Exam #2 LSJ 361

Remedies for Floyd

NYPD can still engage in stop and frisk BUT officers must have "reasonable articulable suspicion" (biggest change)- . This means a police officer must be able to articulate specific facts that give him or her a basis to reasonably suspect that criminal activity "may be afoot"2 Moreover, this suspicion must be individualized, i.e. those articulable facts must apply to the specific person being stopped. In Floyd, Judge Scheindlin decided that the NYPD is violating the law by systematically stopping and frisking people without an individualized belief that they are engaged in criminal activity and are instead stopping them and on the basis of race. This means the Court determined the NYPD is engaging in an unwritten policy of racial profiling. Appointment of a court monitor (caused upset among NYPD) to oversee stop and frisk reforms. The monitor will coordinate closely with Judge Scheindlin, who continues to have power to order the NYPD to take additional steps towards change Immediate reforms to stop and frisk- First, revision to the policies and training materials related to stop and frisk and racial profiling. The Court provided some guidance here, including training that stopping "the right people" is a form of racial profiling and violates the Constitution. Second, revisions to the documentation of stop, question and frisk encounters and to the training and discipline related to documentation of stops and frisks. Specifically, a new UF-250 form will be developed to include: a narrative portion; a separate explanation for why a frisk or search was performed; improvements to the checkbox portion. Joint-Remedy Process- Judge Scheindlin agreed with Communities United for Police Reform (CPR), the Black, Latino and Asian Caucus of the New York City Council (BLAC) and the Floyd plaintiffs that community input is critical to meaningful reform to the NYPD stop and frisk practices. She specifically stated that "communities most affected by the NYPD's use of stop and frisk have a distinct perspective that is highly relevant to crafting effective reforms. No amount of legal or policing expertise can replace a community's understanding of the likely practical consequences of reforms in terms of both liberty and safety." What is the joint-remedy process? A process that includes community stakeholders and the parties working together to develop proposed remedial measures, in addition to the "immediate reforms" described in Remedy #2. Judge Scheindlin recognized that: "At the center of the Joint Remedy Process will be input from those who are most affected by the NYPD's use of stop and frisk[.]" Body cameras- Judge Scheindlin ordered the NYPD to institute a pilot project in which body-worn cameras will be worn for one-year by officers on patrol in the one precinct in each borough with the highest number of stops in 2012. According to the NYPD UF-250 data, this would be the 75th Precinct in Brooklyn, the 103rd Precinct in Queens, the 120th Precinct in Staten Island, the 23rd Precinct in Manhattan, and the 40th Precinct in the Bronx. What is the purpose of body-worn cameras? The purpose of body-worn cameras is to provide a contemporaneous, objective record of st

McClesky v. Kemp dissents

#1 (Brennan): defendant should just show (cuz Baldus) that racial disparity sentencing= risk he will be prejudice(ly) charged where white wouldn't have. #2 (Stevens): Baldus study shows certain serious categories of crimes, death imposed by juries regardless of the race of defendant or victim in those. Having narrowed death-eligible offense=Georgia becomes non-discriminatory capital punishment stuff. #3 (Blackmun): Baldus study demonstrates clear pattern of differential treatment in imposing death penalty on basis of race. Defendant met "prima facie" (first impression, right unless proven wrong) burden on case of purposeful discrim, state should have to disprove it. Petitioner, Warren McCleskey, was convicted of two counts of armed robbery and one count of murder in the Superior Court of Fulton County, Georgia. McCleskey was black; his victim was white Atlanta Police Officer Frank Schlatt. At the sentencing hearing, the jury found that two aggravating circumstances existed beyond a reasonable doubt: the murder was committed during the course of an armed robbery, and the murder was committed upon a police officer engaged in the performance of his duties. A finding of either aggravating circumstance was sufficient to impose the death penalty. Petitioner did not provide any mitigating circumstances, and the jury recommended the death penalty. The court followed the jury's recommendation and sentenced petitioner to death. Baldus, a law professor at the University of Iowa College of Law, studied twenty-five hundred murder cases in Georgia. Baldus' study concluded that all individuals convicted of murdering whites were far more likely to receive the death penalty, thus establishing that the application of the death penalty in Georgia was linked with the race of the victim. One of his models concluded that, even after taking account of 39 nonracial variables, defendants charged with killing white victims were 4.3 times as likely to receive a death sentence as defendants charged with killing blacks.[7] Does capital punishment violate the 8th and 14th amendment? Held: The Court, in an opinion by Justice Lewis Powell, held that the statistical study did not present substantial evidence that would require a reversal of petitioner's conviction. The Court concluded that the lower court had properly applied Georgia law. The McCleskey ruling said that, even if Baldus' statistical data were accepted at face value, the defense failed to show evidence of conscious, deliberate bias by law officials associated with the case, and dismissed evidence of general disparities in sentencing, such as the Baldus study, as "an inevitable part of our criminal justice system The Court held that since McCleskey could not prove that purposeful discrimination which had a discriminatory effect on him existed in this particular trial, there was no constitutional violation. Justice Powell refused to apply the statistical study in this case given the unique circumstances and nature of decisions that face all juries in capital cases. He argued that the data McCleskey produced is best presented to legislative bodies and not to the courts. Racial bias is inevitable because of the correlation of the study Mostly Affrican Americans get the death penalty. 1965.

Loving V. Virginia (1967)

(1967),[X 1] [X 2] is a landmark civil rights decision of the United States Supreme Court, which invalidated laws prohibiting interracial marriage. The case was brought by Mildred Loving, a black woman, and Richard Loving, a white man, who had been sentenced to a year in prison in Virginia for marrying each other. Their marriage violated the state's anti-miscegenation statute, the Racial Integrity Act of 1924, which prohibited marriage between people classified as "white" and people classified as "colored". The Supreme Court's unanimous decision determined that this prohibition was unconstitutional, reversing Pace v. Alabama (1883) and ending all race-based legal restrictions on marriage in the United States. From <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loving_v._Virginia> At the age of 18, Mildred became pregnant, and in June 1958 the couple traveled to Washington, D.C. to marry, thereby evading Virginia's Racial Integrity Act of 1924, which made marriage between whites and non-whites a crime.[7] They returned to the small town of Central Point, Virginia. Based on an anonymous tip,[8] local police raided their home at night, hoping to find them having sex, which was also a crime according to Virginia law. When the officers found the Lovings sleeping in their bed, Mildred pointed out their marriage certificate on the bedroom wall. That certificate became the evidence for the criminal charge of "cohabiting as man and wife, against the peace and dignity of the Commonwealth" that was brought against them. The Lovings were charged under Section 20-58 of the Virginia Code, which prohibited interracial couples from being married out of state and then returning to Virginia, and Section 20-59, which classified miscegenation as a felony, punishable by a prison sentence of between one and five years. The trial judge in the case, Leon M. Bazile, echoing Johann Friedrich Blumenbach's 18th-century interpretation of race, wrote: Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay and red, and he placed them on separate continents. And but for the interference with his arrangement there would be no cause for such marriages. The fact that he separated the races shows that he did not intend for the races to mix.[9] On January 6, 1959, the Lovings pleaded guilty and were sentenced to one year in prison, with the sentence suspended for 25 years on condition that the couple leave the state of Virginia. They did so, moving to the District of Columbia. From <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loving_v._Virginia> Question: Did Virginia's antimiscegenation law violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? From <https://www.oyez.org/cases/1966/395> Held: The U.S. Supreme Court overturned the Lovings' convictions in a unanimous decision (dated June 12, 1967),[17] dismissing the Commonwealth of Virginia's argument that a law that (unlike Virginia's) forbade both white and black persons from marrying persons of another race and providing identical penalties to white and black violators could not be construed as racially discriminatory. The court ruled that Virginia's anti-miscegenation statute violated both the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Chief Justice Earl Warren's opinion for the unanimous court held that: Marriage is one of the "basic civil rights of man," fundamental to our very existence and survival.... To deny this fundamental freedom on so unsupportable a basis as the racial classifications embodied in these statutes, classifications so directly subversive of the principle of equality at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment, is surely to deprive all the State's citizens of liberty without due process of law. The Fourteenth Amendment requires that the freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by invidious racial discrimination. Under our Constitution, the freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of another race resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the State. The court concluded that anti-miscegenation laws were racist and had been enacted to perpetuate white supremacy: There is patently no legitimate overriding purpose independent of invidious racial discrimination which justifies this classification. The fact that Virginia prohibits only interracial marriages involving white persons demonstrates that the racial classifications must stand on their own justification, as measures designed to maintain White Supremacy. Associate Justice Potter Stewart filed a brief concurring opinion. He reiterated his opinion from McLaughlin v. Florida that "it is simply not possible for a state law to be valid under our Constitution which makes the criminality of an act depend upon the race of the actor." From <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loving_v._Virginia> Mildred and Richard Loving were married in DC and returned to Virginia The couple was charged with violating the states anti miscegenation law, which banned inter racial marriages. The lovings were found guilty. Question before SC: Did VA's law violate the 14th amendment? Answer: 9-0 court ruled that it did. Court rule that the law had no other purpose than racial discrimination VA law violated BOTH due process and equal protection clause of 14th. Under our constitution, the freedom to marry a person of race should reside upon the individual and cannot be infringed by the state. The 14rh amendment requires that the freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by invidious racial discrimination

Oberdgefell V. Hodges(2015)

(2015), is a landmark United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held in a 5-4 decision that the fundamental right to marry is guaranteed to same-sex couples by both the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.[2][3] In November 2014, following a lengthy series of appeals court rulings from the Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits that state-level bans on same-sex marriage were unconstitutional, the Sixth Circuit ruled that it was bound by Baker v. Nelson and found them constitutional, creating a split between circuits and leading to an almost inevitable Supreme Court review. Decided on June 26, 2015, Obergefell overturned Baker and requires all states to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples and to recognize same-sex marriages validly performed in other jurisdictions.[4] This legalized same-sex marriage throughout the United States, and its possessions and territories. The Court examined the nature of fundamental rights guaranteed to all by the Constitution, the harm done to individuals by delaying the implementation of such rights while the democratic process plays out, and the evolving understanding of discrimination and inequality that has developed greatly since Baker. Prior to Obergefell, thirty-six states, the District of Columbia, and Guam already issued marriage licenses to same-sex couples.[3]The governor of Puerto Rico announced on June 26 that same-sex marriage would begin in that territory within 15 days, and on June 29 and June 30, the governors of the Northern Mariana Islands and the Virgin Islands (respectively) made similar announcements. The status of same-sex marriage in American Samoa remains uncertain. From <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Obergefell_v._Hodges> Groups of same-sex couples sued their relevant state agencies in Ohio, Michigan, Kentucky, and Tennessee to challenge the constitutionality of those states' bans on same-sex marriage or refusal to recognize legal same-sex marriages that occurred in jurisdictions that provided for such marriages. The plaintiffs in each case argued that the states' statutes violated the Equal Protection Clause and Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and one group of plaintiffs also brought claims under the Civil Rights Act. In all the cases, the trial court found in favor of the plaintiffs. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and held that the states' bans on same-sex marriage and refusal to recognize marriages performed in other states did not violate the couples' Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection and due process. From <https://www.oyez.org/cases/2014/14-556> Question: 1) Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to license a marriage between two people of the same sex? (2) Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to recognize a marriage between two people of the same sex that was legally licensed and performed in another state? From <https://www.oyez.org/cases/2014/14-556> es, yes. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees the right to marry as one of the fundamental liberties it protects, and that analysis applies to same-sex couples in the same manner as it does to opposite-sex couples. Judicial precedent has held that the right to marry is a fundamental liberty because it is inherent to the concept of individual autonomy, it protects the most intimate association between two people, it safeguards children and families by according legal recognition to building a home and raising children, and it has historically been recognized as the keystone of social order. Because there are no differences between a same-sex union and an opposite-sex union with respect to these principles, the exclusion of same-sex couples from the right to marry violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment also guarantees the right of same-sex couples to marry as the denial of that right would deny same-sex couples equal protection under the law. Marriage rights have traditionally been addressed through both parts of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the same interrelated principles of liberty and equality apply with equal force to these cases; therefore, the Constitution protects the fundamental right of same-sex couples to marry. The Court also held that the First Amendment protects the rights of religious organizations to adhere to their principles, but it does not allow states to deny same-sex couples the right to marry on the same terms as those for opposite-sex couples. Justice Roberts, Scalia and Thomas with a dissent: ◦Might be considered good and fair policy, but the Constitution doesn't address it, therefore the Court has no purview to make such a decision and should be left up to the states to decide. ◦Court cannot overstep its bounds and engage in judicial policymaking. There is no precedential support for making the states alter their definition of marriage. ◦Majority opinion relies on an overly expansive reading of the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause. •Justice Scalia and Thomas with a dissent: ◦This question is one that should be left to state legislatures. ◦The majority opinion departed from established Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence to create a right where none exists in the Constitution. •Justice Thomas and Scalia with a dissent: ◦Majority opinion stretched the Fourteenth Amendment too far and distorted the democratic process. ◦Also infringed on religious freedom by legislating from the bench and not from the state legislatures. •Justice Alito, Scalia, and Thomas with a dissent: ◦The Constitution doesn't address same-sex marriage; therefore the decision should be left to the states. ◦By allowing the Court to authorize a new law, they strayed from the democratic process

