FINAL PS 332 Notes

The Euro Crisis lecture in docs

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all podcasts in the other one

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Takenaga 2019.pdf

'I Will Never Be Germanʼ: Immigrants and Mixed-Race Families in Germany on the Struggle to Belong Three decades since the Berlin Wall fell, Germans remain deeply divided over the question of what it means to be German. -renewed debate -The most vocal participants have been members of Germanyʼs far-right, anti-immigrant party, who draw a sharp line between "bio-Germans," with German blood, and "passport Germans." -We asked Germans and immigrants to Germany how they think about their identity — and how they navigate the simmering tensions in their country. -They told us about the subtle and overt racism that they or their family members have experienced, their struggles to integrate fully and their fears for the future. -'Thereʼs the constant assumption that you do not belongʼ -'Trips home get worse every timeʼ -'I see it happening more and moreʼ -'I do not blame Germans for my outsider statusʼ -'My black father was almost killed by fascistsʼ -'Iʼve had to stand up to close family membersʼ -'People sometimes confront me about my physical featuresʼ

Mushaben 2010.pdf

-From its founding in 1949 through the dramatic events of 1989/90, the Federal Republic relied on a concept of "blood-based" citizenship (jus sanguinis) -Geographical reconfiguration, generational change and globalization processes have rendered Germany's insistence on an ethno-national citizenship paradigm detrimental to its own political and socio-economic interests. Ostensibly the real "losers" of unification, more than seven million "foreigners" and children of migrant descent are now set to become the long-term winners of Chancellor Merkel's pro-active measures to foster their integration and education. -3 generations of migrants studied -modernizing German identity -the Economic Miracle Generation, the Long March Generation and the Turn-Around Generation -The fact that blood lineage, shared borders, and a common currency do not make for a unified citizenry became increasingly apparent over the next five years. There are few prescriptions beyond the Basic Law [Art. 16, 116] explaining what "being German" meant in a positive sense. So-called Ossis certainly did not think that it meant doing everything the Besserwessi way -new lander residents saw themselves as losers Social-cultural biases outweigh the legal and economic barriers to migrants' political incorporation. Prior to 1990, most who met the formal requirements for naturalization could still be rejected at the discretion of bureaucrats (Ermessen) as "not in the best interest of German culture.". -xenophobic attacks -the "foreigner problem" "a German problem" My argument here, however, is that Germany has seen a great leap forward over the last two decades, both as a land of immigration and integration—due to a little help from the European Union and the surprising policy advocacy of its first female/eastern Christian Democratic Union (CDU) Chancellor, Angela Merkel. Unification turned millions of GDR "re-settlers" into everyday citizens, despite their self-perceived second-class status see other quizlet

