Euthyphro

Socrates rejects the

DCT thus challenging the Gods' omnipotence

Definiens vs definiendum

Definiens = The word or phrase that defines the definiendum in a definition. LOVED BY THE GODS Definiendum = THE HOLY

Socratic irony is socrates' way of pointing out that

Euthyphro has been careless and inventive about divine matters. He says at the end, that since Euthyphro has not told him what piety is he will not escape Meletus's indictment

11b-11e

Interlude: wandering arguments Euthyphro accuses Socrates' explanations of going round in circles. Socrates says that he is mistaken and that it is Euthyphro's statements that do so - he likens them to the work of his predecessor Daedalus, who made statues that were so realistic, they were said to run away. 11c He remarks that if he were putting forward these ideas and suggestions, it would fair to joke that he had inherited from Daedalus the tendency for his verbal creations to run off. He then says that if this were the case, he would in fact be cleverer in his craft than Daedalus, his ancestor, since he was capable to move only his own products, not the statements of other people as well as his own. Socrates says that he would prefer their explanations to stay put and be securely founded rather than have the wealth of Tantalus to complement his Daedalan cleverness.

Linguistic note

It has caused problems translating The text presents the argument through a distinction between the active and the passive voice, as for example when Socrates asks about the difference between a "carried thing" (φερόμενον) and "being carried" (φέρεται), both using the word "carried" in the English translation,

Who is Socrates being prosecuted by?

Meletus from Pitthus

Definition 4 -

PIETY IS A SPECIES OF THE GENUS "JUSTICE" He comes to this conclusion by asking: Are you not compelled to think that all that is pious is just?

"Zeus the creator, him who made all things, you will not dare speak of; for where fear is, there also is reverence."

The poet Stasinus, probable author of the Cypria (fragment 24) If not Stasinus, then the author is unknown.

The failed definitions in the Euthyphro also teach us the essential features in a definition of piety UPAE (according to Rabbas - these are the three conditions for a Socratic definition)

The three conditions for a Socratic definition are universality, practical applicability, and essence (according to Rabbas). Universality means a definition must take into account all instances of piety. An example of a definition that fails to satisfy the condition of universality is Euthyphro's very first definition, that what he is doing is pious. It is not the use of a paradigm that is the issue with regard to this condition, but that the paradigm is not inclusive enough. As Socrates points out: 'You agree...that there are many other pious actions.' In other words, a definiton must reveal the essential characteristic that makes pious actions pious, instead of being an example of piety. Practical applicability means the definition must provide a standard or criterion to be used as an example to look toward when deliberating about what to do, as well as in the evaluation of an action. Euthyphro's second definition, before amended by Socrates, fails to meet this condition because of the variety in the gods' judgements. It should be possible to apply the criterion to a case and yield a single answer, but in the case of Euthyphro's definition, the gods can disagree and there would therefore be more than one answer. Second definition teaches us that a definition of piety must be logically possible. Socrates criticizes the definition that 'piety is what is pleasing to the gods' by saying that the gods disagree among themselves as to what is pleasing. This means that a given action, disputed by the gods, would be both pious and impious at the same time - a logical impossibility. Essence refers to the Greek concept of ουσία: it must reveal the properties which are essential and make something what it is3. It is not enough to list the common properties of the phenomena because we need to know what makes an action pious in order to justify our actions as pious. Euthyphro's second definition, that the pious is that which is loved by all the gods, does satisfy the second condition, since a single answer can be given in response to the question 'is x pious?'. However, Euthyphro wants to define piety by two ουσίαι simultaneously: being god-loved and some inherent pious trait, which cannot logically co-exist. Moreover, being god-loved is a παθός ('effect', or accidental feature) of piety, rather than its ουσία, since it happens as a result of its existing characteristics. These three criteria are not stated explicitly in the dialogue by Socrates, nor does Euthyphro initially acknowledge them, but he recognises their validity in his own argumentative practice4: he justifies his own actions by referring to some general criterion5; he acknowledges contentious questions must be decided on rational grounds6; he attempts to fix his second proposal by referring to some norm that the gods do in fact all agree on7; and he assures Socrates he is capable of giving a satisfactory answer to his question i.e 'the request for a practicable normative standard for rational practical deliberation'8. Third definition teaches us that Fourth definition (holiness is a part of the right) - Euthyphro does not clearly understand the relationship between holiness and justice. His understanding of the relationship between holiness and justice is based on his traditional religious perspective. - When Euthyphro suggests that 'everything which is right is holy' (11e), aka the traditional conception of piety and justice as 'sometimes interchangeable', Socrates proves this wrong using the Stasinus quote. - Euthyphro '[falls] back into a mere regurgitation of the conventional elements of the traditional conception' , i.e. his defining piety in conventional terms of prayer and sacrifice. This leads Euthyphro back to his previously definition of piety as 'that which is dear to the gods', which was formerly refuted, since it was agreed that the gods cannot be benefited by men. Fifth definition (Piety is an art of sacrifice and prayer - He proposes the notion of piety as a form of knowledge, of how to do exchange: Giving gifts to the gods, and asking favours in return. )(14e) Socrates presses Euthyphro to say what benefit the gods perceive from human gifts - warning him that "knowledge of exchange" is a species of commerce. (14e) Euthyphro objects that the gifts are not a quid pro quo, between man and deity, but are gifts of "honour, esteem, and favour", from man to deity. (15a) In other words, Euthyphro admits that piety is intimately bound to the likes of the gods. The dialogue has come full circle, and Euthyphro leaves Socrates without a clear definition of "piety" as he faces a trial for impiety (ἀσέβεια asebeia).

what happens when the analogy of distinction 2 is applied to the verb used in the definiens 'love'?

When this analogy is applied to the verb used in the definiens, 'love', Socrates reaches the same conclusion: what makes something dear to the gods is the fact that the gods love it (10d).

socrates' analogies are

a dialectic technique

15d-16a

conclusion Socrates persists, says: 'like Proteus, you're not to be let go until you speak' Meletus - ring comp Euthyphro runs off.

8b-8e

dialogue in continuation of above Socrates says that Euthyphro's decision to punish his father may be approved by one god, but disapproved to another. Euthyphro, however, believes that the gods do not dispute with another on whether one who kills someone unjustly should pay the penalty. Socrates says that humans too do not dispute with each other on this. BUT Socrates shows to Euthyphro that not everyone, however, admits that they are wrong, since they do not want to pay the penalty. The dispute is therefore, not, on whether the wrong-doer must pay the penalty, but on who the wrongdoer is, what he did, or when etc. The same goes for the god's quarrels. Both gods and men quarrel on a deed - one party says it's been done unjustly, the other justly.

