Constitutional Interpretation One

Cooper v. Aaron

ALYSSA- Background: Following the SCOTUS ruling in Brown v Board of Education (declaring segregation in public schools unconstitutional), the Little Rock School Board attempted to comply with orders from an Arkansas federal district court to comply with Brown and desegregate schools in the district. The Governor of Arkansas actively intervened by placing Little Rock's Central High School as "off-limits" to African- American students and called in National Guard. In response, an injunction was granted through a district court against the Governor, the National Guard troops were withdrawn, and African American students were allowed to attend the high school accompanied by and with the protection of Federally commanded troops. Public resistance continued, so the school board petitioned for a delay on de-segregating its schools, the district courts granted the postponement due to the "chaos, bedlam, and turmoil" that accompanied the allowance of African American students to attend the central high school. The Court of Appeals reversed that district court decision, and that reversal was upheld by the SCOTUS. Questions & Decisions: 1)Were Arkansas officials bound by federal court orders mandating desegregation? a) Yes! Supreme Court's ruling in Brown & it's interpretation of the 14th Amendment in that decision became the "supreme law of the land" (Article VI) on the issue. Created a "binding" effect on the states. The Court reaffirmed its commitment to desegregation and reiterated that legislatures are not at liberty to annul judgments of the Court. Arguments 1)Article VI establishes the constitution as the "Supreme law of land" 2)Marshall, in Marbury v Madison, referred to constitution as "the fundamental and paramount law of the nation" and declared that "It is emphatically the... duty of the judicial department to saw what the law is." 3) The above mentioned power of the SCOTUS has been respected by the court and the country itself as a "permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional system" ever since. The supreme court, in Brown v Board of Education, ruled that segregation was unconstitutional. Article VI establishes the constitution as "law of the land" and Marbury v Madison establishes the SCOTUS as the natural and proper interpreter of the constitution. This effectively makes the SCOTUS interpretation of the Constitution the "working" form of the constitution. In other words, until (and unless) the SCOTUS changes its mind on the interpretation on "x part" of the constitution, their interpretation *is* what the constitution says for the purposes of law. The SCOTUS interpretation of the 14th Amendment and subsequent ruling in Brown bound the states to obedience to that ruling and interpretation (until the day, if it ever comes, that the SCOTUS interprets the 14th Amendment different). Every state legislator and executive and judicial officer is sworn under oath, under Article VI, section 3, "to support this Constitution", so they can't go against it (or it's current, official interpretation) without violating their oath. Since the SCOTUS has the official and final say on the interpretation of it, as established and accepted in Marbury, it is however the SCOTUS interprets the constitution, since they have the ultimate power and say in its interpretation, that is the interpretation that those individuals are bound to protect and support. ----- Facts of the case The Governor and the Legislature of Arkansas openly resisted the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education. They refused to obey court orders designed to implement school desegregation. Local officials delayed plans to do away with segregated public facilities. Question Were Arkansas officials bound by federal court orders mandating desegregation? Conclusion the Court held that the Arkansas officials were bound by federal court orders that rested on the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education. The Court noted that its interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment in Brown was the supreme law of the land and that it had a "binding effect" on the states. The Court reaffirmed its commitment to desegregation and reiterated that legislatures are not at liberty to annul judgments of the Court.