Mapp v. Ohio year

1961, Clark, 6-3

Mapp v. Ohio

1961. police search Dollree's house w/ out permit. Dollree Mapp, was an employee in the illegal gambling rackets dominated by Cleveland rackets kingpin Shon Birns. On May 23rd, 1957, police officers in Cleveland, Ohio, received an anonymous tip by phone that Virgil Ogletree, a numbers operator who was wanted for questioning in the bombing of rival numbers racketeer and future boxing promoter Don King's home three days earlier, might be found at Mapp's house, as well as illegal betting slips and equipment employed in the "California Gold" numbers operation set up by Mapp's boyfriend Edward Keeling.[1] Three officers went to the home and asked for permission to enter, but Mapp, after consulting her lawyer by telephone, refused to admit them without a search warrant. Two officers left, and one remained, watching the house from across the street. • Police started rifling through all of her stuff and in boxes where this person could not have been • No search warrant - forced the way into her home • Warrant was then faked and she took it and hid it in her blouse and the officers reached in and took it back • Found "obscene material" and charged her was not introduced as evidence in any of the ensuing court proceedings. When asked about the warrant during oral argument at the Supreme Court, the Cleveland prosecutor arguing the case cautiously deflected the question, which the court did not press. As the search of Mapp's second-floor, 2-bedroom apartment began, police handcuffed her for being belligerent. The police searched the house thoroughly, and discovered Ogletree, who was subsequently cleared on the bombing charge, hiding in the apartment of the downstairs tenant, Minerva Tate. In the search of Mapp's apartment and in a footlocker in the basement of the house police found a quantity of "California Gold" betting slips and paraphernalia.[2][3] They also found a pistol and a small quantity of pornographic books and pictures which Mapp stated a previous tenant named Morris Jones had left behind Question: Does this action violate the 4th amendment? Were the confiscated materials protected by the First Amendment? (May evidence obtained through a search in violation of the Fourth Amendment be admitted in a state criminal proceeding? Held: • Yes - "The right o the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures" • "...shall not be violated and no warrants shall be issued, but upon probable cause." • Swarm of protests from police departments followed because they felt this hindered law enforcement • Evidence obtained illegally is excluded from trials Ct rules 6-3. Tom C. Clark. that based on 4th amend, can't convict based on illegally obtained evid. (exclusionary rule), The Court brushed aside the First Amendment issue and declared that "all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by [the Fourth Amendment], inadmissible in a state court." Mapp had been convicted on the basis of illegally obtained evidence. This was an historic -- and controversial -- decision. It placed the requirement of excluding illegally obtained evidence from court at all levels of the government. The decision launched the Court on a troubled course of determining how and when to apply the exclusionary rule.Harlan dissents saying it's fed/state distinction

Gideon v. Wainwright

1963. Clarence Gideon represents himself in Ctroom after not being given attorney (FL only gave for capital offenses) for his small bar misdemeanor. Filed habeas corpus petition, says 6th amend was violated (right to counsel). Yes. Justice Hugo L. Black delivered the opinion of the 9-0 majority. The Supreme Court held that the framers of the Constitution placed a high value on the right of the accused to have the means to put up a proper defense, and the state as well as federal courts must respect that right. The Court held that it was consistent with the Constitution to require state courts to appoint attorneys for defendants who could not afford to retain counsel on their own. Justice William O. Douglas wrote a concurring opinion in which he argued that the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply a watered-down version of the Bill of Rights to the states. Since constitutional questions are always open for consideration by the Supreme Court, there is no need to assert a rule about the relationship between the Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights. In his separate opinion concurring in judgment, Justice Tom C. Clark wrote that the Constitution guarantees the right to counsel as a protection of due process, and there is no reason to apply that protection in certain cases but not others. Justice John M. Harlan wrote a separate concurring opinion in which he argued that the majority's decision represented an extension of earlier precedent that established the existence of a serious criminal charge to be a "special circumstance" that requires the appointment of counsel. He also argued that the majority's opinion recognized a right to be valid in state courts as well as federal ones; it did not apply a vast body of federal law to the states. Ct agrees, requires all to provide attorneys for those who can't afford their own (14th amend gives this right).

Miranda v. Arizona year

1966, Warren, 5-4

Terry v. Ohio year

1968, Warren, 8-1

Terry v. Ohio

1968. • Detective saw two strangers walking back and forth and suspected men of casing a job. man patrolling a store, police stop & search them, found weaponry. Met third men in front of a store. The plainclothes officer approached the three, identified himself as a police officer, and asked their names. The men "mumbled something", whereupon McFadden spun Terry around, patted down his outside clothing, and felt a pistol in his overcoat pocket. He reached inside the overcoat pocket, but was unable to remove the gun. The officer ordered the three into the store. He removed Terry's overcoat, took out a revolver, and ordered the three to face the wall with their hands raised. He patted down the outer clothing of Chilton and Katz and seized a revolver from Chilton's outside overcoat pocket. He did not put his hands under the outer garments of Katz (since he discovered nothing in his pat-down which might have been a weapon), or under John Terry's or Richard Chilton's outer garments until he felt the guns. The three were taken to the police station. Terry and Chilton were subsequently charged with carrying concealed weapons. Question: Was this search of the persons and then seizure of property constitutional or violation of the 4th? Held: Ct rules by Earl Warren it's not a violation of 4th amend, eliminate "probable cause" in favor of "reasonable suspicion" to balance legit law needs over personal. Douglas dissents, thinks too intrusive. • A police seizure does not need to result in custodial arrest to implicate the 4th amendment. Any police seizure must be "reasonable" under Constitutional analysis. In an 8-to-1 decision, the Court held that the search undertaken by the officer was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and that the weapons seized could be introduced into evidence against Terry. Attempting to focus narrowly on the facts of this particular case, the Court found that the officer acted on more than a "hunch" and that "a reasonably prudent man would have been warranted in believing [Terry] was armed and thus presented a threat to the officer's safety while he was investigating his suspicious behavior." The Court found that the searches undertaken were limited in scope and designed to protect the officer's safety incident to the investigation. • Terry created two levels for lawful police seizure: o Probable cause to arrest o Reasonable suspicion to stop and question Lower bar than probable close For the safety of themselves and the public When is a person seized and what constitutes a search?[edit] The Supreme Court first had to determine, for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, when is a person "seized" and what constitutes a "search". The Court rejected the idea that a "stop and frisk" could categorically never be a search or seizure subject to the protection of the Fourth Amendment. Instead, it made room for the idea that some police action short of a traditional arrest could constitute a seizure—that is, "whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has 'seized' that person." The Court also noted that "... it is nothing less than sheer torture of the English language to suggest that a careful exploration of the outer surfaces of a person's clothing all over his or her body in an attempt to find weapons is not a 'search.' " Thus, when the police detective took hold of Terry and patted him down on that Cleveland street, the detective "seized" Terry and subjected him to a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. But the Fourth Amendment protects only against unreasonable searches and seizures, so the Court next had to determine whether Terry's seizure and search were "reasonable". he stop and frisk of Terry was very reasonable[edit] These principles led the Court to conclude that the evidence found on Terry's person was properly admitted because the search was reasonable. The detective had observed Terry and his companions acting in a manner he took to be a preface to a stick-up. A reasonable person in the detective's position would have thought that Terry was armed and thus presented a threat to his safety while he was investigating the suspicious behavior he was observing. The events he had witnessed made it reasonable for him to believe that either Terry or his cohorts were armed. "The record evidences the tempered act of a policeman who in the course of an investigation had to make a quick decision as to how to protect himself and others from possible danger, and took limited steps to do so." The police detective here limited his search to the outer surfaces of Terry's clothing. Thus, the search was reasonably related in scope to the concern for his own safety that justified the stop from the beginning. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the revolver found on Terry's person was properly admitted into evidence. The sole justification for the search is protection of the officer and public[edit] The Ohio Court of Appeals allowed the search, but made it clear that such a search was limited to discovering dangerous weapons that could be used against the officer, as Chief Justice Warren noted: "In this case, for example, the Ohio Court of Appeals stated that 'we must be careful to distinguish that the "frisk" authorized herein includes only a "frisk" for a dangerous weapon. It by no means authorizes a search for contraband, evidentiary material, or anything else in the absence of reasonable grounds to arrest. Such a search is controlled by the requirements of the Fourth Amendment, and probable cause is essential.' " (392 U.S. 1, at 16, Fn 12, quoting State v. Terry, 5 Ohio App. 2d 122, at 130) Chief Justice Warren later made it clear that this was also the opinion of the Court: "The sole justification of the search ... is the protection of the police officer and others nearby, and it must therefore be confined in scope to an intrusion reasonably designed to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for the assault of the police officer."[3]

Furman v. Georgia year

1972, 5-4, all different opinions, per curium opinion (only Brennan/Marshall think it's never OK, rest think racial bias and arbitrariness came into play) longest Ct decision ever.

Gregg v. Georgia year

1976, Stewart, 7-2

McCleskey v. Kemp year

1987, Powell, 5-4

Florida v. Bostick year

1991, O'Connor, 6-3

Whren v. US

1995 • Police cars patrolling "high drug" area • Pathfinder stopped at light for "unusually" long time (20 seconds) • Turned without signal and then sped off • Officer stopped driver to find crack cocaine with the driver in the car Defendants claim police used traffic stop as pretext, didn't have reasonable cause to pull em over. Both suspects were arrested and charged with federal drug violations. Before trial, counsel for the defense moved to suppress the drug evidence. They argued that the traffic stop was only a pretext to investigate possible drug crimes, without probable cause, in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution. The motion to suppress was denied by the District Court and both defendants were convicted. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. Question: The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide this question: "Was the officers conduct an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment?"Unanimous Ct decision: w/ probable cause, any evidence police find in plain view within stopped vehicle can legally be seized and used as Ct evid. Can't decide who to pull over, gotta use their discretion as long as there was an actual (traffic) violation. In Whren, the US Supreme Court rejected the "subjective" standard and applied the objective test: a traffic stop is valid if the officer reasonably believes a violation has taken place, and the officer's subjective intent is irrelevant "As a general matter, the decision to stop and automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred." - Justice Scalia Whren is an extension of the Terry Doctrine No. The unanimous Court held that as long as officers have a reasonable cause to believe that a traffic violation occurred, they may stop any vehicle. In the present case, the officers had reasonable cause to stop the petitioners for a traffic violation since they sped away from a stop sign at an 'unreasonable speed' and without using their turn signal. Thus, since an actual traffic violation occurred, the ensuing search and seizure of the offending vehicle was reasonable, regardless of what other personal motivations the officers might have had for stopping the vehicle. Furthermore, the Court rejected the claim that the anxiety, confusion, and haste which the petitioners experienced from the stop-and-search outweighed the government's interest in traffic safety. While the Fourth Amendment does require a balancing test between a search-and-seizure's benefits and the harm it might cause to the individual, such a test only applies to unusually harmful searches and seizures. There was nothing unusually harmful about this traffic stop.

Whren v. US year

1995, Scalia, unanimous

Rasul v. Bush

1st Gbay case, opens up to lawyers! 4 UK/Aussie citizens captured by US, put in Gbay. Gov says they don't have jurisdiction because Gbay=Cuban territory (US just has de facto sovereignty). Q: do US Cts have jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus petitions filed by foreigners in Gbay? Ct says yes, men have right to habeas corpus wherever US controls anywhere, habeas corpus doesn't depend on citizenship, and Gbay not theater of war. gives non-US citizens habeas corpus in Gbay. Facts- brits and aussies Captured in pakistan/afghanistan Sent to Gitmo; detained indefinitely; they file for HC seeking a writ of habeas corpus that would declare the detention unconstitutional. They claimed that the government's decision to deny the men access to attorneys and to hold them indefinitely without access to a court violated the Fifth Amendment's Due Process clause. The government countered that the federal courts had no jurisdiction to hear the case because the prisoners were not American citizens and were being held in territory over which the United States did not have sovereignty (the Guantanamo Bay base was leased from Cuba indefinitely in 1903, and Cuba retains "ultimate sovereignty"). The district court agreed with the government, dismissing the case because it found that it did not have jurisdiction. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed the district court's decision. Their petition requested: • That they be released • That they be allowed to have private, un-monitored conversations with their attorneys • That interrogations cease until the trials were complete From <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rasul_v._Bush> Do US Courts have jurisdiction over cases in gitmo? Do foreign citizens have access to HC? Answer: yes and yes In a 6-to-3 opinion written by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court found that the degree of control exercised by the United States over the Guantanamo Bay base was sufficient to trigger the application of habeas corpus rights. Stevens, using a list of precedents stretching back to mid-17th Century English Common Law cases, found that the right to habeas corpus can be exercised in "all ... dominions under the sovereign's control." Because the United States exercised "complete jurisdiction and control" over the base, the fact that ultimate sovereignty remained with Cuba was irrelevant. Further, Stevens wrote that the right to habeas corpus is not dependent on citizenship status. The detainees were therefore free to bring suit challenging their detention as unconstitutional. Torture: Scalia dissents that court is overstepping its boundaries Congress responded to the Rasul decision by passing the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 which stripped courts of jurisdition over habeus corpus filed by detainees Detainees insisted the DTA did not apply to their cases, which were pending before its passage. The supreme court ultimately agreed, in Hamdan v. Rumself Congress went back to the drawing board and passing the Military Commissions Act of 2006. The Act eliminates jurisdiction to hear pending habeus applications from detainees

Rasul v. Bush year

2004, Stevens, 6-3

Hamdan v. Rumsfeld year

2006, 5-3, Stevens (no Roberts, he was part of DC Circuit case)

Boumediene v. Bush year

2008, 5-4, Kennedy

Maqaleh v. Gates year

2012, 3 judges decide in DC Circuit

Floyd v. New York year

2013, Scheindlin

Floyd v. New York

2013. Class action suit by "stopped often" minorities from NY, claiming racial profiling w/ out reasonable suspicion, Facts: o Facts: Class Action Lawsuit Alleged NYPD employs sotp and frisk w/o reasonable suspicion o David Floyd Police stopped and searched Floyd for suspicion of a burglary while he was helping a tenant in his building get into his apartment with the spare keys o David Ourlicht Suspected weapons but no evidence of weapon suspicion. Ordered him and man beside him to get down on floor and frisked him. No evidence found of someone telling him there's a gun. o Question: Were these reasonable stops or did they violate the 4th Amendment? o Decision: NYPD violated the 4th Amendment by conducting unreasonable searches and conducting frisks in a racially discriminatory manner NYPD "has repeatedly turned a blind eye to clear evidence of unconstitutional stops and frisks" bc police officers had quotas of how many stop and frisks and people they had to arrest Also found them to be racially discriminating in violation of Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment This decision only applied to NYPD's enforcement of stop and frisk - not stop and frisk in general manner Judge Scheindlin rules in their favor, say they've been racially profiled/unctutional stops. Orders more reforms, but not an end to stop-and-frisk totally.handed down two rulings in favor of the plaintiffs, one on liability and one dealing with remedies. Violate 4th and 14th amendment. The second order addresses the remedies (or reforms) that are necessary to bring NYPD stop and frisk practices into compliance with the U.S. Constitution. Because the remedies following the preliminary injunction ordered in Ligon, a separate case involving individuals stopped outside of buildings that participate in the Trespass Affidavit Program in the Bronx, overlap with the relief in Floyd, Judge Scheindlin addressed both cases in one opinion. This document summarizes only the Floyd remedies.