A third essential characteristic of Socrates' conception of piety

is Socrates' conception of religion and morality. For his proposed Socratic definition is challenging the traditional conception of piety and drawing attention to its inherent conflicts. SOCRATES REJECTS EUTHYPHRO'S CONCEPTION OF JUSTICE IN RELATION TO PIETY.... From the start of the concluding section of the dialogue, Socrates devotes his attentions to demonstrating to Euthyphro 'the limitations of his idea of justice [...] by showing Euthyphro a broader concept of justice and by distinguishing between piety and justice' . When Socrates attempts to separate piety and justice, asking what part of the right is holy and the inverse, Euthyphro says that he does not understand, revealing that 'he has conceived until this point piety and justice to be united' . (EUTHYPHRO HAS CONCEIVED PIETY AND JUSTICE TO BE CONNECTED, WHEREAS SOC SHOWS THAT THEY ARE SLIGHTLY DIFFERENT, FOR JUSTICE IS MORE COMPREHENSIVE THAN PIETY) Indeed, Socrates proves false the traditional conception of piety and justice as 'sometimes interchangeable' , through his method of inversing propositions. On Euthyphro's suggestion that 'everything which is right is holy' (11e), Socrates makes the following logical arguments. He firstly quotes Stasinus, author of the Cypria: "thou wilt not name; for where fear is, there also is reverence" (12b) and states that he disagrees with this quote. Socrates takes the proposition 'where fear is, there also is reverence' and inverses it: 'where reverence is, there also is fear', which shows the latter nor to be true since, as he explains, 'fear is more comprehensive than reverence' (12c). He therefore proves that the two are not mutually exchangeable. Socrates then applies this logic to the above statement. When we take the proposition 'where justice is, there also is piety' and its inverse: 'where piety is, there also is justice', we discover in similar fashion, that 'piety is not everywhere where piety is, for piety is a part of justice' (12d). Indeed, Euthyphro's conception of justice is shown to change throughout the dialogue. Initially, he is only able to conceive of justice 'in terms of the enforcement of particular laws, and he was willing to join this narrow concept of justice to piety.' However, by the end of the dialogue, the notion of justice has expanded and is 'the all-pervading regulator of human actions' . SOCRATES REJECTS EUTHYPHRO'S CONCEPTION OF PIETY Euthyphro's failed suggestions 'represent important features of the traditional conception of piety' . When Euthyphro misunderstands Socrates' request that he specify the fine things which the gods accomplish, he '[falls] back into a mere regurgitation of the conventional elements of the traditional conception' , i.e. his defining piety in conventional terms of prayer and sacrifice. This leads Euthyphro back to his previously definition of piety as 'that which is dear to the gods', which was formerly refuted, since it was agreed that the gods cannot be benefited by men. Therefore, the third definition, even after its revision and the pronouncement of piety as the part of justice which consists in serving the gods, proves not to move beyond the second definition. Euthyphro's 'wrong-turning' therefore provides us with an example of the inadequacy of the traditional conception of piety.

Euthyphro's last attempt to construe "looking after"

"knowing how to say + do things gratifying to the gods in prayer + in sacrifice" S = E's wrong-turning S = science of requests + donations S = Would it not be correct to ask the gods for what they need from us? E says yes S: is holiness then a trading-skill S: how are the gods benefitted from what they receive from humans E SAYS THAT THE GODS RECEIVE NO BENEFIT FROM MENS' SERVICE, ONLY GRATIFICATION. SOC: THEN THE HOLY, AGAIN, IS WHAT'S APPROVED BY THE GODS. Socrates says Euthyphro is Daedalus

Euthyphro Dilemma

'is the holy approved by the gods because it is holy or is it holy because it's approved?' Socrates says that there is thus a distinction between what is holy and what the gods approve of. If the thing is holy already, then the gods approve of it - these are two separate things. This does not answer what is holy. There must be some other explanation. - 1st horn of the dilemma: the gods command it because it is holy. This is the view accepted by Socrates and Euthyphro in Plato's dialogue. If acts are innately holy and therefore loved by the gods, what is the point of them even existing, or us using the gods to justify morality. This view however implies that the gods are not required for morality. - 2nd horn of the dilemma: it is holy because the gods command it - divine command theory. The problem with this is that it is arbitrary morality, since as we saw before Greek gods are capricious; some think things are holy, others think the same things are unholy. Socrates believes that any real god will act and think rationally; thus acts would be approved by them according to rational principles. Holiness is here seen as being a possible explanation of why the gods might universally approve certain actions. Their quarrels would arise when deeds are neither holy or unholy.

Burnyeat's opinion on the Euthyphro

'the Euthyphro lays the groundwork for Plato's own denunciation in the Republic of the impiety of traditional Greek religion...'

Problem of knowledge?

- Problem of knowledge - how do we know what is pleasing to all of the gods?

Proteus

- Proteus is an old sea-god who would not willingly yield up information, and was able to transform himself into all kinds of beasts if trapped. He had to be tired up and held fast during his magical contortions in order that he might be subdued and yield the information required. Homer, Odyssey 4. Plato also uses the Proteus analogy in the Ion.

Euthyphro's failings

- his hubris (see above) - his decision to prosecute his father is unpopular. He is acting against conventions. Socrates assumes that the person murdered was a member of Euthyphro's household as otherwise he wouldn't have prosecuted his father for simply killing an outsider. This shows how inconceivable Euthyphro's action is. Euthyphro explains that it makes no difference whether the dead man was an outsider or a relative - the factor determining why he is prosecuting his father is whether or not the killer killed with justification. 1) the person murdered is not a member of his family, he is an outsider 2) the person murdered is a slave and murdered someone else 3) his father indirectly murdered him - his inability to follow the argument at times After Soc asks: 'is the holy approved by the gods because it is holy or is it holy because it's approved?', Euthyphro says that he doesn't know what Socrates means and so Socrates uses the analogies of being carried/ carrying, being led/ leading, being seen/ seeing. When Socrates helps Euthyphro along by suggesting in effect that holiness is a species of justice. Euthyphro, when required to say whether all of the just is holy, or part of the just is holy, says he doesn't follow. 'And yet you are as much younger than I as you are wiser; but, as I said, you are indolent on account of your wealth of wisdom. But exert yourself, my friend; for it is not hard to understand what I mean.' - his impatience After Socrates asks Euthyphro to explain what specifically the gods accomplish using humans as servants, thus going into detail in the argument that holiness is 'looking after' the gods, Euthyphro becomes impatient and explains that he just told Socrates that they accomplish a multitude of things and that it is hard to say which. He the however refines holiness as knowing how to pray and sacrifice in a way that will please the gods. - his lack of clarity in explanation - socrates refers to him as Daedalus at two distinct points of the dialogue. At the end. - in 14c, soc says that E. has given a very long-winded explanation of what's holy as being knowing how to say and do things gratifying to the gods in prayer and sacrifice. Soc tells him that it is obvious that Euthyphro is not trying to teach him.

On the other hand it is difficult to extract a Socratic definition because

1) Firstly, it is impossible to overlook the fact that Euthyphro himself struggles to reach a definition. No resolution is reached by either parties at the end of the dialogue. The pessimistic, defeatist mood is conveyed in Euthyphro's refusal to re-examine the matter of discussion, as Socrates suggests, and his eagerness to leave to keep an appointment. 2) Similarly, Euthyphro, at various points, professes lack of understanding, for example, when he is asked to separate justice and piety and find out which is a part of the other (12a) and his wrong-turning. However, one could argue that Euthyphro's traditional conception of piety impedes him from understanding the Socratic conception. 3) Lastly, whilst I would not go as far as agreeing with Rabbas' belief that we ought to read the Euthyphro as Plato's attempt to demonstrate the incoherence of the concept of piety 'as a practical virtue [...] that is action-guiding and manifests itself in correct deliberation and action' , I believe, as shown above, that the gap between Socrates and Euthyphro's views is so unbridgeable that the possibility of a conception of piety that is widely-applicable, understood and practical becomes rather unlikely.

