Criminal Process

Navarette v California

a. Facts i. On August 23, 2008, the Mendocino County dispatch center received a call from a Humboldt County dispatcher with the information that a silver Ford F150 pickup truck had run an unidentified vehicle off the road at mile marker 88 on southbound Highway 1. The original caller had also provided the license plate number of the pickup truck in question. The dispatch center broadcast that information to officers in the area, and two separate officers soon reported seeing the vehicle and began following it. The officers pulled the vehicle over, and while requesting information from the driver, smelled marijuana. During a search of the vehicle, the officers found four large bags of marijuana in the truck bed. The occupants of the vehicle, D and D2, were arrested for transportation of marijuana and possession of marijuana for sale. ii. At trial, the defendants moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the traffic stop and argued that the evidence did not establish a reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing to justify the stop. The state argued that the anonymous tip combined with the officers' observations of details that matched the tip constituted reasonable suspicion of the alleged reckless driving. The magistrate judge denied the motion. After the defendants petitioned for a review of this decision and were denied by both the California Court of Appeals for the First District, Division Five and the California Supreme Court, the defendants pled guilty. The California Court of Appeals for the First District, Division Five affirmed. b. Issue i. Sufficiently reliable informant? ii. Does the Fourth Amendment require an officer who received information regarding drunken or reckless driving to independently corroborate the behavior before stopping the vehicle? c. Holding i. 5-4, no d. Reasoning i. The Court held that, under the totality of the circumstances, the officer had a reasonable suspicion that the driver was intoxicated, which justified the traffic stop. Because the reasonable suspicion standard allows an officer to rely on information beyond what that officer personally observed, a stop based on an anonymous tip does not violate the Fourth Amendment as long as the officer had reason to believe the information contained in the tip was reliable. In this case, the information came in the form of a call from the driver who had been run off the road, which means that the caller claimed eyewitness knowledge of the incident. Additionally, the timeline of the events suggest that the call was made almost immediately after the incident, so the caller presumably would not have had sufficient time to concoct a story. The Court held that, because the anonymous tip had these indicators of reliability and reported driving behavior consistent with reports of drunk driving that resulted in a car being run off the road, the officer had sufficient reasonable suspicion and did not need to observe the alleged behavior at length. ii. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Antonin Scalia wrote that the aspects of the anonymous tip that the majority opinion argues make it reliable do not in fact make the information trustworthy enough to stand uncorroborated. Justice Scalia argued that the supposed eyewitness status of the caller could be afforded to anyone who saw the truck and wanted the driver to be pulled over and that any time at all between the alleged incident and the phone call allowed the caller to create a false story. Since the caller only reported a specific instance of unsafe driving—forcing another car off the road—there was no reason for the police officer to suspect ongoing drunk driving. When the officers observed the car and still did not see any indication of impaired driving, the reliability of the anonymous tip was further undermined, and there was no reasonable suspicion for the officer to conduct a traffic stop. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Justice Sonia Sotomayor, and Justice Elena Kagan joined in the dissent.

Us v Hensley

Facts: The D was suspected to the driver of a getaway car in an armed robbery. That same car was pulled over a week later. one of the passengers was a convicted felon and the officer noticed the butt of a gun protruding from under the car. Issue: Does the recognition of a suspected felon constitute the stop of a vehicle? Holding: yes, if police have reasonable suspicion that a person they encounter was involved in or is wanted in connection with a completed felony, then a terry stop may be made to investigate that suspicion

US v Mandenhall

Facts: D arrived in Detroit from LA on a commercial airline flight and was the last to deplane. 2 DEA agents watched her and said that she fit a "drug courier profile" because she was arriving from LA, a known origin point for drugs; she was the last to deplane, appeared very nervous, and scanned the whole area; didn't claim any luggage at baggage claim; and changed airlines for her flight out of Detroit. The agents approached her and asked for her ticket and ID; she gave it to them, and they saw the ticket was under a different name. The agents returned her ticket and ID and then asked if she would accompany them to an office for further questioning; she agreed. In the office, the agents asked her if they could search her and her purse; she said "Go ahead"; a female agent then conducted a strip search which resulted in finding heroin. Issue: Was she seized? What is the Mandenhall test? Was an airline passenger "seized" under the 4th Amdt. when two DEA agents confronted her upon deplaning and asked for her ticket and ID and then asked if she would accompany them to an office for further questioning? Holding 5-4 No, consensual encounter. She gave valid consent, told her she could say no. Reasoning: Show of physical force or authority. Restrain movement, display of weapons, use of language or a tone of voice, did not summon her to them. Given the circumstances surrounding the incident A reasonable (innocent) person would feel free to leave - the Mandenhall Test. Terry v. Ohio. Taking physical hold of terry and spinning him around was seizure

Florida v bostick

Facts: D was a passenger on a bus from Miami to Atlanta when the bus stopped in Ft. Lauderdale to pick up additional passengers. 2 agents boarded the bus in bright green jackets with one holding a zippered pouch containing a gun. The agents approached D, asked for his ID and ticket, and then asked for permission to search D's bag -- D agreed and contraband was found. Issue: Can the police do a drug search on a scheduled bus stop? Holding: No. Reasoning: The Court, in a 6-to-3 decision, noted that when deciding if a search request is overly coercive, within a confined space such as a bus, one must not look at whether a party felt "free to leave," but whether a party felt free to decline or terminate the search encounter. The Court held that in the absence of intimidation or harassment, D could have refused the search request. Moreover, the fact that he knew the search would produce contraband had no bearing on whether his consent was voluntarily obtained. The test of whether a "reasonable person" felt free to decline or terminate a search presupposes his or her innocence.

Terry v Ohio

a. Facts i. D and two other men were observed by a plain clothes policeman in what the officer believed to be "casing a job, a stick-up." The officer stopped and frisked the three men, and found weapons on two of them. D was convicted of carrying a concealed weapon and sentenced to three years in jail. b. Issue i. Was the search and seizure of D and the other men in violation of the Fourth Amendment? c. Holding i. 8-1, No d. Reasoning i. the Court held that the search undertaken by the officer was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and that the weapons seized could be introduced into evidence against D. Attempting to focus narrowly on the facts of this particular case, the Court found that the officer acted on more than a "hunch" and that "a reasonably prudent man would have been warranted in believing [D] was armed and thus presented a threat to the officer's safety while he was investigating his suspicious behavior." The Court found that the searches undertaken were limited in scope and designed to protect the officer's safety incident to the investigation.

US v Sharpe

a. Facts i. A Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA") agent was patrolling an area known for drug trafficking in an unmarked car. The DEA agent saw a blue pick up truck with an attached camper shell driving along side a blue Pontiac on a highway. The Respondent (R1), (the "Respondent") was driving the pickup and another Respondent (R2) , was driving the Pontiac. R3 was also in the Pontiac. The DEA agent thought the truck was heavily loaded. The DEA agent followed the two vehicles for twenty minutes due to his suspicions. The DEA agent then decided to make an "investigative stop." The DEA agent radioed the highway patrol for back up. After the cars were stopped, the agent smelled marijuana coming from the pick up truck. The DEA agent asked R2 to search the truck, but he would not consent and also said that the truck was owned by the Respondent. R2 also produced documents saying the Respondent owned the truck. Without seeking the Respondent's permission to search the truck, the agent opened the rear of the camper and found multiple bales of marijuana. The Respondent was arrested and thereafter R2 and R3 were also arrested. About 30 or 40 minutes passed between the time the Pontiac was stopped and when the arrests actually occurred. iii. The Respondent and R2 were charged with the possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction. The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the conviction and remanded the case and the Court of Appeals again reversed the convictions. b. Issue i. "[W]hether an individual reasonably suspected of engaging in criminal activity may be detained for a period of 20 minutes, when the detention is necessary for law enforcement officers to conduct a limited investigation of the suspected criminal activity[?]" c. Holding i. The majority found that [Terry] applied here. It observed "[i]t is not necessary for us to decide whether the length of R2's detention was unreasonable, because that detention bears no causal relation to [the DEA agent"s] discovery of the marihuana. The marihuana was in [the Respondent"s] pickup, not in R2's Pontiac; the contraband introduced at respondents' trial cannot logically be considered the 'fruit' of R2's detention." "[The majority] conclude[d] that the detention of [the Respondent] clearly meets the Fourth Amendment's standard of reasonableness." d. Reasoning i. "Much as a 'bright line' rule would be desirable, in evaluating whether an investigative detention is unreasonable, common sense and ordinary human experience must govern over rigid criteria." ii. This case is a situation where the Supreme Court reiterated that a bright line rule is not sufficient.

