European Gov Exam 3

Europe has engaged in a number of military missions

(predominantly in Africa - piracy and stabilization). Also B&H. Dispatch of 1000 troops to the CAR. Civilian missions in slightly broader scope centered on Africa, S.E. and M.E. Civilian missions represents an awareness on EU that CSDP is not simply a military policy. Civilian authorities can also play an important role in providing Europe with a strategic face. Little of this would have been possible were it not for the initial agreements at St. Malo (condominium between Britain and France).

What 'new narrative' does Howorth suggest for the EU as a global security actor?

"To facilitate and engineer a peaceful transition towards a new global order."

What are the Petersberg Tasks? Explain their significance to the ESDI.

'humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking' - implied radical transformation of the EU's existing capacity to provide deployable, professional intervention forces geared to 'out of area' crisis management.

Europe as a normative power

(NPE - Normative Power Europe) - this is where we'll stake our claim. Haven't really talked about what NPE means. Normative powers derive their interests from and behave consistently with an identity grounded in a given set of norms (principles or roots). Governs interest and behavior, these norms are also a source of influence. Lastly, these norms help inform how the normative power will use power in the international system.

What three 'distinct developments in post-2011 US global policy framed the necessary and ongoing recalibration of CSDP-NATO relations?

1) Concept of the US 'leading from behind' in Libya 2) Defense Secretary Robert Gates' June 2011 valedictory speech in Brussels, effectively warning the Europeans of a 'dim and dismal future' for NATO if the balances and free-riding in the Alliance continued 3) January 2012 Strategic Guidance paper announcing the US 'tilt' to Asia.

Like the Maastricht discourse, CS&D discourse was also divided into two camps

-British-led - refused to consider broadening EU's powers or change EU's architecture; not accommodating some sort of S&D mechanism. -French-led (but not exclusively) - promoted Europeanizing S&DC (at least to some extent). There were some disagreements, but as they extended time horizon, disagreements dissipated. Despite broad agreement in second camp, the unanimity rule let UK reduce common denominator to their position once again. Effecitvely guaranteed that the Maastricht Treaty's framing of S&D policy cooperation would remain unaltered, barring some sort of intervention.

What is the role of the High Representative? Who is this, currently?

-Conducts the Union's common F&S policy to which he/she contributes through proposals; presides over foreign affairs council; ensure the consistency of the Union's external action -Federica Mogherini

Turn to cost: financial crisis

-Global financial crisis and ensuing Eurozone crisis clearly loomed large over question of cost. Budget deficits ballooned in 2009 to nearly 7% GPD and while things have improved, renew has been sluggish. Unlikely that member states will go on spending spree anytime soon, reasonable to expect social programs first even if they do; military expenditures behind.

Future Prospects

-Robert Gilcken? When a hegemon starts to decline, etc. - this changes incentives that draw lessor powers into alliances with hegemon, so when hegemon is declining, we should anticipate realignment. These arragenemnets may no longer promote the security interest of the hegemon, let alone the lesser states. We should expect that the alliance structures, particularly involving hegemon, powers gravitating towards hegemon that is decline will realign -For example: a hegemon confronting regional aspirates (China), should seek out regional partners capable of projecting force into region. The patterns of alliance dissolution and formation during a transition period should reflect changes to the epicenter of competition. In other words, if competition shifts from one region to another, alliance partners from previous region will no longer seem useful; will seek out new parternships in the region occupied by its chief competitor. Old structures like NATO may endure; new prioroities need not automatically lead to collapse of alliance if cost of alliance can be redistributed. Unlikely to do so if resources are better spent facing off with new chief competitior. From a dynamic perspective therefore, the utility of an old alliance should decline lockstep with the draw of resources into a new zone of competition. Former alliance partenrs relegated to bystanders. What do these lessor regional states do if the hegemon begins to look elsewhere and devote resources into new areas. No firm prognosis for these old extra regional (bystander) states. Do they want to be relevant to the security of the international system? These lessor powers could remain occupied in their own region, effectively passing the buck by sitting out competition between hegemon and its competitor (SOUTH CHINA SEA). Lessor states may potentially bandwagon and renew their ties with their former champion and be able to use potentially security dividend. It's possible that these states may ought to acquire the power on equal footing with the hegemon. What do these lessor states? No firm prognosis, and there are THREE options: pass the buck, bandwagon, or balance. The vital question is what happens to NATO?

Why did the CSDP emerge? What is the CSDP and what is its focus?

-The result of the absence of suitable existing alternatives in a world that was changing rapidly from year to year. -CSDP is not a response to a sense of existential threat hanging over Europe or involve the creation of a potentially offensive or aggressive armed force poised to engage in expeditionary warfare or to enter into conflict with other powers. -The CSDP represents the generation of a range of instruments appropriate tot the task of crisis management.

Why does a 2009 ECFR report qualify the EU's civilian power as 'largely illusory'? (Hint: the report identifies three major issues.)

1) 'Bosnia template' - while the police mission model may have worked in the Balkans, elsewhere it 'has proved ineffectual.' 2) 'The Member State problem' - EU nations in four groups: professionals, strivers, agnostics, and indifferents - messy 3) The EU is in need of a 'new mission concept', which involves nothing less than 'rethinking its entire approach to foreign interventions - beginning with the nature of what an ESDP mission is.'

What are the three key concepts of the European Security Strategy?

1) 'Comprehensive security' - reflects the intense discussions over a new definition of security which characterized the 1990s 2) Global public goods - emerged out of debates within the UN - physical security and stability; enforceable legal order; open and inclusive economic order; general well-being; health; education and a clean environment 3) The notion of comprehensive security is increasingly linked to the new theories of human security which is defined as 'freedom for individuals' from basic insecurities caused by gross human rights violations'

What are the 'Yes, but...', 'Yes, please!', 'Oh yeah?', and 'No Way!' approaches?

1) 3d's + Gordon's additions 2) Sees American power as overstretched and entering a period of decline in which robust and positive assistance from the European allies should only be welcomed 3) Extreme skepticism 4) CSDP should be something that should be AVOIDED.

What are four reasons why the EU became a security actor?

1) CSDP is the logical offspring of exogenous forces deriving from the end of the Cold War - most notably the lessening strategic importance of Europe for the USA and, as a consequence, the diminishing political and military significance attached by Washington to European security. 2) The 'new world order' called into being by President HW Bush in 1990 was one in which some of the old rules of the Westphalian system came to be questioned. International community came into prominence of which the EU had to be included. 3) The reappearance of military conflict on the continent of Europe (specifically, the Balkans) in early 1990s. 4) The forging of a transnational European defence industry has also - albeit painfully slowly - had a major impact on the course of the CSDP.

Three dimensions to NPE

1) Civilian power lineage - extends to the Cold War when Europe was increasingly disaffected superpower competition (civilian power relies upon economic and political tools to advance peace and stability). Note the absence of military. 2) Also linked the promotion of certain core values and interests (peace, human rights, rule of law, economic development, etc.). 3) Legitimacy rests in part on principle; shared acceptance of what is right and just. Also rests upon multilateral sanction of the use of normative power, as well as the participation in the use of normative power.

How did St. Malo represent a 'triple crossing of the Rubicon'?

1) Conferred on the EU directly the political and institutional decision-making capacity for crisis-management missions that the WEU had manifestly been ill-equipped to assume. 2) Insisted that 'the Union must have capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises'. 3) the Declaration posited a new relationship between the EU and NATO, contributing to the vitality of a modernized Atlantic Alliance

What are the five 'priority avenues' identified by the EU-ISS that would help the EU achieve its security and defense objectives?

1) Consolidation - of the military assets available to the Union through rationalization and a targeted EU Military Review 2) Optimization - of procurement and interservice cooperation 3) Innovation - to enhance military technology 4) Regionalization - the maximization of the 'clusters' approach 5) Integration - of EU armed forces under a single structure

What are the objectives of the European Defense Agency?

