Con law II

From Strauder, we can start to see at least two different theories of the EPC begin to emerge:

Equal treatment/equal application; people should not be subject to different treatment solely because of their race Anti-subordination; government cannot take race into account when done to stigmatize or subordinate

Criticisms of dred scott

It is devoid of any consideration of morality or justice The Court purports to invoke "originalism" reasoning to justify a decision that favored white slave owners It represents "bad originalism" because it gets the historical record wrong (e.g., as J. Curtis notes in dissent, blacks were citizens and even voted in some states before the Revolution

Strauder v. West Virginia (1880) Question = held:

Question = whether all persons of the defendant's same race can be excluded from the jury by law "solely because of" their race, so that "by no possibility can any colored man sit upon the jury" (p. 52) held: Exclusion of individuals from juries solely because of their race is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause

City of Boerne v. Flores (1997)

"Legislation which deters or remedies constitutional violations can fall within the sweep of Congress's enforcement power even if in the process it prohibits conduct which is not itself unconstitutional." What does this mean? (1) Congress can use 14.5 to prohibit conduct that IS itself a violation of 14.1; and... (2) Congress can use 14.5 to prohibit conduct that itself is NOT unconstitutional, where Congress is trying to deter or remedy constitutional violations.

Morrison: Breyer dissent

"The Court points out that in [prior cases], the Court held that § 5 does not authorize Congress to use the Fourteenth Amendment as a source of power to remedy the conduct of private persons. That is certainly so. The Federal Government's argument, however, is that Congress used § 5 to remedy the actions of state actors, namely, those States which, through discriminatory design or the discriminatory conduct of their officials, failed to provide adequate (or any) state remedies for women injured by gender-motivated violence--a failure that the States, and Congress, documented in depth."

Shelby County dissent

"throwing out preclearance when it has worked and is contiuing to work to stop discriminatory changes is like throwing away your umbrella in a rainstorm because you are not getting wet" "just as buildings in California have a greater need to be earthquake-proofed, places where there is greater racial polarization in voting have a greater need for prophylactic measures to prevent purposeful race discrimination." Congress has already developed a record to support the initial legislation and has built in a periodic-review requirement. The legislative record should naturally be more limited when considering a reauthorization than when legislation is originally passed. Therefore, the Voting Rights Act satisfies the rational basis test.

Obergefell v. Hodges (2015) issues

(1) Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to license a marriage between two people of the same sex? (2) Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to recognize a marriage between two people of the same sex that was legally licensed and performed in another state?

Shapiro

(right to travel) (classification based on duration of residency) • Class based (new vs. old state residents—doesn't in and of itself trigger heightened review) • Rights Based (right to travel—protected by SS, p.188) • found EPC violated by state statutory provisions that totally denied welfare assistance to residents who had resided within the jurisdiction for less than one year

Pace v. Alabama (1883)

- African American man and white woman arrested because of their sexual relationship - Ruled anti-miscegenation statute was constitutional because they were punished equally (Equal protection Clause in 14th Amendment) "There is in neither section any discrimination against either race. Section 4184 equally includes the offense when the persons of the two sexes are both white and when they are both black"

Yick Wo v. Hopkins (1886)

- All white applicants (about 80) were granted permits; 200 Chinese were denied permits (unequal fashion) - Yick sued - Determined a law that is race-neutral in text, but is applied in a discriminatory fashion, violates the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment (1868) - The Equal Protection Clause: No state shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction "equal protection of the law."

Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. (1972) p. 315

-Louisiana law involving recovery under worker's compensation scheme limited the ability of "unacknowledged illegitimate children" to recover. -"[V]isiting this condemnation on the head of an infant is illogical and unjust. Moreover, imposing disabilities on the illegitimate child is contrary to the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing. Obviously, no child is responsible for his birth and penalizing the illegitimate child is an ineffectual—as well as an unjust—way of deterring the parent."

Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No.1 three questions presented

1) Do the decisions in Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger apply to public high school students? 2) Is racial diversity a compelling interest that can justify the use of race in selecting students for admission to public high schools? 3) Does a school district that normally permits a student to attend the high school of her choice violate the Equal Protection Clause by denying the student admission to her chosen school because of her race in an effort to achieve a desired racial balance?

Griswold v. Connecticut (1965) concurrences 1 2 3

1. Rather than finding that the right to privacy was contained in imaginary penumbras, Goldberg located it in the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments. 2. Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the right to privacy. 3. arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment was the proper basis for the decision.

Griswold v. Connecticut (1965) dissents 2

1. Unpersuaded by the loose reasoning of the majority, Black felt that there was no way to infer that the Constitution contained a right to privacy. He also dismissed the views of the concurrences that it could be found in the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments. 2.Stewart argued that despite his personal view that the law was "uncommonly silly," he felt that the Court had no choice but to find it constitutional.

background Did the Nebraska statute violate the ______ Amendment's Due Process Clause? held?

14A background: Nebraska passed a law prohibiting teaching grade school children any language other than English. Meyer, who taught German in a Lutheran school, was convicted under this law. held: The Court declared the Nebraska law unconstitutional, reasoning it violated the liberty protected by Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Liberty, the Court explained, means more than freedom from bodily restraint. It also includes the right of a teacher to teach German to a student, and the right of parents to control the upbringing of their child as they see fit. While the state has a legitimate interest in encouraging the growth of a population that can engage in discussions of civic matters, the means it chose to pursue this objective was excessive.

Clark v. Jeter (1988)

A Pennsylvania law required illegitimate children to prove paternity before seeking support from their fathers. Did the Pennsylvania law violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co

1991: Race-based peremptory challenges forbidden in civil cases under EP 14A

Carolene products facts question presented

A 1923 act of Congress banned the interstate shipment of "filled milk" (skimmed milk mixed with fat or oil other than milk fat). Carolene Products argued that the law lacked rational basis and also that Congress did not regulate the use of oleomargarine, which substituted vegetable fats for butter fat, in interstate commerce. Q: Does the law violate the Commerce Power granted to Congress in Article Section 8 and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment?

Hoyt v. Florida (1961) facts and what constitutional provision?

A Florida statute automatically exempted women from jury duty and did not place women on jury lists. Women could, however, volunteer and register for jury duty Did the Florida statute violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney 1979

A Massachusetts law gave hiring preference to honorably discharged veterans applying for state civil service positions. Did the law discriminate against women and violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Goesaert v. Cleary (1948) facts question

A Michigan statute required that all bartenders hold licenses in cities with populations greater than 50,000, but the statute also stated that a woman could not be issued a license unless she was "the wife or daughter of the male owner" of a liquor establishment. Did the Michigan statute, in denying female bartenders access to licenses, violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Shelby County v. Holder (2013)

A federal law that departs from the fundamental principles of federalism must be justified by current needs The drastic measures of these provisions were warranted in 1965. However, there is no longer a substantial disparity in voter registration or turnout between white citizens and African American citizens in the states covered by the formula contained in § 4(b). This coverage formula is based on 40-year-old data and does not reflect modern reality. Congress must justify these restrictions using the current conditions, not those of 40 years ago

Bell v. Maryland (1964)

A group of 15-20 African-American students entered Hooper's restaurant in Baltimore to engage in a sit-in to protest the restaurant's refusal to serve African-American patrons. They refused to leave when requested to do so by the hostess on behalf of Mr. Hooper, the president of the corporation that owned the restaurant.After Mr. Hooper swore out a warrant, the students were arrested for violating a Maryland statute prohibiting trespassing. The Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions. Can the students' convictions be upheld in the light of intervening state laws?

Plyler v. Doe (1982) facts and issues

A revision to the Texas education laws in 1975 allowed the state to withhold from local school districts state funds for educating children of illegal aliens. Did the law violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Griswold v. Connecticut (1965) held

A right to privacy can be inferred from several amendments in the Bill of Rights, and this right prevents states from making the use of contraception by married couples illegal. In a 7-2 decision authored by Justice Douglas, the Court ruled that the Constitution did in fact protect the right of marital privacy against state restrictions on contraception. While the Court explained that the Constitution does not explicitly protect a general right to privacy, the various guarantees within the Bill of Rights create penumbras, or zones, that establish a right to privacy. Together, the First, Third, Fourth, and Ninth Amendments create the right to privacy in marital relations. The Connecticut statute conflicted with the exercise of this right and was therefore held null and void.

Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña facts

Adarand, a contractor specializing in highway guardrail work, submitted the lowest bid as a subcontractor for part of a project funded by the United States Department of Transportation. Under the terms of the federal contract, the prime contractor would receive additional compensation if it hired small businesses controlled by "socially and economically disadvantaged individuals." [The clause declared that "the contractor shall presume that socially and economically disadvantaged individuals include Black Americans, Hispanic Americans, Native Americans, Asian Pacific Americans, and other minorities...." Federal law requires such a subcontracting clause in most federal agency contracts]. Another subcontractor, Gonzales Construction Company, was awarded the work. It was certified as a minority business; Adarand was not. The prime contractor would have accepted Adarand's bid had it not been for the additional payment for hiring Gonzales.

Justice Harlan in Dissent in Plessy anti-subordination colorblindness

Anti-subordination: "Every one knows that the statute in question had its origin in the purpose, not so much to exclude white persons from railroad cars occupied by blacks, as to exclude colored people from coaches occupied by or assigned to white persons...." ii) colorblindness: "Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens."

The Slaughter-House Cases (1873) Background?

