary to further a compelling interest, such action is constitutional when it satisfies the narrow tailoring requirement. Dissent. Justice John Paul Stevens (J. Stevens) states the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) assumes there is no difference between a decision by the majority to impose a burden on the minority and a decision by the majority to provide a benefit to the minority notwithstanding the incidental burden certain members of the majority will incur. The Supreme Court would disregard the difference between a "No Trespassing" sign and a welcome mat. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg (J. Ginsburg) stated that given this Country's racial history and its consequences, Congress should be able to carefully design remedial programs to help us finally realize the "equal protection of the laws" the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution) has promised since 1868. Concurrence. Justice Antonin Scalia (J. Scalia) stated that the government could never have a compelling interest for discriminating on the basis of race in order to "make up" for past discrimination. There is no such thing under the Constitution of the United States as a debtor or creditor race. Justice Clarence Thomas (J. Thomas) stated government programs based on benign racial classifications are just as noxious as those inspired by malicious prejudice. Discussion. In City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., the Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution requires strict scrutiny of all race-based programs adopted by state or local governments. In this case, the Supreme Court brings the standard of judicial review for state and local governments into harmony with that for the federal government. The Supreme Court says that there should be no different treatment between claims brought under the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause and those brought under the Equal Protection component of the Fifth Amendment due process clause.

Regents of the University of California v. Bakke

Brief Fact Summary. A white student was denied admission into medical school despite having scores higher than minority student admitted into the school under a special quota system. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Race-based classifications, for purposes of school admissions, are constitutional. The use of racial-quotas, however, is unconstitutional. Facts. The Respondent, Alan Bakke (Respondent), a white male, applied to, and was rejected, by the Davis Medical School in 1973 and 1974. The school's admission program allowed for sixteen out of 100 slots to be reserved for the admission of minority students. The Respondent argued that his grade point average and MCAT scores were higher than minorities who were granted admissions, within the sixteen slots, into the school. The California Supreme Court ruled in favor of his equal protection claim declaring that the admissions program was unlawful and enjoined the School from considering the race of an applicant. The judgment was affirmed in part and reversed in part. Issue. The issues are as follows: Whether Davis' admissions policy that reserved sixteen slots for each entering class of 100 students to disadvantaged minority students deprived white students of their rights guaranteed under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution). Whether Davis' admissions policy violated Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Held. The holdings of the Court are as follows: Justice Lewis Powell (J. Powell). Yes and No. A school's admissions policy should be permitted to take into account an applicant's membership in a racial minority. However, the use of racial quotas to achieve a certain amount of minority students is unconstitutional. The strict scrutiny standard must be applied when any racial group is treated differently. Considering race in a school's admission's policy withstands strict scrutiny because the policy would create an institution that was more "ethnically-diverse." However, it is not necessary to use quotas to achieve the goal of ethnic diversity. Instead of using quotas, the school should consider a student's minority status as a "plus" among the overall credentials of the applicant. The judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part. Justice Lewis Powell (J. Powell). No. Because Davis' admission's policy does not violate the Constitution on the basis that it considers race, Title VI is not violated. Title VI is only violated if the Constitutional is also violated. Dissent. The dissenting opinions are as follows: Justice John Paul Stevens (J. Stevens). "Race cannot be the basis of excluding anyone from participation in a federally funded program. . . . " Justices William Brennan, Justice Byron White, Justice Thurgood Marshall and Justice Harry Blackmun (J. Brennan, J. White, J. Marshall, and J. Blackmun). The use of racial quotas for purposes of school admissions is not unconstitutional. The intermediate level of scrutiny should have been applied to this case rather than the strict scrutiny standard. Concurrence. The concurring opinions are as follows: Justices William Brennan, Justice Byron White, Justice Thurgood Marshall and Justice Harry Blackmun (J. Brennan, J. White, J. Marshall, and J. Blackmun). The Medical School's admission policy, which reserves slots for disadvantaged minorities, is constitutional. Justice Thurgood Marshall (J. Marshall). "I agree with the judgment of the Court only insofar as it permits a university to consider the race of an applicant in making admissions decisions. I do not agree that the [school"s] admission program violates the Constitution." Justice Harry Blackmun (J. Blackmun). In order to resolve racial problems, "we must first take account of race." "[I]n order to treat some persons equally, we must treat them differently." Discussion. In order to mend the harmful effects of race discrimination, racial minorities who have been historically discriminated against need to be treated differently in order to be treated equally under the requirements of the Constitution.

Virginia v. Black

Brief Fact Summary. Black (D) was convicted under Virginia's (P) cross-burning statute. He argued that it was an unconstitutional law because under it any cross-burning was treated as prima facie evidence of the intention to create fear in another. Synopsis of Rule of Law. If a state's cross-burning statute treats any such incident as being on the face of it an intention to intimidate another, it violates the constitution. Facts. Black (D) was prosecuted because of burning a cross, and convicted of the same by a jury, under the cross-burning statute of Virginia (P) which bans cross burning with the object of creating fear in a person or a group. Such an action is taken to be evidence, prima facie, of such an intention, under a section of the law. The Virginia Supreme Court upheld the decision and Black (D) appealed. Issue. Is the provision in this or any other state's cross-burning statute unconstitutional in viewing any such incident as prima facie evidence of having an intention to create fear in, or a threat to another person or group? Held. (O'Connor, J.) Yes. A provision in a cross-burning statute of any state which declares that an incident of this nature is an expression of the intent to threaten or otherwise cause fear in another person or group is a violation of the constitution. The burning of a cross is always a hate symbol, though it may sometimes also include the idea of threat. The threat may at times be the predominant message. The consistent view of the Supreme Court on intimidatory speech has been that the government has the authority to control some classes of expression if the constitution so calls for it, and also that intimidation is a type of real threat if the word is used in the sense that the constitution prohibits. In this sense, Virginia may prohibit the burning of a cross done with the intent to threaten because it is a very deadly threat. This is not a violation of the First Amendment's guarantee of free speech. Even more, Virginia has the freedom to choose to enact laws against this particular form of intimidation instead of against all intimidatory speech, just because cross-burning has a long history of being followed soon afterward by violence. But in the statute under consideration, the provision is that any burning of a cross is obvious evidence that there is an intent to threaten a group or individual. This in fact removes the reason for the state to ban cross-burning as a sign of threat. With this provision the jury may straightaway convict the defendant of the offense in any case where the defendant chooses not to offer a defense, as is his right under law, instead of having to weigh the evidence before them in the light of the law. Such a provision would therefore create a very high possibility that a citizen's ideas would be suppressed instead of expressed, by the probability of conviction. It is necessary to separate the expression of anger or hatred from the expression of an intent to cause harm or threat as the ground of lawful conviction. The First Amendment does not allow feelings to be interpreted as an intent to perform unlawful actions. The decision is affirmed and the case remanded. Dissent. (Thomas, J.) The mistake made by the majority is in interpreting an activity as an expression. In the U.S. cross-burning has almost without exception come to mean activity outside the pale of law, which brings about a justifiable fear of violent sequelae in the victims of such activity. Hatred may be expressed but law does not allow inducing terror or fear of harm in others to express such hatred. Concurrence. (Scalia, J.) I agree with the Court that a state may prohibit the burning of a cross when carried out with the intent to threaten harm, without violating the First Amendment, but the majority decision of the Court to declare the prima facie provision of the Virginia statute invalid seems unjustified. (Souter, J.) I agree that the law does distinguish between content of different kinds of expression inside the category of punishable intimidation, but I disagree with the Court that any exception should therefore make the statute non-violative of the First Amendment. My opinion is that any content-based statute should be disallowed unless it is very probable that it does not encourage the government to suppress ideas. Discussion. The Court made it clear that in this statute, the provision at fault was the one which allowed all cross-burning to be treated as prima facie evidence of the intent to threaten, regardless of all contextual evidence which would be needed to independently arrive at such a conclusion. However, several legal experts concur with Justice Thomas's dissenting opinion that an act of cross-burning carries no other meaning but that of intimidation.

Zelman v. Simmons-Harris

Brief Fact Summary. The Cleveland public schools were performing badly, and in an effort to resolve this issue, the state of Ohio put into effect a school voucher plan under which parents could opt to enroll their children in private schools taking part in the program. Since a great majority of the private schools were affiliated to one or other religious group, Ohio taxpayers filed an action against the program pleading violation of the Establishment Clause. Synopsis of Rule of Law. A school voucher program which allows parents to send their children to a private school is not in violation of the Establishment Clause, where the vast majority of participating private schools are affiliated to religious groups. Facts.Ohio started up a Pilot Project Scholarship Program aimed at any family in an Ohio school district which was under federal control owing to a court decree. Cleveland City School District had a dismal performance compared to others. Under the project certain students in this district could attend participating public or private schools of their parents' choice and receive tuition scholarship, or remain in their own public school with tutorial aid. There was no distinction made in participation eligibility between religious and non-religious schools in the district, nor against public schools in the adjacent district. The criterion for tuition aid was the financial status of the parents, who could spend it entirely at their discretion in enrolling their children in schools of their choice. The program included the condition that the number of tutorial fee grants to children who chose to remain in public school must be equal to the number of tuition aid scholarships. In 1999-2000, 82 percent of participating private schools were religious, none of the adjacent district's public schools chose to take part, and 96 percent of the scholarship students were enrolled in religious schools. 60 percent were from low income families, at or below the poverty line. Other options under this program included community schools, which were run by their own boards but funded by the state, and received double the funding per student as a private school did; magnet schools, which are public but stress some specific area of teaching, method of teaching, or service. Ohio taxpayers (P) sought an injunction against the program on the ground that the state was encouraging religious instruction. The district court granted summary judgment to them, and the verdict was affirmed by the court of appeals. The Supreme Court reviewed the case. Issue. Is a school voucher program which allows parents to send their children to a private school in violation of the Establishment Clause, where the vast majority of participating private schools are affiliated to religious groups? Held. (Rehnquist, C.J.) No. A school voucher program which allows parents to send their children to a private school is not in violation of the Establishment Clause, where the vast majority of participating private schools are affiliated to religious groups. The purpose of the program in this case is secular, without a doubt. It is meant to assist poor children in a failing public school to complete their education. The issue then is whether the program advances or inhibits religion. The Court's ruling in Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) and following related cases shows that a government aid project cannot be easily defeated with reference to the Establishment Clause provided it gives no deference to religion, and makes aid available to a class of citizens who by their own voluntary and independent choice channel that aid to religious schools. Such is the case in this program which is therefore supported by the constitution. It favors no religion nor even religion in the abstract, it is part of a state plan to make education available to children in a school district where such opportunity is largely absent, is part of a more general and multi-pronged action plan, and shows no discrimination towards the recipients of the educational aid except on financial grounds, in that poor families receive greater preference for admission and more aid. It allows all schools irrespective of religious affiliation to participate, including public schools in the adjacent district. It not only does not incentivize private schools, but in fact provides disincentives. A participating private school gets only half the aid a community school receives, and only a third of that given to magnet schools. Adjacent public schools get two to three times this amount. Families which choose to send their children to private schools too have disincentives in that they have to contribute towards the school tuition, whereas in public, community or magnet schools tuition is completely free. This is therefore in no sense a government endorsement of religion. Another important point is that the program gives ample opportunity for parents to choose secular educational options if preferred, among the various alternatives offered such as continuing to send their child to the same public school, using tutorial aid paid for by the program in public school, obtaining a scholarship to attend a religious private school, use the same scholarship to attend a non-religious school, enroll in a community college or in a magnet school. Thus the Establishment Clause is not violated in the sense that Ohio in no sense promotes or coerces the parents to send children to religious schools. The other argument of the taxpayers that 96 percent of the scholarship recipients were in religious schools, which violates the constitution, is already addressed in Mueller. Just because most private schools in a certain area or at a certain time are religious, or why this is so, or most scholarship recipients choose to enroll at a religious school is not the touchstone to decide on the constitutionality of a school district program. Thus the Ohio program is neutral to religion, uses only financial need and geographical location with respect to a particular school district as criteria, and enables true and full choice to the beneficiaries of such aid as to the options available to utilize the aid. It is thus a program which protects true private choice. The verdict is reversed. Dissent. (Souter, J .)The voucher program uses tax money to pay for religious instruction as well as for secular instruction. In the case of Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947) which is a still standing verdict, the Court specified that no tax is allowed to be used to support a religious activity or institution. In this case it is clear that a large proportion of the money under the voucher program will be spent on religious schools in amounts which cover almost the whole of the tuition. This money is thus spent to give eligible students under the program religious instruction in addition to secular teaching, in schools which exist for the purpose of teaching religion. Thus tax money is spent in teaching religion. The Court cannot ignore the verdict in Everson without ignoring the significance of neutrality and private choice. If the history of the Clause is considered, this opinion creates a new type of thinking regarding this statute which holds the real nature of government aid to be insignificant as regards its constitutional nature, and treats the issues of neutrality in making aid available and private choice in using that aid as merely formalities. Thus the conclusion would be that the majority opinion has mostly disposed of the Establishment Clause as regards educational aid, as non-applicable in reality, though Everson remains the test of soundness in this aspect. Concurrence. (O'Connor, J.) Here the program makes no distinction between religious and non-religious schools. Both are reasonable educational alternatives in the program. Many of the beneficiaries do in fact use community, magnet or non-religious private schools. Since true private choice is available, the program does not violate the Establishment Clause. (Thomas, J.) The protection of religious liberty using the Fourth Amendment is legitimate, but to use the Establishment Clause to prevent the operation of a perfectly neutral program concerning school choice is not. Education is a necessity to take hold of the protection afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, the importance of the program in providing educational opportunity to a wide range of deprived minority children is in keeping with the Establishment Clause. Discussion. The traditional stand of the Court has been that a law is neutral with respect to its primary effect if the religious consequence is non-immediate, incidental and indirect. The demography of the school district encouraged enrollment in religious schools under a program of this design, and so the religious impact was neither a byproduct nor remote, so the dissent suggests. There are unanswered questions such as whether there is an existing provision in the constitution to prevent discrimination by schools receiving aid, by including such conditions in the voucher programs, and whether the state laws which specifically prevent the use of aid for religious schools are themselves violations of the constitution.