1) Contribute to identifying the Member States' military capability objectives and evaluating observance of the capability commitments given by the Member States 2) Promote harmonization of operational needs and adoption of effective, compatible procurement methods 3) Propose multilateral projects to fulfill the objectives in terms of military capabilities, ensure coordination of the programmes implemented by the Member States and management of specific cooperation programmes 4) Support defence technology research, and coordinate and plan joint research activities and the study of technical solutions meeting future operational needs 5) Contribute to identifying and, if necessary, implementing any useful measure for strengthening the industrial and technological base of the defence sector and for improving the effectiveness of military expenditure

Implications

1) Current force structure reductions (scaling back on militaries) will leave Europe with some ability to project force, but that ability will be under strain (only able to be shorter in conflict) and they will be increasingly unlikely to involve themselves in more than one conflict at a time. 2) European force projection into the Asia-Pacific region does not appear viable. 3) Capability gaps would still force the EU and its member states to still rely upon the US for large-scale operations wherever they may be.

NPE represents both a disposition and a strategy in three respects

1) Europe's shared strategic culture is grounded upon a clear set of values and beliefs, favoring among other things, economic development, governance, rule of law, human rights, etc.; the EU is therefore disposed to act when these values are threated and to do so through policies that are consistent with these values (both in disposition and in strategy). 2) Setting aside all practical considerations about capabilities, the scope of action for the exercise of its power is limited. On one hand, it's limited by the values (only used in certain cases), but also by a heightened sense of responsibility for Europe's own neighborhood. There's a particular sensitivity to events in Africa and the Middle East. 3) The instruments of normative power are suited to the task. They will involve both civilian as well as military power but only when the task requires it and this view contrasts arguments that privilege military power absolutely.

Following Amsterdam, British (Blair) position began to evolve...

1) Evolving attitude in the Blair administration toward integration in general (Blair believed integration was a good thing). All aspects of integration could yield some good (that Britain should join this) 2) Growing awareness that post-Cold War security environment did actually require an independent European security capacity 3) Desire to shape common foreign and security policy bc remaining states were going to push ahead regardless. 4) Kosovo violence during 1998 also spurred Blair's thinking (especially because NATO///America were hesitant to intervene - no US support).

Unfavorable argument to future of Europe military capability concerns

1) France and UK most stable but they themselves would only be able to invest troops of about 1-2 brigades, they would need air and missile protection (likely form US). 2) Where amphibious landings are involved, would also be unable to do this without US protection. 3) French and British naval power projection will also be constrained because of cutbacks to procurement (namely, the UK has decided that instead of buying 2 brand new carriers, they're only going to buy one). 4) Even if they do try to project naval force, they're have to rely upon US aerospace protection.

Evolving French position

1) France were thinking the same as GB regarding NATO. At Maastricht, a truly independent European S&D policy seemed impossible to France 2) common security & defense would only come out through NATO. Anti-Atlancistit CDSP gave way to a more practical standing for France.

What two 'interconnecting trends' have shaped Atlantic relations in the 21st century?

1) Gradual and inevitable re-prioritization of 'European affairs' in US grand strategy after the Cold War; from Euro to Asia and Middle East 2) As the EU emerged as an international actor, the future of the transatlantic relationship seemed clouded in obscurity.

What were the four main objectives of the 'Declaration on Strengthening Capabilities'?

1) Improvements in operational force projection - modernization of stuff 2) Strengthening information-gathering and space-based intel 3) Increased force protection assets 4) Strengthening interoperability

What three processes hinder rendering decisions in CSDP?

1) Interagency competition 2) Derives from the complex politico-institutional relations between the member states and the EU itself 3) The EU is heavily over-institutionalized

What are the '3 Ds' and who articulated them? What are the three additional conditions?

1) No decoupling 2) No duplication 3) No discrimination Sec State Albright - 1) European should attach 'far greater priority' to modernizing their military capabilities than to creating new institutions 2) Europeans should recognize and state clearly that 'NATO remains their first choice when it comes to military force' and that CSDP would not challenge NATO's primacy 3) Formal links should be created immediately between the EU and NATO in order to avoid crossed wires and potential areas of transatlantic conflict -Philip Gordon

What are the three post-St. Malo institutions, and what do they do?

1) Political and Security Committee (PSC) - designed to correct the lack of continuity and permanency in the personnel involved in key organisms and to fix the shifting location of meetings - monitors the int'l situation in the areas covered by the CFSP and contribute to the definition of policies by delivering opinions to the Council at the request of the High Representative. Also monitors the implementation of agreed policies, without prejudice to the powers of the HR. 2) EU Military Committee and EU Military Staff (EUMC) - highest EU military body - vital mechanism in the policy-making process - ultimate function is to deliver to the EC, via the PSC, the unanimous advice of the 28 chiefs of the defence staff on all matters with a military dimension, as well as recommendations for action. 3) Committee for Civilian Crisis Management (CIVCOM) - the civilian equivalent of the EUMC - offers a different picture

What are the two main innovations required for the 'infant CSDP' in the St. Malo Declaration?

1) Political institutions 2) Military capacity

EUFOR RD Congo is generally regarded as controversial. What are the two main problems associated with the mission, as well as the four main criticisms?

1) Reluctance of the UK to be involved, given its major deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan 2) France wanted to pressure Germany into leading this mission as a demonstration that the Franco-German partnership was still alive and well. - 1) The size of the force (1,000 maximum deployed in DRC itself) was inadequate given that the elections were nationwide in a country three times the size of France with 50,000 polling stations. This, it was alleged, was surely 'tokenism' in the extreme 2) The EU troops were overwhelmingly based in Kanshasa, which had essentially been pacified for some time; none was deployed to the eastern part of the country were troubles were likely to occur. 3) Tokenism was heightened by the stationing of the reserve force in Gabon. 4) The mission would end at precisely the time when the troops might most be needed - after the announcement of the result.

According to Meyer & Giegerich, what are the three basic patterns of strategic culture in the EU? Why does Howorth think that strategic culture is important to the development of the CSDP?

1) Security policy as a manifestation of statehood 2) Security policy as international bargaining 3) Protecting and projecting state power A uniting culture is necessary to develop a grand strategy.

What is the 'Triple Challenge' posed by the 1991 Gulf War?

1) Since the CFSP was barely even in gestation, there was simply no prospect of devising a common EU approach. 2) Each member state had to decide for itself whether to join the US-led coalition or to stand on the sidelines. This produced predictable internal divisions. 3) Those that joined the war had to face up to the reality of their own military inadequacy (minus the UK); especially compared to the US

What three things did the St. Malo declaration achieve for EU security and defense cooperation?

1) Stated that the EU should have 'the capacity for autonomous action' in security and defence matters. This was an unprecedented and crucial breakthrough asserting the EU's intension to formulate policy independently of the US. 2) The Declaration stated that the EU 'must be given appropriate structures' to take decisions and implement them. This was a call for new institutions which would allow the EU, for the first time ever, to make policy in the field of security and defence. 3) Called for 'credible military forces' and 'the means to decide to use them.'

What are the two post-Afghanistan options for NATO? What options are there for the CSDP?

1) The long-time American preference is for NATO to become a 'global alliance'. 2) Re-designated as a mechanism for guaranteeing regional stability in the European area and its neighborhood. Stability will be secured through the development of a serious capacity for regional crisis management. Collective security will complement collective defence. - 1) To continue to attempt to carve out a workable relationship with NATO as a separate and autonomous entity. 2) For CSDP to enter into an intensive and increasingly structural relationship with NATO, progressively assuming those leadership responsibilities that the Europeans collectively proved unable to assume during the Libyan and Mali operations.

What are the three problems with the 'HHG' process?