Background • In 1869, the reconstructed Louisiana legislature (which included black legislators for the first time in the state's history) passed a law giving a monopoly in the slaughterhouse business in the City of New Orleans to a particular livestock/slaughterhouse company; all cattle to be slaughtered in the region had to go there The law was challenged by white butchers who argued that the monopoly granted to the one slaughterhouse was unconstitutional because it violated their right to practice their trade

Lochner Harlan dissent

Broadly interpreting state authority to regulate under its police powers, Justice Harlan in his dissent articulated reasoning that would inform later decisions in the post-Lochner era. Rather than requiring the government to prove that a law had a rational basis, he would require the party challenging the law to prove that the test was not met. (This is the current rule.)

Jones v. Alfred Mayer (1968) (p. 204):

Can Congress use its enforcement powers under the 13th Am. to reach private as opposed to state action? 2. Question involves the constitutionality of a federal statute that provides:All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property." 42 USC sec. 1982. 3. The court interprets this statute to prohibit all racial discrimination, whether private or public, in the sale or rental of property. Court interprets 13.2 to give Congress the power to "rationally" determine "what are the badges and incidents of slavery," and to translate that determination into "effective legislation" Court also makes clear that 13.2 (unlike 14.5) can be used to reach private conduct, not just state action (p. 206

Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992) issue

Can a state require women who want an abortion to obtain informed consent, wait 24 hours, if married, notify their husbands, and, if minors, obtain parental consent, without violating their right to abortion as guaranteed by Roe v. Wade?

Geduldig v. Aiello (1974) facts

Carolyn Aiello experienced disability as a result of complications during her pregnancy. She was ineligible for benefits from California's Disability Fund under Section 2626 of California's Unemployment Insurance Code. Section 2626 denied benefits to women whose disabilities resulted from pregnancy. Aiello and other disabled women who were denied benefits under Section 2626 challenged the statute as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections (1966) (p. 179)

Case involves the right to vote... Virginia residents brought a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of Virginia's poll tax, which required payment of $1.50 to vote Court's holding? A state violates the 14th Am.'s EPC when it makes affluence of the voter or payment of a fee an electoral standard for state voting.

United States v. Windsor (2013) dissent

Chief Justice John G. Roberts wrote a dissent in which he argued that the Court lacked the jurisdiction to review the case and that interests in uniformity and stability justified Congress' enactment of DOMA. He also argued that the majority's opinion did not address the issue of state definitions of marriage affecting same-sex couples. In his separate dissent, Justice Antonin Scalia wrote that the Supreme Court had neither the jurisdiction to review the case nor the power to invalidate democratically enacted legislation. He argued that the majority's opinion wrongly asserted the supremacy of the Supreme Court as the final arbiter of government. However, the majority opinion did not address the issue of whether or not the Equal Protection Clause required laws restricting the definition of marriage to be reviewed under a rational basis or strict scrutiny standard. He also argued that the majority misconstrued DOMA's insidious intent and should not rule based on that presumption. Justice Clarence Thomas and Chief Justice Roberts joined in the dissent. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. also wrote a separate dissent in which he argued that the United States Government did not have standing in the case because the executive branch declined to defend the statute, but that BLAG did have standing because it chose to defend the otherwise undefended statute. He also argued that the Constitution does not guarantee the right to enter into a same-sex marriage because that right is not "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition." Instead, the issue of the definition of marriage is left to the people to decide, a decision in which DOMA does not interfere. Justice Clarence Thomas partially joined in the dissent.

Obergefell v. Hodges dissent

Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. wrote a dissent in which he argued that, while same-sex marriage might be good and fair policy, the Constitution does not address it, and therefore it is beyond the purview of the Court to decide whether states have to recognize or license such unions. Instead, this issue should be decided by individual state legislatures based on the will of their electorates. The Constitution and judicial precedent clearly protect a right to marry and require states to apply laws regarding marriage equally, but the Court cannot overstep its bounds and engage in judicial policymaking. The precedents regarding the right to marry only strike down unconstitutional limitations on marriage as it has been traditionally defined and government intrusions, and therefore there is no precedential support for making a state alter its definition of marriage. Chief Justice Roberts also argued that the majority opinion relied on an overly expansive reading of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment without engaging with the judicial analysis traditionally applied to such claims and while disregarding the proper role of the courts in the democratic process. Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Scalia wrote that the majority opinion overstepped the bounds of the Court's authority both by exercising the legislative, rather than judicial, power and by doing so in a realm that the Constitution reserves for the states. Justice Scalia argued that the question of whether same-sex marriage should be recognized is one for the state legislatures, and that for the issue to be decided by unelected judges goes against one of the most basic precepts of the Constitution: that political change should occur through the votes of elected representatives. In taking on this policymaking role, the majority opinion departed from established Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence to create a right where none exists in the Constitution.

Tennessee v. Lane (2004)

Congress has the power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate the States' sovereign immunity in cases implicating the fundamental right of access to the courts. Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, as applied to circumstances affecting the right to access the judicial system, represents a valid exercise of Congress' § 5 authority to enforce the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. Congress may abrogate a state's constitutional immunity against non-consensual lawsuits if Congress acts pursuant to a valid grant of constitutional authority and unequivocally expresses its intent to abrogate state immunity. During its considerations of the ADA, Congress heard evidence that denial of access to courthouses for people with disabilities presented a substantial concern nationwide. The record of constitutional violations supports Congress' exercise of § 5 authority to enforce the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment. As applied to access to the judicial system, Title II is appropriately tailored to serve the government's objective

Nevada v. Hibbs (2003)

Congress may abrogate state sovereign immunity in federal court if it makes its intention to abrogate unmistakably clear in the language of the statute and acts pursuant to a valid exercise of its power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA): Congress may implement legislation that prohibits directly unconstitutional conduct, and it may also implement broader remedial legislation that regulates facially constitutional conduct for the purpose of preventing unconstitutional conduct Employers tend to embrace the stereotypical view of the home and family as the woman's domain. The FMLA seeks to eliminate the perception that women will be less reliable employees due to family-care obligations by establishing minimum standards for family leave applicable to all employees, regardless of gender. The FMLA is designed to deter unconstitutional gender discrimination, and its methodology is proportional and congruent to the achievement of that goal.

Gonzales v. Carhart (2007) held standard? what about Roe was thrown out

Congress's ban on partial-birth abortion was not unconstitutionally vague and did not impose an undue burden on the right to an abortion. Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote the opinion for the majority. The Court held that, under the most reasonable interpretation, the Act applies only to the intact D&E method (also known as "partial-birth abortion") and not to the more common D&E procedure. The Act's application was limited by provisions that restrict enforcement to cases where the physician intends to perform an intact D&E and delivers the still-living fetus past specific "anatomical landmarks." Because the majority found that the Act applies only to a specific method of abortion, it held that the ban was not unconstitutionally vague, overbroad, or an undue burden on the decision to obtain an abortion. The Court also held that Congress, after finding intact D&E never to be medically necessary, could validly omit a health exception from the ban, even when "some part of the medical community" considers the procedure necessary. To require the exception whenever "medical uncertainty" exists would be "too exacting a standard to impose on the legislative power [...] to regulate the medical profession." The Court left open the possibility that an as-applied challenge could be brought against the Act if it were ever applied in a situation in which an intact D&E was necessary to preserve a woman's health

Croson holding

Court held that "generalized assertions" of past racial discrimination could not justify "rigid" racial quotas for the awarding of public contracts. Justice O'Connor's opinion noted that the 30 percent quota could not be tied to "any injury suffered by anyone," and was an impermissible employment of a suspect classification. O'Connor further held that allowing claims of past discrimination to serve as the basis for racial quotas would actually subvert constitutional values: "The dream of a Nation of equal citizens in a society where race is irrelevant to personal opportunity and achievement would be lost in a mosaic of shifting preferences based on inherently unmeasurable claims of past wrongs."

Zablocki v. Redhail (1978)

Court held that Wisconsin's statute violated the Equal Protection Clause and reaffirmed that marriage was a fundamental right. In the majority opinion authored by Justice Thurgood Marshall, the Court emphasized marriage as part of the right to privacy found in the Fourteenth Amendment as identified in Griswold v. Connecticut. While the state has an interest in ensuring that child support obligations were fulfilled, this statute only regulated those who wished to be married and did not justify the restriction on the right to marriage as found in Loving v. Virginia

Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.

Court held that it failed to establish Arlington's racially discriminatory intent or purpose. While indicating that Arlington's zoning denial may result in a racially disproportionate impact, the evidence did not show that this was Arlington's deliberate intention. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded for further consideration.

Grutter holding

Court held that the Equal Protection Clause does not prohibit the Law School's narrowly tailored use of race in admissions decisions to further a compelling interest in obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body. The Court reasoned that, because the Law School conducts highly individualized review of each applicant, no acceptance or rejection is based automatically on a variable such as race and that this process ensures that all factors that may contribute to diversity are meaningfully considered alongside race. Justice O'Connor wrote, "in the context of its individualized inquiry into the possible diversity contributions of all applicants, the Law School's race-conscious admissions program does not unduly harm nonminority applicants."

Saenz v. Roe (1999) held

Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment protects the right to travel in three ways by: allowing citizens to move freely between states, securing the right to be treated equally in all states when visiting, and securing the rights of new citizens to be treated like long-time citizens of a state. The Court explained that by paying first-year residents the same TNF benefits they received in their state of origin, states treated new residents differently than others who have lived in their borders for over one year. As such, enforcement of the PRWORA power unconstitutionally discriminated among residents.

