developmental psychology

Animal work shows that A not B performance is governed by the PFC:

"The unoperated infant monkey progressed through increasingly long delays on at a rapid rate. ... In contrast, the infant monkeys with lesions of dorsolateral prefrontal cortex showed no evidence of passing at delays of 2,5, or 10 sec even by the end of their testing. Thus, in infant monkeys, as in adult monkeys, lesions of dorsolateral prefrontal cortex produced a profound deficit on the A-not-B task as long as any demand whatsoever was placed on memory." Diamond, 1990

early work on attachment: Ainsworth

insworth also introduced the concept of styles of attachment. The Strange situation •A very famous observation study to explore attachment styles in infants (Ainsworth & Bell, 1970). • •Used at 12 - 24 months to measure attachment ● 1.Mother, infant & experimenter in room 2.Mother & infant play 3.Stranger enters, talks to mum, plays with infant 4.Mum leaves. Stranger plays with baby. 5.Mum returns. Stranger leaves. Mum settles infant. 6.Mum leaves: infant alone 7.Stranger comes in, tries to settle infant, then stands back. 8.Mum returns. Stranger leave. Mum settles infant •Episodes 5 and 8 are 'reunions'. How does infant react on reunions with mum? These are scored every 15 seconds, on a scale of 1-7 intensity. 1.Proximity and contacting seeking 2.Contact maintaining 3.Avoidance of proximity and contact 4.Resistance to contact and comforting Does infant use mum as a base to explore from at the start? e.g. Infant plays with toys e.g. Infant moves around room How does the infant behave when mother is absent? e.g. Infant looks at or goes to door Type A- insecure avoidant (approx 20% of children) •Does not play much with mother. • •Is not distressed by her absence; plays happily with stranger. • •Avoids interactions with mother even during reunions. Can be comforted by either mother or stranger. • •These children operate independently of their attachment figure. She may not be responding to their needs adequately (Ainsworth, 1979). This strategy minimises possible negative reactions from the parent (ie. can't get band response if they don't care) . Type B - secure attachment •Uses mother as a secure base for exploration. • •Plays with stranger only when mum is there. Distressed when mum leaves. Happy to see her return and is easily calmed down from any distress related to her absence. If child is not too distressed will still acknowledge mother coming back. • •These children possess a "representational model of attachment figures(s) as being available, responsive, and helpful". Type C- insecure resistant/ insecure ambivalent •Less exploration than average. • •Very distressed by mother's absence. Afraid of stranger. • •When mother returns, seeks contact with her but also shows resistance (e.g. pushing away). semi-contracdictory. • •The child is at the same time clingy and resistant. Perhaps the mother has given inconsistent responses to the child. This strategy of focus on the parent clearly demonstrates to the parent the need for greater responsiveness. Type D- insecure disordered •This was introduced by Main & Solomon (1986). (approx 5% of children) • •No consistent/ organised, obvious strategy for gaining contact with mother or for being soothed and comforted. • •Contradictory behaviour (e.g. cries a lot but then indifferent). • •Misdirected behaviour (going to stranger rather then parent on reunion). • •Freezing or fear of parent. "The parent is at the same time the source of fright as well as the only potential haven of safety". "Fright without solution" (quotes from van Izendoorn et al, 1999). • •Related to drug abuse, maltreatment etc -- but not always. New data Original data (Ainsworth & Bell, 1970) •Using ABC system •Non-clinical middle class US families New Meta-analysis (van IJzendoorn et al, 1999) Using ABCD system Non-clinical middle class US families % of infants in each category Original Newer Secure 70 62 Avoidant 20 15 Resistant/Ambivalent 10 9 Disorganised x 15 we can see in the newer data this disorganised attachment type appears to 'mop up' children that would have been previously categorised in the other attachment styles.

Overview of piaget

1.Learning processes ● 2.Sensorimotor stage (0-2 yrs) ● 3.Pre-operational stage (2-7 yrs) & concrete operational stage (7-11 yrs) ● 4.Formal operational stage (11+yrs) ● 5.Criticisms

TOM: the Sally Anne Task

85% of typically developing children passed the task. • •86% of individuals with Down syndrome passed. Only 20% of children with ASD passed. • •But note that some passed! So ToM can't account for everything. • •ASD participants complete the TOM task in a verbally mediated way (Happé, 1995). verbal mental age highly correlated with passing Sally-anne task

Morality in babies

A moral sense, which evolved to help collective action, should encompass three abilities (Hamlin, 2013): •Moral goodness: feeling concern for others despite moral costs (empathy). •Moral evaluation: identifying and disliking uncooperative others - this involves analysing others' behaviours. •Moral retribution: punishing those who misbehave. Moral goodness •Feeling concern for others despite moral costs (empathy). • •By 13-14 months, we can see prosocial behaviour - designed to help someone else - such as sharing, showing, comforting a child in distress (Hastings, 2007)

Weak central coherence and ASD

ASD people have more localised than global processing style •Processing style •Global vs. local •Local, detail-focused processing style in ASD (Frith & Happe, 1994) •Features perceived at the expense of global configuration and meaning. Accounts for strengths as well as weaknesses in ASD. •Poor performance on tasks requiring recognition of global meaning or integration of stimuli in context (Navon figures). •Good performance where attention to local information helps (Embedded figures). Children with autism perform badly on planning task

Spelke: core knowledge

According to this theory, infants: •Have an understanding of objects which is independent of action, and understand some key physical properties of objects. • •Represent the rough number of objects present in a display. • •Have basic mechanisms for representing the spatial layout of their environments. • •These domains operate independently of one another until later in childhood when they are bound together by language.

Motion perception

At what age can babies detect a change of direction? Looming view at birth( like looking down a tunnel) the white space will be going up and then it will change direction and go down. stroboscopic is strobe lights so it is like you're viewing lots of still images in succession.

Visuospatial tasks

Both individuals with DS and WS struggle in this domain, but in different ways: •WS show difficulties with construction tasks, such as ones used as part of the WISC: • •What impact might this have on assessments of IQ? •These skills also impact on everyday activities like drawing and/navigation. have to draw a D shape comprised of the letter Y Williams make the Y shape -specific detail whereas downs make the D shape. - big picture Visuospatial v Language: WS Bellugi et al., 2000 people with Williams syndrome greatly struggle with cube orientation and spatial awareness hers people with downs struggle much less In this task WS could explain the different parts of the body but not draw the elephant

Early Work on attachment: Bowlby

Bowlby, 1958 •Proposed infants have an innate drive to form a close relationship with a caregiver. (not learnt simply born with) •Infant produces 'social releaser' behaviours: sucking, clinging, crying, smiling, following - which elicit care from the caregiver. (social releasers fulfil the innate drive for closeness) •Only mother will do: monotropy •This bond serves as the model for other relationships. •Maternal Deprivation Hypothesis: breaking this bond any time in the first 5 years of life can lead to profound cognitive, social, and emotional consequences - e.g. aggression, depression, delinquency (lack of emphasis on the bond with the father) Bowlby, 1969 Birth - 6 weeks Preattachment phase Orienting & signaling to anyone 6 weeks - 6-8 months Attachment in the making Increasingly orienting to and seeking comfort from primary caregiver. 6-8 months - 18-24 months 'Clear cut' attachment. Stays close to primary caregiver. Separation protest; fear of strangers. 18-24 months +. Formation of reciprocal relationship With mother/caregiver. Child increasingly accommodates mother's needs. Reduction in immediate proximity-seeking; development of internal working model of relationship. Child becomes increasingly aware of the mother's needs as an individual. •This internal working model captures the child's beliefs about how trustworthy others are; their own value; and their own social effectiveness.