Delaware v Prouse

a. Facts i. A patrolman stopped D's car to make a routine check of his driver's license and vehicle registration. The officer had not observed any traffic violation or suspicious conduct on the part of D. After stopping the car, the officer uncovered marijuana. The marijuana was later used to indict D. b. Issue i. Did the officer's search of D's automobile constitute an unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment? c. Holding i. 8-1, yes d. Reasoning i. the Court held that the privacy interests of travelers outweighed the state interests in discretionary spot checks of automobiles. The Court found that random checks made only marginal contributions to roadway safety and compliance with registration requirements; less intrusive means could have been used to serve the same ends. Officers must be held to a "probable cause" standard for searches, otherwise individuals would be subject to "unfettered governmental intrusion" each time they entered an automobile.

US v Ceccolini

a. Facts i. A police officer (Biro), while taking a break in respondent's flower shop and conversing with an employee of the shop (W), noticed an envelope with money protruding therefrom lying on the cash register. Upon examination, he found it contained not only money, but policy slips. Biro then placed the envelope back on the register and, without telling W what he had found, asked her to whom the envelope belonged. She told him it belonged to respondent. Biro's finding was reported to local detectives and to the FBI, who interviewed W some four months later without referring to the incident involving Biro. About six months after that incident, respondent was summoned before a federal grand jury, where he testified that he had never taken policy bets at his shop, but W testified to the contrary, and, shortly thereafter, respondent was indicted for perjury. W testified against respondent at his trial, but, after a finding of guilt, the District Court granted respondent's motion to suppress W's testimony and set aside that finding. The Court of Appeals affirmed, noting that the "road" to that testimony from the concededly unconstitutional search was "both straight and uninterrupted." b. Issue i. c. Holding i. The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the degree of attenuation between Biro's search of the envelope and W's testimony at the trial was not sufficient to dissipate the connection between the illegality of the search and challenged testimony. d. Reasoning i. In determining whether the exclusionary rule, with its deterrent purpose, should be applied, its benefits should be balanced against its costs, and, in evaluating the standards for application of the rule to live witness testimony in light of this balance, material factors to be considered are the length of the "road" between the Fourth Amendment violation and the witness' testimony; the degree of free will exercised by the witness; and the fact that exclusion of the witness' testimony would perpetually disable the witness from testifying about relevant and material facts regardless of how unrelated such testimony might be to the purpose of the originally illegal search or the evidence discovered thereby. ii. Here, where the evidence indicates overwhelmingly that Hennessey's testimony was an act of her own free will in no way coerced or induced by official authority as a result of Biro's discovery of the policy slips where substantial time elapsed between the illegal search and the initial contact with the witness and between the latter and her trial testimony, and where both Hennessey's identity and her relationship with respondent were well known to the investigating officers, and there is no evidence that Biro entered the shop or picked up the envelope with the intent of finding evidence of an illicit gambling operation, application of the exclusionary rule could not have the slightest deterrent effect on the behavior of an officer such as Biro, and the cost of permanently silencing Hennessey is too great for an evenhanded system of law enforcement to bear in order to secure such a speculative and very likely negligible deterrent effect. iii. The exclusionary rule should be invoked with much greater reluctance where the claim is based on a causal relationship between a constitutional violation and the discovery of a live witness than when a similar claim is advanced to support suppression of an inanimate object. iv. Even though the witnesses' identity was discovered as a result of illegal search, her testimony is not excluded because even though there was a causal connection b/w the initial illegality and testimony, the taint had been dissipated. e. Key points i. When dealing with live witnesses, the attenuation analysis is different, there needs to be a closer connection to exclude. ii. Distinguishable from Wong Sun because none of the evidence seized was used to question L. iii. Exclusionary rule should not apply when the crime was committed after the unconstitutional activity.

Florida v JL

a. Facts i. Anonymous caller reports to the police that a black male was standing at a bus stop with a gun ii. D was stopped and frisked and they found a gun b. Issue i. Does the anonymous tip give the police reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk? c. Holding i. 9-0 d. Reasoning i. The Court concluded that the anonymous tip did not meet the minimum requirements to perform a warrantless search e. Rule from case i. Anonymous tip is not enough to form reasonable suspicion to perform a stop without predictive information that would allow them to test the basis of knowledge of the informant ii. All police had to go on this case was a bare report of a guy with a gun on his possession. Informant never explained how he knew about the gun, nor gave any basis for the police to believe he had reliable information

Massachusetts v Sheppard

a. Facts i. Boston police sought to obtain a warrant to search the home of D, a suspected murderer. Detective Peter O'Malley prepared an affidavit listing the pieces of evidence he hoped to find at D's home. Since the local court was closed for the weekend and O'Malley could not find a new warrant form, he filled out a previously used form instead. He took this form and the affidavit to the residence of the presiding judge and told him the form required revision and approval. The judge returned the form with his approval, but he did not list the pieces of evidence from the affidavit on the warrant. Police found items from the affidavit in D's home and charged him with first-degree murder. During Sheppard's trial, the judge stated that the warrant did not conform to Fourth Amendment standards because it did not describe the items to be seized. Because the police acted in good faith upon what they believed was a valid warrant, the judge admitted the items as evidence and D was convicted. On appeal to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Sheppard successfully argued that the trial judge should have suppressed the evidence since no "good-faith exception" existed for admitting evidence obtained on a faulty warrant. b. Issue i. If police officers mistakenly believe they have obtained a valid warrant, can a trial court use the evidence they obtained? c. Holding i. 7-2, Yes d. Reasoning i. Justice Byron White delivered the opinion for a 7-2 court. The Court maintained that trial courts can use evidence seized by officers who have an "objectively reasonable basis" for mistakenly believing they have obtained valid warrants. Upon a factual inquiry, the Court found that "the officers in this case took every step that could reasonably be expected of them" to secure a valid warrant. Lawmakers did not enact rules for excluding evidence to invalidate evidence because of clerical errors by judges but to deter police from conducting unlawful searches.

US v Drayton

a. Facts i. D and D2 were traveling on a Greyhound bus. In Tallahassee, Florida, police officers boarded the bus as part of a routine interdiction effort. One of the officers worked his way from back to front, speaking with individual passengers as he went. The officer did not inform the passengers of their right to refuse to cooperate. As the officer approached D and D2, he identified himself, declared that the police were looking for drugs and weapons, and asked if the two had any bags. Subsequently, the officer asked D2 whether he minded if he checked his person. D2 agreed and a pat-down revealed hard objects similar to drug packages in both thigh areas. When D agreed, a pat-down revealed similar objects. Both were arrested. A further search revealed that D and D2 had taped cocaine to their legs. Charged with federal drug crimes, D and D2 moved to suppress the cocaine on the ground that their consent to the pat-down searches was invalid. In denying the motions, the District Court determined that the police conduct was not coercive and D and D2's consent to the search was voluntary. In reversing, the Court of Appeals noted that bus passengers do not feel free to disregard officers' requests to search absent some positive indication that consent may be refused. b. Issue i. Must police officers, while searching buses at random to ask questions and to request passengers' consent to searches, advise passengers of their right not to cooperate? c. Holding i. No, 6-3 d. Reasoning i. No threat, command, or authoritative tone of voice ii. No display of weapon iii. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment does not require police officers to advise bus passengers of their right not to cooperate and to refuse consent to searches. The Court reasoned that, although the officer did not inform the defendants of their right to refuse the search, he did request permission to search and gave no indication consent was required. Moreover, the Court noted, the totality of the circumstances indicated that the consent was voluntary. Justice David H. Souter, with whom Justices John Paul Stevens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined, dissented. "The issue we took to review is whether the police's examination of the bus passengers ... amounted to a suspicion less seizure under the Fourth Amendment. If it did, any consent to search was plainly invalid as a product of the illegal seizure," argued Justice Souter.

