Constitutional Powers - Final Exam

Modern Day Cooperative Federalism Cases (This began the transition from Dual Federalism back to Cooperative Federalism)

U.S. v. Darby (1941) National League of Cities v. Usery (1976)

Juris Privati

"Private right, not clothed with public interest"

Civil War Amendments

13th, 14th, and 15th amendments 13th - Abolished slavery 14th - Due Process and Equal Protection to all citizens of the US (Granted citizenship to free slaves) 15th - Abolished voting discrimination on the basis of race

National Preemption of State Laws

A doctrine under which certain federal laws preempt, or take precedence over, conflicting state or local laws.

Dormant Commerce Clause

A situation in which the federal government has the Commerce Clause power to regulate an area of commerce but has chosen not to regulate that area of commerce.

The Dormant Commerce Clause

A situation in which the federal government has the Commerce Clause power to regulate an area of commerce but has chosen not to regulate that area of commerce. States may regulate in these areas so long as the federal government has not regulated it and their regulation does not harm or frustrate federal aims

Dual Federalism

A system of government in which both the states and the national government remain supreme within their own spheres, each responsible for some policies.

Cooperative Federalism

A system of government in which powers and policy assignments are shared between states and the national government. They may also share costs, administration, and even blame for programs that work poorly.

Case that focused on Substantive Due Process

Adkins v. Children's Hospital (1923)

Sixteenth Amendment

Amendment to the U.S. Constitution that authorized Congress to enact a national income tax.

Power to Tax and Spend

Article 1. Section 8. Clause 1. The Congress shall have Power to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States.

Prints v. US

Facts of the case The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act (Brady Bill) required "local chief law enforcement officers" (CLEOs) to perform background-checks on prospective handgun purchasers, until such time as the Attorney General establishes a federal system for this purpose. County sheriffs Jay Printz and Richard Mack, separately challenged the constitutionality of this interim provision of the Brady Bill on behalf of CLEOs in Montana and Arizona respectively. In both cases District Courts found the background-checks unconstitutional, but ruled that since this requirement was severable from the rest of the Brady Bill a voluntary background-check system could remain. On appeal from the Ninth Circuit's ruling that the interim background-check provisions were constitutional, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and consolidated the two cases deciding this one along with Mack v. United States. Question Using the Necessary and Proper Clause of Article I as justification, can Congress temporarily require state CLEOs to regulate handgun purchases by performing those duties called for by the Brady Bill's handgun applicant background-checks? Conclusion No. The Court constructed its opinion on the old principle that state legislatures are not subject to federal direction. The Court explained that while Congress may require the federal government to regulate commerce directly, in this case by performing background-checks on applicants for handgun ownership, the Necessary and Proper Clause does not empower it to compel state CLEOs to fulfill its federal tasks for it - even temporarily. The Court added that the Brady Bill could not require CLEOs to perform the related tasks of disposing of handgun-application forms or notifying certain applicants of the reasons for their refusal in writing, since the Brady Bill reserved such duties only for those CLEO's who voluntarily accepted them.

Hammer v. Dagenhardt (1918)

Facts of the case The Keating-Owen Child Labor Act prohibited the interstate shipment of goods produced by child labor. Reuben Dagenhart's father -- Roland -- had sued on behalf of his freedom to allow his fourteen year old son to work in a textile mill. Question Does the congressional act violate the Commerce Clause, the Tenth Amendment, or the Fifth Amendment? Conclusion Day spoke for the Court majority and found two grounds to invalidate the law. Production was not commerce, and thus outside the power of Congress to regulate. And the regulation of production was reserved by the Tenth Amendment to the states. Day wrote that "the powers not expressly delegated to the national government are reserved" to the states and to the people. In his wording, Day revised the Constitution slightly and changed the intent of the framers: The Tenth Amendment does not say "expressly." The framers purposely left the word expressly out of the amendment because they believed they could not possibly specify every power that might be needed in the future to run the government.

Ex parte Quirin

Facts of the case These cases concern Operation Pastorius, a failed attempt in June 1942 by Nazi agents to sabotage various U.S. targets. Following the declaration of war between the United States and Germany, eight German residents, Richard Quirin, Ernst Burger, George Dasch, Herbert Haupt, Heinrich Heinck, Edward Keiling, Herman Neubauer, and Werener Thiel, received training on sabotage at a school near Berlin. The men traveled to the United States via submarine. On the night of June 13, 1942, Burger, Heinrich, Quirin, and Dasch landed near Long Island, New York wearing German uniforms and carrying explosives. On the night of June 17, 1942, the remaining four came ashore in similar fashion at Ponte Vedra Beach, Florida. Shortly after the landings, Burger and Dasch backed out of the mission. Dasch turned himself in to the Federal Bureau of Investigations. All eight conspirators were subsequently arrested and, on the orders of President Franklin Roosevelt, tried by military commission. The commission found all eight men guilty and sentenced them to death. Because of their confessions and cooperation, President Roosevelt later commuted Burger and Dasch's sentences to life in prison. Arguing that the President exceeded his power in ordering the commission and that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the Constitution protect their rights to a regular trial, seven of the eight conspirators, not including Dasch, filed petitions for a writ of habeas corpus in Federal District Court. Their claims were denied, and they appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Before the court ruled, however, they filed for hearing before the Supreme Court and, separately, filed petitions for habeas corpus directly with the Court. The Court, sitting in a special term, agreed to hear the cases. Question Did the President exceed his authority in ordering a trial by military commission for the German saboteurs, thereby violating their rights under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments? Conclusion No. In a unanimous opinion authored by Chief Justice Harlan Fisk Stone, the Court concluded that the conspirators, as spies without uniform whose purpose was sabotage, violated the law of war and were therefore unlawful enemy combatants. Noting that Congress had, under the Articles of War, authorized trial by military commission for unlawful enemy combatants, the Court therefore determined that the President had not exceeded his power. Furthermore, the Court asserted that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments "did not enlarge the right to jury trial" beyond those cases where it was understood by the framers to have been appropriate. Therefore, because the amendments cannot be read "as either abolishing all trials by military tribunals, save those of the personnel of our own armed forces, or, what in effect comes to the same thing, as imposing on all such tribunals the necessity of proceeding against unlawful enemy belligerents only on presentment and trial by jury," the rights of the conspirators were not violated.

The Beginning of the End for Narrow Commerce Clause Interpretation West Coast Hotel v. Parish (1937)

Facts of the case Under Washington state law, the Industrial Welfare Committee and Supervisor of Women in Industry set a minimum wage of $14.50 for each work week of 48 hours. Elsie Parrish, an employee of the West Coast Hotel Company, received an amount less than this wage. Parrish brought a suit to recover the difference between the wages paid to her and the minimum wage fixed by state law. In ruling for the hotel, the lower court relied on Adkins v. Children's Hospital (1923), in which the Court struck down a minimum wage law for working women. Question Does a minimum wage law for women violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment? Conclusion In a 5-to-4 decision written by Justice Charles Evans Hughes, the Court held that the establishment of minimum wages for women was constitutional. Echoing Muller v. Oregon (1908), the majority ruled that the state may use its police power to restrict the individual freedom to contract. The decision overruled Adkins and marked the Court's departure from the expansive view of the freedom to contract. The decision is generally regarded as having ended the Lochner era, a period in American legal history in which the Supreme Court tended to invalidate legislation aimed at regulating business. While Justice Hughes wrote the opinion, the stark doctrinal shift resulted from Justice Owen Josephus Roberts changing his perspective on this issue. According to Hughes, President Franklin Roosevelt's reelection in 1936 and the impressive achievements of the New Deal caused Roberts to abandon his affiliation with the Court's conservative justices. In dissent, Justice George Sutherland implicitly criticized Roberts for changing sides and argued that politics and public opinion should not impact the Court's understanding of the Constitution.

Dames & Moore v. Regan (1981)

Facts: When American diplomats were seized in Tehran in 1979 during the Iranian revolution and overthrow of the Shah of Iran, President Carter froze all Iranian assets in American banks under the International Economic Emergency Powers Act and protected those assets from judgments, decrees, or any other encumbrance. The idea was that these assets, which were substantial, would be used as leverage or a bargaining chip in getting the hostages back. In December 1979, Dames & Moore filed suit in federal district court against Iran for payment of unpaid claims for work and consulting on an Iranian nuclear power plant. They asked to attach these Iranian assets to pay their claims. As part of the resolution of the hostage crisis, the U.S. agreed to terminate all lawsuits involving the frozen assets in favor of a claims tribunal, which would hear all claims on the assets and making binding determinations which would be enforceable in any court. President Reagan (who had subsequently taken office) transferred the money to the Federal Reserve to complete the process and begin the claims process. When the federal district court denied Dames & Moore the right to attach the assets, they filed suit against Treasury Sec. Donald Regan. The district court ruled for the government and an expedited appeal was heard before the U.S. Supreme Court. Arguments for Dames & Moore: - Unprecedented - no American president has ever denied lawful claims against a foreign state resulting from a pending lawsuit. - The President does not have authority to settle or remove legitimate claims from the Article III courts nor to assist in shielding foreign assets from legitimate claims. - The Act relied upon allows only the blocking and freezing of foreign assets, not the transfer away from the reach of legal creditors. For Regan (the U.S.): - The President was acting in accordance with the act passed by Congress. - Congress recognized the need for the President to have control over foreign assets in order to address foreign threats. - The President has long exercised the authority to settle claims against foreign nations by executive agreement and Congress approves. Issue: Whether the President was acting within his constitutional authority when he entered into this process of settling claims against foreign states? Holding: Yes, the President was within his authority in light of the absence of Congressional opposition. Reasoning: - Recounting the reasoning from the Jackson concurrence in Youngstown Steel, the Court indicates that the President's authority is at its greatest when, as here, he is acting pursuant to a specific grant of authority from Congress. - The Court recognizes that executive action may not fall neatly into one of the three categories envisioned by Justice Jackson, and indicates that it is hard to imagine that Congress would have envisioned the hostage crisis when drafting the laws in question. - Failure of Congress to enact a law which specifically addressed the situation in question does NOT equal Congressional disapproval of Presidential action, particularly in areas of foreign policy, where the president may have to act quickly and unilaterally to protect American interests. - The Court concludes that Congress has "implicitly approved the practice of claim settlement by executive agreement." - The Court referenced the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949 as an example of Congress recognition that an executive branch process for the resolution of claims against foreign nation states was a sound way to resolve these disputes. Although that bill was limited to claims against Yugoslavia, the Court indicated that there was support for extending that process to claims against other countries. - The Court also recognizes that these kinds of executive agreements, even without Congressional approval or involvement, have been upheld by the Court in the past. - The Court concludes that Congress has taken no action to express disapproval - i.e., this is NOT Youngstown Steel. - The Court decides that where, as here, the resolution of claims against foreign nations are necessary to the resolution of major foreign policy disputes and where Congress has taken no action to disapprove or to provide a separate process, the President is within his constitutional authority to settle such claims. The Court does indicate that its decision is limited to this case. Aftermath: This conclusion was surprising to the general public at the time, because the actions taken here meant that many with legitimate claims against the Iranian government were denied either a meaningful venue for review of their claims or the ability to actually collect on a judgment owed (because the new Iranian government would not necessarily honor the agreements of the prior). But this case demonstrates how foreign policy questions are often resolved differently.

Muller v. Oregon (1908)

First time Court allows for a law limiting the hours of work, and therefore the "liberty of contract." Allowed social science as evidence, but ruled that women deserved protection because of their status as potential mothers. (Progressive victory, or a step back for women?) Issue - May Oregon regulate the number of hours women work in factories and laundromats per day? Holding - Yes, such regulation is a proper exercise of state police power and does not violate the due process clause of the 14th amendment (The court however ignored that it did violate the equal protection clause of the 14th amendment) The Court had similar ruling in the Holden case where it ruled states may limit hours for hazardous conditions

Taxing and Spending for the General Welfare

Is the power to tax and spend limited to the pursuit of enumerated powers (James Madison) or a broader power which may be used for additional purposes or regulation (Alexander Hamilton)?

U.S. v. Knight (1895)

Knight had a monopoly on sugar, so government takes action to regulate it under the Sherman Act. Supreme Court says there is a difference between regulating commerce and regulating manufacturing which doesn't directly effect commerce. All sugar was being produced in PA by Knight so congress couldn't regulate its production. Set tights limits on Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause.

Cases that focused on a decline of Substantive Due Process

Nebbia v. New York (1934) West Coast Hotel v. Parrish (1937)

Privileges and Immunities Clause

Part of Article IV of the Constitution guaranteeing that the citizens of each state are afforded the same rights as citizens of all other states.

Direct Tax

Per person or on land Per capita (uniform)

11th amendment

Prohibits citizens of one state or foreign country from suing another state.

Passenger Cases

Smith v. Turner; Norris v. Boston, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849),[1] were two similar cases, argued together before the United States Supreme Court, which decided 5-4 that states do not have the right to impose a tax that is determined by the number of passengers of a designated category on board a ship and/or disembarking into the State. The cases are sometimes called the Passenger Case or Passenger Cases.

Swift & Company v. US

Stream of Commerce doctrine. Federal regulation for meat products and livestock crossing state borders.

The Anti-Federalist Position

Suspicious of a strong central government; wanted Bill of rights to protect personal liberties; wanted strong states

The Hedge on Federal Power

The 10th Amendment - The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.

How does the government have power? Who empowers it?

The Constitution!

West Lynn Creamery v. Healy

The Court held a state law that assessed a fee on all milk sold in the state, but distributed the proceeds only to state milk producers was a violation of the dormant commerce clause because of its clear discriminatory purpose.

Civil War Era Cases Addressing Executive Power over Military or Foreign Affair

The Prize Cases Ex parte Milligan

"Occupy the Field

To preempt or monopolize an area of statutory law by a higher authority, such as federal preemption over state laws on issues affecting interstate commerce

Transition to Korean War Cases addressing Executive Power (What happens when Congress disagrees with the President?)

Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer (1952) Facts - Facing a steelworkers strike on April 9, 1952, President Truman ordered the Sec. of Commerce to take over the industry and keep it running in the name of the U.S. in order to support the war effort in Korea. No justification was given or statutory authority for the executive order. The Taft-Hartley Act which was the controlling authority for resolving labor disputes required an 80-day cooling off period as a way to postpone strikes and keep parties talking. Why didn't Truman do this? He felt that his inherent powers were sufficient to justify the order. Congress took no action, steel plant owners filed suit to end the Sec.'s seizure and the federal district courts ruled in their favor. The Circuit Court of Appeals stayed the district court order. Issue - Did the President have inherent authority to seize the steel mills in the interests of national defense and the prosecution of the war? Arguments for Steel Owners: - President could not act in direct contravention of the Taft-Hartley Act. - The situation was not a national emergency that demanded executive action. The Taft-Hartley process should be followed. - The president's executive authority does not extend to the seizure of private property, which is either a legislative or judicial function. When could it be an executive function? - No inherent power in the president to seize property. It is not inherent in his war powers nor implied by any other. For U.S. - The President had authority to take temporary action to sustain the war effort. Is this a war power? - Equates the "faithfully execute the law" provision to "Necessary and Proper" authority. This act necessary to conduct war. To execute what law? - Argues that the President has a "wide scope" of discretion to determine what a threat is. What is the natural conclusion of such an argument? The President is unfettered in his discretion. - Argues that Taft-Hartley is not the only method of dealing with labor disputes. Holding - No, the President's authority over foreign relations did not give him the power to seize the steel mills, particularly when Congress had given specific direction with regard to how such disputes were to be resolved. Reasoning - No constitutional authority or statutory authority = no presidential authority - The president has authority to issue executive orders, but not to exercise authority not provided in the constitution. - The Court cannot accept a broad construction of the President's war powers to include taking property to settle labor disputes. Page 312: "Even though 'theatre of war" be an expanding concept, we cannot with faithfulness to our constitutional system hold that the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces has the ultimate power as such to take possession of private property in order to keep labor disputes from stopping production. This is a job for the Nation's lawmakers, not its military authorities." - The President executes the laws rather than making them. All law making authority is vest in the Congress, so the President cannot decide to craft his own legislative solutions to problems because he deems them important to national security or foreign relations. - The President was not executing a law but creating a law to be executed. - Congress' authority to make laws exists as the exclusive lawmaking process during good times and bad. - Therefore, the President's seizure was unconstitutional. Concurrence (Jackson). Justice Jackson concurs in the result but writes: - That there is a lack of clear guidance in the law and cases concerning the power of the President and the resolution of questions concerning the limits of that power. - That it might be more expedient and practical for a president to have wide-ranging, unfettered power in times of war or when expedient, but that such a construction of Art. II would threaten the balance of power between the branches of government. - So he proposes this framework for thinking about presidential power: - With express or implied authorization from Congress, the President is virtually all-powerful (HML: Subject, of course, to the constraints of the constitution). Power = maximum - In the absence of Congressional authority, the President may only act if he is independent powers, whether express or implied. And Jackson recognizes that there are many areas in which the President and the Congress share power. Power = depends upon authority exercised. - When the President acts in defiance of the expressed or implied will of Congress, he may only act to the extent of his specific constitutional authority under Art. II. Power = lowest ebb - Here, Jackson argues that the seizure of the steel mills is in defiance of three statutes that address the process for resolving labor disputes and the limits of presidential power during wartime. Thus, he concludes that the President only has authority to act if he has sufficient constitutional authority and that he may exercise it beyond the control of Congress. Very few things fall into this category. - On pages 314-315, he examines whether the President may have sufficient authority to place this matter beyond Congressional control, holding that the President does not have such power. Dissent (Vinson) - The dissent argues that the President acted within his authority - both his inherent authority as Commander-in-Chief and also within his authority to see that the laws were faithfully executed. Justice Vinson argues that we are at war, that this is extraordinary, and that the Defense Production Act of 1950 grants the President sufficient power to act to seize the mills. Aftermath/Analysis - Three Different Approaches to Presidential Power: - First Approach (Black and Douglas): "The President has only that authority which Congress or the Constitution explicitly grants." - Second Approach (Dissenters) - "The President has broad authority under Art. II to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed, explicit authority when granted by Congressional legislation, and, finally, inherent authority to act to protect the country." - Third Approach (Plurality) - "The President has the authority granted in the Constitution explicitly, the authority granted by Congress legislatively, and some inherent authority granted by Art. II. But, with the exception of the authority exclusively granted by the Constitution to the President, the President must yield to expressed Congressional intent."