developing object permanence

By the end of the sensorimotor stage, the child achieves object permanence - she realises that objects exist independently of the infant and her actions. • •4 - 8 months. Initially, "Laurent's reaction to falling objects still seems to be non-existent: he does not follow with his eyes any of the objects which I drop in front of him." 'out of sight, out of mind' • •8-12 months. The child knows that occluded objects still exist (basic "object permanence"): "Laurent searches in front of him for a paper ball which I drop above the coverlet.". However.. • •.. the child is still subject to the A not B error. "Suppose an object is hidden at point A: the child searches for it and finds it. Next the object is placed in B and is covered before the child's eyes; although the child has continued to watch the object and has seen it disappear in B, he nevertheless immediately tries to find it in A!' • •So, objects exist in relation to the action of retrieving them. •12-18 months, children solve the A-not-B task, understanding that invisible objects exist. But they don't understand that invisible objects can move. At 18-24 months, they can imagine even hidden objects moving - they have achieved symbolic representation: knowledge independent of action.

Summary of attachment

Different styles of attachment have been proposed, pretty much all of which are based on the Strange Situation. • •Early attachment styles are predictive of many later domains of behaviour. • •Genetics do not seem to play a very big role - more likely more about environment. •

summary of attachment

Different styles of attachment have been proposed, pretty much all of which are based on the Strange Situation. • •Early attachment styles are predictive of many later domains of behaviour. • •Genetics do not seem to play a very big role - more likely more about environment. • •For fun: You could take an attachment style quiz and see how you do. Do you think it's accurate? Why/not? Think about how you approach your own relationships with others. What do you think your biggest influences were?

Moral intuitions

Do we really operate according to principles which can be stated easily like this? no •Do we even operate consistently in different situations? no •Are we morally 'rational' or 'irrational'? both The trolley problem Case 1: A trolley is running out of control down a track. In its path are five people who have been tied to the track by a mad philosopher. Fortunately, you could flip a switch, which will lead the trolley down a different track to safety. Unfortunately, there is a single person tied to that track. Should you flip the switch or do nothing? ('Spur', Foot, 1967) The common intuition is that it was ok to flip the switch. Case 2: You are standing on the side of the railway with your fat friend, Bob, watching a trolley hurtling towards five people. Bob is fat enough that if you push him in front of the trolley, you know that he will stop it, though he will be killed in the process. Should you push him? (Fat Man, Jarvis Thomson, 1976) If asked to compare case one ('spur') and case 2 ('fat man') most people will say that the switch is morally permissible whereas pushing the man isn't. THINK: Why might there be a difference between these cases? [Switch: OK. Pushing: NOT OK.] •The consequences of an action are all that matter? X no intention matters too- actively intending to harm someone (in case 2) is different than preventing the harm of others by passively avoiding it (not without consequence) • •'The doctrine of the double effect' -there is a moral difference between intending harm (kill the fat man) and foreseeing that it will will happen as a result of your intentions (in spur, your friend dies). • •But people think it is ok to kill the fat man if you don't do it at close physical quarters, but rather by opening a trapdoor by remote control. Edmonds, 2014 Moral intuitions •Perhaps we do NOT have a set of easily-explainable moral principles! • •Instead we have hardwired moral intuitions resulting from evolutionary processes (Mikhail, 2011; Haidt 2001; Singer 2009). • •The responses to these kind of dilemmas are very consistent across culture (Mikhail, 2007). • •Back to children! Do they have moral intuition?

Modern views of motor development

Dynamic systems: Motor abilities are present earlier than previously thought. However, their expression is limited by other factors: physical development, experience with motor programs and the visuomotor environment. • •This view was pioneered by Esther Thelen in the 1980's and is more recently held by Karen Adolph (NYU). (e.g. Thelen, 1984; Adolph, 2000). •Flexible timing, individual differences. Children are in two stages at once; regress from one to another; skip stages - continuous, not stage-like change (Piek, 2006; Adolph & Berger, 2006). There are individual differences between infants , the modern approach takes this in to account much better. Children can be in 2 stages at once, skip stages or regress. This shows that the modern approach is much less fixed. African and Caribbean practices (Adolph et al 2010) : •Support for sitting from hole in the ground; sand; cushions (Ainsworth, 1967; Super, 1976). • •Support for walking from vigorous bouncing ("kitwalse" - to make jump) (Super, 1976); luring with food (Konner, 1977). • •Burying up to knees on a sandy beach at 1 year (Hopkins & Westra, 1988). • •Massage & exercise (Bril & Sabatier 1986; Rabain-Jamin & Wornham, 1993). • •More data needed! Importance of experience motor programs are the experience of actually doing something •Infants take around 9000 steps per day = 29 football fields (Adolph, 2005, 2012) babies were put at the top of the slope, the experience they had with walking pr crawling was inversely proportional to the number of errors made. suggesting more experience less errors. 'The visual cliff' Gibson & Walk, 1960 •Child (6-14 months) placed on centre board, mum at shallow side. Child crawls to mum. • Child placed on centre board, mum at deep side. Touch indicates safety, but visual cues indicate depth drop. Child refuses to crawl to mum •At 7-8 months, the visual cliff is avoided by: 35% inexperienced crawlers (11 days); 65% of experienced crawlers (41 days) (Berthenthal, Campos & Barrett, 1984). • •Successful performance in a similar paradigm is dependent on experience in that posture (sitting vs crawling) (Adolph, 2000). • •For humans, experience is necessary for learning the visual cues to depth and feeding them into motor plans. • •experience may not be so crucial for all animals: to develop visual cues. 1 day chick, goat 3-4 weeks rat, cat 6-10 months human Does physical context determine motor behaviour? (Thelen, Fisher & Ridley-Johnson, 1984) •12 infants aged 4 weeks old, baby held over a table top for 1 minute • •Usually by this age the newborn stepping reflex is disappearing (totally by ~8weeks). • •This was thought to be a result of inevitable neural maturation. But can it in fact be altered by physical context? • Stepping with weights decreased stepping frequency. Stepping in water increased stepping frequency, as (buoyancy counteracts gravity). • •Stepping is limited by muscle strength as well as central factors.