Holt v. Hobbs

Gregory Holt (also known as Abdul Maalik Muhammad) was an inmate of the Arkansas Department of Corrections and a practicing Salafi Muslim. He sought an injunction and temporary relief from the enforcement of the Arkansas Department of Corrections' grooming policy, which allowed trimmed mustaches and quarter-inch beards for diagnosed dermatological problems but otherwise no facial hair. Holt argued that growing a beard was a necessary part of the practice of his religion, that the grooming policy significantly burdened his ability to do so, and that the grooming policy was therefore a violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). Holt was willing to limit his beard to a length of one-half inch as a form of compromise with the policy. The district court granted temporary relief but then dismissed the complaint upon being presented with evidence of the other ways in which Holt was allowed to practice his religion and the extent to which the grooming policy was necessary to maintain prison security. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. Question Does the Arkansas Department of Corrections grooming policy violate the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act by preventing Holt from growing a one-half-inch beard in accordance with his religious beliefs? Conclusion • UNANIMOUS DECISION FOR HOLT MAJORITY OPINION BY SAMUEL A. ALITO, JR. Yes. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 9-0 majority. The Court held that the Arkansas Department of Corrections policy on beards violates the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA). The Court held that, while providing substantial protection of religious exercise, RLUIPA allows prison officials to test the sincerity of religious beliefs to prevent these from being used for illicit conduct. In this case, Holt met the standard for accommodation established in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. —that an accommodation must be based on a sincerely held religious belief—because he was neither slight nor idiosyncratic with the tenets of Islam. Further, the Court held that the district court erred in suggesting that Holt's other religious privileges demonstrated a reasonable accommodation of Holt's beliefs. The prison officials had the burden to prove that preventing inmates from growing beards furthered a compelling government interest and that this policy was the least restrictive means of interference, but the Court held that prison officials did not satisfy that burden in this case because other steps could be taken to ensure quick identification and an inability to hide contraband. In her concurring opinion, Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote that, while RLUIPA does not require prison officials to refute every less restrictive means of furthering a compelling government interest, Arkansas officials responded inadequately to the Holt's objections. However, Justice Sotomayor disagreed with the majority opinion's dismissal of the explanations of the prison officials. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a concurring opinion in which she objected to the majority opinion's use of the Hobby Lobby decision, because in this case the requested accommodation would not affect the religious beliefs of others.

MICHAEL A. WHREN and JAMES L. BROWN, PETITIONERS v. UNITED STATES

Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court. On the evening of June 10, 1993, plainclothes vice squad officers of the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department were patrolling a "high drug area" of the city in an unmarked car. Their suspicions were aroused when they passed a dark Pathfinder truck with temporary license plates and youthful occupants waiting at a stop sign, the driver looking down into the lap of the passenger at his right. The truck remained stopped at the intersection for what seemed an unusually long time--more than 20 seconds. When the police car executed a U turn in order to head back toward the truck, the Pathfinder turned suddenly to its right, without signalling, and sped off at an "unreasonable" speed. The policemen followed, and in a short while overtook the Pathfinder when it stopped behind other traffic at a red light. They pulled up alongside, and Officer Ephraim Soto stepped out and approached the driver's door, identifying himself as a police officer and directing the driver, petitioner Brown, to put the vehicle in park. When Soto drew up to the driver's window, he immediately observed two large plastic bags of what appeared to be crack cocaine in petitioner Whren's hands. Petitioners were arrested, and quantities of several types of illegal drugs were retrieved from the vehicle. Petitioners were charged in a four count indictment with violating various federal drug laws, including 21 U.S.C. §§ 844(a) and 860(a). At a pretrial suppression hearing, they challenged the legality of the stop and the resulting seizure of the drugs. They argued tha[t]...Officer Soto's asserted ground for approaching the vehicle--to give the driver a warning concerning traffic violations-- was pretextual. Petitioners accept that Officer Soto had probable cause to believe that various provisions of the District of Columbia traffic code had been violated. See 18 D. C. Mun. Regs. §§2213.4 (1995) ("An operator shall . . . give full time and attention to the operation of the vehicle"); 2204.3 ("No person shall turn any vehicle . . . without giving an appropriate signal"); 2200.3 ("No person shall drive a vehicle . . . at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions"). They argue, however, that "in the unique context of civil traffic regulations" probable cause is not enough. Since, they contend, the use of automobiles is so heavily and minutely regulated that total compliance with traffic and safety rules is nearly impossible, a police officer will almost invariably be able to catch any given motorist in a technical violation. This creates the temptation to use traffic stops as a means of investigating other law violations, as to which no probable cause or even articulable suspicion exists. Petitioners, who are both black, further contend that police officers might decide which motorists to stop based on decidedly impermissible factors, such as the race of the car's occupants. To avoid this danger, they say, the Fourth Amendment test for traffic stops should be, not the normal one (applied by the Court of Appeals) of whether probable cause existed to justify the stop; but rather, whether a police officer, acting reasonably, would have made the stop for the reason given. Not only have we never held, outside the context of inventory search or administrative inspection (discussed above), that an officer's motive invalidates objectively justifiable behavior under the Fourth Amendment; but we have repeatedly held and asserted the contrary. In United States v. Villamonte Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 584, n. 3 (1983), we held that an otherwise valid warrantless boarding of a vessel by customs officials was not rendered invalid "because the customs officers were accompanied by a Louisiana state policeman, and were following an informant's tip that a vessel in the ship channel was thought to be carrying marihuana." We flatly dismissed the idea that an ulterior motive might serve to strip the agents of their legal justification. In United States v. Robinson,414 U.S. 218 (1973), we held that a traffic violation arrest (of the sort here) would not be rendered invalid by the fact that it was "a mere pretext for a narcotics search," id., at 221, n. 1; and that a lawful post arrest search of the person would not be rendered invalid by the fact that it was not motivated by the officer safety concern that justifies such searches, see id., at 236. See also Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 266 (1973). And in Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978), in rejecting the contention that wiretap evidence was subject to exclusion because the agents conducting the tap had failed to make any effort to comply with the statutory requirement that unauthorized acquisitions be minimized, we said that "[s]ubjective intent alone . . . does not make otherwise lawful conduct illegal or unconstitutional." We think these cases foreclose any argument that the constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops depends on the actual motivations of the individual officers involved. We of course agree with petitioners that the Constitution prohibits selective enforcement of the law based on considerations such as race. But the constitutional basis for objecting to intentionally discriminatory application of laws is the Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth Amendment. Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable cause Fourth Amendment analysis. Recognizing that we have been unwilling to entertain Fourth Amendment challenges based on the actual motivations of individual officers, petitioners disavow any intention to make the individual officer's subjective good faith the touchstone of "reasonableness." They insist that the standard they have put forward--whether the officer's conduct deviated materially from usual police practices, so that a reasonable officer in the same circumstances would not have made the stop for the reasons given--is an "objective" one. But although framed in empirical terms, this approach is plainly and indisputably driven by subjective considerations. Its whole purpose is to prevent the police from doing under the guise of enforcing the traffic code what they would like to do for different reasons. Petitioners' proposed standard may not use the word "pretext," but it is designed to combat nothing other than the perceived "danger" of the pretextual stop, albeit only indirectly and over the run of cases. Instead of asking whether the individual officer had the proper state of mind, the petitioners would have us ask, in effect, whether (based on general police practices) it is plausible to believe that the officer had the proper state of mind. For the run of the mine case, which this surely is, we think there is no realistic alternative to the traditional common law rule that probable cause justifies a search and seizure. * * * Here the District Court found that the officers had probable cause to believe that petitioners had violated the traffic code. That rendered the stop reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, the evidence thereby discovered admissible, and the upholding of the convictions by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit correct. Judgment affirmed.

Graham v. Connor

Petitioner Graham, a diabetic, asked his friend, Berry, to drive him to a convenience store to purchase orange juice to counteract the onset of an insulin reaction. Upon entering the store and seeing the number of people ahead of him, Graham hurried out and asked Berry to drive him to a friend's house instead. Respondent Connor, a city police officer, became suspicious after seeing Graham hastily enter and leave the store, followed Berry's car, and made an investigative stop, ordering the pair to wait while he found out what had happened in the store. Respondent backup police officers arrived on the scene, handcuffed Graham, and ignored or rebuffed attempts to explain and treat Graham's condition. During the encounter, Graham sustained multiple injuries. He was released when Conner learned that nothing had happened in the store. Graham filed suit in the District Court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against respondents, alleging that they had used excessive force in making the stop, in violation of "rights secured to him under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983." The District Court granted respondents' motion for a directed verdict at the close of Graham's evidence, applying a four-factor test for determining when excessive use of force gives rise to a § 1983 cause of action, which inquires, inter alia, whether the force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain and restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028. The Court of Appeals affirmed, endorsing this test as generally applicable to all claims of constitutionally excessive force brought against government officials, rejecting Graham's argument that it was error to require him to prove that the allegedly excessive force was applied maliciously and sadistically to cause harm, and holding that a reasonable jury applying the Johnson v. Glick test to his evidence could not find that the force applied was constitutionally excessive. Held: All claims that law enforcement officials have used excessive force -- deadly or not -- in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other "seizure" of a free citizen are properly analyzed under the Fourth Amendment's "objective reasonableness" standard, rather than under a substantive due process standard. Pp. 490 U. S. 392-399. (a) The notion that all excessive force claims brought under § 1983 are governed by a single generic standard is rejected. Instead, courts must identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed by the challenged application of force, and then judge the claim by reference to the specific constitutional standard which governs that right. Pp. 490 U. S. 393-394. (b) Claims that law enforcement officials have used excessive force in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other "seizure" of a free citizen are most properly characterized as invoking the protections of the Fourth Amendment, which guarantees citizens the right "to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable seizures," and must be judged by reference to the Fourth Amendment's "reasonableness" standard. Pp.490 U. S. 394-395. (c) The Fourth Amendment "reasonableness" inquiry is whether the officers' actions are "objectively reasonable" in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation. The "reasonableness" of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, and its calculus must embody an allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second decisions about the amount of force necessary in a particular situation. Pp. 490 U. S. 396-397. (d) The Johnson v. Glick test applied by the courts below is incompatible with a proper Fourth Amendment analysis. The suggestion that the test's "malicious and sadistic" inquiry is merely another way of describing conduct that is objectively unreasonable under the circumstances is rejected. Also rejected is the conclusion that, because individual officers' subjective motivations are of central importance in deciding whether force used against a convicted prisoner violates the Eighth Amendment, it cannot be reversible error to inquire into them in deciding whether force used against a suspect or arrestee violates the Fourth Amendment. The Eighth Amendment terms "cruel" and "punishment" clearly suggest some inquiry into subjective state of mind, whereas the Fourth Amendment term "unreasonable" does not. Moreover, the less protective Eighth Amendment standard applies only after the State has complied with the constitutional guarantees traditionally associated with criminal prosecutions. Pp. 490 U. S. 397-399. 827 F.2d 945, vacated and remanded.

Parents involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District Parents of unadmitted students (P) v. Public School district (D)

Synopsis of Rule of Law. Balancing racial composition between local high-school districts is not a strong government interest under the Equal Protection Clause. Facts. The Seattle School District (D) put into action a plan to assign students to different schools among its ten public high schools, the aim being to achieve equal ratios of white and black students in each. The district has no history of racial segregation in schools. The Jefferson County Public Schools in Louisville, Kentucky, was under orders to desegregate from 1975 to 2000, at which time a federal court ruled that Louisville had attained unitary status, earlier racial segregation being now mostly absent. After the Louisville district was removed from court supervision, it adopted a plan on its own initiative which assigned specific maximum and minimum percentages for black student enrollment. Parents of students in both districts sued their respective district, citing violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The assignment plan was supported by the intermediate appellate courts in both cases, upon which the Supreme Court was petitioned for review. Issue. Is balancing racial composition between local high-school districts a strong government interest under the Equal Protection Clause? Held. (Roberts, C.J.) No. Balancing racial composition between local high-school districts is not a strong government interest under the Equal Protection Clause. Since both districts have assigned government benefits in the form of education with race as a criterion, strict standard of review is applicable in these cases. Thus it is binding upon the districts to show that their race-based discrimination (1) is to promote a strong government interest (2) use of means which is specifically shaped to the objective. The interest asserted in both districts is to achieve a numerical balance in the number of students of both races. This is not lawful, as this Court has held on a number of occasions. In Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) the principle was different in that it involved the state interest of providing higher education, and the law-school admission policy affirmed in that case was based on racial mixture as well as a number of other factors. In this case, only racial balance is sought to be achieved, which has never been a valid interest of government. The other reason for rejecting these plans is that the districts failed to show that other means than race-based splitting would not fulfill the objective. The verdict is reversed. Dissent. (Stevens, J.) The Chief Justice demands strict equality before law but forgets that in the days before Brown, only black students were dictated to regarding their school admissions. This decision is in effect completely changing the history of the most outstanding school-desegregation verdict. ( Breyer, J.) The plans rejected in this case are very similar to those which this Court has enforced as mandatory, encouraged and allowed in local school districts. Secondly, all voluntary use of race-based criteria to address racial difficulties is not impermissible, as all branches of government have recognized, even if these criteria are not required under the constitution. The plurality should have taken note of the fact that there is no precedence for the principle that strict scrutiny is applicable to all race-conscious plans. This Court has applied different standards to different classifications based on race, the objective being to understand whether the purpose is to exclude or to include persons from government benefits and programs. The present decision to apply strict scrutiny to such classifications would mean that every government action based on race, whether affirmative or discriminatory, would automatically become invalid. In the present case, the objective of the school districts here is plainly to remedy existing ills, better educational availability and advance democratic values. These very valid and numerous concerns mean that Grutter'sdecision prevails in this case, and the plans require to be upheld. Even under strict scrutiny, however, these plans are valid since they are more narrowly tailored as to means than that in Grutter, and so are consistent with the Equal Protection Clause. Concurrence. (Thomas, J.) Racial imbalance is not the same as racial segregation, and even without the desire or plan to segregate there may be racial imbalance. Forced mixing of students is a debatable means of promoting educational benefit or of improving the achievement potential for black students in particular. Since the constitution recognizes no color, these plans must be rejected. (Kennedy, J.) The Chief Justice in his plurality opinion has failed to note that race can be one of several admission criteria in education. Indirect solutions to the difficulty of achieving racial balance in schools are usually preferable to blunt plans as in this case. The special government interest in ensuring equal opportunity to all children means that government may lawfully use race as one criterion in its plans to achieve that interest. However, in a case of this sort where race alone is considered, it would be necessary to prove that such a criterion is required if the plan is not to be struck down. Discussion. The plurality opinion in this case was based mostly upon the hard and fast percentages fixed by the districts. This is as good as a quota-based system, which has never been accepted by the Court under the Equal Protection Clause, though Justice Breyer does not see it that way in his dissent. In Regents of the University v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978), where the university's purpose to provide for a specific percentage of some particular group just because it is of a desired race or people group was declared facially invalid.

CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. TERESA SHEEHAN

We granted certiorari to consider two questions relating to the manner in which San Francisco police officers arrested a woman who was suffering from a mental illness and had become violent. After reviewing the parties' submissions, we dismiss the first question as improvidently granted. We decide the second question and hold that the officers are entitled to qualified immunity because they did not violate any clearly established Fourth Amendment rights. Petitioners are the City and County of San Francisco, California (San Francisco), and two police officers, Sergeant Kimberly Reynolds and Officer Kathrine Holder. Respondent is Teresa Sheehan, a woman who suffers from a schizoaffective disorder. Because this case arises in a summary judgment posture, we view facts in the light most favorable to Sheehan, the nonmoving party. See, e.g., Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U. S. ___, ___-___ (2014) (slip op., at 1-2). The second question presented is whether Reynolds and Holder can be held personally liable for the injuries that Sheehan suffered. We conclude they are entitled to qualified immunity. Public officials are immune from suit under 42 U. S. C. §1983 unless they have "violated a statutory or constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct." Plumhoff, 572 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 12) (internal quotation marks omitted). An officer "cannot be said to have violated a clearly established right unless the right's contours were sufficiently definite that any reasonable official in [his] shoes would have under-stood that he was violating it," ibid., meaning that "existing precedent . . . placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate." Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at 9). This exacting standard "gives government officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments" by "protect[ing] all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Id., at ___ (slip op., at 12). In this case, although we disagree with the Ninth Circuit's ultimate conclusion on the question of qualified immunity, we agree with its analysis in many respects. For instance, there is no doubt that the officers did not violate any federal right when they opened Sheehan's door the first time. See 743 F. 3d, at 1216, 1223. Reynolds and Holder knocked on the door, announced that they were police officers, and informed Sheehan that they wanted to help her. When Sheehan did not come to the door, they entered her room. This was not unconstitutional. Nor is there any doubt that had Sheehan not been disabled, the officers could have opened her door the second time without violating any constitutional rights. For one thing, "because the two entries were part of a single, continuous search or seizure, the officers [were] not required to justify the continuing emergency with respect to the second entry." 743 F. 3d, at 1224 (following Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 499, 511 (1978)). In addition, Reynolds and Holder knew that Sheehan had a weapon and had threatened to use it to kill three people. They also knew that delay could make the situation more dangerous. The Fourth Amendment standard is reasonableness, and it is reasonable for police to move quickly if delay "would gravely endanger their lives or the lives of others." Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294, 298-299 (1967). This is true even when, judged with the benefit of hindsight, the officers may have made "some mistakes." Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U. S. ___, ___ (2014) (slip op., at 5). The Constitution is not blind to "the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments." Plumhoff, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 8). We also agree with the Ninth Circuit that after the officers opened Sheehan's door the second time, their use of force was reasonable. Reynolds tried to subdue Sheehan with pepper spray, but Sheehan kept coming at the officers until she was "only a few feet from a cornered Officer Holder." 743 F. 3d, at 1229. At this point, the use of potentially deadly force was justified. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U. S. 372, 384 (2007). Nothing in the Fourth Amendment barred Reynolds and Holder from protecting themselves, even though it meant firing multiple rounds. See Plumhoff, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 11). The real question, then, is whether, despite these dangerous circumstances, the officers violated the Fourth Amendment when they decided to reopen Sheehan's door rather than attempting to accommodate her disability. Here we come to another problem. The panel majority concluded that "[I}t is unreasonable to forcibly enter the home of an armed, mentally ill suspect who had been acting irrationally and had threatened anyone who entered when there was no objective need for immediate entry." 743 F. 3d, at 1229. But even assuming that is true, no precedent clearly established that there was not "an objective need for immediate entry" here. [The reasonable] officer could not know that reopening Sheehan's door to prevent her from escaping or gathering more weapons would violate the Ninth Circuit's test, even if all the disputed facts are viewed in respondent's favor. Without that "fair notice," an officer is entitled to qualified immunity. See, e.g., Plumhoff, 572 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 13). Nor does it matter for purposes of qualified immunity that Sheehan's expert, Reiter, testified that the officers did not follow their training. Even if an officer acts contrary to her training, however, (and here, given the generality of that training, it is not at all clear that Reynolds and Holder did so), that does not itself negate qualified immunity where it would otherwise be warranted. Rather, so long as "a reasonable officer could have believed that his conduct was justified," a plaintiff cannot "avoi[d] summary judgment by simply producing an expert's report that an officer's conduct leading up to a deadly confrontation was imprudent, inappropriate, or even reckless." Billington, supra, at 1189. In sum, we hold that qualified immunity applies because these officers had no "fair and clear warning of what the Constitution requires." al-Kidd, supra, at ___ (KENNEDY, J., concurring) (slip op., at 3). Because the qualified immunity analysis is straightforward, we need not decide whether the Constitution was violated by the officers' failure to accommodate Sheehan's illness. For these reasons, the first question presented is dismissed as improvidently granted. On the second question, we reverse the judgment of the Ninth Circuit. The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

National Socialist Party v. Skokie

sometimes referred to as the Skokie Affair), was a United States Supreme Court case dealing with freedom of assembly. The outcome was that the Illinois Supreme Court ruled that the use of the swastika is a symbolic form of free speech entitled to First Amendment protections and determined that the swastika itself did not constitute "fighting words." Its ruling allowed the National Socialist Party of America to march. effect-In the summer of 1978, in response to the Supreme Court's decision, some Holocaust survivors set up a museum on the Main Street of Skokie to commemorate those who had died in the concentration camps. Ultimately the NSPA failed to carry through its march in Skokie. (Gaining permission in Chicago, they marched there instead).

City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Company

Brief Fact Summary. Richmond, Virginia created a set-aside program which required that a percentage of subcontracts for construction projects be reserved for minorities. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Affirmative action programs can only be maintained by a showing that the programs aim is to eliminate effects of past discrimination. Facts. In1983, the Richmond City Council, in the state of Virginia, adopted the minority Business Utilization Plan (the Plan), which required government supported construction contractors to set-aside 30% of its subcontracts to one or more Minority Business Enterprises (MBEs). MBEs were defined as "[a] business at least fifty-one (51) percent of which is owned and controlled . . . by minority group members." Under the Plan, "minority group members" were defined as "[c]itizens of the United States who are Black, Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, or Aleuts." The purpose of the Plan was to "promot[e] wider participation by minority business enterprises in the construction of public projects." The Appellant, J.A. Croson Company (Appellant), challenged the Plan on the grounds that it violated the United States Constitution (Constitution) because there had been no specific finding that the Plan's purpose was supported by past discriminatory practices in the construction indust ry of Richmond, Virginia. The District Court upheld the Plan, but, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision holding that the set-aside program "violat[ed] both prongs of strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . . " The judgment of the Court of Appeals was affirmed. Issue. Whether a state may enact an affirmative action plan without support that the "race-based measure ameliorates the effects of past discrimination on the opportunities enjoyed by members of minority groups in our society . . . ." eld. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor (J. O'Connor). No. Without a showing that a race-based initiative was created to remedy past racial discrimination and that it supports a compelling governmental interest, the race-based initiative is unconstitutional and cannot withstand strict-scrutiny. The judgment is affirmed. All classifications based on race must be supported by a compelling government interest and withstand strict-scrutiny. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) finds that the Plan failed to consider race-neutral measures that would encourage more minority participation in the construction program. Also, the 30% quota allowed by the Plan was not "narrowly tailored to any goal, except perhaps outright racial balancing." The race-based measure of Richmond, Virginia's construction set-aside program makes only a "generalized assertion that there has been past discrimination in . . . [the construction industry and] provides no guidance for a legislative body to determine the precise scope of the injury it seeks to remedy." Dissent. Justice Thurgood Marshall (J. Marshall). Richmond's Plan would be declared constitutional under the intermediate level of scrutiny. The Supreme Court should have applied the intermediate level rather than the strict scrutiny standard. Preventing initiatives, such as the set-aside program, for lack of a showing of past discrimination in the area only perpetuates racial discrimination because it suggests that racial discrimination no longer exists. Concurrence. The concurring opinions of the Court are as follows: Justice John Paul Stevens (J. Stevens). The premise of remedying past wrongs should not be the sole requirement for allowing racial classifications. The judicial system, not the legislative process, is best equipped to identify past discrimination and to create ameliorative remedies. Justice Anthony Kennedy (J. Kennedy). "The Fourteenth Amendment ought not be interpreted to reduce a State's authority [eradicate racial discrimination] . . . unless, of course, there is a conflict with federal law or a state remedy is itself a violation of equal protection." Justice Antonin Scalia (J. Scalia). All racial discrimination is unconstitutional. There is only one instance when a State "may act by race to 'undo the effects of past discrimination': where that is necessary to eliminate their own maintenance of a system of unlawful racial classification." Discussion. Regardless of its application to racial minorities or to other racial groups, race-based classifications require the highest level of scrutiny in all cases.

Shaw v. Reno ( Shaw I)

Brief Fact Summary. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) held that the Appellants, Shaw and others (Appellants), have a legitimate claim that North Carolina's redistricting scheme was so irregular on its face that it could only be viewed as an effort to segregate races for the purposes of voting, without regard for traditional districting principles and without sufficiently compelling justification. Synopsis of Rule of Law. The deliberate segregation of voters into separate districts on the basis of race violates their constitutional right to participate in a "color-blind" electoral process. Facts. As a result of the 1990 census, North Carolina became entitled to a twelfth seat in the United States House of Representatives. The North Carolina General Assembly (General Assembly) enacted a reapportionment plan that included one majority-black congressional district. After the Attorney General of the United States objected to the plan pursuant to Section:5 of the Voting Rights Act, the General Assembly passed new legislation creating a second majority-black district. The Appellants allege that the revised plan, which contains district boundary lines of dramatically irregular shape, constitutes an unconstitutional gerrymander. Issue. Whether the Appellants have stated an equal protection claim by alleging that the General Assembly adopted a reapportionment plan so irrational on its face that it can only be viewed as an effort to segregate races for the purposes of voting, without regard for traditional districting principles and without sufficiently compelling justification? Held. Yes. Judgment reversed and remanded for further proceedings. Redistricting differs from other kinds of state decision-making in that the legislature always is aware of race when it draws district lines. That sort of race consciousness does not lead inevitably to impermissible race discrimination. A reapportionment plan that includes in one district individuals who belong to the same race, but who are otherwise widely separated by geographical and political boundaries and who have little in common with one another, but the color of their skin, bears an uncomfortable resemblance of political apartheid. By perpetuating such notions, a racial gerrymander may exacerbate the very patterns of racial block voting that majority-minority districting is sometimes said to counteract. When a district is created solely to effectuate the perceived common interests of one racial group, the elected officials are more likely to believe that their primary obligation is to represent only the membe rs of that group, rather then their constituency as a whole. Thus, a plaintiff challenging a reapportionment statute under equal protection may state a claim by alleging that legislation, though neutral on its face, rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to separate voters on the basis of race, and that the separation lacks sufficient justification. That racial block voting or minority political cohesion may be found to exist in some cases, is no reason to treat racial gerrymanders differently from other types of racial classifications. Thus, if Appellant's allegations of a racial gerrymander are not contradicted on remand, the District Court must determine whether the reapportionment plan satisfies strict scrutiny. Appellants have stated a claim under equal protection by alleging that the General Assembly adopted a reapportionment plan so irrational on its face that it can only be viewed as an effort to segregate races for the purposes of voting, without reg ard for traditional districting principles and without sufficiently compelling justification. Dissent. Appellants have not presented a cognizable claim because they have not alleged a cognizable injury. Appellants have not presented a cognizable claim because they have not alleged a cognizable injury. The case in which the majority chooses to abandon settled law and recognize for the first time this "analytically distinct" constitutional claim, is a challenge by white voters to the plan under which North Carolina has sent black representatives to Congress for the first time since Reconstruction. Appellants have not presented a cognizable claim because they have not alleged a cognizable injury. However, the shape of the second district is so bizarre that it must have been drawn for the purpose of advantaging or disadvantaging a cognizable group of voters. Additionally, regardless of that shape, it was drawn for the purposes of facilitating the election of black representatives from North Carolina. Exacting scrutiny of racial gerrymanders under the Fourteenth Amendment is inappropriate because reapportionment "nearly always requires some consideration of race for legitimate reasons." The racial gerrymandering here is a "benign" racial discrimination that should have relaxed judicial review. Discussion. This case involved two of the most complex and sensitive issues the Court has faced in recent years: the meaning of the constitutional "right" to vote and the propriety of race-based state legislation designed to benefit members of historically disadvantaged minority groups.

Williams v. U.S.

Brief Fact Summary. Williams (P), adminstratrix for the decedent, sued the United States (Defendant) because they refused to provide emergency medical treatment to the decedent which resulted in his death. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Neither a physician or a private hospital has a duty to provide medical services to every person requesting them. Facts. The decedent, Berlie White, went to Cherokee Indian Hospital (CIH) suffering from respiratory distress. CIH, the nearest hospital Mr. White could reach at the time, was an Indian hospital operated on the Cherokee Reservation by the United States Public Health Service. CIH was operated under the federal Indian Health Care Improvement Act (IHCI Act), which prohibits treatment of non-Indians, except for discretionary treatment in emergency situations. The federal employees at CIH refused to treat Mr. White and refused to refill his oxygen tank. Mr. White was referred to another hospital ten miles away. When he arrived at that hospital, Mr. White was in extreme distress and he died from complications of oxygen deprivation the following day. Plaintiff, the adminstratrix of Mr. White"s estate, brought suit under various theories claiming the breach of a duty to provide emergency treatment on a non-discriminatory basis. The district court dismissed and this appeal followed. Issue. Does either a physician or a private hospital have a duty to provide medical services to every person requesting them? Held. (Niemeyer, J.) No. Neither a physician or private hospital has a duty to provide medical services to every person requesting them. Four theories are raised by Plaintiff in an effort to establish a duty on the part of health care providers to provide emergency services. Plaintiff argues: (1) North Carolina General Statutes (NCGS) § 58-65-85 prohibits non-profit hospitals from discriminating on the basis of race, color and natural origin; (2) NCGS § 131A-8 requires all health care facilities that receive state funding be operated to serve and benefit the public in a non-discriminatory manner; (3) the Patients" Bill of Rights, § 3C.4103, made known after NCGS § 131E-75 requiring that care be provided; and (4) the common-law duty for public utilities providing that once a public institution has held itself out as providing a service, it cannot arbitrarily refuse to provide that service to a member of the public. The problem with Plaintiff"s theories is that none of the alleged "duties" created by statute authorize any mechanism for their enforcement, and the common-law public utility doctrine has no application toward health care providers in private settings. At best, the IHCI Act provided for discretionary treatment, which the federal employees refused to provide. While the circumstances of this case are morally repulsive, the scope of the law is much "narrower than the reach of moral command." The court affirms the district court"s dismissal. Discussion. The casebook author uses this case as an illustration of there being no general duty to provide medical treatment, and no presence of a law to prevent discrimination in allocating treatment. It should be noted that the procedural posture of this case hinged on the application of the Federal Torts Claim Act (FTCA) in association with the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA). The federal government has sovereign immunity from suit even when violating its own Acts unless, as provided in the FTCA. The liability would exist if the government were acting as a private person in accordance with the law on private parties in the locality where the alleged tort occurred. Consequently, since Plaintiff was unable to establish any private duty to provide medical treatment in North Carolina, the United States (Defendant) was immune from being sued. Even though, for the most part, there is no affirmative duty to provide health care, once a decision is made to offer services and a doctor-patient relationship is formed, then traditional medical malpractice negligence law is applicable. Also, note that if this had been a private hospital receiving federal funds, then EMTALA would have required, at least, stabilization of Mr. White before he was transferred to another facility, and the private hospital would not have immunity from being sued.