PROBLEM WITH SOCRATES' ARGUMENT 1) THE STATEMENT THAT THE GOD-LOVED AND THE HOLY ARE TWO DIFFERENT THINGS IS PROBLEMATIC LOGICAL INADEQUACY How could one criticise Socrates' statement: ὡς παντάπασιν ἑτέρω ὄντε ἀλλήλων - 'that the two are completely different from each other' (11a) (the two being the god-loved and the holy)?

1) Socrates places restraints on his argument which render such a conclusion. Although Socrates does concede that the two terms are co-extensive, he is keen to examine the definiens and definiendum in 'non-extensional contexts' (Geach, 'Plato's Euthyphro: An Analysis and Commentary'). The non-extensional contexts only prove one specific thing: ''[holy]' cannot be defined as 'god-loved' if the gods' reason for loving what is [holy] is that it is [holy]'. If the substitutions were extensional, we would observe that the terms 'holy' and 'god-beloved' would 'apply to different instances' too and that they were not so different from each other as Socrates makes them out to be.

Looking after is construed in 3 diff ways

1) looking after qua improving or benefitting the gods 2) looking after qua service to the gods in the same way as a slave services his master Soc - to what goal does this contribute? E- the gods achieve many fine things from humans 3) looking after qua knowledge of how to pray and sacrifice to the gods Socrates says this implies some kind of trade between gods and men. If this is the case would it not be better to asks the gods what they want from men? Euthyphro by this is saying that the gods receive gratification from humans = the same as saying piety is what (all) the gods love - definition 2 and 3

14e-15a

14e-15a. Socrates, however, has a problem with the gods having any need of sacrifices from us. So he asks what benefit the gods would have from our gifts to them. At the same time he stipulates, "What they give us is obvious to all. There is for us no good that we do not receive from them." This is a telling passage for Socrates's views about the gods. And, if there is "no good" that we do not get from the gods, is this not the answer to the question about the gods' purposes? Are not the gods, indeed, always trying to accomplish simply the good? That could well complete the definition of piety that Socrates was looking for. At the same time, such a definition would simply open the further question: What is the good? If the business of the gods is to accomplish the good, then we would have to worry about what that is.

Socrates asks what good thing the gods accomplish with the help of humans/ how humans benefit the gods

15a-15b. Euthyphro is not going to admit, as Socrates would not, that the gods are actually benefited by our sacrifices. Our gifts are not actually needed by them. So why bother? Euthyphro suggests that the gifts are made out of reverence and gratitude. Since this would not benefit the gods, what is it to them? It is, Euthyphro says, dear to them. This amounts to definition 2 and 3

15d-15e

15d-15e. "For fear of the gods..." That is, Euthyphro should fear the gods for what he is doing. "...and would have been ashamed before men..." That is, Euthyphro should be ashamed before men. "...but now I know well..."...unless Euthyphro has knowledge of piety and impiety, so either get on with it, or admit his ignorance.

Moral by Socrates

A Moral: if we want to characterize piety (or doing right), perhaps it's best to leave the gods out of the picture. SOCRATES REJECTS INCLUDING THE GODS IN DEFINING PIETYYY The Euthyphro as a dialogue on how NOT to define piety

A genus-differentia definition

A genus-differentia definition is a type of intensional definition, and it is composed of two parts: a genus (or family): An existing definition that serves as a portion of the new definition; all definitions with the same genus are considered members of that genus. the differentia: The portion of the definition that is not provided by the genus. Socrates asks Euthyphro to consider the genus and differentia when he says: 'what part of justice is the holy?' Euthyphro replies that holy is the part of justice concerned with looking after the gods The genus = justice The differentia = concerned with looking after the gods

PROBLEMS WITH SOCRATES' ARGUMENT MORALLY INADEQUATE MORALITY + RELIGION (5)

Although Socrates' argument follows through from a logical point of view, it becomes problematic when we begin to think about it from the perspective of morality and religion. In order for Socrates' refutation of the inference to be accepted, it requires one to accept the religious and moral viewpoint it takes. Firstly, it makes the assumption that the gods are rational beings and have a 'rational love' for the holy . secondly, as Judson brings to our attention, Socrates' argument does not allow for the alternative that the gods have no reason for loving the holy. Socrates 'bypasses the need to argue against the alternative that the gods do not have reasons for loving what they love.' Thirdly, it rules out the possibility that the gods love 'holiness' for an incidental feature by the suggestion that they must love it for some reason intrinsic to 'holiness' . Fourthly, the necessity of all the gods' agreement. Perhaps piety depends on the individual and their outlook on it. The fact that the gods vary in their love of different things means that the definition of piety varies for each of them. Each of the gods may love a different aspect of piety. Lastly and perhaps most importantly, Socrates' argument requires one to reject the Divine Command Theory, also known as voluntarism . Socrates' claim that being holy has causal priority to being loved by the gods, suggests that the 'holy', or more broadly speaking, morality is independent of the divine. With the suggestion that the gods 'are not the active cause of [something] being [holy], the traditional divinities lose their explanatory role in the pursuit of piety (or justice, beauty, goodness, etc.)' and 'become accidental to the piety, justice, or goodness of a particular' . And so, as Diamond convincingly argues, the traditional Greek gods and their traditional 'causative role' are replaced by 'universal causal essences or forms'. Indeed, Socrates, by imposing his nonconformist religious views, makes us (and Euthyphro included, who in accepting Socrates' argument (10c-d) contradicts himself), less receptive to Euthyphro's moral and religious outlook. Euthyphro, as 'an earnest and simple believer in the old traditional religion of the Hellenes' , is of the belief that moral questions ought to be 'settled by appeal to moral authorities--the gods' and that 'holiness' 'is to be defined in terms of the gods' approval' . Although Socrates' argument is generally logical, it relies upon 'a purgation of subjectivity from divine principles'. Indeed, it is hard to believe that Euthyphro, after reaching a state of απορία, abandoned his traditional religious outlook. THE MAIN FLAW WITH SOCRATES' ARGUMENT IS THAT it relies on the assumption of deities who consider morality and justice in deciding whether or not something is pious, and therefore whether or not to love it.

The merits of Socrates' argument the two crucial distinctions made (EVEN THOUGH THE LAST ONE IS DIFFICULT TO TRANSLATE)

Analogies with the grammatical distinction of the active and passive voices and then inflected passives, which enable Socrates to question where the causal priority lies in the statement: is the holy loved by the gods because it is holy, or is the holy holy, because it is loved by the gods? The first distinction he makes 1) DISTINCTION = PASSIVE + ACTIVE NEUTER PARTICIPLES Socrates appeals to logical, grammatical considerations , in particular the use of passive and active participial forms: λέγομέν τι φερόμενον καὶ φέρον καὶ ἀγόμενον καὶ ἄγον καὶ ὁρώμενον καὶ ὁρῶν - 'we speak of a thing being carried and a thing carrying and a thing being led and a thing leading and a thing being seen and a thing seeing' (10a). 2) DISTINCTION = Socrates drops the active participles and substitutes them for inflected third person singular present passives so we have THE ORIGINAL PRESENT PASSIVE NEUTER PARTICIPLES + INFLECTED THIRD PERSON SINGULAR PRESENT PASSIVES. the use of two different phrases which are extremely similar when translated into English: φερόμενόν ἐστι and φέρεται. The former might be translated most easily as 'a thing being carried' and the latter as 'gets carried'. In essence, Socrates' point is this: If something is a thing being carried, it is because it gets carried (but it does not get carried because it is a thing being carried) Socrates, therefore, concludes that 'x is being-carried (pheromenon) because x [one carries it/ it gets carried] (pheretai), and it is not the case that [one carries/ it gets carried] x because x is being-carried' In the same way, if a thing loved is loved, it is because it is being loved (it is not being loved because it is a thing loved) Being a thing loved is dependent on being loved, but this does not apply to the inverse. This distinction becomes vital. Alternatively, one can translate the inflected passives as active, Cohen suggests one can more easily convey the notion of its causality: an object has entered an altered condition 'φερόμενόν' as a result of the process of alteration implied in 'φέρεται' . INFLECTED PASSIVES = HAVE A NOTION OF CAUSALITY