Bell & Fox, 1992

EEG differences in 7-12 month old infants who can vs those who cannot solve the A not B task after a long delay: • Power of EEG signal at frontal electrodes (lots of change in strong group) • Coherence of EEG signal between front and back electrodes • à Individual differences in brain activity (related to maturation of PFC) explain some of the individual differences in A not B performance

early work on attachment: Harlow

Harlow showed that monkeys need 'contact comfort' from mother - not just food (going against idea of classical conditioning that mum is associated with food and thus bond, pavlovian) . •There is an interesting review paper of his work, compared to the other theorists we will be discussing in this lecture. A shift: Margaret Ainsworth •Ainsworth (1963, 1967) is one of the leading names in attachment theory. • •She initially worked with Bowlby in London, but went on to conduct research in other cultures, e.g. Uganda. •Her studies led Bowlby (1969) to change his ideas and conclude that infants can have more than 1 attachment figure. •Infants in the UK also multiply attached - 87% by 18 months (Shafer & Emerson, 1964). (this goes against bowlby's ideas of one singular attachment between these ages)

Extreme male brain and ASD

Higher incidence of ASD in males than females • •Biological difference: increased testosterone in womb (F < M < ASD) • •Empathising: "the drive to identify another person's emotions and thoughts, and to respond to these with an appropriate emotion" •"Female brain": empathising better than systemising • •Systemising: "the drive to analyse the variables in a system, to derive the underlying rules that govern the behaviour of a system. Systemising also refers to the drive to construct systems." •"Male brain" : systemising better than empathising • •"It is as though they are trying to systemise social behaviour when the natural approach to socialising should be via empathising" Female ASD: •Theory of mind •Discriminating emotions from eyes •Eye contact •Empathy Quotient Male ASD: •Special / 'savant' abilities •Attention to detail •Structured, rule-based, factual information •Collecting items •Systematising quotient Criticisms: •ASD in females • •Poor evidence for testosterone link • •Poor evidence for male-female differences in typical population

Kellman and Spelke

If you cover an object a baby won't search for it, according to Piaget's theory this is because babies have no representation of the object when it is not visible. Kellmen and Spelke's study is a direct contradiction of that. They habituated babies to see a rod behind a block, looked longer when they saw the broken rod, suggesting they knew that this was different from the rod behind the block and not what the baby was expecting. habituation is the point at which you've looked at something and stopped paying attention to it. dishabituation is the new novel item that the individual pays more attention to.

resolution 1: dualist theories

Implicit v Explicit understanding of theory of mind (e.g. Clements & Perner, 1994): these are qualitatively different types of understanding, with implicit developing before explicit. explicit TOM means you can articulate it, this appears at 4 years old when you can articulate false beliefs •Implicit TOM emerges before 4 years (looking time; pretend play, deception). Characterised as: • •Perner & Ruffman (2005): Understanding behaviour but not mental states: "People look for an object where they last saw it"? • •Wellman & Woolley, 1992: Understanding the 'simple desires' of another person - knowing what the other person wants, but not especially why, or what beliefs they might hold about it. Able to predict what someone might do, but not for example why they might look in the wrong place. •Explicit, verbal performance only emerges at 4 years (e.g. false belief). Characterised as: • •Theory theory (Wellman, 1990): Children and adults really theorise about others' mental states. This allows them to generate new hypotheses about mental states. • •Simulation theory (Harris, 1991): Children and adults merely imagine themselves in the shoes of another person. • •Modularity theory (Baron-Cohen, 1995): TOM is an innate human cognitive capacity (though one that needs to mature). The "theory of mind module" can be impaired in developmental disorders (More next week).

Preoperational stage 2-7 yrs Concrete operational stage 7-11 yrs Pre-operational vs concrete operational thought

In the early part of the pre-operational stage, the pre-conceptual period (2-4 yrs), there is a rapid increase in language, which according to Piaget arises from the symbolic thought they are now capable of. One can see symbolic thought in e.g. make-believe play, deferred imitation. • •However, these children are unable to manipulate concepts. This can be seen in a number of key tasks. • •The ability to pass these tasks in an intuitive way develops by the end of the preoperational period (5-7 years), but logical justification is only given later, in the concrete operational stage (7-11 years).

language in DS and WS

Individuals with WS have a higher language ability than children with DS matched for overall IQ (Jarrold et al., 1998) •Language falls above full scale IQ in WS and the opposite is apparent in DS (see Gunn & Crombie, 1996; Jarrold et al., 1998.•In WS, language is a relative strength (Bellugi et al., 1990; Karmiloff-Smith et al., 1995). But... ••"In our view, it remains questionable as to whether any aspect of language— syntax, semantics, phonology, or pragmatics—is intact in WS." (Karmiloff-Smith et al., 2003)

Summary: WS v. DS

Intelligence is low in both disorders; there is more change in DS than WS. • •Language is relatively good in WS compared with DS. • •Visuospatial skills are good spared in DS compared with WS. • •Social behaviour is very friendly in both WS and DS.

Moral dilemmas

Jon accidentally broke 15 cups. Henry purposely broke one cup. Who is naughtier? •Heteronomous children (5-10 years) say John is naughtier because he broke more cups, i.e. focus on the consequences of actions. •Autonomous children (10 years +) say Henry is naughtier because he intended to break the cup, i.e. focus on the intentions of actions. So you can see that there is a shift in focus as the child grows up from the consequences of the action to the intention of the action.

Levels of morality Levels and their stages

Level 1 (Pre-Conventional) 1. Heteronomous morality: Obedience and punishment orientation (Avoiding punishment and focus is still on consequences) 2. Individualistic, Instrumental morality: Self-interest orientation (What's in it for me?) Level 2 (Conventional) 3. Interpersonally normative morality: Interpersonal accord and conformity (Appearing like a 'good boy') 4. Social system morality: Authority and maintaining social-order (Law and order) Level 3 (Post-Conventional) 5. Human right and social welfare morality: evaluating that laws are in accord with human rights & values (Uphold the spirit of social contract) - you follow laws not necessarily to the letter 6. Morality of the Universalizable, Reversible, Prescriptive General Ethical Principles: Universal ethical principles (Principled conscience) over law. People like Martin Luther King and Ghandi

Environment: early experiences

Maternal deprivation hypothesis (Bowlby) •Infants should have "continuous relationship with mother", especially at 6 months - 3 yrs. Infants deprived of this will risk poor outcomes. Separation included even short separations (e.g. part-time work). Historical context •Maternal Care and Mental Health, 1951 (WHO) •Child Care and the Growth of Love, 1953 •Children in institutions in postwar Europe, with little sensory stimulation & social contact. •Lack of jobs in post-war period meant mothers not encouraged to work. •THINK: what effect might paternity laws in the UK have? Current perspectives on childminding & attachment •Children attached normally to parent (Clarke-Stewart et al 1994). •Children also attached securely to caregiver, who is more sensitive than either parent (Goosens, van Ijzendoorn 1990). • An aside on childcare: Major study: National Institute of Child Health and Human Development (NICHD), 2006 •High quality care is related to better linguistic and cognitive scores in primary school, until 11 years. •More childcare (irrespective of quality) associated with more aggression - still significant by 12 years. environment: maternal sensitivity •So a constant relationship with mother does not determine attachment. What does? • •Maternal sensitivity hypothesis (Bowlby/Ainsworth) suggests that the mother's responses to the infant determine their attachment. • •Promptness, appropriateness & completeness of responses. • •These ratings of maternal sensitivity correlate somewhat with attachment (De Wolff & van Ijzendoorn, 1997: r=.24). • •Interventions to improve sensitivity improve attachment (Bakermans-Kranenburg, van Ijzendoorn & Juffer 2003). mind-mindedness (Meins et al ,2001) •Suggested that sensitivity is a very broad measure and not predictive enough - e.g. does not predict whether an infant will be insecure-avoidant or insecure-ambivalent. • •Specifically focussed on the content of the responses, rather than their promptness. • •Do they indicate that the mother understands her infant as "a mental agent, capable of intentional action"? • •This would allow her to make appropriate infant-directed responses and actions.