New Jersey v T.L.O.

a. Facts i. D was a high school student. School officials searched her purse suspecting she had cigarettes. The officials discovered cigarettes, a small amount of marijuana, and a list containing the names of students who owed D money. D was charged with possession of marijuana. Before trial, D moved to suppress evidence discovered in the search, but the Court denied her motion. The Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of New Jersey, Middlesex County found her guilty and sentenced her to probation for one year. On appeal, the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress evidence. The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed, holding that the exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment applies to searches and seizures conducted by school officials in public schools. b. Issue i. Does the exclusionary rule apply to searches conducted by school officials in public schools? c. Holding i. 6-3, yes d. Reasoning i. After the original oral argument in March of 1984, the Supreme Court restored the case to the calendar for reargument. In addition to the previously argued question, the Court requested that the parties brief and argue the additional question of whether the assistant principal violated the Fourth Amendment in opening D's purse. ii. The Court heard reargument on October 02, 1984. The Court that while the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures applies to public school officials, they may conduct reasonable warrantless searches of students under their authority notwithstanding the probable cause standard that would normally apply to searches under the Fourth Amendment. The Court held that the search of D's purse was reasonable under the circumstances.

Hiibel v Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada

a. Facts i. D was arrested and convicted in Nevada state court for failing to identify himself to a police officer who was investigating an assault. Nevada, and many other states, has a law that requires a person to tell an officer his name if asked. D challenged the conviction, claiming it violated his Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate himself and his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches. The state intermediate court and Supreme Court rejected his argument in affirming the conviction. b. Issue i. Did D's arrest and conviction for not telling a police officer his name violate his Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate himself and his Fourth Amendment right to be free from an unreasonable search? c. Holding i. 5-4 d. Reasoning i. The Court ruled that the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment because it was based on reasonable suspicion (the police officer was investigating the assault, and D was nearby) and involved only a minimally intrusive question (his name). it was also a governmental interest because the police needed to know his history to prevent more violence It also did not violate the Fifth Amendment because D never argued that telling the officer his name would actually incriminate him of any crime. Justice Kennedy wrote, "While we recognize petitioner's strong belief that he should not have to disclose his identity, the Fifth Amendment does not override the Nevada Legislature's judgment to the contrary absent a reasonable belief that the disclosure would tend to incriminate him." ii. The request for ID must be reasonably related to the incident

Michigan v Long

a. Facts i. D was convicted for possession of marijuana found by Michigan police in the passenger compartment and trunk of his car. The police searched the passenger compartment because they suspected D's vehicle contained weapons potentially dangerous to the officers. After a state appellate court affirmed the conviction, the Michigan Supreme Court reversed. The Michigan Supreme Court held that the search violated the Fourth Amendment and the Michigan Constitution. b. Issue i. If there is not probable cause for arrest, can a protective search for weapons extend to an area beyond the person? Did the Supreme Court have jurisdiction over state court decisions that rested on "adequate and independent" state grounds? c. Holding i. 6-3 d. Reasoning i. In Terry, the Supreme Court held that there was a valid protective search for weapons in the absence of probable cause to arrest because it was unreasonable to deny a police officer the right "to neutralize the threat of physical harm," when the officer possesses a reasonable suspicion that an individual is armed and dangerous. In Terry, the Supreme Court only permitted a search of the person. In this case, the Supreme Court holds that the principles outlined in Terry also apply to the passenger compartment and trunk of a vehicle if the officer has a reasonable suspicion that a person may be armed and dangerous. ii. The Court, after admitting that it had not developed "a satisfying and consistent approach" regarding lower court references to independent state grounds, held that it had jurisdiction in the case. The Court held that when state court decisions appeared to rest primarily on federal law, it would infer that state courts believed that federal law required them to do so. State courts could expressly state that independent grounds were being used in cases as opposed to constitutional grounds. The Court reasoned that this approach would avoid the rendering of advisory opinions and would decrease the intrusive practice of requiring state courts to clarify decisions to the liking of the Justices. In the case at hand, the Court affirmed the constitutionality of the search and affirmed D's conviction.

Hudson v Michigan

a. Facts i. D was convicted of drug and firearm possession in state court after police found cocaine and a gun in his home. The police had a search warrant, but failed to follow the Fourth Amendment "knock and announce" rule which requires police officers to wait 20-30 seconds after knocking and announcing their presence before they enter the home. The trial judge ruled that the evidence found in the home could therefore not be used, but the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed based on two Michigan Supreme Court cases that created an exception to the suppression of evidence when the evidence in question would have inevitably been found. b. Issue i. Does the general rule excluding evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment apply to the "knock-and-announce" rule? c. Holding i. 5-4, No d. Reasoning i. In a 5-4 decision, the Court ruled that evidence need not be excluded when police violate the "knock-and-announce" rule. The opinion by Justice Scalia reaffirmed the validity of both the knock-and-announce rule and the "exclusionary rule" for evidence obtained by police in most cases of Fourth Amendment violation. However, the majority held that the exclusionary rule could not be invoked for evidence obtained after a knock-and-announce violation, because the interests violated by the abrupt entry of the police "have nothing to do with the seizure of the evidence." Justice Scalia wrote that the knock-and-announce rule was meant to prevent violence, property-damage, and impositions on privacy, not to prevent police from conducting a search for which they have a valid warrant. The Court also found that the social costs of the exclusionary rule as applied to the knock-and-announce rule outweighed any possible "deterrence benefits," and that alternative measures such as civil suits and internal police discipline could adequately deter violations. Justice Stephen Breyer wrote a dissenting opinion, and was joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg. The dissent noted the Court's long history of upholding the exclusionary rule and doubted that the majority's cited precedents supported its conclusion. The dissent also expressed doubt that knock-and-announce violations could be deterred without excluding the evidence obtained from the searches.

Brown v Illinois

a. Facts i. On May 6, 1968, Roger Corpus was shot and killed in his apartment. The police obtained the name of D, who was identified as an acquaintance of the victim, though not a suspect. On May 13, 1968, detectives arrested D and searched his apartment without probable cause and without a warrant. The detectives read D his Miranda rights and proceeded to question him. During the questioning, D confessed to assisting in Corpus' murder. Later, D was questioned again after being read his Miranda rights a second time. He substantially repeated his account of the murder. ii. Prior to his trial, D moved to suppress the two statements based on the fact that his arrest was illegal and the statements were taken in violation of his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. The motion was denied and the case proceeded to trial. The jury found D guilty. The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed the judgment but did not accept the State's argument that the arrest was legal. b. Issue i. Should inculpatory statements resulting from an illegal arrest but after the reading of Miranda rights be admissible in trial? c. Holding i. 9-0 No d. Reasoning i. Justice Harry A. Blackmun delivered the unanimous opinion. The Court held that Miranda warnings are not sufficient to remove the taint of an illegal arrest from statements made in custody. The Court held that the Fourth and Fifth Amendment were meant to work together, so that even if a statement is found to be voluntary as required by the Fifth Amendment, it could still be the result of an illegal search under the Fourth Amendment and therefore inadmissible. Because D's arrest was illegal and the statements clearly stemmed from that arrest, the Court held that the statements were inadmissible. ii. Justice Byron R. White concurred in the judgment and wrote that the Miranda warnings do not circumvent the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. iii. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. wrote an opinion concurring in part. He argued that the admissibility of D's statements should be considered in the context of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule. He also argued that the case should be remanded because the trial court made no determination regarding probable cause for the original arrest. Justice William H. Rehnquist joined in the concurrence in part.

Arizona v Johnson

a. Facts i. D was riding in the backseat of a car when it was pulled over by the state police in Sugar Hill, Arizona. The officers had scanned the license of the car and found that it had a "mandatory insurance suspension." Although the stop was solely predicated on the suspended license, the officers began to question the car's occupants, including D, about gang activity in the area. Based on certain circumstantial evidence, such as D's possession of a police scanner, the officers asked D to exit the car so that they could question him further. Although D was free to stay in the car, he voluntarily exited and a subsequent search of his person by the officers revealed a handgun and a small amount of marijuana. Based on evidence obtained during this search, D was convicted in Arizona state court of (1) the unlawful possession of a weapon as a prohibited possessor and (2) possession of marijuana. D appealed, arguing that the evidence recovered from the search should have been suppressed because the officers did not have probable cause to search him at the time of his arrest and therefore did so in violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment. ii. The Court of Appeals of Arizona agreed with D and reversed his conviction and sentence. The court found that the officers had no reason to believe that D was involved in any criminal activity when he was searched. The officers requested that D step out of the car to discuss gang activity, not because the officers feared that their safety was threatened, thus it was part of a consensual encounter between the officers and D. Therefore, the court said, the officers' subsequent search of D was illegal and unconstitutional. b. Issue i. Reasonable suspicion to frisk? ii. Do officers violate the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures when, after making a routine traffic stop, they search an individual who is consensually conversing with those officers? c. Holding i. 9-0, no d. Reasoning i. the Supreme Court reversed the Arizona Court of Appeals. It held that D's encounter with police officers was not consensual and therefore did not violate his Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable search and seizure. The Court reasoned that lawful traffic stops entail the "temporary seizure of driver and passengers" that continues for the duration of the stop. Officer inquiries into matters unrelated to the stop do not transform the event into a "consensual" encounter whereby the driver or passenger is free to go as he or she pleases. Therefore, the police officers who frisked D were not constitutionally required to depart the scene without first ensuring that he was not armed and dangerous, so long as they reasonably suspected he was armed and dangerous.