McCulloch v. Maryland

ALYSSA: Background: In 1816, Congress chartered The Second Bank of the United States. In 1818, the state of Maryland passed legislation to impose taxes on the bank. The taxes must be paid in order to get the stamped paper that the banks were required to issue notes with in Maryland. James W. McCulloch, the cashier of the Baltimore branch of the bank, refused to pay the tax. A suit was brought against him and was decided against McCulloch in the initial suit, due to the fact that he didn't contest the facts. It was decided against McCulloch in appeal as well (Maryland Court of Appeals). From there, the case was taken by a writ of error to the SCOTUS. *Writ of Error- a writ issued by an appellate court (in this case the SCOTUS) to a court of record (in this case, district court below that originally heard the case) where a case was tried, requiring that the record of the trial be sent to the appellate court for examination of alleged errors. Questions/Decisions: 1) Did Congress have the authority to establish the bank? Ultimately, yes. Cumulation of arguments: a) Bank had existed for YEARS. In fact, the bill establishing the first bank was heavily debated and thought through. i)Initially, the first act was allowed to expire and there was (briefly) not a national bank, and things were a hot mess.. It became obvious that a national bank was necessary, so Congress created the second! b) Power of Fed gov't does NOT stem from the States, but rather from the people. i) We held conventions of delegates, chosen in each state by the people, for their assent and the ratification of the Constitution. Since those delegates were chosen by the people, the people authorized those individuals to represent them. Thus, the people approved of the ratification of the constitution, NOT the States. ii) The states brought the constitution and proposed it to the people in these conventions, giving the States' assent to the Constitution by the act of presenting it, leaving it to the people to accept or reject it. iii) "We the people", not "We the States". "The gov't proceeds directly from the people; is "ordained and established" in the name of the people.." c) "The government of the Union, though limited in its powers, is supreme within its sphere of action" - Marshall, in McCulloch v Maryland. i) The fed govt doesn't have much power over many areas, but in the areas it DOES have power, its power is supreme. d) The power to "charter a bank" is not in the constitution! And the 10th Amendment says that powers that "aren't delegated to the United States, nor prohibited to the States, are reserved for the States or to the people". So how does the *federal* government have the power to create banks? i) WELL, the pwr to create banks isn't granted to either govt expressly... however, the power to law and collect taxes; to borrow money; to regulate commerce; to declare and conduct war; and to raise and support armies and navies IS expressly given to the Fed gov't. However, the constitution doesn't go through each enumerated power and lay out how the fed gov't can act on and conduct those powers and duties. It's implied, otherwise why give the gov't the power in the first place, if the means were implicitly granted as well? The people granted the fed gov't the power to do x, it only makes sense that they would be implicitly granting the fed gov't the MEANS necessary to accomplish x. ii) "[The government] which has a right to do an act, and has imposed on it the duty of performing that act, must, according to the dictates of reason, be allowed to select the means". 1) If there are those that disagree, they must take on the burden of proving why a specific mean is an exception to that belief and the burden of proving why the fed gov't shouldn't be able to act in furtherance of its powers and duties through that specific mode/via that specific mean. e) The "necessary and proper" clause i)Interpreted "necessary" to not mean "absolute physical necessity" where one thing "can't exist without another", but have a broader definition. ii) In common use, it just means "one thing is convenient, or useful, or essential to another". 1) In discussing something else, elsewhere in the constitution (A1, S10), the words "absolutely necessary" are used- so clearly there is a distinction in the intention of the use of "necessary" here and in where it was used in conjunction with "absolutely". This supports the "common use" interpretation of the word. CONCLUSION: f) "[the necessary and proper clause] cannot be construed to restrain the powers of Congress, or to impair the right of the legislature to exercise its best judgement in the selection of measures to carry into execution the constitutional powers of the government." g) "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional" i) The degree of necessity of a bank has been demonstrated in the past, no one disagrees that it is an appropriate measure, thus it is constitutional. 2) Did the Maryland law unconstitutionally interfere with congressional powers? Yes! The constitution is the supreme law of the land, and so are the laws made in pursuance of the constitution. Since the constitution granted the fed gov't x enumerated power, and the fed gov't felt that a national bank was the appropriate and necessary means for achieving and fulfilling that enumerate power, the state has no right to do anything to interfere with the fed gov't conducting that practice. Decision: 1) "Power to create implies a power to preserve" 2) "That a power to destroy, if wielded by a different hand, is hostile to, and incompatible with these powers to create and preserve" i) Power of taxing bank is to destroy it 3) "That where this repugnancy exists, that authority which is supreme must control, not yield to that over which it is supreme" i) "[We conclude] that the states have no power, by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden, or in any manner control, the operations of the constitutional laws enacted by Congress to carry into execution the powers vested in the general government". ii) Thus, the tax is unconstitutional. ---- Questions: Did Congress have the authority to establish the bank? Did the Maryland law unconstitutionally interfere with congressional powers? Facts of the case: In 1816, Congress chartered The Second Bank of the United States. In 1818, the state of Maryland passed legislation to impose taxes on the bank. James W. McCulloch, the cashier of the Baltimore branch of the bank, refused to pay the tax. Conclusuion: In a unanimous decision, the Court held that Congress had the power to incorporate the bank and that Maryland could not tax instruments of the national government employed in the execution of constitutional powers. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Marshall noted that Congress possessed unenumerated powers not explicitly outlined in the Constitution. Marshall also held that while the states retained the power of taxation, "the Constitution and the laws made in pursuance thereof are supreme. . .they control the Constitution and laws of the respective states, and cannot be controlled by them."