measures

Maternal responsiveness to change in infant's direction of gaze. •Maternal responsiveness to infant's object-directed action •M looks at, picks up, or talks about object of infant's attention •Imitation; Encouragement of autonomy •She interprets infant as intentional agent •Appropriate mind-related comments "Which do you prefer?" "Are you bored?" "You're joking!" "She says, 'Mummy roll me back over'" THINK: issues with subjectivity in this data? Maternal responsiveness to infant's object-directed action Related to attachment security Appropriate mind-related comments Strongly related to attachment security, more so than sensitivity, and discriminates between insecure avoidance and insecure ambivalent groups. What are the latter effects of early attachment style? •Secure attachment at 12 months predicts (Oppenheim et al 1988): -curiosity & problem solving at 2 yrs -social confidence at nursery at 3 yrs -empathy & independence at 5 yrs •But SS classification isn't stable across 6 months (Belsky et al 1996); 46% stability from 15 to 36 months (NICHD Early child Care Research Network 2001). •Adult attachment interview classifies adults as Autonomous, Dismissing, Preoccupied, Unresolved. • •Does SS classification in childhood predict Adult Attachment? -72% yes, but about 22% changed classification, and 44% of those experiencing negative life events (Waters et al 2000). -77% yes (Hamilton, 2000) -Not in a high risk sample - changes in classification particularly linked to maltreatment, maternal depression, family functioning at age 13 (Weinfeld 2000). -Not in a middle class sample (Lewis 2000). - •Significant discontinuity is present!

Morality by Piaget (1932)

Morality: a set of principles for action which derives from social ideas of right and wrong socially driven •Moral reasoning: cognitive processes underlying the consideration of moral rules, their basis, and their conflicts (complex problems) and where these moral rules come from Methods •Piaget (1932) examined children's moral reasoning using clinical interviews: •Interviewing about games and rules •Posing moral dilemmas Games and rules Piaget approached children in the playground and: 1.Asked them to teach him the rules of the game 2.Played the game with them 3.Watched them playing together 4.Asked where the rules come from and if they could be changed Using this technique he identified three stages of moral development: 0 - 5 years: 'amoral' / 'premoral' Played game, but didn't understand there were rules 5 - 10 years: Heteronomous morality / moral realism Understood rules, but did not understand that they were just rules. "Rules are rules". "Rules have to be obeyed". New rules "would be cheating". inflexible and fixed 10 years +: 'Autonomous morality' / 'moral relativism' Understood that rules are conventional and alterable by social consent rules are flexible and just rules

Seriation & transitive inference

Only concrete operational children are able to sort the sticks in order of length... (seriation) .. or compare two values by using their relations to an intermediate value (transitive inference). eg is A is longer than B and B is longer than C which one is bigger A or C?

Egocentrism and perspective taking

What does the array look like to the doll? Choice from an array of photographs. Preoperational children (4-5 yrs) choose the picture matching their own perspective - "egocentrism." • •By 7-8 yrs (concrete operations) they choose correctly. • •According to Piaget this shows that 'decentration' has occurred: This is the ability to consider a situation from different perspectives, or from more than one perspective at once.

individual differences

Origin of individual differences: genes? •From 110 twin pairs assessed in the strange situation, genetics explained only 14% of the variance (O'Connor & Croft, 2001).This suggests genetics does not have any real effect so must be environment. •What other factors might influence attachment? •How would you test these? Environment: cross-cultural variation •Different cultural norms can lead to different classifications on the strange situation. •Ijzendoorn's group have conducted reviews of the cross-cultural literature in different decades. secure most common in each country •van Ijzendoorn & Kroonenberg, 1988: Higher Type A (avoidant) in Germany (emphasis on independence in culture) ; Higher Type C in Japan & Israel (more stay at home mothers) •But Intracultural variation is 1.5 times higher.

ASD-Difficulties in social communication & interaction

Persistent deficits in social communication and social interaction across multiple contexts, as manifested by the following, currently or by history (examples are illustrative, not exhaustive, see text): •1. Deficits in social-emotional reciprocity, ranging, for example, from abnormal social approach and failure of normal back-and-forth conversation; to reduced sharing of interests, emotions, or affect; to failure to initiate or respond to social interactions. •2. Deficits in nonverbal communicative behaviours used for social interaction, ranging, for example, from poorly integrated verbal and nonverbal communication; to abnormalities in eye contact and body language or deficits in understanding and use of gestures; to a total lack of facial expressions and nonverbal communication. •3. Deficits in developing, maintaining, and understanding relationships, ranging, for example, from difficulties adjusting behaviour to suit various social contexts; to difficulties in sharing imaginative play or in making friends; to absence of interest in peers.

Depth perception

Pictoral cues develop early •Stereopsis: the perception of depth through noticing differences between the images in the two eyes ('binocular disparity'). • •Activity: oFocus on your finger; close one eye, then the other. oNow move your finger closer and repeat. What do you notice? Braddick & Atkinson, 1983- red and green cinema goggles, can compare depth changes with different colour eye goggles (red green) with those from red red eye goggles. at what age can we see a difference from red green and red red in depth perception. This is stereo-activity. 11-13 weeks. Perception of depth by shifting some bars laterally See whether VEP responses are visible at different ages

Williams Syndrome

Prevalence 1:20,000 approx •Some reports of 1:7,500 (Stromme et al., 2002) • •Sporadic genetic disorder (v. rarely runs in families) • •Deletion of approx 25-28 genes on chromosome 7 •Main gene affected/implicated is the elastin gene. WS phenotype • Medical •Feeding difficulties and failure to thrive as newborn- failure to reach normal developmental milestones ta the same time as other children •Extreme heart and blood vessel abnormalities (SVAS) •Hyperacusis (sensitive hearing)- makes it difficult to sleep • •Physical •Facial dysmorphology- more prominent eyes than down syndrome , bulbous, less wide noses •Short height / stature

ASD Restricted & repetitive behaviours

Restricted, repetitive patterns of behavior, interests, or activities, as manifested by at least two of the following, currently or by history (examples are illustrative, not exhaustive; see text): •1. Stereotyped or repetitive motor movements, use of objects, or speech (e.g., simple motor stereotypies, lining up toys or flipping objects, echolalia, idiosyncratic phrases). •2. Insistence on sameness, inflexible adherence to routines, or ritualized patterns or verbal nonverbal behavior (e.g., extreme distress at small changes, difficulties with transitions, rigid thinking patterns, greeting rituals, need to take same route or eat food every day). •3. Highly restricted, fixated interests that are abnormal in intensity or focus (e.g, strong attachment to or preoccupation with unusual objects, excessively circumscribed or perseverative interest). •4. Hyper- or hyporeactivity to sensory input or unusual interests in sensory aspects of the environment (e.g., apparent indifference to pain/temperature, adverse response to specific sounds or textures, excessive smelling or touching of objects, visual fascination with lights or movement).

comparison of approaches

Spelke "Core knowledge" • •Knowledge is innate. • •Knowledge is domain specific. • •Learning as consolidation & enrichment of the starting position. • •Learning through language & symbol systems. Gopnik "Infant Scientist" • •Some innate knowledge. • •Knowledge is not domain specific. • •Learning can fundamentally alter the existing understanding. • •Learning through exploration & seeking out evidence.

is the pfc the central executive?