Safford Unified School District v Redding

a. Facts i. D, an eighth grader at Safford Middle School, was strip-searched by school officials on the basis of a tip by another student that D might have ibuprofen on her person in violation of school policy. D subsequently filed suit against the school district and the school officials responsible for the search in the District Court for the District of Arizona. She alleged her Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable search and seizure was violated. The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissed the case. On the initial appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. However, on rehearing before the entire court, the court of appeals held that D's Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable search and seizure was violated. It reasoned that the strip search was not justified nor was the scope of intrusion reasonably related to the circumstances. b. Issue i. 1) Does the Fourth Amendment prohibit school officials from strip searching students suspected of possessing drugs in violation of school policy? ii. 2) Are school officials individually liable for damages in a lawsuit filed under 42 U.S.C Section 1983? c. Holding i. 8-1, Sometimes, fact dependent. No. d. Reasoning i. The Supreme Court held that D's Fourth Amendment rights were violated when school officials searched her underwear for non-prescription painkillers. With David H. Souter writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, and Justices Antonin G. Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy, Stephen G. Breyer, and Samuel A. Alito, and in part by Justices John Paul Stevens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court reiterated that, based on a reasonable suspicion, search measures used by school officials to root out contraband must be "reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction." Here, school officials did not have sufficient suspicion to warrant extending the search of D to her underwear. The Court also held that the implicated school administrators were not personally liable because "clearly established law [did] not show that the search violated the Fourth Amendment." It reasoned that lower court decisions were disparate enough to have warranted doubt about the scope of a student's Fourth Amendment right. ii. Justice Stevens wrote separately, concurring in part and dissenting in part, and was joined by Justice Ginsburg. He agreed that the strip search was unconstitutional, but disagreed that the school administrators retained immunity. He stated that "[i]t does not require a constitutional scholar to conclude that a nude search of a 13-year old child is an invasion of constitutional rights of some magnitude." Justice Ginsburg also wrote a separate concurring opinion, largely agreeing with Justice Stevens point of dissent. Justice Clarence Thomas concurred in the judgment in part and dissented in part. He agreed with the majority that the school administrators were qualifiedly immune to prosecution. However, he argued that the judiciary should not meddle with decisions school administrators make that are in the interest of keeping their schools safe.

Illinois v Wardlow

a. Facts i. D, who was holding an opaque bag, inexplicably fled an area of Chicago known for heavy narcotics trafficking after noticing police officers in the area. When officers caught up with him on the street, one stopped him and conducted a protective pat-down search for weapons because in his experience there were usually weapons in the vicinity of narcotics transactions. The officers arrested D after discovering that he was carrying a handgun. In a trial motion to suppress the gun, D claimed that in order to stop an individual, short of actually arresting the person, police first had to point to "specific reasonable inferences" why the stop was necessary. The Illinois trial court denied the motion, finding that the gun was recovered during a lawful stop and frisk. D was convicted of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon. In reversing, the Illinois Appellate Court found that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to make the stop. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, determining that sudden flight in a high crime area does not create a reasonable suspicion justifying a stop because flight may simply be an exercise of the right to "go on one's way." b. Issue i. Is a person's sudden and unprovoked flight from identifiable police officers, patrolling a high crime area, sufficiently suspicious to justify the officers' stop of that person? c. Holding i. 5-4, d. Reasoning i. The Court held, 5 to 4, that the police officers did not violate the Fourth Amendment when they stopped D, because the officer was justified in suspecting that the accused was involved in criminal activity and, therefore, in investigating further. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the majority that, nervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion to justify a stop. Rehnquist noted that flight is the consummate act of evasion. Stevens, joined by three other justices, concurred in avoiding a per se rule but dissented from the majority holding.

Adams v williams

a. Facts i. During the early morning hours of October 30, 1966, an individual approached a police officer in a gas station parking lot in Bridgeport, Connecticut, and informed him that another individual in a nearby vehicle was carrying narcotics and had a gun at his waist. The officer approached the vehicle on foot and asked the occupant, D, to open the door. When D rolled down the window instead, the officer reached into the car and removed a gun from D's waistband, though the gun was not visible from outside the vehicle. The officer then arrested D for unlawful possession of a firearm and proceeded to search his vehicle, where he found heroin. D was convicted in a Connecticut state court of possession of a handgun and heroin. ii. After the Supreme Court of Connecticut affirmed the conviction, D filed a claim against the prison warden, Frederick Adams, in which he alleged that the state of Connecticut continued to detain him unlawfully as a prisoner. D argued that the handgun and drugs were discovered through an unlawful search and should not have been admitted into evidence at his trial. The district court denied his petition. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit sided with D and ordered that his conviction be set aside. b. Issue i. Does the Fourth Amendment allow a police officer, acting only on a tip from an informant, to approach a person and remove a weapon concealed in the person's waistband? c. Holding i. 6-3 d. Reasoning i. Yes. Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Court held that the informant's tip permitted the officer to approach D's car and make a limited search of D's waistband for the officer's own protection. The Court further held that the discovery of the weapon gave the officer probable cause to arrest D's for illegal possession of a firearm. Because the officer's subsequent search of the vehicle was permissible, the narcotics he discovered were admissible at D's trial. ii. Justice William O. Douglas wrote a dissent in which he argued that the officer did not have probable cause to arrest D's for illegal possession of a firearm because Connecticut's "free-and-easy" gun laws allow individuals to carry concealed weapons so long as they have a permit. Justice Thurgood Marshall concurred in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. expressed concern that the unnamed informant gave no information that the officer could not have readily manufactured after seizing the weapon. Therefore, Justice Brennan argued that police officers should not be permitted to arrest and search individuals on the basis of an informant's tip alone. Justice Marshall also wrote a separate dissent in which he argued that the prosecutors failed to meet their burden to prove that the informant's information was reliable and sufficient to justify the arrest and search of Williams. Justice Douglas joined in the dissent.

US v Arvizu

a. Facts i. In 1998, D was stopped by Border Patrol Agent Clinton Stoddard while driving on an unpaved road in a remote area of southeastern Arizona. A number of factors prompted Stoddard to stop D, including his slowing down, his failure to acknowledge the agent, the raised position of the children's knees, and their odd waving. After receiving permission to search the vehicle, Stoddard found more than 100 pounds of marijuana. D was charged with possession with intent to distribute. D moved to suppress the marijuana, arguing among other things that Stoddard did not have reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle as required by the Fourth Amendment. Denying the motion, the District Court cited a number of facts that gave Stoddard reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle, including its location. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the District Court relied on factors that carried little or no weight in reasonable-suspicion calculus and that the remaining factors were not enough to render the stop permissible. In the appellate court's view, fact-specific weighing of circumstances or other multifactor tests introduced uncertainty and unpredictability into the Fourth Amendment analysis, making it necessary to clearly delimit the factors that an officer may consider in making stops such as this one. b. Issue i. Did a border agent have reasonable suspicion to believe that D was engaged in illegal activity based on a number of factors? c. Holding i. 9-0, yes d. Reasoning i. the Court held that the Court of Appeals' methodology was contrary to its prior decisions and that it reached the wrong result in this case. The Court concluded that Stoddard had reasonable suspicion to believe that D was engaged in illegal activity, having considered the totality of the circumstances and given due weight to the factual inferences drawn by the law enforcement officer and District Court Judge. The Court reasoned that, although each factor alone could have appeared innocent, when taken together they sufficed to form a particularized and objective basis for Stoddard's stopping the vehicle, making the stop reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a concurring opinion. ii. Innocent factors