Martin v. Hunter's Lessee

ALYSSA: During the American Revolution, the Commonwealth of Virginia enacted legislation that allowed it to confiscate Loyalists' property. The Jay Treaty was a federal treaty with the British crown doing various things, one of which was awarding back that land to the original owners. Developed into a disagreement over whether the SCOTUS had the authority to evaluate the case since the case originally was seen in a state court. Here is how it went down, part 1-3 are for background, 4 & 5 are the parts in question for the decision: 1) The original court ruled in favor of the defendant (Hunter's lessee) on April 24, 1794. Denny Martin (plaintiff) appealed. 2) The Virginia state supreme court ruled on the case next, and upheld the previous verdict. Virginia SC's logic: argued that, in its own interpretation of the treaty, the treaty did not cover the dispute. 3)The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed with this conclusion, ruling that the treaty did in fact cover the dispute, and remanded the case back to the Virginia Supreme Court. 4) THEN the Virginia court claimed that the U.S. Supreme Court did not have authority over cases originating in state court: 5) Final: The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the state court's decision on appeal, ruling that questions of federal law were within its jurisdiction, and thereby establishing its own supremacy in matters of constitutional interpretation. Basically, after being ruled against/contradicted to on the interpretation of the treaty, the Virginia state court argued that since the case was originally seen in the State's court, and not a federal court, that the STATE's supreme court should have the final say on interpretation. The SCOTUS argued that since it was a federal law in question, it doesn't matter that a Vriginia court saw the case first- the SCOTUS had authority over it. Arguments: 1) A3, S1 does not limit the appellate power that it grants to the SCOTUS. SCOTUS argued that it is the case itself, and the matter at hand, that determines jurisdiction, not the court that it is originally heard it. 2) Basically, to ensure uniformity, the SCOTUS *has* to have appellate jurisdiction in all matters. There has to be someone to have the final say or different states may interpret the same federal laws, treaties, etc differently. a) The counter logic rests on the belief that the States were never meant to be subject to the constitution and that isn't the case. Story wrote for the court "Judges of equal learning and integrity, in different states might differently interpret a statutes... treaty... or even the constitution itself: if there were no revising authority to control these jarring and discordant judgements, and harmonize them into uniformity, the laws, the treaties and the constitution of the United States would be different in different states." ------- Question: Does the appellate power of the Supreme Court extend to the Virginia courts? Facts of the Case: Lord Fairfax held land in Virginia. He was a Loyalist and fled to England during the Revolution. He died in 1781 and left the land to his nephew, Denny Martin, who was a British subject. The following year, the Virginia legislature voided the original land grant and transferred the land back to Virginia. Virginia granted a portion of this land to David Hunter. The Jay Treaty seemed to make clear that Lord Fairfax was entitled to the property. The Supreme Court declared that Fairfax was so entitled, but the Virginia courts, where the suit arose, refused to follow the Supreme Court's decision. Conclusion: The Court rejected the claim that Virginia and the national government were equal sovereigns. Reasoning from the Constitution, Justice Story affirmed the Court's power to override state courts to secure a uniform system of law and to fulfill the mandate of the Supremacy Clause.

Interposition and Nullification

Compact theory is essentially the argument that national power emanates not from the people directly, but from a compact among the states. Because states compacted to grant limited power to a national government, they could determine congressional acts passed and could declare them unconstitutional. For example, gibbons argues that the states may exercise the same power (interstate commerce,) within their respective jurisdictions because they possess sovereignty which was retained before the formation of the constitution.

Compare E.C. Knight & Shrevport. What were the decisions, what were the reasonings, and which is correct? When does and doesn't the court have the ability to regulate?

From E.C. Knight: "Congress can't regulate manufacturing, as manufacturing isn't commerce." Direct vs. Indirect Test Shreveport: Substantive Economic influence test. Congress can regulate intrastate commerce when it is closely associated with interstate commerce, for economic reasons. "The Court sustained congressional authority to regulate intrastate rail rates that discriminated against interstate railroad traffic to prevent monopolization by the Texas rail road industry. Certain economic affairs are applicable when inter and intra become too closely aligned.

What are legitimate and illegitimate reasons for regulation of inter and intra state commerce?

