Civil Procedure - Professor MCQ's

P sued D company for negligence in federal court. D moved for summary judgment on the ground that P had lost an identical claim against it the year before. The court denied the motion. May D company appeal the court's decision? A. No, because D company may not appeal until after a trial on the merits or other disposition resulting in a final judgment. B. No, because the court's decision is an interlocutory order. C. Yes, because a trial will result in undue delay. D. Yes, because D company's original motion was based solely on a legal question.

A. No, because D company may not appeal until after a trial on the merits or other disposition resulting in a final judgment.

P, a manufacturer, sued D, a department store, for breach of contract, alleging that D failed to pay for a shipment of watches delivered by P to D in July of that year. At trial, P introduced evidence regarding D's failure to pay for the watches. In addition, it introduced evidence that D failed to pay for a shipment of necklaces, also delivered in July pursuant to a separate contract. D then introduced evidence showing that both the watches and the jewelry were defective. The jury returned a verdict P, awarding P damages for breach of both contracts. P then immediately moved to amend its Complaint to conform to the evidence introduced at trial about the contract for shipment of necklaces. Should the court allow the amendment? A. Yes, because D impliedly consented to the introduction of the evidence. B. Yes, because the parties entered into the contracts at approximately the same time. C. No, because the motion should have been made before the verdict was rendered. D. No, because D must have had knowledge of the claim when the Complaint was served.

A. Yes, because D impliedly consented to the introduction of the evidence.

Dan (D) from Arizona purchased a luxury automobile from Princeton Motors (P) in San Diego on credit. After the D defaulted on the loan, P sued D in U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California to recover the balance due. P properly served process on D. Several months passed, and D did not file any response to the complaint. P then filed a motion asking the clerk of court to make an entry of default, and the clerk did so. P then brought an action in Arizona state court to seek enforcement of the entry of default. D filed a motion to dismiss the enforcement action. Will D's motion to dismiss be granted? A. Yes, because P failed to file a motion to have the clerk of court enter a default judgment. B. Yes, because P must seek enforcement in California where the purchase took place. C. No, because under the Full, Faith, and Credit Clause of the US Constitution, AZ state courts must recognize the validity of the entry of default in the federal court in California. D. No, because D has waived his right to challenge the validity of the entry of default.

A. Yes, because P failed to file a motion to have the clerk of court enter a default judgment.

At a federal trial for negligence, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant (D). Shortly after the trial, one of the jurors told the plaintiff (P) that another juror researched a confusing issue on the Internet during a recess in the trial and reported the results, which favored D, to the rest of the jury. Thereafter, P timely and properly filed a motion for a new trial based on jury misconduct. Is the court likely to grant P's motion for a new trial? A. Yes, because a juror conducting independent research during the trial on a matter being litigated amounts to jury misconduct, which is a proper ground for granting a new trial. B. Yes, because a juror communicating with the parties or their counsel after the case amounts to jury misconduct, which is a proper ground for granting a new trial. C. No, because while jury misconduct is a proper ground for granting a new trial, independent research by a juror during the trial does not amount to jury misconduct. D. No, because while a juror conducting independent research during the trial on a matter being litigated amounts to juror misconduct, the P failed to make a timely objection at trial.

A. Yes, because a juror conducting independent research during the trial on a matter being litigated amounts to jury misconduct, which is a proper ground for granting a new trial.

P, a pedestrian, was injured in an auto accident caused by driver D. P's injuries included a broken nose and a broken toe. Not sure of the strength of her case, P sued D in federal court only for the injuries to her nose, seeking $100,000 in damages and won. Encouraged by her success, she sues D in federal court again, this time for the injuries to her toe. D moves to dismiss due to the judgment in Case 1. Will the court grant D's motion? A. Yes, because both claims arise from the same transaction. B. Yes, because she will be collaterally estopped from pursuing the claim. C. No, because the injuries are different. D. No, because the evidence is different.

A. Yes, because both claims arise from the same transaction.

A corporation operated several factories that were emitting toxic chemicals into the air. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") sued the corporation in federal court for violation of several environmental laws, and the jury found in favor of the EPA. One of the corporation's factories was located near a town, and some residents believed that their health had been harmed by the factory's emissions. One resident sued the corporation in federal district court for damages stemming from the factory's violation of the environmental laws. The resident asserts issue preclusion (collateral estoppel) to establish the factory's violation of the environmental laws. Is the court likely to permit the resident to use issue preclusion to establish the violation? A. Yes, because it is fair and equitable to allow the resident to use issue preclusion (collateral estoppel) offensively. B. Yes, because the resident's cause of action arises from the same transaction or occurrence. C. No, because the resident was not a party to the previous lawsuit. D. No, because a nonparty in the first case may use issue preclusion (collateral estoppel) only defensively against someone who was a party in the first case.