1) The way the forces were to be built up - voluntary, bottom-up contributions might secure the raw numbers, but they could not guarantee the delivery, still else the mobilization of a coherent fighting force 2) Procurement of a new generation of strategic systems 3) No strategic plan of vision

What are the nine pre-St. Malo inputs for security and defense policy at the EU-level?

1) Three-monthly European Council meetings of heads of state and government with ultimate decision-making and political responsibility for all matters connected with foreign and security policy 2) General Affairs Council -> Foreign Affairs Council -> General Affairs and External Relations Committee - in practice, the main decision-taking body for CSDP; but its agenda had become overloaded by the turn of the century, compromising its ability to remain abreast of the minutiae of foreign and security policy - renamed the General Affairs and External Relations Committee 3) Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) 4) Political Committee (PoCo) comprising the Political Directors of the member state Ministries of Foreign Affairs; much taken over by Political and Security Committee 5) Council Secretariat - dates from the SEA of 1985 - now concentrates more on juridical aspects of foreign and security policy 6) rotating Presidency of the EU 7) European Commission 8) European Parliament 9) High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy - High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the Commission

6 Lingering problems

1) people and bases still dominate resource allocation 2) current force structures involve an excess of certain capabilities in terms of both manpower and hardware 3) member states continue to neglect strategic LIFT capabilities and tactical transport 4) the EU defense equipment market remains fragmented; no Europe-wide defense equipment market; inefficiencies in both cost and production 5) Research and development is limited if not decreasing. 6) Cross-national coordination, cooperation, and integration suffered from a number of obstacles. This makes it very difficult for Europe to pool and share.

5 basic ideas of addition of Petersberg Tasks:

1. Both F&S perceived NATO and the EU to be valuable contributors to European security. In their minds, loosening the ties to either would be bad news for Europe. Would lead to a less stable peace. 2. Both WEU & NATO may play a part in Europe's institutional web. Only caveat: NATO and WEU must offer unique services & could not exclude member states on the basis of neutrality or Atlantic ties - promoted equality. 3. F&S hoped the CFSP could promote internationalism and intervention for the sake of human rights and peacekeeping (that CFSP would promote Petersburg Tasks). 4. A CFSP built upon the PT, would add to the legitimacy for a more active international role for F&S. 5. They believed their memorandum would enhance their EU credentials (more valuable partner and participant). Would allive fears that F&S would seek to block changes.

-Interpreting Maastricht Treaty - Title 5 of the Maastricht Treaty - 3 ways

1. It is the EC's first attempt to grapple with global structural changes brought on by the collapse of the USSR. 2. Treaty also grew from sentiment that Europe could now play a greater role in crafting its own future. 3. Though what we see on the surface to be a collective response, core ideas varied among the member states. The gap between these ideas were not too wide to establish a common security policy could not emerge. Reconciling divergent interest required underspecifying certain elements (Role of WEU and possible merger into the EU). Integeration required common ideas and unianismity is reuiqred at COM LEVEL. Shape of institutional developments rests upon parties involved. Less shared ideas, more narrow posibilties for institutional change.

Idea that NATO as the primary structure for European security validated by two particular events

1. NATO (NOT EU) intervened (bombing campaigns) in B&H to stabilize region and end genocide (94-95 - prior to Amsterdam, after Maastrict) - NATO possessed will and means to resolve threats to Europe's security; NATO achieved these results only after independent diplomatic efforts by the EU failed dramatically and embarrassingly (NATO came in an cleaned things up) 2. NATO and Russia sign the Founding Act in May 1997 - significant because it paved the way for enlargement of the Atlantic Alliance to Central and Eastern Europe. Reforming the alliance had been a prority since the end of the Cold War - wondering what to do with the Warsaw Pact countries. Signing Founding Act not only signed to C&E Europe that not only did NATO intend to fulfill this promise, but that NATO was able to engage Russia in matters of S&D for the sake of continental security. Both - NATO confirms relevance of post-CW relevance to European order. Support for NATO as preeminent institution wasn't merely because of incompatible ideas - in other words, if NATO had neither expanded nor met security challenges in the Balkans , would be greater impetus for EU to strengthen security mechanisms and EU's support of NATO would have waned. Would have signaled NATO's death if they had failed (and facing contradicting ideas). But they DIDN'T fail.

Elysée Accord (revisited again)

25th anniversary of treaty (1990) - France and Germany create a common brigade (Franco-German Brigade - joint officer training in addition). France was successful in drawing Germany a LITTLE bit away from NATO. W Germany would see it as bringing France closer back to NATO. Brigade marks first successful effort at a purely European military force since the end of the 2nd WW.

France also called for...

A European Security and Defense Identity in 1983 w/ improved relations w/ W Germany. Reflected French desire for Europe to take control over own security/defense destiny - sought to lessen the role of the US and NATO in Europe's security and defense as a major goal. Europe to reclaim more control over its own security and defense. Vessel for ESDI: WEU. US not a member of WEU. ESDI, reminder of CDG's philosophies of entanglements of NA Treaty was still alive in 80s. France saw WEU as a possible mechanism for collectiveness. Because the WEU had remained dormant, were no materiels, structures, personnel, would stay on paper long time. Brussels signatory states liked the idea.

The impact of these trends could be quite severe.

A mixture of acute budgetary pressures. Challenge of cost not simply about buying hardware to manage crises or trying to compete with Russia China and US; Europe will very likely be unprepared to meet the very threats that justify the creation of the CSDP at all. Cost point may lead to erosion of what the EU already possesses. According to the EU ISS, unless Europe shares in burden and does more together, EU could lose its capacity autonomously altogether. Current fiscal climate not conducive.

The development and implementation of CDSP offers...

A third way based upon shared values, multilateralism and restrained use of force as means to solve problems. Europe's commitment to these principles put it in a position to play a powerful role. Values-driven discourse source of tension with China. Confronted with Russian counter measures, promise of partnership with EU alone was not enough to initially bring Ukraine into orbit. Reason to question centrality or genuineness. Difficult to base claim to influence on principles if principles appear to bend too easily. Also, if Europe continues to struggle matching action with rhetoric which would render third way mute.

Elysée Accord (1963 signed)

Agreement b/w France & W Germany. Called for coop. in armaments prod., consultation on strategy and tactics, & collaboration in civil defense. CDG trying to leverage W Germany and pull them closer into France's orbit. Unfortunately, two years b/w Fouchet and Elysée, W Germany remained committed to NATO and the US. France's partners didn't look fondly upon the plan and shared the same sentiment in 1961. NATO working.

Why might Turkey be worried about the development of the CSDP?

As a major security actor within NATO, Turkey had played an important role in the WEU. That role abruptly ended with the emergence of CSDP in 2000.

Harmel Report

Belgium PM Pierre Harmel - reaffirmed NATO's position in Europe and reaffirmed Western Europe's willingness to allow NATO to be the Western mouthpiece during peacetime in relations w/ USSR. Also established the NATO policy of flexible response - meant that no nation would be forced to consult NATO, but none would be impeded either. Signaled everyone else's support of US and ignored France's withdrawal. NATO would remain dominate security solution. France did not turn to WEU now that NATO no longer part of France's military actions. UK looked to revive WEU after final rejection from EC in 68. WEU would serve as backdoor for UK. Call for revitalization quieted as UK became member to EC in 1974.

What are Katarina Engberg's conclusions about the likely circumstances that will prompt EU military operations?

CSDP missions are more likely when the consent of influential local actors can be secured (as in EUFOR RDC), and less likely when this factor does not obtain (Lebanon). Furthermore, the EU, in her judgment, is likely to undertake an autonomous military mission when it can be identified as an opportunity rather than as a challenge; in other words, when the interests at stake and the instruments to be used are situated in what she calls the low-to-middle bandwidth; but if either the interests at stake or the mission itself are high risk, the operation becomes less likely.

How does identity impact the prospects for the CSDP?