From Gibbons: "the national government had exclusive power over interstate commerce, negating state laws interfering with the exercise of that power." From E.C. Knight: "Can't regulate manufacturing, as manufacturing isn't commerce." Shreveport: "The Court sustained congressional authority to regulate intrastate rail rates that discriminated against interstate railroad traffic to prevent monopolization by the Texas rail road industry. Certain economic affairs are applicable when inter and intra become too closely aligned. Swift & Co. v. United States: The commerce clause justifies regulation when used to combat the formation of a monopoly, such as the Chicago meat industry's. The meat trust was viewed as having an intentional and direct impact on the economy. Champion v. Ames: "Congress may arbitrarily exclude from commerce among the States any article, commodity or thing, of whatever kind or nature, or however useful or valuable, which it may choose, no matter what the motive." Basically harmful goods or just deemed to be immoral. Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States: The power to seize is a good is the same power that allows it to bar a good from interstate commerce. It denies them the facilities of interstate commerce, and an appropriate means, would be the condemnation of the articles at their destination. If they weren't supposed to be shipped in the first place, then they are in violation of interstate commerce laws. Hoke v. United States: prohibiting the transportation of women in interstate commerce for immoral purposes. The principal established may adopt not only means necessary but convenient to its exercise, and the means may have the quality of police regulations." Hammer: Over interstate transportation, there regulatory power of congress is ample, but the production of articles intended for interstate commerce is a matter of local production. If not, all matters intended for interstate shipment would be brought under federal control

On what grounds does and doesn't congress have the authority to regulate commerce?

From Gibbons: "the national government had exclusive power over interstate commerce, negating state laws interfering with the exercise of that power." From E.C. Knight: "Can't regulate manufacturing, as manufacturing isn't commerce." Shreveport: "The Court sustained congressional authority to regulate intrastate rail rates that discriminated against interstate railroad traffic to prevent monopolization by the Texas rail road industry. Certain economic affairs are applicable when inter and intra become too closely aligned. Swift & Co. v. United States: The commerce clause justifies regulation when used to combat the formation of a monopoly, such as the Chicago meat industry's. The meat trust was viewed as having an intentional and direct impact on the economy. Champion v. Ames: "Congress may arbitrarily exclude from commerce among the States any article, commodity or thing, of whatever kind or nature, or however useful or valuable, which it may choose, no matter what the motive." Basically harmful goods or just deemed to be immoral. Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States: The power to seize is a good is the same power that allows it to bar a good from interstate commerce. It denies them the facilities of interstate commerce, and an appropriate means, would be the condemnation of the articles at their destination. If they weren't supposed to be shipped in the first place, then they are in violation of interstate commerce laws. Hoke v. United States: prohibiting the transportation of women in interstate commerce for immoral purposes. The principal established may adopt not only means necessary but convenient to its exercise, and the means may have the quality of police regulations." Hammer: Over interstate transportation, there regulatory power of congress is ample, but the production of articles intended for interstate commerce is a matter of local production. If not, all matters intended for interstate shipment would be brought under federal control.

What defines regulation?

From Gibbons: p. 223" [regulation] implies... full power of the thing to be regulated." "That regulation is designed for the entire result, applying in those parts which remains as they were, as well as those which are altered. It produces a uniform whole..." Also from Gibbons: "[The commerce power is] the power to regulate; that is, TO PRESCRIBE THE RULE BY WHICH COMMERCE IS GOVERNED. This power, like all others vested in congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed by the constitution. "

What is the difference between and enumerated power and means? (Pull from McCulloch)

From McCulloch: The government is one of limited and enumerated powers, meaning that the government, though limited in its powers, is supreme within its sphere of action. The tenth amendment grants all powers not given to the government to the states, though nothing prohibits the government from establishing a bank. The bank was merely a means to an end that the government has been entrusted with, and in the interest of the people. "BUT it may with great reason be contended, that a government, entrusted with such ample powers, on the due executuion of which theh happiness and prosperity of the nation so vitally dpeneds, must also be entrusted with ample means for their execution. Not relevant but supporting: Also, if the constitution was to express every little thing that the government was and wasn't allowed to do, then it would be to long and complicated for anybody to understand.

What defines commerce?

From U.S. v. E.C. Knight Co. " Contracts to buy, sell, or exchange goods to be transported among the several states, the transportation and its instrumentalities, and articles bought, sold, or exchanged for the purposes of such transit among the States, or put in the way of transit, may be regulated but this is because they form part of interstate trade or commerce." Commerce is traffic and intercourse, as also referenced by Gibbons.