The PFC changes throughout childhood and into adolescence - including synaptic pruning (when synapses are not used eg such as all the different phonemes babies can distinguish, they will loose these synapses) ; increased myelination & connectivity; increase & subsequent decrease in gray matter (Giedd et al, 1999) This connectivity may be why the central executive cannot be pinned down to one area yet but research suggests more of a network. Huge increase in myelination observed in first year of life, and latest to develop in frontal lobes (Deoni et al 2011).

introduction to theory of mind

The ability to attribute mental states (desires, attitudes & beliefs) to oneself and others (Premack & Woodruff, 1978). • •"Theory of mind underlies the ability to explain, predict, and interpret actions and speech by attributing mental states - such as beliefs, desires, intentions and emotions - to oneself and to other people." (Astington & Hughes (2013), in Zelazo (Ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Developmental Psychology, Vol 2.) •This involves understanding alternative perspectives and decentering from egocentric representations (Piaget). Theory of mind is the idea of working out what someone else is thinking/feeling in a given situation. This means understanding someone's perspective and moving away form an egocentric view of the world. •A theory because we can't directly see or measure someone else's mind • •And a theory because it has predictive value : getting the right present .. OR, I think she is angry, so I'd better leave...its predictive also because you think what might happen if I don't leave • •THINK: When do you need a theory of mind? When has someone else demonstrated a theory of mind to you? seeing other people's perspective imagine play being invested in characters in books/ tv

Executive function and the A not B error

The most famous EF task in infancy is the A not B task •At 8-12 months, the child makes a perseverative error, continuing to search at A after the object moves to B. With age, errors decrease, as does the delay period over which the child will search correctly. •children will continue to look in A even if see someone hide it in B, because they get 'stuck' as only used to having it be placed in A. •This demonstrates difficulties in set-shifting, inhibition and working memory. with younger children, the longer they wait to do the task the harder it is for them to find the object, this is the delay period.

stage like development

These processes produce development in identifiable stages which are qualitatively dissociable: Birth-2yrs Sensorimotor Stage 2-7yrs Preoperational Stage 7-11yrs Concrete Operational stage 11 yrs -> Formal Operational stage The sensorimotor stage 0-2 yrs •During this stage, the child has a very limited number of skills at her disposal, which develop: -Sensory abilities (vision, touch, hearing, etc) -Motor & Sensorimotor abilities - •Gradually, these allow for the development of cognition - understanding & representing the surrounding world.

earlier developments

Things we can see children doing which involve theory of mind without theory of mind tasks •Deception •Pretend play (appearance-reality) •Jokes •Prosocial behaviour •Cooperation Dunn 1988, Chandler 1988 Looking tasks (Woodward 1998) •Do infants attend to "aspects of an action that are related to the goals of the actor"? • •A 9 month old baby watches a hand reaching for an object - then the hand reaches for the same object (goal) in a different location, or a different object (goal) in the same location. •Results: 9-month-olds look longer to the new goal than the new location. 5-month-olds do not show these effects. • •Conclusion: By 6-9 months, infants perceive not just movement paths, but the relation between an human agent and a goal. • •They seem to infer the intentions of the actor (her mental state). • •[This competence is also taken as an example of Spelke's 'core knowledge' of actions and agents. ] This is an example of how a child understands the relationship between a human agent and a goal they had

Executive function and ASD

Umbrella term, high order control processes: •Planning •Inhibition •Cognitive flexibility (set-shifting) •Multitasking •Working memory; attention • •Lower in ASD (Ozonoff & Jensen, 1999; Hill, 2004)

Formal Operational Period 11 years +

Verbal reasoning •In this stage, children can reason logically about objects that are not currently present. • •They can also conduct verbal reasoning, which deals with logical thought about totally hypothetical scenarios. 'Edith is fairer than Susan. Edith is darker than Lily. Who is the darkest?'

perceptual and motor development

Visual processing takes over half of our brains! • •We can study separable aspects of this, and we can use neuroimaging to measure their development in an exact manner. • •Many of these studies have not used a whole EEG net, but two electrodes. • •The scalp activity recorded as a result of visual stimuli is called 'Visual Evoked Potentials'.

Social context and learning

Vygotsky (1896-1934) was a Russian Psychologist writing in the 1920's and 1930's. His work was translated into English in the 1960's. • •The individual constructs knowledge - not through solitary interaction with the world, but in a social context. • •"What a child can do in co-operation today he can do alone tomorrow". • •She uses tools provided by culture: real tools (pens, paper) & symbolic tools (maths, language). • •And she is taught by others. •The learner has a Zone of Proximal Development. • •"Distance between the actual developmental level as determined by independent problem solving and the level of potential development as determined through problem solving under adult guidance, or in collaboration with more capable peers." • •The teacher provides 'scaffolding' for learning (Wood et al 1976 ; Bruner, 1986).

intelligence in WS and DS

WS: Full scale IQ scores in of 40-90 (mean 55) (Bellugi et al., 2000). Mild-moderate learning difficulty (Searcy et al., 2004). •DS: By adulthood IQ is generally in moderate to severely delayed range (e.g. IQ=25-55) Williams people have higher IQ than downs •WS: Not much change in IQ over development, but lots of individual differences (Mervis et al 2012). • •DS: Differences between domains of skill are relatively small, and are magnified as the children age and develop. There are therefore developmental changes in the DS cognitive phenotype. This shows correlation between chronological age and IQ score. great variability in WS people.

morality conclusions

While we can see some stage-like progression in moral reasoning (Piaget & Kohlberg), we can also suppose that there are innate, evolved moral drives and intuitions. Maybe we have two modes of thought (Kahneman, 2012): emotion (fast system) vs reason/calculation (slow system) Arguably, children and adults are both morally rational and morally irrational

ASD heterogenity

You can see from the list of diagnostic criteria that ASD is an extremely heterogeneous disorder. • •It's important to note that we do not know what causes autism. No specific genes have consistently and unrefutedly been identified. heterogeneity means its passed from parent to child - however unknown cause Deficit in Theory of Mind (TOM)? • •Poor Executive function? • •Weak Central Coherence? • •Extreme male brain? •

developing sensorimotor schema

a) a primary circular reaction with both the action and the response involving the infants own body involving the infants own body (eg thumb sucking) 0-4 months b) secondary circular reaction - action gets a response from another person leading to repitition of the action- 4-8months c)tertiary circular reaction action gets one pleasing result leading baby to perform similar actions to get similar results 12-18months

Orientation perception

everything is in different orientations, we show pictures with different grates and looking using a scanner at when there is activity produced by orientational changes. we can compare the response form random changes to those from orientation changes. Braddick found this was produces at 3 weeks.