CSDP must first await the generation of a common European identity and the construction of a single strategic narrative; without this, nothing will happen for a long time.

Brussels Treaty revived in 1984

Changes had more to do with beefing up structure, working up a parliamentary body. Not including substantial authority or body. No formation of European body or army. For remainder of 80s, WEU is simply talk/theory. In the end, France not able to create a equal competitor to NATO with WEU, but did create some movement in the direction of a ESDI.

St. Malo and the St. Malo Declaration

Chirac/Blair franco-anglo affairs and strengthen security policy - significant; Summit meant to address underdev of CFSP. Wanted to discuss bilateral negot. & enhance coop. at EU-level. Hoped that France and Britain could overcome difference and make some common ground for moving forward. Produced St. Malo Declaration: 1) Increased bilateral cooperation b/w France and GB (outside of any structure). 2) Called for a capability for autonomous action backed by credible military forces (an EU common defense policy). In this respect, the St. Malo summit gave a significant addition - whether EU should have its own autonomous military capability. Resolved significant piece of puzzle.

London Declaration - June 1, 1948

Clarified Germany's post-war status among three of the four occupying powers (US, France, UK). Meant to normalize Germany. They determined that Western Germany would be granted limited sovereignty subject to oversight (was very clearly a tip of the hat to the concerns of the Brussels Treaty). Also had the three occupying powers as well as the Benelux countries that German military power was necessary and needed to find a structure to make this happen. They looked to NATO. Germany can have more sovereignty and we also agree that militarized Germany is something we do need but we can't let them grow into the European system without tying it down to something (with force that would be able to counter - NATO). Could help protect Germany against USSR.

What are the EUs 'strong points as an international actor'? What must happen for the EU to realize its potential?

Comparative advantage that it needs to learn to leverage; the world has now enjoyed 65 years of multilateral institutionalism and the progressive accumulation of a corpus of international law which ahs sought to regulate relations between states which operate under anarchy; the EU has blazed that trail as effectively as any other actor. An intensifying system called 'complex interdependence' structurally interrelated global networks between nation-states and other actors; the EU is in a class of its own in forging and managing complex interdependence. The bloody violence of war; the EU understood this earlier. Shifting movement from strong states to failed states, etc. - EU blazed this lonely trail.

What is the 'Kosovo syndrome' and why is it significant?

Concern about the lack of EU military capacity in the event of a new crisis similar to Kosovo; it explain the specifics of the Helsinki Headline Goal: the ability rapidly to deploy forces capable of tackling peace enforcement operations potentially demanding up to crops level strength.

What was the first military operation launched by the EU? What was the first autonomous mission?

Concordia - peacekeeping mission in Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, taking over from a NATO force Artemis - in DRC - EU's first operation outside Europe and the first EU operation under Chapter VII of the UN Charter

What does constructivism offer to the study of the CSDP? What is 'international role formation'? What is a principal weakness of the constructivist approach to the CSDP?

Constructivists tend to seek out and to analyze the ways in which the CSDP both reflects and generates a European normative approach towards security based on the rejection of traditional options of war and peace (zero sum) and which posits collective security and stability (positive sum) as the crucial objective. International role formation = how an actor engages in international activity with an intitial self-perception about its role and its objectives. principal weakness - its difficulty in establishing exactly how shifts in strategic culture take place and what states occasionally change course.

Why did efforts to 'Europeanize' security and defense cooperation fail for nearly 50 years? What is the 'Euro-Atlantic Security Dilemma'?

Contradiction between the respective positions of France and the UK. Britain and France effectively stalemated any prospect of serious European cooperation on security issues by their contradictory interpretations of the likely impact in Washington of the advent of serious European military muscle (the Euro-Atlantic Security Dilemma). London tended to fear that if Europe demonstrated genuine ability to take care of itself militarily, the US would revert to isolationism. Paris, on the other hand, expressed confidence that the US would take even more seriously allies who took themselves seriously.

Europe's ability let alone wanting a full-pledged CDSP has been faltering from beginning.

Defense expenditure began to fall after end of Cold War. Sharpest decline occurs from 2008-2009, at height of financial crisis. Since 2009, the pace of decline has slowed somewhat, but government spending has increased overall during this period. Financial crisis did not cause changes underway, but has likely locked them in, if not encouraging further decline. National procurement reliance has been trending upwards. When they do invest, they invest at national level. Member states act first towards domestic considerations. Coordination problem in terms of military spending is transcended since advent of CSDP. In light of American complaints over burden sharing and NATO, patterns in defense spending appear to be business as usual. EU policymakers and analysts have been aware of vulnerabilities; and the overhang of financial crisis has only pushed rhetoric over reality. **Diminishing defense spending has been product of domestic considerations rather than changes in the nature of the threats that face Europe

Mid-60's

Dispute on Multilateral Nuclear Force / force de frappe. Would take NATO assets and gave US exclusive veto over their use. Saying to Europeans - you WILL carry these weapons, but you have no control in determining their use. Only continental nuclear power was France. If you put nuclear weapons on the continent then you give continental authority. US still lobbied for MNF, but eventually backed away (by 65 - MNF was dead in water). Not enough for the French.

1980's - Elysée Accord (revisited)

Dormant WEU received a new breath of life from the frustrated French who still promoted CDG-like foreign policies. Spirit of furthering integration. Despite these nations, NATO remained big kid on block - Europe's attention as 80s occurred was definitely turning inward. France's diversions - first concentrated around the Elysée Accord. In 1982, France and West Germany form a council of foreign and defense ministers to study security issues that affect West Germany, France, and Europe. Couldn't legislate or implement policies, but the council was exclusively European and was designed to function outside of NATO.

British ideas about CFSP

Drew from well-established ideas that only partly aligned with Germany and almost entirely opposed France. GB was traditionally suspicious of federalist tendencies. Resisted notion of transferring more and more power to Brussels. Greater S&DC, at least as proposed by French, involved this. Needed to be intergovernmental. This wasn't an effort/way to take one's sovereignty over one's military and transfer that to EU. British thinking was exclusively Atlanticist. Would not weaken NATO's primacy. British advocated the view that NATO had to be the preeminent security and defense institution in Europe. -Impact of Britain's position effectively handcuffed the Maastricht intergovernmental conference. British ideas of community defense operation set common denominator for policy outcomes. Ideas of MT went beyond the British opinion, but London's acquiescence is easy to understand under the vagueness of these propositions. What we do see if some language that hints at this aggressive policy. Gives the EU some military capacity. There is no guarantee, no commitment, no sweeping institutional change reminds us that GB set that common denominator and little else could have been expected. Discourse was fractured, divided according to these mutually exclusive ideas. Britain saying NATO is the only game that matter and French with a EU-centered structure that would replace NATO.

First effort to coordinate a European security system

Dunkirk Treaty - signed in 1947 (2 years after WWII ended); represented Anglo-French efforts to monitory activity & behavioral attributes of Germany. Dunkirk Treaty brings PHPS theory together, but object was to say that Germany is still a real threat and needs to be monitored and establish behavioral norms. Treaty did not actually create an organizational structure per se, but did regularize multilateral cooperation. Also set in motion a flurry of other negotiations. Momentum is what opens the door to some of the key, pivotal security institutions that dominated the scene for the better of 50 years.

Post-Hostilities Planning Staff (PHPS)

During WWII - entity in Britain - charged with saying what kind of a war, what kind of security needs do we have, and what kind of architecture will we require. USSR invasion is primary threat. Solution: Anglo-French Alliance. Also said continental participation. Fulcrum of this idea was the AFA. Also proposed cooperating with the US. Europe's major powers are quite a bit weaker (no longer world leaders). The UK recognized that Europe, broadly, would be dependent on the US for security guarantees in post-WWII world. Demonstrated awareness of US superiority and the very reality that Europe would be dependent on US for security guarantees after war.

After St. Malo, the EU launched...