Procedural Due Process

the government must employ fair procedures and methods

Effect of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (2006)

After Hamdi, Bush did exactly as the Court suggested and attempted to use military tribunals to try enemy combatants. The Court held that neither the AUMF nor the President's inherent power were sufficient to justify using military tribunals but that Congress could authorize it. At the President's request, Congress did so in the Military Commissions Act.

New York v. U.S. (1992)

Biggest takeaways from this case: - Federal Government may not compel states to regulate - Congress may not coerce states to act - States may be considered private actors except when the problem is uniquely governmental Facts of the case The Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Act Amendments of 1985 required states alone or in compacts with other states to dispose of such radioactive waste within their borders. New York State and Allegany and Cortland counties were frustrated in their compliance efforts by resistance from residents to proposed radioactive waste sites and a lack of cooperation from neighboring states. New York filed suit against the federal government, questioning the authority of Congress to regulate state waste management. Question Does the Low-Level Waste Act violate the Tenth Amendment and the "guarantee clause" of Article Four? Conclusion In a 6-3 decision, the Court upheld two of the three provisions of the Act under review, reasoning that Congress had the authority under the Commerce Clause to use financial rewards and access to disposal sites as incentives for state waste management. The third provision, the "take-title" qualification, stipulated that states must take legal ownership and liability for low-level waste or by the regulatory act. "Either type of federal action," wrote Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, "would 'commandeer' state governments into the service of federal regulatory purposes, and would for this reason be inconsistent with the Constitution's division of authority between federal and state governments." This last provision violated the Tenth Amendment.

Brown v. Maryland (1827)

Case Facts: Maryland passed a law that required importers of foreign goods to get a license from the state in order to sell the imported items. Maryland charged Brown with importing and selling goods without a license. Issue/s: Can a state require all importers of foreign goods to acquire a license from the state in order to sell the goods imported? Holdings/reasoning: No, Maryland's statute for a tax on imports interferes with federal governments control of commerce with foreign countries, a power that was vested to Congress by the U.S. constitution. When there is a conflict between state legislation and federal legislation, Federal is supreme. Items are taxable by the state if they have been sufficiently intermixed with the domestic goods, but goods that remain with the importer in the original form or packaging that it was imported in then a state taxing them would be in conflict with the provision in the Constitution forbidding states to tax imports.

Lasissez-Faire Era

Era where government does not interfere in private businesses

World War II Era Cases Addressing Executive Power over Military or Foreign Affair

Ex parte Quirin Korematsu v. US (1944) Ex parte Endo

Indirect Tax

Excise: Any duty on manufactured goods which is levied at the moment of manufacture, rather than at sale Duty

Mugler v. Kansas

Facts of the case A Kansas law prohibited the manufacture or sale of intoxicating liquor. Mugler was arrested for making and selling beer. This case was decided together with Kansas v. Ziebold. Question Does the Kansas law violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? Conclusion According to Harlan, the Kansas prohibition does not infringe on Fourteenth Amendment rights. Though Mugler has an abstract right to make liquor for his own use, such a right could be conditioned on its effect on others. Here the state legislature may exercise its police powers.

Over the course of the semester, we have discussed the concept of dual federalism and cooperative federalism and its affect as a political philosophy on the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court. Choose two cases which demonstrate the influence of dual federalism on the court's opinions and two cases which demonstrate the influence of cooperative federalism on the court's opinions. For each federalism theory, define what the theory means, explain the issue and holding of each case, and explain why the case reflects a dual federalism or cooperative federalism approach to the relationship between the state and federal governments. To be clear, you must discuss at least 4 cases.

Dual federalism is the assumption that state and federal government are coequal sovereigns which are each tasked with handling their own issues and are both supreme in their own right. Cooperative federalism still acknowledges the power of state government, but advocates the position that the federal government remains superior over the states and can set policy that affects these states. Here, the two forms of government work together on certain issues, but the federal government still remains supreme over the state and does not act as an equal partner to the states. A decision that supported the notion of dual federalism can be found in Scott v. Sandford. The issue at hand was whether Scott could do away with his slave status and live as a citizen since he had been living on free soil. The Court held that African Americans could not become citizens of the United States, Scott could not sue for his freedom in federal court, and the Congress had no constitutional power to regulate slavery in the states. This supported dual federalism, because it ultimately viewed the states as separate sovereign entities free to regulate their own issues without intrusion by the federal government. Another decision that supported the notion of dual federalism was New York v. United States. In an effort to increase radioactive waste disposal in the states, Congress passed an act which compelled state government to pass their own laws promoting the disposal of radioactive waste. This was seen as unconstitutional because the Court ruled that the federal government was trying to commandeer the power of the state legislatures. This supports dual federalism, because the court acknowledged the power of the states to reserve powers under state sovereignty that was free from intrusion by the federal government McCulloch v. Maryland exemplified the notion of cooperative federalism. The issue at hand was whether a state government could tax a federal bank and whether the federal government had the power to make these banks. The Supreme Court ruled that the federal government could create the bank and not have it taxed by the states. This was supported by the necessary and proper clause, as well as, the supremacy clause. This reflects cooperative federalism because although both governments may work cooperatively to perform actions that boost their economy through the creation of banks, the national government remains supreme and cannot have their actions impeded by the states. Another case that supported cooperative federalism was Gibbons v. Ogden. The issue in this case was whether the federal government could regulate interstate navigation. The Supreme Court ultimately ruled that interstate navigation did fall under the commerce clause and thus, the state governments, could not pass acts which impeded the power of Congress to regulate commerce. Again, although state governments have some authority and can work collectively with the federal government on certain issues, the latter still retains supreme power over the states.

NFIB v. Sibelius (2012)

Facts of the case Amid intense public interest, Congress passed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), which became effective March 23, 2010. The ACA sought to address the fact that millions of Americans had no health insurance, yet actively participated in the health care market, consuming health care services for which they did not pay. The ACA contained a minimum coverage provision by amending the tax code and providing an individual mandate, stipulating that by 2014, non-exempt individuals who failed to purchase and maintain a minimum level of health insurance must pay a tax penalty. The ACA also contained an expansion of Medicaid, which states had to accept in order to receive Federal funds for Medicaid, and an employer mandate to obtain health coverage for employees. Shortly after Congress passed the ACA, Florida and 12 other states brought actions in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida seeking a declaration that the ACA was unconstitutional on several grounds. These states were subsequently joined by 13 additional states, the National Federation of Independent businesses, and individual plaintiffs Kaj Ahburg and Mary Brown. The plaintiffs argued that: (1) the individual mandate exceeded Congress' enumerated powers under the Commerce Clause; (2) the Medicaid expansions were unconstitutionally coercive; and (3) the employer mandate impermissibly interfered with state sovereignty. The District Court first addressed whether the plaintiffs had standing to bring the lawsuit. It determined that Brown had standing to challenge the minimum coverage provision because she did not have health insurance and had to make financial arrangements to ensure compliance with the provision, which would go into effect in 2014. The court further determined that Idaho and Utah had standing because each state had enacted a statute purporting to exempt their residents from the minimum coverage provision. The court also concluded that the Anti-Injunction Act did not bar the suit. The District Court then addressed the constitutional questions. It ruled that the individual mandate provision was not a valid exercise of Congress' commerce or taxing powers. The court held the entire act invalid because the mandate could not be severed from any other provision. The court dismissed the states' challenge to the employer mandates and granted judgment to the federal government on the Medicaid expansions, finding insufficient support for the contention that the spending legislation was unconstitutionally coercive. A panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed 2-to-1 the District Court's holdings as to the Medicaid expansions and the individual mandate. But it also reversed the District Court, holding that the individual mandate could be severed without invalidating the remainder of the ACA. Question 1.) Is the suit brought by respondents to challenge the minimum coverage provision of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act barred by the Anti-Injunction Act, 2 U.S.C. 7421(a)? 2.) Does Congress have power under Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, specifically under the Commerce Clause or the Taxing and Spending Clause, to require most Americans to purchase health insurance? 3.) Is the individual mandate severable from the ACA? 4.) Did Congress exceed its enumerated powers and violate principles of federalism when it pressured States into accepting conditions that Congress could not impose directly by threatening to withhold all federal funding under Medicaid, the single largest grant-in-aid program? Conclusion: 1.) No, because it was considered a penalty, not a tax. 2.) Yes, under the Taxing and Spending Clause; 3.) Unanswered 4.) Yes. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., largely joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen G. Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan, authored the majority opinion. The Court reached the following conclusions: The justices unanimously agreed that the Anti-Injunction Act did not bar the suit. Congress did not intend that the payment for non-compliance with the Individual Mandate be a tax for purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act. Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, concluded that the Individual Mandate penalty is a tax for the purposes of the Constitution's Taxing and Spending Clause and is a valid exercise of Congressional authority. The payment is not so severe as to be coercive, is not limited to willful violations like fines for unlawful acts, and is collected by the Internal Revenue Service by normal means. As part of a jointly written dissenting opinion, Justices Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel Alito disagreed, arguing that because Congress characterized the payment as a penalty, to instead characterize it as a tax would amount to rewriting the Act. Chief Justice Roberts, with Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, concluded that the Individual Mandate was not a valid exercise of Congress' power to regulate commerce. The Commerce Clause allows Congress to regulate existing commercial activity, but not to compel individuals to participate in commerce. This would open a new realm of Congressional authority. Justice Ginsburg, as part of an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan disagreed with this conclusion, arguing that the Chief Justice's distinction between economic "activity" and "Inactivity" is ill-defined and unsupported by either the Court's precedents or the text of the Constitution. Furthermore, even if the distinction were permissible, individuals who fail to purchase insurance nonetheless frequently participate in the healthcare marketplace, substantially impacting healthcare commerce, and may therefore be regulated by Congress. Justice Thomas, in a separate dissent, added that the "substantial effects test" has encouraged Congress to push the limits of its power. The majority did not address the serverability question after concluding that the Individual Mandate was constitutional. Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito argued that the Individual Mandate and Medicaid expansion are inserverable, and that the entirety of the ACA is therefore unconstitutional. The provisions of the Act, they argue, are "closely interrelated," with the two unconstitutional provisions serving as "pillars." Chief Justice Roberts, with Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Breyer, Alito, and Kagan, concluded that the Medicaid expansion provisions was unconstitutionally coercive as written. Congress does not have authority under the Spending Clause to threaten the states with complete loss of Federal funding of Medicaid, if the states refuse to comply with the expansion. Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor disagreed, arguing, "Congress' authority to condition the use of federal funds is not confined to spending programs as first launched. The legislature may, and often does, amend the law." Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, concluded that the remainder of the Medicaid expansion provision, without the unconstitutional threat to completely withdraw Medicaid funding, could stand as a valid exercise of Congress' power under the Spending Clause. Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito argued that the Court does not have the power to remedy the unconstitutional expansion as written. Such power should be vested exclusively in Congress.

Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Company (2009)

Facts of the case In October 1998, Hugh Caperton filed suit against A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc. (Massey) for tortious interference, fraudulent misrepresentation, and fraudulent concealment. A state trial court in West Virginia rendered judgment against Massey and found it liable for $50 million in damages. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia granted review. However, prior to hearing, Mr. Caperton motioned for Justice Brent Benjamin to recuse himself. He argued that since Massey's C.E.O. had donated $3 million to Justice Benjamin's campaign to win a seat on the Supreme Court of Appeals, Justice Benjamin's participation would present a "constitutionally unacceptable appearance of impropriety." The motion was denied. In a 3-2 decision with Justice Benjamin voting in the majority, the Supreme Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and ordered it to dismiss the case. After its decision, the court granted Mr. Caperton's motfion for rehearing, but once again denied his motion for Justice Benjamin to recuse himself. On rehearing, the court maintained in a 3-2 decision that the trial court should be reversed and the case dismissed. It reasoned that a forum selection clause in a contract between the parties made the trial court in West Virginia an improper venue. It also concluded that because the parties had previously adjudicated the dispute in a Virginia state trial court, the doctrine of res judicata did not allow this case to be retried. Question Did Justice Brent Benjamin's failure to recuse himself from participation in a case where one of the parties donated $3 million to his election campaign violate the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment? Conclusion Yes. The Supreme Court held that due process required that Justice Brent Benjamin recuse himself from participation in the case in question. With Justice Anthony M. Kennedy writing for the majority and joined by Justices John Paul Stevens, David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen G. Breyer, the Court stated that it need not find that Justice Benjamin was actually biased in his decision making in order to find invalid the decision in which he took part. Rather, it need merely be shown that "under a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and human weakness," Justice Benjamin's interest posed "a risk of actual bias" and thus he should have recused himself if his participation threatened the adequate implementation of due process. The Court stated that such a risk of bias exists where a judge has a "direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest," as Justice Benjamin did. Therefore, the Court reasoned, he improperly failed to recuse himself. Chief Justice John G. Roberts dissented and was joined by Justices Antonin G. Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel A. Alito. He argued that the majority imprudently expanded the standard for which a judge need recuse himself by merely showing a "probability of bias." He raised forty points of uncertainty that arise because of the majority's vague standard. Justice Scalia also wrote a separate dissenting opinion. He argued that the majority performed its duties poorly as a clarifying body by making an area of the law vastly more uncertain.

Arizona v. US

Facts of the case On April 23, 2010, the Arizona State Legislature passed S.B. 1070; Governor Jan Brewer signed the bill into law. On July 6, 2010, the United States sought to stop the enforcement of S.B. 1070 in federal district court before the law could take effect. The district court did not enjoin the entire act, but it did enjoin four provisions. The court enjoined provisions that (1) created a state-law crime for being unlawfully present in the United States, (2) created a state-law crime for working or seeking work while not authorized to do so, (3) required state and local officers to verify the citizenship or alien status of anyone who was lawfully arrested or detained, and (4) authorized warrantless arrests of aliens believed to be removable from the United States. Arizona appealed the district court's decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The appellate court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the United States had shown that federal law likely preempted: (a) the creation of a state-crime for violation of federal registration laws, (b) the creation of a state-crime for work by unauthorized aliens, (c) the requirement to verify citizenship of all detained persons, and (d) the authorization for police officers to effect warrantless arrests based on probable cause of removability from the United States. Arizona appealed the court's decision. Question Do the federal immigration laws preclude Arizona's efforts at cooperative law enforcement and preempt the four provisions of S.B. 1070 on their face? Conclusion Yes for provisions 1, 2, and 4; No for provision 3. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, writing for a 5-3 majority, reversed in part and affirmed in part. The Supreme Court held that provision 1 conflicts with the federal alien registration requirements and enforcement provisions already in place. Provision 2 is preempted because its method of enforcement interferes with the careful balance Congress struck with federal laws on unauthorized employment of aliens. Provision 4 is preempted because it usurps the federal government's authority to use discretion in the removal process. This creates an obstacle to carrying out the purposes and objectives of federal immigration laws. The Court upheld provision 3 as constitutional on its face. This provision merely allows state law enforcement officials to communicate with the federal Immigrations and Customs Enforcement office during otherwise lawful arrests. The provision has three limitations that protect individual rights: a detainee is presumed not to be an illegal alien if he/she produces a valid Arizona drivers license; an officer may not consider race, color, or national origin during a check; and the check must be implemented in a manner consistent with federal law. Justice Kennedy noted that this decision did not foreclose any future constitutional challenges to the law on an as applied basis. Justice Antonin Scalia concurred in part and dissented in part, writing that all four provisions are constitutional. He argued that the Arizona statute does not conflict with federal law, but enforces federal immigration restrictions more effectively. Justice Clarence Thomas concurred in part and dissented in part, agreeing with Justice Scalia that all four provisions are constitutional. He argued that there is no conflict between the ordinary meaning of the federal laws and the Arizona statute. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. concurred in part and dissented in part, agreeing with the majority on provisions 1 and 3, but disagreeing on 2 and 4. Justice Elena Kagan took no part in the consideration or decision in the case.

Boumedienne v. Bush (2008)

The Court again acted to strike down the use of military commissions, holding that detainees had the right to have their habeas corpus petitions heard in the federal courts. The Constitutional Suspension Clause must be met for Congress to suspend habeas corpus.

Perez v. US

The Court held that when a federal statute that made loan sharking a crime was applied to a NYC loan shark, it was constitutional and that Congress could make criminal the petitioner's activity because there is a connection between local loan sharks and interstate crime.

The Framers and the Contract Clause

The post-revolutionary war crisis - Limitation of the contract clause to state government - "No state shall pass a law impairing the obligations of contracts" (Article 1, Section 10) Marshall's Contract Clause -

New Judicial Federalism

The practice whereby state judges base decisions regarding civil rights and liberties on their state's constitution, rather than the U.S. Constitution, when their state's constitution guarantees more than minimum rights.

Original package doctrine

a principle of Constitutional law which says an item in its original package retained its character as an import and was thus free from state taxation as long as they are unsold and remain in the original packaging.