Hipolite Egg Co. v. U.S

Heron: A food product failed to disclose an important ingredient, and therefore violated the Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906. THE CHALLENGE CAME FROM HIPOLITE'S EGGS BEING SEIZED AT THEIR DESTINATION, meaning their argument was that it was "after" interstate commerce which absolved them from seizure. "To give them immunity would defeat, in many cases, the provision for their confiscation and their confiscation or destruction is the especial concern of the law." " An appropriate means to that end... are the seizure and condemnation of the articles at their point of destination."

Hammer v. Dagenhart (The Child Labor Case), pp 123-124

Heron: Did congress have the ability to control interstate commerce of products produced through child labor? Yes. The SCOTUS COULDN'T regulate it through means of production because "production" was considered the internal affair of the state, and local economies and municipalities have done engaged in the process for so long. If it came down to the court ruling morally-based writs of injunction for all goods, then interstate commerce would be at the mercy of the federal government. CASES LIKE THE LOTTERY CASE, HIPOLITE EGG, AND HOKE DEALT WITH PROHIBITION OF ITEMS. THE COMMERCE CLAUSE IS NOT INTENDED TO EQUALIZE COMPETITION, so even from an economic standpoint this reason would not be valid. SCOTUS COULD regulate the interstate commerce of goods produced by child labor by not allowing these goods to leave a state's borders. Question: Does the congressional act violate the Commerce Clause? Facts of the Case:The Keating-Owen Child Labor Act prohibited the interstate shipment of goods produced by child labor. Reuben Dagenhart's father -- Roland -- had sued on behalf of his freedom to allow his fourteen year old son to work in a textile mill. Conclusion: Day spoke for the Court majority and found two grounds to invalidate the law. Production was not commerce, and thus outside the power of Congress to regulate. And the regulation of production was reserved by the Tenth Amendment to the states. Day wrote that "the powers not expressly delegated to the national government are reserved" to the states and to the people. In his wording, Day revised the Constitution slightly and changed the intent of the framers: The Tenth Amendment does not say "expressly." The framers purposely left the word expressly out of the amendment because they believed they could not possibly specify every power that might be needed in the future to run the government. -------

Hoke v. U.S

Heron: The Mann Act (which was upheld through this case) prohibited the transportation of women in interstate commerce for immoral purposes (prostitution). The court upheld the act because "if the facility of interstate transportation can be taken away from the demoralization of lotteries, the same can be done with prostitution and debauchery", on moral grounds. Another argument was that the power to police prostitution should reside within the states (10th amendment concept), so they could only interfere if prostitution crossed state lines.

U.S. v. E. C. Knight Co

Heron: The Sherman Act was constitutional, though it did not apply to the manufacturing of certain goods. This isn't commerce. The acquisition of refineries is intrastate commerce. To explain in depth, section one of Sherman mandated that, when contracts, combination, or conspiracy are involved "restraint of trade or commerce among the several states" is allowed. A company had purchased refineries and now had control of 98% of sugar production, which the court ruled didn't extend to the challenged monopoly because Congress could not constitutionally regulate "manufacture" under the commerce clause. The court may absolutely control all matters associated with disposition, though not manufacture, as this impacts commerce indirectly, and not directly. The Sherman Act didn't warrant a suit against the company because it bore no direct relation to commerce between states. Question: Did Congress exceed its constitutional authority under the Commerce Clause when it enacted the Sherman Anti-Trust Act? Facts of the case: The Congress passed the Sherman Anti-Trust Act in 1890 as a response to the public concern in the growth of giant combinations controlling tranportation, industry, and commerce. The Act aimed to stop the concentration of wealth and economic power in the hands of the few. It outlawed "every contract, combination...or conspiracy, in restraint of trade" or interstate commerce, and it declared every attempt to monopolize any part of trade or commerce to be illegal. The E.C. Knight Company was such a combination controlling over 98 percent of the sugar-refining business in the United States. Conclusion: The Act was constitutional but it did not apply to manufacturing. Manufacturing was not commerce, declared Fuller for the majority; the law did not reach the admitted monopolization of manufacturing (in this case, refining sugar). Although American Sugar had monopolized manufacturing, the Court found no violation of the Sherman Act because the acquisition of the Philadelphia refineries involved intrastate commerce. The trust did not lead to control of interstate commerce and so "affects it only incidentally and indirectly."