inhibition

ohnstone, Barry, and Clarke (2007) •At 7 - 12 years, little or no developmental change in behavioral measures on Go/No-Go and Stop tasks •But important changes in the neural mechanisms that accompanied performance. For instance, the central and parietal ''No- Go'' N2 component decreased in amplitude with age, whereas the parietal ''Stop'' N2 component increased in amplitude with age across this developmental period. •"Tracing neurodevelopmental trajectories provides an additional layer at which executive control mechanisms can be distinguished." Astle & Scerif, 2009 Jonkman, Sniedt , Kemner 2007 Go/NoGo task 6-7yrs, 9-10 yrs, adult Press a button when the letter X appeared, but only when it was preceded by the A (Go condition). When an A is followed by another letter, inhibit your prepared response (A-not-X, NoGo condition). percentage detected targets: lower in younger ages ( ie older people are better at the task) percentage false alarms (button press by mistake): same at 6-7yrs, 9-10yrs; less in adults. •"Tracing neurodevelopmental trajectories provides an additional layer at which executive control mechanisms can be distinguished." Astle & Scerif, 2009

'agents and actions'

re essentially intentions The baby understand that the grabbing hand is going towards the teddy, but then iff it grabs something else unexpectedly the baby looks longer, than if just the teddy is grabbed. the infant understands that the hand was going for the teddy. This is studied through looking time and we have to be careful about this because there is a lot of inferences. thus we must critically look at papers and see if the results support the conclusion.

shifting

shifting attention •The dimension card change sort: A test of attentional shifting (Zelazo, Frye & Rupus, 1996) •Wisconsin card sorting task: classify the cards, under changing & unspecified rules •3- and 4-year-olds asked to sort a stack of cards either by colour or shape •Half way through the game, the rule changes •Despite answering correctly to questions concerning the game 'rules', at 3 years children typically continue sorting cards with respect to the first dimension. • •By 4-5 years they switch successfully. • •They lack the ability to switch attention between aspects of the scene (colour and shape) - a central executive task. • •At 3-4 years, executive function is still developing. there is a change in blood oxygenation activity as shown below 5 year olds have more activity in this area than both the three year olds who were successful and those who failed.

motor skills

traditional views of motor control •Traditional views of motor control suggested that motor development could be seen as progression through a series of milestones, phases or stages. • •These were prominent in the 1930's - 1940's and are still the basis for 'modern' development scales - e.g. the Bayley scales • •Development was thought to occur in a rigid manner, with the stages occurring in strict order, and similar times for all infants. Shirley 1933: motor milestones

spelke's core knowledge theory

young infants have cognitive capabilities such as -object representation -number -space -agents and actions these cannot be seen in search paradigms but are observable using looking time measures -innate domain specific systems of knowledge -each system has its own set of core principles -learning is the enrichment of core principles

Constructivism

•"Children are active thinkers, constantly trying to construct more advanced understandings of the world" • baby is born 'blank' •Knowledge is not innate, but gained through active learning. • •They construct ways of understanding the world: schemata (small view of the world). These can be patterns of behaviour, mental models, or mental operations. • •Learning occurs through two processes, working together. The child seeks out both ('equilibration'): • •Assimilation: application of old schema to a new instance (calling a cat a dog) • •Accommodation: development of a new schema (calling a cat a cat, or even a Persian cat).

Kanner (1943) Autism Spectrum Disorder

•A pervasive developmental disorder •Affecting 1 in every 100 children born (Baird et al. 2007) •More males than females •Present across the lifespan •At all IQ levels •Core deficits in social relationships, language & communication and repetitive behaviours. Varies massively in terms of its severity.

Gopnik: the scientist in the crib

•Alison Gopnik argues that very young infants think like scientists, observing the statistics of their environments; forming and testing hypotheses, and revising their theories on the basis of new data. • •"Thirty years ago, the idea that 2-year olds think like scientists would have seemed absurd.. Piaget claimed that preschoolers' thinking was just the opposite of scientific.. Irrational, illogical.. And limited to the here and now. These ideas informed both education and policy. These claims have turned out to be wrong."

executive functions

•An umbrella term for the processes underlying conscious, goal-directed thought, most often in novel circumstances. •Inhibitory control •Monitoring/ updating working memory •Planning •Problem-solving •Attention-switching •Forward planning Executive function examples- the cloth pulling task •A test of means-end behaviour Willats (1999) • •6- to 8-month-old infants are presented with an object which they can only retrieve by an intermediary action (pulling it towards them on a supporting cloth) • •7-month-olds would sometimes retrieve the object by chance (without watching it during their response) • •8-month-olds demonstrated intentional means-end behaviour: they looked at their 'goal' when pulling the 'means' • •This required them to execute a sequence of actions in the correct order - an executive function task. It is essentially asking if infant can plan what it needs to do to get to the desired end (the toy) Tower of Hanoi task- Shallice (1982) task: move the whole stack one disc at a time, larger one cannot be placed on top of a smaller one. The graph shows that there are huge improvements in childhood in the ability to do this task. •Executive Function is strongly associated with the prefrontal cortex. (Robbins, 1996). eg Phineas Gauge Phineas Guage lost inhibition, ability to plan, etc, this suggests the pre-frontal cortex plays a huge part in executive function.

Inferring causality

•Are 3-4 year olds able to learn about causes? E.g. can they give objects with the same causal powers the same name? (Gopnik & Sobel, 2000). • •Children are given experience of objects ('blickets') which had a new causal power: the ability to make a machine ('blicket detector') light up. •Child is shown that two of these make it light up & play music; two don't. • •Then shown one that does, and told "this one is a blicket. Can you show me another blicket?" • •Results: they chose the one with the same causal powers on 74% of trials.

Making inferences

•Are babies able to make inductive inferences? For example can they deduce something about the population from a sample? (Xu & Garcia, 2008). Habituation 8 month olds shown boxes containing coloured balls: Test One ball at a time taken out of box to give series of 5 balls: Then infant shown contents of box: expected or unexpected: •8 month old infants looked longer at the unexpected display: they can use information about a sample to make inferences about the population.

Looking tasks: false belief

•Can 15-month-old infants even be able to do the false belief aspect of theory of mind? (Onishi & Baillargeon 2005). BELIEF INDUCTION PHASE: Object always starts in the dark (green) box True belief induction Object moves into yellow box, and actor sees the move so has a true belief that it's in the yellow box. False belief induction: actor cannot see object move Object moves into yellow box & back to green. Actor does not see the move, so has a false belief that it's in the yellow box. 2) test phase •On the test trial, the infant either sees the actor look in the green box, or in the yellow box. • •In the crucial false belief conditions, will she look longer if the actor looks in the correct box, or in the box where the actor thinks it is? • •Results: babies look longer if the actor looks in the correct box! They expected the actor to look in the incorrect box because they thought the actor had a false belief. •So 15 month olds can apparently notice and learn that someone has a false belief ("it's in the yellow box"), and use that to predict their behaviour ("she should look in the yellow box"). • •If the actor's behaviour goes against that prediction (she looks in the green box), the baby seems surprised (looks longer). • •This study suggests that infants of 15 months possess theory of mind.

Class inclusion

•Children are shown a set of items with subset divisions, and are asked questions concerning the relation of the subset to the set. Are there more beads or brown beads? Nearly all preoperational children answer that there are more brown beads. Concrete operational children pass •According to Piaget, preoperational children cannot simultaneously consider the set and the subset, but become focussed on the subset only.