A. Yes, because it is fair and equitable to allow the resident to use issue preclusion (collateral estoppel) offensively.

A car and a truck collided. A photographer who witnessed the accident took numerous photos of the immediate aftermath of the accident. Fearing litigation, the truck company hired an investigator to gather information about the accident. The investigator located the photographer, interviewed her, and purchased copies of the photographs, which he delivered to the truck company's lawyer. The photographer did not keep any copies of the photos, and no other photos of the scene were taken. The car driver commenced a proper diversity action against the truck company. The car driver served a request for production of documents on the truck company, which included a demand for copies of all photographs taken at the scene of the accident. Assuming that the photographs are relevant to the car driver's claim, is the car driver entitled to production of the photographs taken by the photographer? A. Yes, because the documents are not work product. B. Yes, because the car driver has substantial need for the photographs and will be unable to obtain the substantial equivalent by other means. C. No, because the investigator obtained copies of the photographs in anticipation of litigation. D. No, because the car driver may obtain substantially the same information by deposing the photographer.

A. Yes, because the documents are not work product.

An electronics company P sued a competitor D in federal court for patent infringement, alleging that D had copied several aspects of P's latest smartphone model. D plans to defend the lawsuit but is worried about being forced to reveal confidential research and development information. The parties scheduled a conference under Rule 26(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. At the conference, the parties are to discuss whether they need a court order protecting trade secrets and other related confidential information. Is this a proper discussion for a Rule 26(f) conference? A. Yes, because the parties must discuss their discovery plan during a Rule 26(f) conference. B. Yes, because the sole purpose of a Rule 26(f) conference is to give the parties an opportunity to ask the court for protective orders. C. No, because at a Rule 26(f) conference, the parties should discuss only their claims and defenses. D. No, because a Rule 26(f) conference is used to formulate a plan for trial.

A. Yes, because the parties must discuss their discovery plan during a Rule 26(f) conference.

Corporation P filed an antitrust action against two defendant corporations in federal district court. The action seeks damages based on Ds' allegedly conspiring to fix prices in violation of federal antitrust statutes. P has in its possession three internal memoranda written by key officers of Ds that indicate that Ds in fact were conspiring to fix prices. Absent an applicable discovery request from Ds, must P disclose to Ds their knowledge and possession of the memoranda? A. Yes, because the P must product without any request all documents in its possession that it may use as evidence to support its claim. B. Yes, because any party must produce without request all documents in its possession that are relevant to a claim or defense in the action. C. No, because parties must produce documents only in response to appropriate requests for production of documents. D. No, because they were written by the D's and the D's should thus be aware of their existence.

A. Yes, because the plaintiff must produce without any request all documents in its possession that it may use as evidence to support its claim.

A sporting goods company (P) sued a supplier (D) in federal district court in State A. D moved to dismiss the claim for lack of jurisdiction, arguing it did not have sufficient minimum contacts with State A for the federal court to have personal jurisdiction over it. D had one sales representative in State A, and that sales representative worked out of his home and was paid only through commissions. D owned no property in State A and derived only a small part of its total revenue from State A. Customer orders were, however, subject to D's approval, and the goods were shipped directly from D to buyers. Does the federal court in State A have jurisdiction over D? A. Yes, because the sales representative solicited order for D in State A. B. Yes, because D shipped directly to buyers. C. No, because D had only one sales representative in the state. D. No, because the sales representative worked out of his home and was paid through commissions.

A. Yes, because the sales representative solicited order for D in State A.

P Corp. is a Delaware-incorporated insurance company with headquarters in Arizona. One of its life insurance policyholders has recently passed away, and each of his three children claims the right to the proceeds from the $1 million policy. Two of the children reside in Arizona and one of them resides in San Diego. The San Diegan has sued the company in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California for breach of contract and bad faith for failure to pay out the proceedings. In-house counsel for the company has retained you to commence an interpleader action under 28 U.S.C. § 1335(a) in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona and to have the Arizona judge enjoin the California action. Should you do as requested? A. Yes, because two of the adverse claimants reside in different states, the policy proceeds exceed $500, at least one of the claimants resides in Arizona, and personal jurisdiction can be obtained by serving process on all three claimants. B. Yes, because the California federal court lacks personal jurisdiction over the company. C. No, because you must bring a motion in the existing California case to join the other two claimants under FRCP 22(a). D. No, because there is lack of diversity between the company and two of the claimants.