Zivotofsky v. Kerry (2015) (Kennedy, 6-3)

Facts: The Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 2002 allowed those U.S. citizens born in Jerusalem to list Israel as their date of birth on their U.S. passports. As this violated long-standing U.S. foreign policy to take no position with regard to the sovereignty of Israel over Jerusalem, the State Department refused to issue a passport in compliance with the act. The state department indicated that the passport would say only "Jerusalem." This is the case we discussed earlier this semester - Zivotofsky v. Clinton (2012) in which the court held that the issue in the case did not present a political question, but rather could be resolved by the courts without impeding upon the ability of the president to formulate foreign policy. This opinion addresses the exact same case on appeal after it was remanded to the lower courts for further proceedings to determine whether the President had the authority to deny the operation of the Act, in light of his constitutional authority to conduct foreign policy. On remand below, the court of appeals ruled that the Act unconstitutionally infringed upon the President's authority to conduct foreign policy. This appeal ensued. Arguments for Zivotofsky: - Under Youngstown Steel, the President executes the laws and has the least power when acting in direct contravention of Congressional act. - Congress frequently legislates on matters that affect foreign affairs. In other words, the conduct of foreign affairs is not exclusively a president power. - The President's right to recognize countries is not "a thing." To the extent that there is some formal process of recognition, Congress has been involved on occasion. For Kerry: - The Constitution grants to the President the right to recognize foreign states and the limits of their sovereignty. - Congress has no constitutional authority to recognize foreign countries or to override the President's decision to do so. - The President has inherent constitutional authority to conduct foreign policy and to recognize nations. Issue: Does the President have exclusive power to recognize foreign states? Whether Congress' passage of the Act violates the President's constitutional authority to recognize foreign states? Holding: Yes, the President does have exclusive power to recognize foreign states and Congress' passage of the Act unconstitutionally infringed upon that power. Reasoning: - The Court adopts the philosophical framework concerning executive authority from Justice Jackson's concurrence in Youngstown. - The question is whether the President's authority to recognize foreign states falls into that "exclusive" third category - power reserved exclusively to the President and beyond the control of Congress. - Recognition = formal acknowledgment of statehood or that an entity is the effective government for a state. - If receiving an ambassador = recognizing a state, Art. II, §3 would seem to grant that authority to the President alone. The Court notes that this has historically happened. - Article II provisions regarding treaties and ambassadors also supports the idea that the founders intended to vest authority of recognition in the President. - The Court states that the fact that the President has these powers and there appear to be no corresponding powers vest in the Congress indicates that the power was intended to be exclusive. - The Court also reasons that, as a matter of structure, the President is the obvious choice to exercise exclusive power over these issues. The nation must speak with one consistent voice and the President is the only one in a position to speak with such unanimity. The Court also reasons that the President is in a superior position to make these kinds of foreign policy determinations. - Historically, presidents have been charged with the duty of recognition. - Although many areas of foreign policy require Congressional approval, recognition does not. - There are good reasons for the President and Congress to act cooperatively in the recognition process, as Congress can do much to harm relations, but the power resides exclusively in the President. - Exclusive authority in the President serves a crucial diplomatic purpose, creating certainty and stability. - The Court rejects the suggestion that the President possesses an even broader, exclusive authority over foreign affairs, calling into question some of the broad language of the Curtiss-Wright Exports case. - The Court then embarks on an analysis of historical practice with regard to recognition - an analysis which supports the Court's determination. - The Court then holds that Congress' lack of recognition authority means: o That it cannot legislate to force the President to change his recognition. o That it cannot legislate to directly contradict that recognition. o That it cannot legislate to formally recognize a state on its own. - In this case, the Court concludes that the Act would require the President to contradict his prior position and that the Act was intended to do just that - change U.S. policy with regard to recognition. - The Court, therefore, rejected Zivotofsky's argument and held for Secretary of State Kerry. Concurrence/Dissent: - Note that I am not concerned about Breyer Concurrence or the Thomas Concurrence. - Roberts Dissent: Roberts argues that the President should not be allowed to contravene the will of Congress, as there is no exclusive right in the presidency to conduct foreign affairs. He rejects the kind of sweeping executive authority envisioned in Curtiss-Wright and finds that the recognition authority of the President is not implicated by the Act (presumably because he distinguishes between passports and formal recognition). - Scalia Dissent: This Act is not about recognition but about passport control. Congress has explicit authority over naturalization and therefore, may pass laws concerning passports. Information contained in a passport does not equal sovereign state recognition.

Advantages of Federalism

*Avoids concentration of power *Keeps government close to people *States serve as laboratories for new programs and training grounds for national leaders *Allows adaption to regional differences

Disadvantages of Federalism

*Complexity: there are many governments to deal with *Duplication of offices and functions *Conflicts of authority often arise *Inconsistency from state to state in regulations, education, etc.

Relevance of Substantive Due Process Now

- BMW of North America v. Gore (1996) - Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Company

The Taney Court (Focus on Dual Federalism)

-Replaced the Marshall Court -In existence from 1835-1864 -Dred Scott vs. Sanford case was discussed. -Under the Taney court, economic opportunity was expanded. Also under the Taney court the ideas of private property were protected.

McCulloch v. Maryland (1819) - Key Questions

1. Does the authority for the Constitution flow from the people or from the states? 2. What is the impact of the answer on state sovereignty and states' rights under the 10th Amendment? 3. Does the Supremacy Clause control all contrary state action when federal action is based upon implied, inherent or nonenumerated power? 4. Can clauses in the Constitution, such as the Necessary and Proper Clause and the General Welfare Clause, be interpreted broadly to allow federal legislation in areas not specifically enumerated in the Constitution? 5. Does allowing states to regulate the federal government, through taxation and other means, violate the supremacy clause?

The Larger Conclusions of McCulloch v. Maryland

1. The Necessary and Proper Clause - Legitimate purpose test = New laws must serve a legitimate purpose 2. The 10th Amendment - Rejects enclave approach 3. Supremacy Clause

Preemption Analysis

1. does fed law expressly say state can regulate? 2. does state law conflict with fed law? 3. has Congress so comprehensively governed that issue that there is no room for state law--field completely covered?

What Congress can Regulate under the Interstate Commerce Clause

1.) Channels of Commerce 2.) Instrumentalities of Interstate Commerce (Trucks, planes, boats, highways, etc.) 3.) Activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce

The Four-Part Dole Test for Federal Spending

1.) Is it in pursuit of the general welfare 2.) Are the conditions that attend the receipt of federal aid clear - do states know what they're agreeing to do? "unambiguously clear 3.) Are the conditions directly related to the federal program being funded or promoted? Are the conditions necessary to a valid federal aim? 4.) Are there any other constitutional bars to the conditions being imposed? (for instance, could it be considered a direct tax on property?)

Four Issues surrounding Federalism

1.) Nation-State Relations 2.) 11th Amendment and Sovereign Immunity 3.) New Judicial Federalism - The practice whereby state judges base decisions regarding civil rights and liberties on their state's constitution, rather than the U.S. Constitution, when their state's constitution guarantees more than minimum rights. 4.) The Supremacy Clause and State Preemption

The Constitution's Limitation on States

1.) The Necessary and Proper Clause 2.) The Supremacy Clause

Exceptions to the 11th Amendment

14th amendment Commerce Clause State Delegation

Example of the Federalism Debate

1976 - National League of Cities v. Ussery 1985 - Garcia v. San Antonio MTA

Ex parte Endo (1944)

A United States Supreme Court ex parte decision handed down on December 18, 1944, in which the Justices unanimously ruled that the U.S. government could not continue to detain a citizen who was "concededly loyal" to the United States. Although the Court did not touch on the constitutionality of the exclusion of people of Japanese ancestry from the West Coast—which they had found not to violate citizen rights in their Korematsu v. United States decision on the same date—the Endo ruling nonetheless led to the reopening of the West Coast to Japanese Americans after their incarceration in camps across the U.S. interior during World War II.

16th Amendment

Amendment to the United States Constitution (1913) gave Congress the power to tax income.

Laissez-Fare Era Decisions Restricting Federalism

Cases Interpreting the Interstate commerce Clause - U.S. v. Knight (1895) - Hammer v. Dagenhardt (1918)

The Contract Clause

Clause of the Constitution (Article I, Section 10) originally intended to prohibit state governments from modifying contracts made between individuals; for a while interpreted as prohibiting state governments from taking actions that adversely affect property rights; no longer interpreted so broadly and no longer constrains state governments from exercising their police powers.

Taxation of Exports

Congress has no authority to tax exports (Article 1; Section 9; Clause 5)

Commerce Power

Congress shall have the power to "regulate commerce among the states" Commerce: The buying and selling of goods Regulation: A rule or directive made and maintained by an authority Interstate Commerce: Trade or purchases made between 2 or more states Exercise of the Commerce Clause authority follows historical federalism eras In order for intrastate commerce (commerce within a state) to be regulated under the interstate commerce clause it must directly impact interstate commerce (commerce between two states).

Supreme Court Expansion of the Commerce Clause

Court gave Congress broader authority under the interstate commerce clause and gives Congress the authority to determine what is considered interstate commerce

Hoke v. United States (1913)

Court upheld the Mann Act, prohibiting transportation of women in interstate commerce for immoral purposes

Allegeyer v. Louisiana (1897)

Facts of the case A Louisiana statute prohibited foreign (out-of-state) insurance corporations from conducting business in Louisiana without maintaining at least one place of business and an authorized agent in the State. Louisiana implemented the statute as an exercise of its police powers, intending to protect its citizens from deceitful insurance companies. Allgeyer & Company violated this statute by purchasing insurance from a firm based in the State of New York. The state trial court ruled for Allgeyer, finding the law violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Question Does a Louisiana law prohibiting out-of-state insurance corporations from conducting business in the state without maintaining at least one place of business and an authorized agent in the state violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, which protects companies' liberty to enter into contracts with businesses of their choice? Conclusion In a unanimous decision, the Court found that the Louisiana statute deprived Allgeyer & Company of its liberty without due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. Agreeing with the trial court, the Court found that the Fourteenth Amendment extends broadly to protect individuals from restrictions on their freedom to contract in pursuit of one's livelihood or vocation. The Court noted that each potential deprivation of liberty by the state needed to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Later cases allowed states greater authority to place restrictions on the freedom to contract. To summarize, states may not restrict citizens from doing business with a foreign corporation (Today however, that is not the case. States can enforce some regulations on these foreign companies)

Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Railroad Co. v. Minnesota (1890)

Facts of the case A Minnesota law made its railroad commission the final judge of the reasonableness of railroad rates. The railroad maintained that "it is always a judicial question as to whether a statute is repugnant to provisions of the constitution." Question Does the Minnesota law violate the due process clause of the 14th Amendment? Conclusion Yes. The statute did not provide procedural due process: railroads received no hearing or other chance to defend their rates before the commission. Moreover, a rate's reasonableness "is eminently a question for judicial investigation, requiring due process of law for its determination." A company denied the authority to charge a reasonable rate and unable to turn to a judicial mechanism for review would be deprived of the "lawful use of its property, and, thus, in substance, and effect, of the property without due process of law."

Gibbons v. Ogden

Facts of the case A New York state law gave Robert R. Livingston and Robert Fulton a 20-year monopoly over navigation on waters within state jurisdiction. Aaron Ogden and other competitors tried to forestall the monopoly, but Livingston and Fulton largely succeeded in selling franchise or buying competitors' boats. Thomas Gibbons -- a steamboat owner who did business between New York and New Jersey under a federal coastal license - formed a partnership with Ogden, which fell apart after three years when Gibbons operated another steamboat on a New York route belonging to Ogden. Ogden filed suit against Gibbons in New York state court, and received a permanent injunction The New York state court rejected Gibbons' argument asserting that U.S. Congress controlled interstate commerce. Question Does the Commerce Clause give Congress authority over interstate navigation? Conclusion Justice Marshall concluded that regulation of navigation by steamboat operators and others for purposes of conducting interstate commerce was a power reserved to and exercised by the Congress under the Commerce Clause. As interstate navigation fell under interstate commerce, New York could not interfere with it, and the law was therefore invalid. In a concurring opinion, Justice William Johnson argued that the national government had exclusive power over interstate commerce, negating state laws interfering with the exercise of that power. Justice Thompson did not participate in the discussion or decision of the case.

Cooley v. Board of Wardens (1852)

Facts of the case A Pennsylvania law required all ships entering or leaving the port of Philadelphia to hire a local pilot. Ships that failed to do so were subject to a fine. Cooley was a ship owner who refused to hire a local pilot and also refused to pay the fine. He argued that the law violated the Commerce Clause, which gives Congress authority over interstate commerce and bars Congress from delegating that authority to the states. This argument was rejected by the lower courts. Question Does a Pennsylvania's law requiring ships to hire a local pilot violate the Commerce Clause of the Constitution? Conclusion The majority held the pilotage law did not violate the Constitution, reasoning localized elements of commerce like selection of pilots could be appropriately delegated to the states. Though navigation was commerce, the Court held that pilotage demanded diverse local rules to cope with varying local conditions. Therefore, Congress's power was selectively exclusive.

South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros (1938)

Facts of the case A South Carolina law banned trucks over 90 inches wide and weighing over 20,000 pounds from its state highways. Barnwell Bros, Inc., an interstate trucking company, argued that this was an unconstitutional restriction on interstate commerce. The lower court agreed and granted an injunction. The lower court reasoned that the law would impede the flow of commercial trucking through South Carolina by increasing costs and creating other burdens. Question Did the law impose an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce? Conclusion The Court acknowledged that the law imposed a burden on interstate commerce, but nonetheless upheld it. Writing for unanimous Court, Justice Harlan Fiske Stone reasoned that Congress had not enacted regulations in this area, so the states remained free to regulate in it. States cannot impose burdens on interstate commerce by crafting laws that are designed to create an advantage for local businesses, even if they only relate to local matters. In this instance, however, the law closely related to a matter of substantial local concern, since the states own and maintain their own highways. The Court held that in the absence of congressional action, federal courts may not determine the details of motor vehicle regulations, as that would exceed the proper scope of the judicial role and infringe on legislative powers.

Alden v. Maine

Facts of the case A group of probation officers sued their employer, the State of Maine, in 1992 alleging that the state had violated the overtime provisions of the 1938 Fair Labor Standards Act. Following the Court's decision in Seminole Tribe v. Florida (1996) which held that States are immune from private suits in federal court and that Congress lacks the authority to abrogate that immunity the probation officers' suit was dismissed in Federal district court. Alden and the other probation officers then sued Maine again for violating the Fair Labor Standards Act, this time in state court. The state trial court and the state supreme court both held that Maine had sovereign immunity and could not be sued by private parties in their own court. Question May Congress use its powers under Article I of the Constitution to abrogate a state's sovereign immunity from private suits in its own courts? Conclusion No. A sharply divided court held in a 5-4 decision that Congress may not use its Article I powers to abrogate the states' sovereign immunity. Both the terms and history of the eleventh amendment suggest that States are immune from suits in their own courts. And more generally, the original understanding of the Constitution's structure and the terms of the tenth amendment confirm that states retained much of their sovereignty despite their agreeing that the national government would be supreme when exercising its enumerated powers.

Mayor of New York v. Miln (1837)

Facts of the case A state law required all vessels docking in New York City to provide a list of passengers and to post security against the passengers from becoming public charges. Miln, the master of the ship "Emily," refused to comply with the law. The city sought to collect a penalty for Miln's failure to file the report. Question Does the New York law violate the Commerce Clause which vests all power over interstate and foreign commerce in Congress? Conclusion The Court upheld the state law. The justices ducked the Commerce Clause issue and invoked what was to become the state "police power" -- the right of a sovereign to take all necessary steps to protect the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens. According to Barbour, who wrote the majority opinion, a state is as competent "to provide precautionary measures against the moral pestilence of paupers, vagabonds, and possible convicts, as it is to guard against the physical pestilence, which may arise from unsound and infectious articles imported." The Court reversed Miln in 1941. (See Edwards v. California)

BMW of North America v. Gore (1996)

Facts of the case After purchasing a new vehicle from an authorized Alabama BMW dealership, Ira Gore, Jr. discovered that his new vehicle had been repainted. He sued BMW's American distributor (BMW), alleging that it committed fraud by failing to inform him that his car had been repainted. The Alabama Circuit Court entered judgment, following a jury verdict, awarding Gore $4,000 in compensatory damages and $4 million in punitive damages. On appeal from the trial judge's denial of BMW's post-trial petition to set aside the punitive damages as 'grossly excessive,' the Alabama Supreme Court ruled that the punitive damages were not so excessive as to violate BMW's Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. Due to a jury calculation error, however, the Alabama Supreme Court reduced Gore's punitive damage award to $2 million. BMW appealed to the Supreme Court. Question Assuming that Gore's punitive damage award was grossly excessive, does the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause protect BMW from paying the award? Conclusion Yes. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that while a state may impose punitive damages to further its interest in deterring unlawful conduct, the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause prohibits states from imposing grossly excessive punishments on tort-feasors. In the present case, the punitive damage's excessive nature is indicated by the 500 to 1 ratio between the jury's punitive and actual damage awards, the relatively insignificant amount of damage, and the lack of statutory fines that remotely parallel the present award's magnitude. BMW's due process rights were also violated because it could not have possibly anticipated, nor did it receive fair notice, that it might face such a severe punishment.