ESDP, replacing CFSP. Member states ensure the headline goal (Helsinki - Dec. 1999). Chief objective: to enlarge EU's military capacity. Meant to increase the EU's ability to complete Petersburg Task missions (humanitarian, crisis manage, peacekeeping, statebuilding).

Under this plan, EU pledged...

EU would be able to deploy and sustain a rapid reaction force (RRF). Initially, size of force would involve 50k-60,000 troops. Aim was to make these forces 1) self-reliant (they could act without depending upon the US) 2) deployable within 60 days so it could actually respond in time 3) they could remain sustainable in the field for a year. RRF would have to number around 180,000 troops so you could rotate/replace during an operation. Idea put forward at the Helsinki Council in December 1999. Formal agreement not actually reached until Nov. 2004. Superseded the time frame in which the forces would actually be operable.

Howorth explains that there little agreement on the true nature of the present or future agenda of NATO. Why?

No competition from Europe for NATO in the 90s; yet enlargement and prosecution of war on terror; unique political climate that only existing for a fleeting moment that is now becoming confusing

Brussels Treaty - 1948

Ernest Beven with French Foreign Minister and Marshall - Grand design - Britain wanted to see a union of Europe. Part of grand design actually yielded Beven's diplomatic efforts to help to move the US and other continental friends. Signed by France, GB, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg countries. Came about because these five signatory countries afraid of German resurgence. Reaffirmed general European desire to monitor & restrict any efforts to rearm Germany. Way for these countries to say that we are not okay with German resurgence due to Cold War. Also stated that Germany was still perceived to be a threat to European security. They did envision an institutional architecture: develop a bureaucracy (way to coordinate their military and security policies), but the treaty itself did not actually do this. Anticipated the value in this.

The Third Wheel

Europe has embraced normative role thus far and new role would be unimaginable. Normative power has limits and could be source of irritation. If foundation of Europe's power rests upon principles that don't align w/ preferences of other great powers, then exercise of normative power could prick sensitivities. If image of third wheel realized (where Europe's normative power does not ally), the effort to be security actor could have tragic consequences.

Culture and military power

Europe's strategic culture has not altered in response to changes. The EU has acknowledged the power transition that's framing this entire discussion (China going up, US going down). Current global climate is subject to increased regional volatility. We're told that the structural change is marked in the change in the nature of power -favors CSDP. As Europe conceives of a strategy to address this period of transition, its approach says that we simply need to be able to resolve crises first (status quo). Secondly, if they don't possess military might, they should back it up with multilateralism and normative persuasion. Europe's response: things are going in our way, we're just sitting here waiting for it.

What is the ESDI? Was it viable during the early-to-mid 1990s?

European Security and Defence Identity - out of the Balkan dilemma was born the first serious post-Cold War chapter in the EU's security work in progress. Intended to allow European forces, in crisis situations of little or no interest to the US, to borrow American military assets via NATO. It implied that the EU would seek to organize its security arrangements entirely within the NATO framework, based on European-only forces, a European-only command chain, and complex arrangements for borrowing essential assets from the Alliance (in effect from the US). 'Separable but not separate', a formula which consciously eschewed any suggestion of autonomy. Object was to provide for circumstances where the EU needed to (and wished to) deploy military force, but in which the US did not wish to be directly involved. It was a reasonably sensible idea, but it did not work in practice because: 1) the formal arrangements under which the EU might be able to borrow crucial military assets from NATO, and presumably to return them, were felt to be unsatisfactory for both parties and 2) the identification of the WEU as the pivotal structure at the heart of such arrangements was an understandable but ultimately misguided choice.

By 1951...

European diplomats began to draft treaty for European defense community that would inc. Germany. Pléven Plan designed for this. EDC would initiate supranational structure to govern all defense related activities in Europe & called for a common European army (European Defense Force). Would be sustained by requiring all countries to contribute. Bold. Participating countries pledging to throw over all defense sovereignty to one supranational unit. Represented Paris' dislike of the US's plans to rearm Germany. France wanted to delay rearmament and focus on political reintegration first. Point of EDC is exclusively European entity (not involving US) and France would gain control over German military in event that it rearms. Not subtle. Integration promised to realize Germany reintegration and brought France's partners on-board. France didn't want to see remilitarization to happen but was allowing it to happen IF Europe was in charge. Debate lasted for another three years (51-54 - took so long because of the French). Following a new coalition gov't that gained power, French general assembly is what killed off the EDC (with fears over national sovereignty).

Looking forward

European forces trending toward limited force and operational capabilities. Recent military operations have demonstrated that Europeans lack air-to-air refueling, surveillance, etc. - Europe is aware of these deficiency and create forced development track and erodes Europe's military power. Addressing capability shortfalls and modernizing hardware is not something that can be fixed easily or in the short-term. It takes times to develop these things. Meanwhile, while you're waiting, human capital diminishes. Efforts for cooperation of cluster states, but not necessarily with EU capability in mind. Small-scale of these islands (small clusters), would Europe be able to respond? No.

Amsterdam Treaty Themes

European policymakers saw that Maastricht was ambitious but incomplete. Idea of institutional C&D at E level generally appealing but agreement very thin. Maastricht's authors included an automatic review no longer than 5 years after M T entered enforcement. This (Amsterdam Intergovernmental Conference - IGC) created opportunity to alter/halt progress, opportunity to revisit certain issue areas. Ultimately result in IGC and Amsterdam Treaty. Importance of CF&D policy not simply unfinished business. Title 5, even in broad framing, intended for union to take bigger role in'tly. Hoped would extend union's credibility and influence. Common foreign and security policy proved cumbersome & awkward, if not an altogether failure. EU faced opportunities to act together though the EU in Africa (Rwanda, Burundi, DRC) not to mention problems in their own backyard - former Yugoslavia - to exercise part J. Should've been Europe's hour and was hardly that. EU proved to be unhelpful or called US for help. Can appreciate why at the first summit of Amsterdam IGC (January 1996) why security policy was important.

French Ideas about CFSP

European security in the same lens. French notion of a EC-level security and defense cooperation was nested in broader concerns about German power, by a desire to animating and strengthen Franco-German axis within the EU as well as this prevailing dream of a European security structure that didn't involve the US. German reunification spurred French fears that Germany would wake up and would abandon the French. French supported political union because it would lock Germany in place in the EC. The CFSP. French supported the idea of WEU because it doesn't have the US as a member. European security defense. As for Germany, saw an opportunity to desensitize neighbors to changes into the continental distribution of power through deeper integration. Connected desire ends to neighbor's important needs (deeper integration).

Why is 'transparency' a challenge to the CSDP?

Few states have attempted to explain the CSDP, even though public opinion supports it.

The Amsterdam IGC, divided into these two camps seemed primed to revisit Maastricht Treaty.

Four declared neutral states within the EU (3 new members: Austria, Finland, Sweden joined in 1995 - one year prior to IGC - questions around what the neutral states were going to do. Would they attempted to positively shape the CFSP? Did not appear to be a concern to the remaining member states - other 11 member-states were signatories of the Atlantic Charter. Impact of neutrality had been sorted out prior to joining. Commission made clear that neutrality could not be blockages. Whether that would play out/whether neutral states would be cooperative, remained to be seen during the IGC. All three had seats to the table led by unanitmity and that any one of them could affect policy for better or for worse. Neutral members - you must be prepared for IGC and play an active and full part - this included the eventual Europeaniziation of S&D cooperation. Finland and Sweden had separated determined to strike a construcutive posture (they was gonna help y'all). By the IGC, both countries had largely updated their understanding of neutrality. Meanwhile the aligned member-states reciprocated. Advancing S&D cooperation would not push them into any uncfomrotalbe moments. Neutral countries would fit under S&D cooperation was prioroity. Finland and Sweden brought different ideas to the able - weren't simply going to be hangers-on.