A. Yes, because two of the adverse claimants reside in different states, the policy proceeds exceed $500, at least one of the claimants resides in Arizona, and personal jurisdiction can be obtained by serving process on all three claimants.

In exchange for future royalty payments, an inventor sold a developer a license to use the inventor's patented technology. The inventor and the developer are citizens of different states. A month later, the inventor and developer were in a traffic accident entirely unrelated to their patent licensing transaction. A few months after that, the inventor filed a breach of contract action against the developer seeking $250,000 in royalty payments. The developer then filed two counterclaims, one alleging that the inventor's licensed product did not work properly and one alleging negligence and seeking $150,000 in damages for injuries sustained in the traffic accident. The inventor was also injured in the accident and believes the developer's negligence was the cause of the accident. May or must the inventor file a counterclaim against the developer to recover $50,000 in damages he sustained in the accident? A. Yes. The inventor must assert the claim as a counterclaim or he will be barred from later asserting it. B. Yes. The inventor may assert the tort claim as a counterclaim, or he may wait and assert it in an independent action. C. No. The inventor may not assert the claim as a counterclaim, because the inventor is the original plaintiff and only defendants may assert counterclaims. D. No. The inventor may not assert the claim as a counterclaim, because the amount in controversy is too small.

A. Yes. The inventor must assert the claim as a counterclaim or he will be barred from later asserting it.

P sued D in federal district court, claiming his use of her artwork on his blog constituted a violation of federal copyright law. D defended himself by arguing that his use of the artwork met the legal definition of "fair use" under the applicable law because his blog was educational and he was writing critically about the artwork. The federal district court ruled in favor of D, finding the way he used the artwork met the legal definition of "fair use." P appealed the decision. What standard of review will the appellate court use in making a decision regarding whether the use of the artwork was "fair use"? A. De novo, because whether the use meets the legal definition of "fair use" is a question of fact. B. De novo, because whether the use meets the legal definition of "fair use" is a mixed question of law and fact. C. Abuse of discretion, because whether the use meets the legal definition of "fair use" is a question of fact. D. "Clearly erroneous", because whether the use meets the legal definition of "fair use" is a matter of law.

B. De novo, because whether the use meets the legal definition of "fair use" is a mixed question of law and fact.

P Corporation, a retailer incorporated in Arizona, sued D, the publisher of a newsletter, for libel in California state court, seeking $1 million in damages in good faith. P Corp., which had its headquarters in Nevada, did business throughout the United States, but had its largest warehouse in California and operated more stores in California than it did in any other state. D, which had subscribers in every state, was an individual who lived most of the year in Mexico, but continued to be domiciled in California. D timely filed a notice to remove the libel action to federal court in California, and P Corp. filed a timely motion to remand the case back to state court. Is the federal court likely to grant P Corp.'s motion to remand the case to state court? A. Yes, because P corp. and D are citizens of the same state for diversity purposes. B. Yes, because D is a citizen of the forum state. C. No, because diversity jurisdiction exists. D. No, because a federal court can decide a state law tort action.

B. Yes, because D is a citizen of the forum state.

A college (P) filed a breach of contract action against D1, a general contractor, in federal district court. D1 believes that the contract breach was partly the fault of D2, a subcontractor. D1 therefore files a third-party (impleader) complaint against D2, seeking indemnification or contribution for any sums the college recovers from D1. D1 also wants to assert a tort claim against D2 for $80,000 worth of equipment belonging to D1 that D2 took from the construction site. All parties are citizens of different states. May D1 assert the tort claim against D2 in the pending action? A. Yes, because the court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over D's counterclaim. B. Yes, because D may bring the claim as a permissive counterclaim. C. No, because the court cannot exercise supplemental jurisdiction over D's counterclaim. D. No, because the court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over P's claim.

B. Yes, because D may bring the claim as a permissive counterclaim.

P was injured in a traffic accident in California when his car was struck by a truck driven by D1, an Arizona citizen who had been hired by D2 Corp. as an independent contractor and was in the process of making a one-time delivery for D2 Corp. P sued D1 for negligence and D2 based on respondeat superior, in federal district court in California, based on diversity of citizenship jurisdiction. D2 is incorporated in Arizona, and its principal place of business is in Arizona. P is a citizen of California. Does the court have personal jurisdiction over D2? A. Yes, because every federal court has diversity of citizenship jurisdiction in this case. B. Yes, because D2 purposefully availed itself of the benefits and laws of California. C. No, because D2 is not a citizen of California. D. No, because D1 was an independent contractor, rather an an employee of D2.