Korematsu v. US majoirty

Court ruled that the evacuation order violated by Korematsu was valid. The majority found that the Executive Order did not show racial prejudice but rather responded to the strategic imperative of keeping the U.S. and particularly the West Coast (the region nearest Japan) secure from invasion. The Court relied heavily on a 1943 decision, Hirabayashi v. U.S., which addressed similar issues. Black argued that the validation of the military's decision by Congress merited even more deference

Eisenstadt v. Baird (1972) held

Court struck down the Massachusetts law but not on privacy grounds. The Court held that the law's distinction between single and married individuals failed to satisfy the "rational basis test" of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. Married couples were entitled to contraception under the Court's Griswold decision. Withholding that right to single persons without a rational basis proved the fatal flaw. Thus, the Court did not have to rely on Griswold to invalidate the Massachusetts statute. "If the right of privacy means anything, wrote Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. for the majority, "it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child."

Carolene Products

Court upheld the act. The majority reasoned Congress may restrict shipments of certain milk substitutes without also restricting butter. Considering that Congress had held many hearings prior to passing this law, it was reasonable to conclude that Congress believed it was necessary for public welfare. Carolene Products failed to meet its burden of proving that no rational basis for the law existed

San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez

Did Texas' public education finance system violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause by failing to distribute funding equally among its school districts?

Loving v. Virginia Did Virginia's antimiscegenation law violate the _________ Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Did Virginia's antimiscegenation law violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Washington v. Glucksberg (1997) issue

Did Washington's ban on physician assisted-suicide violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause by denying competent terminally ill adults the liberty to choose death over life?

Frontiero v. Richardson (1973) question presented

Did a federal law, requiring different qualification criteria for male and female military spousal dependency, unconstitutionally discriminate against women thereby violating the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause?

Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority (1961) issue? Holding

Did the Eagle Coffee Shoppe's refusal to serve Burton constitute a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? the Court concluded that the restaurant, as a recipient of assistance by the parking authority, benefited from the city's aid and constituted an financially integral and indispensable part of the state. As such, the Court found that the restaurant and the parking authority were so physically and financially intertwined that the private entity's conduct could be imputed to the government. Thus, it's discrimination could be considered state action in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Korematsu v. United States Did the President and Congress go beyond their ______powers by implementing exclusion and restricting the rights of Americans of Japanese descent?

Did the President and Congress go beyond their war powers by implementing exclusion and restricting the rights of Americans of Japanese descent?

Hirabayashi v. United States Did the President's executive orders and the power delegated to the military authorities discriminate against Americans and resident aliens of Japanese descent in violation of the _____Amendment?

Did the President's executive orders and the power delegated to the military authorities discriminate against Americans and resident aliens of Japanese descent in violation of the Fifth Amendment?

Zablocki v. Redhail (1978) facts

Did the Wisconsin statute violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? Roger C. Redhail, a Wisconsin minor, fathered a child. A court ordered him to pay child support. Two years later, he applied for a marriage license in Milwaukee County. His application was denied by County Clerk Thomas E. Zablocki who declined to issue the license under a state statute on the ground that Redhail owed more than $3,700 in child support.

City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.

Did the denial of the permit for a special needs home violate the Equal Protection rights of Cleburne Living Center, Inc. and its potential residents?

Washington v. Davis (1976)

Did the recruiting procedures violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? procedures and written personnel test did not constitute racial discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause. The Court found that the Clause was designed to prevent official discrimination on the basis of race; laws or other official acts that had racially disproportionate impacts did not automatically become constitutional violations. The Court reasoned that the D.C. Police Department's procedures did not have discriminatory intent and were racially neutral measures of employment qualification.

Different Theories of Equality From Strauder, Pace, Yick Wo & Plessy, we can start to see a number of possible theories of the EPC begin to emerge: Equal treatment/equal application; Color blindness; Anti-subordination; Equal outcomes;

Different Theories of Equality From Strauder, Pace, Yick Wo & Plessy, we can start to see a number of possible theories of the EPC begin to emerge: Equal treatment/equal application; people should never be subject to different treatment because of their race Color blindness; government should never take race into account Anti-subordination; government cannot take race into account when done to stigmatize or subordinate Equal outcomes; EP protects against discriminatory effects and is concerned with the actual impact or effect on people

Lawrence v. Texas (2003) issue

Do the criminal convictions of John Lawrence and Tyron Garner under the Texas "Homosexual Conduct" law, which criminalizes sexual intimacy by same-sex couples, but not identical behavior by different-sex couples, violate the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal protection of laws? Do their criminal convictions for adult consensual sexual intimacy in the home violate their vital interests in liberty and privacy protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? Should Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), be overruled?

Romer v. Evans (1996)

Does Amendment 2 of Colorado's State Constitution, forbidding the extension of official protections to those who suffer discrimination due to their sexual orientation, violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause?

Katzenbach v. Morgan (1966) issue

Does Section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 exceed the scope of Congress' powers to enact legislation because it infringes on powers reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment?

US v. Virginia (1996)

Does Virginia's creation of a women's-only academy, as a comparable program to a male-only academy, satisfy the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause? the Court held that VMI's male-only admissions policy was unconstitutional. Because it failed to show "exceedingly persuasive justification" for VMI's gender-biased admissions policy, Virginia violated the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause. Virginia failed to support its claim that single-sex education contributes to educational diversity because it did not show that VMI's male-only admissions policy was created or maintained in order to further educational diversity. Furthermore, Virginia's VWIL could not offer women the same benefits as VMI offered men.

West Coast Hotel v. Parrish (1937) Does a minimum wage law for women violate the ______Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as applied to the states by the ________Amendment?

Does a minimum wage law for women violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment? held: that the establishment of minimum wages for women was constitutional. Echoing Muller v. Oregon (1908), the majority ruled that the state may use its police power to restrict the individual freedom to contract. The decision overruled Adkins and marked the Court's departure from the expansive view of the freedom to contract. The decision is generally regarded as having ended the Lochner era, a period in American legal history in which the Supreme Court tended to invalidate legislation aimed at regulating business.

Saenz v. Roe (1999)

Does a state statute, authorizing states receiving Temporary Assistance to Needy Families to pay the benefit amount of another State's TANF to its first year residents, violate the Fourteenth Amendment's right-to-travel protections?

Box v. Planned Parenthood of Indiana and Kentucky, Inc. issue

Does an Indiana law that prevents the incineration of fetal remains with surgical byproducts, authorizes simultaneous cremation of fetal remains, and leave unchanged a woman's right under existing law "to determine the final disposition of the aborted fetus" bear a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest?

The Civil Rights Cases (1883) issue holding

Does the Civil Rights Act of 1875 violate the 10th Amendment of the Constitution which reserves all powers not granted to the national government to the states or to the people? held: Differentiating between state and private action, the majority ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment did not permit the federal government to prohibit discriminatory behavior by private parties. Thus, Sections 1 and 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 were unconstitutional because they exceeded Congress's authority under the Fourteenth Amendment by purporting to regulate the conduct of private individuals. The Court held the Act likewise exceeded Congress's authority under the Thirteenth Amendment, which bars involuntary servitude and is restricted to prohibiting ownership of slaves, not other forms of discriminatory conduct.

Bowers v. Hardwick (1986) issue

Does the Constitution confer a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in consensual sodomy, thereby invalidating the laws of many states which make such conduct illegal?

Griswold v. Connecticut (1965) facts and question

Does the Constitution protect the right of marital privacy against state restrictions on a couple's ability to be counseled in the use of contraceptives? In 1879, Connecticut passed a law that banned the use of any drug, medical device, or other instrument in furthering contraception. A gynecologist at the Yale School of Medicine, C. Lee Buxton, opened a birth control clinic in New Haven in conjunction with Estelle Griswold, who was the head of Planned Parenthood in Connecticut. They were arrested and convicted of violating the law, and their convictions were affirmed by higher state courts.

United States v. Windsor (2013) issues

Does the Defense of Marriage Act, which defines the term "marriage" under federal law as a "legal union between one man and one woman" deprive same-sex couples who are legally married under state laws of their Fifth Amendment rights to equal protection under federal law?

McDonald v. City of Chicago 2010 issue? held:

Does the Second Amendment apply to the states because it is incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges and Immunities or Due Process clauses and thereby made applicable to the states? held: holding that the Fourteenth Amendment makes the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms for the purpose of self-defense applicable to the states. With Justice Samuel A. Alito writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that rights that are "fundamental to the Nation's scheme of ordered liberty" or that are "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition" are appropriately applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court recognized in Heller that the right to self-defense was one such "fundamental" and "deeply rooted" right. The Court reasoned that because of its holding in Heller, the Second Amendment applied to the states. Here, the Court remanded the case to the Seventh Circuit to determine whether Chicago's handgun ban violated an individual's right to keep and bear arms for self-defense.

Grutter v. Bollinger (2003) question presented

Does the University of Michigan Law School's use of racial preferences in student admissions violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964?

Shelley v. Kraemer (1948) issue: Holding:

Does the enforcement of a racially restrictive covenant violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Fred Vinson, the Court held that standing alone, racially restrictive covenants do not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Private parties may abide by the terms of such a covenant, but they may not seek judicial enforcement of such a covenant, as that would be a state action. Thus, the enforcements of the racially restrictive covenants in state court violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Grutter v. Bollinger (2003) facts

In 1997, Barbara Grutter, a white resident of Michigan, applied for admission to the University of Michigan Law School. Grutter applied with a 3.8 undergraduate GPA and an LSAT score of 161. She was denied admission. The Law School admits that it uses race as a factor in making admissions decisions because it serves a "compelling interest in achieving diversity among its student body.