South Central Bell v. Alabama (1999)

Facts of the case Alabama requires each corporation doing business in that state to pay a franchise tax based on the firm's capital. A domestic firm, organized under the laws of Alabama, has leeway in controlling its own tax base and tax liability. A foreign firm, organized under the laws of a State other than Alabama, does not have similar leeway to control its tax base. In 1986, the Reynolds Metals Company and other foreign corporations sued Alabama's tax authorities, seeking a refund of the foreign franchise tax they had paid on the ground that the tax discriminated against foreign corporations in violation of the Commerce and Equal Protection Clauses. The Alabama Supreme Court rejected Reynolds' claims, holding that the special burden imposed on foreign corporations simply offset a different burden imposed exclusively on domestic corporations by Alabama's domestic shares tax. During the Reynolds case, the South Central Bell Telephone Company and others brought a suit asserting similar Commerce and Equal Protection Clause claims. The Alabama trial court agreed with South Central Bell that the tax substantially discriminated against foreign corporations, but nonetheless dismissed their claims as barred by res judicata in light of the State Supreme Court's Reynolds decision. The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed. Question Does Alabama's franchise tax discriminates against interstate commerce, in violation of the Commerce Clause? Did the Alabama Supreme Court's refusal to permit the South Central Bell Telephone Company and others to raise their constitutional claims because of res judicata deprive them of the due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment? Conclusion Yes and yes. In an opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the Alabama franchise tax was unconstitutional. Justice Breyer wrote for the Court that, "Alabama law gives domestic corporations the ability to reduce their franchise tax liability..., while it denies foreign corporations that same ability. And no one claims that the different tax rates for foreign and domestic corporations offset the difference in the tax base. The tax therefore facially discriminates against interstate commerce and is unconstitutional unless the State can offer a sufficient justification for it." The Court concluded the State could not justify the tax. The Court also held that the State Supreme Court's decision was inconsistent with the Fourteenth Amendment's due process guarantee because the South Central Bell case was unrelated to the court's prior judgement and thus could not be bound by it. Furthermore, the Court rejected the State's argument that the Court lacked appellate jurisdiction under the Eleventh Amendment.

U.S. v. Lopez (1995)

Facts of the case Alfonzo Lopez, a 12th grade high school student, carried a concealed weapon into his San Antonio, Texas high school. He was charged under Texas law with firearm possession on school premises. The next day, the state charges were dismissed after federal agents charged Lopez with violating a federal criminal statute, the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990. The act forbids "any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that [he] knows...is a school zone." Lopez was found guilty following a bench trial and sentenced to six months' imprisonment and two years' supervised release. Question Is the 1990 Gun-Free School Zones Act, forbidding individuals from knowingly carrying a gun in a school zone, unconstitutional because it exceeds the power of Congress to legislate under the Commerce Clause? Conclusion Yes. The possession of a gun in a local school zone is not an economic activity that might, through repetition elsewhere, have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. The law is a criminal statute that has nothing to do with "commerce" or any sort of economic activity.

Case that Shows Modern Treatment of Substantive Due Process Claims Williamson v. Lee Optical Company (1955)

Facts of the case An Oklahoma law prohibited persons who were not licensed optometrists or ophthalmologists to fit lenses for eyeglasses. Non-licensed individuals were also prohibited from duplicating optical instruments without written prescriptions from licensed ophthalmologists. The Lee Optical Company challenged the law. Question Did the Oklahoma law violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? Conclusion In a unanimous decision authored by William Orville Douglas, the Court held that while the law may have been "needless" and "wasteful," it was the duty of the legislature, not the courts, "to balance the advantages and disadvantages of the new requirement." That is, Courts should not be able to invalidate state economic regulations on the grounds that they disagree with the theories supporting them. Even if the state law imposes burdens or waste, the legislature has the sole authority over weighing its benefits against its costs. In sum, the opticians could not prove that the law had no rational relationship to legitimate state objectives.

Cohens v. Virginia

Facts of the case An act of Congress authorized the operation of a lottery in the District of Columbia. The Cohen brothers proceeded to sell D.C. lottery tickets in the state of Virginia, violating state law. State authorities tried and convicted the Cohens, and then declared themselves to be the final arbiters of disputes between the states and the national government. Question Did the Supreme Court have the power under the Constitution to review the Virginia Supreme Court's ruling? Conclusion In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to review state criminal proceedings. Chief Justice Marshall wrote that the Court was bound to hear all cases that involved constitutional questions, and that this jurisdiction was not dependent on the identity of the parties in the cases. Marshall argued that state laws and constitutions, when repugnant to the Constitution and federal laws, were "absolutely void." After establishing the Court's jurisdiction, Marshall declared the lottery ordinance a local matter and concluded that the Virginia court was correct to fine the Cohens brothers for violating Virginia law.

The Marshall Court and Rise of Supreme Federalism = Establishing the Contours of Federal Authority (Cohens v. Virginia)

Facts of the case An act of Congress authorized the operation of a lottery in the District of Columbia. The Cohen brothers proceeded to sell D.C. lottery tickets in the state of Virginia, violating state law. State authorities tried and convicted the Cohens, and then declared themselves to be the final arbiters of disputes between the states and the national government. Question Did the Supreme Court have the power under the Constitution to review the Virginia Supreme Court's ruling? Conclusion In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to review state criminal proceedings. Chief Justice Marshall wrote that the Court was bound to hear all cases that involved constitutional questions, and that this jurisdiction was not dependent on the identity of the parties in the cases. Marshall argued that state laws and constitutions, when repugnant to the Constitution and federal laws, were "absolutely void." After establishing the Court's jurisdiction, Marshall declared the lottery ordinance a local matter and concluded that the Virginia court was correct to fine the Cohens brothers for violating Virginia law.

Southern Pacific Company v. Arizona

Facts of the case Arizona imposed a monetary penalty on railroad companies operating trains of over 14 passenger cars or 70 freight cars. It sought to recover these penalties from Southern Pacific Co., but the trial court made detailed factual findings that led it to conclude that Southern Pacific was not liable because the law violated the Commerce Clause. The Arizona Supreme Court reversed on the grounds that the law was reasonably related to the health and safety of the state's citizens and that the state had properly based it on its police power. It held that this foundation insulated it from challenges under the Commerce Clause, even though it had an adverse effect on interstate commerce. Question Did the Arizona law violate the Commerce Clause? Conclusion In an opinion authored by Justice Harlan F. Stone, the plurality struck down the law. The Court reasoned that that the law imposed a great burden on interstate commerce because nearly all the freight and passenger rail traffic in Arizona was interstate traffic, meaning that even trains operating outside Arizona had to comply with the law. As a result, 30% more trains than previously used were needed because of the limitation on the number of trains per car, at an added cost of $1,000,000 per year before adjustment for inflation. The Court found that there was insufficient benefit to Arizona's legitimate health and safety interests to justify so great a burden on interstate commerce. The law had ostensibly been passed to decrease the rate of rail accidents that "result from the greater length of trains," but the court noted that if anything the result of the law might have been to increase accidents "resulting from the larger number of trains." Accordingly, the law was not reasonably related to the state's legitimate interest in train safety let alone sufficiently beneficial towards achieving that end that it would justify the burden it imposed on interstate commerce. Justice Rutledge concurred. Justices Black and Douglas dissented.

Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Company (1922)

Facts of the case As an exercise of its taxing powers Congress enacted the Revenue Act of 1919, also called the Child Labor Tax Law. Under the law, companies employing children under fourteen years of age would be assessed ten percent of their annual profits. During the same year in which the act was passed, Drexel Furniture Company was found in violation of it and required to pay over $6000 in taxes, which it did under protest. Question Did Congress violate the Constitution in adopting the Child Labor Tax Law in attempting to regulate the employment of children, a power reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment? Conclusion Yes. The Court found that the Child Labor Tax Law was in violation of the Constitution as it intruded on the jurisdiction of states to adopt and enforce child labor codes. Chief Justice Taft argued that the tax law in question did much more than simply impose an "incidental restraint" but exerted a "prohibitory and regulatory effect" in a realm over which Congress had no jurisdiction. Taft feared that upholding this law would destroy state sovereignty and devastate "all constitutional limitation of the powers of Congress" by allowing it to disguise future regulatory legislation in the cloak of taxes.

McCray v. US (1904)

Facts of the case At the urging of dairy farmers, Congress passed an act imposing a tax of 10 cents per pound on oleomargarine that was artificially colored yellow. Noncolored margarine was taxed only one-quarter of a cent per pound. McCray, a licensed dealer, did not pay the higher tax while selling the colored product. After losing his case in lower courts, McCray appealed to the Supreme Court. Question Did the congressional act overstep the boundaries of the taxing powers established in the Constitution? Conclusion In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that the taxes levied on colored and noncolored oleomargarine were constitutional. The Court held that the right of Congress to tax within its delegated powers was essentially "unrestrained," and that "no want of due process of law could possibly result" from exercises of that power. The Court argued that to question the purpose and motive of Congress in exerting its delegated powers would be to "usurp the functions of the legislative in order to control that branch of the government in the performance of its lawful duties."

Complete Auto Transit v. Brady (1977) (State taxes on interstate commerce)

Facts of the case Complete Auto Transit was a Michigan corporation doing business in Mississippi. Complete shipped cars into the state where they were distributed for sale. Mississippi imposed a tax on transportation companies for the "privilege of doing business" in the state. The tax was applied equally to businesses involved in intra-and interstate commerce. Question Did the Mississippi tax violate the Commerce Clause because it placed a burden on an activity associated with interstate commerce? Conclusion A unanimous Court found the tax valid. Businesses involved in interstate commerce should assume a just share of the state tax burden. The Court's decision established four criteria to be met for a state tax to be valid and not an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce. The tax must be (1) on an activity connected to the state, (2) fairly apportioned to be based on intrastate commerce, (3) nondiscriminatory, and (4) related to state services provided. These criteria are only valid if Congress has not imposed conflicting regulations.

Michigan v. Long

Facts of the case David Long was convicted for possession of marijuana found by Michigan police in the passenger compartment and trunk of his car. The police searched the passenger compartment because they suspected Long's vehicle contained weapons potentially dangerous to the officers. After a state appellate court affirmed the conviction, the Michigan Supreme Court reversed. The Michigan Supreme Court held that the search violated the Fourth Amendment and the Michigan Constitution. Question Did the Supreme Court have jurisdiction over state court decisions that rested on "adequate and independent" state grounds? Conclusion The Court, after admitting that it had not developed "a satisfying and consistent approach" regarding lower court references to independent state grounds, held that it had jurisdiction in the case. The Court held that when state court decisions appeared to rest primarily on federal law, it would infer that state courts believed that federal law required them to do so. State courts could expressly state that independent grounds were being used in cases as opposed to constitutional grounds. The Court reasoned that this approach would avoid the rendering of advisory opinions and would decrease the intrusive practice of requiring state courts to clarify decisions to the liking of the Justices. In the case at hand, the Court affirmed the constitutionality of the search and affirmed Long's conviction.

Scott v. Sandford, 1857 (Dred Scott Case)

Facts of the case Dred Scott was a slave in Missouri. From 1833 to 1843, he resided in Illinois (a free state) and in the Louisiana Territory, where slavery was forbidden by the Missouri Compromise of 1820. After returning to Missouri, Scott filed suit in Missouri court for his freedom, claiming that his residence in free territory made him a free man. After losing, Scott brought a new suit in federal court. Scott's master maintained that no descendant of slaves could be a citizen in the sense of Article III of the Constitution. Question Was Dred Scott free or slave? Conclusion The majority held that a man, whose ancestors were imported into [the U.S.], and sold as slaves," whether enslaved or free, could not be an American citizen and therefore did not have standing to sue in federal court. Because the Court lacked jurisdiction, Taney dismissed the case on procedural grounds. Taney further held that the Missouri Compromise of 1820 was unconstitutional and foreclose Congress from freeing slaves within Federal territories. The opinion showed deference to the Missouri courts, which held that moving to a free state did not render Scott emancipated. Finally, Taney ruled that slaves were property under the Fifth Amendment, and that any law that would deprive a slave owner of that property was unconstitutional. In dissent, Benjamin Robbins Curtis criticized Taney for addressing the claim's substance after finding the Court lacked jurisdiction. He pointed out that invalidating the Missouri Compromise was not necessary to resolve the case, and cast doubt on Taney's position that the Founders categorically opposed anti-slavery laws. John McLean echoed Curtis, finding the majority improperly reviewed the claim's substance when its holding should have been limited to procedure. He also argued that men of African descent could be citizens because they already had the right to vote in five states.

Wickard v. Filburn (1942) How far will the court go?

Facts of the case Filburn was a small farmer in Ohio who harvested nearly 12 acres of wheat above his allotment under the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938. Filburn was penalized under the Act. He argued that the extra wheat that he had produced in violation of the law had been used for his own use and thus had no effect on interstate commerce, since it never had been on the market. In his view, this meant that he had not violated the law because the additional wheat was not subject to regulation under the Commerce Clause. Question Did the Act violate the Commerce Clause? Conclusion A unanimous Court upheld the law. In an opinion authored by Justice Robert Houghwout Jackson, the Court found that the Commerce Clause gives Congress the power to regulate prices in the industry, and this law was rationally related to that legitimate goal. The Court reasoned that Congress could regulate activity within a single state under the Commerce Clause, even if each individual activity had a trivial effect on interstate commerce, as long as the intrastate activity viewed in the aggregate would have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. To this extent, the opinion went against prior decisions that had analyzed whether an activity was local, or whether its effects were direct or indirect.

Munn v. Illinois

Facts of the case Illinois regulated grain warehouse and elevator rates by establishing maximum rates for their use. Question Did the state-imposed rates deny the warehouse and elevator owners equal protection and due process under the 14th Amendment? Conclusion No on both counts. Waite, for the Court, took a broad view of the state's police power. He argued that the states may regulate the use of private property "when such regulation becomes necessary for the public good." Waite resurrected an ancient legal doctrine to support his view: "When property is affected with a public interest, it ceases to be juris privati only."

Proprietors of Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of Warren Bridge (1837)

Facts of the case In 1785, the Massachusetts legislature incorporated the Charles River Bridge Company to construct a bridge and collect tolls. In 1828, the legislature established the Warren Bridge Company to build a free bridge nearby. Unsurprisingly, the new bridge deprived the old one of traffic and tolls. The Charles River Bridge Company filed suit, claiming the legislature had defaulted on its initial contract. Question Did the legislature enter into an economic contract with the Charles River Bridge Company that was impaired by the second charter in violation of Article I Section 10 of the Constitution? Conclusion In a 5-to-2 decision, the Court held that the state had not entered a contract that prohibited the construction of another bridge on the river at a later date. The Court held that the legislature neither gave exclusive control over the waters of the river nor invaded corporate privilege by interfering with the company's profit-making ability. In balancing the rights of private property against the need for economic development, the Court found that the community interest in creating new channels of travel and trade had priority.

Chisholm v. George (1793)

Facts of the case In 1792, Alexander Chisholm attempted to sue the State of Georgia in the U.S. Supreme Court over payments due to him for goods that Robert Farquhar had supplied Georgia during the American Revolutionary War. The defendant, Georgia, refused to appear, claiming that as a sovereign state, it could not be sued without consenting to the suit. Question Can state citizens sue state governments in federal court? Conclusion In a 4-to-1 decision, the Court ruled for the plaintiff, reasoning that Article 3, Section 2, of the Constitution abrogated the states' sovereign immunity and granted federal courts the affirmative power to hear disputes between private citizens and states. Thus, state conduct was subject to judicial review. Justice Iredell dissented, reasoning that under Common Law, each state was sovereign, and could not be sued without consent. This opinion eventually became law with the passage of the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution, which provides that "The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any foreign state." Lead to the creation of the 11th Amendment

Hylton v. U.S. (1796)

Facts of the case In 1794, Congress enacted a tax of sixteen dollars on each carriage owned by an individual or business. Hylton viewed the law as a direct tax in violation of the constitutional requirement that taxes passed by Congress must be apportioned, that is, laid according to the population and the number of representatives from each state. Question Was the carriage tax a direct tax, which would require apportionment among the states? Conclusion The Court concluded that the carriage tax was not a direct tax and thus that the carriage tax did not violate the Article I, Section 2, Clause 3 and Article I, Section 9, Clause 3 requirements for the apportioning of direct taxes. The Court reasoned that direct taxes did not include taxes on the possession of goods.

Fletcher v. Peck (1810)

Facts of the case In 1795, the Georgia state legislature passed a land grant awarding territory (Yazzu Land) to four companies. The following year, the legislature voided the law and declared all rights and claims under it to be invalid. In 1800, John Peck acquired land that was part of the original legislative grant. He then sold the land to Robert Fletcher three years later, claiming that the land sales had been legitimate. Fletcher argued that since the original sale of the land had been declared invalid, Peck had no legal right to sell the land and thus committed a breach of contract. Question Could the contract between Fletcher and Peck be invalidated by an act of the Georgia legislature? Conclusion The legislature's repeal of the law was unconstitutional under Article I, Section 10, Clause I (the Contract Clause) of the United States Constitution. The majority concluded the sale between Fletcher and Peck was a binding contract, which under the Contract Clause cannot be invalidated even if it is illegally secured because it fell under Bona Fide Good Faith Purchasers for Value

McCulloch v. Maryland

Facts of the case In 1816, Congress chartered The Second Bank of the United States. In 1818, the state of Maryland passed legislation to impose taxes on the bank. James W. McCulloch, the cashier of the Baltimore branch of the bank, refused to pay the tax. The state appeals court held that the Second Bank was unconstitutional because the Constitution did not provide a textual commitment for the federal government to charter a bank. Question Did Congress have the authority to establish the bank? Did the Maryland law unconstitutionally interfere with congressional powers? Conclusion In a unanimous decision, the Court held that Congress had the power to incorporate the bank and that Maryland could not tax instruments of the national government employed in the execution of constitutional powers. Pursuant to the Necessary and Proper Clause (Art. I, Section 8), Chief Justice Marshall noted that Congress possessed powers not explicitly outlined in the U.S. Constitution. Marshall redefined "necessary" to mean "appropriate and legitimate," covering all methods for furthering objectives covered by the enumerated powers. Marshall also held that while the states retained the power of taxation, the Constitution and the laws made in pursuance thereof are supreme and cannot be controlled by the states.

Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward (1819)

Facts of the case In 1816, the New Hampshire legislature attempted to change Dartmouth College-- a privately funded institution--into a state university. The legislature changed the school's corporate charter by transferring the control of trustee appointments to the governor. In an attempt to regain authority over the resources of Dartmouth College, the old trustees filed suit against William H. Woodward, who sided with the new appointees. Question Did the New Hampshire legislature unconstitutionally interfere with Dartmouth College's rights under the Contract Clause? Conclusion The Contract Clause (Art 1, Section 10, Clause 1) prohibits states from violating contracts with private or public corporations. In a 6-to-1 decision, the Court concluded that the Contract Clause applies to private as well as public corporations. The Court held that the College's corporate charter qualified as a contract between private parties, with which the legislature could not interfere. The fact that the government had commissioned the charter did not transform the school into a civil institution. Chief Justice Marshall's opinion emphasized that the term "contract" referred to transactions involving individual property rights, not to "the political relations between the government and its citizens."

Stone v. Mississippi

Facts of the case In 1867, the provisional state legislature of Mississippi chartered the Mississippi Agricultural, Educational, and Manufacturing Aid Society. The Society was chartered to run a lottery for the next 25 years; however, in 1868, a new constitution ratified by the people outlawed lotteries in the state. John Stone and others associated with the Society were arrested in 1874 for running a lottery. The Society claimed they were protected by the provisions of their charter while the state declared that the subsequent enforcement legislation had repealed the grant. Question Did Mississippi violate the Contract Clause by repealing the Society's grant? Conclusion A unanimous Court found that the Mississippi classification of lotteries as outlawed acts was valid. The State legislature do not have the power to bind the decisions of the people and future legislatures. The Court stated that no legislation had the authority to bargain away the public health and morals. The Court viewed the lottery as a vice that threatened the public health and morals. The contracts protected in the Constitution are property rights, not governmental rights. Therefore, one can only obtain temporary suspension of the governmental rights (in this case, the right to outlaw actions) in a charter which can be revoked by the will of the people.

Coyle v. Smith

Facts of the case In 1910, Oklahoma enacted a law moving its state capital from Guthrie to Oklahoma City. In admitting Oklahoma to the Union, the Congress declared the temporary capital to be Briscoe and that a change to some other location would not occur until 1913. Question Does Oklahoma have the power to locate its seat of government when Congress has imposed conditions limiting that location? Conclusion Yes. This was congressional overreaching. States are on an equal footing to determine their own location for the seat of government.

Stafford v. Wallace

Facts of the case In 1921, Congress enacted the Packers and Stockyards Act in an attempt to regulate activities of meat packers that were unfair, discriminatory, or deceptive and encouraged the formation of monopolies. Stafford sought an injunction against the enforcement of the Act. After his application was denied, he sought review by the Supreme Court. This case was decided together with Burton v. Clyne. Question Did Congress have authority under the Commerce Clause to pass and enforce the Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921? Conclusion In a 7-to-1 decision, the Court held that the activities controlled by the Act did indeed burden the freedom of commerce and fell within the regulatory jurisdiction of Congress. The Court argued that Congress did not have to wait until after deleterious economic monopolies had developed to regulate particular industries. Drawing on its decision in Swift v. United States, the Court found that business done in the stockyards was an essential part of interstate commerce and thus subject to national legislation.

Home Building and Loan Association v. Blaisdell

Facts of the case In 1933, Minnesota enacted the Mortgage Moratorium Law in an effort to combat the economic emergency posed by the Great Depression. The law extended the time period in which borrowers could pay back their debts on property to lenders. A court granted an extension to the Blaisdells under this statute while also requiring them to pay $40 a month during the extended period to Home Building and Loan Association, which was the mortgagor of their home. Home argued that the Minnesota law was unconstitutional under the Contracts Clause of the Constitution but was unsuccessful in state courts. Question Did the Minnesota law violate the Contracts Clause? Conclusion In an opinion authored by Justice Charles Hughes, the Court held that the law did not violate the Constitution. The court reasoned that there are limitations on the doctrine embedded in the Contracts Clause (Section 10 of Article I). There may be a public need to restrain private rights to further the public interest when there is an emergency. The Framers of the Constitution could not have foreseen all possible modern problems, so the Constitution should not be interpreted in too rigid a way to allow for responding to them. This statute met the relevant five-factor test because there was a genuine emergency, the legislation was designed to help the public in general, the relief was narrowly tailored to the problem, the mortgagor's interests were not seriously undermined, and the legislation is temporary. Since the demands of the Great Depression were vital to all of the state's citizens, the Court held the law was a legitimate use of Minnesota's police power. Justice Sutherland dissented, joined by Justices Van Devanter, McReynolds, and Butler.

Panama Refining Company Case

Facts of the case In 1933, the President issued Executive Order 6199 via the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA). The order prohibited transporting petroleum and petroleum products in interstate and foreign commerce if they had been produced in excess of the amounts permitted by states. Panama Refining Co. operated an oil refinery and sought an injunction against enforcing the regulations that were created under the NIRA. It succeeded in the lower court, but the intermediate appellate court removed the injunction. Question Was the executive order regulating petroleum commerce constitutional? Conclusion Writing for the 8-1 majority, Chief Justice Charles E. Hughes concluded the order was not constitutional. Supreme Court held that in enacting the order, the President subsumed legislative powers that Congress does not have the power to delegate. Congress cannot delegate legislative powers to other branches of government in order to sustain the democratic system of government. When it allows the executive branch to make rules, Congress must provide policies and standards for formulating them. This was not the case in the regulation of oil transportation. The lack of any limits on executive discretion concerned the Court and rendered the order unconstitutional. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Benjamin Cardozo argued that there were enough standards to guide the President's actions so that the delegation of power is constitutional. The President was essentially enforcing Congress' goals of regulating interstate commerce to prevent unfair competition and the misuse of resources. He also argued that the elasticity of government is crucial for the government to continue to function when faced with new problems.

The New Deal and the Four Horsemen The Successful Prevention of Wage and Hours Laws (1895-1936)

Four conservative members of the Court who follow strict interpretations of the constitution They went against FDR's New Deal and struck down many of the New Deal's regulation (including the regulation power in Schechter Poultry v. US) Roosevelt's primary motivation is economic motivation to pull us out of the Depression and passes many acts to regulate industries that are not competitive and to ensure that industries have a living wage. AND time after time they are struck down by the Supreme Court and it's four horsemen.

Carter v. Carter Coal (1936)

Facts of the case In 1935, Congress enacted the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act, also known as the Guffey Coal Act. The Act regulated prices, minimum wages, maximum hours, and "fair practices" of the coal industry. Although compliance was voluntary, tax refunds were established as incentives to abide by the regulations. Carter, a stockholder, brought suit against his own company in an attempt to keep it from paying the tax for noncompliance. This case was decided together with R.C. Tway Coal Co. v. Clark, R.C. Tway Coal Co. v. Glenn, and Halvering v. Carter. Question Did the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935 exceed congressional powers under the Commerce Clause? Conclusion In a 5 to 4 decision, the Court held that the 1935 Act overstepped the bounds of congressional power. The Court ruled that "commerce" is plainly distinct from "production." Employing workers, setting wages and working hours, and mining coal were found to be part of the local process of production, separate from any trade of goods that could be regulated under the Commerce Clause. In striking down the law, Justice Sutherland argued that "[e]verything which moves in interstate commerce has had a local origin. Without local production somewhere, interstate commerce. . . would practically disappear."

Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission (1977)

Facts of the case In 1972, the North Carolina Board of Agriculture adopted a regulation that required all apples shipped into the state in closed containers to display the USDA grade or nothing at all. Washington State growers (whose standards are higher than the USDA) challenged the regulation as an unreasonable burden to interstate commerce. North Carolina stated it was a valid exercise of its police powers to create "uniformity" to protect its citizenry from "fraud and deception." Question Did the North Carolina regulation violate the Commerce Clause by placing an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce? Conclusion The Court voted unanimously that the North Carolina regulation was an unconstitutional exercise of the state's power over interstate commerce. Although the regulation was facially neutral, it had a discriminatory impact on the Washington growers while shielding the local growers from the same burden. The regulation removed the competitive advantage gained by the Washington apples from stricter inspection standards. The regulation produced a leveling effect that works to the local advantage by "downgrading" apples from other states unjustly. Therefore, the regulation places an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce.

National League of Cities v. Ussery (1976)

Facts of the case In 1974, Congress passed amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. The purpose of the amendments was to regulate minimum wage and overtime pay for state and local government employees. The National League of Cities, as well as several states and cities, challenged the constitutionality of the amendments. Question May Congress, acting under its commerce power, regulate the labor market of state employees, which the Tenth Amendment reserves to the states? Conclusion Congress may not regulate the labor market of state employees. The Tenth Amendment prohibits Congress from enacting legislation which operates "to directly displace the States' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions." While the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause is "plenary," that power has constitutional limits. In this case, the exercise of the commerce power ran afoul of the Tenth Amendment which protects the states' traditional activities.

Allied Structural Steel Company v. Spannaus

Facts of the case In 1974, Minnesota adopted legislation which required private employers to pay a fee if they terminated employee pension plans or if they moved their offices from the state, leaving insufficient funds to cover pensions for ten-year employees. This law affected Allied Structural Steel as the company began closing offices in Minnesota. Even though the employees affected by the closing were not entitled to pensions under the terms of their employment with the company, according to the Minnesota law, they were. The company was ordered to pay approximately $185,000 to comply with the statute's provisions. Question Did Minnesota's Private Pension Benefits Protection Act violate the Contract Clause of the Constitution? Conclusion The Court found that the Minnesota law did violate the Constitution as it "substantially altered" the provisions of pension agreements which Allied Steel had with its employees. Citing the importance that the Framers placed on private contracts in the conduct of business, Justice Stewart found that the act's effect was "severe" as it nullified terms of the company's obligations to its employees and imposed an "unexpected liability in potentially disabling amounts." Furthermore, the law was narrowly targeted at employers who had decided to establish employee pension plans, and it did not seek to deal with broad economic and social problems.

South Carolina v. Baker (1988)

Facts of the case In 1982, Congress passed the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act (TEFRA). The statute removed the federal income tax exemption for interest earned on publicly offered long-term bonds issued by state and local governments unless they were issued in registered form. South Carolina declared that both bearer and registered bonds issued by states and municipalities had been free from taxation since Pollock v. Farmer's Loan and Trust Co (1895). The federal government claimed that the Act did not eliminate the state's power to issue bonds free from taxation; rather it regulated the types of bonds to be exempt. Question Did the TEFRA violate the Tenth Amendment and intergovernmental tax immunity? Conclusion Section 310(b)(1) does not violate the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity by taxing the interest earned on unregistered state bonds. Any increased administrative costs incurred by States in implementing the registration system are not taxes within the meaning of the tax immunity doctrine. The Court found that its subsequent decisions overruled Pollock so that state bond interest is not immune from a nondiscriminatory federal tax. Therefore, the owners of state bonds have no constitutional authority to exempt taxes on the earned income. TEFRA imposes no direct tax on the states; it is only collected from bondholders. The Act is nondiscriminatory because the regulations are imposed on the federal government as well as the state governments.

Takings Clause

Government can take private property for a public purpose, but it must provide fair compensation to the owners of that property.

South Dakota v. Dole (1987) - Can federal spending be conditional?

Facts of the case In 1984, Congress enacted legislation ordering the Secretary of Transportation to withhold five percent of federal highway funds from states that did not adopt a 21-year-old minimum drinking age. South Dakota, a state that permitted persons 19 years of age to purchase alcohol, challenged the law. Question Did Congress exceed its spending powers, or violate the Twenty-first Amendment, by passing legislation conditioning the award of federal highway funds on the states' adoption of a uniform minimum drinking age? Conclusion No. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that Congress, acting indirectly to encourage uniformity in states' drinking ages, was within constitutional bounds. The Court found that the legislation was in pursuit of "the general welfare," and that the means chosen to do so were reasonable. The Court also held that the Twenty-first Amendment's limitations on spending power were not prohibitions on congressional attempts to achieve federal objectives indirectly. The five percent loss of highway funds was not unduly coercive.

Oregon Waste Systems v. Dept. of Envir. Quality of Oregon (1994)(Thomas, 7-2) (Taxing and Spending to Protect Intrastate Commerce)

Facts of the case In 1989, Oregon Legislature imposed a surcharge on solid waste generated out-of-state and disposed of within the state. The Department of Environmental Quality, determined the amount of the surcharge to be $2.25 per ton, significantly higher than the $0.85 per ton fee charged for in-state waste. Two waste disposal companies —Waste Systems Inc. and Columbia Resource Company (CRC) — disposed of waste generated out-of-state in Oregon. Waste Systems Inc. managed and owned a landfill in Oregon, and CRC transported waste from Washington State to Oregon. The companies challenged the surcharge in the Oregon Court of Appeals, arguing that it breached the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. However, the appellate court upheld the surcharge, and the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed. Question Is the surcharge that Oregon imposed on the in-state disposal of waste produced out-of-state a violation of the Commerce Clause? Conclusion Yes. In a majority decision authored by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court noted that the Commerce Clause prohibits discrimination against interstate commerce, and a regulation is discriminatory if it "taxes a transaction or incident more heavily when it crosses state lines." The majority determined that the surcharge was clearly discriminatory because waste disposal companies were required to pay three times more to dispose of waste produced out-of-state. Thus, for the surcharge to comply with the Commerce Clause, the Department of Environmental Quality needed to demonstrate that it had no choice but to use discriminatory means to serve some local purpose, but it failed to do so. Consequently, the decision of the Oregon Supreme Court was reversed.

U.S. v. Morrison (2000)

Facts of the case In 1994, while enrolled at Virginia Polytechnic Institute (Virginia Tech), Christy Brzonkala alleged that Antonio Morrison and James Crawford, both students and varsity football players at Virginia Tech, raped her. In 1995, Brzonkala filed a complaint against Morrison and Crawford under Virginia Tech's Sexual Assault Policy. After a hearing, Morrison was found guilty of sexual assault and sentenced to immediate suspension for two semesters. Crawford was not punished. A second hearing again found Morrison guilty. After an appeal through the university's administrative system, Morrison's punishment was set aside, as it was found to be "excessive." Ultimately, Brzonkala dropped out of the university. Brzonkala then sued Morrison, Crawford, and Virginia Tech in Federal District Court, alleging that Morrison's and Crawford's attack violated 42 USC section 13981, part of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA), which provides a federal civil remedy for the victims of gender-motivated violence. Morrison and Crawford moved to dismiss Brzonkala's suit on the ground that section 13981's civil remedy was unconstitutional. In dismissing the complaint, the District Court found that that Congress lacked authority to enact section 13981 under either the Commerce Clause or the Fourteenth Amendment, which Congress had explicitly identified as the sources of federal authority for it. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals affirmed. Question Does Congress have the authority to enact the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 under either the Commerce Clause or Fourteenth Amendment? Conclusion No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that Congress lacked the authority to enact a statute under the Commerce Clause or the Fourteenth Amendment since the statute did not regulate an activity that substantially affected interstate commerce nor did it redress harm caused by the state. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court that [i]f the allegations here are true, no civilized system of justice could fail to provide [Brzonkala] a remedy for the conduct of...Morrison. But under our federal system that remedy must be provided by the Commonwealth of Virginia, and not by the United States." Dissenting, Justice Stephen G. Breyer argued that the majority opinion "illustrates the difficulty of finding a workable judicial Commerce Clause touchstone." Additionally, Justice David H. Souter, dissenting, noted that VAWA contained a "mountain of data assembled by Congress...showing the effects of violence against women on interstate commerce."

Gonzalez v. Raich (2005)

Facts of the case In 1996 California voters passed the Compassionate Use Act, legalizing marijuana for medical use. California's law conflicted with the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA), which banned possession of marijuana. After the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) seized doctor-prescribed marijuana from a patient's home, a group of medical marijuana users sued the DEA and U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft in federal district court. The medical marijuana users argued the Controlled Substances Act - which Congress passed using its constitutional power to regulate interstate commerce - exceeded Congress' commerce clause power. The district court ruled against the group. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ruled the CSA unconstitutional as it applied to intrastate (within a state) medical marijuana use. Relying on two U.S. Supreme Court decisions that narrowed Congress' commerce clause power - U.S. v. Lopez (1995) and U.S. v. Morrison (2000) - the Ninth Circuit ruled using medical marijuana did not "substantially affect" interstate commerce and therefore could not be regulated by Congress. Question Does the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 801) exceed Congress' power under the commerce clause as applied to the intrastate cultivation and possession of marijuana for medical use? Conclusion No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the commerce clause gave Congress authority to prohibit the local cultivation and use of marijuana, despite state law to the contrary. Stevens argued that the Court's precedent "firmly established" Congress' commerce clause power to regulate purely local activities that are part of a "class of activities" with a substantial effect on interstate commerce. The majority argued that Congress could ban local marijuana use because it was part of such a "class of activities": the national marijuana market. Local use affected supply and demand in the national marijuana market, making the regulation of intrastate use "essential" to regulating the drug's national market. The majority distinguished the case from Lopez and Morrison. In those cases, statutes regulated non-economic activity and fell entirely outside Congress' commerce power; in this case, the Court was asked to strike down a particular application of a valid statutory scheme.

Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council

Facts of the case In 1996, the Massachusetts Burma Law, which restricted state entities from buying goods or services from companies doing business with Burma, was passed. Afterwards, Congress also imposed mandatory and conditional sanctions on Burma. Businesses with ties to Burma landed on Massachusetts' "restricted trade" list. The list came to include 34 members of the National Foreign Trade Council (Council), a non-profit advocate for American companies that do business abroad. The Council filed suit against Stephen Crosby, the Massachusetts Secretary of Administration and Finance, and other state officials in federal court, claiming that the state act unconstitutionally infringes on the federal foreign affairs power, violates the Foreign Commerce Clause, and is preempted by the Federal Burma Law. The District Court permanently enjoined the state act's enforcement, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The court also found that the Massachusetts Burma Law violated the Supremacy Clause because the state was acting in an area of unique federal concern, foreign policy, through a balanced, tailored approach. Question Is the Massachusetts Burma Law, which restricts the authority of its agencies to purchase goods or services from companies doing business with Burma, unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause? Conclusion Yes. In a opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that "the state Act is preempted, and its application unconstitutional, under the Supremacy Clause." Justice Souter wrote for the Court that Massachusetts' law created an obstacle to the President's discretion to control economic sanctions against Burma, interfered with Congress's intention to limit economic pressure against the Burmese Government, and was at odds with the President's authority to speak for the United States among the world's nations to develop a comprehensive, multilateral Burma strategy. Therefore, the Massachusetts Burma Law "is invalid under the Supremacy Clause...owing to its threat of frustrating federal statutory objectives."

Missouri v. Holland

Facts of the case In December 1916, the United States and Great Britain entered into a treaty to protect a number of migratory birds in the U.S. and Canada. Congress passed the Migratory Bird Treaty Act in 1918 in order to facilitate enforcement of the treaty. When Ray P. Holland, the U.S. Game Warden, threatened to arrest citizens of Missouri for violating the Act, the state of Missouri challenged the treaty. The state argued that the constitution gave Congress no enumerated power to regulate migratory bird hunting, and thus the regulation of such hunting was the province of the states according to the Tenth Amendment. Question Did the treaty infringe upon rights reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment? Conclusion In a 7-to-2 decision authored by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, the Court upheld the exercise of the treaty power and found no violation of the Tenth Amendment. The Court reasoned that the national interest in protecting wildlife could be protected only by national action. The Court further reasoned that the Supremacy Clause (Article VI, Clause 2) renders treaties the "supreme law of the land," a finding that trumps any state-level concerns with regard to the provisions of any treaty. The Supremacy Clause further implied that the treaty provisions were not subject to questioning by the states under the process of judicial review.

Maine v. Taylor (1986)

Facts of the case In order to protect its fisheries from parasites and non-native species, the state of Maine prohibited the importation of live baitfish. Robert J. Taylor, the owner of a bait business, violated the law and was prosecuted by Maine authorities. Question Did the Maine law unconstitutionally burden interstate commerce, violating the Commerce Clause? Conclusion No. In an 8-to-1 decision, the Court held that the limitation imposed by the Commerce Clause on state regulatory power was not absolute and that the States "retain[ed] authority under their general police powers to regulate matters of 'legitimate local concern.'" The Court found that Maine's ban on the importation of live baitfish served a legitimate local purpose that could not adequately be served by available nondiscriminatory alternatives. The Court argued that the ban was not a simple case of "arbitrary discrimination against interstate commerce." Justice Stevens was the only dissent and he said that the law shouldn't be upheld if the state has trouble proving that the law actually does decrease the amount of parasites. Essentially he wanted to know whether the law actually worked at accomplishing it's goal (Substantive Due Process)

Korematsu v. US (1944)

Facts of the case In response to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor during World War II, the U.S. government decided to require Japanese-Americans to move into relocation camps as a matter of national security. President Franklin Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066 in February 1942, two months after Pearl Harbor. A Japanese-American man living in San Leandro, Fred Korematsu, chose to stay at his residence rather than obey the order to relocate. Korematsu was arrested and convicted of violating the order. He responded by arguing that Executive Order 9066 violated the Fifth Amendment. The Ninth Circuit affirmed Korematsu's conviction. Question Did the President and Congress go beyond their war powers by implementing exclusion and restricting the rights of Americans of Japanese descent? Conclusion In an opinion written by Justice Black, the Court ruled that the evacuation order violated by Korematsu was valid. The majority found that the Executive Order did not show racial prejudice but rather responded to the strategic imperative of keeping the U.S. and particularly the West Coast (the region nearest Japan) secure from invasion. The Court relied heavily on a 1943 decision, Hirabayashi v. U.S., which addressed similar issues. Black argued that the validation of the military's decision by Congress merited even more deference. Justice Frankfurter concurred, writing that the "martial necessity arising from the danger of espionage and sabotage" warranted the military's evacuation order. Justice Jackson dissented, arguing that the exclusion order legitimized racism that violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

US v. Butler

Facts of the case In the 1933 Agricultural Adjustment Act, Congress implemented a processing tax on agricultural commodities, from which funds would be redistributed to farmers who promised to reduce their acreage. The Act intended to solve the crisis in agricultural commodity prices which was causing many farmers to go under. Authority to determine which crops would be affected was granted to the Secretary of Agriculture. He decided that one of the crops should be cotton, and Butler received a tax claim as a receivers of the Hoosal Mills Corp., a cotton processor. Question Did Congress exceed its constitutional taxing and spending powers with the Act? Conclusion In an opinion written by Justice Roberts, the majority declared the Act unconstitutional because it attempted to regulate and control agricultural production, an arena reserved to the states. Congress' Spending Power (Article I, Section 8) is restricted to situations in which it is being used for the general welfare of the people. Agricultural production historically lies beyond the authority of the federal government to regulate. Although Congress does have the power to tax and appropriate funds, in this case those activities were "but means to an unconstitutional end." That is, Congress was using the spending power as an enforcement mechanism to control activity that was completely within the authority of the states. Thus, the Act violated the Constitution. Justice Stone wrote a dissenting opinion and was joined by Justices Brandeis and Cardozo.

Ex Parte Milligan

Facts of the case Lambden P. Milligan was sentenced to death by a military commission in Indiana during the Civil War for engaging in acts of disloyalty. Milligan sought release through habeas corpus from a federal court. Question Does a civil court have jurisdiction over a military tribunal? Conclusion Writing for the Court, Justice David Davis held that trials of civilians by presidentially created military commissions are unconstitutional. Specifically, it is unconstitutional to try civilians by military tribunals unless there is no civilian court available. The military commission therefore did not have jurisdiction to try and sentence Milligan, and he was entitled to discharge.

The Prize Cases

Facts of the case Lincoln proclaimed a blockade of southern ports in April 1861. Congress authorized him to declare a state of insurrection by the Act of July 13, 1861. By the Act of August 6, 1861, Congress retroactively ratified all Lincoln's military action. These cases involved the seizure of vessels bound for Confederate ports prior to July 13, 1861. Question Did Lincoln act within his presidential powers defined by Article II when he ordered the seizures absent a declaration of war? Conclusion The President had the power to act. A state of civil war existed de facto after the firing on Fort Sumter (April 12, 1861) and the Supreme Court would take this fact into account. Though neither Congress nor the President can declare war against a state of the Union, when states waged war against the United States government, the President was "bound to meet it in the shape it presented itself,without waiting for Congress to baptize it with a name."

The Slaughterhouse Cases

Facts of the case Louisiana passed a law that restricted slaughterhouse operations in New Orleans to a single corporation. Pursuant to the law, the Crescent City Live-stock Landing and Slaughter-House Company received a charter to run a slaughterhouse downstream from the city. No other areas around the city were permitted for slaughtering animals over the next 25 years, and existing slaughterhouses would be closed. A group of butchers argued that they would lose their right to practice their trade and earn a livelihood under the monopoly. Specifically, they argued the monopoly created involuntary servitude in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment, and abridged privileges or immunities, denied equal protection of the laws, and deprived them of liberty and property without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Question Did the creation of the monopoly violate the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments? Conclusion The Court held that the monopoly violated neither the Thirteenth or Fourteenth Amendments, reasoning that these amendments were passed with the narrow intent to grant full equality to former slaves. Thus, to the Court, the Fourteenth Amendment only banned the states from depriving blacks of equal rights; it did not guarantee that all citizens, regardless of race, should receive equal economic privileges by the state. Any rights guaranteed by the Privileges or Immunities Clause were limited to areas controlled by the federal government, such as access to ports and waterways, the right to run for federal office, and certain rights affecting safety on the seas. Moreover, the Court held that the butchers bringing suit were not deprived of their property without due process of law because they could still earn a legal living in the area by slaughtering on the Crescent City Company grounds. Thus, the Court concluded that the Louisiana law was constitutional. Justice Stephen Johnson Field's dissent argued that the Fourteenth Amendment could not be construed as only protecting former slaves. Rather, he believed that it incorporated strands of common-law doctrine and needed to be interpreted outside the Civil War context. This position would later become widely accepted.

Granholm v. Heald (2005)

Facts of the case Michigan and New York laws allowed in-state wineries to directly ship alcohol to consumers but restricted the ability of out-of-state wineries to do so. In separate cases groups sued the states and argued the laws violated the U.S. Constitution's "dormant" commerce clause. The dormant commerce clause prohibited states from passing laws affecting interstate commerce, particularly laws favoring in-state business over out-of-state business. The states argued the laws were valid exercises of state power under the 21st Amendment, which ended federal Prohibition and allowed states to regulate alcohol importation. A federal district court ruled for Michigan. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ruled the Michigan law violated the dormant commerce clause and did not advance the core concerns of the 21st Amendment (such as temperance). A separate federal district court ruled against New York. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ruled the 21st Amendment allowed New York's law. Question Does a state law that allows in-state wineries to directly ship alcohol to consumers, but restricts the ability of out-of-state wineries to do so, violate the dormant commerce clause in light of the 21st Amendment? Conclusion Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court held that both states' laws violated the commerce clause by favoring in-state wineries at the expense of out-of-state wineries and did so without the authorization of the 21st Amendment. State authority to engage in such economic discrimination was not the purpose the 21st Amendment. Moreover, in modern cases, that amendment did not save state laws violating other provisions of the Constitution.

United States Trust v. New Jersey

Facts of the case New York and New Jersey had established a Port Authority to enhance water-bound business between the two states. In 1974, the states repealed a 1962 bond agreement which limited the Authority to administer commercial and passenger railroad subsidies. Question In repealing the 1962 agreement, did the states violate the Contract Clause? Conclusion The repeal violated the Constitution. Justice Blackmun argued that the states could have implemented a less drastic solution to encourage people to use commuter train services in lieu of driving their cars. (State leaders thought the increase in bridge fares that would occur with the agreement's repeal would cause this to occur.) Furthermore, since the need to facilitate mass transportation in the New York metropolitan area had been a concern long before 1962, the states could not justify their action as a response to unforeseen circumstances.

Davis v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury (1989)

Facts of the case Paul Davis, a resident of Michigan, worked for the federal government and upon retirement received benefits. Michigan law exempts state retirement benefits from state taxes. Smith unsuccessfully petitioned for a refund on the state taxes he paid on his federal retirement benefits. He then filed suit in the Michigan Court of Claims arguing that the state's tax policy violated 4 U.S.C. 111 by taxing benefits paid to federal employees but not to state employees. The court dismissed his suit and so did the Michigan Court of Appeals. Question Did Michigan violate federal law when it exempted state and local government pensions from taxation but levied taxes on federal government pensions? Conclusion Yes. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion for an 8-1 court. The Court emphasized the principles of intergovernmental tax immunity, which work to keep one part of the government from hindering the operations of another part. Section 111 allows a state to tax income paid by the federal government "if the taxation does not discriminate against the officer or employee because of the source of the pay or compensation." Because the Court found no "significant differences between the two classes [federal and state employees]," it held that the Michigan tax distinguished between employees solely on "the source of the pay."

U.S. v. E.C. Knight Company

Facts of the case The Congress passed the Sherman Anti-Trust Act in 1890 as a response to the public concern in the growth of giant corporations controlling transportation, industry, and commerce. The Act aimed to stop the concentration of wealth and economic power in the hands of the few. It outlawed "every contract, combination...or conspiracy, in restraint of trade" or interstate commerce, and it declared every attempt to monopolize any part of trade or commerce to be illegal. The E.C. Knight Company was such a combination controlling over 98 percent of the sugar-refining business in the United States. Question Did Congress exceed its constitutional authority under the Commerce Clause when it enacted the Sherman Anti-Trust Act? Conclusion The Act was constitutional but it did not apply to manufacturing. Manufacturing was not commerce, declared Fuller for the majority; the law did not reach the admitted monopolization of manufacturing (in this case, refining sugar). Although American Sugar had monopolized manufacturing, the Court found no violation of the Sherman Act because the acquisition of the Philadelphia refineries involved intrastate commerce. The trust did not lead to control of interstate commerce and so "affects it only incidentally and indirectly."

Pollock v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co. (1895)

Facts of the case The Constitution gave the states the power to impose direct taxation. The federal government could impose direct taxes as well, but only if those taxes were apportioned among the states in proportion to their representation in Congress. In this case, the Court examined the Income Tax Act of 1894. Question Was the income tax a direct tax in violation of the Constitution (Article I, Section 9)? Conclusion The Court held that the Act violated the Constitution since it imposed taxes on personal income derived from real estate investments and personal property such as stocks and bonds; this was a direct taxation scheme, not apportioned properly among the states. The decision was negated by the adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913. Justices John Marshall Harlan, Howell Edmunds Jackson, Edward Douglass White, and Henry Billings Brown dissented from the majority opinion. Justice White argued: "this court should consider itself compelled to go back to a long repudiated and rejected theory of the constitution, by which the government is deprived of an inherent attribute of being - a necessary power of taxation." Justice Brown wrote: "The decision involves nothing less than the surrender of the taxing power to the moneyed class."

Maryland v. Wirtz (1968)

Facts of the case The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (Act) requires every employer to pay each of his employees engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce a minimum hourly wage and a higher rate for exceeding a maximum number of hours per week. The Act excluded the federal government or any state government or political subdivision from the definition of "employer." In 1961, the Act was amended to include employees of any enterprise engaged in commerce or production of commerce, such as the operation of a hospital or any place that cares for the sick, a school, or an institution of higher education. The Act also removed the exemption for the state governments and their political subdivisions. The state of Maryland and twenty-seven other states sued W. Willard Wirtz, the Secretary of Labor, to prevent the enforcement of the Act as it applied to schools and hospitals operated by states or their subdivisions. The states argued this expansion of the Act was unconstitutional because it violated the Commerce Clause and conflicted with the Eleventh Amendment's protection of states' sovereign immunity. A three-judge district court held that the extension of the Act's coverage to commercial enterprise and state institutions did not exceed Congress' powers under the Commerce Clause because it did not transgress the sovereignty of the states. However, the court declined to consider the Eleventh Amendment issue. Maryland appealed directly to the Supreme Court. Question Does the expansion of the Fair Labor Standards Act to include schools and hospitals operated by states or their subdivisions violate the Commerce Clause and the Eleventh Amendment? Conclusion No. Justice John Marshall Harlan, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 6-2 majority. The Court held that the inclusion of commercial enterprises is constitutional because otherwise commercial enterprises that utilize substandard wages and excessive hours would have an advantage over other companies. Substandard labor conditions also lead to labor disputes and strikes, which Congress wanted to avoid. Furthermore, the Court held that the Act did not interfere with states' sovereignty by telling them how to perform medical and educational functions; rather it subjected a state that employs people performing such functions to the same restrictions as other employers whose activities affect commerce. Therefore, the Court held that minimum wage amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act extending to non-professional, non-executive and non-administrative employers of state public schools, hospitals, and related institutions was also constitutional. Justice William O. Douglas wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that bringing employees of state-owned enterprises under the auspices of the Fair Labor Standards Act was an invasion of state sovereignty. Requiring states to pay employees minimum wage would force them to increase taxes, lower the standard of services in these institutions, reduce services in other government activities, and refrain from entering into new governmental fields needed for social change. The Act therefore affected the states fiscally and was a clear invasion of state sovereignty. Justice Potter Stewart joined the dissent. Justice Thurgood Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

U.S. v. U.S. Shoe Corp. Intergovernmental

Facts of the case The Harbor Maintenance Tax (HMT) obligates exporters, importers, and domestic shippers to pay 0.125 percent of the value of the commercial cargo they ship through the Nation's ports. From April to June 1994, United States Shoe Corporation paid the HMT for articles it exported. U.S. Shoe then filed a protest with the Customs Service alleging that, to the extent the toll applies to exports, the HMT violates the Export Clause of the Constitution, which provides that "No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State." The Customs Service refuted the accusation, stating that the HMT is a statutorily mandated user fee. U.S. Shoe then sued for a refund in the Court of International Trade (CIT). Granting U.S. Shoe summary judgment, the CIT held that the HMT qualifies as a tax, reasoning that the tax is assessed ad valorem directly upon the value of the cargo itself, not upon any services rendered for the cargo. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed. Question Does the Harbor Maintenance Tax, as applied to goods loaded at U.S. ports for export, violate the Export Clause? Conclusion Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that "the [Harbor Maintenance Tax], which is imposed on an ad valorem basis, is not a fair approximation of services, facilities, or benefits furnished to the exporters, and therefore does not qualify as a permissible user fee." The Court noted that the Export Clause does not categorically bar Congress from imposing any tax on exports and that a charge designed as compensation for government-supplied services, facilities, or benefits would pass scrutiny.