B. Yes, because D2 purposefully availed itself of the benefits and laws of California.

P, a citizen of California, decided to move to Arizona. He packed his belongings and shipped them to Arizona to be stored. He intended to drive his car to Arizona, stay in a hotel until he found an apartment, and then have his belongings delivered to the apartment. As P drove away from his San Diego apartment, he was in an automobile accident in El Centro, California, and suffered severe injuries. He has remained in El Centro because of his injuries, but still intends to move to Arizona when he recuperates. While recuperating in El Centro, he filed a negligence action against the other driver (D) in federal district court, seeking $500,000 for his injuries. D, who is a citizen of California, moved to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Is the judge likely to grant the motion? A. Yes, because P was physically present in California when he sued D. B. Yes, because P has not established a home elsewhere. C. No, because P intended to live in Arizona indefinitely and had already shipped his belongings there. D. No, because P had moved out of his San Diego apartment.

B. Yes, because P has not established a home elsewhere.

An Arizona attorney represented P to sue Dr. D for medical malpractice sustained due to Dr. D's negligence, which occurred on January 20, 2019. The statute of limitations for P's cause of action was governed by the law California, where the statute of limitations is one year from medical malpractice claims. In Arizona and other states, the statute of limitations for medical malpractice ranges from two to three years. P first went to see the Arizona attorney on January 21, 2020, one day after the statute of limitations had expired. The attorney, based on his experience in Arizona, believed that the case was well within the statute of limitations. He drafted a complaint, signed it, and filed it in federal district court. The case was immediately dismissed as time-barred under the applicable statute of limitations. May the attorney be sanctioned? A. Yes, because the attorney's signature makes him strictly liable for any defects in the complaint. B. Yes, because he should have known that P's case was not warranted by existing law. C. No, because he did not know that P's case was not warranted by existing law. D. No, because he could have argued that the statute of limitations should be reversed.

B. Yes, because he should have known that P's case was not warranted by existing law.

P, a citizen of Arizona, sued D, a pharmaceutical company, incorporated in Nevada and with its primary place of business in Nevada, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada. P claimed $500,000 in damages based on breach of contract and tortious interference claims, arguing that D made it impossible for him to make necessary contracts with medical suppliers in California, where he also had a practice. P asserts that Nevada law should apply to decide his claims. Should the federal court apply the law of Nevada? A. Yes, because a P is the master of his or her claim. B. Yes, because jurisdiction is based on diversity. C. No, because the claim arose in California. D. No, because federal common law applies in federal court.

B. Yes, because jurisdiction is based on diversity.

P lost control of his car and crashed into a telephone pole. P sued D Corp., the manufacturer of the car, for breach of warranty and negligence. After D Corp. filed its Answer to P's Complaint, P filed a motion seeking to file an amended complaint, adding a claim for strict products liability against D Corp., stemming from the same incident. The statute of limitations for strict products liability claims expired one week before P filed his motion. Should P's motion be granted? A. Yes, because every party is entitled to amend once as a matter of course. B. Yes, because the amended complaint relates back to the date of the original complaint. C. No, because while the motion is timely, the proposed claim is futile, because the statute of limitations has run. D. No, because the motion is not timely.

B. Yes, because the amended complaint relates back to the date of the original complaint.

While vacationing in State Y, D accidentally collided with P's parked car. D is a citizen of State X, and P is a citizen of State Y. P sued D for negligence in a state court in State Y, seeking $50,000 due to damage to his car. D filed a timely notice to remove the case to federal district court. Fifty-nine days later, P filed a motion to remand the case back to state court. Is the federal judge likely to grant P's motion to remand? A. Yes, because removal is not available if one of the parties is a citizen of the forum state. B. Yes, because the federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. C. No, because P's motion to remand was not timely. D. No, because the federal court has diversity of citizenship jurisdiction over the action.

B. Yes, because the federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.

P filed an action against D in federal district court, seeking compensatory damages for negligence after a car accident. D has an insurance policy under which the insurance company will pay for D's defense and all or part of D's liability in the action. A. Yes, because it is relevant to the claims and defenses asserted by the parties. B. Yes, because the insurance policy is a part of D's required disclosures. C. No, because the insurance policy is not relevant to the claim or defense of any party. D. No, because the existence of the insurance policy is privileged information.