Maqaleh v. Gates

3 non Afghans transferred to Bagram (US legal black hole), Bush & Obama say as non-citizens challenged outside US, can't challenge detainment, plaintiffs say Boudmediene gives em precedent for habeas corpus no matter what. Is it unconstitutional for no habeas corpus to alien detainees even in war theater? DC Circuit says no, because in theater of war, it's like Eisnentrager case, gives right to use suspension clause. Case ISN'T Boumedine precedent ("road map for determining when a constitutional right extends extraterritorially"). "the jurisdiction of the courts to afford the right to habeus relief and and the protection of the Suspension Clause does not extend to aliens held in Executive detention in the Bagram detention facility in the Afghan theater of war. active war zone.

Miranda v. Arizona

4 separate cases where each defendant was held in a way where they weren't aware of their rights, cut off from outside world, not told of right to counsel, found guilty. Does this violate 5th amend? Ct says yes, must give em safeguards against self-incrimination. Must read people "Miranda" rights now. -gorgeous: "the blood of the accused is not the only hallmark of an unconstitutional inquisition." On March 13, 1963, Ernesto Miranda was arrested, by the Phoenix Police Department, based on circumstantial evidence linking him to the kidnapping and rape of an eighteen-year-old woman ten days earlier.[1] After two hours of interrogation by police officers, Miranda signed a confession to the rape charge on forms that included the typed statement: "I do hereby swear that I make this statement voluntarily and of my own free will, with no threats, coercion, or promises of immunity, and with full knowledge of my legal rights, understanding any statement I make may be used against me."[2] However, at no time was Miranda told of his right to counsel. Prior to being presented with the form on which he was asked to write out the confession he had already given orally, he was not advised of his right to remain silent, nor was he informed that his statements during the interrogation would be used against him. At trial, when prosecutors offered Miranda's written confession as evidence, his court-appointed lawyer, Alvin Moore, objected that because of these facts, the confession was not truly voluntary and should be excluded. Moore's objection was overruled and based on this confession and other evidence, Miranda was convicted of rape and kidnapping. He was sentenced to 20-30 years of imprisonment on each charge, with sentences to run concurrently. Moore filed Miranda's appeal to the Arizona Supreme Court, claiming that Miranda's confession was not fully voluntary and should not have been admitted into the court proceedings. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision to admit the confession in State v. Miranda, 401 P.2d 721 (Ariz. 1965). In affirmation, the Arizona Supreme Court emphasized heavily the fact that Miranda did not specifically request an attorney.[3] Question: Does the police practice of interrogating individuals without notifiying them of their right to counsel and their protection against self-incrimination violate the Fifth Amendment? Held: Chief Justice Earl Warren, a former prosecutor, delivered the opinion of the Court, ruling that due to the coercive nature of the custodial interrogation by police (Warren cited several police training manuals which had not been provided in the arguments), no confession could be admissible under the Fifth Amendment self-incrimination clause and Sixth Amendment right to an attorney unless a suspect had been made aware of his rights and the suspect had then waived them: The person in custody must, prior to interrogation, be clearly informed that he has the right to remain silent, and that anything he says will be used against him in court; he must be clearly informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him during interrogation, and that, if he is indigent, a lawyer will be appointed to represent him.[4] Thus, Miranda's conviction was overturned. The Court also made clear what had to happen if the suspect chose to exercise his or her rights: If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease... If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present. At that time, the individual must have an opportunity to confer with the attorney and to have him present during any subsequent questioning. The Court held that prosecutors could not use statements stemming from custodial interrogation of defendants unless they demonstrated the use of procedural safeguards "effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination." The Court noted that "the modern practice of in-custody interrogation is psychologically rather than physically oriented" and that "the blood of the accused is not the only hallmark of an unconstitutional inquisition." The Court specifically outlined the necessary aspects of police warnings to suspects, including warnings of the right to remain silent and the right to have counsel present during interrogations.

EEOC v. Abercrombie (2015)

A&F is a chain of stores that requires employees to follow the "Look Policy." ◾If a question arises about the Look Policy during an interview, then the interviewer is instructed to contact HR to determine if an accommodation can be made. ◾Samantha Elauf, a practicing Muslim, applied for the store and wore a hijab to the interview. ◾She didn't mention it in the interview and did not ask for accommodations. ◾The interviewer also didn't mention the hijab, but still contacted HR about it, where they told her to lower Elauf's score so that she wouldn't be hirable. ◾EEOC sued A&F on Elauf's behalf, claiming that the company violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. ◾Abercrombie argued that Elauf had to inform her interviewer about the hijab because it didn't comply with the Look Policy and was not the expression of a sincerely held religious belief. ◾District court granted summary judgment to EEOC, but Court of Appeals reversed it. ◦Question: Can an employer be held liable under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for refusing to hire an applicant based on a religious observance or practice if the employer did not have direct knowledge that a religious accommodation was required? ◦Ruling: 7-2 - Yes, they can be held liable ◦Reasoning: ◾Justice Scalia for the majority: •To be held liable, an applicant must only show her need for an accommodation was a motivating factor in the employer's decision to not hire her. •The disparate-treatment provision of Title VII does not contain a knowledge requirement, but forbids certain motives. •If an applicant can show that the employer's decision not to hire them was because they didn't want to provide accommodation, then they have violated Title VII. •Also, Title VII doesn't have neutrality; it is an affirmative duty to accommodate religious practices. ◾Justice Alito with a concurrence: •The applicant has to show that the employer had knowledge of the applicant's religious practices, but the applicant doesn't have to blatantly tell them. •The statutory language would not make sense without knowledge requirement because such a reading would allow an employer to be held liable without fault. ◾Justice Thomas with a concurrence/dissent: •The application of neutral policy cannot constitute intentional discrimination that violates Title VII. •The policy still treated all applicants in the same manner, meaning that an applicant that was denied a job because of her religious headscarf didn't suffer from disparate treatment. •Title VII also doesn't hold that failure to accommodate is intentional discrimination. •Also argued that statutory language should be construed narrowly so as to only punish employers who act with a discriminatory motive.

Carbado opinion on Bostick

Bostick as a man sitting in the back of a bus,137 and (2) the police as two officers who asked a man in the back of a busa few questions.138 Keep in mind that these representations exist in a social, legal, and political context within which race is perceived to be real and everyone is presumed to have one. In this sense, race is not absent from Justice O'Connor's representation of Bostick and the police officers; it is obscured. Nor is race ignored; it is given a particular content. reason Justice O'Connor writes them out of the opinion, has to do with the colorblind social meaning that she attributesto race - namely, that it does not matter. That is, Bostick's race and the race of the police officers are irrelevant. says didn't take race into account (or chose to disregard it) by recognizing it just to ignore it, she's recreating race. masking bad dynamic btwn white cops/black people. Coercion argument in this case, guy didn't feel safe saying no.This disruption does not eliminate race; Bostick remains black and the police officers remain white. The disruption merely re-defines whatblackness vis-a-vis Bostick and whiteness vis-a-vis the police officers signify. Under this redefinition, Bostick becomes a black man without the presumption of criminality and the police become white officers without the presumption of a racist identity. In the abstract, both disruptions might make sense. But in the context of Bostick, they obscure that Bostick may have held and acted on a racial presumption that the police officers were racists and the police may have held and acted on a racial presumption that Bostick was a criminal. Thus, when black people encounter the police,"[t]hey don't know whether justice will be meted out or whether judge, jury and executioner is pulling up behind them."161 Yet, Justice O'Connor situates her seizure analysis outside of this racial reality. On a bus, is that a seizure. Delgado- also confined in workplace because 30 INS agents with weapons, asking questions like do you have papers, if you leave, you are guilty. Did not inform workers that they were free to leave.

Florida v. Bostick

Bostick riding a bus, police board and ask to search him, said yes and they found coke. Is getting evid. on bus searches, even w/ consent, unctutional via 4th amend because they can't leave bus to refuse? Ct says it's bus preventing him from leaving and he agreed to be on it, not a violation of 4th amendment.

Boumedine v. Bush

Boumediene & 5 others scooped for allegedly plotting to attack US embassy, filed habeas corpus. Ct says since he's an alien detained overseas, no right to habeas. Q: Should MCA take away Ct jurisdiction of habeas corpus for foreign citizens in Gbay? Should detainees get geneva rights & habeas corpus? Is MCA violation of Suspension Clause of Ctution? Ct says yes, said because the procedures laid out in the Detainee Treatment Act are not adequate substitutes for the habeas writ, the MCA operates as an unconstitutional suspension of that writ. • Prisoners should get protections, even if they're on Gbay or called enemy combatants or aliens Falsely accused of embassy bomb plot Never officially charged Suspected of terrorism Enemy combatant status Renditioned to Guantanmo Question: Are detainees at Gitmo entitled to the protection of the 5th Amendment right to not be deprived of liberty w/o due process of law and habeus corpus relief? Is MCA an adequate substitute for habeus relief? Us has de facto sovereignty over Guantanamo Detainees at Gitmo have a right to challenge their detention in US Federal courts through habeus corpus petitions Congressional Combatant Status Review Tribunal is not an adequate substitute MCA 2006 is unconstitutional Justice Kennedy Their petitioners acces to the writ is a necessity Justice Scalia argues that the procedures presccribed by the Congress in the Detainee Treatment Act provide the essentional protections that habeus corpus guarantees, there has been np suspension of the writ, and no basis exists for judicial intervention beyond what the Act allows Have right to habeus relief .A five-justice majority answered yes to each of these questions. The opinion, written by Justice Anthony Kennedy, stated that if the MCA is considered valid its legislative history requires that the detainees' cases be dismissed. However, the Court went on to state that because the procedures laid out in the Detainee Treatment Act are not adequate substitutes for the habeas writ, the MCA operates as an unconstitutional suspension of that writ. The detainees were not barred from seeking habeas or invoking the Suspension Clause merely because they had been designated as enemy combatants or held at Guantanamo Bay. The Court reversed the D.C. Circuit's ruling and found in favor of the detainees. Justice David H. Souter concurred in the judgment. Chief Justice John G. Roberts and Justice Antonin Scalia filed separate dissenting opinions.

Gregg dissent

Brennan & Marshall (who oppose death penalty altogether) say there's no evid. deterrence is done by death penalty, and Gerogia jury not informed of immoralness of death.

Whole Woman's Health V. Hellerstedt

Constitutionality of HB2: Medical necessity or politics? Requires doctors to have admitting priviledges at a hospital w/in 30 miles Clinic rules similar to those of surgical centers Law will have the effect of closing 34 of the 40 clinics 2 standards in HB2 are unreasonable Ginseberg et al. - creates an undue burden. Number of clinics will go down. 3 or more appointments. Building restrictions. Admittance- negative incentive. Bad for women's health Roberts et al- interest in women's health Casey... not a "substantive burden" Intent is not close clinics, but to increase safety In 2013, Texas legislators passed HB2, a sweeping measure that imposes numerous restrictions on access to abortion, most notably the following requirements: •doctors who provide abortion services must obtain admitting privileges at local hospitals no farther than 30 miles away from the clinic; and •every health care facility offering abortion care must meet building specifications to essentially become mini-hospitals (also known as ambulatory surgical centers, or ASCs). These requirements unfairly single out women's health care providers and do not apply to other, comparable medical procedures or practices. They serve only to drive reputable, experienced reproductive health care providers out of practice. Together, these requirements would shutter all but 9 or 10 abortion clinics in a state with 5.4 million women of reproductive age, and leave more than 500 miles between San Antonio and the New Mexico border without a single clinic.