What is the Ghent Framework, and what are the problems regarding its implementation?

Framework for rationalizing and maximizing EU military capacity. Agreed to categorize their defence assets into three baskets: national, pooled, role and task sharing. Defence cuts by almost all member states have been conducted at purely national level without any reference to what others were doing; pooling and especially sharing require a considerable degree of trust between states; notoriously difficult to put a credible price-tag on military expenditure and even more difficult to demonstrate precisely what savings can be derived from cooperation

Why is this relevant?

France and UK are most capable member states. Why did he bring up these arguments? In a war between US and China, we're going to need these things. Will they be relevant? Only with these four points.

1961

France begins to express dissatisfaction of defense and security relations in Europe - worried about US lack of potential involvement in the event of an attack. CDG worried about US using its nuclear weapons located IN Europe without the continents consent. Fouchet Plan emerged - usurp US power & promote other countries to adopt France's security policies. Intergovernmental council would be established to develop common defense and security policy among Western European nations (not the US). Would coordinate policy and called for an IG structure. France misjudged European interests - West G and UK would not abandon US. Fouchet something talked about but never seriously considered. CDG persisted and led a second French effort to provide a non-american security initiative.

Status quo actually beneficial to Europe? Power in normative power Europe? Status quo is likely.

Fundamental assumption: changes in distribution in power require adjustment in defense cost and strategy. A relatively peaceful system is more problematic for Europe. When things are peaceful yet competitive, less of an intense incentive to react. Unfortunately, Europe must respond from a position of weakness. While Europe's economic strength and institutional cooperation gives hope, overcoming weaknesses will be held by CCC. Europe without military power will not be able to exercise influence over others. Europe might be able to influence other economic power but not other military powers. In this way, normative power, like civilian power is of limited value. Appropriate to cast Europe as a "small power." The EU, as something that matters to the int'l system, by virtue of very narrow and specific defense roles that it can fill. Historically, small powers have tended toward neutrality or alliances (positions of dependence - not leaders of int'l system, and lack ability to force change or pressure). Circumscribed - not entirely ineffective, but rather what matters is whether that limited power can address the threats that are actually occurring close to Europe, or those that emanate to another region of the world.

Maastricht Treaty Themes

German Reunification - by the close of 88, the USSR's hold on Central and Eastern Europe would evaporate. At the EU level, most powerful states propelled security onto the agenda alongside unification. Germany's rapid reunification threatened to destabilize the setting. Fear of Germany would seek to dominate EC or would leave the EC and seek to dominate the European continent. From British and French view, quickly needed to tie Germany down. Mitterand to pressure into backing intitiaves into intergovernmental security and economic stuff. Packaged in this is consideration of security and defense as well. -Gulf War framed - Change in strategic environment justified the reconsideration of security and defense cooperation under the context of Europe integration. NATO - the US - was there to do what the EPC could not. EPC wasn't designed for superpower war. Couple this with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Communities conducts during the Gulf War revealed a lack of cohesiveness within the EPC. Communities efforts implied economic and integration only. Army was only UK, France, Italy - only states that participated military in the Gulf War, and not under the ausicipusses of any conteinetal mission but based off US. Rising incertaininty about US's wishes that did not involve Europe. Dangers of a rudderless community defense mechanism. Will US stay around in Europe and stay committed to NATO. -Atlanticists vs. Europeanists - taking stock of what we've just witnessed and feeling lousy - two lines: -Atlantiticsts - championed by UK - called for limited institutional changes at the European level. And balked at the idea that the EU should have military capaibility. -Europeanists - led by France and Germany - hoped to endow EU WITH military capaibility (give the EU an army). Looked to the WEU as an appropriate, ready-made instuttion to merge within the EU architecture. When we take stock, there's a Cold War hangover. Over, but still looking at

Germany's ideas about CFSP

Germany's involvement in intergovernmental process was complicated - Atlantic connection still something very important to German understanding of security and defense cooperation. According to the German mindset, didn't conflict with maintain strong commitment with maintain strong connection to NATO. Enhancing S&DC didn't conflict with maintain a strong tie to NATO. Thus, deeper political integration (S&D dimension) could proceed without destabilizing NATO or comprising commitment to NATO OR France. Germany was willing to pursue French initiatives of CFSP that included common army because they did so while still stressing importance of NATO. We're on board with what you suggest France, and also on board with NATO.

Marshall Plan - March 1948

Hallmarks of the plan is that it's meant to stabilize Europe while promoting integration of European economies (promote domestic stability and stave off inroads of Communism) - economically, politically, militarily weak Europe is too great of a potential bonus to USSR. Marshall insisted Germany included in program. US pushed this through - they anticipated Marshall Plan to normalize Germany's relations with other countries and then rearmament. Very real strategic implications. Keep in mind that US was pushing Germany to become a normal player in Europe - wanted to desensitize German's neighbors.

Why is the EU characterized as a 'regional actor'? How does this apply to the 'broader globalizing context'? Where has the EU been most active?

It stays involved in its own region and close-areas; Balkans, Africa, and 'others' (EU's Eastern border, Palestine, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Indonesia)

ESS 2006

Long-Term Vision - aim of this document was to update ESS - broadened focus of ESS. ESDP operations will be expeditionary multinational and multiinstrument. Overall aim - to achieve security and stability more than victory. "Focus of military efforts shifts to diplomacy in order to prevent wars." Success will be influenced by military capabilities & actions. Would involve a broader range of domains - initial list of 5 factors +: promotion of human rights, rule of law, security sector reform, good governance, and the fight against international crime. We need a wider view of assets from 2003 (not just tanks and guns - we need experts in these areas).

Structural Change & the EU

Maastricht Treaty - states in turn will evaluate the fit of strategic arrangement that emerged under previous equilibrium. Tough time explaining when this will happen, but explain that IT WILL. Previous arrangements always end up being abandoned - do not fit. One particularly relevant outcome: states as bystanders face an uncertain future and may not be able to influence that future unless they react to the situation at hand. Prospect of losing any semblance of control is chief fear that should motivate smaller states to enhance capabilities. EU would appear to face such a moment.

Kosovo crisis encouraged introspection.

Military power is not only complementary but also subordinate to Europe's normative agenda. Military power, therefore, is not intended to use under any other objectives under the auspices of CSDP. For this reason, the EU's military capabilities are qualitatively differentiated from those possessed from other great powers like US, Russia and China.

When we define NPE, guidiping principle is that military might is but one tool to achieve one's ends.

Military security is not the sole or primary security strategy in Europe; states may influence by example and normative persuasion. Also through treaties, int'l institutions; employing these instruments aligns with the core values. Instruments amount to exercise of normative power, not exclusively military power. EU has traditionally sought to form a sphere of influence in its own backyard. Membership a means to stabilize regimes and extend western European government strtucutres. Achieved very tangible ends to security and defense. Military power cannot be neglected if the EU is to properly project normative power and remain a credible actor, even in its own backyard.

What is meant by 'leadership from behind'?

Misnomer regarding Libya; NATO mission benefited from massive US military inputs, without which it probably would have failed. But the Obama administration's insistence that Europeans should at least be perceived to be 'taking the lead' in Libya represented a paradigm shift in both political and symbolic ways. The US signaled that, henceforth, it was prepared to transfer responsibility in the European theatre to the Europeans.

What is the 'only possibility for Europeans to affect the outcome of global change'? Should the EU become a military superpower, according to Howorth? What is the likely future for the CSDP?

Must be a United Player; without this, it will just be a political pygmy. It should not become military superpower. The CSDP will be focused on its "near-abroad."