NORTHWEST AUSTIN MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT NUMBER ONE v. HOLDER

The appellant is a small utility district with an elected board. Because it is located in Texas, it is required by §5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (Act) to seek federal preclearance before it can change anything about its elections, even though there is no evidence it has ever discriminated on the basis of race in those elections. The district filed suit seeking relief under the "bailout" provision in §4(a) of the Act, which allows a "political subdivision" to be released from the preclearance requirements if certain conditions are met. The district argued in the alternative that, if §5 were interpreted to render it ineligible for bailout, §5 was unconstitutional. The Federal District Court rejected both claims. It concluded that bailout under §4(a) is available only to counties, parishes, and subunits that register voters, not to an entity like the district that does not register its own voters. It also concluded that a 2006 amendment extending §5 for 25 years was constitutional. Held: 1. The historic accomplishments of the Voting Rights Act are undeniable, but the Act now raises serious constitutional concerns. The preclearance requirement represents an intrusion into areas of state and local responsibility that is otherwise unfamiliar to our federal system. Some of the conditions that the Court relied upon in upholding this statutory scheme in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301 , and City of Rome v. United States, 446 U. S. 156 , have unquestionably improved. Those improvements are no doubt due in significant part to the Voting Rights Act itself, and stand as a monument to its success, but the Act imposes current burdens and must be justified by current needs. The Act also differentiates between the States in ways that may no longer be justified. At the same time, the Court recognizes that judging the constitutionality of an Act of Congress is "the gravest and most delicate duty that this Court is called upon to perform." Blodgett v. Holden,275 U. S. 142 (Holmes, J., concurring). Here the District Court found that the sizable record compiled by Congress to support extension of §5 documented continuing racial discrimination and that §5 deterred discriminatory changes. The Court will not shrink from its duty "as the bulwark of a limited Constitution against legislative encroachments," The Federalist No. 78, but "[i]t is ... well established... that normally the Court will not decide a constitutional question if there is some other ground upon which to dispose of the case," Escambia County v. McMillan, 466 U. S. 48 . Here, the district also raises a statutory claim that it is eligible to bail out under §§4 and 5, and that claim is sufficient to resolve the appeal. Pp. 6-11. 2. The Act must be interpreted to permit all political subdivisions, including the district, to seek to bail out from the preclearance requirements. It is undisputed that the district is a "political subdivision" in the ordinary sense, but the Act also provides a narrower definition in §14(c)(2): " '[P]olitical subdivision' shall mean any county or parish, except that where registration for voting is not conducted under the supervision of a county or parish, the term shall include any other subdivision of a State which conducts registration for voting." The court below concluded that the district did not qualify for §4(a) bailout under this definition, but specific precedent, the Act's structure, and underlying constitutional concerns compel a broader reading. This Court has already established that §14(c)(2)'s definition does not apply to the term "political subdivision" in §5's preclearance provision. See, e.g., United States v. Sheffield Bd. of Comm'rs, 435 U. S. 110 . Rather, the "definition was intended to operate only for purposes of determining which political units in nondesignated States may be separately designated for coverage under §4(b)." Id.,at 128-129. "[O]nce a State has been [so] designated ... , [the] definition ... has no operative significance in determining [§5's] reach." Dougherty County Bd. of Ed. v. White, 439 U. S. 32 . In light of these decisions, §14(c)(2)'s definition should not constrict the availability of bailout either. The Government responds that any such argument is foreclosed by City of Rome. In 1982, however, Congress expressly repudiated City of Rome. Thus, City of Rome's logic is no longer applicable. The Government's contention that the district is subject to §5 under Sheffield not because it is a "political subdivision" but because it is a "State" is counterintuitive and similarly untenable after the 1982 amendments. The Government's contrary interpretation has helped to render the bailout provision all but a nullity. Since 1982, only 17 jurisdictions—out of the more than 12,000 covered political subdivisions—have successfully bailed out of the Act. It is unlikely that Congress intended the provision to have such limited effect. Pp. 11-17. 573 F. Supp. 2d 221, reversed and remanded.

Ricci v. DeStefano

Ricci v. DeStefano raises questions as to what steps employers may take where avoidance of discrimination against one group may mean discrimination against another group. The City of New Haven, Connecticut administered a civil service examination for fire department promotions. The exam produced racially disproportionate results, favoring white candidates over black candidates. As a result, New Haven ultimately did not certify the examination. Ricci and other candidates who scored higher on the examination and thus were eligible for promotion sued New Haven, claiming racial discrimination against the higher scoring candidates. The district court granted summary judgment for New Haven, and the Second Circuit affirmed. Ricci and the other petitioners claim New Haven discriminated against them on the basis of race in violation of the Equal Protection Clause and Title VII. New Haven, on the other hand, claims it was complying with Title VII in declining to certify the exam and thus did not violate either the Equal Protection Clause or Title VII. Issue(s) Whether city officials trying to diversify a civil service department are guilty of racial discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause or Title VII when they decide not to utilize written test results which favor one racial class over another, and whether an employer violates 42 U.S.C. § 2000E-2(1), which makes it illegal to adjust test scores or cut-off scores based on race, when he decides not to utilize test results because the successful candidates are all of one race. Analysis Both statutory and constitutional safeguards exist to protect individuals against racial discrimination in employment. Here, arguments center on theEqual Protection Clause of the Constitution and Title VII. This case concerns a tension in those safeguards where an exam necessary for promotion produced racially disproportionate results: certifying the exam may mean discrimination against the group injured by the exam, while rejecting the exam may mean discrimination against the group benefited by the exam. Conclusion The Court's decision in this case will have far-reaching effects on disparate impact jurisprudence. It will clarify for employers the steps they may take in efforts to create a more diverse workplace, while avoiding Title VII lawsuits alleging "reverse discrimination," i.e., discrimination against traditionally advantaged groups.

Gratz v. Bollinger

Synopsis of Rule of Law. Admission criteria based on race must be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling interest. Race may be considered in an individual assessment, but not as a sole or contributing factor for admission. Facts. The University of Michigan receives a high volume of applicants each year to its College of Literature, Science and the Arts (LSA). To help with admission decisions, the University implements a point system. This point system is out of 100 points. A student that is from an underrepresented group automatically receives 20 points towards his or her over all score. The groups of students typically come from African-American, Hispanic, and Native American backgrounds. A student with extraordinary artistic talent only receives 5 points under the admission system. Also every student that is from an underrepresented group, and is otherwise qualified, is typically accepted into the school. A group of white student's, that were determined qualified by the University, where denied admission. Issue. Whether a School's admission policy to automatically grant 20 out of 100 points to students of a minority ethnicity is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. Held. Yes. Firstly, the Supreme Court has only upheld racial plans at a school or town where previous racial discrimination was being remedied. In previous cases, one of the Justices of the Supreme Court stated that each applicant should be individually assessed. Each student's admission should be based on the student's ability to contribute to the unique setting of higher education. An admission system that grants points for certain characteristics such as race is not an individual assessment. When applicants are being chosen for a program and part of the reasoning is based on race, any discrimination made is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. Since the White students are being discriminated based on race, they are a suspect class which deserves strict scrutiny review. Unless the school can show the system is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling interest of diversity, the admission system will be considered unconstitutional. Here the system is not narrowly tailored. Simply Dissent. The previous school admission policies that were struck down made race sole reasons for denials or admission. Here the point system accounts for many things such residency, grades, essay, athletic ability, social-economic status. Surely the plan design is better fit than other plans to ensure diversity. Discussion. The School argues that with the volume of applications, a system with individual assessment will be impractical. However, this court states that just because it will be difficult to achieve such standards, it does not render their actions constitutional.

TORCASO v. WATKINS

Appellant was appointed by the Governor of Maryland to the office of Notary Public; but he was denied a commission because he would not declare his belief in God, as required by the Maryland Constitution. Claiming that this requirement violated his rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, he sued in a state court to compel issuance of his commission; but relief was denied. The State Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the state constitutional provision is self-executing without need for implementing legislation and requires declaration of a belief in God as a qualification for office. Held: This Maryland test for public office cannot be enforced against appellant, because it unconstitutionally invades his freedom of belief and religion guaranteed by the First Amendment and protected by the Fourteenth Amendment from infringement by the States. Pp. 489-496.

Bowen v. Roy

Appellees applied for and received benefits under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program and the Food Stamp program. They refused, however, to comply with the federal statutory requirements that participants in those programs furnish the state welfare agencies who administer the programs with their Social Security numbers and those of each member of their household as a condition of receiving benefits, and that each state agency utilize those numbers in administering the programs. Appellees contended that obtaining a Social Security number for their 2-year-old daughter would violate their Native American religious beliefs. Thereafter, the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare terminated AFDC benefits payable to appellees on the child's behalf and instituted proceedings to reduce the level of food stamps that appellees' household was receiving. Appellees then filed an action in Federal District Court, claiming that the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment entitled them to an exemption from the Social Security number requirements, and requesting injunctive and other relief. Following a trial in which it was disclosed that the child had in fact been assigned a Social Security number, the court held that the public interest in maintaining an efficient and fraud-resistant system could be met without requiring a Social Security number for the child. The court then enjoined the Secretary of Health and Human Services from using and disseminating the Social Security number issued in the child's name, and also enjoined the federal and state defendants from denying appellees benefits, until the child's 16th birthday, because of their refusal to provide a Social Security number for her. Held: The judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded. 590 F.Supp. 600, vacated and remanded. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I and II, concluding that the statutory requirement that a state agency utilize Social Security numbers in administering the programs in question does not violate the Free Exercise Clause. That Clause affords an individual protection from certain forms of governmental compulsion, but does not afford an individual a right to dictate the conduct of the Government's internal procedures. The Government's Page 476 U. S. 694 use of a Social Security number for appellees' child does not itself impair appellees' freedom to exercise their religion. Pp. 476 U. S. 699-701.

Abrams v. United States

Brief Fact Summary- The defendants' convictions for distributing leaflets advocating strikes during the Russian Revolution were upheld because their speech was not protected by the United States Constitution (Constitution) based on the "clear and present danger" test. Synopsis of Rule of Law- Men must be held to have intended and to be accountable for the effects, which their acts are likely to produce. Facts- They were convicted under 1918 amendments to the Espionage Act that prohibited the curtailment of production of materials necessary to the prosecution of war against Germany with intent to hinder its prosecution. Held. No. Men must be held to have intended and to be accountable for the effects which their acts are likely to produce. The plain purpose of Defendants' propaganda was to excite, at the supreme crisis of war, disaffection, sedition, riots and as they hoped, revolution in this country for the purpose of embarrassing and if possible defeating the military plans of the Government in Europe. Therefore, their speech is not protected by the First Amendment of the Constitution. Dissent. In this case, sentences of twenty years have been imposed for the publishing of two leaflets that the Defendants had as much right to publish as the Government had to publish the Constitution. Discussion. Clear and present danger supposedly assures special attention to the time dimension. Speech may not be curtailed until there is an immediate risk of an evil. Speech with a remote tendency to cause danger may not be curtailed.

Schenck v. United States

Brief Fact Summary- The distribution of leaflets using impassioned language claiming that the draft was a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution) and encouraging people to "assert your opposition to the draft" was held not to be protected speech. Synopsis- The question in every case is whether the words are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to protect. Issue- Whether the words used in the leaflets are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to protect? Held. Yes. Judgment of the lower court affirmed. However, the character of every act depends on the circumstances in which it is done. When a nation is at war, many things that might be said in a time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight and that no Court could regard them as protected by any constitutional right. Therefore, the words used in the leaflets are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to protect. Discussion. This case gave birth to the "clear and present danger" test.

Van Orden v. Perry

Brief Fact Summary. Texas has a monument outside the capital building that has the Ten Commandments on it. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Displays that have both religious and governmental significance will not be held to violate the Establishment Clause Facts. Outside of the Texas capital building is a site that contains 17 monuments. Each monument represents something in connection with Texas's history. One of those statutes has the Ten Commandments in its entirety on it. This display is challenge. Issue. Whether every public display holding religious context must pass the Lemon test in order to not violate the Establishment Clause. Held. No. While it is true the separation of church and state are taken seriously by this court, not every display of religion by a Government will be per se invalid. Here we have 17 monuments all meant to show the history of a state. This one monument with the Ten Commandments is a passive display that does not warrant automatic invalidation under the Establishment Clause. This court instead analyzes the nature of the monument and the Nation's history and finds that a monument with the dual nature of historical reference and religious content is not unconstitutional. The court compares the factual circumstances of this case to another in Kentucky. The Government had a statute that required all classrooms to have the Ten Commandments posted. That circumstance clearly is more obvious as it will be shown to elementary school kids everyday. It is not the same as a historical display outside of the Texas Capital Building. The court states that our Nation's heritage does have religious implication, thus every historical landmark can not be said to be reinforcing a particular religious rather than showing a history of this County. Dissent. This monument is not a work of art, nor does it have a link to any specific historical date or person in Texas's history. No reasonable observer would look at the monument and think it is there to honor the history of Texas. Instead it shows the state endorses such religious ideologies.

Locke v. Davey

Brief Fact Summary. A student was awarded a grant for school and was not allowed to use those funds for a devotional degree. Synopsis of Rule of Law. A state may have a facially discriminatory practice against the Free Exercise clause as long as there is a substantial and historical state interest in doing so. Facts. The State of Washington has a program called the Promise Scholarship Program. It gives funding to academically gifted students for postsecondary education. There is a rule that students may not use the funds for a solely devotional training. The student is allowed to attend a religious school and take religious classes, just not obtain a degree in those studies. Davey brought suit stating this exception to funding was a violation of his right of Free Exercise of Religion. Issue. Whether an exclusion from Scholarship funding that states it may not be used for solely devotional training is a violation of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Held. No. There is a fine balance between the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. This country was built on the premises that religious leaders would not be afforded tax payers monies. Along with that meant that any government funding should not be given to religious instruction. The program has a rule that is not facially neutral towards the Establishment Clause. We find the state has a substantial interest in not funding such degrees and does so with minor burden on these students.

McCreary County v. ACLU

Brief Fact Summary. Two counties placed the Ten Commandments citing King James Version on the walls of the court house. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Placing religious documents on court house walls is a violation of the Establishment Clause and will not be allowed. Facts. The County of McCreary and the County of Pulaski had a display of a gold-framed copy of King James Version of the Ten Commandments placed on the wall of their respective court houses. The displays even had the religious citation of the Book of Exodus 20:3-17. This was placed so that all citizens could see the display. In the first case the ACLU sued in federal court for this display. A month later the legislative bodies of each county authorized a second display. This one stated the Ten Commandments are the precedent legal code upon which the civil and criminal codes of the counties of Kentucky are founded. The District court ordered the displays be removed. Then the counties tried another display, this one showing the Ten Commandments and 8 other historical relevant documents. Issue. Whether placing the Ten Commandments on the wall of a public court house is a violation of the Establishment Clause. Held. Yes. There is deeply-rooted history in this country against the combination of church and state. It is this Government's job to remain neutral when it comes to matters of religion. A public court house, regardless of how it is displayed, can not in good conscious place the Ten Commandments in public view. Clearly having religious picture on the wall that states which bible the writings came from is clearly a combination of church and state. The Counties argue that the Framers of the Constitution use the Ten Commandments in their laws and in the text of many national speeches songs and statements. However it is not for the government to impose the ideas of a monotheistic religion upon the people of this Country. As long as an objective observer can look upon a display and see it clearly is reinforcing some for of religion it does not belong in a Court House. Dissent. One Justice gave a personal example of why religious does have its place in the government. He told a story about how he was in Italy for a conference during the 9/11 attacks and how another member at the conference gave his condolences and then stated he wish his president could say God Bless in his address to his country. Not all combination of state and religion need be forbidden. It fosters community and morality to the people of this country at a time of need.