THE principle of substitutivity of definitional equivalents + the Leibnizian principle

By the 'principle of substitutivity of definitional equivalents' / Leibnizian principle , Socrates fairly competently demonstrated that 'holy' and 'god-beloved' are not mutually replaceable. The main explanation for this is their difference in meaning. As Mill states, the argument validly expresses the notion that both terms 'have a different connotation, even if they denote the same men and actions' .

5d-6e

Definition 1: Holiness is what he is doing now, prosecuting a criminal either for murder or for sacrilegious theft etc., regardless of whether that person happens to be his father. Unholiness would be choosing not to prosecute. Evidence of divine law is the fact that Zeus, best and most just of the gods. imprisoned his own father because he had unjustly swallowed his sons and similarly his father, Kronos had castrated his own father for similar reasons. These are references to tales in Hesiod's Theogony. Socrates expresses scepticism of believing in such myths, as those of gods and heroes, and appealing to them in order to justify personal behaviour. This is mocked by Aristophanes in Clouds. Nonetheless, he says that he and Euthyphro can discuss myth and religion at some other point and ought to return to formulating a definition of holy. Objection to first definition: Euthyphro gave him an example of holiness, whereas Socrates asked for the special feature (eidos)/ STANDARD (idea) through which all holy things are holy. Eidos is used which is another of Plato's terms for his Ideas, often translated 'Form'. Then he refers to this using the term 'idea' - standard. It seems to be with reference to the one 'idea' that both things holy and things unholy are recognised.

7a-8a

Definition 2: Piety is what is agreeable to (loved by) the gods. 7a Here Euthyphro gives a universal definition of holiness Socrates: Socrates says that Euthyphro has now answered in the way he wanted him to. However, he points out that the gods have quarrels and disputes with one another. Therefore definition 2 satisfies in form but not in content. Elenchus (Refutation): If the holy is agreeable to the gods, and the unholy in disagreeable to the gods, then A 'divinely approved' action/person is holy, and a 'divinely disapproved' one is unholy BUT gods have quarrels and disputes with one another. These disputes cannot be settled easily as disputes can on: - which of two numbers is greater = resolved by arithmetic - the relative size of two things = resolved by measurement - the relative weight of things = resolved by weighing Since quarrels and disputes take place over things that are unquantifiable/ abstract, for example: disagreement as to whether something is just or unjust or fine, despicable or good and bad. This means that some gods consider what they approve of to be good and other gods disapprove of this very thing and consider the opposite to be good. Therefore The same things are both god-loved/ god-approved and god-hated/ god-disapproved 8a Therefore on this account The same things would be both holy and unholy Socrates says he hasn't answered his question, since he wasn't asking what turns out to be equally holy and unholy - whatever is divinely approved is also divinely disapproved.

9e-11a

Definition 3: Piety is what all the gods love. 'What's holy is whatever all the gods approve of, what all the gods disapprove of is unholy'. Elenchus: EUTHYPHRO DILEMMA Soc asks: 'is the holy approved by the gods because it is holy or is it holy because it's approved?' (a) Is it loved because it is pious? or (b) Is it pious because it is loved? Socrates uses as analogies the distinctions between being carried/ carrying, being led/ leading, being seen/ seeing to help Euthyphro out. Therefore something being 'approved' and something 'approving' are two distinct things. Socrates then complicates things when he asks: He then asks if what's carried is being carried because it gets carried, or for some other reason? *the same for being led, gets led and being seen, gets seen Here the distinction is the following: - Being carried denotes the state of having something done to one - Whereas gets carried denotes the action that one is at the receiving end of - i.e. the action that one is recipient of/ receives - gets carried. IT MAY MAKE SENSE TO TRANSLATE THIS AS ACTIVE SINCE THE VERB DENOTES AN ACTION THAT ONE IS RECIPIENT OF Euthyphro replies that it is for this reason. Soc THEREFORE Whats being led is led because it gets led AND ITS NOT THAT because its being led, it gets led (eli: the key is the right one is: BECAUSE IT GETS) 'I am trying to say this, that if something is coming to be so or is being affected, then its not the case that it gets to be so because its coming to be so, but that it's coming to be so, because it gets to be so, nor that it gets affected because it's being affected, but that it's being affected because it gets affected.' in rlly simple terms: sthg is being led, because one leads it and it is not the case that because it's being led, one leads it. The act of leading, results in the object entering the condition of being led. THIS ANALOGY IS THEN APPLIED TO THE GOD-LOVED Similarly, 'something does not get approved because it's being approved, but it's being approved because it gets approved' ON THE OTHER HAND THE HOLY the holy gets approved (denotes the action that one is at the receiving end of) for the reason that it's holy, AND IT IS NOT THAT it is holy because it gets approved. WHEREAS AS WE JUST SAID (EL) the 'divinely approved' is 'divinely approved' because it gets approved by the gods - i.e. by this act of approval AND IT IS NOT THAT it gets approved because it is 'divinely approved'. 'If the divinely approved and the holy were the same thing, then - 1) if the holy were getting approved because of its being holy, then the 'divinely approved' too would be getting approved because of its being 'divinely approved' - whereas 2) if the 'divinely approved' were 'divinely approved' on account of its getting approved by the gods, then the holy would be holy too on account of its getting approved.' SO THE 'DIVINELY APPROVED' AND THE HOLY ARE NOT THE SAME THING. Since what is 'divinely approved' is determined by what the gods approve, while what the gods approve is determined by what is holy, what is 'divinely approved' cannot be identical in meaning with what is holy. 'Where A determines B, and B determines C, A ≠ C.'