April 4th, 1949

NA Treaty signed by US, Canada, Brussels Treaty nations, Denmark, Portugal, Iceland, Italy, and Norway. Neither response nor means to monitor West Germany exclusively. Germany no longer a priority target (esp in eyes of US). Worry: USSR would send tanks into Europe - viable. USSR conventional forces stronger (greater leverage) if a war was to be fought. US at this point, by forming NA treaty, made German problem not strategic but political. Germany was actually excluded from NATO at first - France still reluctant (Paris used reluctance to negotiate US support to refitting its army). US troops still stationed in Germany helped ease fears that Germany was still a threat. Brought France closer to Germany and soften stance that Germany was still their enemy. In the spirit of accommodation, they recognized the need of Germany to participated in the European institutional structures.

Headline Goal 2010

Needed to be revised bc shortcomings in their planning, chiefly 1) Strategic lift (ability to transport troops and materiel in and out of combat zones). Previous planning had always relied on assets of the US - wouldn't work if Europe wanted to act independently of NATO. Addressing problem of EU's independent capacity to carry out military missions would be enhanced. 2) Called for institutional structures to encourage (not force) member-states follow through on their commitments. 3) Headline Goal 2010 also, added to the RRF concept to include high-readiness joint packages (Battlegroups). Battlegroups would be compromised of units numbering between 1500 to 2200 troops (including logistical people as well). These would be deployable within 5-10 days and capable of remaining in for at least 30 days. Hope was that battlegroups would speed deployment in crisis situations. Also serve bridging functions (put troops on the ground while larger contingencies were planned and sent in).

Is Howorth's assessment positive or negative? Does he believe the EU has plateaued as a security actor?

Negative; headed there

Why do the origins of NATO and the CSDP suggest more differences than similarities?

NATO arose and persisted for 40 years because of a single, massive, systemic and existential military threat not just to W.E. but also to 'the West' in general. This required an overwhelming military response. CSDP arose because of the re-emergence across the European space (and beyond) of a range of destabilizing risks and threats which required, above all, comprehensive political management. NATO's rise was accompanied by the emergency of the US as a the indispensable security actor in Europe, a theatre which was also projected to centre-stage in US defence planners' agendas. CSDP arose because of the gradual disengagement of the US from the European theatre, no longer seen as strategically central, in favour of a major American concentration on other parts of the globe (Asia, Middle East). NATO arose at a time when the various states of Europe, bled dry by two world wars in 30 years, were literally and figuratively on their knees (physical exhaustion and the begging bowl). CSDP arose at a time when the EU as a global actor, having established the Single Market and the Single Currency, and having emerged as the largest and wealthiest trading bloc in the world, was buoyantly seeking to complement its economic and commercial clout with some serious political and even military muscle. NATO arose in an era dominated by arguably the starkest form of Wesphalian realism, where the only concerns of international relations were to avoid at all cost another interstate global conflagration. CSDP arose in an era marked by the quest for a new world order based on the growing role of international institutions, an inchoate but discernible body of international law, the ascendancy of non-state actors, the assertion of human rights and even human security above those of states, and much talk of a post-Westphalian order.

Is the EU capable of developing a 'Grand Strategy'? Why or why not?

No, because it requires several things that the EU does not have: intuitive overview, runs counter to specialization logic, based on extraction of key but limited information from a large range of sources and its quasi-instinctive, bold decision-making, early fixing of an overall objective followed by its focused pursuit, great discourse.

Is liberalism equipped to explain the CSDP? Why or why not?

No; neither school of thought can explain it on its own. Difficulty dealing with the reality of power.

What are the implications of the Lisbon Treaty for national sovereignty over security and defense questions?

Nothing in the Treaty text can 'prejudice' the specific character of a security and defence policy of the Member States'. If the member states wish to disregard the Treaty for their own national purposes, then they are entitled to do so.

Headline Goal Cont.

Operation capacity, particular involving lift, consistently neglected despite an awareness of gaps. Member states not surprised by limited operational capacity, yet through first decade, consistently neglected.

Why St. Malo?

Paris wasn't able to establish an independent defense structure on EU-level bc of GB.

North Atlantic Treaty concurrent, paving the way for NATO

Pentagon talks, helped sketch out the North Atlantic Treaty. Explicit security guarantees that Western Europe was seeking. Pointed to this entity and said "this is what we want to rearm Germany." Momentum to finalize negotiations to the NA Treaty.

How have Poland and Germany shifted their interests relative to NATO and the CSDP?

Poland used to only viewed NATO as potential institution, viewing CSDP; shifting more towards CSDP now Same with Germany because of NATO not offering options (being mainly defensive force) that they wanted

Changing CFSP Discourse

Remaining states endorsed memorandum Substantive advances were limited in AT, but clear that S&F tapped into ideas that freed up the discourse. The AT was struggling with reconciling a role that didn't conflict with NATO. The PTs, however, offered prospect developing role for the EU w/out overreaching or evoking longstanding objections about military force at EU level. S&F changed the CFSP such that security cooperation less of a competition b/w EU and NATO. Largely occurred after Amsterdam, and mere introduction of new focal point broke through uneasy compromise at Maastricht. EU-level foreign security cooperation is now framed around the PT instead of some suprapower.

Single European Act - 1987

Represented movement towards European integration on all fronts - first successful effort to institutionalize. Language labels the EPC as a possible means to replace the foreign policy autonomy of EC member states. Provision was non-committal (looked into future and said "this might happen.") Pretty bold proposal to take away foreign policy autonomy and invest it in a supranational forum. Merging the EPC into EC did not affect European's defense architecture to any major degree. Accord that called for

Why is intelligence gathering important to the future security role of the EU?

The EU only gets scraps of intelligence from bigger states and smaller states feel left out. Intelligence is a necessity for national sovereignty.

Council's declaration December 2008 (ESDP)

Shortfalls in operation capacity continued to be discussed today should be considered greatest failure of ESDP during first decade. Furthermore, there are significant implications for this for force projection in the future.

European Security Strategy, 2003

Solana added 5 key areas: coherence of Europe's agenda including humanitarian and rescue tasks, disarmament, support for combatting terrorism, support for peacekeeping and crisis management tasks, and peacemaking.

ESS 2008

Solana's back - Providing Security in a Changing World - echoes long-term vision - Solana stresses Europe faces complex threats (including state failure, organized crime, piracy, terrorism, proliferation of WMDs, in addition to things like cyberwarfare, distruption of energy supplies, and even global warming and environmental degradation, globalization and human security).

Headline Goal: Limited Results

Some have argued that these advices would be double-edged sword (limited institutional developments). Member-states also tended to come up short to previously agreed-upon standards. Legacy of failing of living up to promises didn't force the member states to give up on endowing the EU with military; just lowered expectations. Within a decade of St. Malo, European level of security of and defense capabilities were stymied by procrastination, weak coordination, and persistent absenteeism. ~70% of European land forces incapable of working outside national territory. Force projection hindered by various shortfalls (involving lift & supply). Battlegroups did encourage modernization & communication, but positive outcomes uneven across member states. Slow-going in first decade, but member states remained committed to the RRF principle. At no point did the member states think about expanding scope beyond Petersburg Tasks - limited ambitious didn't = success in equipping the RRF or bringing member states together. EU security strategy does fit w/ domestic security and defense priorities, greater success in military capability development (when people can get behind operation). People concerned w/ integration and fiscal impact.

How has neo-functionalism approached the idea of security integration? What might the lack of 'spillover' into security mean for the neo-functionalist interpretation of the CSDP?

Spillover; spillover is the process whereby the successful functioning of integration in a given policy area is believed to create pressures in connected policy areas for a similar measure of integration. Lack of spillover due to only believed to be working in area of 'low politics.' CSDP could be explained by the neo-functionalists but too busy finding a reason for the empirical absence of integration in security and defense

What does neo-realism suggest about the CSDP? What is the prognosis for trans-Atlantic relations? Will the CSDP become a serious security actor?

The CSDP is barely studied by neo-realists - mainly because it does not fit into their vision of things. The EU is 'balancing' against US dominance. The CSDP will be dominated by the EU's large and powerful states who will seek to use it for their own national purposes rather than for trans- European purposes.