Bulmer 2018

-Germany has been at the heart of European integration from the outset. -A key component of the FRG's emergence as a committed European player is its relationship with France. The post-unity period raises concerns about German power in the European Union that are explored in the context of the Eurozone and refugee crises. Due to its embracing of integration the FRG has experienced considerable Europeanization. -As European integration developed over the subsequent decades it served to both emancipate the Bonn Republic from the historical legacy of the Nazi era as well as to develop the FRG's key trading arena. arena. -The Federal Republic became one of the strongest advocates of deeper integration both as a matter of political principle and, especially from the 1970s, through practical initiatives typically launched in conjunction with France. The fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War led Chancellor Kohl to pursue further integration in the political and economic domains to demonstrate continuing commitment to integration and reassure neighbors about the unified Germany's role in the 'new' Europe. -By the 2010s, however, the normalization debate had turned to questions about German power (or hegemony) in the EU following the turmoil of the Eurozone crisis. -Over the period since the creation of the FRG in 1949 the strong support of successive governments for European integration -Rather, the consolidation of the Bonn Republic went hand-in-hand with the process of European integration. -The 1957 Treaties of Rome that established the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community in the following year were major steps in European integration. -Despite the Elysée Treaty the period until 1969 demonstrated how the absence of Franco- German agreement served as a barrier to further integration. -In simple terms during this period the Bonn Republic would not recognise states that had opened diplomatic relations with the German Democratic Republic. The Soviet Union was a notable exception. Helmut Schmidt -The first was the decision to place the intermittent EC summits on a regular basis: the European Council. -The second major Franco-German initiative was the European Monetary System, introduced in 1979. -Schmidt's advocacy of monetary cooperation via the EMS was later to give rise to the first major expression of concern about German power in the European Communities. Once the system had bedded down, particularly after German unification, it became clear that the German Federal Bank (Bundesbank) was the anchor. -The commitment in 1985 to completing the single market, together with the first major reform of the EC Treaties in the 1986 Single European Act, were key steps, and the FRG played an important role. -Kohl was particularly keen that the free movement of people should be facilitated rather than just the free movement of goods. -During the Bonn Republic European integration played a major role in enabling the FRG to establish itself as a stable democratic state. Franco-German reconciliation was at the heart of the commitment to integration and it was striking how the whole process flat-lined when the political leadership of the two states failed to see eye-to-eye (1963-69). -The 'big picture' was that the EC had become the key arena for West German trade and in many respects the cornerstone of its economy. -The Bonn government was therefore a major advocate of liberalization of trade in goods within the EC's internal market and in the EC's external trade policy. It is no exaggeration to regard European integration as one of the core principles that had become embedded in the political system of the Bonn Republic. Beyond European integration economic beliefs based around 'sound money' and open trading-with their roots in ordoliberal thinking-formed a second core principle embedded in the Bonn Republic. Unification -The FRG's close engagement with European integration during the semi-sovereign years (i.e., prior to unification) created a symbiotic relationship. -From the perspective of Germany's relationship with the EC a key aspect was to negotiate an 'enlargement without accession' -Because the newly created states (Länder) of the GDR acceded to membership of the Federal Republic, application of EC rules was also necessary. -Nevertheless, France and Germany had divergent views regarding the Maastricht route to monetary union -To summarize a longer account, German preferences were more influential than those of France -German preferences were also important in negotiating the more purely political parts of the Maastricht Treaty -The end of the Cold War and the likely consequences of disengagement from German and European politics on the part of the USA were likely to require a stronger European voice in international politics. The third pillar of the newly inaugurated European Union (EU) comprised Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) cooperation. -As the EU state with the greatest number of borders, and with new challenges emerging following the end of the Cold War, Germany was an important advocate of bringing the hitherto limited ad hoc arrangements on home affairs into a more systematic EU framework. -The Kohl governments supported eastern enlargement of the EU as well as further deepening. 