Buckley v. Valeo

Brief Fact Summary. A Restriction on campaign finances was alleged to violate First Amendment of the United States Constitution's (Constitution) freedom of speech. Synopsis of Rule of Law. A restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on political communications during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration and the size of the audience reached. Facts. The statutory scheme adopted by Congress, the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (the Act), to regulate federal election campaigns included restrictions on political contribution and expenditures that apply broadly to all phases of and all participants in the election process. The major contribution and expenditure limitations in the Act prohibit individuals from contributing more than 25,000 dollars in a single year or 1,000 dollars to any single candidate for an election campaign and from spending more than 1,000 a year relative to a clearly identified candidate. Other provisions of the Act restrict a candidate's use of personal and family resources in his campaigning and limited the amount that could be spent by a candidate in campaigning for federal office. Issue. Did the limits placed on electoral expenditures by the Act and related provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (IRC), violate the First Amendment's freedom of speech and association clauses? Held. The provisions of the Act that impose a 1,000-dollar limitation on contributions are constitutionally valid. These limitations serve the basic governmental interest in safeguarding the integrity of the electoral process without directly impinging upon the rights of individual citizens and candidates to engage in political debate and discussion. However, the First Amendment of the Constitution requires the invalidation of the Act's independent ceilings. These provisions place substantial and direct restrictions on the ability of the candidates, citizens and associations to engage in protected political expression. Limiting expenditures from a candidate from his own personal or family funds is unconstitutional and the interest in equalizing the relative financial resources of donations is not sufficient to justify the provisions infringement on First Amendment constitutional rights. Dissent. The Supreme Court of the United States' (Supreme Court) attempt to distinguish the communication inherent in political contributions from the speech aspect of political expenditure will not wash. Contribution limits are a severe restriction on the First Amendment of the Contribution. Expenditure limitations do not violate the First Amendment of the Constitution as Congress in enacting this bill wished to ensure that personal wealth and money ought to play a less important role in political campaigns Discussion. This case involves the regulation of campaign finances within the context of the First Amendment of the Constitution. The type of speech restricted here was content-neutral, as it was not the content of the speech being restricted, rather the manner in which the speech was communicated. The campaign finance restrictions were meant to affect all candidates equally. The Supreme Court ruled that campaign finance could not be restricted under the First Amendment of the Constitution if it necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration and the size of the audience reached.

Texas v. Johnson

Brief Fact Summary. A conviction for burning the United States flag based on a Texas law was overturned after the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) found that the Texas law was unconstitutional. Synopsis of Rule of Law. The government generally has a freer hand in restricting expressive conduct than it has in restricting the written or spoken word. It may not, however, proscribe particular conduct because it has expressive elements. It is not simply the verbal or nonverbal nature of the expression, but the governmental interest at stake, that helps to determine whether a restriction on that expression is valid. Facts. After publicly burning the American flag, the Defendant, Gregory Lee Johnson (Defendant), was convicted of desecrating a flag in violation of Texas law. The Court of Criminal Appeals overturned the conviction. Issue. Whether Defendant's burning of the flag constituted expressive conduct, permitting him to invoke the First Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution)? Whether the state's interest in preserving the flag as a symbol of nationhood justifies Defendant's conviction? Held. Yes. Judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. The very purpose of a national flag is to serve as a symbol of our country. Pregnant with expressive content, the flag as readily signifies this nation as does the combination of letters found in "America." Texas conceded that Defendant's conduct was expressive conduct. He burned the flag as part of a political demonstration. Therefore, Defendant's burning of the flag constituted expressive conduct thereby permitting him to invoke the First Amendment of the Constitution. No. Judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. The state's restriction on Defendant's expression is content-based. Therefore, the state's asserted interest in preserving the special symbolic character of the flag must be subjected to the "most exacting scrutiny." To say that the Government has an interest in encouraging proper treatment of the flag is not to say that it may criminally punish a person for burning the flag as a means of political protest. Therefore, the state's interest in preserving the flag as a symbol of nationhood does not justify Defendant's conviction because it is not consistent with the First Amendment of the Constitution. Dissent. It was for Defendant's use of this symbol, not the idea that he sought to convey for which he was convicted. The interest of preserving the flag as a symbol of nationhood is legitimate and justified the Defendant's conviction. Discussion. This case resulted in battle lines being drawn between those in Congress who wanted to amend the Constitution to permit restraints on flag desecration and those who supported new legislation rather than constitutional amendment.

Whitney v. California

Brief Fact Summary. A conviction under the Criminal Syndicalism Act of California (the Act) was upheld and the Act was held constitutional because a state may punish those who abuse freedom of speech by utterances inimical to the public welfare, tending to incite crime, disturb the public peace, or endanger foundations of organized government and threaten its overthrow by unlawful means. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Persons who abuse such rights [of freedom of speech, association, assembly] by joining and furthering an organization thus menacing the peace and welfare of the state are not protected by due process. Facts. The Defendant, Anita Whitney (Defendant), was convicted under the Act for being an active member of the Communist Labor Party (CLP). Issue. Whether the Act, as here construed and applied, deprived Defendant of her liberty without due process of law? Held. No. Judgment of the lower court affirmed. Defendant's contention is nothing more than an effort to review the weight of the evidence for the purpose of showing that the Defendant did not join the CLP with knowledge of its unlawful character and purpose. That question is one of fact and not open to review. The Act as applied in this case is not repugnant to the Due Process Clause as a restraint on the rights of free speech, assembly, and association. Persons who abuse such rights by joining and furthering an organization thus menacing the peace and welfare of the state are not protected by due process. Therefore, the Act as here construed and applied, did not deprive Defendant of her liberty without due process of law. Concurrence. The Court has not yet fixed the standard by which to determine when (i) a danger shall be deemed clear; (ii) how remote the danger may be and yet be deemed present and (iii) what degree of evil shall be deemed sufficiently substantial to justify the resort to abridgment of free speech and assemble as a means of protection. Discussion. In this case, the Supreme Court of the United States was faced with a prior legislative declaration that certain classes of speech caused an intolerable risk of harm.

Reynolds v. Sims

Brief Fact Summary. A districting scheme that was based on an outdated census and that had a practical effect of discriminating against voters in counties whose populations had grown proportionally far more than others since the 1900 census was held unconstitutional as a violation of equal protection by the Supreme Court of the United States. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Equal protection requires that the seats in both houses of a bicameral state legislature be apportioned on a population basis. Facts. This case was a challenge to the malapportionment of the Alabama legislature. The challengers claimed discrimination against voters in counties whose populations that had grown proportionally far more than others since the 1900 census. The complaints noted that the existing districting scheme was based on the1900 census, even though the state constitution required legislative representation based on population and decennial reapportionment. The lower federal court found that the old apportionment scheme, as well as two new ones devised by the legislature, violated equal protection. Issue. Whether this districting scheme violates equal protection. Held. Yes. Judgment of the lower federal court affirmed and remanded for further proceedings. If a state should provide that votes in one part of the state should receive more weight than votes from another part of the state, the right to vote of those in disfavored areas is diluted. With respect to the allocation of legislative representation, all voters, as citizens of the state, stand in the same relation regardless of where they live. So long as the divergences of a strict population standard are based on legitimate considerations incident to the effectuation of a rational state policy, some deviations from the equal population principle are constitutionally permissible, but neither history alone, nor economic or other sorts of group interests, are permissible factors in attempting to justify disparities from population-based representation. Further, equal protection requires that the seats in both houses of a bicameral state legislature must be apportioned on a population basis. Therefore, this districting scheme violates equal protection. Discussion. Within a year of the 1962 ruling in Baker v. Carr, suits challenging state legislative apportionment schemes were instituted in over thirty states. This case answered some of the questions left open by Baker.

Scott v. Harris

Brief Fact Summary. A police officer in pursuit hit the back of motorist's vehicle to stop him from hurting innocent bystanders. Synopsis of Rule of Law. For Summary Judgment, facts must be viewed in the light most favorably to the non-moving party only if there is a genuine dispute to alleged facts. Also the objective reasonable standard for violations of the fourth amendment is a balancing test between the person's rights and government's rights. Facts. A Georgia county deputy clocked motorist car diving at speeds of 73 miles per hour in a 55 mile-an-hour zone. The officer activated his lights and the motorist sped away accelerating his speed. The officer called it in over his dispatch and several officers including Scott joined in. After six minutes and 10 miles of a high speed chase, Officer Scott has permission to employ precision intervention techniques to stop Harris and was told to stop him. Office Scott rear-ended the car, it spun and flipped over. Harris was badly injured and now a quadriplegic. Issue. Whether the summary judgment standard of viewing the facts in light most favorably of the non-moving party, requires the court to put more weight in testimony than video tape evidence to the contrary. Also, whether the police officer actions were reasonable under the fourth amendment is the second issue. Held. NO. Upon a Summary Judgment motion it is the moving party's burden to show there is no genuine issue of material fact. Only then does the burden shift to the non-moving party to state otherwise. However, here the non-moving party (motorist) only gave testimony that he was driving perfectly. The police officer had a video tape of the entire tape showing seriously reckless driving. The court found that the record of all evidence could not lead a rationale trier of the fact to find for the non-moving party. Therefore there was no genuine issue of material fact. The court found the lower court was wrong in only relying on that testimony. The central issue for trial is whether motorist drove in such a way to engage human life. Here since the motorist story was completely discredited by the video tape and he had no other evidence, no reasonable jury would find for the motorist. There mere existence of an alleged fact is not enough. Yes. The second issue is whether the police officers actions in seizure were objectively reasonable under the fourth amendment. Reasonableness is found by balancing the nature and quality of the intrusion on the person's 4th amendment rights and the importance of the government's interests to justify such actions. The police officer defends his action on the need to protect the safety of pedestrians and other motorist. The video clearly showed the motorist was an actual and imminent threat to others, and while the police officer drove just as reckless this court will not impose a rule that states police officers must stop a chase in the motorist is to reckless. That would tell drivers they can get away of they speed enough Dissent. Justice Stevens. The issue of whether the police officer's actions were reasonable is a question for the jury no the judge. There are other cases where a jury has disagreed with a judge on those actions. This was an open highway the chase occurred on. The police office lights and siren is enough to warn others on the road. The deadly force used by the officer was unreasonable. Also the question as to whether his actions warranted the use of deadly force is also a jury's question. Discussion. Before a court will hear a case against an office of the law, the court must find the officer wasn't immune from his actions. However the court must decide if that immunity is present. The test for immunity is to find that no constitutional rights are violated and that the right to commit such actions was clearly established based on the facts to the case.

Lee v. Weisman

Brief Fact Summary. A school that invited a rabbi to deliver nonsectarian prayers at the school's graduation ceremony was held by the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) to be a violation of the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution (Constitution). Synopsis of Rule of Law. The Constitution forbids the state to exact religious conformity from a student as the price of attending her own high school graduation ceremony. To say that a student must remain apart from the ceremony at the opening invocation and closing benediction is to risk conforming uniformity in an environment analogous to the classroom setting, where we have said the risk of compulsion is high. Facts. The principal of Providence Middle School invited a rabbi to deliver nonsectarian prayers at the school's graduation ceremony. The Respondent, Deborah Weisman (Respondent), a student at the school, raised an Establishment Clause challenge to the practice of prayer at the district's graduation ceremonies. Issue. Whether the district's practice of prayer at the graduation ceremony was a violation of the Establishment Clause of the Constitution? Held. Yes. Judgment of the lower court affirmed. Even for students who object to the religious exercise, their attendance and participation in the state-sponsored religious activity are in a fair and real sense obligatory, though the school district does not require attendance as a condition for receipt of the diploma. The degree of school involvement here made it clear that the graduation prayers bore the imprint of the state and thus, put school-age children who objected in an untenable position. For a dissenter of high school age, who has a reasonable perception that she is being forced by the state to pray in a manner her conscience will not allow, the injury is no less real. The state may not, consistent with the Establishment Clause of the Constitution, place primary and secondary school children in this position. Therefore, the district's practice of prayer at the graduation ceremony was a violation of the Establishment Clause of the Constitution. Dissent. In holding that the Establishment Clause of the Constitution prohibits invocations and benedictions at public school ceremonies, the Supreme Court lays waste a tradition that is as old as public school graduation ceremonies themselves. As an instrument of destruction, the Supreme Court invents a boundless and boundlessly manipulatable, test of psychological coercion. Concurrence. Government pressure to participate in a religious activity is an obvious indication that the government is endorsing or promoting religion. But it is not enough that the government restrain from compelling religious practices, it must not engage in them either. When public school officials, armed with the state's authority, convey an endorsement of religion to their students, they strike near the core of the Establishment Clause of the Constitution. However, "ceremonial" their messages may be, they are flatly unconstitutional. Discussion. Despite a history of traditions, the Supreme Court held that religious statements made at public school ceremonies violate the Establishment Clause of the Constitution.

American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut

Brief Fact Summary. An Indianapolis ordinance's definition of pornography was held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) because it discriminated based on the content of the speech. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Any restriction on speech that discriminates on the ground of the content of the speech is unconstitutional. Facts. Indianapolis enacted an ordinance defining "pornography" as a practice that discriminates against women or the "use of men, children, or transsexuals in the place of women." This ordinance does not refer to the prurient interest, to offensiveness, or to the standards of the community. It demands attention to particular depictions, not to the work judged as a whole. Held- no, . Under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution), the government must leave to the people the evaluation of ideas. This ordinance is thought patrol. It establishes an "approved" view of women, of how they must react to sexual encounters and how the sexes may relate to each other. This speech is protected no matter how insidious. Therefore, Indianapolis's ordinance definition of pornography is not constitutional. Discussion. Where a restriction of speech is overbroad, sweeping in protected speech as well as unprotected speech, it will be held unconstitutional.

Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah

Brief Fact Summary. City ordinances passed to prevent animal sacrifices in connection with Santeria rituals were held invalid by the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court). Synopsis of Rule of Law. A law burdening religious practice that is not neutral or not of general application must undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny. Where the government restricts only conduct protected by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution) and fails to enact feasible measures to restrict other conduct producing substantial harm or alleged harm of the same sort, the interest given in justification of the restriction is not compelling. Facts. Santeria is a religion that fused African religion with Roman Catholicism. It called for animal sacrifices to keep the orishas (spirits) alive. In response to the news that a Santeria church was to be built in the city of Hialeah, the city council held an emergency public session in order to pass three laws outlawing any animal sacrifices in connection with Santeria rituals. All ordinances were passed by a unanimous vote. Violations were punishable by fines not exceeding $500.00 or imprisonment no longer than sixty days, or both. Issue. Whether the city ordinances violate the Free Exercise Clause of the Constitution? Held. Yes. Judgment of the lower court reversed. The protections of the Free Exercise Clause pertain if the law at issue discriminates against some religious beliefs or regulates or prohibits conduct because it is undertaken for religious reasons. If the object of the law is to restrict or infringe upon practices because of their religious motivation, the law is not neutral and it is invalid unless it is justified by a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to advance that interest. The record in this case compels the conclusion that suppression of the Santeria worship service was the object of the ordinances. Here, religious practice is being singled out for discriminatory treatment. A law burdening religious practice that is not neutral or not of general application must undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny. Where the government restricts only conduct protected by the First Amendment of the Constitution and fails to enact feasible measures to restrict other conduct producing substantial harm or alleged harm of the same sort, the interest given in justification of the restriction is not compelling. Therefore, the city ordinances violate the Free Exercise Clause of the Constitution. Concurrence. Had the ordinances here been passed with no motivation to suppress a religious practice, but rather to prevent the cruelty of animals, they would still be held invalid. The First Amendment looks to the effects of the laws enacted, not the purposes for which they are enacted. The decision of the Court is correct, but its reference to Employment Division v. Smith is objectionable. Discussion. The Court looked behind the facial neutrality of the law to discern a religiously discriminatory purpose.

City of Boerne v. Flores

Brief Fact Summary. Congress' enactment of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993 was held by the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) to be an excessive use of power under Section:5 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution). Synopsis of Rule of Law. While preventive rules are sometimes appropriate remedial measures, there must be a congruence between the means used and the ends sought to be achieved. The appropriateness of remedial measures must be considered in light of the evil presented. Facts. A decision by local zoning authorities to deny a church a building permit was challenged Issue. under the RFRA. The Act's stated purposes are: "(1) to restore the compelling interest test and to guarantee its application in all cases where the free exercise of religion is substantially burdened; (2) to provide a claim or defense to persons whose religious exercise is substantially burdened by government." The Act forbids the government from "substantially burdening" a person's exercise of religion unless the government can demonstrate that the burden "(1) is in furtherance of a compelling state interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that state interest." Specifically, this case calls into question the authority of Congress to enact the RFRA.Whether the RFRA is a proper exercise of Congress' Section:5 power to "enforce" by "appropriate legislation" the constitutional guarantee that no state shall deprive any person of "life, liberty, or property without the due process of law" nor deny any person "equal protection of the laws?" Held. No. Judgment of the lower court reversed. Congress' power under Section:5 extends only to "enforcing" the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. While preventive rules are sometimes appropriate remedial measures, there must be a congruence between the means used and the ends to be achieved. The appropriateness of remedial measures must be considered in light of the evil presented. The RFRA's legislative records lacks examples of modern instances of generally applicable laws passed because of religious bigotry. Further, the RFRA cannot be considered remedial, preventive legislation. Rather, it appears to attempt a substantive change in constitutional protections. Preventive measures prohibiting certain types of laws may be appropriate when there is reason to believe that many of the laws affected have a significant likelihood of being unconstitutional. Remedial legislation under Section:5 should be adapted to the wrong which the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution was intended to protec t against. The RFRA is not so confined. The stringent test the RFRA demands of state laws reflects a lack of proportionality between the means adopted and the legitimate end to be achieved. Therefore, the RFRA is not a proper exercise of Congress' Section:5 power to "enforce" by "appropriate legislation" the constitutional guarantee that no state shall deprive any person of "life, liberty, or property without the due process of law" nor deny any person "equal protection of the laws." Discussion. This decision disavowed any power on Congress' power to confer new substantive rights not derived from prior decisions of the Court interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, this case is important because it illustrates that Congress does not have unlimited power to create new substantive rights. Rather, it must look to the Court's interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment to find such rights.

Turner v. Safley

Brief Fact Summary. Inmates brought suit over a Missouri Corrections regulation that permitted inmates to marry only with permission of the prison superintendent and allowed for approval only when compelling reasons exist. Synopsis of Rule of Law. The reason for the rule did not have a reasonable relationship to the goals of the penal system, therefore the prisoner's constitutional right to marriage was violated. Facts. The Missouri Division of Corrections had regulations permitting inmates to marry only with the permission of the superintendent of the prison, and allowing for such approval only when there are compelling reasons to do so. Prison officials testified that generally only a pregnancy or the birth of an illegitimate child where considered compelling. Plaintiff inmates brought a class action suit for injunctive relief and damages. Issue. Should a different rule apply in a prison forum that does not include marriage as a constitutionally protected right? If the rule burdens prisoner's constitutional rights, should the restriction be tested under a reasonableness standard? Held. Multiple elements of marriage that are not inconsistent with the status of a prisoner are sufficient to form a constitutionally protected right to marriage. Even under a reasonable relationship test, the marriage regulation does not withstand scrutiny. Prison inmates retain those constitutional rights not inconsistent with their status as a prisoner or with legitimate penological objectives. Although the right to marry is subject to substantial restriction for prisoners, the expressions of emotional support and public commitment; the religious spiritual significance; and the expectation that most inmate marriages will ultimately be consummated remain unaffected by confinement or legitimate correctional goals. Petitioners rely on security and rehabilitation as their support for the reasonable relationship between the rule and correctional goals. This is because marriages can lead to violent love triangles and the domination of female prisoners who are overly dependant on male figures. However, love triangles can develop without marriage, and the focus on banning mainly the female prisoners from marriage is unacceptable. The almost complete ban on such marriages is overly broad and not reasonably related to legitimate penological objectives. Discussion. The Court did not reach the question of if a higher standard of scrutiny is necessary because it found that the rule did not pass muster under the reasonable relationship test. However, the Court did state that the regulation may impose an unacceptable constitutional restriction on non-prisoners because they would be unable to marry incarcerated individuals.

R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul

Brief Fact Summary. St. Paul's Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance (the Ordinance) was held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) because it was substantially overbroad and impermissibly content-based. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Content-based restrictions, as well as point-of-view restrictions, are presumably invalid. Facts. The Petitioner, R.A.V. (Petitioner) and several other teenagers made a cross and burned it inside the fenced yard of a black family. The city of St. Paul charged Petitioner under the Ordinance which forbids harmful conduct on the basis of race. Petitioner moved to have this count dismissed on the ground that the Ordinance was substantially overbroad and impermissibly content-based. The trial court granted that motion, but the state of Minnesota Supreme Court reversed. Issue. Whether the Ordinance is substantially overbroad and impermissibly content-based? Held. Yes. Judgment of the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed. The statute is unconstitutional because it prohibits otherwise protected speech solely on the basis of the subjects the speech addresses. This ordinance, even narrowly construed to apply only to "fighting words," still clearly applies to "fighting words" that insult or provoke violence "on the basis of race

Cohen v. California

Brief Fact Summary. The Appellant, Paul Robert Cohen (Appellant), was convicted in the Los Angeles Municipal Court of violating California Penal Code Section:415, which prohibits "maliciously and willfully disturbing the peace or quiet of any neighborhood or person, by offensive conduct." Appellant was given 30 days imprisonment. Synopsis of Rule of Law. We are often captives outside the sanctuary of the home and subject to objectionable speech. The ability of government to shut off discourse solely to protect others from hearing it is dependent upon a showing that substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner. Facts. On April 26, 1968, the Appellant was observed in the Los Angeles County Courthouse, in the corridor outside the municipal court, wearing a jacket bearing the words "Fluck the Draft." The Appellant did not engage in, or threaten to engage in, nor did anyone as the result of his conduct in fact commit or threaten to commit any act of violence. The Appellant did not make any loud or unusual noise, nor was there any evidence that he uttered any sound prior to his arrest. Issue. Whether California can excise, as "offensive conduct," one particular scurrilous epithet from the public discourse, either upon the theory that its use is inherently likely to cause violent reaction or upon a more general assertion that the States, acting as guardians of public morality, may properly remove this offensive word from the public vocabulary? Held. Absent a more particularized and compelling reason for its actions, the State may not, consistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution (Constitution), make the simple public display here involved of this single four-letter expletive a criminal offense. Dissent. The Appellant's absurd and immature antic was mainly conduct and little speech.

Baker v. Carr

Brief Fact Summary. The General Assembly had failed to reapportion the states voting districts since 1901, despite changes in population. Tennessee voters sought an injunction against further elections and a reapportionment of voting districts. Synopsis of Rule of Law. The political question doctrine requires courts to refuse to adjudicate certain issues that do not lend themselves to judicial standards or remedies. Facts. Tennessee voters claimed their equal protection rights were being violated due to a debasement of their votes. This claim was based on the fact that voting districts had not been reapportioned since 1901, despite population growth and redistribution since then. Additionally, they claimed redress through changes in state law was impossible due to the election of the present legislature under the malapportioned voting districts. They sought an injunction against further elections and reapportionment. The lower court denied relief, finding the claim to be a nonjusticiable political question. Issue. Was the lower court correct in determining that a state's voter apportionment scheme was a political question, and therefore nonjusticiable? Held. No. Judgment reversed and remanded for further proceedings. Based on the "political question" doctrine, certain cases are nonjusticiable. The political question doctrine is essentially based on the separation of powers. These cases generally fall under the following criteria: i. A textual commitment of the issue in the Constitution to another branch of government. ii. An inability to resolve the issue based on judicially discoverable or manageable standards. iii. An inability to decide the issue without making an initial policy determination that is not for judicial discretion. iv. An inability of the court to make an independent resolution of the issue without demonstrating a lack of respect due to another branch of government. v. An exceptional need to not question a political decision already made. vi. The possibility of embarrassment due to different pronouncements by various departments on the same question. Cases based upon the Guaranty Clause, Art. IV, Section: 4, of the United States Constitution (Constitution) have traditionally been deemed nonjusticiable due to the political question doctrine. The Guaranty Clause guarantees a republican form of government. However, the majority determined this claim falls under the Equal Protection Clause. Also, since the claim does not violate any of the other political question criteria, it is justiciable. Dissent. The current case involves all of the elements that have made previous claims under the Guarantee Clause nonjusticiable. Attempting to invoke the Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause does not change the nature of the controversy. Therefore, the courts should not determine this case. Discussion. Constitutional questions are rarely found to be nonjusticiable, partially due to current limitations on standing.

Miller v. Johnson

Brief Fact Summary. The Georgia General Assembly (or, the "Assembly") drew a congressional district that combined black metropolitan neighborhoods, with neighborhoods in which blacks predominated on the coasts. The neighborhoods were 260 miles apart and gave blacks a second district in the state containing a majority of black voters. The Appellees, voters in the Eleventh Circuit (Appellees), challenged the constitutionality of the Eleventh District was called into question. Synopsis of Rule of Law. To make out a case for racial gerrymandering, a plaintiff must show, either through circumstantial evidence of a district's shape or more direct evidence going to legislative purpose, that race was the predominant factor motivating the legislature's decision to place a significant number of voters within a particular district. Facts. Between 1980 and 1990, one out of ten of Georgia's congressional districts contained a majority of black voters. The 1990 Census revealed that 27 % of Georgia's population was black and that Georgia was entitled to an additional congressional seat. Thereupon, the Georgia General Assembly set out to redraw the State's congressional district. In so doing, the Assembly designed an Eleventh District that combined the black neighborhoods of metropolitan Atlanta with the poor black populace of Coastal Chatham, even though these places were 260 miles apart in distance and worlds apart in culture. At trial, the District Court held that the General Assembly's intent to racially gerrymander the Eleventh District was overwhelming. The Appellants, Miller and others (Appellants), countered that under [Shaw v. Reno] the test is not legislative intent, but whether a district is drawn so bizarrely in shape that its configuration is unexplainable other than on the basis of race. Issue. Does Shaw v. Reno require a plaintiff to show bizarreness of a district's shape in order to make out a successful claim of racial gerrymandering? Was sufficient evidence produced to show that the Eleventh District was the product of racial gerrymandering? Held. No and Yes. Appellants misconstrue the Supreme Court of the United States' (Supreme Court) holding in Shaw v. Reno. A district need not be bizarre in shape before there is a constitutional violation. Shape is relevant merely because it may be persuasive circumstantial evidence that considerations of race were the legislature's predominant motivation in drawing the district lines. Parties may rely on evidence other than bizarreness of shape to establish improper intent. In this case, the geometric shape of the Eleventh District may not have been any more bizarre than other constitutionally drawn districts in Georgia, but there was sufficient additional evidence to show that the General Assembly was motivated by a predominantly by race. Dissent. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg (J. Ginsberg) stated that although the Assembly obviously prominently considered race in shaping the Eleventh District, the record does not show that considerations of race crowded out other considerations. Concurrence. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor (J. O'Connor) said that application of the Supreme Court's standard helps to achieve Shaw v. Reno's basic objective, the making extreme instances of gerrymandering subject to judicial review. Discussion. This case is an example of so-called benign racial policy. It calls into question the standard of review that should be used to evaluate such classifications.

Brandenburg v. Ohio

Brief Fact Summary. The Ohio Criminal Syndicalism statute was found unconstitutional as a violation of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution) by the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) thereby reversing the Appellant's conviction based on a violation of the statute. Synopsis of Rule of Law. The constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a state to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to produce such action. Facts. The Appellant, Brandenburg (Appellant), a leader of the Ku Klux Klan group, was convicted under the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism statute for "advocating the duty, necessity, or propriety of crime

Stanley v. Georgia

Brief Fact Summary. The Petitioner, Stanley's (Petitioner) home was being searched for evidence of bookmaking when officers found obscene films. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Mere possession of obscenity is not punishable under the United States Constitution (Constitution). Facts. The Petitioner was being investigated for bookmaking. Officers were searching his home when they found 8mm films that they determined to be obscene. They confiscated the materials and charged the Petitioner with knowingly having possession of obscene matter. Issue. Does this law prohibiting possession of obscenity violate the First Amendment of the Constitution? Held. Yes. The Constitution prohibits making mere possession a crime. Discussion. The government is not allowed to dictate to people what they will and will not read, watch or enjoy. The Constitution strictly protects an individual from such unwarranted intrusion and control.