B. Yes, because the insurance policy is part of D's required disclosures.

P filed a negligence action against D in federal district court after a two-car accident. P's attorney created a list of everyone he could identify who observed the accident or otherwise had information relevant to the accident. The list includes one eyewitness whom P's attorney was able to identify only through the expenditure of several thousand dollars in investigation costs. D served the following interrogatory on P: "Please state the name of each person who may know or have information relevant to this action." A. Yes, because while the names are subject to qualified immunity from discovery under the work product doctrine, D will be able to show sufficient need to obtain a court order requiring the names' disclosure. B. Yes, because the names are relevant to the claims and defenses of the parties, and they do not constitute work product. C. No, because the names on the list are protected from discovery under the work product doctrine. D. No, because P does not have to reveal the names of eyewitnesses found through P's investigation efforts.

B. Yes, because the names are relevant to the claims and defenses of the parties, and they do not constitute work product.

P, the driver of a car, was involved in a collision with a delivery truck. The accident occurred in State A, where P is domiciled. The delivery truck operator is a citizen of State A, and his employer (D) is a citizen of State B. P sued D for negligence, seeking $100,000 in damages in federal district court in State A. The summons and complaint were served on the D's housekeeper at a summer house he rented in State C, which the housekeeper used for occasional weekend stays. Neither State A rules nor State C rules allow for service in this manner. However, State B does permit such service. Upon receiving the summons and complaint from the housekeeper, the employer filed a motion to dismiss based on improper service of process. Is the court likely to grant the motion to dismiss? A. Yes, because the defendant may not have more than one usual place of abode. B. Yes, because the service did not comply with the federal rules. C. No, because the defendant was a citizen of State B and State B rules permitted such service. D. No, because the State A court should apply the choice of law rules of State B where the defendant is domiciled.

B. Yes, because the service did not comply with the federal rules.

P, a marshmallow sales representative from Arizona, sued D, a domiciliary of California, in federal court for extensive injuries that P received from a fight with D in an elevator. P's medical bills totaled $15,000, and he also alleged $70,000 in damages for pain and suffering. D has a claim against P for breach of contract, because one P's deliveries turned out to be melted marshmallows, resulting in a $76,000 loss to D. May D have his claim heard as a counterclaim in P's action? A. Yes, because the tort claim is a proper third-party claim. B. Yes, because while the tort claim is not a proper third-party claim, D1 may join the tort claim with the indemnification/contribution claim. C. No, because the tort claim is not derivative of P's original claim and does not arise from the same transaction or occurrence as the original claim. D. No, because the breach of contract claim and the tort claim do not share common questions of law or fact.

B. Yes, because while the tort claim is not a proper third-party claim, D1 may join the tort claim with the indemnification/contribution claim.

A patient (P) sued her doctor (D) in federal court for medical malpractice. At trial, P's attorney called only one young and inexperienced expert who opined that D did not act within the normal standard of care, but then contradicted himself on the stand and could not answer certain simple questions. D's attorney then called four well-known experts in the field who uniformly agreed that D acted within the normal standard of care in treating P. Neither P nor D brought motions under Rule 50 after the presentation of their cases, and the case was submitted to the jury for deliberation. Surprisingly, the jury returned a verdict in favor of P, and 22 days after judgment was entered, D's attorney filed a motion for new trial pursuant to Rule 59. Is the court likely to grant the motion? A. Yes, because the judgment was based on a verdict that a reasonable jury would not have had a legally sufficient basis to reach. B. Yes, given the weight of D's evidence. C. No, because D did not move for judgment as a matter of law during the trial. D. No, because D's motion was not timely.

B. Yes, given the weight of D's evidence.

P, a homeowner, sued D, a contractor, in federal court for fraud and misrepresentation. Subject matter jurisdiction was properly based on diversity of citizenship. Both P and D presented testimony from witnesses at trial. D's witnesses were impressive on the stand, and all observers believed that D would prevail. The case then went to the jury without any motions being made by either party, and the jury returned a verdict for P. D moves for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Will the court grant his motion? A. Yes, because the court may find that D's witnesses were more credible. B. Yes, because the jury is only advisory in a diversity case. C. No, because D did not meet the procedural requirements. D. No, because a jury verdict based on witness testimony cannot be overturned.

C. No, because D did not meet the procedural requirements.

P filed a negligence action against D in federal court in Arizona after they were involved in a car accident in California. D filed a motion to dismiss for improper venue. P is a citizen of Arizona. D owns a home in Nevada, where he lives most of the year. D also owns a mountain cabin in Arizona. He spends about a month and a half each year at the cabin, but never more than a week at a time. Is venue proper in the Arizona federal court? A. Yes, because D resides in both AZ and NV. B. Yes, because P resides in AZ. C. No, because D is not domiciled in AZ, and the act or omission giving rise to the claim did not occur there. D. No, because D is not a citizen of AZ.