1997 Amsterdam treaty SGP -However, from 2002 to 2005 Germany itself transgressed the rule (a consequence of the costs of German unification) and it flexed its muscles to escape censure. This episode did not contribute to the Eurozone's resilience, as transpired with the crisis from late-2009. Another example of a firmer negotiating line from Germany came with the Nice Treaty negotiations, during which serious tensions arose with France over Germany's desire to have an increased voting weight in the Council to reflect its rise in population following unification Agenda 2000 reforms that prepared the CAP The future of the reforms fell as a task to Chancellor Merkel's first government A new generation of political leaders, such as Gerhard Schröder, had grown up in the Bonn Republic and did not feel the historical constraints of their predecessors. 'Normalization' was evident, in that German governments were prepared to articulate national interests like other states (Bulmer and Paterson 2010). Hellmann (2006,p. ix) even contended that 'Europeanist' instincts seldom prevailed over "nationalist' instincts among German decision-makers. Yet it was the development of the Eurozone crisis from late-2009 that really placed Germany's relationship with the EU under the spotlight. The consequence was Germany was pushed into a position of leadership during the crisis. Within Germany the Eurozone crisis led to an apparent collision of two guiding principles of the state: its credentials as a supporter of European integration and its preferences for 'sound money' policies. -Has Germany become the EU's hegemony in the 2010s. Euro crisis -Chancellor Merkel's authority and longevity have boosted Germany's influence in the EU. The 2015 refugee crisis saw Chancellor Merkel pursing the role of 'liberal hegemon' in seeking to take a welcoming approach to those fleeing turmoil in Syria and elsewhere (Bulmer and Paterson 2016). In this case, however, it is very difficult to evidence a hegemonic position. Longer-term efforts to tackle the refugee crisis have led to mixed results. Efforts to persuade other states to agree to EU quotas for re-distributing refugees have failed, albeit with one exception. -Domestically, critical voices in public and the rise of the AfD, most clearly in the 2017 federal election, indicate the domestic limits to Merkel's initial policy position. Yet here was its Chancellor seeking to rescue the Eurozone by exporting-some said imposing-German principles of sound money to debtor states, raising concerns about a 'German Europe' More concretely there are a number of key policy principles advocated from Berlin. 15!!!!! the EU's impact at domestic level-Europeanization-had fewer adverse effects in Germany than in some other states, -The growing range of policy areas in which the EU had competencies suggested a reduction in the scope for German to pursue its own policies. For political institutions Europeanization poses questions for the executive, legislature and judiciary on how to adapt to the increasing encroachment of the EU on their work. At the federal level the challenge has been for government to be effective in responding to and contributing to EU policy. The state (Länder) governments have felt Europeanisation especially acutely. Over time they became frustrated at their lack of formal voice in European policy-making and at their powers being transferred to the EU by negotiators from the federal government. The Bundesrat conducts its work through its Committee on EU Affairs. The Bundestag's powers have been increased over the period since the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, especially as a result of judgments by the Federal Constitutional Court (below). The Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) has also been impacted by Europeanization. However, to a certain extent it has sought to fight back by questioning elements of the supremacy of European law and of the European Court of Justice. By the nature of its judgments the FCC has had the effect of incentivizing the bringing of cases to it in relation to EU issues. The FCC has therefore had several responses to Europeanization: (see 16-17) The impact of Europeanization on political forces has been significant. Interest groups and large firms have long ago learned to 'play the Brussels game' by organizing themselves either directly or via EU-level associations to ensure their voice is heard at the supranational level. However, the impact on party-political contestation has certainly increased during the 2010s. see 17 -the Europeanization of German public policy By the same token the dissonance between the two states in the mid-1960s coincided with a period where integration stagnated. -The Franco-German relationship has proved indispensable to the EU. Bilateral relations at all levels of government underpin it. Germany pursues many forms of 'minilateralism' but still nothing compares with the Franco-German relationship. Yet Berlin also has to exercise care to maintain good relations with smaller member states. Neglect of them runs the risk that they perceive the EU as being run as directoire of large member states and can be politically counter-productive. Fears of a German Europe arise intermittently, most notably during the EU crises of the 2010s. conclusion -Germany has used the language of national interests more and has pursued them more obviously. -Instead of promoting greater cohesion during this difficult phase of European integration, he argues that Germany's insistence on the Eurozone states' adherence to a rules-based ordo-liberal approach seems to be turning the EU into a German sphere of influence. -to the 2017 election outcome that has weakened her position in Germany (Merkel) -They set out a contrasting argument, namely that Germany has exerted a 'benign hegemony' in the EU