City of Erie v. Pap's A.M

Brief Fact Summary. The Petitioner, the City of Erie (Petitioner), passed an ordinance banning nude dancing. The Respondent, Pap's (Respondent), operates a nude bar and challenges the constitutionality of the ordinance. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Preventing secondary effects is a sufficient reason to make a content neutral law. Facts. In 1994, the Petitioner passed a law that makes it a crime to intentionally appear in public in a "state of nudity." The Respondent, Pap' A.M. (Respondent), owns "Kandyland" a club that features totally nude erotic dancing by women. To comply with the ordinance, the dancers must wear G-strings and pasties. Now, the Respondent seeks a permanent injunction against the Petitioner. Issue. Is the ordinance constitutional? Held. Yes. It is a content neutral regulation and does not violate the First Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution) because being nude is not an expression. Dissent. Justice David Souter (J. Souter): There is insufficient evidence to support the city's claim of secondary effects. Justice John Paul Stevens (J. Stevens): This law is an example of censorship. There is no way that dancers wearing G-strings and pasties result in a decrease of the secondary effects of which the city was concerned. Concurrence. The First Amendment of the Constitution is violated only when the communicative aspects of conduct are the reasons for the prohibition. Discussion. This law was passed to prevent the secondary effects of the activity. Nude dancing attracts other undesirable public nuisances that provide the city with a legitimate interest in prohibiting public nudity.

New York Times Co. v. Sullivan

Brief Fact Summary. The Plaintiff, Sullivan (Plaintiff) sued the Defendant, the New York Times Co. (Defendant), for printing an advertisement about the civil rights movement in the south that defamed the Plaintiff. Synopsis of Rule of Law. The constitutional guarantees require a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with actual malice - that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. Facts- Although the advertisement did not mention the Plaintiff by name, he claimed that it referred to him indirectly because he had oversight responsibility of the police. The Defendant claimed that it authorized publication of the advertisement because it did not have any reason to believe that its contents were false. There was no independent effort to check its accuracy. The Plaintiff demanded that the Defendant retract the advertisement. The Defendant was puzzled as to why the Plaintiff thought the advertisement reflected adversely on him. The jury found the ad libelous per se and actionable without proof of malice. The jury awarded the Plaintiff $500,000 in damages. The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed. The Defendant appealed Issue. Is the Defendant liable for defamation for printing an advertisement, which criticized a public official's official conduct? Held. No. Reversed and remanded. * Safeguards for freedom of speech and of the press are required by the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution (Constitution) in a libel action brought by a public official against critics of his official conduct. Concurrence. Justice Hugo Black (J. Black) argued that the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution do not merely "delimit" a State's power to award damages, but completely prohibit a State from exercising such a power. The Defendant had an absolute, unconditional right to publish criticisms of the Montgomery agencies and officials. Discussion. In order for a public official to recover in a defamation action involving his official conduct, malice must be proved. Without the showing of malice, the Supreme Court felt that a defamation action in this case would severely cripple the safeguards of freedom speech and expression that are guaranteed in the First Amendment of the Constitution and applicable to the States via the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.

West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette

Brief Fact Summary. The Respondent, Barnette (Respondent), is a Jehovah's Witness who refused to pledge allegiance the United States flag while in public school. According to the Petitioner, the West Virginia State Board of Education's (Petitioner), rule, the Respondent was expelled from school and charged with juvenile delinquency. Synopsis of Rule of Law. The right to not speak is as equally protected under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution) as the right to free speech. Facts. In 1942, the Petitioner adopted a rule that forced all teachers and pupils to pledge allegiance the nation's flag each day. If the student refused he would be found insubordinate and expelled from school. He would not be readmitted to school until he conformed. Meanwhile, he was considered to be "unlawfully absent" and subject to delinquency hearings. The parents could be fined $50 per day with a jail term not to exceed 30 days. The Respondent asked for an exception for all Jehovah's Witnesses because this pledge goes against their religious belief. But he was denied an exception. Issue. Does this rule compelling a pledge violate the First Amendment of the Constitution? Held. Yes. Compelling a salute to the flag infringes upon an individual's intellect and right to choose their own beliefs. Dissent. This legislation is well within the states purview to encourage good citizenship. Discussion. The majority focuses on the right of persons to choose beliefs and act accordingly. As long as the actions do not present a clear and present danger of the kind the state is allowed to prevent, then the Constitution encourages diversity of thought and belief. The state has not power to mandate allegiance in hopes that it will encourage patriotism. This is something the citizens will choose or not.

New York v. Ferber

Brief Fact Summary. The Respondent, Ferber (Respondent), was convicted of distributing child pornography in violation of New York state law. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Child pornography is obscene without exception. Facts. Use of children in pornographic materials has increased over the years causing the introduction of many state laws prohibiting such activity. The Respondent was a storeowner who sold material showing children under the age of 16 engaged in sexual activities. Issue. Is child pornography a form of obscenity that may be constitutionally restricted? Held. Yes. The prohibition on the sale and distribution of child pornography is constitutional even if the material is not obscene. Distribution of these materials is intrinsically related to child abuse. Advertising and selling these types of materials provide an economic motive to engage in illegal activity. The value of showing children engaged in sex is de minimis. Concurrence. It is possible for some depictions of child sex acts to have serious literary, artistic, scientific or medical value. Discussion. These laws protect the children from being exploited and abused. This protection of children is a legitimate state interest that outweighs an adult's freedom to enjoy sexually explicit material.

Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe

Brief Fact Summary. The Respondents, Doe and others (Respondents), brought suit to enjoin student-lead prayers at football games, as a violation of the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution (Constitution). Synopsis of Rule of Law. School prayer is necessarily a violation of the Establishment Clause when it is conducted in a manner that subjects students to it who do not wish to participate. Facts. The Respondents began their action in 1995, when they moved for a temporary restraining order, preventing the Petitioner, the Santa Fe Independent School District (Petitioner), from violating the Establishment Clause due to its allowance of school prayer. The District Court held that the school's action in allowing prayer could not coerce other students into participation. The Court of Appeals agreed with Respondents' contentions that the allowance of prayers violated the Establishment Clause. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) granted writs. Issue. In allowing certiorari, the Supreme Court limited its inquiry to whether student-led and initiated prayer was a violation of the Establishment Clause. Held. Affirmed. The Supreme Court found that pre-game prayer at football games could have the effect of coercion of students to participate in religious worship to which they may or may not proscribe. This, on its face, was a violation of the separation of church and state. The Supreme Court also enumerated that school sponsorship of a religious message is impermissible because it sends the message to those who do not subscribe to the particular ideology that they are outsiders and not full members of the political community. Dissent. Judge William Rehnquist (J. Rehnquist) dissented, noting that the Supreme Court's prohibition on school prayer was a sort of prior restraint because the activity had not taken place since new school regulations had been enacted. Discussion. This is the landmark decision, which declared prayer in public schools to be unconstitutional as a violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment of the Constitution. While the individual religious freedoms of the students should be recognized, they cannot abrogate the greater policy for the separation of church and state.

Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith

Brief Fact Summary. The Respondents, Smith and others (Respondents), were discharged from their employment for ingesting peyote in furtherance of their Native American religious beliefs. Synopsis of Rule of Law. While the Free Exercise Clause holds great weight when considering State laws, it does not mandate the allowance and acceptance of activities that would otherwise be seen as criminal. Facts. The Respondents, both members of the Native American Church, ingested peyote for sacramental purposes at a ceremony. Because their action was directly related to their employment at a drug rehabilitation facility, they were both terminated. Upon applying for unemployment benefits, the Respondents were summarily turned down, based on misconduct associated with the use of drugs. Respondents appealed, relying on Sherbert, based on the fact that their conduct was in furtherance of their Free Exercise rights as outlined by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution). The Oregon Supreme Court held that Respondents religious use of peyote served to invalidate the unemployment scheme. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) granted certiorari to consider this decision. Issue. This case considers whether the Free Exercise Clause may be used to allow an activity that is otherwise illegal and in derogation of the public interest. Held. Reversed. The Court disagreed that a religious motivation for the use of peyote invalidated the criminal conduct associated with that use. The Supreme Court weighed the interests of the Petitioner, the Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon (Petitioner) and the Respondents and found that the public policy against drug use was to be afforded greater latitude than the ingestion of peyote under the guise of religious practice. Regardless of how the ingestion occurred, there was still a danger both to the individual and secondary dangers to society when drug usage was sustained. Dissent. Justice Harry Blackmun (J. Blackmun) dissented, holding the converse of the Supreme Court's ruling to be true: that the Petitioner's interest in enforcing its drug laws against religious use of peyote is not sufficient to outweigh the Respondents right to freely exercise their religion. Concurrence. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor (J. O'Connor) concurred, noting that granting a selective exemption for religious use of a drug would impair a compelling state interest in prohibiting the use of peyote by its citizens. Discussion. This case stands for the proposition that the Free Exercise Clause cannot be used as an excuse to condone an activity that would normally be seen as a serious derogation from public policy.

Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith

Brief Fact Summary. The Respondents, Yoder and other members of a Wisconsin Amish community (Respondents) took issue with the State's compulsory education law, maintaining that keeping children in school until the age of sixteen was against their religious principals, in violation of the Free Exercise Clause. Synopsis of Rule of Law. When a true religious interest exists, a state cannot enforce a law, which abrogates that interest, provided the public interest in enforcing the law is not otherwise burdened. Facts. The Respondents refused to send their children to school after they completed the eighth grade, in conformance with their religious practices. The Petitioner, the State of Wisconsin (Petitioner), brought an action seeking to enforce its compulsory education law. The Respondents were convicted in violation of the law. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reversed, sustaining the Respondents' argument that their actions fell under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution). Wisconsin appealed, and the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) granted certiorari. Issue. This case considers whether members of a religious community can be compelled to follow a compulsory education scheme, which could be detrimental to their own religious teachings. Held. Affirmed. After applying a balancing test and determining that the interests of the state in compelling attendance were secondary to the Amish community in preserving its traditions of informal vocational education, the Supreme Court upheld the ruling of the Wisconsin Supreme Court. Dissent. Justice William Douglas (J. Douglas) dissented, noting that the claims brought herein were by parents and may not have necessarily been the viewpoints of their high-school-age children. Concurrence. Justice Potter Stewart (J. Stewart) and Justice Byron White (J. White) concurred in the judgment of the Supreme Court. Discussion. While there are valid governmental interests to be upheld by compulsory education schemes, these interests do not necessarily outweigh the Free Exercise of religion as mandated by the First Amendment of the Constitution.

Wisconsin V. Yoder

Brief Fact Summary. The Respondents, Yoder and other members of a Wisconsin Amish community (Respondents) took issue with the State's compulsory education law, maintaining that keeping children in school until the age of sixteen was against their religious principals, in violation of the Free Exercise Clause. Synopsis of Rule of Law. When a true religious interest exists, a state cannot enforce a law, which abrogates that interest, provided the public interest in enforcing the law is not otherwise burdened. Facts. The Respondents refused to send their children to school after they completed the eighth grade, in conformance with their religious practices. The Petitioner, the State of Wisconsin (Petitioner), brought an action seeking to enforce its compulsory education law. The Respondents were convicted in violation of the law. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reversed, sustaining the Respondents' argument that their actions fell under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution). Wisconsin appealed, and the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) granted certiorari. Issue. This case considers whether members of a religious community can be compelled to follow a compulsory education scheme, which could be detrimental to their own religious teachings. Held. Affirmed. After applying a balancing test and determining that the interests of the state in compelling attendance were secondary to the Amish community in preserving its traditions of informal vocational education, the Supreme Court upheld the ruling of the Wisconsin Supreme Court. Dissent. Justice William Douglas (J. Douglas) dissented, noting that the claims brought herein were by parents and may not have necessarily been the viewpoints of their high-school-age children. Concurrence. Justice Potter Stewart (J. Stewart) and Justice Byron White (J. White) concurred in the judgment of the Supreme Court. Discussion. While there are valid governmental interests to be upheld by compulsory education schemes, these interests do not necessarily outweigh the Free Exercise of religion as mandated by the First Amendment of the Constitution.

Sherbert v. Verner

Brief Fact Summary. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) held that South Carolina may not constitutionally apply the eligibility provisions of its unemployment compensation scheme in order to deny unemployment benefits to a Seventh-Day Adventist because she refused to work on Saturday. Synopsis of Rule of Law. A state may not constitutionally apply the eligibility provisions of its unemployment compensation scheme so as to constrain a worker to abandon her religious convictions respecting the day of rest. Facts. The Appellant, Sherbert (Appellant), a Seventh-Day Adventist was denied unemployment benefits by South Carolina because she refused to work on Saturdays. Specifically, her claim for unemployment benefits was denied because the state compensation law barred benefits to workers who failed, without good cause, to accept "suitable work when offered." She refused to take a job that required her to work Saturdays. The highest state court sustained the denial of benefits. Issue. Whether the disqualification for benefits imposes any burden on the free exercise of Appellant's religion? Whether some compelling state interest justifies the substantial infringement of Appellant's First Amendment constitutional right? Held. Yes. Judgment of the highest state court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. The consequences of such a disqualification to religious principles and practices may be only an indirect result of welfare legislation within the state's general competence to enact. Here, not only is it apparent that Appellant's declared ineligibility for benefits solely derives from the practice of her religion, but the pressure upon her to forego that practice is unmistakable. Governmental imposition of such a choice puts the same kind of burden upon the free exercise of religion as would a fine imposed against Appellant for her Saturday worship. Therefore, the disqualification for benefits imposes a burden on the free exercise of Appellant's religion. No. Judgment of the highest state court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. The state's asserted interest is no more than a possibility of the filing of fraudulent claims by people feigning religious objections to Saturday work. Here, no justifications underlie the determination of the state court that Appellant's religion makes her ineligible to receive benefits. South Carolina may not constitutionally apply the eligibility provisions of its unemployment compensation scheme in order to deny unemployment benefits to a Seventh-Day Adventist because she refused to work on Saturday. Therefore, there are no compelling state interests that justify the substantial infringement of Appellant's First Amendment constitutional right. Dissent. In no way did the state did not discriminate against the Appellant on the basis of her religious beliefs or that she was denied benefits because she was a Seventh-Day Adventist. Concurrence. It is the Supreme Court's duty to face up to the dilemma posed by the conflict between religion cases. Discussion. In the wake of this holding, religious objectors to general regulations repeatedly came to the Court invoking Sherbert's strict scrutiny in claiming constitutionally mandated exemptions. Although the Court typically adhered to the Sherbert analysis in form, it quite frequently rejected the religious objector's claims in fact.