How does Howorth react to the idea of a 'European Army'?

The CSDP process is destined to remain strictly voluntary, consensual and intergovernmental for as long as the Union remains a body which falls short of fully fledged federalism. Most of the discussion of a 'Euro-Army' is little more than politically motivated chatter.

Looking at the tenure of the first High Representative, is the key issue whether she was ineffective or whether the job is doable? What is Howorth's response?

The doability of the job; Howorth agrees.

Define 'Civilian Crisis Management' (CCM) and note the capabilities.

The entire range of non-military instruments which are called for in crisis situations. Includes: police forces, state-building capacity, trained judges, lawyers, civil administrators, customs officials, civil protection and disaster relief agents, demobilization and reintegration specialists, security sector reform instruments.

What is the key institutional development of the Lisbon Treaty for security and defense?

The introduction of the double-hatted post of High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the Commission (HR-VP)

What is one of the CSDP's 'most significant innovations, and how does it relate to post-conflict/crisis management situations? Has this innovation actually been effective on the ground?

The police mission; in post-conflict or crisis management situations, the most urgent need is often for local security forces and above all for a professional police force. Effectiveness is mixed.

What is the 'comprehensive approach'?

The synergy between the military and civilian instruments which the CSDP tries to coordinate in order to formulate an approach

Regarding the ECFR report on military strategy, what are the main categories of the EU Member States and which states fit within each category?

Those that actually have a strategy (France and UK) Those that have some sense of strategic purpose (Sweden, Finland, and Czech Republic) Those with global horizons, although little in the way of operational plans (NL, Spain, Germany, Hungary, Slovenia) 'Abstentionists' who have no coherent plan and in some cases no defence ministry as such (Luxembourg, Austria, Ireland, Malta) 'Drifters' whose national plans, for one reason or another, have not been updated since the turn of the century (Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Belgium) And the rest, dubbed 'localists', whose main concern is their own territorial integrity.

Treaty of Lisbon & the CSDP

Treaty of Lisbon is significant. In addition to paving way for enlargement, also enhanced security and defense structure. 1) ESDP renamed the CSDP. 2) High representative of the EU for foreign affairs and security policy. Effectively this meant that two previous position were merged into one. Currently Federica Mogherini. Also enshrined unanimity as threshold for action (all member states had to agree). That unanimity as the threshold for action would not prevent enhanced collaboration of smaller groups was not precluded. Common defense is end-goal for European cooperation under the EU. Sensitive to preexisting commitments, but this was still a common agreement. Member states promised that their own national policies wouldn't contradict EU policy.

1966

US moved to establish coordination of peacetime prod. & planning of member states' militaries paired with a mutual defense pact. US saying we'll give you what you wanted in the 40s, but you need to pay for your own defense. CDG pushed for firm commitment by NATO for assistance in the event of an attack on any French ally. Led France to withdraw from NATO's military structure in 1966.

What is a 'civilian actor'?

Union's focus on the core policy areas of trade and economics, its existence as an institutions-driven project rooted in international law, and its total absence from the arena of military ambition or coercive diplomacy. Features lay at the heart of the original EU work in progress.

Formation of Western European Union

WEU most commonly referred European security arrangement seen after WWII - 1954 as potential for EDC collapsed. Emerged from under auspices of Brussels Treaty. In principle, WEU created to regulate German rearmament strictly as European entity; however, protocols transferred authority to NATO. To be fair, WEU not supposed to be independent European initiative. Came about WITH US support - tired of waiting for German rearmament (and Italy) to become members of NATO. WEU not created to upset the balance in Europe or somehow enable the European to provide for their own defense without the US. Sanctioned by the US, encouraged by the US, purely instrumentally. US simply believed that NATO would present a stronger front about the USSR if the Germany was firmly embedded in the alliance. WEU came on the back of the failure of the EDC. The diplomatic climate at the time was not right for an independent European defense structure. When we look at WEU, it didn't envision a common army or the supranational entities that would somehow oversee European security. WEU represented a politically softer version of the EDC. WEU was a step forward in terms of developing a European security identity, but the org was functionally weak. WEU accomplished very little aside from rearming Germany and potential entrance into NATO. Was a step forward, albeit modest one, for developing a purely European security identity.

Negotiations for the NA Alliance did not go as well as expected

Western Europe wanted a stronger mutual assistance clause to be sure that if the Soviets attacked or Germany decides to flex muscles that the US WOULD HELP and WOULD COMMIT RESOURCES. US was resistant- didn't want to get themselves in entanglements into European obligation. US very much aware that Cold War is proxy war and being stuck w/ Europe could hurt. Movement of rolling back USSR was still active and requires resources. US insists language includes military action as a POSSIBLE response, but ALL responses would be considered in the event of an attack. This satisfied Europe.

Europe would appear to have choices in the face of the US-China competition

When NATO is in doubt, a new focus on Asia might pose challenge to Europe but also an opportunity to decide what they really want. He'll argue that Europe's choices are much more constrained. More precisely, two conclusions: 1) Europe will neither seek to balance through the acquisition of hard power capabilities (CSDP) 2) It will not fashion a S&D strategy based upon the projection of massive force so that it may exercise greater influence on a regional or global scale. This claim rests upon an assessment of three factors: cost, capiblities, and culture.

Limited goals of CSDP are

appropriate and further supports the accumulation of non-military instruments. The position that Europe has taken in regards to the prospect of transition of power is that the nature of power is changing in Europe's direction. Projection of power should be limited to preventing crises. Status quo expectations in the near-term. Deep pervasive rethink (maybe due to generational change). Can Europe achieve agreement and unity of purpose?

EC hoisted desire to...

develop common defense policy on security. Early action towards this end in EP and council, form European Political Cooperation in 1970. Wasn't formally part of the EC at that time (just the European member states but not supranational). Purpose was through EPC, member states could increase consultation/coordination on security and defense affairs and forum would be strictly European. EPC informal, non-binding met on ad-hoc basis. No one forced in.

Prospects for NATO

has been the bedrock of Euorpe's defense for the better part of 70 years. But NATO has derived stretagic fheft from military offering from US. If US is declining power relataive to China, from abstract discussion, what might we expect from NATO? According to hegemonic decline, 3 possiblities: 1) NATO will fade completely into background and irrelevant to security competition between US and China. 2) May endure by won't be relevant to the security competition that is not on Europe's doorstep.

Capability, cost, culture, clearly

propagate the status quo. Even if the member states WANTED to invest more in the EU, for the sake of being a more prominent global actor, unlikely that they would be able to in the near to immediate turn.

Consensus Expectations Gap

the difficulties of obtaining the agreement do more to inhibit defense capabilities. The lower the level of commitment, the higher the likely of achieving consensus. More defined by what tools can be agreed upon. The EU appears better suited to small-scale crisis management than large-scale military operations. Until cultural change happens, EU unlikely to aspire to more than the normative power instruments that are already in place.

EU is framed as...

unique security actor facing a diverse range of unconventional threats. Enhancing European S&D cooperation is a way to resolve these unconventional threats. Allow Europe to have a greater role globally (share in the responsibility of building a better world). Division of Europe's military capabilities is tailored to these unconventional threats and therefore rejects any notion of accumulating overwhelming force at the European level. Preparing for large-scale aggression is not a pressing concern. On the whole, this notion of Europe as a unique security actor rejects traditional power politics (what we should normally assume of a great power). Yes, the EU should be prepared to project power, but for the purposes of preventing and resolving crises rather than waging widespread war. And understanding that the crises is quite broad in its interpretation. Furthermore, military might should be supplemented multilateralism and an international order based upon the rule of law. Military might is just one piece of the puzzle - should also involve multilateralism. This position maintains the limited goals of the ESDP relative to the accommodation of military power while promoting a wide range of military instruments.