12e-

Definition 5: Holiness is the part of justice concerned with looking after the the gods. 12e Elenchus: How can we construe "looking after" in this definition? Socrates explains that he doesn't understand 'looking after'. He asks, do we look after the gods in the same way as we look after other things? If so, not everyone knows how to look after horses, only grooms, for example, then how can all men know how to look after the gods? Examples used: - groom looking after horses - kennel-master looking after dogs - cattle-farmer looking after cattle 1) In all these cases, Socrates suggests that the effect of the 'looking after' is for the improvement and benefit of the thing looked after, since things are not looked after to their detriment. "looking after" = aims at benefit of the gods It follows from this that holiness, qua (as being) 'looking after' the gods, is of benefit to the gods - an absurd claim. Euthyphro says that he does not think whenever he does sthg he's improving one of the gods. 2) looking after = service as in a slave's service toward his master. 13d Socrates asks: What goal does this achieve? o 'service to doctors' = achieves health o 'service to shipbuilders' = achieves a boat o 'service to builders' = achieves a house Therefore, what does 'service to the gods' achieve/ or to what goal does it contribute? E. replies 'a multitude of fine things'. Soc asks what the god's principal aim is. For example, he says: - generals' principal aim/ achievement is victory in war - farmers' principal aim/ achievement is food from earth E. says he told him it was a great task to learn these things with accuracy, but refines his definition of 'looking after' as 3) "looking after" = knowing how to pray and sacrifice in a way that will please the gods. Therefore Soc says E believes that holiness is the science of requests (since prayer is requesting sthg from the gods) and donations (since sacrifice is making donations to them) to the gods. Socrates says that since humans ask them for the things they need, surely the correct kind of giving would be to bestow upon gods in return the things which they happened to need from humans. This, Soc says, means that holiness is a kind of skill in trading between gods and men. Socrates reduces this to a knowledge of how to trade with the gods, and continues to press for an explanation of how the gods will benefit. 14c Euthyphro: gods receive gratification from humans This is essentially 'what's approved by the gods'. This amounts to saying that if we are pious, we give the gods what pleases them. So we are back to Definition 2 or 3.

5 definitions - definition 1

Definiton 1: Euthyphro's first definition of piety is what he is doing now, that is, prosecuting his father for manslaughter (5d). Socrates rejects Euthyphro's action, because it is not a definition of piety, and is only an example of piety, and does not provide the essential characteristic that makes pious actions pious.

Daedalus

Euthyphro accuses Socrates' explanations of going round in circles. Socrates says that he is mistaken and that it is Euthyphro's statements that do so - he likens them to the work of his predecessor Daedalus. Daedalus was a figure of divine ancestry, descended from Hephaestus, who was an archetypal inventor and sculptor prominent in Minoan and Mycenaean mythology. He is associated with the carving of limbs which were separated from the main body of the statue for most of their length, thus suggesting the ability to move freely. Daedalus is said to have created statues that were so realistic that they had to be tied down to stop them from wandering off. Socrates rejects the Daedalus title despite his purported lineage (Since trades were conventionally passed from father to son, stonemasons traced their ancestry back to Daedalus, while Socrates was the son of Sophroniscus, who was reported to be a stonemason. ) He remarks that if he were putting forward these ideas and suggestions, it would fair to joke that he had inherited from Daedalus the tendency for his verbal creations to run off. He then says that if this were the case, he would in fact be cleverer in his craft than Daedalus, his ancestor, since he was capable to move only his own products, not the statements of other people as well as his own. Socrates says that he would prefer their explanations to stay put and be securely founded rather than have the wealth of Tantalus to complement his Daedalan cleverness. Tantalus: a mythical king of Lydia, of proverbial wealth; ancestor of the house of Atreus, offender of the gods and sufferer of eternal punishment as a result. LATER ON, AT END OF DIALOGUE 15b+c = Socrates again accuses Euthyphro of being like Daedalus since his 'stated views are shown to be shifting rather than staying put'. Socrates says that Euthyphro is even more skilled than Daedalus since he is making his views go round in circles, since earlier on in the discussion they agreed that the holy and the 'divinely approved' were not the same thing.

Euthyphro's 'wrong-turning'

Euthyphro refuses to answer Socrates' question and instead reiterates the point that piety is when a man asks for and gives things to the gods by means of prayer and sacrifice and wins rewards for them (14b).

Definition 5

Euthyphro then proposes a fifth definition: "Piety is the part of justice concerned with looking after the gods" Then looking after is construed in three ways... the last of which is: "Piety is knowledge of sacrifice and prayer". He proposes the notion of piety as a form of knowledge, of how to do exchange: Giving gifts to the gods, and asking favours in return. (14e) Socrates presses Euthyphro to say what benefit the gods perceive from human gifts - warning him that "knowledge of exchange" is a species of commerce. (14e) Euthyphro objects that the gifts are not a quid pro quo (a favour or advantage granted in return for something), between man and deity, but are gifts of "honour, esteem, and favour", from man to deity. (15a) In other words, Euthyphro admits that piety is intimately bound to the likes of the gods. The dialogue has come full circle, and Euthyphro leaves Socrates without a clear definition of "piety" as he faces a trial for impiety (ἀσέβεια asebeia).

definition 2

Euthyphro's second definition: Piety is what is pleasing to the gods/ what is approved by the gods. (6e-7a) Socrates applauds this definition, because it is expressed in a general form, but criticises it saying that the gods disagree among themselves as to what is pleasing. This means that a given action, disputed by the gods, would be both pious and impious at the same time - a logical impossibility. Euthyphro argues against Socrates' criticism, by noting that not even the gods would disagree, among themselves, that someone who kills without justification should be punished. Yet Socrates argues that disputes would still arise - over just how much justification actually existed; hence, the same action could be pious and impious; again, Euthyphro's definition cannot be a definition of "piety".

Can we extract a Socratic definition of piety from the Euthyphro?

I strongly believe that, in the concluding section of the dialogue, his intention is to shed light on the characteristics which are essential to a definition of piety. Plato enables this enlightening process to take place in a highly dramatic context : Euthyphro is prosecuting his father for murder, an act which he deems to be one of piety, whereas Socrates goes to court, accused by the Athenian state of impiety. Moreover, both men radically oppose one another in their religious views: Euthyphro is an exponent of the traditional Athenian religiosity, whereas Socrates represents new intellectualism. The concluding section of Socrates' dialogue with Euthyphro offers us clear direction on where to look for a Socratic definition of piety. We must understand that Plato adds necessary complexities, hurdles and steps backwards, in order to ensure that, we, as readers, like Socrates' interlocutors, undergo our very own internal Socratic questioning and in this way, acquire true knowledge of piety.

3rd definition summed up

In Socrates' definitional dialogue with Euthyphro, Socrates argues against Euthyphro's suggestion that 'the holy is what all the gods love' (9e) - Euthyphro's third attempt at a definition (his second was that piety is what the gods love). The third definition is wrong because using the Leibnizian principle, its definiens and definiendum are not mutually replaceable, that is to say, the holy and the god-beloved are not the same thing. This conclusion is reached by a long discussion on concepts concerning the Theory of causal priority, which is ignited by Socrates' question: is the holy loved by the gods because it is holy, or is it holy because it is loved? Using the theory of 'causal priority', does one place priority in the essence of the object loved, or the god's love? Socrates argues in favour of the first proposition, that an act is holy and because it is holy, is loved by the gods. Therefore, being loved by the gods is not 'intrinsic to what [holiness] is, but rather a universal affection or accident that belongs to all [holy] things through an external relation'. Therefore, the fact that the holy is loved by the gods is a pathos of holiness and does not tell us about the ousia of holiness. Then when Socrates applies the logic of causal priority to the definiens: being loved by the gods, summed up as the 'god-beloved', he discovers that the 'holy' and the 'god-beloved' are not the same thing. He first asks whether the god-beloved is loved by the gods because it is god-beloved or the god-beloved is god-beloved because it is loved by the gods. Understood in a less convoluted way, the former places priority in the essence of something being god-beloved, whereas the latter places priority in the effect of the god's love: a thing becoming god-beloved. In contrast to the first distinction made, Socrates makes the converse claim. He states that the gods love the god-beloved because of the very fact that it is loved by the gods. Therefore, given that the definiens and definiendum are not mutually replaceable in the aforementioned propositions, Socrates, concludes that 'holy' and 'god-beloved' are not the same and that 'holy' cannot be defined as 'what all the gods love'.