Roe V. Wade(1973)

Discovered she was pregnant with her third child. Question: does the constitution embrace a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy by abortion? 1970- Two graduates from UT, and Sarah brought a lawsuit against texas law for criminalizing abortion. Roe couldn't go anywhere else for an abortion Court found 3 justifications for banning abortions: Victorian concern to discourage illicit sexual conduct Protecting health of mother Protecting prenatal life Three Trimester System 1st trimester: the decision to abort may be left up to the woman and her physician 2nd trimester: states can regulate abortion in reasonable ways as it realtes to the health of the mother 3rd trimester/viability: states can regulates or prohibit abortion except in cases where the mother's life is in danger Roe v wade: holdings Recognized the physician's right to practice medicine freely- not women's rights in general The court explicitly rejecteeed a fetal "right to life" argument Decision expressed clear intent not to interfere with day to day practice of medical professionals Argued for a "zone of privacy": marriage, contraception, child rearing Conclusion: The Court held that a woman's right to be an abortion fell within the right to privacy (recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut) protected by the 14th amendment The Court ruled 7-2 that a right to privacy under the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment extended to a woman's decision to have an abortion, but that this right must be balanced against the state's two legitimate interests in regulating abortions: protecting women's health and protecting the potentiality of human life The Court declined to adopt the district court's Ninth Amendment rationale, and instead asserted that the "right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the district court determined, in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy."[30] Douglas, in his concurring opinion in the companion case, Doe, stated more emphatically, "The Ninth Amendment obviously does not create federally enforceable rights."[31] Justice Blackmun's majority opinion explicitly rejected a fetal "right to life" argument.[32][33] The Court instead recognized the right to an abortion as a fundamental right included within the guarantee of personal privacy.[34] As a result, regulations limiting abortion had to be justified by a "compelling state interest," and legislative enactments regulating abortion had to be narrowly tailored to meet the compelling interests; in other words, Justice Blackmun applied a strict scrutiny analysis to abortion regulations.[35] ustice Blackmun for the majority: ◦A woman's right to an abortion fell within her right to privacy laid out in Griswold v. Connecticut. ◦The decision gave a woman total control over her pregnancy during the first trimester and defined different levels of state interest for the second and third trimesters. ◦Laws for 46 states were affected. While acknowledging that the right to abortion was not unlimited, Justice Blackmun, speaking for the Court, created a trimester framework to balance the fundamental right to abortion with the government's two legitimate interests: protecting the mother's health and protecting the "potentiality of human life White asserted that the Court "values the convenience of the pregnant mother more than the continued existence and development of the life or potential life that she carries." Though he suggested that he "might agree" with the Court's values and priorities, he wrote that he saw "no constitutional warrant for imposing such an order of priorities on the people and legislatures of the States." White criticized the Court for involving itself in the issue of abortion by creating "a constitutional barrier to state efforts to protect human life and by investing mothers and doctors with the constitutionally protected right to exterminate it." He would have left this issue, for the most part, "with the people and to the political processes the people have devised to govern their affairs." Rehnquist elaborated on several of White's points, asserting that the Court's historical analysis was flawed: To reach its result, the Court necessarily has had to find within the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment a right that was apparently completely unknown to the drafters of the Amendment. As

Riley V. California (2014)

Facts: was a landmark[1] United States Supreme Court case in which the Court unanimously held that the warrantless search and seizure of digital contents of a cell phone during an arrest is unconstitutional. The case arose from a split among state and federal courts over the cell phone search incident to arrest (SITA) doctrine. The Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits had ruled that officers can search cell phones incident to arrest under various standards. That rule was followed by the Supreme Courts of Georgia, Massachusetts, and California. Other courts in the First Circuit and the Supreme Courts of Florida and Ohio disagreed. Searched phone at a traffic stop and found gang related information. A warrant is required to search a mobile phone. David Leon Riley belonged to the Lincoln Park gang of San Diego, California. On August 2, 2009, he and others opened fire on a rival gang member driving past them. The shooters then got into Riley's Oldsmobile and drove away. On August 22, 2009, the police pulled Riley over driving a different car; he was driving on expired license registration tags. Because Riley's driver's license was suspended, police policy required that the car be impounded. Before a car is impounded, police are required to perform an inventory search to confirm that the vehicle has all its components at the time of seizure, to protect against liability claims in the future, and to discover hidden contraband. During the search, police located two guns and subsequently arrested Riley for possession of the firearms. Riley had his cell phone in his pocket when he was arrested, so a gang unit detective analyzed videos and photographs of Riley making gang signs and other gang indicia that were stored on the phone to determine whether Riley was gang affiliated. Riley was subsequently tied to the shooting on August 2 via ballistics tests, and separate charges were brought to include shooting at an occupied vehicle, attempted murder, and assault with a semi-automatic firearm. Before trial, Riley moved to suppress the evidence regarding his gang affiliation that had been acquired through his cell phone. His motion was denied. At trial, a gang expert testified to Riley's membership in the Lincoln Park gang, the rivalry between the gangs Held: Yes. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. wrote the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court held that the warrantless search exception following an arrest exists for the purposes of protecting officer safety and preserving evidence, neither of which is at issue in the search of digital data. The digital data cannot be used as a weapon to harm an arresting officer, and police officers have the ability to preserve evidence while awaiting a warrant by disconnecting the phone from the network and placing the phone in a "Faraday bag." The Court characterized cell phones as minicomputers filled with massive amounts of private information, which distinguished them from the traditional items that can be seized from an arrestee's person, such as a wallet. The Court also held that information accessible via the phone but stored using "cloud computing" is not even "on the arrestee's person." Nonetheless, the Court held that some warrantless searches of cell phones might be permitted in an emergency: when the government's interests are so compelling that a search would be reasonab

Furman v. Georgia

Furman accused of intent to murder in his burglary, sentenced to death. His and 2 other cases (rape/murder) being considered for death penalty. Furman claims 14th & 8th amend. rights violated, death penalty banned cuz of this case (some think it's awful, some just say arbitrariness not OK) was a United States Supreme Court decision that ruled on the requirement for a degree of consistency in the application of the death penalty.[1] The case led to a de facto moratorium on capital punishment throughout the United States, which came to an end when Gregg v. Georgia was decided in 1976. n the Furman v. Georgia case, the resident awoke in the middle of the night to find William Henry Furman committing robbery in his house. At trial, in an unsworn statement allowed under Georgia criminal procedure, Furman said that while trying to escape, he tripped and the weapon he was carrying fired accidentally, killing the victim. This contradicted his prior statement to police that he had turned and blindly fired a shot while fleeing. In either event, because the shooting occurred during the commission of a felony, Furman would have been guilty of murder and eligible for the death penalty under then-extant state law, according to the felony murder rule. Furman was tried for murder and was found guilty based largely on his own statement. Although he was sentenced to death, the punishment was never carried out. Jackson v. Georgia, like Furman, was also a death penalty case confirmed by the Supreme Court of Georgia. Unlike Furman however, the convicted in Jackson had not killed, but attempted to commit armed robbery and committed rape in the process of doing so. Branch v. Texas was brought to the Supreme Court of the United States on appeal on certiorari to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. Like Jackson, Branch was convicted of rape.[2 De facto moratorium- issued a way so that death penalty isn't so arbitrary. Only two justices decided that death penalty is unconstitutional for any crime. Allowed for some crime. Didn't think that it would be unconstitutional. The Majority 5-4 held that the imposition of the death penalty in these cases constituted cruel and unusual punishment and violated the Constitution Justices agreed on only one major point of law: that those using capital punishment do so in an arbitrary manner, particularly with regard to race Douglas said arbitrarieness led to discriminatory sentencing Brennan used arbitrariness as part of a four part test designed to determine whether the death penalty is acceptable to punishment. He found that it was degrading, arbitrary, unacceptable to contemporary society, and excessive Marshall adopted a similar approach but explained that arbitrariness was but one reason whwy capital punishment was cruel and unusual and "morally unacceptable" To sweart, arbitrarieness in sentencing meant that the death penalty was imposed in a "wanton" and "freakish manner" akin to being struck by lightning For White, arbirariness led to the infrequency of imposition, which in turn made death a less than credible deterrant

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld

Hamdi (US citizen) captured in Afghanistan, declared enemy combatant, transferred from Gbay to Virginia (still no lawyer access, dad files his habeas corpus). Did gov violate his 5th amend. right by holding him solely based on "enemy combatant" classification? Ct said prez can detain (post 9/11 power) but 5th amend gives a citizen (even enemy combatant) right to contest that detention (and says Ct can hear the argument). prez can't just infer wartime powers. gives US citizens habeas corpus in Gbay, Ct jurisdiction over em. Hamdi = American arrested in AFG sent to Gitmo deemed an enemy combatant. No access to courts. When found out also US citizen, then transferred to a naval prison in Virginia and then South Carolina. In June 2002, his father filed a habeus corpus petition. The Bush administration claimed that because Hamdi was caught in arms against the U.S., he could be properly detained as an enemy combatant,[7] without any oversight of presidential decision making, and without access to an attorney or the court system. The administration argued that this power was constitutional and necessary to effectively fight the War on Ter Can US citizens be deemed enemy combatants? Writ of habeus corpus is challenging being illegally detained Do citz who are EC's have due process? Does the separation of powers doctrine require federal courts to defer to Executive Branch determinations that an American citizen is an "enemy combatant"? Answer: Yes, exec can deem citizens Ecs. No- Citizens can't be denied due process. Though no single opinion of the Court commanded a majority, eight of the nine justices of the Court agreed that the Executive Branch does not have the power to hold a U.S. citizen indefinitely without basic due process protections enforceable through judicial review. Justice O'Connor wrote a plurality opinion representing the Court's judgment, which was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Breyer and Kennedy. O'Connor wrote that although Congress had expressly authorized the detention of enemy combatants in its Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) passed after 9/11, due process required that Hamdi have a meaningful opportunity to challenge his enemy combatant status. Congress didn't authorize his detention. Justice David Souter, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, concurred with the plurality's judgment that due process protections must be available for Hamdi to challenge his status and detention, providing a majority for that part of the ruling. However, they dissented from the plurality's ruling that AUMF established Congressional authorization for the detention of enemy combatants. Dissent: Justice Antonin Scalia's dissent, joined by Justice John Paul Stevens, went the furthest in restricting the Executive power of detention. Scalia asserted that based on historical precedent, the government had only two options to detain Hamdi: either Congress must suspend the right to habeas corpus, or Hamdi must be tried under normal criminal law. Scalia wrote that the plurality, though well-meaning, had no basis in law for trying to establish new procedures that would be applicable in a challenge to Hamdi's detention—it was only the job of the Court to declare it unconstitutional and order his release or proper arrest, rather than to invent an acceptable process for detenti Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote that although Congress authorized Hamdi's detention, Fifth Amendment due process guarantees give a citizen held in the United States as an enemy combatant the right to contest that detention before a neutral decisionmaker. The plurality rejected the government's argument that the separation-of-powers prevents the judiciary from hearing Hamdi's challenge. Justice David H. Souter, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, concurred with the plurality that Hamdi had the right to challenge in court his status as an enemy combatant.

shaker aamir

In 2007, the US authorities completely dropped any case against him when they said that he was being cleared for release. However, the jail gates didn't swing open. The UK asked Washington to let him out to return to his family. Two years later a second US tribunal approved his release - and again nothing happened. A succession of British foreign secretaries have raised the case with Washington, backed by parliamentarians, human rights groups and justice campaigners. Earlier this year Prime Minister David Cameron personally raised the case again with President Obama. Why he is getting out now, and what happens to him next, is simply unclear. Security researcher Robin Simcox of the Henry Jackson Society think tank says that Mr Aamer presents a potential threat to national security. "The United States government believes him to be a military-trained al-Qaeda member who recruited for extremist causes and had close ties to Osama bin Laden," he says. "He was a hugely influential figure at Guantanamo Bay known to be able to exert influence over detainees and guards alike." The earliest Shaker Aamer can return home will be 25 October, at the end of a formal period during which the US Congress has the power to review the decision. Assuming he is returning, on his arrival in the UK Mr Aamer will, like other Guantanamo detainees before him, be met by British security officials and, potentially, questioned. He will then be returned to his family and will be medically and psychiatrically assessed. The news that Shaker Aamer is going to be released came after he had been held at Guantanamo for 13 years, 7 months and 11 days. That is exactly the same age as his youngest son, Faris, born the day he arrived at the camp - his fourth child, whom he has never met.

Tanvir v. Lynch (2015)

Lawsuit brought by 4 Muslim US Citizens who were placed on the US government's "no-fly" list to try to pressure them into becoming informants for the FBI, highlights gov targeting some just cuz they're Muslim, civil actions denied to them (eventually dismissed, gov didn't want bad publicity).

McCleskey v. Kemp

McCleskey commits armed robbery, sentenced to death, uses Baldus study (says more blacks than whites given death penalty in Georgia) to say his 8th/14th rights violated by being given death penalty. Ct rules that no, your rights are fine, cuz no proof race was the reason you received the penalty, and can't say disproportionate sentencing (also could apply to gender, religion, etc.) sets precedent that must present actual discrim in one's own case for it to count as 14th amend violation.

MCA

Military Commissions Act of 2006, after Rasul, stops all right to habeas corpus for detainees of Gbay, "to authorize trial by military commission for violations of the law of war, and for other purposes." including pending. Detainees argue this is unconstitutional under Suspension Clause. The Act eliminates federal courts' jurisdiction to hear habeas applications from detainees who have been designated (according to procedures established in the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005) as enemy combatants. When the case was appealed to the D.C. Circuit for the second time, the detainees argued that the MCA did not apply to their petitions, and that if it did, it was unconstitutional under the Suspension Clause. The Suspension Clause reads: "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it."

Nuns and birth Control

Nuns don't want to provide contraceptives ◾THey believe that it is against everything that they believe in ◾They also don't want a third party to give it to people either ◾Going to Supreme Court - hearing arguments this month ◾Decision to come out in June On Tuesday, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals did just that. A three-member panel of judges ruled that the Obama administration has come up with a sufficient accommodation for religious organizations like the Little Sisters: If they object to providing insurance coverage to employees who want to buy birth control, organizations can sign a two-page form stating that objection. That's it—from there, the administration will arrange for a third-party provider to make sure the employee can get coverage. But the Little Sisters, along with schools like Notre Dame and other religious organizations, claimed that signing that piece of paper was the moral equivalent of condoning birth control.