Jackson holding was the utility company's action state action?

Edison's termination of Jackson's service did not qualify as state action. Rehnquist reiterated that private actions are "immune from the restrictions of the Fourteenth Amendment." The Court acknowledged that Metropolitan Edison was heavily regulated by the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, but this regulation did not make Metropolitan Edison part of the state. Additionally, the Court cited Nebbia v. New York in declining to rule on whether all actions by businesses that provided essential public services qualified as state action.

Clark v. Jeter (1988)

Equal protection challenges to statutory classifications based on legitimacy are subject to intermediate scrutiny. To be constitutional, the classification must substantially relate to an important government objective. In evaluating limitations periods for paternity suits, the Court has articulated the following framework: the period must be long enough to provide a reasonable opportunity for claims to be presented, and the time limitation must be substantially related to the state's interest in curbing stale or fraudulent suits. ie There are legitimate reasons why a mother might not file a paternity claim within the first six years. In addition to emotional obstacles, she might not realize the extent of her child's financial needs until the child gets older. E

Slaughterhouse case: ruling on Equal Protections claim?

Equal protection clause "We doubt very much whether any action of a State not directed by way of discrimination against the negroes as a class, or on account of their race, will ever be held to come within the purview of this provision. It is so clearly a provision for that race and that emergency, that a strong case would be necessary for its application to any other." (p. 27)

Palmore v. Sidoti

Facts: Custody original awarded to mother, but when she married black guy, it was deemed in child's best interest to go with white father Holding: SCOTUS reversed lower court; private biases may be outside the reach of law, but the law cannot directly, or indirectly, give them effect

City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. (1989) facts question presented

In 1983, the City Council of Richmond, Virginia adopted regulations that required companies awarded city construction contracts to subcontract 30 percent of their business to minority business enterprises. The J.A. Croson Company, which lost its contract because of the 30 percent set-aside, brought suit against the city. Did the Richmond law violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Marsh v. Alabama (1946) Facts: issue: (which amendments)

Facts: Grace Marsh, a Jehovah's Witness, attempted to distribute religious literature on the sidewalk near a post office in Chickasaw, Alabama. The Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation owned Chickasaw, Alabama in its entirety as a company town. Marsh was convicted of criminal trespass. Appealing her conviction, Marsh argued that the state law violated the First Amendment. Issue: Did Alabama violate Marsh's rights under the First and Fourteenth amendments by refusing to allow her to distribute religious material in the privately owned town of Chickasaw?

City of Boerne? What are the requirements for 14.5 leg?

For 14.5 to support Congress's legislation, "[t]here must be a congruence and proportionality between the [constitutional] injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end."

Ambach v. Norwick (1979) held

In a 5-4 opinion, the Court reversed the District Court and held that states could be justified in barring aliens from certain positions in government. Justice Lewis F. Powell's majority opinion asserted the state's interest in charging teachers with "an obligation to promote civic virtues and understanding in their classes, regardless of the subject taught." The statute furthered this interest, in that it affected only non-citizens who did not want to seek citizenship

Romer v. Evans (1996)

In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that Amendment 2 of the Colorado State Constitution violated the equal protection clause. Amendment 2 singled out homosexual and bisexual persons, imposing on them a broad disability by denying them the right to seek and receive specific legal protection from discrimination. In his opinion for the Court, Justice Anthony Kennedy noted that oftentimes a law will be sustained under the equal protection clause, even if it seems to disadvantage a specific group, so long as it can be shown to "advance a legitimate government interest." Amendment 2, by depriving persons of equal protection under the law due to their sexual orientation failed to advance such a legitimate interest. Justice Kennedy concluded: "If the constitutional conception of 'equal protection of the laws' means anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest."

United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno held

In a 7-2 decision, the Court upheld the District Court and maintained that amended Section 3 violated the Fifth Amendment in creating two types of households - one in which all members were related and one in which at least one member was unrelated. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., writing for the majority, acknowledged the interest of Congress in preventing abuse of the Food Stamp program. However, the statute did not fulfill Congress' stated purpose of preventing "hippies" and "hippie communes" from enrolling the food stamp program. Additionally, there existed other measures within the Food Stamp Act that were specifically aimed at preventing abuse of the program. Since the statute "simply does not operate so as rationally to further the prevention of fraud," the distinction between households with related members and households with unrelated members did not further the state interest and therefore violated the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

Reed v. Reed holding

In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the law's dissimilar treatment of men and women was unconstitutional. The Court argued that "[t]o give a mandatory preference to members of either sex over members of the other, merely to accomplish the elimination of hearings on the merits, is to make the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. . .[T]he choice in this context may not lawfully be mandated solely on the basis of sex."

Calder v. Bull (1798)

In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the legislation was not an ex post facto law. The Court drew a distinction between criminal rights and "private rights," arguing that restrictions against ex post facto laws were not designed to protect citizens' contract rights. Justice Chase noted that while all ex post facto laws are retrospective, all retrospective laws are not necessarily ex post facto. Even "vested" property rights are subject to retroactive laws

Hoyt v. Florida (1961)

In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the statute was based on a reasonable classification and was therefore constitutional. Noting that women were "still regarded as the center of home and family life," the Court found that the states could relieve them from the civic responsibility of jury duty unless they themselves determined that such service was consistent with their own "special responsibilities." The Court held that the case was distinct from other cases involving racial discrimination in jury selection, and that male-female disproportions on jury lists carried no constitutional significance. Cite this page

Cleburne held

In a unanimous judgment, the Court held that the denial of the special use permit to Cleburne Living Centers, Inc. was premised on an irrational prejudice against the mentally retarded, and hence unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. While the Court declined to grant the mentally retarded the status of a "quasi-suspect class," it nevertheless found that the "rational relation" test for legislative action provided sufficient protection against invidious discrimination.

Whole Woman's Health held

In applying the substantial burden test, courts must weigh the extent to which the laws in question actually serve the stated government interest against the burden they impose. Justice Stephen G. Breyer delivered the opinion for the 5-3 majority, which held that the provisions of H.B. 2 at issue do not confer medical benefits that are sufficient to justify the burdens they impose on women seeking to exercise their constitutional right to an abortion. Therefore, the provisions unconstitutionally impose an undue burden. The Court held that the judicial review of such statutes need not be wholly deferential to the legislative fact-finding, especially when the factual record before the district court contradicted it. In this case, the evidence presented before the district court showed that the admitting privileges requirement of H.B. 2 did not advance the state's interest in protecting women's health but did place a substantial burden in the path of a woman seeking an abortion by forcing about half of the state's abortion clinics to close. This additional layer of regulation provided no further protections than those already in place. Similarly, the requirement that abortion clinics meet the standards for ambulatory surgical centers did not appreciably lower the risks of abortions compared to those performed in non-surgical centers. These requirements were so tangentially related to the actual procedures involved in an abortion that they were essentially arbitrary. If these requirements took effect, only seven or eight facilities in the entire state would be able to function, which is in and of itself a substantial burden

Roe's trimester framework

In the first trimester of pregnancy, the state may not regulate the abortion decision; only the pregnant woman and her attending physician can make that decision. In the second trimester, the state may impose regulations on abortion that are reasonably related to maternal health. In the third trimester, once the fetus reaches the point of "viability," a state may regulate abortions or prohibit them entirely, so long as the laws contain exceptions for cases when abortion is necessary to save the life or health of the mother.

Roe v. Wade

Inherent in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is a fundamental "right to privacy" that protects a pregnant woman's choice whether to have an abortion. However, this right is balanced against the government's interests in protecting women's health and protecting "the potentiality of human life." The Texas law challenged in this case violated this right.

Craig v. Boren (1976) Did an Oklahoma statute violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause by establishing different drinking ages for men and women?

Intermediate scrutiny Gender discrimination can be justified only if it serves "important governmental objectives" and is "substantially related to those objectives"

Nguyen v. Immigration and Naturalization Service (2001) issue

Is 8 USC section 1409(a)'s statutory distinction, which imposes different requirements for a child's acquisition of citizenship depending upon whether the citizen parent is the mother or the father, consistent with the equal protection guarantee embedded in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment?

Gonzales v. Carhart (2007) issue

Is the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 an unconstitutional violation of personal liberty protected by the Fifth Amendment because the Act lacks an exception for partial-birth abortions necessary to protect the health of the mother?

FCC v. Beach Communications issue

Is there a conceivable rational basis justifying the distinction between cable facilities that serve separately owned and managed buildings and those that serve one or more buildings under common ownership or management for purposes of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment?

United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno facts

Jacinta Moreno lived with Ermina Sanchez, who was not related, and Sanchez's three children. Sanchez provided care to Moreno, who contributed to household living expenses. Moreno satisfied the income requirements for the federal food stamp program, but was denied under Section 3 of the Food Stamp Act of 1964, amended in 1971, which prohibited households with unrelated members from receiving food stamp benefits. Sanchez's food stamp benefits were also to be terminated. Moreno and other households who were denied benefits under Section 3 challenged the statute in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The District Court held that Section 3 violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The United States appealed.

CALDER V. BULL (1798) Are there rights protected by the Constitution that are not enumerated therein?