Everson v. Board of Education

Brief Fact Summary. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) held that a New Jersey statute which authorized reimbursement to parents of children attending parochial schools did not violate the United States Constitution (Constitution) by forcing inhabitants to pay taxes that to help maintain and support schools which teach the Catholic faith. Synopsis of Rule of Law. The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment of the Constitution means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or remain away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or professing a religious belief or disbelief, for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, can be levied to support religious activities or institutions. Neither the state nor the Federal Government may participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa. Facts. Pursuant to a New Jersey statute, a school board adopted a resolution authorizing reimbursement to parents for money spent to transport their children on public buses. A local taxpayer challenged those payments going to parents of Roman Catholic parochial school students. The highest state court denied relief. Issue. Whether the New Jersey statute which authorized reimbursement to parents of children attending parochial schools violates the Establishment Clause of the Constitution? Held. No. Judgment of the highest state court affirmed. The First Amendment of the Constitution does not prohibit New Jersey from spending tax-raised funds to pay the bus fares of parochial school students as a part of a general program under which it pays the fares of students attending public and other schools. The First Amendment of the Constitution requires the state to be neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers; it does not require the state to be their adversary. Therefore, New Jersey has not violated the First Amendment of the Constitution. Dissent. The undertones of this opinion that advocate complete and uncompromising separation of church and state, seem utterly discordant with its conclusion yielding support to their commingling in educational matters. The First Amendment's purpose was to create a complete and permanent separation of the spheres of religious activity and civil authority comprehensively forbidding every form of public aid or support of religion. The tax in this case therefore, violates the First Amendment of the Constitution. Discussion. This case helped define the reach of the Establishment Clause of the Constitution by holding that tax reimbursements that are paid to parents of students in public and other schools can also be paid to parents of students in parochial schools.

F.C.C. v. Pacifica Foundation

Brief Fact Summary. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) held that the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) may regulate radio broadcasts that are indecent, but not obscene after the FCC received a complaint from a listener who heard an indecent broadcast while driving with his son. Synopsis of Rule of Law. A broadcast of patently offensive words dealing with sex and excretion may, under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution), be regulated because of its content since such words offend for the same reasons obscenity offends and broadcasting is uniquely available to children. Issue. Whether the Petitioner's Declaratory Order violates the First Amendment of the Constitution? Held. No. Judgment of the Court of Appeals reversed. There is no such absolute rule that the First Amendment of the Constitution prohibits all governmental regulation that depends on the content of speech. Here, the words at issue offend for the same reasons obscenity offends. Because the content of the radio show's broadcast was "vulgar," "offensive," and "shocking," that speech is not entitled to absolute conditional protection. Further, the context of the broadcast must be considered to determine whether the Petitioner's action was constitutionally permissible. To say that one may avoid further offense by turning off the radio when he hears indecent language is inappropriate. Additionally, broadcasting is uniquely available to children especially during the time of day when the monologue was aired. Therefore, a broadcast of patently offensive words dealing with sex and excretion may, under the First Amendment of the Constitution, be regulated. Dissent. The First Amendment of the Constitution protects the speech aired in the broadcast. The Supreme Court allows the government to prevent minors from gaining access to materials that are not obscene. The constitutional questions could have been avoided by holding that Congress intended, by using the word "indecent," "to prohibit nothing more than obscene speech." Concurrence. The Petitioner sought to "channel" the broadcast to hours when the fewest children would be listening. This strongly supports the Petitioner's holding. Broadcasting comes into the home where people have the right not to be assaulted by uninvited and offensive sights and sounds. Discussion. Here the Supreme Court allows the government to rely on "captive audience" rationales when applied to the home.

Dennis v. United States

Brief Fact Summary. The convictions of members and creators of the Communist Party under the Smith Act ( a criminal offense to advocate the violent overthrow of the government or to organize it) were upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States which held that the Act was constitutional because it was directed at advocacy not discussion. Synopsis of Rule of Law. In each case the courts must ask whether the gravity of "evil," discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid danger in order to determine if the speech is protected or not. Facts- that literature of the Party and statements by its leaders, Petitioners here, advocate the general goal of the Party, which is to achieve a successful overthrow of the existing order by force and violence. Held. Yes. Judgment of the Court of Appeals Affirmed. The Act is constitutional because it is directed at advocacy rather than discussion. Further, the gravity of evil posed by the Communist Party justifies such an invasion of free speech in order to avoid danger. Their conspiracy to organize the Communist Party and to teach and advocate the overthrow of the Government by force and violence created a "clear and present danger" of such an attempt. Therefore, the Act is constitutional. Dissent. The First Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution) does not permit the Court to sustain laws suppressing freedom of speech and press on the basis of Congress' or our own notions of mere "reasonableness." No such evidence of seditious conduct or danger to the Government was introduced. Concurrence. The considerations of security and free speech underlie the decision of the case before us. The "clear and present danger" test should be saved to be used as a "rule of reason" in the kind of case for which it was devised. Discussion. This case clearly adopts the "clear and present danger" test created by Judge Learned Hand.

Tennessee v. Garner

Brief Fact Summary. The officers in question shot an unarmed suspected felon. This case was instituted by the victim's family alleging that the victim's constitutional rights were violated by the officers. Synopsis of Rule of Law. If an officer has probable cause to believe the suspect poses a threat of serious bodily harm either to fellow officers or to others, it is not constitutionally unreasonable to prevent escape by using deadly force. Facts. The police were summoned to stop a suspected burglary. As the police arrived, Victim was seen fleeing the scene of the alleged burglary. An officer saw Victim, and could see that Victim possessed no weapon, and yelled at him to stop. Victim continued to climb the wall to escape at which point he was shot and killed. Victim's father brought this action seeking damages for a violation of the Victim's constitutional rights. The judge found the officer's actions were constitutional. The Appellate Court reversed and the State appealed. Issue. Whether law enforcement officials can use deadly force to prevent the escape of an unarmed suspected felon under the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. Held. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. The reasonableness of a search and seizure had to be determined looking at the manner of the search and how it is carried out. If an officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses the threat of serious bodily harm, either to a fellow officer or to others, it is not constitutionally unreasonable to prevent escape by using deadly force. Dissent. Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor and the Chief Justice dissented arguing that a deadly seizure analysis should conduct a careful balance between the public interest and the nature of the intrusion on the individual in question. The dissent argued that burglary was a serious felony and that fore used could be found to be justified. The dissent criticized the majority for crafting a decision that would allow second guessing of police without providing the officers with adequate guidance on how to proceed in the future. Discussion. The Court ruled that the State has not advanced an interest more important than the suspect's life to allow for the use of deadly force. The Court noted that several jurisdictions had explicitly prohibited the use of deadly force to arrest nonviolent suspects. Further, the Court reviewed current police department procedures and found that the use of deadly force to apprehend suspected criminals had been limited the use to violent felonies or felons. The final point the Court made was that the traditional common law rule allowing such force to be used was outdated and unnecessary due to advances and new society views on the use of force.

Lemon v. Kurtzman

Brief Fact Summary. The state reimburses parochial schools for certain expenses associated with the education of its children. Synopsis of Rule of Law. To be valid, a statute must have a secular legislative purpose, must not advance or inhibit religion, and must not excessively entangle church and state. Facts. Pennsylvania has a statute that reimburses religious schools for teacher salaries, textbooks, and other instructional materials. Rhode Island has a similar statute that allows the state to pay private school teachers a 15% salary supplement. Issue. Is it constitutional for the state to provide financial assistance to religious schools for the cost of teaching secular subjects? Held. No. The statutes result in excessive entanglement between the government and religion. Excessive entanglement is determined by the character and purpose of the institution benefited, the nature of the aid given, and the resulting relationship between the government and church. Discussion. The framers of the United States Constitution specifically and purposefully prohibited the establishment of a state church because of the inherent problems. The Establishment Clause was designed to avoid state "sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity."

Miller v. California

Brief Fact Summary. This is one of a group of "obscenity-pornography" cases being reviewed by the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) in a re-examination of the standards, which must be used to identify obscene material that a State may regulate. Synopsis of Rule of Law. The basic guidelines for a trier of fact in an obscenity matter must be: (a) whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value. Facts. In this case, the Appellant, Miller (Appellant), conducted a mass mailing campaign to advertise the sale of illustrated adult material books. This case thus involves the application of a state's criminal obscenity statute to a situation in which sexually explicit materials have been thrust by aggressive sales action upon unwilling recipients. Issue. Whether the obscenity presented in this case is prohibited by the applicable state statute? Held. In sum, the Supreme Court: (a) reaffirmed the Roth holding that obscene material is not protected by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution), (b) held that such material can be regulated by the States, subject to specific safeguards, without a showing that the material is "utterly without redeeming social value and (c) held that obscenity is to be determined by applying "contemporary community standards." As a result, the majority determined that the material at issue in this case was not protected by the First Amendment of the Constitution and that the California state statute could regulate the matter. Furthermore, the requirement that a California jury evaluate the materials with reference to "contemporary standards" is constitutionally adequate Dissent-J. Douglas: It should not be the role of the court to define obscenity. J. Brennan: The state statute in this case is unconstitutionally overbroad. Discussion. The Supreme Court focused much of its decision on the role of a jury in this type of matter. The Supreme Court found that, despite the guidelines that it established, it is nearly impossible to articulate a national obscenity standard. As a result, the Supreme Court noted that each state should be free, through state statute, to construct obscenity laws that are representative of their communities. Furthermore, the Supreme Court noted that the publication at issue in this case had no literary, artistic, political or scientific value. The Supreme Court found that hard-core portrayal of sexual conduct, for its own sake and for the ensuing commercial gain, does not fit the articulated standard.

Vitale v. Engel

Facts A New York State law required public schools to open each day with the Pledge of Allegiance and a nondenominational prayer in which the students recognized their dependence upon God. The law allowed students to absent themselves from this activity if they found it objectionable. A parent sued on behalf of his child, arguing that the law violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, as made applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Issue Whether school-sponsored nondenominational prayer in public schools violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. Ruling Yes (8-1) Reasoning The majority, via Justice Black, held that school-sponsored prayer violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The majority stated that the provision allowing students to absent themselves from this activity did not make the law constitutional because the purpose of the First Amendment was to prevent government interference with religion. The majority noted that religion is very important to a vast majority of the American people. Since Americans adhere to a wide variety of beliefs, it is not appropriate for the government to endorse any particular belief system. The majority noted that wars, persecutions, and other destructive measures often arose in the past when the government involved itself in religious affairs. Concurrence Justice Douglas In his concurrence, Justice Douglas took an even broader view of the Establishment Clause, arguing that any type of public promotion of religion, including giving financial aid to religious schools, violates the Establishment Clause. Dissent Justice Stewart Justice Stewart argued in his dissent that the Establishment Clause was only meant to prohibit the establishment of a state-sponsored church, such as the Church of England, and not prohibit all types of government involvement with religion. In particular, he found that the nondenominational nature of the prayer and the "absentee" provision removed constitutional challenges.

Guinn V. United States

The so-called Grandfather Clause of the amendment to the constitution of Oklahoma of 1910 is void because it violates the Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The Grandfather Clause being unconstitutional, and not being separable from the remainder of the amendment to the constitution of Oklahoma of 1910, that amendment as a whole is invalid. The Fifteenth Amendment does not, in a general sense, take from the States the power over suffrage possessed by the States from the beginning, but it does restrict the power of the United States or the States to abridge or deny the right of a citizen of the United States to vote on account of race, color or previous condition of servitude. While the Fifteenth Amendment gives no right of suffrage, as its command is self-executing, rights of suffrage may be enjoyed by reason of the striking out of discriminations against the exercise of the right. The facts, which involve the constitutionality under the Fifteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States of the suffrage amendment to the constitution of Oklahoma, known as the Grandfather Clause, and the responsibility of election officers under § 5508, Rev.Stat., and § 19 of the Penal Code for preventing people from voting who have the right to vote, are stated in the opinion. Opinion-All citizens of the United States who are otherwise qualified by law to vote at any election by the people of any State, Territory, district, . . . municipality, . . . or [p356] other territorial subdivision, shall be entitled and allowed to vote at all such elections, without distinction of race, color, or previous condition of servitude; any constitution, law, custom, usage, or regulation of any State or Territory, or by or under its authority to the contrary notwithstanding. We answer the first question, No, and the second question, Yes.

County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter

This litigation concerns the constitutionality of two recurring holiday displays located on public property in downtown Pittsburgh. The first, a creche depicting the Christian nativity scene, was placed on the Grand Staircase of the Allegheny County Courthouse, which is the "main," "most beautiful," and "most public" part of the courthouse. The creche was donated by the Holy Name Society, a Roman Catholic group, and bore a sign to that effect. Its manger had at its crest an angel bearing a banner proclaiming "Gloria in Excelsis Deo," meaning "Glory to God in the Highest." The second of the holiday displays in question was an 18-foot Chanukah menorah or candelabrum, which was placed just outside the City-County Building next to the city's 45-foot decorated Christmas tree. At the foot of the tree was a sign bearing the mayor's name and containing text declaring the city's "salute to liberty." The menorah is owned by Chabad, a Jewish group, but is stored, erected, and removed each year by the city. Respondents, the Greater Pittsburgh Chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union and seven local residents, filed suit seeking permanently to enjoin the county from displaying the creche and the city from displaying the menorah on the ground that the displays violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, made applicable to state governments by the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court denied relief, relying on Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U. S. 668, which held that a city's inclusion of a creche in its annual Christmas display in a private park did not violate the Establishment Clause. The Court of Appeals reversed, distinguishing Lynch v. Donnelly and holding that the creche and the menorah in the present case must be understood as an impermissible governmental endorsement of Christianity and Judaism under Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602. Page 492 U. S. 574 Held: The judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the cases are remanded.

Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission

race, and ran ads to urge others to order it on-demand to watch. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Congress may not ban political speech based on a speaker's corporate identity. Facts. The Citizens United is a nonprofit organization with a 12 million budget. Some of its funding comes from for-profit corporations. This organization created a 90 minute documentary named Hillary, which names Hillary Clinton and shows interview and political commentators all who urged voters to not vote for Hillary. The organization first released the movie in theaters and then on DVD. Afterwards the organization produced two 10-second ads and one 30-second ad promoting viewers to order the documentary on-demand. A negative statement about Hillary is made and then information on how to find the website is given. This movie is basically a feature-length negative advertisement against Hillary. Issue. Whether section 441b of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act BCRA which criminalizes ads produced by corporations that expressly advocate for or against a candidate within 30 days of the primary elections and within 60 days of the general election is constitutional. Held. No. The Government may not suppress political speech on the basis of the speaker's corporate identity. Corporations have long been held to enjoy Constitutional rights of Freedom of Speech just like an individual, regardless of their status of for-profit or non-profit. The government does not have any sufficient interest in the complete ban of such advertisement. The court discusses how there has been a constant struggle between the Judiciary and Congress to prevent corruption during election season, and protecting Freedom of Speech rights afforded to persons and corporations. The court also mentions that some corporations are Media corporations made to create news. Banning all corporations from political speech is too broad and the constitution will not allow it. The Government to support this ban, states the compelling interest is in preventing the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregation of wealth that are accumulated with the help of corporate form. That can not be sufficient to state that corporation's rights of Freedom of Speech should be taken from it, simply because it has the funds to support its ideas. Dissent. The distinction between an individual and corporation is significant. Congress throughout history has put limitation on corporate spending, and this should not change now. This court states corporations do not need PAC's, but they helps protect shareholders from engaging in business with a corporation without the fear of possibility supporting a political agenda they do not agree with. Discussion. Previously, corporations were required to form a separate account, called PAC's, from which it could use the funds for its political agendas. This court states that is should not matter whether a corporation has a PAC or not, Freedom of Speech protects its ability to spend in accordance with those agenda's.