Hamdan v. Rumsfeld

Osama bin Laden's driver. Files writ of habeas corpus, and had tribunal to determine war prisoner status. Does Hamdan get Geneva rights thru habeas corpus? was military commission trying Hamdan for war on Terror war crimes authorized by prez or Congress? Ct says no. Must be specific w/ war powers and their limitations, exec can't infer power. Said Ct can oversee military commissions, especially because they suck--Hamdan couldn't go to his own trial! (& other probs like lawyer access, heresay/torture evid). Commission must apply w/ regular Ct rules and Geneva Convention. a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that military commissions set up by the Bush administration to try detainees at Guantanamo Bay lack "the power to proceed because its structures and procedures violate both the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the four Geneva Conventions signed in 1949."[1]Specifically, the ruling says that Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions was violated. The case considers whether the United States Congress may pass legislation preventing the Supreme Court from hearing the case of an accused combatant before his military commission takes place, whether the special military commissions that had been set up violated federal law (including the Uniform Code of Military Justice and treaty obligations), and whether courts can enforce the articles of the 1949 Geneva Conventio The plaintiff was Salim Ahmed Hamdan, a citizen of Yemen who worked as a bodyguard and chauffeur for Osama bin Laden. Hamdan had formerly worked in Afghanistan on an agricultural project that Bin Laden had developed. Hamdan was captured by militia forces during the invasion of Afghanistan in the fall of 2001 and turned over to the United States. In 2002, he was sent by the US to its new Guantanamo Bay detention camp at its Naval Base in Cuba. In July 2004, Hamdan was charged with conspiracy to commit terrorism,[5] and the Bush administration made arrangements to try him before a military commission, established by the Department of Defense under Military Commission Order No. 1 of March 21, 2002. He was assigned a defense counsel, LCDR Charles D. Swift from the Navy JAG, who with a legal team filed a petition for Hamdan in US District Court for a writ of habeas corpus, challenging the constitutionality of the military commission, and saying that it lacked the protections required under the Geneva Conventions and United States Uniform Code of Military Justice. Following the United States Supreme Court ruling in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (2004), which established that detainees had the right ofhabeas corpus to challenge their detention, Hamdan was granted a review before the Combatant Status Review Tribunal. It determined that he was eligible for detention by the United States as an enemy combatant or person of interest.[2] Process: After reviewing Hamdan's habeas petition, Judge James Robertson of the United States District Court for the District of Columbiaruled in the detainee's favor. He found that the United States could not hold a military commission unless it was first shown that the detainee was not a prisoner of war.[6][7][8] On July 15, 2005, a United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit three-judge panel: Arthur Raymond Randolph, John G. Roberts, Jr. and Stephen F. Williams, unanimously reversed the decision of the District Court.[9] Judge Randolph, who wrote the decision, cited the following reasons for the legality of the military commission: 1. Military commissions are legitimate forums to try enemy combatants because they have been approved by Congress. 2. The Geneva Convention is a treaty between nations and as such it does not confer individual rights and remedies. 3. Even if the Geneva Convention could be enforced in U.S. courts, it would not be of assistance to Hamdan at the time because, the war against al-Qaeda was not between two countries, and the Convention guarantees only a certain standard of judicial procedure—a "competent tribunal"—without speaking to the jurisdiction in which the prisoner must be tried. Question: May the rights protected by the Geneva Convention be enforced in federal court through habeas corpus petitions? Was the military commission established to try Hamdan and others for alleged war crimes in the War on Terror authorized by the Congress or the inherent powers of the President? Conclusion From <https://www.oyez.org/cases/2005/05-184> From <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hamdan_v._Rumsfeld> In Supreme Court held: The Supreme Court announced its decision on 29 June 2006. The Court reversed the ruling of the Court of Appeals, holding that President George W. Bush did not have authority to set up the war crimes tribunals and finding the special military commissions illegal under both military justice law and the Geneva Conventions From <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hamdan_v._Rumsfeld> Yes and no. The Supreme Court, in a 5-to-3 decision authored by Justice John Paul Stevens, held that neither an act of Congress nor the inherent powers of the Executive laid out in the Constitution expressly authorized the sort of military commission at issue in this case. Absent that express authorization, the commission had to comply with the ordinary laws of the United States and the laws of war. The Geneva Convention, as a part of the ordinary laws of war, could therefore be enforced by the Supreme Court, along with the statutory Uniform Code of Military Justice. Hamdan's exclusion from certain parts of his trial deemed classified by the military commission violated both of these, and the trial was therefore illegal. Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito dissented. Chief Justice John Roberts, who participated in the case while serving on the DC Circuit Court of Appeals, did not take part in the decision. Congress responded to the Rasul decision by passing the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 which stripped courts of jurisdition over habeus corpus filed by detainees Detainees insisted the DTA did not apply to their cases, which were pending before its passage. The supreme court ultimately agreed, in Hamdan v. Rumself Congress went back to the drawing board and passing the Military Commissions Act of 2006. The Act eliminates jurisdiction to hear pending habeus applications from detainees

Planned Parenthood V. Casey (1992)

Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982 A lot of states were upset after Roe. Supreme court said women can have abortions and states were angry States effected access to getting it Pennsylvania altered its abortion laws in 1988 and 1989. •Among the new provisions included informed consent and 24-hour waiting period prior to the procedure. •A minor seeking an abortion needed the consent of one parent. •A married woman had to notify her husband that she was intending to have the procedure done. •Many abortion clinics and physicians in the state of Pennsylvania challenged these provisions. •A federal appeals court upheld all provisions except for the husband notification requirement Question: Can a state without violating their right to abortions as guaranteed by Roe V. Wade, require women who want to abortion to obtain: Informed consent, wait 24 hours, tell husband, and if minors, obtain parental consent? In a bitter, 5-4 decision, the Court again reaffirmed Roe, but upheld most of the Pennsylvania law. "Substantive right to privacy" Majority by souter For the first time, the justices imposed a new standard to determine the validity of laws restricting abortions. The new standard asks whether a state abortion regulation has the purpose or effect of imposing an "undue burden" which is defined as a "substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability" It would be an "undue burden" to tell your husband because that could infringe in your right. 24 hour waiting period: YES, you have to Parental Consent: YES Husband notification: NO The new standard asks if the state regulation has the effect or purpose of "undue burden," defined as an obstacle to get in the way of an abortion. ◦Under this standard, the only provision that failed was the husband notification requirement. ◦"Undo burden, required to inform husband - could lead to abuse, could infringe on her other rights"

Before the Law- Kalief Browder

Police Officer said a man said he robbed him with his friend two weeks ago. first said just robbed him. 10 days before his 17th birthday. He had already gotten probation for crashing a delivery truck into a parked car. The next day, he was led into a courtroom, where he learned that he had been charged with robbery, grand larceny, and assault. The judge released his friend, permitting him to remain free while the case moved through the courts. But, because Browder was still on probation, the judge ordered him to be held and set bail at three thousand dollars. Male adolescents are confined in the Robert N. Davoren Center—known as R.N.D.C. When Browder arrived, the jail held some six hundred boys, aged sixteen to eighteen. Conditions there are notoriously grim. In August of this year, a report by the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York described R.N.D.C. as a place with a "deep-seated culture of violence," where attacks by officers and among inmates are rampant. Although the Sixth Amendment guarantees "the right to a speedy and public trial," in the Bronx the concept of speedy justice barely exists.. Browder's attorney thought they would win in no time. But the recent U.S. Attorney's report about R.N.D.C. recounts many instances in which officers pressured inmates not to report beatings—to "hold it down," in Rikers parlance, or else they would get solitary. On January 28, 2011, Browder's two-hundred-and-fifty-eighth day in jail, he was brought back to the courthouse once again. This time, the prosecutor said, "The People are not ready. We are requesting one week." The next court date set by the judge—March 9th—was not one week away but six. As it happened, Browder didn't go to trial anytime that year. O'Meara, who works mostly in the Bronx and in Westchester County, never made the trip out to Rikers to see him, since a visit there can devour at least half a day. To avoid this trek, some lawyers set up video conferences at the Bronx courthouse with their clients who are in jail. O'Meara says he's "pretty sure" he did this with Browder, but Browder says he never did. Court papers suggest a lawyer in a hurry: in the fall of 2010, O'Meara filed a notice with the court in which he mistakenly wrote that he would soon be making a motion on Browder's case in "Westchester County Court," instead of in the Bronx.For a growing teen-ager, the portions were never big enough, and in solitary Browder couldn't supplement the rations with snacks bought at the commissary. He took to begging the officers for leftovers: "Can I get that bread?" Sometimes they would slip him an extra slice or two; often, they refused. Browder's brother also noticed a growing tendency toward despair. When Browder talked about his case, he was "strong, adamant: 'No, they can't do this to me!' " But, when the conversation turned to life in jail, "it's a totally different personality, which is depressed. He's, like, 'I don't know how long I can take this.' " Case dismissed after 3 years. Prestia has represented many clients who were wrongfully arrested, but Browder's story troubles him most deeply. "Kalief was deprived of his right to a fair and speedy trial, his education, and, I would even argue, his entire adolescence," he says. "If you took a sixteen-year-old kid and locked him in a room for twenty-three hours, your son or daughter, you'd be arrested for endangering the welfare of a child." Browder doesn't know exactly how many days he was in solitary—and Rikers officials, citing pending litigation, won't divulge any details about his stay—but he remembers that it was "about seven hundred, eight hundred." One day last November, six months after his release, Browder retreated to his bedroom with a steak knife, intending to slit his wrists. A friend happened to stop by, saw the knife, and grabbed it. When he left the house to find Browder's mother, Browder tried to hang himself from a bannister. An ambulance rushed him to St. Barnabas Hospital, where he was admitted to the psychiatric ward. In his medical record, a social worker describes the suicide attempt as "serious." During that time, he endured about two years in solitary confinement, where he attempted to end his life several times. Once, in February, 2012, he ripped his bedsheet into strips, tied them together to create a noose, and tried to hang himself from the light fixture in his cell. In November of 2013, six months after he left Rikers, Browder attempted suicide again. This time, he tried to hang himself at home, from a bannister, and he was taken to the psychiatric ward at St. Barnabas Hospital, not far from his home, in the Bronx. When I met him, in the spring of 2014, he appeared to be more stable. Browder's story also caught the attention of Rand Paul, who began talking about him on the campaign trail. Jay Z met with Browder after watching the videos. Rosie O'Donnell invited him on "The View" last year and recently had him over for dinner. Browder could be a very private person, and he told almost nobody about meeting O'Donnell or Jay Z. However, in a picture taken of him with Jay Z, who draped an arm around his shoulders, Browder looked euphoric. Last Monday, Prestia, who had filed a lawsuit on Browder's behalf against the city, noticed that Browder had put up a couple of odd posts on Facebook. When Prestia sent him a text message, asking what was going on, Browder insisted he was O.K. "Are you sure everything is cool?" Prestia wrote. Browder replied: "Yea I'm alright thanks man." The two spoke on Wednesday, and Browder did seem fine. On Saturday afternoon, Prestia got a call from Browder's mother: he had committed suicide.

2,000 cases may be overturned because police used Stingray surveillance

Police and FBI signed a nondisclosure agreement in Baltimore that said that the wouldn't disclose evidence in the "discovery" phase to make it seem the Stingray wasn't used. Prosecutors revealed this agreement. The motion, which was filed on behalf of defendant Shemar Taylor by attorney Josh Insley in the Baltimore city circuit court on Friday, says the state's attorney's office colluded with the police department to withhold "discovery" material from the defendants and the courts about the use of the Stingray device. Taylor was convicted of assault, robbery and firearm possession. Manufactured by the Harris corporation and around the size of a briefcase, Stingrays are one of a class of surveillance devices known as "cell-site simulators", which pretend to be cellphone towers in order to extract metadata, location information, and in some cases content from phones that connect to it. Federal Government uses it, they obtain warrants from the court but don't mention stingray, but different terminology. It can record calls, find location of the phone, and the incoming and outcoming calls numbers, etc.

Prisoner Rights Movement

Prison organizing in 1970s. Can't really organize of you are in solitary. 2013 CA Hunger Strike. Prisoners refused food. Refused food 30000 prisoners List of grievances. 2 days before end, court would take hearings. Now it is in eyes of others. Included those moved to other maximum security facilites. The California assembly held hearings, and the gang validation procedure was tweaked so an inmate would be deemed a gang member based on behaviour, not on association with other inmates. But what inmates saw as insufficient change and follow-up prompted the new protest, which has been planned for months. "Our decision does not come lightly," said a June 20 letter from the Pelican Bay leaders. "For the past two years we've patiently kept an open dialogue with state officials, attempting to hold them to their promise to implement meaningful reforms, responsive to our demands." It said its leaders had participated in a mediation session - ordered by a judge in their class action lawsuit - but that authorities acted in bad faith. "Thus we are presently out of alternative options for achieving the long overdue reform to this system and, specifically, an end to state-sanctioned torture, and now we have to put our lives on the line via indefinite hunger strike to force CDCR to do what's right. An estimated 30,000 inmates in jails across California are participating in a hunger strike to protest against solitary confinement and other conditions they say amount to torture. Prisoners refused meals for a second day on Tuesday in about two dozen jails, signalling what was thought to be the biggest protest of its kind in California's history. The campaign is a ramped-up sequel to hunger strikes in 2011, which shone international attention on the state's troubled penal system but failed to wring significant concessions from authorities. A group of inmates at the maximum security Pelican Bay state prison in Crescent City has organised the protest, saying they will starve themselves unless the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) agrees to meaningful negotiations.