Conservation

•Children shown two equal rows with equal spacing. Are there the same number of counters in each row? •Early preoperational children pass. • • •Children watch a transformation of one of the rows. Are there the same number of counters in each row? •Early preoperational children fail. • •Concrete operational children (7 yrs) pass. •Piaget suggested that it was not until the concrete operational stage that children attained the principles needed to pass conservation tasks: • •Reversibility: the ability to imagine the opposite of a perceived transformation. • •Invariance: that things stay the same unless something has been added or subtracted. •In fact, these tasks develop at different times - number usually by 5-6 years and volume not until 10-11 years. • •This is somewhat problematic for Piaget's stage-like view of development, although he adapted it to include the idea that concepts, once acquired, might not be immediately applied to all cases. think cows with spread out grass have more, think flatter ball is heavier, think more water in one with ball in.

Conclusions: developmental disorders

•Disorders where we know the genetic cause (WS & DS) tend to be more uniform in their manifestation of behaviours. BUT... • •There is still a lot of variation within disorders, therefore other factors (environment/support etc) must play a role. • •Disorders with v different genetic origins can actually have very similar behavioural profiles. • •Is anything specific? Do we actually just need a continuum of disorders instead of a spectrum for each? • •Two general reviews of DS and WS: Fidler, Most and Philofsky, (2008). Martens, Wilson and Reutens, (2008).

Core knowledge: number

•Do 6-month-olds have an 'approximate number' system for distinguishing between large sets? (Xu & Spelke, 2000) • •Each habituation set varies the size and layout of the dots, but keeps their number constant. • •Each test set keeps constant the display density (therefore they are both different sizes to the habituation display). • •Result: 6 month-olds looked longer at the new number than at the old number. Therefore they can discriminate between a set of 8 and a set of 16. • •They cannot discriminate between 8 and 12 in this way, so it is only approximate! •Mix, Huttenlocher & Devine (2002) points out that infants may have been responding not to number but to 'contour length': imagine putting a piece of string around each dot, and then putting those strings end to end. •If during habituation, infants were paying attention to contour length, then in test they could have looked longer at the novel number purely because it had a very different contour length - not because they perceived number! • •Plus, these contour length differences weren't so large in the 8 vs 12 condition, which might explain the null result there. •So perhaps infants tend to perceive continuous extent (e.g. area or contour length) ... ecologically, this has a point. •Feigenson (2005) showed that infants computed number when objects differed in color, pattern & texture; and continuous extent when the objects were identical.

causes of ASD

•Do you think that one theory can account for the diversity of behaviours associated with ASD? • •Some researchers suggest that there are a number of independent, co-existing deficits in ASD - weak CC, ToM, EF (Pellicano et al, 2006). • •Not every child has each deficit - 50-70% had deficits on TOM, EF.

Toddler morality

•Even young children (2-3 years) are implicitly aware of the rules of the game, even when they have not been explicitly told anything (Rakoczy, 2008). • •They enforce social norms when a puppet misbehaves... • •2 year olds describe "no! not in this hole" implying that they know something is wrong •3 year olds show awareness of rules: "no! it does not go like this!" and an understanding that rules may change - in one context a yellow stick is used as a toothbrush and in one as a carrot - their protest is specific to the context. they understand that there are rules. •And in spontaneous peer conflict... • •Here, 3 yr olds are more rigid than 5 yr olds. • •"They both insist on their version of rule over and over and do not acknowledge that the alternative rule is acceptable. In fact, they continue to argue over the rule for 66 more lines and do not eventually agree on a rule."

neural development conclusions

•Executive and attentional control influence performance on a wide range of tasks. • •Young children are limited in these abilities. • •The neural basis of this can be quite well explained and underpins behavioural developments in a range of tasks.

false belief and the maxi task

•False belief is understanding that someone can have a different view to your own. • •Demonstrating false belief shows theory of mind (Wimmer & Perner, 1983). Happens when you have developed theory of mind supposedly The Maxi task - False belief (Wimmer & Perner, 1983) Children (4, 6 and 8 years old) are told a story about a boy called Maxi. They see toy characters & cupboards, too. "Maxi helps his mum put away some shopping, putting the chocolate into the blue cupboard. After he leaves to go to the playground, his mother takes the chocolate out, cooks with it, and returns it to the green cupboard. She realises she has forgotten the eggs, and goes out to get some. Maxi comes back, hungry, and wants chocolate..." Children have a visual representation as acted out with dolls. Children with theory of mind will see that Maxi will have different view point as he hasn't seen chocolate be moved. •"Where will Maxi look for the chocolate?" • •4 year olds fail (say where they know the chocolate to be); 6 and 8 year olds pass •Younger children can't work out that Maxi doesn't know it has moved - they can't assign a false belief to him. • •The interim conclusion is that Theory of Mind develops at 5 years or more. • •However, some control tests were also necessary... • •Control test for memory : children did remember where the chocolate was and where Maxi had put it. •Control test for competing ideas: Current position of the chocolate (green) vs. where Maxi would look (blue). need to control for this because children are hiding the idea of where the chocolate actually is in their head as well as where it was previously and these ideas compete but the more dominant idea is where the chocolate is now which is why they may answer in this way? • •If the chocolate disappears from the box it's really in (green), so that the current position is 'nowhere', then this competition is removed. • •This makes performance improve at 4 years, but not at 3 years. • •Conclusion: False belief develops at 4-5 years (Wimmer & Perner, 1983).

A moral core

•Hamlin (2013) suggests that young children and even babies have a 'moral core', evolved in order to facilitate cooperation. • •"Traditionally... accounts posit that infants start out as fundamentally different moral creatures from adults - either amoral .. or immoral.. However.. as has been argues for humans' "core" understanding of certain conceptual domains - including objects, numbers, agents, there may be aspects of morality that emerge in the absence of specific experiences. This moral core would remain essentially intact throughout the lifespan."

Moral evaluation

•Infants evaluate others. • •Morality plays for 6-8 month olds (Hamlin, Wynn & Bloom 2007) •Display phase: baby watches a protagonist trying but failing to reach a goal, plus helper & hinderer agents. Test phase: Babies are allowed to reach for the helper or the hinderer. 14/16 10-month-olds and 12/12 6-month-olds chose the helper Conclusion: babies show moral evaluation. •3 month olds avoid the hinderer; 6 month olds positively evaluate the helper, too. • • •Conclusion: some development of moral evaluation from 3- 6 mo. (Hamlin et al 2011) •"Preverbal infants prefer appropriately antisocial characters (who harm Hinderers) over inappropriately prosocial ones (who help Hinderers; Hamlin et al., 2011). This effect has been demonstrated in infants as young as 5 months of age (Hamlin, 2012)". • •Conclusion: moral retribution at 5 mo. (Hamlin et al 2011) (punish bad character) •Continued development: a sense of fairness at 19 months: looking is longer for unequal sharing (Sloane, Baillargeon, Premack, 2012)

Kohlberg's extension

•Kohlberg (1984) posed more complex dilemmas which allowed extension of the stage-theory into adulthood. •Controversially claimed that cognitive development drives moral reasoning. So as you develop (eg Spelke's stages), you gain new moral skills. Heinz and the druggist (from Kohlberg, 1984, p.640-651) In Europe, a woman was near death from a special kind of cancer. There was one drug that doctors thought might save her. It was a form of radium that a druggist in the same town had recently discovered. The drug was expensive to make, but the druggist was charging $2,000, or 10 times the cost of the drug, for a small (possibly life-saving) dose. Heinz, the sick woman's husband, borrowed all the money he could, about $1,000, or half of what he needed. He told the druggist that his wife was dying and asked him to sell the drug cheaper or let him pay later. The druggist replied, "No, I discovered the drug, and I'm going to make money from it." Heinz then became desperate and broke into the store to steal the drug for his wife. Should Heinz have done that? Why or why not? why not- stealing is wrong consequences for druggists livelihood and family. why yes- life worth more than profit, risk of loosing life outweighs consequences of stealing.