Gibbons v. Ogden

Heron: The State of New York would grant licenses to people wanting interstate travel between NJ and NY, and would up-charge people out of state who sought a license. Ogden challenged a license granted to Gibbons. This tax is clearly in violation of the commerce clause, as interstate commerce is expressly given to the federal government. Their argument, stemming from compact theory and interposition theory, is that the states retained sovereignty it held before the constitution, and that they were within their rights. When the state proceeds to regulate interstate commerce, it is exercising a power that isn't the state's to use. Beyond that, state's have the right so long as citizens aren't deprived of entitled rights. The word "commerce" also entails navigation. Question: Did the State of New York exercise authority in a realm reserved exclusively to Congress, namely, the regulation of interstate commerce? Facts of the case:A New York state law gave to individuals the exclusive right to operate steamboats on waters within state jurisdiction. Laws like this one were duplicated elsewhere which led to friction as some states would require foreign (out-of-state) boats to pay substantial fees for navigation privileges. In this case Thomas Gibbons -- a steamboat owner who did business between New York and New Jersey under a federal coastal license -- challenged the monopoly license granted by New York to Aaron Ogden. New York courts consistently upheld the state monopoly. Conclusion: The unanimous Court found that New York's licensing requirement for out-of-state operators was inconsistent with a congressional act regulating the coasting trade. The New York law was invalid by virtue of the Supremacy Clause. In his opinion, Chief Justice John Marshall developed a clear definition of the word commerce, which included navigation on interstate waterways. He also gave meaning to the phrase "among the several states" in the Commerce Clause. Marshall's was one of the earliest and most influential opinions concerning this important clause. He concluded that regulation of navigation by steamboat operators and others for purposes of conducting interstate commerce was a power reserved to and exercised by the Congress. In a concurring opinion, Justice William Johnson argued a much stronger position: that the national government had exclusive power over interstate commerce, negating state laws interfering with the exercise of that power. Justice Thomspon did not participate in the discussion or decision of the case.

Champion v. Ames (The Lottery Case)

Heron: The court upheld the the Federal Lottery Act, which expressly prohibited the importing, mailing, or interstate transporting of lottery tickets, (essentially all means of transport associated with the federal government) against constitutional challenge by a man indicted for shipping a box of lottery tickets from Texas to California. 1."Lottery tickets are subjects of traffic and therefore are subjects of commerce" and the prohibition of commerce is within the regulatory powers of congress. This is because the suppression of harmful goods (both morally and health related) is among the duties entrusted to the government. 2. The same power that grants the state's the ability to practice lottery tickets (which is the 10th ammendment, because it isn't expressly prohibited nor mentioned) is the same power that allows congress to forbid its interstate travel. Even if it is a morally motivated decision. Keep in mind that this only regulates INTERSTATE commerce, NOT INTRASTATE commerce.. Question: Did the transport of lottery tickets by independent carriers constitute "commerce" that Congress could regulate under the Commerce Clause? Facts of the Case: The defendants in the case were arrested and convicted under an Act of Congress of 1895 that made it illegal to send or conspire to send lottery tickets across state lines. Conclusion: In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that lottery tickets were indeed "subjects of traffic," and that independent carriers may be regulated under the Commerce Clause. The Court emphasized the broad discretion Congress enjoys in regulating commerce, noting that this power "is plenary, is complete in itself, and is subject to no limitations except such as may be found in the Constitution." The Court argued that Congress was merely assisting those states that wished to protect public morals by prohibiting lotteries within their borders.

Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., (Canvas)

Heron: This case discuses the distinction between police and commerce regulations and relates to a Delaware law allowing Black Bird to build a damn across a stream. Wilson's boat damaged the company's damn trying to pass, and this case arose from Wilson saying the dam's construction violated the commerce clause. 1. The court's first answer was that property and value was enhanced by the dam holding back water, and that this is okay, provided that it doesn't interfere with powers of general government, and is within a state's rights. 2. The state law would be unconstitutional if it were repugnant to the constitution, but it isn't. The company is well within its rights. Question:Did Delaware's authorization of the building of the dam unconstitutionally infringe upon Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause? Facts of the Case: The state of Delaware authorized the Blackbird Creek Marsh Company to construct a dam spanning the Blackbird Creek. Willson, the licensed owner of a sailing vessel, was travelling on the Creek and broke through the dam. The Company successfully sued Willson for trespassing and obtained a court order for Willson to pay damages. Willson then brought the case to the Supreme Court. Conclusion: In a unanimous opinion, the Court held that the Act's interference with the navigation of the Blackbird Creek was "an affair between the government of Delaware and its citizens," and was not in conflict with the Commerce Clause. The Court found that Congress had taken no actions with which the Delaware authorization could conflict: "We do not think that the Act. . .can. . .be considered as repugnant to the power to regulate commerce in its dormant state, or as being in conflict with any law passed on the subject."