Rasul dissent

Scalia (& Rehnquist & Thomas) dissent, said this contradicts Eisentrager (1950), German war criminals being held in China didn't get habeas. Concurring opinion said difference was Gbay detainees didn't have legal proceeding or war criminal status

Ashker V. Governor of CA

Shu prisoners spent 22.5 - 24 hours every day in windowless cell Denied calls, contact visits, educational programming No review of solitary Mostly for so called " gang affiliation" - tattoo if gang affiliated. If wrote a list of blood or crips and guard found it and those 5 people would be in solitary. 85% Latino in Pelican Bay At Pelican Bay State Prison alone, more than 500 prisoners had been held in the SHU for over 10 years, and 78 prisoners had been there for more than 20 years. They were warehoused in cramped, windowless concrete cells for almost 24 hours a day with no phone calls, infrequent visits through plexiglass preventing physical contact, meager rehabilitative opportunities, and no opportunity for normal social interaction with other prisoners. In 2015, the plaintiffs agreed to a far-reaching settlement that fundamentally alters all aspects of this cruel and unconstitutional regime. The agreement will dramatically reduce the current solitary confinement population and should have a lasting impact on the population going forward; end the practice of isolating prisoners who have not violated prison rules; cap the length of time a prisoner can spend in solitary confinement at Pelican Bay; and provide a restrictive but not isolating alternative for the minority of prisoners who continue to violate prison rules on behalf of a gang. 1. The settlement transforms California's use of solitary confinement from a status-based system to a behavior-based system. Under California's old regime, prisoners identified as gang affiliates were sent to SHU for an indefinite term based merely on their gang affiliation, regardless of whether they had ever violated a prison rule. The settlement transforms California's use of solitary confinement from a status-based system to a behavior-based system: from now on, California will only send gang-validated prisoners to SHU if they are found guilty, at a hearing, of a serious "SHU-eligible" rule violation Validated gang affiliates who are found guilty of a SHU-eligible offense will enter a quicker two-year SHU step-down program for return to general population after serving their determinate SHU term. Prisoners validated as gang affiliates in California used to face indefinite SHU confinement, with a review for possible release to general population only once every six years. Even when such reviews occurred, a single piece of evidence of alleged continued gang affiliation led to another six years of solitary confinement. That evidence was often as problematic as the original evidence used to send them to SHU - for example, a book, a poem, or a tattoo that was deemed to be gang-related. As a result, California held more people in solitary confinement, for longer periods of time, than any other state in the country. Under the settlement, California will no longer impose indeterminate SHU sentences. Instead, after serving a determinate sentence for a SHU-eligible offense, validated gang affiliates whose offense was proven to be related to gang activities will be transferred to a two-year, four-step program. Prisoners will definitely be released to a general population prison setting after two years unless they commit another SHU-eligible offense while in the step-down program. While conditions at the steps remain harsh, prisoners will be allowed some telephone calls and rehabilitative programming at each step. California will review all current gang-validated SHU prisoners within one year to determine whether they should be released from solitary under the settlement terms. It is estimated by CDCR that the vast majority of such prisoners will be released to general population. In addition, virtually all of those prisoners who have spent more than 10 years in solitary will be immediately released to a general-population setting, even if they have committed recent serious misconduct. The settlement requires speedy review of all prisoners currently held in a California SHU based on gang affiliation. With very limited exceptions, described below, those who have not been found guilty of a SHUeligible offense within the last two years will be immediately released to a general-population unit. Those with a recent SHU-eligible offense will be placed at the appropriate step of the step-down program, based on the date of the rule violation Nor will anyone be involuntarily held in the Pelican Bay SHU for longer than five years for any reason. Even those prisoners who have been incarcerated in the SHU for more than 10 years and are currently serving a determinate SHU sentence for serious misconduct will be released to the RCGP to complete their SHU sentence and the step-down program unless California can show by a preponderance of the evidence that to do so would pose an unreasonable security risk. 4. California will create a new Restricted Custody General Population Unit (RCGP) as a secure alternative to solitary confinement. The RCGP is a general-population unit designed to facilitate positive and meaningful social interactions for prisoners about whom California has serious security concerns, such that they would otherwise be placed in solitary confinement. As such, it may serve as a model for jurisdictions seeking to do away with solitary confinement altogether, while still ensuring prison security. As part of a general-population unit, RCGP prisoners will be allowed to move around the unit without restraints, will be afforded as much out-of-cell time as other general-population prisoners, and will be able to receive contact visits. As a very high-security, restrictive-custody unit, its group activities will generally be in small groups, instead of large yards. For example, RCGP prisoners will have access to educational courses, a small-group recreation yard, small-group leisure activities and programming, some job opportunities and phone calls. Programming will be designed to provide increased opportunities for positive social interaction with both other prisoners and staff. Very prolonged solitary confinement will be severely limited and those confined provided significantly more out-of-cell time. Because this settlement ends the prior practice of indeterminate SHU sentences for validated prisoners, generally prisoners will not be kept in the SHU for more than 10 continuous years, with a limited exception, called Administrative SHU. The settlement limits and ameliorates such prolonged solitary confinement by (a) setting up strict criteria for its use, (b) requiring increased out-of-cell time, and (c) providing for strong judicial review of its use Prisoner representatives will work with plaintiffs' counsel and the magistrate judge to monitor implementation of the settlement. Transforms CA's use of solitary from status based system to behavior based systen Gang affiliates who are found guilty of a SHU offense will enter a quicker 2 year SHU step down program for return to general population CA review of ALL gang validated SHU prisoners w/ in one year CA will create new restriced custody general population unit as an alternative to solitary Prolonged confinement will be severely limited and those confined will have more out of cell time- another 2 or 3 hours. Prisoner reps will work with plaintiffs counsel and judge to monitor implementation of the settlement. Now it is 10 years Statement of plaintiffs This settlement represents a monumental vistory for prisoners and important step toward our goal of ending solitary confinement in California and across the country. California's agreement to abandon indeterminate SHU confine confinement based on gang affiliation demonstrates the power of unity and collective action.

essay Q topic

Stevenson book (research this!!)

US V. Windsor(2013)

The DOMA, enacted in 1996, states that, for the purpose of federal law, the words "marriage" and "spouse" refer to legal unions between a man and a woman. •Since then, some states have authorized same-sex marriage. In other cases regarding DOMA, federal courts have ruled it unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment, but the courts have disagreed on the rationale. •Edith Windsor is the widow of Thea Spyer and the sole executor of the estate of her late spouse who died in 2009. •The two were married in 2007 in Toronto, Canada and New York law recognized their marriage. •Spyer left the estate to Windsor, but because of DOMA, the federal government imposed a tax of $363,000 because their marriage wasn't recognized federally •Had their marriage been recognized, then there wouldn't have been a tax at all because it would've qualified for marital exemption. •In 2010, Windsor filed a lawsuit claiming that the DOMA was unconstitutional. At the same time, the government's position was that DOMA had to be defended. •In 2011, the President and the Attorney General agreed that they would not defend DOMA. •Then, the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the House of Representatives filed a petition to intervene on behalf of DOMA and dismiss the case. •The motion was denied and DOMA was deemed unconstitutional. US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. ◾Question: •Does the Executive Branch's agreement with the lower court that the act is unconstitutional deprive the Supreme Court of jurisdiction to decide the case? •Does the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the House of Representatives have standing in the case? •Does the Defense of Marriage Act deprive same-sex couples that are legally married under state laws of their Fifth Amendment rights to equal protection under federal law? ◾Ruling: 5-4 - No, unanswered, yes ◾Reasoning: •Justice Kennedy for the majority: ◦The US government retains a significant enough stake in the issue to support Supreme Court jurisdiction. ◦Because the US Treasury would have to refund money, the Government stands to suffer a real economic injury and therefore maintains standing in the case. ◦BLAG presented substantial arguments for the constitutionality of DOMA that reflect an actual argument under Article III, that would allow the Supreme Court to address the case without deciding whether BLAG would have had standing in a lower court. ◦States have the right to define marital relationships and that DOMA undermines the authority. ◦DOMA denies same-sex couples of the same rights as heterosexual couples. ◦DOMA is in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment - "disadvantage, a separate status, and so a stigma." •Justice Roberts with a dissent: ◦The Court lacked jurisdiction for the case. ◦Majority opinion did not provide a definition of marriage that would include same-sex couples. •Justice Scalia, Thomas, and Roberts with a dissent: ◦SC lacked the jurisdiction and the power ◦The SC wrongly asserted their authority in this case. Majority opinion didn't state whether the definition should be reviewed under a rational basis test or a strict scrutiny standard. ◦Majority also misconstrued DOMA's intent. •Justice Alito and Thomas with a dissent: ◦Government didn't have standing in this case, but that BLAG did because it chose to defend the otherwise undefended statute. ◦Constitution doesn't guarantee the right to enter into a same-sex marriage because it isn't embedded into the text, but is instead left up to the people

Burwell V. Hobby Lobby (2014)

The Green family owns the Hobby Lobby franchise and has organized the business around Christian principles, including that the use of contraception is immoral. ◾Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), employment-based group health care plans must provide certain types of preventative care, such as FDA-approved contraceptive methods. ◾There were no exemptions available for for-profit institutions, such as Hobby Lobby stores. ◾On September 12, 2012, the Green family sued Burwell and challenged the contraceptive requirement. ◾The Greens argued that the requirement that the employment-based group health plan violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA). ◾They sought a preliminary injunction to prevent tax penalties, which the district court denied, but the circuit court approved. ◾The Supreme Court denied relief so the Green family filed for an en banc hearing of the Court of Appeals. ◾The panel found reversed and held that corporations were "persons" for the purposes of RFRA and had protected rights under the First Amendment. ◦Question: Does the RFRA allow a for-profit company to deny its employee's health coverage of contraception to which the employees would otherwise be entitled based on the religious objections of the company's owners? ◦Ruling: 5-4 - Yes ◦Reasoning: ◾Justice Alito for the majority: •Congress intended for the RFRA to be read as applying to corporations since they are composed of individuals who use them to achieve desired ends. •Because the contraception requirement forces religious groups to fund what they consider abortion, it creates a substantial burden that is not the least restrictive method of satisfying the government's interests. •A least restrictive method does exist in exemptions for non-profit religious organizations and the same should be applied to for-profit. •This also only applies to the contraceptive mandate in the RFRA. ◾Justice Kennedy with a concurrence: •The government has not met its burden to show a meaningful difference between non-profit religious organizations and for-profit religious corporations. •Because the contraception requirement accommodates the former while imposing a more restrictive requirement on the later, without showing proper cause, therefore it is a violation of the RFRA. ◾Justice Ginsburg, Sotomayor, Breyer, and Kagan with a dissent: •The majority's decision was precluded by Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, where the Court held that there is not violation of the freedom of religion when infringement on that right is merely an incidental consequence of an otherwise valid statute. •Also argues that religious beliefs or observances must not infringe on the rights of a third party. •Majority opinion misconstrued RFRA as "a bold legislative statement with sweeping consequences." •Because for-profit corporations cannot be considered religious entities, the burden is not substantial, meaning that there is no violation of RFRA ◾Justices Breyer and Kagan with a dissent: •Court need not decide whether for-profit corporations or their owners may sue under the RFRA.

No Fly List

There have long been allegations that the FBI has tried to coerce Americans, including law-abiding ones, to act as informants. Tanvir was one that was placed because he refused. No hearing.

DOMA

US law federal law whereby the govt defines the marriage as a legal union between one man and one woman. Under the law, no US state may be required to recognize as a marriage a same sex relationship considered a marriage in another state. The law passed both houses of Congress by large majoritis and was signed into law by President Bill Clinton.

When does your religion legally excuse you from doing your job?

Under Title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act, both public and private employers have a duty to exempt religious employees from generally applicable work rules, so long as this won't create an "undue hardship," meaning more than a modest cost, on the employer. If the employees can be accommodated in a way that would let the job still get done without much burden on the employer, coworkers, and customers — for instance by switching the employee's assignments with another employee or by otherwise slightly changing the job duties — then the employer must accommodate them. Once we see this rule, we can also make some practical observations about it: 1. The rule requires judgments of degree. Some accommodations are relatively cheap (again, always realizing that any accommodation involves some burden on employers), while other are more expensive. The courts have to end up drawing some fuzzy line between them. Maybe that's a bad idea, but that's what Congress set up with the "reasonable accommodation" requirement. So if you want to argue that one religious objector shouldn't get the relatively easy accommodation she wants, you can't do that by analogy to another claim where the accommodation would be very expensive. 2. The rule turns on the specific facts present in a particular workplace. An accommodation can be very expensive when the objecting employee is the only one at the job site who can do a task, but relatively cheap when there are lots of other employees. It can be very expensive when all the other employees also raise the same objection, but relatively cheap when the other employees are just fine with doing the task. Again, maybe that's a bad rule, but it's the rule Congress created. And if you want to argue that one religious objector shouldn't get an accommodation that's easy at the objector's job site, you can't do that by pointing out that the accommodation would be expensive at other job sites. 3. The rule accepts the risk of insincere objections. Of course, when sincere religious objectors can get an exemption, others can ask for the same exemption even just for convenience rather than from religious belief. That's not much of a problem for many exemption requests, since most people have no personal, self-interested reasons not to transport alcohol on their trucks, or raising an American flag on a flagpole. But for some accommodations, there is a risk of insincere claims, for instance when someone just wants Saturdays off so he can do fun weekend things. The law assumes that employers will be able to judge employees' sincerity relatively accurately, and to the extent some insincere objections are granted, this won't be too much of a problem. Again, the law might be wrong on this, but it's the law. 4. The rule accepts the risk of slippery slopes, and counts on courts to stop the slippage. Once some people get a religious exemption, others are likely to claim other religious exemptions; indeed, some people who before managed to find a way to live with their religious objections without raising an accommodation request might now conclude that they need to be more militant about their beliefs. Here too, the law accepts this risk, and counts on courts to cut off the more expensive

main Brian Stevenson Q

What is Stevenson's alternative perception of justice, and what role should mercy and empathy play in that ideal?

Katz V. United States (1967)

a United States Supreme Court case discussing the nature of the "right to privacy" and the legal definition of a "search". The Court's ruling refined previous interpretations of the unreasonable search and seizure clause of the Fourth Amendment to count immaterial intrusion with technology as a search, overruling Olmstead v. United States and Goldman v. United States. Katz also extended Fourth Amendment protection to all areas where a person has a "reasonable expectation of privacy". Charles Katz used a public pay phone booth to transmit illegal gambling wagers from Los Angeles to Miami and Boston. Unbeknownst to Katz, the FBI was recording his conversations via an electronic eavesdropping device attached to the exterior of the phone booth. Katz was convicted based on these recordings. He challenged his conviction, arguing that the recordings were obtained in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The Court of Appeals sided with the FBI because there was no physical intrusion into the phone booth itself. Question: Does the right to privacy extend to telephone booths and other public places? Is a physical intrusion necessary to constitute a search? The Court ruled 7-1 in favor of Katz, with Justice Black in dissent. Justice Marshall did not participate in the vote. Writing for the majority, Justice Stewart wrote, "One who occupies [a telephone booth], shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll that permits him to place a call is surely entitled to assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world."[1] Certain details, such as shutting the door on the telephone booth, help determine if a person intends for a conversation to be private. Thus, private conversations can be made in public areas. Justice Harlan's concurring opinion summarizes the essential holdings of the majority: "(a) that an enclosed telephone booth is an area where, like a home, and unlike a field, a person has a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy; (b) that electronic as well as physical intrusion into a place that is in this sense private may constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment; and (c) that an invasion of a constitutionally protected area by federal authorities is, as the Court has long held, presumptively unreasonable in the absence of a search warrant."[1] The majority opinion by Justice Stewart did not dispute that a magistrate "could constitutionally have authorized" the wiretap in this case, but, since such a warrant was neither sought nor obtained, the search was therefore unconstitutional.[2] Likewise, the Court said it was not recognizing any general right to privacy in the Fourth Amendment: "the protection of a person's general right to privacy—his right to be let alone by other people—is, like the protection of his property and of his very life, left largely to the law of the individual States."[3] Dissent: In his dissent, Justice Hugo Black argued that the Fourth Amendment, as a whole, was only meant to protect "things" from physical search and seizure; it was not meant to protect personal privacy. Additionally, Black argued that the modern act of wiretapping was analogous to the act of eavesdropping, which was around even when the Bill of Rights was drafted. Black concluded that if the drafters of the Fourth Amendment had meant for it to protect against eavesdropping they would have included the proper language.