Payton v New York

a. Facts i. New York City police suspected D of murdering a gas station manager. The police forcibly entered D's home thinking he was there (he was not) and found evidence connecting D to the crime, which was introduced at D's trial. The police lacked an arrest warrant when they entered his home. However, they acted under a New York law allowing police to enter a private residence to make a felony arrest without a warrant. At trial, D unsuccessfully sought to suppress the evidence as the fruit of an illegal search. State courts upheld. In the companion case, victims identified Obie Riddick in June 1973 for robberies in 1971. Police learned of his whereabouts in 1974. Without a warrant, they knocked on his door, entered his residence and arrested him. A search for weapons revealed illegal drugs. He was indicted on narcotics charges but sought the suppression of the evidence based on a warrantless entry. The trial judge concluded that the entry was authorized by the New York law and that the search was therefore permissible. Riddick was convicted. The appeals court affirmed. b. Issue i. Does New York statute authorizing warrantless arrests and searches violate the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures? c. Holding i. 6-3 d. Reasoning i. Yes. Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for the 6 to 3 majority, held that the Fourth Amendment, as applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, "prohibits the police from making a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a suspect's home in order to make a routine felony arrest." Warrantless arrests and searches went to the core of the Fourth Amendment's protection of privacy in a citizen's dwelling. This protection was too important to be violated on the basis of a police officer's on-the-spot decision regarding probable cause. In the absence of special circumstances, a search of a residence is permissible only after a finding of probable cause by a neutral magistrate issuing a search warrant. Justice Byron R. White, joined by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger and Justice William H. Rehnquist, dissented. White maintained that common law and practice prior to and at the time the Fourth Amendment was adopted did not limit a police officer's inherent power to arrest or search

Heien v North Carolina

a. Facts i. On April 29, 2010, Sergeant Darisse of the Surry County Sheriff's Department observed D2 driving north on I-77 with a broken brake light. When Darisse pulled over the vehicle, he noticed another man, D, lying under a blanket in the backseat. Darisse spoke with the two men, felt that their stories did not match up, and was concerned that D had not gotten up from the back seat. Darisse asked for permission to search the vehicle. D agreed, and Darisse found a bag containing 54.2 grams of cocaine in the car. ii. A grand jury indicted D for two counts of trafficking cocaine. D filed a motion to suppress the evidence discovered during the search of his vehicle, and the trial court denied the motion. The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and held that the traffic stop was not objectively reasonable because North Carolina law only required one working brake light. The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed and held that when an officer's mistake of the law is reasonable, it may give rise to the "reasonable suspicion" required for a traffic stop of a vehicle under the Fourth Amendment. That North Carolina Supreme Court sent the case back to the state Court of Appeals. iii. The North Carolina Court of Appeals found no error in the trial court's judgment. A dissenting judge, however, stated that the North Carolina Supreme Court's ruling created "fundamental unfairness" because it held citizens to the traditional rule that "ignorance of the law is no excuse" while allowing police to be ignorant of the law. Based on this dissent, D again appealed to the North Carolina Supreme Court which rejected D's appeal. b. Issue i. Does a police officer's mistake of law provide the individualized reasonable suspicion that the Fourth Amendment requires to justify a traffic stop? c. Holding i. 8-1, yes d. Reasoning i. The Court held that a search or seizure is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when an officer has made a reasonable factual or legal mistake. Because Fourth Amendment jurisprudence turns on the question of reasonableness, governing officials have traditionally been allowed leeway to enforce the law for the community's protection. As long as the mistake of fact or law in question was reasonable, the Fourth Amendment does not hold such mistakes to be incompatible with the concept of reasonable suspicion. However, the Court also held that those mistakes must be objectively reasonable; an officer cannot gain the benefits of Fourth Amendment reasonableness through a sloppy or incomplete knowledge of the law. ii. In her concurring opinion, Justice Elena Kagan emphasized that the majority opinion's analysis was limited to when the mistake of law in question is an objectively reasonable one. Justice Kagan also wrote that the test to determine whether an officer made an objectively reasonable mistake is much more stringent than the one to determine whether a government official is entitled to qualified immunity. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined in the concurring opinion. iii. Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote a dissenting opinion in which she argued that Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has traditionally focused on the officer's factual conclusions rather than understanding of the law. Expanding leeway allowed to police officers with respect to their factual assessment to the meaning of the laws they are meant to enforce runs the risk of eroding the Fourth Amendment's protections. In the absence of any evidence that holding police officers to this standard would prevent effective enforcement of the law, mistakes of law should not be considered reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.

Murray v US

a. Facts i. On April 6, 1983, federal law enforcement agents tailing D1 and James D2 for suspicion of illegal drug activities saw the two drive large vehicles into a warehouse in South Boston. When D1 and D2 left, the agents saw a tractor-trailer rig and a large container. The agents arrested D1 and D2 and lawfully seized their vehicles, which contained marijuana. Several agents then returned to the warehouse, forced entry without a search warrant, and found numerous wrapped bales of what was later confirmed to be marijuana. The agents did not disturb the bales and kept the warehouse under surveillance until they obtained a search warrant. In applying for the search warrant, the agents did not mention the unwarranted entry or the information they had obtained. Approximately eight hours later, the agents obtained the warrant, entered the warehouse, and seized the bales along with the notebooks indicating the destinations of the marijuana. ii. Before the trial, D1 and D2 moved to suppress the evidence discovered in the warehouse and argued that the warrant was invalid because it was based on information obtained in the previous unwarranted entry. The district court denied the motion and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed. b. Issue i. Does the Fourth Amendment require the suppression of evidence viewed in plain sight prior to an illegal entry that was later discovered in the course of a properly warranted search? c. Holding i. 4-3 d. Reasoning i. No. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion of the 4-3 plurality. The Court held that evidence that would be excluded under the Fourth Amendment is admissible if it comes from an independent source. If the police obtained information unlawfully but the evidence in question comes from an untainted source, it is still admissible. Because the officers in this case obtained a lawful warrant without relying on the information they obtained illegally, the evidence seized in the warranted entry can be considered to have come from an independent source and therefore not subject to exclusion. ii. Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote a dissenting opinion where he argued that the independent source exception is limited to cases in which the evidence in question stemmed from a wholly independent source. He argued that courts must keep in mind the incentives that police officers have to hide the use of illegal methods in obtaining evidence, and they must use a high standard of proof when determining whether evidence came from a truly independent source. Justice John Paul Stevens and Justice Sandra Day O'Connor joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice John Paul Stevens wrote that court decisions that incentivize police officers to obtain evidence through illegal means moves further away from the true meaning of and protections offered by the Fourth Amendment. iii. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. and Justice Anthony M. Kennedy did not participate in the decision or discussion of this case.

US v Watson

a. Facts i. On August 17, 1972, a postal inspector received information from an informant that the respondent (D) was in possession of stolen credit cards. The informant had provided the inspector with reliable information in the past, and, later that day, provided the inspector with a stolen card. The inspector asked the informant to arrange another meeting with D to deliver more stolen cards. At the meeting on August 23, when the informant gave the signal, officers revealed themselves and arrested D. The officers read D his Miranda warning and searched him but did not find the cards on his person. They asked to search his car, and D gave them permission. In the car, officers found two stolen cards. D was then charged with four counts of possessing stolen mail. Prior to the trial, D moved to suppress the cards by claiming his arrest was illegal because there was no warrant, and that the search of his car was involuntary because he was not informed that he could withhold consent. The motion was denied and D was convicted. ii. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that the arrest was unconstitutional because the postal inspector had sufficient time to obtain a warrant but failed to do so. The Court of Appeals also held that the subsequent search was coerced and hence unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment. b. Issue i. Did the arrest and following search of the respondent's car violate his Fourth Amendment rights? c. Holding i. 6-2 d. Reasoning i. No. Justice Byron R. White delivered the opinion of the 6-2 majority. The Court held that postal inspectors have the power to execute an arrest without a warrant when there is probable cause. Congress has granted this power to several federal agencies, not just the postal service. Because D's arrest was constitutional, the search of his car was not the product of an illegal arrest. The Court held that there was no evidence that D was coerced into agreeing to the car search. ii. In his concurring opinion, Justice Lewis F. Powell wrote that there was established historical precedent for warrantless arrests. He also argued that interpreting the Fourth Amendment as always requiring a warrant prior to arrest would severely and negatively impact effective law enforcement. Justice Potter Stewart wrote a concurring opinion where he argued that the arrest occurred with probable cause, in broad daylight, in a public place and thus did not violate the Fourth Amendment. He also held that the majority's decision in this case does not set any precedent regarding under what circumstances an officer may make a warrantless arrest in a private place. iii. Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote a dissent and argued that the majority's opinion grants police broad powers to make warrantless arrests and breaks with precedents already set regarding the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment. He argued that the majority's opinion goes beyond the bounds of the case in question and misinterprets common law history. He wrote that the Fourth Amendment was intended to protect people, not places, and that the interests of the people would be best served with a warrant requirement. The warrant requirement would not unduly burden the police because there is no reason to assume that it would cause any delay in an arrest, unless exigent circumstances are present, in which case the arrest may be made without a warrant. He also argued that the government did not meet its burden to show that Watson's consent was not coerced. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. joined in the dissent. iv. Justice John Paul Stevens took no part in the discussion or decision in this case.