Shreveport Rate Case (1914)

Facts of the case The Houston, East and West Texas Railroad and the Texas and Pacific Railway were railroad companies operating rail lines between Shreveport, Louisiana and points in Texas. The Texas Railroad Commission mandated that they charge higher rates on freight travelling between Louisiana and Texas than on freight travelling solely within Texas. The Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) found that the interstate rates were unreasonable and illegally discriminated against freight traffic originating in Shreveport. The ICC established maximum rates and ordered the railroads to fix their intrastate rate schedules. The railroads challenged the order in United States Commerce Court, alleging that the ICC did not have the power to regulate intrastate commerce. The Commerce Court upheld the ICC order. The railroads then appealed to the Supreme Court. Question Did the ICC have the power to regulate the railroads' intrastate rates? Conclusion Yes. In a 7-2 decision, the Court affirmed the Commerce Court and upheld the ICC order. Congress was granted the power to regulate interstate commerce, which it chose to do through the ICC. This power extended to "matters having such a close and substantial relation to interstate traffic," Justice Charles Evans Hughes wrote for the majority. Since the price discrimination adversely affected interstate commerce, "it is immaterial...that the discrimination arises from intrastate rates as compared with interstate rates." Therefore, the railroads' intrastate rates were subject to regulation and the ICC order was valid.

Michelin Tire v. Wages (1975) (State taxes on foreign commerce)

Facts of the case The Michelin Tire Corporation (MTC) operated a warehouse in Gwinnett County, Georgia, in which products imported from France and Nova Scotia were stored for later distribution. The County levied a nondiscriminatory ad valorem property tax on the goods (a percent of the property's value). MTC claimed that the contents of the warehouse were constitutionally free from state taxation because they were in their original containers. The county declared that the products were subject to the tax because they had been sorted and arranged for sale. Question Did the Gwinnett County tax violate the Import-Export Clause by taxing goods that maintained the character of imports? Conclusion The Court affirmed the decision of the Georgia Supreme Court, finding the tax to be valid. The Court stated that the Framers of the Constitution had adopted the Import-Export Clause to give the federal government a source of revenue and the superior position to regulate such foreign trade. This was to overcome the problems under the Articles of Confederation where states lacked uniformity in import regulation, burdening inter-state trade. The property tax was consistent with the Import-Export Clause because it did not (1) interfere with the Federal Government's regulation of foreign commerce (2) deprive the Federal Government of its exclusive right to revenues from imposts and duties on imports (3) interfere with the free flow of goods between the states. It taxed the use of the property and was not based on the origin of the goods.

Garcia v. San Antonio MTA (1985)

Facts of the case The San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority (SAMTA), the main provider of transportation in the San Antonio metropolitan area, claimed it was exempt from the minimum-wage and overtime requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act. SAMTA argued that it was providing a "traditional" governmental function, which exempted it from federal controls according to the doctrine of federalism established in National League of Cities v. Usery (1976). Joe G. Garcia, an employee of SAMTA, brought suit for overtime pay under Fair Labor Standards Act. Question Did principles of federalism make the San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority immune from the Fair Labor Standards Act? Conclusion In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that the guiding principles of federalism established in National League of Cities v. Usery were unworkable and that SAMTA was subject to Congressional legislation under the Commerce Clause. The Court found that rules based on the subjective determination of "integral" or "traditional" governmental functions provided little or no guidance in determining the boundaries of federal and state power. The Court argued that the structure of the federal system itself, rather than any "discrete limitations" on federal authority, protected state sovereignty.

Seminole Tribe v. Florida

Facts of the case The Seminole Tribe brought suit against the State of Florida for violating the good faith negotiations requirement of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA). Under the IGRA, the Tribe may engage in gaming (i.e., casino gambling) activities subject to Florida's good faith regulations. Florida moved to dismiss the Tribe's action, alleging that the lawsuit violated Florida's sovereign immunity. On appeal from the District Court's denial of Florida's motion to dismiss the lawsuit, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Eleventh Amendment shielded Florida from federal suit and that under Ex Parte Young, the Tribe may not enforce its right to good faith negotiations by naming Florida's governor as a party to the suit. Question Does the Eleventh Amendment provide Florida with immunity from the Tribe lawsuit? Conclusion Yes. In a 5-to-4 decision, The Court held that Congress did intend to abrogate states' sovereign immunity under the IGRA but that the Indian Commerce Clause (and by implication the Commerce Clause) did not give Congress that power. Under the Eleventh Amendment, all states are regarded as sovereign entities. Such sovereignty inherently implies that states may not be sued by parties without their consent, even if they are given authority to regulate those parties' activities through receipt of federal funds. Finally, Ex Parte Young's ruling does not justify the Tribe's suit against Florida's governor in light of certain IGRA provisions which specifically prohibit such an action.

Steward Machine Co. v. Davis (1937)

Facts of the case The Steward Machine Company challenged the validity of a tax imposed by the Social Security Act of 1935. The Act imposed a tax on employers of eight or more employees to fund unemployment compensation. If a state had established an approved compensation plan, however, the taxpayer could credit up to 90% of the federal tax paid to the state unemployment fund. Steward argued that with the Act, Congress surpassed its powers outlined in the Tenth Amendment. Question Did the Act arbitrarily impose taxes in violation of the Fifth Amendment or subvert principles of federalism? Conclusion In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that the tax under the Social Security Act was a constitutional exercise of congressional power. Writing for the majority, Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo found that the tax did not coerce the states in contravention of the Tenth Amendment. The Court underscored the high rate of unemployment and poorly performing economy in concluding that the tax would benefit the general welfare. According to the majority, the Act would benefit both the states and the federal government. The majority rejected the argument that the Act provision was void as involving an unconstitutional attempt to coerce the States to adopt unemployment compensation legislation approved by the Federal Government. In dissenting opinions, Justices McReynolds, Sutherland, Van Devanter, and Butler viewed the Social Security Act as a Congressional overreach. These dissenters came to be known collectively as the Four Horsemen, the conservative members of the Court who opposed President Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal agenda.

Champion v. Ames

Facts of the case The defendants in the case were arrested and convicted under an Act of Congress of 1895 that made it illegal to send or conspire to send lottery tickets across state lines. Question Did the transport of lottery tickets by independent carriers constitute "commerce" that Congress could regulate under the Commerce Clause? Conclusion In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that lottery tickets were indeed "subjects of traffic," and that independent carriers may be regulated under the Commerce Clause. The Court emphasized the broad discretion Congress enjoys in regulating commerce, noting that this power "is plenary, is complete in itself, and is subject to no limitations except such as may be found in the Constitution." The Court argued that Congress was merely assisting those states that wished to protect public morals by prohibiting lotteries within their borders.

Lochner v. New York (1905)

Facts of the case The state of New York enacted a statute known as the Bakeshop Act, which forbid bakers to work more than 60 hours a week or 10 hours a day. Lochner was accused of permitting an employee to work more than 60 hours in one week. The first charge resulted in a fine of $25, and a second charge a few years later resulted in a fine of $50. While Lochner did not challenge his first conviction, he appealed the second, but was denied in state court. Before the Supreme Court, he argued that the Fourteenth Amendment should have been interpreted to contain the freedom to contract among the rights encompassed by substantive due process. Question Does the Bakeshop Act violate the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? Conclusion The Court invalidated the New York law. The majority maintained that the statute interfered with the freedom of contract, and thus the Fourteenth Amendment's right to liberty afforded to employer and employee. The Court further held that the New York law failed the rational basis test for determining whether government action is constitutional. The majority reasoned that the Bakeshop Act had no rational basis because long working hours did not dramatically undermine the health of employees, and baking is not particularly dangerous. Broadly interpreting state authority to regulate under its police powers, Justice Harlan in his dissent articulated reasoning that would inform later decisions in the post-Lochner era. Rather than requiring the government to prove that a law had a rational basis, he would require the party challenging the law to prove that the test was not met. (This is the current rule.)

Quill Corp. v. North Dakota (1992)(Stevens, 8-1)

Facts of the case Through its Tax Commissioner, the state of North Dakota filed an action in state court to force the Quill Corporation, an out-of-state mail-order office equipment retailer, to charge a North Dakota use tax on Quill merchandise to be used within the state. The state court ruled in favor of Quill, grounding its decision on Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of Illinois, 386 U.S. 753. In this 1967 case, the United States Supreme Court found a similar Illinois statute to be in violation of both the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed, basing its decision on a rejection of Bellas Hess in light of the "tremendous social, economic, commercial, and legal innovations" since it had been decided. Question 1) Had Bellas Hess become obsolete? 2) Was North Dakota's imposition of a use tax upon the merchandise of the Quill Corporation in compliance with the Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause? Conclusion No and No. In a majority opinion authored by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court admitted that, over time, subsequent cases have allowed for more flexibility than Bellas Hess. Nevertheless, the Court maintained that this evolution does not suggest a rejection of Bellas Hess. The Court also determined that North Dakota's imposition of the use tax did not constitute a breach of the Due Process Clause because the Quill Corporation had sufficient contact with the state's residents and benefited from the state's tax revenue. However, it found the use tax to be unconstitutional because it interfered with interstate commerce, rendering it a violation of the Commerce Clause. Consequently, the Court reversed the North Dakota Supreme Court's decision by ruling in favor of the Quill Corporation.

Heart of Atlanta Motel v. US (1964)

Facts of the case Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbade racial discrimination by places of public accommodation if their operations affected commerce. The Heart of Atlanta Motel in Atlanta, Georgia, refused to accept Black Americans. The government sought to enjoin the motel from discriminating on the basis of race under Title II. Question Did Congress, in passing Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, exceed its Commerce Clause powers by depriving places of public accommodation of the right to choose their own customers? Conclusion The Commerce Clause extends the anti-discrimination provisions in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to hotels that host travelers from outside the state. In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Clark, the Court held the government could enjoin the motel from discriminating on the basis of race under the Commerce Clause. Since the motel was positioned near Interstates 75 and 85 and received most of its business from outside Georgia, this showed that it had an impact on interstate commerce, which is all that is needed to justify Congress in exercising the Commerce Clause power. Justices Black, Douglas, and Goldberg concurred in a separate opinion.

Nebbia v. New York

Facts of the case To combat the effects of the Great Depression, New York adopted a Milk Control Law in 1933 which established a board to set a minimum retail price for milk. It set the price of a quart of milk at nine cents. Nebbia, a store owner, violated the law by offering two quarts of milk and a five-cent loaf of bread for a total of 18 cents. Question Did the regulation violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? Conclusion Following a lengthy discussion of the Due Process Clause, the Court held that since the price controls were not "arbitrary, discriminatory, or demonstrably irrelevant" to the policy adopted by the legislature to promote the general welfare, the regulation was constitutional. In an opinion authored by Justice Owen Roberts, the Court reasoned that regulations are not an inappropriate way to serve the public interest. When industry is particularly tied into a public interest, it is more subject to the state police powers. Courts may not override policy decisions by states in this area on the grounds of due process unless rational basis review is not satisfied. Rational basis review, which is used for economic regulations, requires that the law is not unreasonable or arbitrary and also that there is a reasonable relationship between the law and the interest that it serves. Price regulations are not per se beyond the framework of due process. Justice McReynolds wrote a concurring opinion, which was joined by Justices Van Devanter, Sutherland, and Butler.

Roger Taney

He was Chief Justice for the Dred Scott case. A decision was made on March 6, 1857. Roger Taney ruled against Dred Scott. Scott was suing for freedom because of his long residence in free territory. He was denied freedom because he was property and his owner could take him into any territory and legally hold him as a slave. This court ruling was major cause in starting the Civil War.

Schechter Poultry Corp v. US

Facts of the case Under the National Industrial Recovery Act, Congress allowed the President to regulate certain industries by distributing authority to develop codes of conduct among business groups and boards in those industries. The Act did not provide standards for the President or the business groups in implementing its objectives. When Schechter Poultry Corp. was indicted for violating a business code governing the poultry industry in New York City, it argued that the law was an unconstitutional violation of the non-delegation doctrine. Question Did Congress unconstitutionally delegate legislative power to the President by giving him power to regulate certain industries without also providing guiding standards? Conclusion In an opinion authored by Chief Justice Hughes, the unanimous Court held that the Act was "without precedent" and was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. The President cannot be allowed to have unbridled control to make whatever laws he believes to be necessary to achieve a certain goal. The law did not establish rules or standards to evaluate industrial activity, meaning Congress failed to provide the necessary guidelines for the implementation of this functionally legislative process. Justice Cardozo wrote a concurring opinion, which was joined by Justice Stone.

NLRB v. Jones & McLaughlin Steel (1937)

Facts of the case With the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) of 1935 (an act that allowed unions) Congress determined that labor-management disputes were directly related to the flow of interstate commerce and, thus, could be regulated by the national government. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) charged Jones & Laughlin Steel Co. the country's fourth largest steel producer, with discriminating against employees who were union members. Question Was the NLRA consistent with the Commerce Clause? Conclusion In an opinion written by Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, the majority found that companies cannot discriminate against employees for exercising their fundamental right to unionize. The Court upheld the Act, reasoning that it was narrowly constructed so as to regulate industrial activities which had the potential to restrict interstate commerce. The majority stated that any significant effect (direct or indirect) on interstate commerce allows Congress to regulate an activity under the Commerce Clause. While the manufacturing process or relationships between labor and management may not have a direct impact on the flow of goods, they have an aggregate impact on commerce. In this case, the potential secession of manufacturing activity due to conflicts between management and labor could potentially impede interstate commerce. However, Hughes carefully limited the opinion to exclude situations in which an activity had such an inconsequential or remote impact on interstate commerce that it exclusively impacted local matters. In dissent, Justice McReynolds questioned Congress's enhanced power under the Commerce Clause.

Springer v. US (1881)

Facts: William M. Springer had filed a Federal income tax return for the tax year 1865 showing $50,798 in income and $4,799 in income tax, but refused to pay the tax. Springer's income was from two sources: income in his profession as an Attorney at law, and interest income on United States bonds. After Springer's failure to pay the tax, the Federal tax collector advertised Springer's properties for sale to satisfy the tax liability. In 1867 and 1874, the tax collector sold two pieces of real estate owned by Springer in Springfield, Illinois (one of which was Springer's residence), apparently without physically seizing the properties or ejecting Springer from the properties. The properties were deeded by the tax collector to the United States government. One of the deeds recited the statutory authority for the sale as being an Act of Congress of "July 1, 1862" as amended by an Act of "March 30, 1864." In 1874, the government filed a lawsuit of ejectment against Springer with respect to the previously sold properties. In the ejectment action, Springer challenged the constitutionality of the 1864 Act. Issues: Springer's challenge was based on the contention that the income tax imposed by the statute was a direct tax not apportioned among the states according to the population of each state under Article I of the Constitution. To support his contention that the tax was direct, Springer cited the definitions of direct taxes by John Stuart Mill, Adam Smith, and others. Springer made various other arguments, one of which was that although there was an Act of Congress bearing the date "July 1, 1862," there was no such Act that had been amended on "March 30, 1864," the amendment date cited in one of the deeds. Springer indicated that the statute in question may have been the Act dated June 30, 1864, as amended by an Act dated March 3, 1865, and argued that if this was correct, the 1864 Act did not authorize the sale of the real estate by the Federal tax collector. Conclusion: In an opinion written by Justice Swayne, The Supreme Court agreed with Springer that the recital of the Act of Congress in the deed was incorrect, and that the Act of Congress dated "July 1, 1862" had not been amended on March 30, 1864. The Court stated that the statute in question was actually the Act of June 30, 1864 (see Revenue Act of 1864), as amended by the Act of March 3, 1865. The Court rejected Springer's argument that the 1864 Act did not authorize the sale by the tax collector. The Court then upheld the unapportioned income tax imposed under the 1864 Act, rejecting William Springer's argument that the income tax was a "direct tax" within the meaning of Article I.

Adkins v. Children's Hospital

Facts: Minimum wage laws for women was established in Washington DC. The Hospital refused to comply because they believed it violated the contract clause. Issue - May the government impose minimum wage requirements for women and children? Holding - No, such a regulation is a violation of the due process clause, as it denies the fundamental freedom of contract Summary - The 1923 Supreme Court case that voided a minimum wage for women workers in the District of Columbia, reversing many of the gains that had been achieved through the groundbreaking decision in Muller v. Oregon.