Farrell 2018

Analysis | Thanks to Trump, Germany says it can't rely on the United States. What does that mean? -the days when Europe could rely on others was "over to a certain extent. This is what Ihave experienced in the last few days." This is an enormous change in political rhetoric. One of the key purposes of NATO was to embed Germany in an international framework that would prevent it from becoming a threat to European peace as it had been in World War I and World War II. In the words of NATO's first secretary general, NATO was supposed "to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down." Now, Merkel is suggesting that the Americans aren't really in, and, by extension, Germany and Europe are likely to take on a much more substantial and independent role than they have in the past 70 years. Her belief that the United States is no longer a reliable partner is a direct result of Trump's words and actions. However, Trump did not express his commitment to Article 5 in his speech to NATO, instead lambasting other NATO members for not spending enough money on their militaries -Paris agreement This cements the impression of theUnited States as an unreliable partner. Trump has ostentatiously refused to express his commitment to an agreement that has been the bulwark of Europe-U.S. security relations over the past three generations. Merkel's rhetoric is clearly intended to imply that as the transatlantic relationship grows weaker, the European Union will grow stronger. especially as Britain is leaving However, Merkel will face her own challenges in building a stronger Europe. Europe faces several internal disagreements. -she is cautious. very different than trump. But U.S. leaders are not wrong. Europe does not spend a lot on military, often outsources to U.S. Trump's election may have long-term global consequences States whose interests clash with the United States may have opportunities to win gains while the United States, the global hegemon, is distracted with its internal crises. In other parts of the world, allies are likely to recalibrate their behavior, and in particular their dependence on the United States.