Brown v Texas

a. Facts i. On December 9, 1977, El Paso Police Officers Venegas and Sotelo were cruising in a patrol car. At 12:45 p.m., they observed D and another man leaving an alley in opposite directions. The alley was in an area known for a high incidence of drug traffic. The officers believed the situation was suspicious and stopped D for questioning. They asked D to identify himself, and he refused and asserted that they had no cause to stop him. When the officers frisked him, they did not find any drugs or other suspicious material on D. He was arrested for violation of a Texas statute that made it illegal for a person to refuse to identify himself when a police officer lawfully requests it. D was taken to the county jail, where he did identify himself, and was charged with the violation. ii. D was convicted in municipal court and fined. He then exercised his right to a trial in the county court and moved for dismissal on the grounds that the Texas statue was unconstitutional under the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The motion was denied and he was convicted. b. Issue i. When the police detain someone because that person refused to identify himself, does it constitute a seizure subject to the restrictions of the Fourth Amendment? c. Holding i. 9-0, no they had no d. Reasoning i. The Court held that the Fourth Amendment covers all police seizures, even those as brief as preventing a person from walking away. The Fourth Amendment requires that such seizures be based on specific and objective facts that create a compelling public interest in the seizure that outweighs the individual's expectation of privacy. In this case, the Court held that the police officers lacked any reasonable suspicion based on objective fact to allow them to detain D and question him. Since the seizure was not lawful, the Texas statute requiring D to identify himself did not apply.

New York v Harris

a. Facts i. On January 1, 1984, officers of the New York City Police Department found Thelma Staton murdered in her apartment. Various facts of the case linked D to the crime. On January 16, police officers responded to D's house to take him into custody. Although the police had not obtained an arrest warrant, when they knocked on his door, D let them enter. The police officers read D his Miranda rights, and D admitted to committing the murder. The police officers arrested D and took him to the police station, where he was read his Miranda rights again and signed an inculpatory statement. The police then videotaped an incriminating interview between D and the district attorney, despite D's requests to cease the interrogation. ii. The trial court suppressed D's initial confession and video interview but allowed the signed statement into evidence. After a bench trial, D was convicted of second-degree murder. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The Court of Appeals of New York reversed and found the signed statement inadmissible because it was the fruit of an illegal arrest. b. Issue i. Is the statement of a defendant inadmissible if it is the result of the police entering the defendant's home without a warrant or consent in violation of the Fourth Amendment? c. Holding i. 5-4, No d. Reasoning i. Justice Byron R. White delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule was designed to protect the physical sanctity of the home, not to grant criminal suspects protection from statements made outside the premises when the police have probable cause for arrest. Since the police had probable cause for an arrest, D was not unlawfully in custody when he was read his Miranda rights at the station and made the statement in question. ii. In his dissent, Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote that D's arrest without a warrant and without exigent circumstances violated the Fourth Amendment, and the signed statement was therefore inadmissible because it was the fruit of an illegal arrest. He argued that the exclusionary rule was meant to prevent police officers from violating the Fourth Amendment in general, and it did not specifically apply to the home. He also argued that there is no evidence that a statement made at the police station is removed from the taint of an illegal arrest. Whether or not D was unlawfully in custody at the time his statement was made, he was in custody as a result of an illegal arrest, so the statement was still affected. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Justice Harry A. Blackmun, and Justice John Paul Stevens joined in the dissent.

Dunaway v New York

a. Facts i. On March 26, 1971, the proprietor of a Rochester, New York pizza parlor was killed in an attempted robbery. On August 10, 1971, the police received a lead implicating D, but the lead did not provide enough information to arrest him. Nevertheless, the police brought him in for questioning. He was not told he was under arrest, but he would be physically restrained if he attempted to leave. After being informed of his Miranda rights, D waived his right to counsel and made statements and a drawing that incriminated himself. ii. At trial, D filed a motion to suppress the evidence of his confession and drawing. The motion was denied and he was convicted. The Appellate Division of the Fourth Department and the New York Court of Appeals both affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Brown v. Illinois. iii. The Monroe County Court determined that the motion to suppress should have been granted under Brown. The Appellate Division of the Fourth Department reversed and held that suspects can be detained and questioned without violating Fourth or Fifth Amendment rights. The New York Court of Appeals dismissed D's application for leave to appeal. b. Issue i. Is bringing a suspect into custody for questioning subject to the same probable cause standards as an arrest? c. Holding i. 6-2 d. Reasoning i. Yes. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 6-2 majority. The Supreme Court held that the police violated D's Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights by picking him up and taking him to the police station to be questioned without probable cause. Because picking someone up for questioning involves an intrusion on par with that of an arrest, it is held to the standard of "probable cause" rather than the lower standard of "reasonable suspicion." The Court also held that the confession stemmed directly from the illegal questioning, and without an intervening event, the confession should have been considered tainted evidence and not allowed into evidence at trial. ii. Justice Byron R. White wrote a concurring opinion in which he argued that the key principle of the Fourth Amendment was the balancing of competing interests. He wrote that, while there must be general rules for police conduct, cases should be considered based on their individual facts. In this case, the questioning was too close to an arrest to fit any other criteria. iii. In his concurring opinion, Justice John Paul Stevens wrote that an illegal arrest is only relevant to determining the voluntariness of a confession if it can be shown that the conduct of the illegal arrest was what motivated the confession. iv. Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote a dissent, arguing that not all interactions between citizens and police officers are seizures of persons. Because D willingly accompanied officers to the police station, his time at the police station could not be deemed a seizure. He also argued that, because the police acted in good faith and gave D the Miranda warnings, his statements and drawings should be considered voluntary and admissible. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger joined in the dissent. v. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. did not participate in the discussion or decision of this case.

Minnesota v Dickerson

a. Facts i. On November 9, 1989, while exiting an apartment building with a history of cocaine trafficking, D spotted police officers and turned to walk in the opposite direction. In response, the officers commanded D to stop and proceeded to frisk him. An officer discovered a lump in D's jacket pocket, and, upon further tactile investigation, formed the belief that it was cocaine. The officer reached into D's pocket and confirmed that the lump was in fact a small bag of cocaine. Consequently, D was charged with possession of a controlled substance. He requested that the cocaine be excluded from evidence, but the trial court denied his request and he was found guilty. Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed, and the State Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's decision. b. Issue i. When a police officer detects contraband through his or her sense of touch during a protective pat-down search, does the Fourth Amendment permit its seizure and subsequent introduction into evidence? Was the police officer who frisked D adhering to the Fourth Amendment when he formed the belief, through his sense of touch, that the lump in D's jacket pocket was cocaine? ii. Terry stop only allows stop and frisk and pat-down for weapons. Was the cocaine thought to be a weapon? c. Holding i. 9-0 d. Reasoning i. Yes, and No. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Byron R. White, the Court recalled that a police officer may seize contraband when it is in plain sight, and "its incriminating character is immediately apparent". It held that instances in which an officer uses the sense of sight to discover illegal goods are analogous to those involving the sense of touch. The Court also reasoned that the tactile detection of contraband during a lawful pat-down search does not constitute any further invasion of privacy, therefore warrantless seizure was permissible. The Court also concluded that the police officer frisking D stepped outside the boundaries outlined in Terry v. Ohio which requires a protective pat-down search to involve only what is necessary for the detection of weapons. In fact, the officer was already aware that D's jacket pocket did not contain a weapon, when he detected the cocaine through further tactile investigation.