Hamdi v. Rusfeld (2004) (O'Connor)

Facts: Yaser Hamdi was a U.S. citizen residing in Saudi Arabia. After 9/11, sweeps in Afghanistan led to the arrest and interrogation of Hamdi, who was later transferred to Guantanamo Bay under the AUMF where he was denied access to counsel, formal charges, court proceedings, or the right to communicate with anyone. Under the AUMF, the administration believed that he could be held this way indefinitely. The Defendant's father filed a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his son was a relief worker in Afghanistan. The government, though presenting little evidence, claimed that he was part of a Taliban unit and had been trained to fight. The government won at the Circuit Court of Appeals, which held that their determination was limited to whether the government had acted in accordance with its wartime powers under the AUMF or other authority. This appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court ensued. Arguments for Hamdi: - The suspension of habeas corpus is an extremely limited power which is vested in Congress alone and that power cannot be delegated. - There is no authority for the executive branch to detain citizens indefinitely. It has only a limited authority to detain citizens as necessary within a war zone or hostile area. Once removed, the government is without authority to suspend due process or other constitutional guarantees. - Under federal law (18 USC 4001), no citizen may be detained indefinitely except by act of Congress. For Rumsfeld (U.S.): • During times of war, the President has plenary authority to detain enemy combatants whether citizens or not. • Courts must defer to the President's determination that an individual is an enemy combatant. • The AUMF authorizes the detention of citizens and non-citizens alike. Issue: Does the Executive have authority to detain citizens who qualify as "enemy combatants"? If so, what due process is owed to them? Holding: Although Congress may have impliedly authorized the detention of enemy combatants, due process demands that a citizen being held be given a meaningful opportunity to contest their detention before a neutral decision maker. Reasoning: • The Court agrees that the AUMF provides sufficient authorization to detain enemy combatants - those engaged in supporting hostile forces. • Congress' grant of all "necessary and appropriate force" under the AUMF was sufficient authority for the president to detain those involved in Al-Qaeda or the Taliban. • Detention is necessary and recognized during war to prevent the return of combatants to battle. • Court holds that a citizen may be considered an enemy combatant if they are engage in supporting enemy forces, citing Ex parte Quirin. • The Court agrees, however, that under the circumstances indefinite detention might be a lifetime of detention. • Although the rules of war prevent detention from extending beyond hostilities, there is every possibility that these hostilities may not end. • The court holds that the rules of war allow detention for the duration but if this war ends up being so fundamentally different than prior wars (that informed the rules of war), the Court might have to revisit those underlying principles. • The Court distinguishes Milligan, as an individual who was not involved in armed conflict or hostilities. • Having determined that Hamdi was legally detained, the question is what due process is owed to him, if any. • The Court reaffirms the fact that ongoing detention without the availability of habeas corpus allows unchecked use of power. The Court therefore states that due process is required for this kind of open-ended detention. But what kind? • The Court seeks a balance between individual rights and the government's interest in waging war (and the extent to which extensive due process would interfere with the military operation). • Court holds that the following due process is required: o A chance to receive notice of the facts establishing his enemy combatant status. o The opportunity to rebut those facts before a neutral decision maker. • But the court recognizes that, in light of the ongoing military action, the process afforded may have to be adjusted to allow hearsay evidence (statements made out of court but submitted to prove the claim), to potentially allow a presumption that the government is correct, etc. In short, the court would allow for the difficulties of waging war. • The Court rejects any argument that the judiciary should limit its inquiry into the broader scheme for trying these matters as opposed to the individual cases. The court, in this regard, holds that a state of war is not a blank check to trample constitutional rights and that the Court must continue to hear individual habeas corpus petitions as a check on that power. • On remand, Hamdi is entitled to counsel (which he has been receiving) and an opportunity to make his case, but the court also indicates that case may be before a military tribunal.

Due Process

Fair treatment through the normal judicial system, especially as a citizen's entitlement.

Wilson v. Black-Bird Creek Marsh Company (1829)

HisFacts of the case The state of Delaware authorized the Blackbird Creek Marsh Company to construct a dam spanning the Blackbird Creek. Willson, the licensed owner of a sailing vessel, was travelling on the Creek and broke through the dam. The Company successfully sued Willson for trespassing and obtained a court order for Willson to pay damages. Willson then brought the case to the Supreme Court. Question Did Delaware's authorization of the building of the dam unconstitutionally infringe upon Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause? Conclusion In a unanimous opinion, the Court held that the Act's interference with the navigation of the Blackbird Creek was "an affair between the government of Delaware and its citizens," and was not in conflict with the Commerce Clause. The Court found that Congress had taken no actions with which the Delaware authorization could conflict: "We do not think that the Act. . .can. . .be considered as repugnant to the power to regulate commerce in its dormant state, or as being in conflict with any law passed on the subject." This was known as the dormant commerce clause when states may regulate commerce so long as federal government has not regulated that commerce AND so long as state regulations do not harm interstate commerce or frustrate federal aims (legislation, interests, etc.)

Questions raised by the war on terror

How far executive authority extends to take action without Congressional approval? To what degree might the President suspend constitutional protections in time of war? (sound familiar) Were there limits on the use of executive orders? After 9/11 and with the approval of Congress through an Authorized Use of Military Force act (AUMF), President Bush sent troops into Iraq and Afghanistan, entered an order detaining "enemy combatants" at Guantanamo Bay and restricted their constitutional rights (intending to detain them for the duration of hostilities), adopted the use of military commissions (sound familiar), and denying habeas corpus (sound familiar). To justify this action, the executive argued that it had plenary authority during war under Art. II. Remember that this argument was rejected by the Court in Ex parte Milligan. This act also violated federal law denying the right to detain citizens without an act of Congress. The President felt that the AUMF also authorized his action. This theory was tested in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.

Constitutional War Powers

How is war power balanced between the legislative and executive branches? - The enumerate powers of war are divided between the two branches. Congress can declare war, but the President can control the direction of war and lead the military. Under what circumstances may the President act unilaterally? - Yes, to achieve some foreign policy the president may use the military without a declaration of war - The War Powers Act empowered the President to take short term military action, but limited the President to obtain Congressional Approval after the short term had ended Are the present Constitutional provisions concerning "war" still viable and helpful in resolving disputes over the use of Executive Power? -

Northwest Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park (1878)

In 1867 the Illinois legislature chartered the company for a term of fifty years to manufacture fertilizer, from dead animals, outside the city limits of Chicago. The nearby village of Hyde Park regarded the company's factory as an unendurable nuisance, injurious to the public health. Immediately before the legislature chartered the company it empowered the village to abate public nuisances excepting the company. The village passed an ordinance prohibiting the existence of any company engaged in any offensive or unwholesome business within a distance of one mile. The ordinance put the fertilizer company out of business. It invoked its chartered rights against the ordinance, which it claimed violated the contract clause. On the basis of past decisions the Court should have accepted the company's argument, holding that the village had no authority to lessen its factory. By a vote of 7-1, however, the Supreme Court ruled that the village had validly exercised its police power to protect the public health. Justice noah swayne for the Court declared that the company's charter must be construed narrowly and held that it provided no exemption from liability or nuisances. Swayne quoted from the decision earlier that term in boston beer co. v. massachusetts in which the Court announced the doctrine of inalienable police power. Both cases had the result of weakening the contract clause's traditional protection of chartered rights.

Over the course of the semester, we have discussed explicit (or enumerated) powers and implicit (or implied) powers of each branch of government. For each branch of government - the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Branches - describe an enumerated power and an implied power possessed by that branch of government. For each power, identify a case, its holding, and its reasoning, being sure to explain why the Court found the power to be explicit or implicit. To be clear, this question requires you to discuss 6 separate cases

In the judicial branch, the most powerful implied power is that of judicial review and this was established in the case of Marbury v. Madison. A dispute was at hand over the delivery of commissions from James Madison to William Marbury who was recently appointed to Justice of the Peace. The court actually refused to deliver an opinion on the dispute because they did not have jurisdiction and found that the Judiciary Act of 1789 which extended the Court's original jurisdiction to hear this case was unconstitutional. And thus, judicial review was established as an implied power of the judicial branch needed to effectively uphold the constitution. An enumerated power of the judicial branch is found in Article III, Section 2, Clause 1, which grants federal courts the power to only hear disputes that fall under the "case or controversy" requirement. This can be seen in DeFunis v. Odegaard where the a young man sued a law school for denying him acceptance, but the Supreme Court held that the case no longer met the "case or controversy" requirement because the law school offered him acceptance and the issue at hand had become moot. An implied power of the legislative branch is the power to charter a federal bank which was granted by the necesssary and proper clause and affirmed in McCulloch v. Maryland where the Court held that although it is not an enumerated power, the power of the federal government to establish banks in the US free from state taxation is appropriate and legitimate An enumerated power of the legislative branch is found in the taxing and spending clause of the Constitution (Article 1, Section 8) and was affirmed in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius where the court held that the Affordable Care Act's individual mandate was constitutional because Congress had the power under the taxing and spending clause to issue this tax. Especially since it was not so severe as to be coercive. An implied power of the Executive Branch is the power of the president, through the attorney general, to a appoint bodyguards for Supreme Court Justices if necessary. It is the duty of the Executive Branch to ensure that laws are faithfully executed and so it became an implied power of the executive to take measures that might prevent these laws from being executed. In the case of In re Neagle, the Court held that the president was within his rights as head of the executive branch to have the Attorney General appoint Neagle as a bodyguard for a Supreme Court Justice and Neagle was not to be convicted for killing a man he believed to be a threat to the justice because he was an official bodyguard. An explicit power of the Executive Branch is the power to pardon found in Article 2, Section 2 which then President Ford attempted to exercise in Murphy v. Ford. Ford wanted to issue a pardon for former President, Richard Nixon, after the Watergate scandal and although Ford would have been within his rights to Pardon Nixon. Nixon was not charged with anything and the Court rejected the notion of a peremptory pardon.

Application of the Commerce Clause to Civil Rights

In the late 50's and early 60's, black Americans faced discrimination by being denied jobs, lodging, and services from businesses The 14th amendment could not interfere because it only protected people from GOVERNMENT ACTION (not the actions of private businesses) Therefore, the Court and Congress had to focus more on the commerce aspect of businesses denying services to individuals on the basis of race The Civil Rights Act of 1964 gave us more authority to regulate these businesses and if they can deny service on the basis of race If it has an impact on interstate commerce

What can Congress regulate under the commerce clause?

Instrumentalities of Interstate Commerce - Yes (Gibbons, ICC) Intrastate Business that Affects Interstate Commerce - Yes (Shreveport) Items in the Stream of Commerce (Items that are actually moving from state to state) - Yes (Swift, Stafford) Items at the Point of Manufacture - No (E.C. Knight, Hamer) Items at the Point of Delivery - No (Schechter) If the federal government has not regulated, the state may regulate (Wilson v. Black-Bird Marsh) The court will allow greater extension of federal interstate commerce clause authroity when regulating things that affect public morals (Hoke, Champion)

Substantive Due Process

Judicial interpretation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments' due process clauses that protects citizens from arbitrary or unjust state or federal laws.

Economic Liberties and Individual Rights

Sources of Constitutional Protection - The Contract Clause = Article 1, Section 10, no state shall pass any law impairing contract. (evolution from Marshall Court to Taney Court in the mid 1830's. Move from broad federal authority to impair contacts to a state's rights) - 14th amendment and substantive due process - 5th amendment and the takings clause - The government may take property, so long as you are provided with due process of law Clash between vested individual rights and community interests -

The New Era of Commerce Clause Jurisprudence

The Darby, Wickard, and West Coast Hotel cases all signal a new era of commerce clause jurisprudence Ways that U.S. v. Darby brought about a New Era: - First, the power of congress over interstate commerce is not confined to interstate relations and can be used for intrastate commerce if it has an effect on interstate commerce. - Second, for Congress to effectively regulate interstate commerce, it must be allowed to regulate intrastate commerce that has an influence on interstate commerce (This vastly expanded their reach). - Third, the Court declared that Congress can decide if the regulation on intrastate commerce effects interstate commerce and pass laws accordingly - Finally, it flipped a switch in judicial philosophy from a power to the states approach to a power to the federal government approach.

Roosevelt's Court Packing Scheme and the President's Battle

The Judicial Procedures Reform Bill of 1937[1] (frequently called the "court-packing plan") was a legislative initiative proposed by U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt to add more justices to the U.S. Supreme Court in order to obtain favorable rulings regarding New Deal legislation that the Court had ruled unconstitutional.The central provision of the bill would have granted the President power to appoint an additional Justice to the U.S. Supreme Court, up to a maximum of six, for every member of the court over the age of 70 years and 6 months. It ultimately failed due to its unpopularity

Who holds power over Foreign Affairs

The President and Congress each hold powers for different aspects of foreign affairs The Importance of the Enumerated v. Implied Powers Distinction in Foreign Affairs - Enumerate powers are explicitly granted in the Constitution and implied powers are those that are implied in the Constitution or necessary to perform the enumerate powers Constitutionally Granted Powers to the President over Foreign Affairs - Appoint diplomats and ambassadors (can also receive ambassadors) - Command the military - Make treaties Implied Powers to the President over Foreign Affairs - Because the president can receive ambassadors he has an implied power to meet with foreign ambassadors and have communications - Control over the Air Force and Marines since he had the enumerate power to control the military Constitutionally Granted Powers to Congress over Foreign Affairs - Advise and consent on treaties - Declare war - Regulating foreign commerce - Create immigration policy - Punish piracy - Maintain a navy and pay for armed forces Implied Powers of Congress over Foreign Affairs - To draft soldiers into the military - To regulate and limit immigration Recent Examples of the Use of Power - Congress is talking about pulling troops out of Syria

Intergovernmental Tax Immunity

The doctrine that federal and state governments may not levy taxes on one another Is the state actually being taxed? If those doing business with the state are being taxed, does it effect the state? Note: McCulloch v. Maryland, though prophetic in its analysis has been eviscerated to some degree

Explain how the Court's understanding of the commerce clause has changed from the late 19th century to the present. More specifically, how has the Court's understanding of the regulation of employment under the Interstate Commerce Clause changed over time, and what is the Court's present position on the commerce clause as a basis or justification for federal action with regard to employment? Be sure to cite and discuss at least 5 cases.

The interpretation of the commerce clause has changed radically over the last century. In 1895, the ruling in U.S. v. E.C. Knight Company found that Congress could not instill regulations that take place at the point of manufacture as these do not impact interstate commerce and do not fall under the commerce clause. In 1918, the Court held in Hammer v. Dagenhart that Congress also lacked the power to regulate labor at the production level, specifically child labor, since it was not an interstate activity, but rather was intrastate. The power to regulate this labor that this was a power reserved to the states under the 10th amendment. In 1937, the court eased up on its interpretation of the commerce clause and found, in the case of National Labor Relations Board v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corporation, that labor-management disputes do impact interstate commerce, and therefore fall under Congress' power to regulate. In 1941, The Court's decision in U.S. v. Darby overturned Hammer v. Dagenhart's decision and found that labor could be regulated by Congress because these regulation powers by states could be used to give states an unfair advantage over other states which would impact interstate commerce. The goal was now to promote uniformity in these labor regulations in all states to prevent unfair advantages. In 1976, the Court heard of the case of National League of Cities v. Usery and although Darby allowed the regulation of labor on the private sector, the Usery case would hold the position that states reserved the right to regulate the labor and wages of their own state employees under the notion of state sovereignty The Usery decision was overturned in 1985 which the case of Garcia v. San Antonia MTA where the court held the ruling in the Usery case made federalism unworkable and that state sovereignty could still be protected even if Congress was regulating the labor and wages of state employees. To this day, Congress still maintains a large amount of authority when it comes to regulating under the commerce clause. Darby was a major turning point for Congress' regulating authority and it is now shown that Congress may regulate labor in states so long as it believes that it will have an impact on interstate commerce. This has led to the passage of the federal minimum wage laws and many other federal labor laws.

Tax Immunity Doctrine

The principle of intergovernmental immunity was established by the U.S. Supreme Court in McCulloch v. Md., 17 U.S. 316 (U.S. 1819) wherein it was held that states may not regulate property or operations of the federal government. This doctrine is frequently applied in taxation cases. For example, in Davis v. Michigan Dep't of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803 (U.S. 1989), the court held that Michigan Income Tax Act violated the principles of intergovernmental tax immunity by favoring retired state employees over retired federal employees. In this case state of Michigan violated law when it exempted state and local government pensions from taxation but levied taxes on federal government pensions.

What was the impact of Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer (1952) on today's executive branch?

This case says important things about the limits of presidential authority in an age in which the last three presidents, including the current president, seek to exercise more extensive executive power

U.S. v. Darby (1941)

This is known as the major dividing case between the time where the court refused to allow Congress to regulate many intrastate labor and the time where the Court allowed Congress to regulate intrastate labor. (Pre-Darby v. Post-Darby) Facts of the case In 1938, Congress passed the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) to regulate many aspects of employment, including minimum wages, maximum weekly hours, and child labor. When a lumber manufacturer, Darby, shipped lumber out of state, he was arrested for violating the FLSA. His charges were dismissed because the federal district court found that FLSA was unconstitutional. The court reasoned that the FLSA's potential effects on intrastate activities violated the Commerce Clause. Question Was the Act a legitimate exercise of Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce? Conclusion The unanimous Court upheld the FLSA. Relying heavily on the Court's decision in Gibbons v. Ogden (1824), Justice Stone affirmed the constitutional power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce, which "can neither be enlarged nor diminished by the exercise or non-exercise of state power." The Court held that the purpose of the FLSA was to prevent states from using substandard labor practices to their own economic advantage by interstate commerce. Congress acted with proper authority in outlawing substandard labor conditions since they have a significant impact on interstate commerce. Overturned Hammer v. Dagenhardt (1918)

Nullification Act Crisis (November 1832)

Took place during Taney Court Confrontation between the state of South Carolina and the federal government in 1832-33 over the South Carolina's attempt to declare the federal Tariffs of 1828 and 1832 null and void. The resolution of the nullification crisis in favour of the federal government helped to undermine the nullification doctrine, the constitutional theory that upheld the right of states to nullify federal acts within their boundaries. Response of Andrew Jackson (Who believed strongly in state's rights) - Tariff Act amended - Jackson threatens Supreme Court - Jackson appoints Roger Taney Taney as a Jacksonian Democrat - Balancing state's rights - States and the Federal Government as Twin Sovereigns - Broader Reading of the 10th amendment - Continuing Issues with the Missouri Compromise which was eventually repealed in 1854

The Roller Coaster Ride of Due Process (1898-1923) Holden v. Hardy (1898)

the Supreme Court ruled "states (Utah) may limit the number of hours workers are allowed to work in hazardous industries."