Justice Chase: "An ACT of the legislature...contrary to the great first principles of the social compact, cannot be considered a rightful exercise of legislative authority." (p.2) It is against all reason and justice, for a people to entrust a Legislature with SUCH powers; and, therefore, it cannot be presumed that they have done it." (p.2)

Korematsu -Frankfurter concurrence -Jackson dissent

Justice Frankfurter concurred, writing that the "martial necessity arising from the danger of espionage and sabotage" warranted the military's evacuation order. Justice Jackson dissented, arguing that the exclusion order legitimized racism that violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Gonzales v. Carhart (2007) dissent

Justice Ginsburg's dissent disputed the majority's claim that the opinion was consistent with the Casey and Stenberg precedents and said "The Court's hostility to the right Roe and Casey secured is not concealed."

The Civil Rights Cases Harlan dissent

Justice Harlan advocated for a broader interpretation of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. He pointed to the public function that these private places of accommodation serve. Harlan argued the line between state and private action is often blurred, such as how private railroads provide the government function of facilitating travel. He suggested that restrictions on the right to travel might violate the Thirteenth Amendment prohibition against involuntary servitude, and argued that the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment may also be implicated.

Whole woman's health concurrence

Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote that modern abortions are so safe relative to other medical procedures, including childbirth itself, that any law that made accessing abortions more difficult in the name of safety could not pass judicial review.

Bell v. Maryland O'Douglass concurrence

Justice William O. Douglas wrote a concurring opinion in which he argued that the majority opinion should have reversed the judgment and directed the dismissal of the indictment. He wrote that the case should be decided on the merits and argued that policies allowing people to be refused service based on their race creates a second class of citizens, which the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments were enacted to prevent. Justice Arthur J. Goldberg partially joined in the concurrence.

Moose Lodge v. Irvis facts question presented

K. Leroy Irvis, a black man who was a guest of a white member of the Moose Lodge No. 107, was refused service at the club's dining room because of his race. arguing that the action of the Pennsylvania liquor board issuing the Lodge a license made the club's discrimination "state action." Did the discriminatory practices violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Lochner is frequently pointed to as one of the worst S. Ct. opinions from the 20th century. Why? • Impact on states: • Impact on balance of judicial vs. legislative power: • Unenumerated nature of the right:

Lochner is frequently pointed to as one of the worst S. Ct. opinions from the 20th century. Why? • Impact on states: The opinion harmed the states' authority to care for the lives, health and well-being of their citizens (Harlan dissent) • Impact on balance of judicial vs. legislative power: Judiciary imposed its own views as to the wisdom of state laws on others; the judiciary usurped the legislative role (dissenters) • Unenumerated nature of the right: It protected a right—the freedom of contract between employer and employee—that some say is not fairly inferred from Constitutional text

Calder v. Bull background question

Mr. and Mrs. Caleb Bull, the stated beneficiaries of the will of Norman Morrison, were denied an inheritance by a Connecticut probate court. When the Bulls attempted to appeal the decision more than a year and a half later, they found that a state law prohibited appeals not made within 18 months of the original ruling. The Bulls persuaded the Connecticut legislature to change the restriction, which enabled them to successfully appeal the case. Calder, the initial inheritor of Morrison's estate, took the case to the Supreme Court. Was the Connecticut legislation a violation of Article 1, Section 10, of the Constitution, which prohibits ex post facto laws?

Goesaert v. Cleary (1948) held:

No EP violation. Court concluded that the Constitution "does not preclude the States from drawing a sharp line between the sexes" or "to reflect sociological insight, or shifting social standards, any more than it requires them to keep abreast of the latest scientific standards." The Court found that the Michigan legislature, in enacting the statute, could have determined that allowing women to bartend could "give rise to moral and social problems against which it may devise preventive measures." The Court, Justice Frankfurter concludes, is in no position to "cross-examine either actually or argumentatively the mind of Michigan legislators."

BARRON (1833): Does the Bill of Rights constrain the states?

No! "We are of opinion that the provision in the fifth amendment to the constitution, declaring that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation, is intended solely as a limitation on the exercise of power by the government of the United States, and is not applicable to the legislation of the states." (p. 5)

Washington v. Glucksberg (1997)

No. Analyzing the guarantees of the Due Process Clause, the Court focused on two primary aspects: the protection of our nation's objective fundamental, historically rooted, rights and liberties; and the cautious definition of what constitutes a due process liberty interest. The Court held that the right to assisted suicide is not a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause since its practice has been, and continues to be, offensive to our national traditions and practices. Moreover, employing a rationality test, the Court held that Washington's ban was rationally related to the state's legitimate interest in protecting medical ethics, shielding disabled and terminally ill people from prejudice which might encourage them to end their lives, and, above all, the preservation of human life.

Katzenbach v. Morgan (1966) held

No. The Supreme Court held that Section 4(e) is a proper exercise of the powers granted to Congress. With Justice William J. Brennan writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that Congress exercised its powers consistent with those afforded it by Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court then concluded that the Supremacy Clause prevented the enforcement of the New York English literacy requirement.

Bowers v. Hardwick held

No. The divided Court found that there was no constitutional protection for acts of sodomy, and that states could outlaw those practices. Justice Byron White argued that the Court has acted to protect rights not easily identifiable in the Constitution only when those rights are "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" (Palko v. Connecticut, 1937) or when they are "deeply rooted in the Nation's history and tradition" (Griswold v. Connecticut, 1965). The Court held that the right to commit sodomy did not meet either of these standards. White feared that guaranteeing a right to sodomy would be the product of "judge-made constitutional law" and send the Court down the road of illegitimacy.

City of boerne: did RFRA pass?

Nope: • No evidence of a constitutional injury (the legislative record lacks recent evidence of generally applicable laws being passed because of religious bigotry); and • Not congruent or proportional (RFRA's sweeping coverage is out of proportion with the asserted objective of preventing unconstitutional behavior).

Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson facts claim

Oklahoma's Criminal Sterilization Act of 1935 allowed the state to sterilize a person who had been convicted three or more times of crimes "amounting to felonies involving moral turpitude." Did the Act violate the Fourteenth Amendment?

Brown v. Board of Education (1954)

Overrules Plessy v. Ferguson (no stare decisis). Racial segregation violates 14th Amendment Equal Protection Clause ("separate is inherently unequal")

Adarand holding

Overruling Metro Broadcasting (497 US 547), the Court held that all racial classifications, whether imposed by federal, state, or local authorities, must pass strict scrutiny review. In other words, they "must serve a compelling government interest, and must be narrowly tailored to further that interest." The Court added that compensation programs which are truly based on disadvantage, rather than race, would be evaluated under lower equal protection standards. However, since race is not a sufficient condition for a presumption of disadvantage and the award of favored treatment, all race-based classifications must be judged under the strict scrutiny standard. Moreover, even proof of past injury does not in itself establish the suffering of present or future injury. The Court remanded for a determination of whether the Transportation Department's program satisfied strict scrutiny.

Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia facts constitutional issue

Policeman forced to retire bc age Did the Massachusetts law violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Turner

Prison inmates have a constitutional right to marry unless they are sentenced to life with a ban on marriage constituting part of their punishment. Marriage is a fundamental right protected by the United States Constitution. Although inmates are subject to substantial restrictions, they are guaranteed those constitutional rights that are not inconsistent with their status as inmates or legitimate penological purposes. Many benefits may accrue to an inmate who marries notwithstanding incarceration: emotional support, religious and public significance, governmental and private benefits, and eventual consummation and family life. On the other hand, Missouri's justification of the restriction—security and rehabilitation—is scanty. The restriction is not reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. First, any security concerns arising from speculative "love triangles" are no less likely to occur with respect to unmarried inmates. The rehabilitation rationale is directed at female inmates who seek to marry other inmates or convicted felons. The state's justification for limiting such marriages is paternalistic and unevenly applied

Adamson v. California (1947)

Rejected the proposition that the Fifth Amendment's self-incrimination clause applied to the states. This was later overturned! But the case outlines all the different theories of incorporation and its useful for that.

Slaughterhouse Cases ruling on 14A privileges and Immunities?

Rejection of the 14th Am. PIC Claim: The court distinguished between privileges or immunities of citizens of the U.S. (protected by the 14th Am.'s PIC) and privileges and immunities of citizens of the states (protected by Art. IV) As to privileges or immunities of citizens of the U.S. protected by the 14th Am.'s PIC, the Court gave some examples, such as the right to access navigable waters, and it concludes that the butchers' claimed right to practice a trade was not a privilege or immunity protected by the 14th Am. (even though it might be covered by Art. IV if there was discrimination against out-of-staters) The examples the Court gave of privileges or immunities protected by the 14th Am. were narrow and largely unrelated to the central purpose of the 14th Am., which was to provide protections to those who had been enslaved. In this way, the Court effectively gutted the 14th Am.'s PIC.

claims raised in slaughterhouse case?

Specific claims 13th Amendment: involuntary servitude 14th Amendment: Privileges/Immunities 14th Amendment: Equal Protection 14th Amendment: Due Process

Levy v. Louisiana (1968) p. 312

States may not draw a line that constitutes an invidious discrimination against a particular class, in this case against "illegitimate" children who are persons within the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause. "Legitimacy or illegitimacy of birth has no relation to the nature of the wrong allegedly inflicted on the mother." (p. 314)

Loving v. Virginia what level of scrutiny? DP or EP?

Strict scrutiny! Court held that distinctions drawn according to race were generally "odious to a free people" and were subject to "the most rigid scrutiny" under the Equal Protection Clause. Both DP and EP! The Court also held that the Virginia law violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. "Under our Constitution," wrote Chief Justice Earl Warren, "the freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of another race resides with the individual, and cannot be infringed by the State."