Resolution 2: back to continuity theory

•Kulke 2018: Implicit but fragile TOM; or only one TOM? is it that there is an implicit but fragile theory of mind or is there only 1 ever? mixed results from looking at tasks. A lot are partially replicated or mixed or not at all take the results very cautiously in duplex task if kept visible told to act out then you avoid the 'where is it really' competition idea this stops 'pull of the real' which is the internal conflict between the truth and what the character thinks ands allows the ability to separate them. children are more pulled towards what they know to be true. •Rubio-Fernandes & Geurts (2013) 'How to pass the false belief task before your fourth birthday'. Maxi task is complex, involving long script, props etc. They lose track of whose perspective they are supposed to track as Maxi leaves the room. The Onishi task is simpler. • •Do children of 3.5 years fail the false belief task because it interrupts perspective-tracking? •'The Duplo Task', Girl puts her bananas inside one of two fridges; goes for a walk towards the child (kept visible). Experimenter moves bananas to the other fridge, prompting child that the girl can't see the move. • •Child is prompted throughout. Child is given figure and acts out response: 'what happens next?'. • •The task is interactive, non-verbal, non-binary (no need to explicitly consider alternatives), no focus on target, avoiding 'the pull of the real'. •3.5 year olds in this experiment, 80% failed the Smarties task, but 80% passed the Duplo task. • •When the Duplo girl disappeared from the scene, 80% failed it. So keeping track of perspective is crucial. • •When they made a verbal response, 80% failed it. So avoiding the pull of the real is crucial. • •There is no discontinuity in development, but a perspective-tracking system present early on that is initially fragile. This argues against dualist theories.

conclusions of piaget

•Learning is a process of actively building on existent structures. • •In the sensorimotor stage, reflexes turn into more complex actions. Meanwhile, the child learns to distinguish objects in the world as independent entities, which still exist even if he cannot see them. • •Children learn to manipulate these mental representations of currently present, physical objects: first intuitively, then using logical processes. • •They then learn to manipulate thoughts about completely hypothetical concepts - as shown by progression on tasks like verbal reasoning. • •But criticisms turn out to be so important that they motivate us to ask in the next lecture whether a whole different conception of cognitive development is possible.

Down syndrome

•Prevalence 1:1,000 (Worldwide) •Genetic trisomy of Chromosome 21 (three copies instead of the normal 2) • •Other types of genetic mutation can also occur, but these are much more rare. Trisomy occurs in 90-95% of cases. DS phenotype •Medical •Sucking and feeding problems •Congenital heart defects •Hearing and vision deficits • •Physical •Facial dysmorphology •Slow growth

The Sally-Anne task

•Sally puts a ball in her basket. • •Then she leaves. • •Anne moves the ball to a box. • •Where will Sally look for the ball? • •Results: 3 year olds fail but 4 year olds pass (Baron Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985). • •Conclusion: The Sally-Ann task suggests that the false belief aspect of theory of mind develops at 4 years. different because when Sally walks away she is still within the sight of the child so children can mentally understand better through visualisation also act out where she will look instead verbalise False belief: smarties task/ unexpected contents task Perner, Leekham & Wimmer, 1987 •Child sees Smarties tube • •E: "What's in the box?" •C: "Sweets" • •E shows C that it actually contains pencils! • •E: "When your friend comes in I'm going to show her this box. What will she think is in the box?" •E: "When your friend comes in I'm going to show her this box. What will she think is in the box?" • •C: 3 yrs: "pencils". 4 yrs: "sweets". •E: "What did you think was in the box before it was opened?" • •C: 3 yrs: "pencils". 4 yrs: "sweets". •Conclusion: The false belief aspect of ToM, and the ability to have insight into one's own prior beliefs ('representational change') develop at 4 years. an example of this representational change would be I thought it was sweets but now i think it is pencils because you showed me. Deceptive box: false belief He thinks this is X but I think this is Y Deceptive box: representational change I once thought this was X but now I think this is Y Appearance-reality This looks like X but really is Y Children's performance on all tasks is correlated (Gopnik & Astington, 1988). In the Baka tribe of pygmies there is also development around 5 years (Avis & Harris, 1991 summary •Performance on a number of tasks suggests that there is a universal, stage-like, development of theory of mind at around 4-5 years. all happen around the same time free of culture

Social behaviours

•Studies suggest that, like with ASD, ToM might be impaired in DS and WS (although findings are mixed and there is a lot of individual variation). • •Whereas individuals with ASD tend to pay less attention to faces, people with DS and WS tend to enjoy (or even get stuck on?) looking at faces.

Core knowledge: space

•The Blue Wall study (Hermer & Spelke, 1994). • •If they lose their sense of direction, rats can use geometric information to reorient themselves. So can human adults. What about young children (18-24 months)? •Result: Children search at geometrically correct corners (green circles) equally often; not so often at other two corners. • •Spelke concludes that they have a geometric module for reorientation, which is impervious to colour information. •Conclusion: Children use geometry but not colour to orient themselves spatially. • •Criticisms: Cheng & Newcombe (2005) point out that the room used by Hermer & Spelke was very small (1.2 x 1.8m). Toddlers do use colour for reorientation in a large room (Learmonth et al 2002).

Criticisms

•The experimenter is up to something funny, I'll play along' • •Children have seen the experimenter make the change, and it might seem like the experimenter is repeating the question because she wants a different answer this time. • •If instead of the experimenter, naughty teddy makes the transformation, preoperational children pass. McGarrigle & Donaldson (1974) •Preoperational children fail the class inclusion task ('are there more brown beads or beads?') • •But if rephrased to emphasise the class, they pass! • •Showed four toy cows, three black, one white, all asleep •'Are there more black cows or more cows?' > 'black cows' •Are there more black cows or more sleeping cows? > 'sleeping cows' McGarrigle, in Donaldson (1978) •Bryant and Trabasso (1971) argued that the main problem for children in inferring the difference between A and C was in remembering the premises (A>B and B>C) • •Children who were trained to remember these premises passed.

core knowledge: objects

•What do infants know about objects? • •They perceive the unity of a partly hidden object by analysing the movements and configuration of its visible surfaces. • •Baillargeon (1985) showed these displays to 3½ month-olds. This is known as the violation-of-expectation paradigm. •Infants dishabituated (looked longer) when screen appeared to pass through the place where box had been located. Infants represent: •the spatial location of objects •the fact that they exist continuously (even if hidden) •the fact that solid objects cannot pass through one another • Criticisms: •Individual variation: in the drawbridge study, only fast habituators show the effects. • •Need for careful control: when habituated to the impossible event, babies looked longer at the possible event: just interested in novelty (Cashon & Cohen 2000)?

Response mode

•When looking time rather than reaching is used, children in the sensorimotor stage seem to have a concept of object permanence (Kellman & Spelke, 1983). More in the next lecture!