Griswold v. Connecticut (1965)

a landmark case in the United States in which the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that the Constitution protected a right to privacy. The case involved a Connecticut "Comstock law" that prohibited any person from using "any drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of preventing conception." By a vote of 7-2, the Supreme Court invalidated the law on the grounds that it violated the "right to marital privacy", establishing the basis for the right to privacy with respect to intimate practices. This and other cases view the right to privacy as a right to "protect[ion] from governmental intrusion." At issue was: 1879 CT law prohibiting abetting, counseling or use of birth control, even by married couples. The law made it illegal to use of "any drug, medicinal article, or instrument for the purpose of preventing conception(...)" and subject to be "(...) fined not less than fifty dollars or imprisoned not less than sixty days nor more than one year or be both fined and imprisoned."[1] Although almost never enforced, Massachusetts and Connecticut were the only two states that still had this type of statute on their statute books by the 1950s. From the late 19th century to the beginning of the 20th century in the United States physicians largely avoided the publication of any material related to birth control, even when they often recommended or at least gave advice regarding it to their married patients. It was not until Margaret Higgins Sanger that the public opinion regarding contraception was challenged.[3] She influenced the Connecticut Birth Control League (CBCL), and helped to develop the eventual concept of the Planned Parenthood clinics. . A second challenge to the Connecticut law was brought by Yale School of Medicine gynecologist C. Lee Buxton as well as his patients in Poe v. Ullman (1961). The Supreme Court again voted to dismiss the appeal, on the grounds that the case was not ripe. It held that, because the plaintiffs had not been charged or threatened with prosecution, there was no actual controversy for the judiciary to resolve.Shortly after the Poe decision was handed down on June 1961, Estelle Griswold, Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut,[6] and Dr. Buxton,[7] chairman of Yale Medical School's Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology and volunteer medical of PPLC, opened a birth control clinic in New Haven, Connecticut, hoping to test the contraception law once again.[2] The clinic, which opened in November 1, 1961 received its first ten patients and dozens of appointment requests from married women who wanted advice regarding birth control and prescriptions. Shortly after the clinic was opened, Griswold and Buxton were arrested, tried, found guilty, and fined $100 each.[8] The conviction was upheld by the Appellate Division of the Circuit Court, and by the Connecticut Supreme Court.[9] The director of planned parenthood, Estelle Griswold who was also a physician, opened a clinic to purposely challenge the law. She was arrested, tried, and convicted of violating the law. Question: Does the Constitution protect the right of marital privacy against state restrictions on a couple's ability to be counseled in the use of contraceptives? Yes it does Douglase began by listing individual rights that were recognized by courts but that were not specifically listed in the Constitution "The present case, then, concerns a relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees. " "Would we alow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship." What is Privacy? In other words, the "spirit" of the First Amendment (free speech) the Third Amendment (prohibition of quartering troops), Fourth Amendment (freedom from searches and seizures), Fifth Amendment (freedom from self incrimination), and Ninth Amendment ( other rights), as applied against the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, creates a general "right to privacy" that cannot be unduly infringes Concurring Opinions- Justice Goldberg; Ninth Amendment- "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people" Justice Harlain: Privacy should be protected as stated in the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment Dissenting: Justice Black: A right to privacy does to not exist in the const Did n ot agree with the other justice's interpretations of the ninth and fourteenth amendments Justice stewart said it was "an uncommonly silly law" but was still constitutional

Hassan v. New York (2015)

argue Muslim religious faith acted as proxy for criminality, innocent people protected by 1st/14th amend, case challenges NYPD's suspicion less (religion) surveillance of Muslim Americans. NYPD argues not specific, nat'l security, AP investigation brought more harm than surveillance. Ct rejects "no harm" argument. There is no "Muslim exception" to the Ctution, cited Jackson's dissent in Korematsu v. US (can't focus on one group to discriminate against based on race).

Clayton Lockett

couldn't find drugs bc noone would sell them for sake of execution. Got them from Dubai, middleman lied. Cruel and unusual argument. There needs to be a way for it to be painless. His lawyer sued the doctor and the EMT and the executioner.

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld year

decided on same day as another case in 2004, 8-1, plurality by O'Connor, balancing indiv./gov rights.

Hamdan limitations

doesn't deal with power to attain people indefinitely without charge (NO direct curtailment of prez power in these cases).

Birthright

he origins of Planned Parenthood and its hardships over the years ◾GOP strongly against it and is pro-life; Democrats are pro-choice ◾Not just for abortions, but also for sexual health and for family planning, etc. ◾Still continuing the fight even today ◾As long as there is an opinion on abortion, there will always be a debate about what rights women have to their sexual privacy

Lawrence V. TExas (2003)

is a landmark decision by the United States Supreme Court. The Court struck down the sodomy law in Texas and, by extension, invalidated sodomy laws in 13 other states, making same-sex sexual activity legal in every U.S. state and territory. The Court, with a five-justice majority, overturned its previous ruling on the same issue in the 1986 caseBowers v. Hardwick, where it upheld a challenged Georgia statute and did not find a constitutional protection of sexual privacy. From <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lawrence_v._Texas> By the time of the Lawrence decision, ten states—Alabama, Florida, Idaho, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Michigan, Utah and Virginia—still banned consensual sodomy without respect to the sex of those involved, and four—Texas, Kansas, Oklahoma and Missouri—prohibited same-sex couples from engaging in anal and oral sex From <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lawrence_v._Texas> Facts: Police investigating weapons disturbance Lawrence and Garner having sex and arrested them for violating TX law prohibiting "deviate sexual intercourse w/ another individual of the same sex" On September 17, 1998, John Lawrence,[10][11] a gay 55-year-old medical technologist, was hosting two gay acquaintances, Tyron Garner,[12] age 31, and Robert Eubanks,[13]40, at his apartment on the outskirts of Houston. Lawrence and Eubanks had been friends for more than 20 years. Garner and Eubanks had a tempestuous on-again off-again romantic relationship since 1990. Lacking transportation home, the couple were preparing to spend the night. Eubanks, who had been drinking heavily, left to purchase a soda from a nearby vending machine. Apparently outraged that Lawrence had been flirting with Garner, he called police and reported "a black male going crazy with a gun" at Lawrence's apartment.[14] Four Harris County sheriff's deputies responded within minutes and Eubanks pointed them to the apartment. They entered the unlocked apartment toward 11 p.m. with their weapons drawn. In accordance with police procedures, the first to arrive, Joseph Quinn, took the lead both in approaching the scene and later in determining what charges to bring. He later reported seeing Lawrence and Garner having anal sex in the bedroom. A second officer reported seeing them engaged in oral sex, and two others did not report seeing the pair having sex. Lawrence did not acquiesce to the police. Instead he repeatedly challenged the police for entering his home. Quinn had discretionary authority to charge them for a variety of offenses and to determine whether to arrest them. When Quinn considered charging them with having sex in violation of state law, he had to get an Assistant District Attorney to check the statutes to be certain they covered sexual activity inside a residence. He was told that Texas's anti-sodomy statute, the "Homosexual Conduct" law, made it a Class C misdemeanor if someone "engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another individual of the same sex".[15] The statute, Chapter 21, Sec. 21.06 of the Texas Penal Code, had been adopted in 1973 when the state revised its criminal code to end its proscription on heterosexual anal and oral intercourse.[16] Quinn decided to arrest Lawrence and Garner and charge them with having "deviate sex". In the opinion of the author of the most detailed account of the arrests, Quinn's decision was likely driven by Lawrence's verbal assertiveness, along with some combination of Quinn's negative response to homosexuality, the fact that Lawrence was white and Garner was black, and the false gun report.[17] In the separate arrest reports he filed for each, he wrote that he had seen the arrestee "engaged in deviate sexual conduct namely, anal sex, with another man".[17] Lawrence and Garner were held in jail overnight. At a hearing the next day, they pleaded not guilty to a charge of "homosexual conduct". They were released toward midnight.[18] Eubanks pled no contest to charges of filing a false police report. He was sentenced to 30 days in jail but released early.[19] From <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lawrence_v._Texas> Question: In a petition for certiorari filed in the U.S. Supreme Court on July 16, 2002, Lambda Legal attorneys asked the Court to consider:[28] 1. Whether the petitioners' criminal convictions under the Texas "Homosexual Conduct" law—which criminalizes sexual intimacy by same-sex couples, but not identical behavior by different-sex couples—violate the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal protection of the laws? 2. Whether the petitioners' criminal convictions for adult consensual sexual intimacy in their home violate their vital interests in liberty and privacy protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? 3. Whether Bowers v. Hardwick should be overruled? From <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lawrence_v._Texas> Held: On June 26, 2003, the Supreme Court released its 6-3 decision striking down the Texas statute. Five justices held it violated due process guarantees, and a sixth, Sandra Day O'Connor, held it violated equal protection guarantees. The five-member majority opinion overruled Bowers v. Hardwick and implicitly invalidated similar sodomy statutes in 13 other states. From <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lawrence_v._Texas> ustice Anthony Kennedy wrote the majority opinion which Justices John Paul Stevens, David Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen Breyer joined. The Court held that homosexuals had a protected liberty interest to engage in private, sexual activity; that homosexuals' moral and sexual choices were entitled to constitutional protection; and that moral disapproval did not provide a legitimate justification for Texas's law criminalizing sodomy.[36] Kennedy wrote: "The petitioners [Lawrence and Garner] are entitled to respect for their private lives. The State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime." Kennedy reviewed the assumption the court made in Bowers, using the words of Chief Justice Burger's concurring opinion in that case, that "Condemnation of [homosexual practices] is firmly rooted in Judeao-Christian moral and ethical standards." He reviewed the history of legislation that criminalized certain sexual practices, but without regard for the gender of those involved. He cited the Model Penal Code's recommendations since 1955, the Wolfenden Report of 1963, and a 1981 decision of the European Court of Human Rights. He endorsed the views Justice Stevens had outlined in his dissent in Bowers and wrote: "Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today. It ought not to remain binding precedent. Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is overruled." The majority decision also held that the intimate, adult consensual conduct at issue here was part of the liberty protected by the substantive component of the Fourteenth Amendment's due process protections. Kennedy said that the Constitution protects "personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, [and] child rearing" and that homosexuals "may seek autonomy for these purposes."[37] Holding that "the Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual", the court struck down the anti-sodomy law as unconstitutional. Kennedy underscored the decision's focus on consensual adult sexual conduct in a private setting: The present case does not involve minors. It does not involve persons who might be injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships where consent might not easily be refused. It does not involve public conduct or prostitution. It does not involve whether the government must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter.[38] From <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lawrence_v._Texas> Finding: 6-3 Texas law "furthers no legitimate state interest" (fails rational basis scrutiny), violates due process( equal proection, protects liberty/ privacy Arguments: 1) Fundamental right of privacy. All ladult couples should be free from state intrusion. Private, consensual activitiy. 2) Protecting the marriage contract Lawrence- Implications for Gay Marriage "Liberty protects the person from unwarranted government intrusions into a dwelling or other private places" "Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes a freedom of though, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct." "other spheres of our lives and existence, ouside the home, were the State should not be a dominant presence. Freedom extends beyond spatial bounds. " "The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest where it can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual"

Hassan v. City of New York, Court of Appeals, 3rd Circuit (2015)

issues about 1st and 14th amendment violations. The case is part of CCR's broader effort to end warrantless government surveillance of civilians, particularly those who are being targeted on the basis of their Muslim identity or activism. The original complaint was filed by Muslim Advocates in the District Court of New Jersey and joined by CCR. We are asking the courts to declare this surveillance program unconstitutional and order the NYPD to immediately stop spying on our clients. We also ask the court to order the NYPD to destroy any records that have been surreptitiously generated about our clients and to award financial compensation for the economic harms that have resulted from the NYPD's discriminatory conduct. Do Plaintiffs—themselves allegedly subject to a discriminatory surveillance program—have standing to sue in federal court to vindicate their religious-liberty and equalprotection rights? If so, taking Plaintiffs' non-conclusory allegations as true, have they stated valid claims under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to our Constitution? Both of these questions, which we answer yes issues about 1st and 14th amendment violations. Court rejected "no harm" argument and "individual monitoring" program •NYPD will argue on grounds of national security, surveillance doesn't equal search and seizure, in order to prevent terrorism, they had to focus on the community as a whole and not just specific people •There is no "Muslim exception" to the Constitution •Law enforcement cannot harass people because of their religion with untested national security claims •Cited Justice Jackson's dissenting opinion in Korematsu v. US •Violation of 1st and 14th Amendments, so it needs to be stopped

what is probable cause?

o Search - probable cause to believe that evidence or the fruit of a crime can be found in a particular place o Seizure - probable cause to believe a particular person committed a crime Most searches/seizures can be done legally without a warrant In order to get a warrant police need to show probable cause What does a warrant have to say? • The warrant must state with particularity the place to be searched and the things to be seized o Plain view exception (anything seen in plain sight without searching can also be seized)