Houston E&W Tex. R.R. Co. v. U.S. (Shreveport Rate Case)

Heron: This case emphasized the practical and economic effects of the regulated intrastate activities on interstate commerce. Texas railroad companies, forced by the Texas Rail Road Commission, charged high rates for freight between Louisiana and Texas, and lower rates for intrastate commerce. The Interstate Commerce Commission found that this "unjustly discriminated" Louisiana and placed rate caps on the railroad companies. The rail road's argument was that Congress couldn't control intrastate rates for an interstate carrier. The judge responds by stating that this regulation is essential to prevent a monopoly , taking an economic standpoint in support of Louisiana. The carriers (trains) are instruments of intrastate AND interstate commerce, and when the two are so closely related, Congress and not the state will have the final say. The ICC has the authority to do so because it is a government institution that has been granted regulatory powers through the federal government. Question: Did the ICC have the power to regulate the railroads' intrastate rates? Facts of the case: The Houston, East and West Texas Railroad and the Texas and Pacific Railway were railroad companies operating rail lines between Shreveport, Louisiana and points in Texas. The Texas Railroad Commission mandated that they charge higher rates on freight travelling between Louisiana and Texas than on freight travelling solely within Texas. The Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) found that the interstate rates were unreasonable and illegally discriminated against freight traffic originating in Shreveport. The ICC established maximum rates and ordered the railroads to fix their intrastate rate schedules. The railroads challenged the order in United States Commerce Court, alleging that the ICC did not have the power to regulate intrastate commerce. The Commerce Court upheld the ICC order. The railroads then appealed to the Supreme Court. Conclusion: Yes. In a 7-2 decision, the Court affirmed the Commerce Court and upheld the ICC order. Congress was granted the power to regulate interstate commerce, which it chose to do through the ICC. This power extended to "matters having such a close and substantial relation to interstate traffic," Justice Charles Evans Hughes wrote for the majority. Since the price discrimination adversely affected interstate commerce, "it is immaterial...that the discrimination arises from intrastate rates as compared with interstate rates." Therefore, the railroads' intrastate rates were subject to regulation and the ICC order was valid.

Andrew Jackson Veto Message

Jackson vetoed a bill to recharter the bank of the US, in spite of SCOTUS holding it within the constitutional powers of congress. He argued that precedent was a dangerous source of authority, and that it is the duty of the legislative and executive branch to also determine constitutionality. He thinks the courts shouldn't influence or check the executive and legislative branches.

Necessary and Proper Clause

Keep in mind that the Necessary and Proper Clause is part of A1S8, which grants powers. Hamilton and Marshall argue for broad interpretation of the clause, thereby expanding the powers available to the national government. Think back to talking about how if every power within the government had to be expressly stated then the code would be too long and complex. This gives the government wiggle room to address problems in the future. IF THE END be clearly comprehended within any of the specified powers, and if the measure (mean) has an obvious relationship to the end, then it is legit. The creation of the bank "has a relation, more or less direct," to the federal government carrying out its other duties it has been prescribed. Federalists: Defended the bank (McCulloch), arguing that "necessary" often means no more than "needful, requisite, incidental, useful or conducive to. It was the intent of the convention (ratifying the constitution) to give a liberal latitude to the exercise of the specified powers. Jeffersonians: He wrongly thinks it is unconstitutional.He insisted that the clause did not justify the creation of the Bank (McCulloch): a bank was "not necessary." He believed if enumerated powers were too often granted, then the government would eventually swell with power. He believed the clause is meant to restrain.

Swift & Co. v. U.S

Q: Does Congress have the authority to regulate the "meat trust" concerning the Sherman Act? Facts of the Case: A meat trust formed when suppliers agreed not to bid against each others products in the market, which led to the meat industry controlling prices. This led to them controlling the rates that trains would charge them. The court held that the commerce clause justified regulation. So did the interstate commerce clause justify Congress' regulation of the meat trust (monopoly)? Yes, it did! Because the monopoly affected prices, which factored into the point of sale, which is considered to be an agent of commerce.