Definition 4

In the second half of the dialogue, Socrates suggests a definition of "piety", which is that "PIETY IS A SPECIES OF THE GENUS "JUSTICE" (12d), in text 'HOLY IS A DIVISION OF THE JUST' but he leads up to that definition with observations and questions about the difference between species and genus, starting with the question: ... Are you not compelled to think that all that is pious is just? Yet, Socrates later says that the information provided in his question to Euthyphro is insufficient for a clear definition of "piety", because piety belongs to those actions we call just, that is, morally good; however, there are actions, other than pious actions, which we call just (12d); for example, bravery and concern for others. Socrates asks: What is it that makes piety different from other actions that we call just? We cannot say something is true, because we believe it to be true. We must find proof.

2a-5c (it starts on 2a)

Introduction: 2a-5c Setting: the porch of King Archon's Court (a) Socrates' Case 2b Socrates tells Euthyphro that he is being prosecuted by Meletus from Pitthus. His charge is corrupting the youth. M claims Socrates is doing this by creating new gods and not recognizing the old ones. Socrates' daimonion. - suggestions of Socrates' religious unorthodoxy are recurrent in Aristophanes' play, The Clouds. (b) Euthyphro's Case 3e Euthyphro on the other hand is prosecuting his father for homicide. Euthyphro's father bound a worker hand and foot and threw him in a ditch after he killed one of the slaves. His father sent for an Interpreter to find out what to do, but did not care much about the life of the man, since he was a murderer and so the worker died from starvation, exposure and confinement. Euthyphro is thus prosecuting his father for homicide on a murderer's behalf. Euthyphro's relatives think it unholy for a son to prosecute his father for homicide.

Euthyphro's definition: 'to be pious is to be god-loved' is logically inadequate. Irwin sets out two inadequacies: logical inadequacy and moral inadequacy.

Irwin sets out the first inadequacy of the definition as logical. A logically adequate definition does not contradict itself. An example of a logically ADEQUATE definition would be 'to be hot is to have a high temperature'. In this case, H, a hot thing, has a high temperature. If it did not have a high temperature it would not be hot, and it would be impossible for it to be hot but not have a high temperature. This definition cannot contradict itself and is therefore logically adequate. As for the definition 'to be pious is to be god-loved'. As a god-loved thing, it cannot be true that the gods do not love P, since it is in its very definition. However, it is possible that the gods do not love P, for being a pious thing. The fact that this statement contradicts itself means that the definition is logically inadequate. Thus, the meanings of the two terms 'pious' and 'god-loved' are different, so they cannot therefore be put into a definition (where they must mean the same thing).

Ring composition

MELETUS, one of Socrates' accusers/ prosecutors 5a+b Socrates asks Euthyphro to be his teacher on matters holy and unholy, before he defends his prosecution against Meletus. He says that Meletus may not bring him to court if he accepts the beliefs taught by Euthyphro or that he may indict Euthyphro instead! 15e+16a Socrates says that he was hoping to have learnt from Euthyphro what was holy and unholy, so that he could have quickly done with Meletus' prosecution and live a better life for the rest of his days.

After refuting def 2 by stating that disagreement occurs not on the justice of an action (I.e. everyone agrees that killing someone is wrong) but on the circumstances under which it happened/ did not happen, Socrates says:

Question: "What do the gods agree on in the case?" (9a-9b) 9a-9b. "...what proof..." Now we hear the last that we will ever hear in the Euthyphro about the actual murder case. Socrates asks specifically why all the gods would "consider that man to have been killed unjustly who became a murderer while in your service, was bound by the master of his victim, and died in his bonds before the one who bound him found out from the seers what was to be done with him..." and why it is right for a son to prosecute his father on behalf of the dead murderer. Euthyphro has no answer to this, and it now appears that he has given no thought to the actual murder case at all. It looks like all Euthyphro has prepared for court is his argument from Greek mythology why it is pious for a son to prosecute his father. He probably will enjoy shocking people with his outrageous behavior and argument. But when it comes to the actual case, Euthyphro will not be able to say why his murdering servant died unjustly. His argument from Greek mythology

5d

Question: What is piety? 'Soc: 'what do you say piety and impiety are, be it in homicide or in other matters?' Soc: Everything that is holy/ unholy has one standard which determines its holiness/ unholiness. The word Plato uses for 'standard' is the Greek term idea, by which he refers to the entities of his notorious Theory of Ideas in the middle-period dialogues. The word is related to a verb of vision, and suggests a recognisable mark.

how is justice introduced after the interlude: wandering arguments

Soc: see whether it doesn't seem necessary to you that everything holy is just Euthyphro: it seems so to me Soc: then is all that is just holy? Or is it the case that all that is holy is just, whereas not all that's just is holy - part of its holy and part of its different? When Euthyphro says he doesn't understand, Soc tells him to stop basking in the wealth of his wisdom and make an effort

15b+c

Socrates again accuses Euthyphro of being like Daedalus since his 'stated views are shown to be shifting rather than staying put'. Socrates says that Euthyphro is even more skilled than Daedalus since he is making his views go round in circles, since earlier on in the discussion they agreed that the holy and the 'divinely approved' were not the same thing. The holy is not what's approved by the gods.

Euthyphro dilemma + its conclusion = explained in essay-writing way

Socrates bases his discussion on the following question: is the holy loved by the gods because it is holy, or is it holy because it is loved? Or rather, using the theory of 'causal priority' , does one place priority in the essence of the object loved, or the god's love? Socrates argues in favour of the first proposition, that an act is holy and because it is holy, is loved by the gods. Therefore, being loved by the gods is not 'intrinsic to what [holiness] is, but rather a universal affection or accident that belongs to all [holy] things through an external relation'. Socrates is also keen to apply the logic of causal priority to the definiens: being loved by the gods, summed up as the 'god-beloved'. He asks whether the god-beloved is loved by the gods because it is god-beloved or the god-beloved is god-beloved because it is loved by the gods. Understood in a less convoluted way, the former places priority in the essence of something being god-beloved, whereas the latter places priority in the effect of the god's love: a thing becoming god-beloved. In contrast to the first distinction made, Socrates makes the converse claim. He states that the gods love the god-beloved because of the very fact that it is loved by the gods. Given that the definiens and definiendum are not mutually replaceable in the aforementioned propositions, Socrates, therefore, concludes that 'holy' and 'god-beloved' are not the same and that 'holy' cannot be defined as 'what all the gods love'.

A Socratic conception of the gods-humans relationship

Socrates considers definition 5 - (piety is the part of justice concerned with looking after the gods) and all the 3 ways in which "looking after" is construed, to be both hubristic and wrong.

After Euthyphro says definition 5, construing looking after as knowing how to pray and sacrifice to the gods... soc

Socrates expresses his disappointment, both treating Euthyphro's answer as willing avoidance ("you are not keen to teach me") and as a digression from the proper approach ("you turned away"). It therefore should be noted that Socrates regarded the previous line of questioning as heading in the right direction.