C. No, because D is not domiciled in AZ, and the act or omission giving rise to the claim did not occur there.

A motorist (P) was involved in a car accident with D while on vacation in California. Upon return to his domicile in Arizona, P decided to sue D in Arizona state court. D is a citizen of California and has had absolutely no personal contacts with Arizona. P learned that D was served with a subpoena to testify at a grand jury proceeding in Phoenix, Arizona, so he arranged for process to be served on her as she left the grand jury hearing. Does the Arizona state court have personal jurisdiction over D? A. Yes, because she was served with process while in the forum state. B. Yes, because of her contact with the forum state. C. No, because she was in the forum state solely to testify at the grand jury proceeding, and she lacks minimum contacts with the state. D. No, because mere in-state service of process is never a basis for asserting personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant.

C. No, because she was in the forum state solely to testify at the grand jury proceeding, and she lacks minimum contacts with the state.

Motorist P was involved in a car accident with D, the vice president of a large corporation, while on vacation in Arizona. Upon return to his home state of California, P decided to sue D. D has never had any personal contacts with California, although the company for which she works does extensive business in the state. P read in a newspaper that D was served with a subpoena to testify at a grand jury proceeding in California regarding some of her company's activities in that state, so he arranged for process to be served on D when she attended the hearing. Does the California state court have jurisdiction over D? A. Yes, because she was served with process while in the state. B. Yes, because she is doing substantial and continuous business in the state. C. No, because she was in the state solely to testify at the grand jury proceeding, and she lacks minimum contacts with the state. D. No, because in-state service of process is never a basis for asserting personal jurisdiction.

C. No, because she was in the state solely to testify at the grand jury proceeding, and she lacks minimum contacts with the state.

D and P were in an automobile accident in State Y. Both were citizens of State X. P sued D for negligence, seeking $500,000 in damages in a federal district court located in State Y. Thirty-one days later, D filed a motion to remand the case from federal court to state court in State Y. Is the judge likely to grant the motion to remand? A. Yes, because D can waive the protection that federal diversity jurisdiction provides against potential bias in a State Y. B. Yes, because tort actions arising from accidents in State Y should be litigated in State Y state courts. C. No, because the case was not initially filed in state court. D. No, because the motion to remand is untimely.

C. No, because the case was not initially filed in state court.

P, a wholesaler, sued D, a retailer, in a federal court in California. D timely filed and served a motion to dismiss for insufficient service of process. The court denied the motion. Thereafter, D filed and served his Answer, which included several defenses, including a defense of lack of personal jurisdiction. Shortly thereafter, D filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Should the court grant the motion? A. Yes, because D may file a second motion to dismiss after serving his Answer. B. Yes, because PJ maybe asserted at any time before trial. C. No, because the defense has been waived. D. No, because a D must object to PJ by filing a motion to dismiss before filing an answer.

C. No, because the defense has been waived.

P sued her ex-husband D for installments due under their divorce property settlement agreement. D defended the suit on the ground that P was in breach of the agreement. However, the court granted judgment for P. Now, P is suing D for other installments due under the agreement. D raises the defense that the agreement was void and illegal because of fraud perpetrated by P at the time the agreement was signed. P moves to strike D's defense, claiming issue preclusion. Should the court grant the motion? A. Yes, because D could have raised the defense in the first action. B. Yes, because the issue of fraud is never waived. C. No, because the issue was never litigated. D. No, because judgment on one installment does not bar subsequent action on other installments.

C. No, because the issue was never litigated.

Three plaintiffs sued D Corp. in federal district court as representatives of a putative class of 75 individuals allegedly injured by a product manufactured by D Corp. The three plaintiffs asserted product liability claims under state law and allege that they suffered injuries resulting from D's defectively designed product. Two of the named plaintiffs, as well as the putative class members, suffered relatively minor injuries and asserted damages ranging from $10,000 to $25,000. The third plaintiff, who suffered severe physical injuries, sought damages of $200,000. None of the three Ps are domiciled in the state where D Corp. is incorporated and has its principal place of business. D Corp. moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Will the court likely grant the motion? A. Yes, because the amount in controversy will not exceed $5 million, and there are fewer than 100 putative class members. B. Yes, because the claims of the putative class representatives and members may not be aggregated to satisfy the amount in controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction. C. No, because there is complete diversity, and one of the plaintiffs has asserted a good faith claim over $75,000. D. No, because there is no amount in controversy requirement for class actions if there is diversity between the parties.