Saenz v. Roe (1999)

Struck down California law limiting new arrivals to the same welfare benefits they were eligible in former state. Right to travel grounded in P & I clause of 14th.

Whole Woman's Health facts and issue

TX law made abortion clinics have admitting privileges to hospital within 30 miles and comply with standards for ambulatory surgical centers. Should a court's "substantial burden" analysis take into account the extent to which laws that restrict access to abortion services actually serve the government's stated interest in promoting health?

The Civil Rights Cases (1883) facts?

The Civil Rights Act of 1875 affirmed the equality of all persons in the enjoyment of transportation facilities, in hotels and inns, and in theaters and places of public amusement. Though privately owned, these businesses were like public utilities, exercising public functions for the benefit of the public and, thus, subject to public regulation. In five separate cases, a black person was denied the same accommodations as a white person in violation of the 1875 Act.

Hirabayashi v. United States

The Court found the President's orders and the implementation of the curfew to be constitutional. Chief Justice Stone, writing for the unanimous Court, took into account the great importance of military installations and weapons production that occurred on the West Coast and the "solidarity" that individuals of Japanese descent felt with their motherland. He reasoned that restrictions on Japanese actions served an important national interest. The Court ducked the thorny relocation issue and focused solely on the curfew, which the Court viewed as a necessary "protective measure." Stone argued that racial discrimination was justified since "in time of war residents having ethnic affiliations with an invading enemy may be a greater source of danger than those of a different ancestry."

Plyler v. Doe (1982)

The Court reasoned that illegal aliens and their children, though not citizens of the United States or Texas, are people "in any ordinary sense of the term" and, therefore, are afforded Fourteenth Amendment protections. Since the state law severely disadvantaged the children of illegal aliens, by denying them the right to an education, and because Texas could not prove that the regulation was needed to serve a "compelling state interest," the Court struck down the law.

San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez held

The Court refused to examine the system with strict scrutiny since there is no fundamental right to education in the Constitution and since the system did not systematically discriminate against all poor people in Texas. Given the similarities between Texas' system and those in other states, it was clear to the Court that the funding scheme was not "so irrational as to be invidiously discriminatory." Justice Powell argued that on the question of wealth and education, "the Equal Protection Clause does not require absolute equality or precisely equal advantages."

Roe due process holding

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects against state action the right to privacy, and a woman's right to choose to have an abortion falls within that right to privacy. A state law that broadly prohibits abortion without respect to the stage of pregnancy or other interests violates that right. Although the state has legitimate interests in protecting the health of pregnant women and the "potentiality of human life," the relative weight of each of these interests varies over the course of pregnancy, and the law must account for this variability.

Bolling v. Sharpe (1954) Noting the legal peculiarities of DC, Justice Warren recognized that the _________ Amendment (which applied to the District) did not contain an ____________ Clause, while the Fourteenth Amendment. Lacking an equal protection standard to invalidate the District's segregation, Warren creatively relied on the _______ Amendment's guarantee of "_______" to find the segregation of the Washington, DC, schools unconstitutional.

The Fifth Amendment's guarantee of "liberty" protected by due process also guaranteed racial equality in public education in the District of Columbia. Noting the legal peculiarities of DC, Justice Warren recognized that the Fifth Amendment (which applied to the District) did not contain an Equal Protection Clause, while the Fourteenth Amendment. Lacking an equal protection standard to invalidate the District's segregation, Warren creatively relied on the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of "liberty" to find the segregation of the Washington, DC, schools unconstitutional.

Reed v. Reed facts Did the Idaho Probate Code violate the _____________ Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

The Idaho Probate Code specified that "males must be preferred to females" in appointing administrators of estates. After the death of their adopted son, both Sally and Cecil Reed sought to be named the administrator of their son's estate (the Reeds were separated). According to the Probate Code, Cecil was appointed administrator and Sally challenged the law in court.

United States v. Morrison (2000)

The Violence Against Women Act of Congress is unconstitutional as it exceeds the authority given by the Constitution for Congress to exercise the Interstate Commerce Clause or the Fourteenth Amendment. Why Wasn't 14.5 Sufficient? "Section 13981 is ... directed not at any State or state actor, but at individuals who have committed criminal acts motivated by gender bias. § 13981 visits no consequence whatever on any Virginia public official involved in investigating or prosecuting [the alleged victim's] assault."

South Carolina v. Katzenbach (1966)

The provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 mandating the abolition of literacy tests require advance federal approval of proposed changes to voting regulations and authorize the Attorney General to appoint federal examiners to oversee voter registrations do not violate the United States Constitution or exceed the scope of congressional authority. • The Court explained that the enforcement clause of the Fifteenth Amendment gave Congress "full remedial powers" to prevent racial discrimination in voting and that the Act was a "legitimate response" to the "insidious and pervasive evil" that had led to the widespread disenfranchisement of African Americans The Fifteenth Amendment authorizes Congress to employ any rational means to abolish state laws and policies that promote racial discrimination in election procedures. Congress is expressly authorized by the Fifteenth Amendment to enact legislation in furtherance of its purpose. Congress tailored the Voting Rights Act to implement anti-discrimination measures that take effect without the requirement of advance judicial approval. Given the time and effort that would be required to individually litigate the merits of individual states' voting registration policies, this provision represents a reasonable approach.

McDonald v. City of Chicago (2010) The question presented: The Court's holding: The Court's approach:

The question presented: Whether the 2nd Am.'s right to bear arms applies against the states? The Court's holding: The court (using the selective incorporation approach) holds yes, it does. The Court's approach: What test does the Court use to determine if the right should be selectively incorporated? With Justice Samuel A. Alito writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that rights that are "fundamental to the Nation's scheme of ordered liberty" or that are "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition" are appropriately applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court recognized in Heller that the right to self-defense was one such "fundamental" and "deeply rooted" right. The Court reasoned that because of its holding in Heller, the Second Amendment applied to the states

Thomas P&I concurrence in McDonald v. Chicago

Thomas concurred and concurred in the judgment. He agreed that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Second Amendment against the states, but disagreed that the Due Process Clause was the appropriate mechanism. Instead, Justice Thomas advocated that the Privileges or Immunities Clause was the more appropriate avenue for rights incorporation. Justice John Paul Stevens dissented. He disagreed that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Second Amendment against the states. He argued that owning a personal firearm was not a "liberty" interest protected by the Due Process Clause.

Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Ohio (1977)

The right of related family members to live together is fundamental and protected by the Due Process Clause, and necessarily encompasses a broader definition of "family" than just members of the nuclear family. When a city attempts such an intrusive regulation of family as that present in the CEC ordinance, its decision to do so is examined under *heightened scrutiny (maybe SS but not super explicit). Thus, it must be determined whether the housing ordinance is necessary for the achievement of an important government objective. CEC seeks to justify its ordinance as a means of preventing overcrowding, minimizing traffic and parking congestion, and avoiding an undue financial burden on the CEC's public school system. While these are all legitimate public purposes, the housing ordinance serves them only marginally and is not necessary to their accomplishment. The right of family members to live together is fundamental and protected by the Constitution. Concludes law fails scrutiny because not properly tailored (e.g., the grandmother could live with her son and his 12 children if he had 12 children)

Whole woman's health dissent

Thomas wrote a dissent in which he argued that the majority opinion bent the rules of judicial scrutiny and misinterpreted precedent to reach its conclusion. He argued that this case should never have made it to the Supreme Court because the Court normally did not allow suits by third parties to vindicate the rights of others. Additionally, the majority opinion misconstrued the undue burden test as requiring courts to apply a standard of review similar to strict scrutiny in assessing laws that regulate abortions, despite the fact that there was no precedential support for that level of scrutiny in these cases. By adding further tiers to the levels of judicial scrutiny, the majority created a test that was a "meaningless formalism" and that provided little guidance to lower courts because the result is based on whether a right is favored instead of being actually enumerated in the Constitution. In his separate dissent, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote that the Court should not have reached the substantive issues of this case because the claims should have been barred as already litigated based on the outcome of the facial challenges to the provisions, which arose from the same set of operative facts

Personnel Administrator v. Feeney holding

To prove a discriminatory purpose as required for an Equal Protection Clause challenge, Feeney must prove that the Massachusetts legislature adopted the veteran preference law because of, not merely in spite of, its adverse effects upon women. ·She fails to trigger intermediate gender scrutiny because the "Winners" are mostly men but some women and losers are men and women (actually tons of men). Nothing in the record indicates the legislature enacted the law to discriminate against women. The dispositive question is whether Feeney demonstrates that a gender-based discriminatory purpose has shaped the Massachusetts veteran preference legislation. The crux of Feeney's argument is that a person intends the natural and foreseeable consequences of his voluntary actions. Massachusetts is aware that many more men than women serve in the military. Feeney fails to meet her burden of proof.

Eisenstadt v. Baird (1972) facts and questions

Under the law, only married couples could obtain contraceptives; only registered doctors or pharmacists could provide them Did the Massachusetts law violate the right to privacy acknowledged in Griswold v. Connecticut and protected from state intrusion by the Fourteenth Amendment?

Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. Issue:

Was Arlington Height's denial of a zoning request, necessary for the creation of low-and moderate-income housing, racially discriminatory in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause?

how do we know whether the targeted conduct is itself unconstitutional under the 14th in order determine whether 14.5 leg is appropriate?

Well, if Congress purports to be targeting violations of the DP or EPC, then... State action is necessary for challengers to prevail on a 14.1 claim. Governmental intent to discriminate against the class is necessary for an EPC challenge. See, e.g., Wash. v. Davis. Infringement on a fundamental right (SDP) or unjustified class-based discrimination (EPC)?Here, the relevant standards of scrutiny come into play.