9a-9d

Socrates returns to Euthyphro's case. Socrates asks Euthyphro what proof he has that all gods regard as unjust the death of a man who, as a hired worker, was responsible for the death of another... what proof does he have that is it is correct for a son to bring a prosecution on behalf of this kind of person, and to denounce his own father for homicide. proof that this action is thought BY ALL GODS to be correct. Euthyphro says it's a big task. But Socrates says, even if he were to accept that all the gods think such a killing is unjust and thus divinely disapproved (though they saw that what was 'divinely disapproved' also seemed to be 'divinely approved'), he hasn't learnt much from Euthyphro as to what the holy and the unholy are. He says they should make this correction: what ALL the gods disapprove of is unholy, what ALL the gods approve of is holy and what SOME approve of and OTHERS disapprove of is neither or both.

Hubris on Euthyphro's part (5 things)

Socrates suggests at various points the hubris involved in Euthyphro's belief that he is right to prosecute his father and also his undertaking of it. Socrates: 'I really don't think it's an action to be taken by the man in the street, but only by somebody already far advanced along in the path of wisdom'. 4a+b Euthyphro responds that he is 'far advanced' along the path of wisdom. The fact he takes it upon yourself to prosecute his father, an elderly man, for a labourer's murder, with such a strong belief that he knows what holiness is, as opposed to a normal person's reaction, which as Soc points out in 15d would be, to be worried about the gods and ashamed before men in case he were making the wrong decision. In 5b+c, E. says that if Meletus were to try a prosecution on him, he'd instantly discover his weak spot and 'would be on the defensive in court long before Euthyphro'. EXPRESSES A HUBRISTIC OPINION Euthyphro says that piety is concerned with looking after the gods (12e), but Socrates objects, saying that "looking after", if used in its ordinary sense (with which Euthyphro agrees) would imply that when one performs an act of piety one thus makes one of the gods better - an example of hubris, a dangerous human emotion frowned upon by the Greek gods. As Socrates brings to our attention in 13e, Euthyphro claims that no one knows more than he about religion.

12a-12e

Socrates' Hint to Euthyphro: holiness is a species of justice. 12a Soc then asks: 'is it the case that all that's holy is just, whereas not all that's just is holy - part of its holy and part of it's different'. Euthyphro is then required to say what species of justice. Socrates says he is claiming the OPPOSITE of what was said by the poet "But to speak of Zeus, the agent who nurtured all this, you don't dare; for where is found fear, there is also found shame." Stasinus, author of the Cypria (Fragm. 24) Socrates says that he doesn't believe this to be the case. For people are fearful of disease and poverty and other things but aren't shameful of them. On the other hand, when people are shameful of stuff, at least, they are also fearful of them. Therefore Soc argues that one should say where there is shame, there also is fear, since he believes fear has a wider distribution than shame, because shame is a division of fear like odd is of number. He says, it's not true that where there is number, there is also odd. Fear > shame, just like number > odd number VIEWS SHAME AND ODD NUMBER BOTH AS SUBDIVISIONS OF THE GREATER THING Soc says we can apply this and asks which of the two stands: - 'where is a just thing, there is also a holy one' or - 'where is a holy thing, there is also a just one, but not a holy one everywhere there's a just one'. Euthyphro agrees with the latter that the holy is a division of the just. Just > holy. DEFINITION 4: "piety is a species of the genus 'justice'" (12d) Soc then asks Euthyphro the precise kind of division of the just that is holy. For example, the kind of division of an even number is two equal limbs (for example the number of 6 is 3+3 = two equal legs). Socrates asks Euthyphro for the same type of explanation of the kind of division of justice what's holy is.

How to extract a definition

The Euthyphro gives us insight into the conditions which a Socratic definition must meet 1) universality 2 practical applicability 3) essence CONTENT 4) Socratic conception of religion and morality The main struggles to reach a definition take place as a result of both men's different conceptions of religion and morality. Def 4: Euthyphro conceives of piety and justice as interchangeable - the traditional conception of piety and justice. He finds it difficult to separate them as they are so interlinked. Socrates proves that justice has a wider distribution that piety through his method of inversing propositions. Def 5: Euthyphro falls back into a mere regurgitation of the conventional elements of traditional religion. I.e. defining piety as knowledge of how to pray and sacrifice to the gods There are several essential characteristics to piety that Socrates alerts us to.(2) - justice is required but this must be in the way that Socrates conceived of this, as evidenced by the fact that Euthyphro fails to understand Socrates when he asks him to tell him what part of justice piety is and vice versa. Euthyphro up till this point has conceived of justice and piety as interchangeable. He says that piety is the part of justice that has to do with the gods. - knowledge is also required, as evidenced when Euthyphro describes piety as knowledge of how to sacrifice and pray. Although Socrates rejects this and does not delve further into knowledge, I believe that, following the famous socratic doctrine virtue is knowledge, that knowledge is mentioned here to get the audience to think about the importance of knowledge with regard to moral virtue - whether towards the gods or other others. MORAL KNOWLEDGE.. In this way, one could say that piety is knowledge of how to live in relation to the gods.

Euthyphro's definition: 'to be pious is to be god-loved' is morally inadequate.

The second inadequacy that Irwin sets out is moral inadequacy. It would be unacceptable to suppose that the gods could make anything pious simply by loving it; there must be an existing pious quality that causes these pious things to be loved by the gods, a criterion that the gods use to decide whether or not a thing is pious. Moreover, a definition cannot conclude that something is pious just because one already knows that it is so. In Euthyphro's definition he asserts that the pious is loved by the gods, but this is a result of the thing being pious, not a property that it has that causes it to be pious. Being loved by the gods is what Socrates would call a 'pathos' of being pious, since it is a result of the piety that has already been constituted. A morally adequate definition of piety would explain what property piety has that sets it out from other things;

Definition 3

To overcome Socrates' objection to his second definition of piety, Euthyphro amends his definition. (9e) Euthyphro's third definition of piety is: "What all the gods love is pious, and what they all hate is impious." In reply, Socrates poses the question that would eventually become known in philosophy as the Euthyphro dilemma: "Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious? Or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?". Euthyphro seems unsure as to what the question means and so Socrates applies a dialectic technique: an analogy, to clarify his question (10a). He persuades Euthyphro to agree that when we call a thing "carried", it simply because it is being carried by someone and not because it possesses an inherent characteristic, which could be called "carried". That is, "being carried" is not an essential trait of the thing being carried but a condition, a state of that the object is currently in. He then moves to what we call "beloved" (φιλούμενόν filoumenon). Is something "beloved" in and of itself (like being big or red), or does it become beloved when it is loved by someone? Clearly, the answer is again the latter, something becomes beloved when it is loved. So then, continues Socrates, something beloved by the gods (θεοφιλές theofiles) becomes so because it is loved by them, to which Euthyphro agrees and Socrates moves to the conclusion that reveals his contradiction: What is beloved by the gods cannot be pious. Euthyphro seems to be taken aback so Socrates reminds him the definitions he gave previously (10e). He had said that something is loved by the gods because it is pious, which means that their love follows from something inherent in the pious. And yet they just agreed that what is beloved is put in that state as a result of being loved. So piety cannot belong to what is beloved by the gods since according to Euthyphro it does not acquire its characteristics by something (the act of being loved) but has them a priori, in contrast to the things that are beloved that are put in this state through the very act of being loved. It seems therefore that Euthyphro's third argument is flawed. At that juncture of their dialogue, Euthryphro does not understand what makes his definition of "piety" a circular argument; he agrees with Socrates that the gods like an action because it is pious. Socrates then argues that the unanimous approval of the gods is merely an attribute of "piety", that divine approval is not a defining characteristic of "piety". That divine approval does not define the essence of "piety", does not define what is "piety", does not give an idea of "piety"; therefore, divine approval is not a universal definition of "piety". Since what is 'divinely approved' (A) is determined by what the gods approve (B), while what the gods approve (B) is determined by what is holy (C), what is 'divinely approved' cannot be identical in meaning with what is holy. 'Where A determines B, and B determines C, A ≠ C.'