Gregg v. Georgia

reaffirmed the United States Supreme Court's acceptance of the use of the death penalty in the United States, upholding, in particular, the death sentence imposed on Troy Leon Gregg. Referred to by a leading scholar as the July 2 Cases[1] and elsewhere referred to by the lead case Gregg, the Supreme Court set forth the two main features that capital sentencing procedures must employ in order to comply with the Eighth Amendment ban on "cruel and unusual punishments". The decision essentially ended thede facto moratorium on the death penalty imposed by the Court in its 1972 decision in Furman v. Georgia 408 U.S. 238 (1972). ll five cases share the same basic procedural history. After the Furman decision, the states of Georgia, Florida, Texas, North Carolina, and Louisiana amended their death penalty statutes to meet the Furman guidelines. Subsequently, the five named defendants[2] were convicted of murder and sentenced to death in their respective states. The respective state supreme court[3]upheld the death sentence. The defendants then asked the U.S. Supreme Court to review their death sentence, asking the Court to go beyond Furman and declare once and for all the death penalty to be "cruel and unusual punishment" and thus in violation of the Constitution; the Court agreed to hear the cases. In the July 2 Cases, the Court's goal was to provide guidance to states in the wake of Furman. In Furman only one basic idea could command a majority vote of the Justices: capital punishment, as then practiced in the United States, was cruel and unusual punishment because there were no rational standards that determined when it was imposed and when it was not. The question the Court resolved in these cases was not whether the death sentence imposed on each of the individual defendants was cruel, but rather whether the process by which those sentences were imposed was rational and objectively reviewable. 5 cases- all with similar case history Convicted of murder and sentenced to death Would the SC say death penalty is per se a violation of 8th Amendment ban of cruel and punishment? Is imposition of the death sentence prohibited under the 8th and 14th amendments as "cruel and unusual" punishment? Gregg's conviction was upheld 7-2. Potter wrote that in light of evolving standards of decency, the penalty is constitutional when it is proportional to the severity of the crime (not arbitrary) and is a not wanton infliction of pain Stewart also emphasized public acceptance of the death penalty and that retribution is valid legislative consideration The Georgeia statute, according to Stewart, effectively prevent arbitrary and disproportionate death sentences because the bifurcated procedure allows full exploration of the evidence relating to the penalty; because the sentencing body must make specific factual findings to support the result; and because state supreme court review insures comparability and proportionality among defendants who receive the death penalty. Dissenters: In his dissent, William Brennan reiterated his positin in Furman " the punishment of death for whatever crime and under all circumstances, is cruel and unusual in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments Jutice Thurgood Marshall also issued a dissent reiterating his position in Furman that the death penalty is cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments - He also stated that the issue is if the death penalty is necessary to accomplish the legitimate legislative purposes in punishment, or whether a less severe penalty- life imprisonment- would do as well. The court said that the two purposes are general deterrence and retribution. No. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that a punishment of death did not violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments under all circumstances. In extreme criminal cases, such as when a defendant has been convicted of deliberately killing another, the careful and judicious use of the death penalty may be appropriate if carefully employed. Georgia's death penalty statute assures the judicious and careful use of the death penalty by requiring a bifurcated proceeding where the trial and sentencing are conducted separately, specific jury findings as to the severity of the crime and the nature of the defendant, and a comparison of each capital sentence's circumstances with other similar cases. Moreover, the Court was not prepared to overrule the Georgia legislature's finding that capital punishment serves as a useful deterrent to future capital crimes and an appropriate means of social retribution against its most serious offenders. 1963

Gregg v. Georgia

reaffirmed the United States Supreme Court's acceptance of the use of the death penalty in the United States, upholding, in particular, the death sentence imposed on Troy Leon Gregg. Referred to by a leading scholar as the July 2 Cases[1] and elsewhere referred to by the lead case Gregg, the Supreme Court set forth the two main features that capital sentencing procedures must employ in order to comply with the Eighth Amendment ban on "cruel and unusual punishments". The decision essentially ended thede facto moratorium on the death penalty imposed by the Court in its 1972 decision in Furman v. Georgia 408 U.S. 238 (1972). ll five cases share the same basic procedural history. After the Furman decision, the states of Georgia, Florida, Texas, North Carolina, and Louisiana amended their death penalty statutes to meet the Furman guidelines. Subsequently, the five named defendants[2] were convicted of murder and sentenced to death in their respective states. The respective state supreme court[3]upheld the death sentence. The defendants then asked the U.S. Supreme Court to review their death sentence, asking the Court to go beyond Furman and declare once and for all the death penalty to be "cruel and unusual punishment" and thus in violation of the Constitution; the Court agreed to hear the cases. In the July 2 Cases, the Court's goal was to provide guidance to states in the wake of Furman. In Furman only one basic idea could command a majority vote of the Justices: capital punishment, as then practiced in the United States, was cruel and unusual punishment because there were no rational standards that determined when it was imposed and when it was not. The question the Court resolved in these cases was not whether the death sentence imposed on each of the individual defendants was cruel, but rather whether the process by which those sentences were imposed was rational and objectively reviewable. 5 cases- all with similar case history Convicted of murder and sentenced to death Would the SC say death penalty is per se a violation of 8th Amendment ban of cruel and punishment? Is imposition of the death sentence prohibited under the 8th and 14th amendments as "cruel and unusual" punishment? Gregg's conviction was upheld 7-2. Potter wrote that in light of evolving standards of decency, the penalty is constitutional when it is proportional to the severity of the crime (not arbitrary) and is a not wanton infliction of pain Stewart also emphasized public acceptance of the death penalty and that retribution is valid legislative consideration The Georgeia statute, according to Stewart, effectively prevent arbitrary and disproportionate death sentences because the bifurcated procedure allows full exploration of the evidence relating to the penalty; because the sentencing body must make specific factual findings to support the result; and because state supreme court review insures comparability and proportionality among defendants who receive the death penalty. Dissenters: In his dissent, William Brennan reiterated his positin in Furman " the punishment of death for whatever crime and under all circumstances, is cruel and unusual in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments Jutice Thurgood Marshall also issued a dissent reiterating his position in Furman that the death penalty is cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments - He also stated that the issue is if the death penalty is necessary to accomplish the legitimate legislative purposes in punishment, or whether a less severe penalty- life imprisonment- would do as well. The court said that the two purposes are general deterrence and retribution. jury gives death sentence to Gregg after his armed robbery/murder. Gregg says death penalty="cruel and unusual", Sup. Ct says it's OK cuz new Georgia statue (has specific aggravating factors now).

4th amendment

right against unreasonable search & seizure

Suspension Clause

states that habeas corpus "can't be suspended except in times of war"

Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah (1943)

was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that an ordinance passed in Hialeah, Florida, forbidding the "unnecessar[y]" killing of "an animal in a public or private ritual or ceremony not for the primary purpose of food consumption", was unconstitutional. The law was enacted soon after the city council of Hialeah learned that the Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, which practiced Santería, a religion whose rituals sometimes demand animal sacrifice, was planning on locating there. The church filed a lawsuit in United States district court for the Southern District of Florida, seeking for the Hialeah ordinance to be declared unconstitutional. From <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Church_of_Lukumi_Babalu_Aye_v._City_of_Hialeah> Question: Did the city of Hialeah's ordinance, prohibiting ritual animal sacrifices, violate the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause? From <https://www.oyez.org/cases/1992/91-948> Held: Yes. The Court held that the ordinances were neither neutral nor generally applicable. The ordinances had to be justified by a compelling governmental interest and they had to be narrowly tailored to that interest. The core failure of the ordinances were that they applied exclusively to the church. The ordinances singled out the activities of the Santeria faith and suppressed more religious conduct than was necessary to achieve their stated ends. Only conduct tied to religious belief was burdened. The ordinances targeted religious behavior, therefore they failed to survive the rigors of strict strutiny. Church of Lukumi practiced Santeria Used animal sacrifice as a form of worship Hialeah, FL passed new laws focused on animal sacrifice Question: are the city laws directed at animal sacrifice as part of the Santeria a violation of the First Amendment? New laws were not neutral- they applied to target the rleigion and prevent its practice No legitimate government interest Why must religion alone bear the burden of these ordinances? Grocery stores? Kennedy: " religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent or comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment protection"

Minersville School District V. Gobitis (1943)

was a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States involving the religious rights of public school students under the First Amendment to the United States Const. The Court ruled that public schools could compel students —in this case, Jehovah's Witnesses—to salute the America n Flag and recite the Pledge of Allegiance despite the students' religious objections to these practices. This decision led to increased persecution of Witnesses in the United States. The Supreme Court overruled this decision a mere three years later, in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). Facts: Walter Gobitas[7] was a recent convert to the Jehovah's Witnesses. Gobitas was inspired by stories of other Jehovah's Witnesses who challenged the system and suffered for it, and decided to make a stand himself and instructed his children not to pledge allegiance when at school. Minersville, Pennsylvania was predominantly Roman Catholic and there was significant animosity towards the Jehovah's Witnesses. Tensions were already high before this case arose and many viewed this as one way to get back at the Witnesses. As a result, his children were subjected to teasing, taunting, and attacks from the other kids. For Lillian, this meant giving up her status as class president and losing most of her friends. "When I'd come to school," she said, "they would throw a hail of pebbles and yell things like, 'Here comes Jehovah!' Billy's fifth grade teacher attempted to physically force his arm out of his pocket to make the requisite salute[8] A local Catholic church started a boycott of the family store and its business dropped off. Because of their eventual expulsion, their father had to pay for them to enroll in a private school, resulting in even more economic hardship[citation needed]. At first the school board was in a quandary because the law did not provide penalties for those who refused to pledge. Finally, though, the school board got permission to punish the Gobitas children and expelled them, without appeal[citation needed]. Trial[edit] The case was argued in Philadelphia on 15 February 1938. During the trial, school superintendent Roudabush displayed contempt for the beliefs of the children, stating that he felt they had been "indoctrinated" and that the existence of even a few dissenters would be "demoralizing," leading to widespread disregard for the flag and American values. Four months later District Judge Albert B. Maris found that the board's requirement that the children salute the flag was an unconstitutional violation of their free exercise of religious beliefs.[9] Third Circuit[edit] Within two weeks, the school board unanimously agreed to appeal the decision. Oral arguments in the appeal were made before the Third Circuit of the U.S. Court of Appeals on 9 November 1938. One year later, the three-judge court unanimously affirmed the district court decision.[10] Despite its two defeats in the lower courts, the school board decided to take its case to the Supreme Court, authorizing its attorney to file a petition for a writ of certiorari, which the Court granted on 4 March 1940.[11] Held: The Court's decision was nearly unanimous; only Justice Harlan F. Stone dissented. In an 8-to-1 decision, the Court upheld the mandatory flag salute, declining to make itself "the school board for the country." Justice Felix Frankfurter wrote the majority decision; in doing so, he relied primarily on the "secular regulation" rule, which weighs the secular purpose of a nonreligious government regulation against the religious practice it makes illegal or otherwise burdens the exercise of religion. He identified the Pennsylvania flag-salute requirement as an intrinsically secular policy enacted to encourage patriotism among school children. Frankfurter wrote that the school district's interest in creating national unity was enough to allow them to require students to salute the flag. According to Frankfurter, the nation needed loyalty and the unity of all the people. Since saluting the flag was a primary means of achieving this legitimate goal, an issue of national importance was at stake. The Court held that the state's interest in "national cohesion" was "inferior to none in the hierarchy of legal values". National unity is the basis of national security. To deny the legislature the right to select appropriate means for its attainment presents a totally different order of problem from that of the propriety of subordinating the possible ugliness of littered streets to the free expression opinion through handbills. Weighing the circumstances in this case, he argued that the social need for conformity with the requirement was greater than the individual liberty claims of the Jehovah's Witnesses. He emphasized that Conscientious scruples have not, in the course of the long struggle for religious toleration, relieved the individual from obedience to a general law not aimed at the promotion or restriction of religious beliefs Frankfurter further wrote that the recitation of a pledge advanced the cause of patriotism in the United States. He said the country's foundation as a free society depends upon building sentimental ties. The flag, the Court found, was an important symbol of national unity and could be a part of legislative initiatives designed "to promote in the minds of children who attend the common schools an attachment to the institutions of their country From <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Minersville_School_District_v._Gobitis> Dissent: Harlan Stone, the lone dissenter from the majority's decision wrote: The guarantees of civil liberty are but guarantees of freedom of the human mind and spirit and of reasonable freedom and opportunity to express them... The very essence of the liberty which they guarantee is the freedom of the individual from compulsion as to what he shall think and what he shall say... From <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Minersville_School_District_v._Gobitis> Children did not salute the flaag; violation of religion Minersville was mostly Catholic and Jehovah Witnesses were persecuted School Board punished Gobitis kids and expelled them Did mandatory flag salute infringe upon freedom of religion? Court (8-1) NO! The Supreme Court is not "the school board for the country" State interest in national cohesion was more important than individual religious liberty of Jehovah Witnesses. National unity is the basis of national security Reign of terror ensued WD Board of Ed V. Barnette Free exercise Clause Case Jehovah's Witness case concerning the requirement to pledge to the American flag Did the compulsory flag salute for public school children violate the First Amendment? Yes, citing the Free Exercise Clause The students did NOT have to leave the room or pledg e the flag

where do you not have a reasonable expectation of privacy?

• Clothing • Friends/Acquaintances • Banks/Emails • Trash • *K-9 sniffs are not considered searches under the 4th Amendment

where do you have a reasonable expectation of privacy?

• Home - receives the most protection under the 4th • Vehicles - you have some expectation of privacy, but it is limited when in public or when the car is involved in a crime • Purse/Wallet/Backpack o Limitation: if officers have authority to search your person, they can also search your purse/wallet/backpack

separate Hamdi opinions

• Souter and Ginsburg said yes, he can challenge his detention, but no, detention was not authorized by Congress. • Thomas dissents completely and separately

when are you "seized" under the 4th amendment?

• When a reasonable person would not feel free to leave o Officer stops you for questioning (are you free to leave or are you seized?) o Officer has you blocked in or has your ID or personal belongings o Officer puts you in handcuffs and/or in his car o (The above were what she was asking us - technically the first does not constitute a seizure, but the other two do)