Frontiero v. Richardson EP violation? scrutiny?

Yes. The Court held that the statute in question clearly commanded "dissimilar treatment for men and women who are similarly situated," violating the Due Process Clause and the equal protection requirements that clause implied. A majority could not agree on the standard of review, however. The plurality opinion written by Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., applying a strict standard of review to the sex-based classification as it would to racial classification, found that the government's interest in administrative convenience could not justify discriminatory practices. But a concurring opinion by Justice Lewis F. Powell and joined by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger and Justice Harry A. Blackmun would not go so far as to hold sex discrimination to the same standard as race, choosing instead to argue that statutes drawing lines between the sexes alone necessarily involved the "very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Constitution," an approach employed in the Court's prior decision in Reed v. Reed. Justice Potter Stewart concurred separately that the statutes created invidious discrimination in violation of the Constitution. Justice William H. Rehnquist dissented affirming the reasoning of the lower court opinion.

Bell v. Maryland holding:

court chickened out and remanded because MD had new laws pending: No. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Court held that, since the Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions on January 9, 1962, Maryland had passed state and local laws that criminalized the conduct of Hooper's restaurant employees in refusing to serve the students because of their race. Under these statutes, the students' actions would not be illegal and their right to obtain service in the restaurant would be protected. The Court held that these laws supervened in this case because, although the convictions were affirmed in the Maryland Court of Appeals, the judgment was still not final as the case was before the Supreme Court. The Court reversed the ruling and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of the new laws.

Meyer v. Nebraska (1923) (p. 94) a. Economic Due Process: b. Non-Economic Due Process:

a. Economic Due Process: "Plaintiff in error taught this language in school as part of his occupation. His right thus to teach and the right of parents to engage him so to instruct their children, we think, are within the liberty of the Amendment." b. Non-Economic Due Process: "[I]t denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual ... to marry, establish a home and bring up children..."

Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) background holding

background: In 1890, the state legislature in Louisiana enacted the Separate Car Act He purchased a train ticket and sat in the compartment reserved for whites; as arranged, he was ejected by the conductor and imprisoned for violating the Separate Car Act held: Legalized segregation in publicly owned facilities on the basis of "separate but equal."

United States v. Cruikshank (1876) background The 1A's Right to assembly: Does it constrain the states and/or private actors? The 14th Am.: Does it reach actions taken by private individuals?

background: mob of white people slaughtered black people gathering to vote/protest The 1A's Right to assembly: Does it constrain the states and/or private actors? "The first amendment to the Constitution.... like the other amendments proposed and adopted at the same time, was not intended to limit the powers of the State governments in respect to their own citizens, but to operate upon the National government alone. Barron v. The City of Baltimore. It is now too late to question the correctness of this construction...." The 14th Am.: Does it reach actions taken by private individuals? "The fourteenth amendment... adds nothing to the rights of one citizen as against another." The text of the 14th Am. prohibits only states from depriving any person of life, liberty or property.

Ambach v. Norwick (1979) Facts

both foreign nationals who had resided in the United States for many years and were married to United States citizens. Both were eligible for citizenship, but had refused to apply. Both had applied for certification as public school teachers in New York State. New York law prohibited the certification of non-citizen teachers who had not sought citizenship. Did the New York statute violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Plessy v. Ferguson icky language

cky language: We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff's argument to consist in the assumption that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it."

Lochner v. New York (1905) what claim? held? scrutiny?

claim by bakers: argued that the Fourteenth Amendment should have been interpreted to contain the freedom to contract among the rights encompassed by substantive due process. Held:A New York State law fixing maximum working hours for bakers was declared unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court. The court held the law exceeded the police powers of the state and interfered with the individual's right to freedom of contract under Amendment 14. Scrutiny: The Court further held that the New York law failed the rational basis test for determining whether government action is constitutional.

Nguyen v. Immigration and Naturalization Service (2001) held

comports with the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. "For a gender-based classification to withstand equal protection scrutiny, it must be established 'at least that the [challenged] classification serves important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives,'" wrote Justice Kennedy. Although the law imposes different requirements on unmarried fathers and unmarried mothers, it does so on the basis of the difference between their relationships to the potential citizen at the time of birth and is justified by two important governmental interests.

Yick Wo v. Hopkins (1886)

despite the impartial wording of the law, its biased enforcement violated the Equal Protection Clause. According to the Court, even if the law is impartial on its face, "if it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the Constitution."

Adamson v. California facts issue held

facts: Adamson was convicted in California of murder in the first degree. During the trial, the prosecutor, in accordance with a California law, made comments to the jury which highlighted Adamson's decision not to testify on his own behalf. issue: Is a defendant's Fifth Amendment right not to bear witness against himself applicable in state courts and protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause? held: Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause did not extend to defendants a Fifth Amendment right not to bear witness against themselves in state courts. Citing past decisions such as Twining v. New Jersey (1908), which explicitly denied the application of the due process clause to the right against self-incrimination, and Palko v. Connecticut (1937), Justice Reed argued that the Fourteenth Amendment did not extend carte blanche all of the immunities and privileges of the first ten amendments to individuals at the state level. In a lengthy dissent which included a deep investigation of the Fourteenth Amendment's history, Justice Black argued for the absolute and complete application of the Bill of Rights to the states.

Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Company facts question presented

facts: P's electrical service was terminated in due to a lack of payment without notice. Q: Did Metropolitan Edison's termination of Jackson's electrical service qualify as "state action" under the Fourteenth Amendment?

Hernandez v. New York (1991)

held that a prosecutor may dismiss jurors who are bilingual in Spanish and English from juries that will consider Spanish-language testimony. had to decide whether the peremptory exclusion of two Hispanic jurors was tantamount to exclusion because of race—and therefore violated the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. - held nope language is race neutral...

Bolling v. Sharpe (1954) Did the segregation of the public schools of Washington D.C. violate the _________ Clause of the _________ Amendment?

held that racial segregation in the public schools of the District of Columbia is a denial to Negro children of the due process of law guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.

FCC v. Beach Communications held

held that section 602(7)(B)'s common-ownership distinction is constitutional because the statutory classification neither proceeded along suspect lines nor infringed fundamental constitutional rights. "As we have indicated," Justice Thomas concluded, "there are plausible rationales unrelated to the use of public rights-of-way for regulating cable facilities serving separately owned and managed buildings. The assumptions underlying these rationales may be erroneous, but the very fact that they are 'arguable' is sufficient, on rational-basis review, to 'immunize' the congressional choice from constitutional challenge." Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a concurring opinion.

Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan (1982) scrutiny?

held that single-sex admissions policy of the Mississippi University for Women violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th amendment The Court held that the state did not provide an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for the gender-based distinction. The state's primary argument, that the policy constituted educational affirmative action for women, was "unpersuasive" to the Court since women traditionally have not lacked opportunities to enter nursing. If anything, argued Justice O'Connor, the statute "tends to perpetuate the stereotyped view of nursing as an exclusively women's job."

Adarand issue

is the presumption of disadvantage based on race alone, and consequent allocation of favored treatment, a discriminatory practice that violates the equal protection principle embodied in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment?

key takeaways from Cruikshank i) The Bill of Rights applies to limit the federal government—but not the _________ governments. Barron is reaffirmed. ii) The 14th Am. limits only ________ action, not the actions of private individuals. iii) The effect of the Court's ruling?

key take aways i) The Bill of Rights applies to limit the federal government—but not the state governments. Barron is reaffirmed. ii) The 14th Am. limits only state action, not the actions of private individuals. iii) The effect of the Court's ruling? Attacks that suppressed black voting and helped pave way for white Democratic takeover of state legislatures—leading to Jim Crow laws and disenfranchisement

Marsh v. Alabama holding

majority ruled in Marsh's favor. The Court reasoned that a company town does not have the same rights as a private homeowner in preventing unwanted religious expression. While the town was owned by a private entity, it was open for use by the public, who are entitled to the freedoms of speech and religion. The Court employed a balancing test, weighing Chickasaw's private property rights against Marsh's right to free speech. The Court stressed that conflicts between property rights and constitutional rights should typically be resolved in favor of the latte

Moose lodge holding

no violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court noted that the state action doctrine did not necessarily apply to all private entities that received benefits or services from the government; otherwise, the Court reasoned, all private associations that received electricity, water, and fire protection would be subject to state regulation. The Court found that the Moose Lodge "a private social club in a private building," and thus not subject to the Equal Protection Clause.

FCC v. Beach Communications (1993) facts

of the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 provides that cable television systems be franchised by local governmental authorities, but exempts facilities serving "only subscribers in 1 or more multiple unit dwellings under common ownership, control, or management, unless such...facilities use any public right-of-way." When the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) ruled that satellite master antenna television (SMATV) systems, which typically receive a satellite signal through a rooftop dish and then retransmits the signal by wire to units within a building or a building complex, are subject to the franchise requirement if their transmission lines interconnect separately owned and managed buildings or if its lines use or cross any public right-of-way,

Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992) held

reaffirmed Roe, but it upheld most of the Pennsylvania provisions. For the first time, the justices imposed a new standard to determine the validity of laws restricting abortions. The new standard asks whether a state abortion regulation has the purpose or effect of imposing an "undue burden," which is defined as a "substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability." Under this standard, the only provision to fail the undue-burden test was the husband notification requirement. In a rare step, the opinion for the Court was crafted and authored by three justices: O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter.