What does Euthyphro mean when he says that piety is knowledge of exchange between gods and men

When he says that it is Giving gifts to the gods, and asking favours in return. (14e) Socrates presses Euthyphro to say what benefit the gods perceive from human gifts - warning him that "knowledge of exchange" is a species of commerce. (14e) Euthyphro objects that the gifts are not a quid pro quo (a favour or advantage granted in return for something), between man and deity, but are gifts of "honour, esteem, and favour", from man to deity. (15a) Gifts of honour and esteem from man to deity In other words, Euthyphro admits that piety is intimately bound to the likes of the gods. The dialogue has come full circle, and Euthyphro leaves Socrates without a clear definition of "piety" as he faces a trial for impiety (ἀσέβεια asebeia).

what happens when the analogy of distinction 2 is applied to the holy?

When, however, the analogy is applied to the holy, we observe that a different conclusion is reached. Unlike the other examples, the 'holy' does not derive its holiness from the something done to it, i.e. it being loved by the gods. There are other features in 'holiness' and the god's love of the holy, must lie in their perception of these features. By using the Platonic Theory of Forms to explain this, one could state that 'the holy' has a Form, whereas 'the god-beloved' 'answers to no Form whatsoever' , since it is something which has nothing in common beyond the fact that the Gods love it.

why is distinction 2 successful?

With the help of Socrates' careful grammatical distinctions, his point becomes clear and understood. Irwin sums it up as follows: 'it is plausible to claim that carried or seen things, as such, have no nature in common beyond the fact that someone carries or sees them; what makes them carried or seen is simply the fact that someone carries or sees them.'

Socratic irony

a pose of ignorance assumed in order to entice others into making statements that can then be challenged a teaching tool. Irony is not necessarily, a way of aggression/ cruelty, but as a teaching tool. Euthyphro is certain that he already knows what piety is. Socrates professes admiration for Euthyphro's knowledge. Ironic flattery: 'remarkable, Euthyphro! In that case it would be best for me to become your pupil'. He says that a better understanding on religious matters may help him defend himself in his prosecution against Meletus. 5a 'Come now, Euthyphro, my friend, teach me too - make me wiser' 9a 'I'm a slower learner than the jurymen' 9b . And yet you are as much younger than I as you are wiser; but, as I said, you are indolent on account of your wealth of wisdom. But exert yourself, my friend; for it is not hard to understand what I mean. 12a 'It's obvious you know, seeing that you claim that no one knows more than you about religion' (13e) - when socrates asks Euthyphro to what goal's achievement services to the gods contributes. 'tell me then, what ever is that marvellous work which the gods accomplish using us as their servants?' (13e). - the work 'marvellous' as a pan-compound, is almost certainly ironical. Socrates pours scorn on the idea that we can contribute to the gods' work (or happiness) in any way whatsoever. Socrates is not actually expecting an answer which will solve what holiness is. 'if you didn't know clearly what holiness and unholiness are there's no way you would have taken it upon yourself to prosecute your father, an elderly man, for a labourer's murder; but you would have been worried about the gods and ashamed before men if you took such a risk, in case you should be wrong in doing it.' When E. says he has to go off, Soc says: 'you're going off and dashing me from that great hope which I entertained; that I could learn from you what was holy and quickly have done with Meletus' prosecution by demonstrating to him that I have now become wise in religion thanks to Euthyphro, and no longer improvise and innovate in ignorance of it - and moreover that I could live a better life for the rest of my days'. 15e-16a Socrates' final speech is ironical

Divine Command Theory

a theory asserting that the morally right action is the one that God commands Morality comes from god divine command theory - the belief that what is moral and immoral is commanded by the divine. also known as voluntarism The Euthyphro dilemma, first proposed by Plato (in the context of polytheistic Greek religion), presented a dilemma which threatened either to leave morality subject to the whims of God, or challenge his omnipotence. Socrates' claim that being holy has causal priority to being loved by the gods, suggests that the 'holy', or more broadly speaking, morality is independent of the divine. Therefore he rejects the DCT and his argument requires a rejection of it. Plato clearly has issues with the DCT Divine command theory has also been criticised for its apparent incompatibility with the omnibenevolence of God, moral autonomy and religious pluralism, although some scholars have attempted to defend the theory from these challenges.

Can we extract a Socratic definition of piety from the Euthyphro? The first essential characteristic of piety

is justice towards the gods. The close connection between piety and justice constitutes the starting-point of the fourth definition and also has been mentioned, or presupposed at earlier points in the dialogue. Taylor explains that once justice, or rather, the adjective hosios is viewed as interchangeable with eusebes, ("well-disposed towards the gods", "religious"), as it has been traditionally , the social obligations which were contained in justice become understood. Justice, therefore, ought to be understood as a 'primary social virtue, the standing disposition to respect and treat properly all those with whom one enters into social relations' , whether they be gods or other men. This same idea is expressed in the dialogue. When Euthyphro is asked what part of justice is piety, he states that piety is the part of justice which has to do with attention to the gods (13d) and that the remaining part of justice has to do with the service of men.

A second essential characteristic of piety is

knowledge. We gain this understanding of Socrates' conception of piety through a reading of the Euthyphro with general Socratic moral philosophy in mind and more specifically, the doctrine that virtue is knowledge. As Taylor states: 'there is one good product which the [gods] can't produce without human assistance, namely, good human souls. For a good human soul is a self-directed soul, one whose choices are informed by its knowledge of and love of the good' . In other words, man's purpose, independent from the gods, consists in developing the moral knowledge which virtue requires. An example proving this interpretation is the discussion which takes place on the relationship between men and gods. Euthyphro alters his previous conception of piety as attention to the gods (12e), by arguing that it is service to the gods (13d). This comment, resolves former issues since it shifts the authority, by suggesting that the men are the servants and are by no means in a position to benefit the gods by their attentions in the same way as horsemen benefit their horses when they attend to them (13a). Indeed, this statement suggests that piety is an art of trade between gods and men (14e), revealing 'the primitive notion of religion as a commercial transaction' . Therefore, piety is conceptualized as knowledge of how to ask from the gods and give to them. In the same way, Euthyphro's 'wrong-turning' is another example in favour of this interpretation. Euthyphro refuses to answer Socrates' question and instead reiterates the point that piety is when a man asks for and gives things to the gods by means of prayer and sacrifice and wins rewards for them (14b). Therefore, again, piety is viewed in terms of knowledge of how to appease the gods and more broadly speaking, 'how to live in relation to the gods' . This offers insights on Socrates' views on the relationship between god and men - a necessary component to the understanding and defining of piety. the gods might play an epistemological role in the moral lives of humans, as opposed to an ontological or axiological one. I understand this to mean that the gods become a way for us to know what the right thing to do is, rather than making it right or defining what is right. And so, piety might be 'to do those things that are in fact right, and to do them because they are right, but also to do them while respecting the gods' superior ability to know which things really are right and which are not