Davis v US

a. Facts i. Police arrested Ds after a traffic stop. He subsequently gave a false name to the officers. After discovering his real name, the officers arrested him, handcuffed him and put him in the police car for giving false information to a police officer. Then they searched the vehicle and found a gun in his jacket. He was charged and convicted for possession of an illegal weapon. Following a jury trial, D was convicted and sentenced to 220 months in prison. But the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit found that while the search was illegal the evidence found in the vehicle was still admissible. b. Issue i. Does the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule apply to a search that was authorized by precedent at the time of the search but is subsequently ruled unconstitutional? c. Holding i. 7-2, Yes d. Reasoning i. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court order in an opinion by Justice Samuel Alito. "Searches conducted in objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent are not subject to the exclusionary rule," Alito wrote. Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined in the judgment only. Meanwhile, Justice Stephen Breyer dissented, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. "The Court finds a new 'good faith' exception which prevents application of the normal remedy for a Fourth Amendment violation, namely, suppression of the illegally seized evidence," Breyer notes, adding: "At this point I can no longer agree with the Court. A new 'good faith' exception and this Court's retroactivity decisions are incompatible."

Wong Sun v US

a. Facts i. Police arrested a guy for possession of heroin. While under arrest, Way told police that a man once sold him an ounce of heroin at his laundry on Leavenworth St. Later that day, police found a laundry run by D2. Nothing on the record identified Toy as "Blackie Toy", but police arrested him anyway. Police then went to D2's house where they arrested D3 and found several tubes containing less than one ounce of heroin. Police also arrested D. Police interrogated the men and wrote statements in English for them to sign. Both men refused, citing errors in the statements. At trial in U.S. District Court, D2 and D were convicted on federal narcotics charges. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. b. Issue i. (1) Were the petitioners' arrests lawful? ii. (2) Were the petitioners' unsigned statements admissible as evidence? c. Holding i. 5-4 No, No d. Reasoning i. No, No. In a 5-4 decision, Justice William J. Brennan wrote the majority opinion reversing the lower court and remanding for a new trial. The Supreme Court held that the police did not have probable cause to justify the arrests. With regard to D2, the court should exclude all evidence found during the search because they are the "fruits" of an unlawful search. The unsigned statement was not corroborated, so it gave no basis for conviction. D's unsigned confession and evidence against him were admissible. ii. Justice Tom C. Clark wrote a dissent, stating that the arrests were lawful and there was no reason to grant D a new trial. Justices James M. Harlan, Potter Stewart, and Byron R. White joined in the dissent.

Florida v Royer

a. Facts i. Police officers determined that a respondent matched the profile of a drug trafficker because he was a 25-35 year old man, casually dressed, pale, nervous, paid for his ticket in cash, and was carrying a certain type of luggage with only his name and destination on its tag. They then stopped the respondent and asked to see his identification and the name on it did not match his airline ticket. They took the respondent's documentation and asked him to go with them into a small room where they asked him if he would consent to a search of his luggage, to which he responded by handing them his key. He was convicted of felony possession of marijuana with the help of the fruits of this search, and the Florida District Court of Appeal reversed claiming that the respondent had been involuntarily confined within the small room without probable cause and that the subsequent consent was invalid because it was tainted by the unlawful confinement. The state of Florida was then granted certiorari. b. Issue i. Is the permissible extent under the Fourth Amendment of a temporary Terry stop exceeded when a police officer asks a person suspected of criminal activity to go into a small closed room without telling them they may leave and they end up there for fifteen minutes? ii. Can a search subsequent to an invalid detention be validly consented to under the Fourth Amendment? c. Holding i. Affirm the judgment of the lower court that the detention and search was invalid. ii. Police may not carry out a full search of a person merely but appropriately suspected of criminal activity, nor may they seek to verify their suspicions by means approaching that of a full-fledged arrest. This detention was a more serious intrusion on his personal liberty than that that is allowable based on mere reasonable suspicion as the least intrusive investigatory means should be used in such stops. iii. Since the detective's actions are held to exceed the permissible bounds of an investigative stop, the respondent's consent to the search of his suitcase is invalid, and the evidence found as a result is the "fruit of the poisonous tree" and must be excluded. d. Reasoning i. A police officer asking a suspect to accompany them to a small police room, taking their ticket and driver's license and not mentioning that they are free to leave, has exceeded the scope of a valid stop based on reasonable suspicion under Terry. ii. This case seems to have had the impact of further clarifying what the limits of a Terry stop were. But there definitely is the argument that it has not been that successful at doing so since it is unclear whether the fifteen minutes he was held in the room can be used as a guideline, or even whether the fact that he was moved to another location was what was fatal under the Fourth Amendment. The case may arguably leave the system with not much more than one of its only clear statements: that the investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel an officer's suspicion.

Nix v Williams

a. Facts i. R was arrested for the murder of a ten-year-old girl who's body he disposed of along a gravel road. State law enforcement officials engaged in a massive search for the child's body. During the search, after responding to an officer's appeal for assistance, R made statements to the police (without an attorney present) which helped lead the searchers to the child's body. The defendant's Miranda rights were only read to him after his arrest. b. Issue i. Should evidence resulting in an arrest be excluded from trial because it was improperly obtained? c. Holding i. 7-2 d. Reasoning i. No. The Court relied on the "inevitable discovery doctrine," as it held that the exclusionary rule did not apply to the child's body as evidence since it was clear that the volunteer search teams would have discovered the body even absent R's statements.

Herring v US

a. Facts i. The Coffee County, Alabama Sheriff's Department apprehended D in July of 2004. Upon searching D's vehicle, officers discovered methamphetamine in D's pocket and a gun under the seat of his truck. However, the situation was complicated by the fact that the initial search had been made on a faulty arrest warrant. The warrant, still active in the neighboring Dale County Sheriff's Office, was supposed to have been recalled five months prior, however someone had accidentally failed to remove it from the computer system. D filed a motion to suppress the allegedly "illegally obtained" evidence, however the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama denied D's motion and sentenced him to 27 months in prison. ii. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the conviction, stating that illegally obtained evidence should only be suppressed when doing so could "result in appreciable deterrence" of future police misconduct. In his petition for certiorari, D pointed to an Arkansas case with nearly identical facts that had come out the other way, noting that "as policing becomes ever more reliant on computerized systems, the number of illegal arrests and searches based on negligent recordkeeping is poised to multiply." The Court granted certiorari on February 19, 2008. b. Issue i. Does a court violate the Fourth Amendment rights of a criminal defendant by introducing evidence obtained through a police search based on an arrest warrant that should have been recalled, but was negligently allowed to remain active, at the time of the search? c. Holding i. 5-4, No d. Reasoning i. In a 5-4 decision with Chief Justice John G. Roberts writing for the majority and joined by Justice Antonin G. Scalia, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, Justice Clarence Thomas and Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr., the Supreme Court affirmed the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. It held that a criminal defendant's Fourth Amendment rights are not violated when police mistakes that lead to unlawful searches are merely the result of isolated negligence and "not systematic error or reckless disregard of constitutional requirements." Evidence obtained under these circumstances is admissible and not subject to the exclusionary rule.

Welsh v Wisconsin

a. Facts i. The defendant was arrested at night in his house for operating a motor vehicle while he was intoxicated. This was a non-jailable offense in Wisconsin. The arresting officers did not possess an arrest warrant. The defendant was taken to the police station. The defendant refused to take a breath-analysis test. The trial court concluded that the defendant's arrest was lawful and that the defendant's refusal to take the breath test was not reasonable and was in violation of state law. As a result, the trial court suspended the defendant's operating license (driver's license). The suspension order was vacated by a state appeals court, but the highest state court reinstated the suspension order. b. Issue i. Did the officers' nonconsensual search and seize into D's home violate the 4th? c. Reasoning i. The Court decided 6-2 that D's arrest and suspension of his license was a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Justice William Brennan authored the majority opinion, stating that,"It is axiomatic that the "physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed." And a principal protection against unnecessary intrusions into private dwellings is the warrant requirement imposed by the Fourth Amendment on agents of the government who seek to enter the home for purposes of search or arrest. See Johnson v. United States, It is not surprising, therefore, that the Court has recognized, as"a 'basic principle of Fourth Amendment law[,]' that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable."