Clark v. Jeter (1988)

statute violated the Constitution. Citing the test which the Court developed in Mills v. Habluetzel (1982) to evaluate equal protection challenges to statutes of limitations in paternity suits, Justice O'Connor held that the Pennsylvania law did not "provide a reasonable opportunity to assert a claim on behalf of an illegitimate child." Furthermore, since, in some circumstances, Pennsylvania permitted paternity suits involving illegitimate children to be initiated after six years, there was no reason why the law in question was necessary to deter the litigation of "stale or fraudulent claims," a legitimate state interest.

Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson held

the Act violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court reasoned that certain crimes, such as embezzlement, were excluded from the Act's jurisdiction without explanation or reason. Moreover, the Court reasoned that because of the social and biological implications of reproduction and the irreversibility of sterilization operations, compulsory sterilization laws should be subject to strict scrutiny.

Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia held

the Court held that the law did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. The Court found that the right of governmental employment was not per se fundamental, and that uniformed state police officers over 50 did not constitute a suspect class under the Clause. Applying a rational relationship test, the Court reasoned that the statute was sufficiently justified as a means of protecting the public "by assuring physical preparedness of [the] uniformed police." The Court noted that while the law may not have been the best means to accomplish this purpose, it did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment merely because of its imperfections.

Box v. Planned Parenthood of Indiana and Kentucky, Inc. issue

the Court upheld an Indiana law relating to the disposition of fetal remains as rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Because no other appellate court besides the Seventh Circuit had ruled on the second question (whether another Indiana law that bars the knowing provision of sex-, race-, or disability-selective abortions by abortion providers), the Court denied the petition as to that question, effectively leaving in place the decision of the Seventh Circuit striking down that law. Citing its decision in Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983), the Court found that a state has a "legitimate interest in proper disposal of fetal remains." The Seventh Circuit therefore erred in reaching the opposite conclusion to strike down the Indiana law. The Court then considered whether the challenged law is rationally related to that interest, holding that it is. The Court pointed out that this case does not present the substantive question whether Indiana's law imposes an undue burden on a woman's right to obtain an abortion, and therefore it does not answer that question. Justice Sonia Sotomayor would have denied the petition for certiorari as to both questions. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a concurring opinion in which he discusses the second question, which the Court did not consider. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg would have denied the petition for certiorari as to both questions because, according to her separate opinion, the parties argued below for the incorrect standard (rational basis review rather than heightened review).

Geduldig v. Aiello (1974) held

upheld the statute. the Court accepted California's interest in keeping the Disability Fund program solvent and maintaining the low contribution rate from program members. Insuring disability resulting from pregnancy complications would be "extraordinarily expensive" and make the program "impossible to maintain." California was not obligated by the Equal Protection Clause to "choose between attacking every aspect of a problem or not attacking the problem at all." Therefore, California could constitutionally choose which disabilities to insure through the Disability Fund in order to maintain the solvency and contribution level of the program.

Obergefell v. Hodges held

yes, yes. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees the right to marry as one of the fundamental liberties it protects, and that analysis applies to same-sex couples in the same manner as it does to opposite-sex couples. Judicial precedent has held that the right to marry is a fundamental liberty because it is inherent to the concept of individual autonomy, it protects the most intimate association between two people, it safeguards children and families by according legal recognition to building a home and raising children, and it has historically been recognized as the keystone of social order. Because there are no differences between a same-sex union and an opposite-sex union with respect to these principles, the exclusion of same-sex couples from the right to marry violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment also guarantees the right of same-sex couples to marry as the denial of that right would deny same-sex couples equal protection under the law. Marriage rights have traditionally been addressed through both parts of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the same interrelated principles of liberty and equality apply with equal force to these cases; therefore, the Constitution protects the fundamental right of same-sex couples to marry. The Court also held that the First Amendment protects the rights of religious organizations to adhere to their principles, but it does not allow states to deny same-sex couples the right to marry on the same terms as those for opposite-sex couples.

United States v. Windsor (2013) held

yes. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Supreme Court held that the United States Government, despite the executive branch's agreement regarding DOMA's unconstitutionality, retains a significant enough stake in the issue to support Supreme Court's jurisdiction. Because the judgment in question orders the U.S. Treasury to refund tax money, the Government stands to suffer a real economic injury and therefore maintains standing in the case. The Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group (BLAG) presented substantial arguments for the constitutionality of DOMA that reflected an actual controversy under Article III, which allowed the Supreme Court to address the case without needing to decide whether BLAG would have had standing before a lower court. The Court also held that states have the authority to define marital relationships and that DOMA goes against legislative and historical precedent by undermining that authority. The result is that DOMA denies same-sex couples the rights that come from federal recognition of marriage, which are available to other couples with legal marriages under state law. The Court held that the purpose and effect of DOMA is to impose a "disadvantage, a separate status, and so a stigma" on same-sex couples in violation of the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection.

Reynolds (1964) (p. 175):

• 14th Am. EP case involving challenge to Alabama's failure to apportion legislative districts on population basis • Recognizes the right to vote as a "fundamental political right preservative of all rights" • "An individual's right to vote for state legislators is unconstitutionally impaired when its weight is in a substantial fashion diluted when compared with votes of citizens living on other parts of the state." (p. 177)

Dred Scott The Court's Three Main Infamous Rulings

• Dred Scott could not invoke diversity jurisdiction to sue because individuals who are black cannot become citizens of the United States (p. 7-10) • Congress lacks the power to limit slavery in the territories (p. 10-11) • Legislation limiting slavery violates the Due Process Clause—under the theory that people who are enslaved are property (p. 11-12)

Background History on the Role of Due Process and its cases • Substantive economic due process. See _______ & ________. • The Application of the Bill of Rights to the States: Incorporation via the Due Process Clause. See _________ & _____________. • Noneconomic substantive due process See __________.

• Substantive economic due process. See Lochner & its overruling in West Coast Hotel • The Application of the Bill of Rights to the States: Incorporation via the Due Process Clause. See Adamson & McDonald. • Noneconomic substantive due process See Meyer.

Slaughter House case ramifications • The decision rendered the ___________ Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment a practical nullity. • See also Bradwell (1873) (rejecting PIC challenge to an Ill. law that denied __________a license to practice law) • As a result, the Court over time, when seeking to protect individuals against actions of the _________, has turned from the _________Clause to the other provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. • In so doing, the Court eventually (as we will see this quarter) adopted a more expansive interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment's (1) _____ and (2) ______.

• The decision rendered the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment a practical nullity. • See also Bradwell (1873) (rejecting PIC challenge to an Ill. law that denied woman a license to practice law) • As a result, the Court over time, when seeking to protect individuals against actions of the states, has turned from the Privileges or Immunities Clause to the other provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. • In so doing, the Court eventually (as we will see this quarter) adopted a more expansive interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment's (1) DPC and (2) EPC.

• What do the Reconstruction Amends. say? • When given its first opportunity to interpret the 13th and 14th Amends., what did the Court do? (______ Cases) • Did the Reconstruction Amendments seem to alter the Supreme Court's views on the extent to which the constitution regulates the conduct of state governments? (__________) • Did the Reconstruction Amendments seem to alter the Supreme Court's views on the extent to which the constitution countenances racial discrimination? (1_______ ; 2._______; 3________)

• What do the Reconstruction Amends. say? • When given its first opportunity to interpret the 13th and 14th Amends., what did the Court do? (Slaughter-House Cases) • Did the Reconstruction Amendments seem to alter the Supreme Court's views on the extent to which the constitution regulates the conduct of state governments? (Cruikshank) • Did the Reconstruction Amendments seem to alter the Supreme Court's views on the extent to which the constitution countenances racial discrimination? (Strauder; Pace; Yick Wo; Plessy)

Slaughterhouse cases - ruling on 13A claim?

• plaintiff argued that the plaintiffs had been "prohibited from doing their usual and customary work, except upon the property and for the compensation and profit of these parties." • The Court rejected this 13th Am. claim, interpreting the 13th Am. as being directed at "freedom of the slave race"

Things that were NOT state action name 4

•Civil Rights Cases (1883) (EP) (places of public accommodation are not state actors) •J. Black's dissent in Bell v. Maryland (1964) (EP) (trespass action against students who engaged in a sit-in at a private restaurant) (case distinguishable from Shelley in part because it involves court's color-blind support for property owner's legal right to exclude) •Moose Lodge (1972) (EP) (private club with racially discriminatory policy) (private social club in a private building, unlike the facts in Burton) (not enough of a close relationship) (liquor board's regulation/involvement in club not enough) (club not performing state function) •Jackson (1974) (DP)

State Action? name all 7

•J. Harlan's dissent in Civil Rights Cases (1883) (EP) (places of public accommodation are agents of the state in that they are charged with duties to the public and are subject to govt regulation) •Marsh (1946) (1A rights of Jehovah's Witness) (privately owned town) (public function, plus appearances) •Shelley (1948) (EP) (active judicial facilitation of and enforcement of private racial discrimination) •Burton (1961) (EP; racial discrimination by Eagle Coffee Shop, which leased space in public building) (symbiotic relationship; public building; appearances) •J. Douglas's separate opinion in Bell v. Maryland (1964) (EP) (trespass action against black students who engaged in sit-in at private restaurant) (place of public accommodation serving the public; plus state facilitation/enforcement like in Shelley) •Moose Lodge (1972) (EPC) (private club with racially discriminatory member policy) (govt. encouragement/facilitation as to the club's bylaws only) •Edmonson (1991) (EP) (jury)