Marbury v. Madison

Question: (1) Do the plaintiffs have a right to receive their commissions? (2) Can they sue for their commissions in court? (3) Does the Supreme Court have the authority to order the delivery of their commissions? Facts of the case: In the last days of President John Adams' presidency, he nominated a number of people to serve as justices of the peace for the District of Columbia. The Senate confirmed the nominations, and the commissions were prepared. President Adams' Secretary of State, John Marshall, did not deliver all of the commissions before President Thomas Jefferson took office. President Jefferson then ordered his Secretary of State, James Madison, not to deliver the commissions. The plaintiffs, men whose commissions were not delivered, sued Madison in the Supreme Court and argued that, in refusing to deliver the commissions, the Secretary of State was neglecting his Constitutional duty. Conclusion: Yes, yes, no. Chief Justice John Marshall delivered the unanimous opinion. (1) The Supreme Court held that the Constitution grants the president the power to appoint and commission officers of the United States. Because the only evidence of the appointment is the commission, the two actions are tied together. Without the commission, the appointment is not complete, and so the president's signature on the commission is the final step in the appointment process. (2) The Court also held that, upon appointment, the officers have acquired rights to their positions under the law. If those rights are denied, then they may seek redress in the courts. (3) Marbury and others sought an original action for their commissions in the Supreme Court. But the congressional act conferring that authority conflicts with Article III Section 2 of the Constitution. The judicial power in the United States extends to all cases under the Constitution and the Supreme Court is bound to decide cases according to the Constitution rather than the law when the two conflict. So if a law is found to be in conflict with the Constitution, then the law is invalid. In this case, Section 13 of the Judiciary Act ran counter to the Constitution and is therefore void. Thus, lacking authority, the Supreme Court canceled Marbury's claim.

Griswold v. Connecticut

Question: Does the Constitution protect the right of marital privacy against state restrictions on a couple's ability to be counseled in the use of contraceptives? Facts of the case: Griswold was the Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut. Both she and the Medical Director for the League gave information, instruction, and other medical advice to married couples concerning birth control. Griswold and her colleague were convicted under a Connecticut law which criminalized the provision of counselling, and other medical treatment, to married persons for purposes of preventing conception. Conclusion: Though the Constitution does not explicitly protect a general right to privacy, the various guarantees within the Bill of Rights create penumbras, or zones, that establish a right to privacy. Together, the First, Third, Fourth, and Ninth Amendments, create a new constitutional right, the right to privacy in marital relations. The Connecticut statute conflicts with the exercise of this right and is therefore null and void.

Jefferson's letter to Abigail Adams

When Jefferson took office, he pardoned many convicted under the sedition acts, which criminalized defaming of federal officials. He argues that most think the courts can decide the validity of a law, and he argues that the constitution gives the executive that power. He goes far enough to say he can also deem laws unconstitutional. (veto)

Federalist 78

Wikipedia: In Federalist No. 78, Hamilton said that the Judiciary branch of the proposed government would be the weakest of the three branches because it had "no influence over either the sword or the purse, ...It may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment." Federalist No. 78 quotes Montesquieu: "Of the three powers [...], the judiciary is next to nothing." There was little concern that the judiciary might be able to overpower the political branches; since Congress controlled the flow of money and the President the military, courts did not have nearly the same clout from a constitutional design standpoint. The Judiciary would depend on the political branches to uphold its judgments. Legal academics often argue over Hamilton's description of the judiciary as the "least dangerous" branch. Hamilton also explains how federal judges should retain life terms as long as those judges exhibit good behavior. [2] Federalist No. 78 discusses the power of judicial review. It argues that the federal courts have the duty to determine whether acts of Congress are constitutional and to follow the Constitution when there is inconsistency. Hamilton viewed this as a protection against abuse of power by Congress.

Federalist 10

Wikipedia: No. 10 addresses the question of how to reconcile citizens with interests contrary to the rights of others or inimical to the interests of the community as a whole. Madison saw factions as inevitable due to the nature of man - that is, as long as men hold differing opinions, have differing amounts of wealth and own differing amount of property, they will continue to form alliances with people who are most similar to them and they will sometimes work against the public interest and infringe upon the rights of others. He thus questions how to guard against those dangers.[citation needed]

Federalist 51

Wikipedia: No. 51 addresses means by which appropriate checks and balances can be created in government and also advocates a separation of powers within the national government. One of its most important ideas is the often quoted phrase, "Ambition must be made to counteract ambition" and its "if men were angels" argument is famous.