C. No, because there is complete diversity, and one of the plaintiffs has asserted a good faith claim over $75,000.

P sued D company for civil rights violations. When P's attorney failed to comply with a discovery order, D moved for sanctions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4). The federal district court granted the motion and also disqualified the attorney as counsel. The attorney immediately appealed the order for sanctions. The appellate court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Is the appellate court's decision correct? A. No, because the sanctions are immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine. B. No, because the attorney was disqualified as counsel. C. Yes, because there has been no final decision in the case. D. Yes, because appellate review of the order for sanctions is discretionary.

C. Yes, because there has been no final decision in the case.

P sued D, a surgeon, for medical malpractice, alleging that D used an improper procedure during cardiac surgery, thereby permanently injuring P. D's attorney contacted a renowned cardiologist to ask whether she thought D's procedure was proper. The cardiologist told D's attorney that the procedure was likely improper. After talking to the cardiologist, D's attorney did not have any further communication with the cardiologist about the matter. Does D have to disclose what the cardiologist told his attorney? A. Yes, because there was no attorney-client relationship between D's attorney and the cardiologist. B. Yes, because the cardiologist is an expert. C. No, because the conversation concerned private medical information. D. No, because D's attorney did not retain the cardiologist as an expert to testify at trial.

D. No, because D's attorney did not retain the cardiologist as an expert to testify at trial.

Pedestrian P sued a driver (D) for personal injuries in federal court, properly invoking diversity of citizenship jurisdiction. In the complaint, P alleged that D ran a red light and struck P while P was in the crosswalk. Concurrent with the accident, a police report was prepared on which the name and address of a witness to the accident was listed, but neither party requested a copy of the report from the police department. Thus, when P submitted an interrogatory to D for the names and addresses of persons with knowledge of the accident known to D, D truthfully omitted the name of the witness. When asked during his deposition whether he knew of any witnesses, D again truthfully answered "I don't know of any." At trial, the jury found for D. In one of the special interrogatories answered by the jury, the jury found that D had the green light and that P was crossing against the light. Six months and a day after a final judgment was rendered in favor of D, P's attorney was contacted by the witness, who stated that D ran a red light and that P had the "walk" sign when he attempted to cross the road. P's attorney immediately moved for relief from judgment based on newly discovered evidence, and the trial judge granted the motion. On appeal, should the appellate court affirm the trial judge's decision? A. Yes, because whether to deny or grant a motion for relief from judgment is strictly a matter within the trial judges discretion. B. Yes, because D should have discovered the identity of the witness. C. No, because more than 6 months had passed since the judgment was rendered when the trial judge granted the motion. D. No, because P could have discovered the witness's identity with reasonable diligence.

D. No, because P could have discovered the witness's identity with reasonable diligence.

P, a State X citizen, is a shareholder of a corporation (D) incorporated and having its principal place of business in State X. She brought an action in the U.S. District Court in State X, requesting an injunction against D for violating a State X law that required corporations to invest only in lawful commercial paper and that gave shareholders a right to sue over alleged violations of this law. P claims that D purchased commercial paper that had been issued by the federal government in violation of the U.S. Constitution. D denies the claim and moves to dismiss on the ground that the district court lacks jurisdiction. Will the court grant the motion to dismiss? A. Yes, because P's claim arose under state law because state law created her cause of action, and there is no diversity of citizenship. B. Yes, because shareholders cannot sue their corporations in federal court, except for violations of federal securities law. C. No, because federal law created the plaintiff's cause of action. D. No, because P has a real and substantial issue of federal law and her right to relief depends upon resolution of this issue.

D. No, because P has a real and substantial issue of federal law and her right to relief depends upon resolution of this issue.

D, a utility company, constructed an office building costing approximately $2 million that encroached on P's ranch property. P sued D for trespass in federal district court, invoking diversity of citizenship jurisdiction. P sought an injunction requiring D to remove the office building, and he sought $200,000 in damages incurred because of the trespass. In his Complaint, P did not request a jury trial, and in its Answer, D requested a jury trial. P brings a motion to strike D's request for a jury trial. Will the court grant the motion? A. Yes, because both parties must stipulate to a jury trial. B. Yes, because there is no right to a jury trial in a diversity case. C. No, because a jury must determine whether there is a factual basis for the injunction. D. No, because P is seeking compensatory damages.