US v Leon

a. Facts i. The exclusionary rule requires that evidence illegally seized must be excluded from criminal trials. D was the target of police surveillance based on an anonymous informant's tip. The police applied to a judge for a search warrant of D's home based on the evidence from their surveillance. A judge issued the warrant and the police recovered large quantities of illegal drugs. D was indicted for violating federal drug laws. A judge concluded that the affadavit for the search warrant was insufficient; it did not establish the probable cause necessary to issue the warrant. Thus, the evidence obtained under the warrant could not be introduced at D's trial. b. Issue i. Is there a "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule? c. Holding i. 6-3, Yes d. Reasoning i. Yes, there is such an exception. The justices held that evidence seized on the basis of a mistakenly issued search warrant could be introduced at trial. The exclusionary rule, argued the majority, is not a right but a remedy justified by its ability to deter illegal police conduct. In D, the costs of the exclusionary rule outweighed the benefits. The exclusionary rule is costly to society: Guilty defendants go unpunished and people lose respect for the law. The benefits of the exclusionary rule are uncertain: The rule cannot deter police in a case like D, where they act in good faith on a warrant issued by a judge.

Hayes v Florida

a. Facts i. The police interviewed various people including the Petitioner, about various crimes and the Petitioner became the prime suspect. Several burglary-rapes occurred in Punta Gorda, Florida. The police found latent fingerprints on one of the victim's door knobs. The police also found a footprint near the same victim's front porch. Police officers went to the Petitioner's home to escort him to the police station for fingerprints. The Petitioner was reluctant to accompany the officers to the station and one of them then said they would arrest him. The Petitioner then said that he would rather go to the station than be arrested. The officers also seized a pair of tennis shoes in plain view from the porch. The Petitioner was taken to the police station and his fingerprints were found to match those left at the scene of the crime. ii. The Petitioner moved to suppress the fingerprint evidence, claiming it was a fruit of an illegal detention. The trial court denied the motion. The Petitioner was convicted of burglary and sexual battery. The state court of appeals affirmed the conviction. The court refused to find consent because the threatened arrest was "at best, highly questionable." The court also found the officers did not have probable cause to arrest the Petitioner until after they obtained his fingerprints. However, the court held "analogizing to the stop-and-frisk rule of [Terry v. Ohio], that the officers could transport petitioner to the station house and take his fingerprints on the basis of their reasonable suspicion that he was involved in the crime." The Florida Supreme Court denied review. b. Issue i. "[W]hether the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, applicable to the States by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment, was properly applied by the District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District, to allow police to transport a suspect to the station house for fingerprinting, without his consent and without probable cause or prior judicial authorization." c. Holding i. No, the judgment has to be reversed. "Here, as in [Davis v. Mississippi], there was no probable cause to arrest, no consent to the journey to the police station, and no judicial authorization for such a detention for fingerprinting purposes." "None of our later cases have undercut the holding in Davis that transportation to and investigative detention at the station house without probable cause or judicial authorization together violate the Fourth Amendment." ii. "There is no doubt that at some point in the investigative process, police procedures can qualitatively and quantitatively be so intrusive with respect to a suspect's freedom of movement and privacy interests as to trigger the full protection of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. And our view continues to be that the line is crossed when the police, without probable cause or a warrant, forcibly remove a person from his home or other place in which he is entitled to be and transport him to the police station, where he is detained, although briefly, for investigative purposes. We adhere to the view that such seizures, at least where not under judicial supervision, are sufficiently like arrests to invoke the traditional rule that arrests may constitutionally be made only on probable cause." iii. "[Neither] reasonable suspicion nor probable cause would suffice to permit the officers to make a warrantless entry into a person's house for the purpose of obtaining fingerprint identification." d. Reasoning i. An individual cannot be brought to a police station and fingerprinted without probable cause and a warrant. ii. It is interesting to note the court "do[es] not abandon the suggestion in Davis and Dunaway that under circumscribed procedures, the Fourth Amendment might permit the judiciary to authorize the seizure of a person on less than probable cause and his removal to the police station for the purpose of fingerprinting."

California v Hodari

a. Facts i. Two police officers dressed in street clothes and wearing jackets with the word "Police" on the front and back were on patrol in Oakland, California in an unmarked car. As they approached a group of youths near Foothill Blvd. and 63rd Ave., the youths panicked and ran. One of the officers left the car and ran after D. D tossed away something that looked like a small rock just before the officer tackled him and handcuffed him. The officer retrieved the rock, which turned out to be crack cocaine. ii. At trial, D moved to suppress evidence relating to the cocaine, arguing that the officer obtained it during an unlawful search and seizure. The trial court denied the motion. The California Court of Appeal reversed, holding that D was "seized" when he saw the officer running towards him and that seizure was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The California Supreme Court denied the state's application for review. b. Issue i. Has a person who is not under the physical control of a police officer been "seized" under the Fourth Amendment when the officer is chasing that person? ii. Can a person who is pursued by a police officer avoid prosecution by discarding incriminating evidence and asserting that he did so out of fear of an unlawful search? c. Holding i. 7-2 d. Reasoning i. No. No. Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for a 7-2 majority, reversed and remanded. The Supreme Court held that a Fourth Amendment seizure requires some sort of physical force with lawful authority, or submission to an assertion of authority. D had not been touched when he discarded the cocaine, and had not submitted to authority because he was still attempting to escape. ii. Justice John Paul Stevens dissented, writing that a seizure takes place when a police officer conveys the message that a citizen is not free to leave. In this situation, when the officer started chasing D, he made it clear that D was not free to leave. Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent.

Atwater v City of Lago Vista

a. Facts i. Under Texas law, it is a misdemeanor, punishable only by a fine, either for a front-seat passenger in a car equipped with safety belts not to wear one or for the driver to fail to secure any small child riding in front. In 1997, D was driving her truck in location. Neither of D's children, who were sitting in the front seat, was wearing seatbelts. A policeman Bart Turek observed the violations and pulled D over. Ultimately, D was handcuffed, placed in jail, and released on bond. D then filed suit alleging that Turek's actions had violated her Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure. In granting the city summary judgment, the District Court ruled the claim meritless. In affirming, the en banc Court of Appeals held that the arrest was not unreasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes because no one disputed that Turek had probable cause to arrest D, and there was no evidence the arrest was conducted in an extraordinary manner, unusually harmful to D's privacy interests. b. Issue i. Does the Fourth Amendment, either by incorporating common-law restrictions on misdemeanor arrests or otherwise, limit a police officer's authority to arrest without warrant for minor criminal offenses? c. Holding i. 5-4 d. Reasoning i. No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment does not forbid a warrantless arrest for a minor criminal offense, such as a misdemeanor seatbelt violation punishable only by a fine. "If an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender," wrote Justice Souter for the Court. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's dissenting opinion argued that the Court's decision "neglects the Fourth Amendment's express command in the name of administrative ease" and thus "cloaks the pointless indignity that D suffered with the mantle of reasonableness."

Virginia v Moore

a. Facts i. Virginia police stopped D after receiving a radio call alerting them that he was driving on a suspended license. State law specified the procedure for punishing that infraction: issuance of a citation and summons to appear in court. The officers instead decided to arrest D. After reading D his Miranda rights, they asked for and received consent to search his hotel room. Once they arrived at the room, they decided to search his person and discovered sixteen grams of crack cocaine. D was then charged with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. ii. At trial court, D's attorney sought to suppress the cocaine evidence, arguing that it was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The trial court allowed the evidence to be presented and D was convicted. On appeal, the Virginia Supreme Court held that the introduction of the cocaine evidence at trial was unconstitutional. b. Issue i. Does the Fourth Amendment require the suppression of evidence obtained incident to an arrest when the arrest violates a provision of state law? c. Holding i. 9-0 d. Reasoning i. The Court held unanimously that the search did not violate D's constitutional rights. Writing for an eight justice majority (with Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg concurring), Justice Antonin Scalia stated that the existence of probable cause gives an arresting officer the right to perform a reasonable search of the accused to ensure the officer's safety and to safeguard evidence. States may impose stricter search and seizure requirements, Scalia wrote, but "when states go above the Fourth Amendment minimum, the Constitution's protections concerning search and seizure remain the same."