D. No, because P is seeking compensatory damages.

Paul sued Delia for negligence in federal court, alleging that Delia negligently ran a red light at an intersection and collided with Paul's car, causing property damage and personal injury. After the close of discovery, Paul filed a motion for summary judgment.Paul's motion included (i) the affidavit of a witness who stated that he was driving in a car behind Paul and saw that the light was green when Paul entered the intersection and (ii) the affidavit of a witness who stated that she was driving in a car behind Delia and saw that light was red when Delia entered the intersection. Delia's response to Paul's motion included (i) her own affidavit in which she stated that her traffic signal was green when she entered the intersection and (ii) the affidavit of a pedestrian who states that, as he stepped out of a bar after drinking whiskey all afternoon, he saw that Delia's traffic signal was green when she entered the intersection. A. Yes, because Paul's evidence is more persuasive. B. Yes, because Delia's affidavit is self-serving, and her witness admits that he was intoxicated. C. No, because Paul may not obtain summary judgment on issues on which he has the burden of proof. D. No, because both parties have come forward with evidence from which a jury could find for either party if the jury believes that party's evidence.

D. No, because both parties have come forward with evidence from which a jury could find for either party if the jury believes that party's evidence.

A citizen of State A purchased life insurance by mail from a State B insurance company. The policy was the only one that the company had ever sold in State A. The purchaser mailed premiums from State A to State B for five years, and then died. The insurance company refused to pay the policy benefits. The purchaser's administrator sued the company in State A state court. The state has a long arm statute that grants a state court in personam jurisdiction over a defendant who "contract[s] to insure any person, property, or risk located within this State at the time of the contracting." The insurance company moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, arguing that its only contact with State A since it began its business was the purchaser's insurance policy and that this single contact does not meet the minimum required for the exercise of in personam jurisdiction under International Shoe. Should the court grant the company's motion to dismiss? A. Yes, because the exercise of jurisdiction would not be constitutional. B. Yes, because suit must be brought in State B. C. No, because the State A statute authorizes jurisdiction. D. No, because of the close connection between the contact and the case.

D. No, because of the close connection between the contact and the case.

A designer, P, sued D, an independent contractor, in federal court. The claim turned on the scope of work covered by D's contract. The court held a bench trial. P and D were the only witnesses, and they strongly disagreed on the scope of work under the contract. At the end of the trial, the judge stated findings of fact on the record and neither party objected to the findings. Ultimately, the judge ruled in favor of D. P appealed, arguing that the findings should be overturned. Is the appellate court likely to overturn the findings? A. Yes, because there were disputed issues of fact at trial. B. Yes, because the decision was made in a bench trial. C. No, because the designer did not object to the finding before the judge's ruling. D. No, because the appellate court must give due regard to the trial judge's opportunity to determine witness credibility.

D. No, because the appellate court must give due regard to the trial judge's opportunity to determine witness credibility.

Ps sued D, the manufacturer of canned tuna, in federal district court for products liability on behalf of their 12-year-old daughter who sliced open her finger while opening a can of tuna, causing severe injury to her hand. The complaint properly alleged complete diversity of citizenship and sought $100,000 in damages. In addition, Ps joined in the lawsuit, claiming negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) due to their witnessing the incident, seeking $50,000 for their own emotional distress and medical expenses. D filed a motion to dismiss Ps' NIED claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Should the court grant D's motion? A. Yes, because P's action fails to satisfy the minimum amount in controversy requirement. B. Yes, because multiple P's may not aggregate separate and distinct claims against a single D. C. No, because P's are regarded as P's as to both claims and may therefore aggregate their claims against a single D. D. No, because the court may invoke supplemental jurisdiction, since complete diversity of citizenship is satisfied as to Ps' daughter's claim.

D. No, because the court may invoke supplemental jurisdiction, since complete diversity of citizenship is satisfied as to Ps' daughter's claim.

P was injured when her car collided with D's vehicle in Arizona. P was a citizen of Nevada, and D was a citizen of California. P filed her complaint in the Southern District of California based on diversity jurisdiction. P had the summons and complaint served on D pursuant to the applicable Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, but the manner of service was not sufficient under either California or Arizona state law. D moved for dismissal of the action for insufficient service of process. Should the district court grant the motion? A. Yes, because the federal court must apply the law of the state in which it is sitting. B. Yes, because the federal court must apply the law of the state in which the claim arose. C. No, because the motion for summary judgment will affect P's substantive rights. D. No, because the rule is arguably procedural.

D. No, because the rule is arguably procedural.