Langenbacher 2010.pdf

Cognitive DissonanceAlmost twenty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, a 2009 survey found that Germany was the most positively assessed country cross-nationally with a score of 61 percent—ahead of the perennial, non-offensive, universal-health-care-providing favorite, Canada with 59 percent (the UK scored 58 percent and Japan 57 percent). surprising! a certain pessimism since (and before)the 1989/1990 caesura has been typical. Such negativity may be unavoid-able with scholars trained always to direct a critical eye towards theirobject of study. But, it is also true that many authors especially in the Eng-lish-speaking world long have viewed the country through the lens of theNazi past and its purported continuities in the present The 2009 Transatlantic Trends survey of the German Marshall Fund of theUnited States found that 60 percent of German respondents believed that ":immigrants' unwillingness to integrate is the greatest barrier to integration," as opposed to 27 percent who believe that discrimination by society is the greatest challenge. Germany has the largest majority of people who support the view that [the failure to integrate] ... is the immigrants' fault. Nevertheless, a comparative perspective shows that the situation in Germany is not particularly worse than in other European countries Moreover, a wave of liberalizing reforms implemented after the 1998 change in government resulted in citizenship policy moving from the most illiberal in western Europe to the middle of the pack. other Merkel govt initiatives scholars of the German economy have long been pessimistic, deeming the country the newest "sick man of Europe" in the 1990s But then, partially as a consequence of the poor economy that forced down unit labor costs and eroded the power of unions and centralized bargaining, and partially due to the Red-Green government's implemen-tation of the neoliberal Agenda 2010 and Hartz IV reforms in the early 2000s, the situation changed rapidly. Today, the World Economic Forum places it seventh (behind Switzerland, the U.S., Singapore, and the Nordic countries) in its Global Competitiveness Report. however. Germany places eighty-fourth out of 183 countries in terms of starting a new busi-ness and a dismal one hundred-fifty-third regarding the ease of letting workers go, which the OECDin March 2010 recommended the govern-ment take immediate action to redress. Pessimism also has long been apparent among scholars who deal with collective memory and culture. —fosters very high standards of assessment and, often, disappointment. Moreover, many observers increasingly have lauded the character of Germany's efforts to work through its Nazi legacy and construct an exemplary memory regime. The German Soul In short, the empirical record shows more positive developments than scholars have acknowledged over the last twenty years. -maybe it takes a while to assimilate more positive findings and to update the paradigms through which we observe the country—to reduce cognitive dissonance so to say. -But, it may also be true that Germany specialists have "gone native" and have adopted the serious, often pessimistic demeanor so often associated with the people who created the words Angst -Thomas Mann even said that "a collective inclination towards self-criticism, leading to self-disgust (Selbstekel)" was"typically German" (kerndeutsch Certainly, as public opinion polls constantly reveal, Germany is among the least patriotic nations on earth, having internalized the postwar critique of nationalism and seemingly embracing Habermasian notions of post nationality, constitutional patriotism, or "European" identity. In any case, Germans themselves probably are even more negative about their country than observers from abroad. There was a marked absence of joy as the twentieth anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall approached— the continued socio-economic problems in the East. As Stephen Silvia, Jeffrey Anderson, and Holger Wolf discuss in this issue, whatever indicators one looks at—unemployment, crime, productivity, demo-graphics, income, xenophobia, political radicalism—it is still a rather bleak picture twenty years after unification, even though easterners' quality of life and basic freedoms are incalculably better than during the communist period and compared to any other former communist country. and the massive sums of money that have been trans-ferred from West to East The entrenched problems have helped the former/reformed commu-nist party (Party of Democratic Socialism, PDS, since 2007 renamed the Left Party, gain a seemingly per-manent 20-30 percent electoral foothold in the region— This party has been both cause and consequence of another trend in the region, the rise of Ostalgie—an overly positive and tendentious view of the German Democratic Republic (GDR),which arguably has inhibited a fuller confrontation with that legacy. Radi-cal right parties (the DVU and more recently the NPD especially in Saxony) also have gained strength in the region and representation in several Landtage at various points over the last twenty years. Many areas havewitnessed violent attacks on foreigners and parts of the region were de -clared "no-go" areas for foreign fans during the 2006 World Cup afflict the western portion of the country as well Why the World Likes Germany -is precisely the self-critical tradition that often has spurred con-stant improvement—so an uncritical stance is certainly never to be advo-cated. -Engineering is still at the top of the list of things the world likes about Germany. -Culturally, Germans continue to have worldwide impact—especially in photography with artists such as Andreas Gursky and Thomas Demand. The German government has invested heavily in culture promo-tion -the country's hosting of the 2006 World Cup. Indeed, Germany's successful tradition in international soccer: three world champi-onships...is a major reason for its positive reputation, even if many complainabout the German style of play efforts (all-day school, achieving better performance, addressing the gap between indigenous Germans and newcomers) are underway. Internationalism and openness also manifest themselves in tourism. Wo r l d w i d e , G e r m a n y i s t h e n i n t h m o s t v i s i t e d c o u n t r y w i t h 2 4 . 9 m i l l i o nentries in 2008. beer In any case, the millions of German tourists worldwide are a big factor behind knowledge of Germany and constitute an under-appreciated form of cultural diplomacy. People also may think of more "official" achievements. Germany is on eof the richest countries in the world with a fifteenth place in the 2008 Wo r l d B a n k p e r c a p i t a GDPlist Moreover, Germany is one of the best performers in terms of minimizing income inequality... Despite the need for further improvement, the country is one of the best performers on the Wo r l d E c o n o m i c F o r u m ' s G e n d e r G a p I n d e x — t w e l f t h i n 2 0 0 9 More recent studies have given the German healthcare system higher marks: a 2009 study ranks it sixth out of thirty-three European countries. Quality of life factors also may affect assessments. It scores in the "very high" category of the United Nations' human development index d comprehensive public transportation (indeed infrastructure is a big reason for its high international rankings), recycling programs, and envi-ronmental policy more generally, where the country has been a policy leader. renewable energy Germany's pioneering mixed electoral system (with the combina-tion of single member plurality constituencies and closed list proportional representation) has been emulated in a diverse array of countries Despite a host of complaints in recentyears,49the German party system is admired for the (usually) seriousness ofpolitical debate, clear but moderate partisanship, and a rather fully occu-pied party system. Unlike virtually every other European country, the radi-cal Right has been virtually non-existent—a weakness generated by goodgovernance, constitutional protections (Bundesverfassungsschutz), and cul-tural changes produced by the comprehensive official and civil societalprocess of coming to terms with its Nazi past. The Bundesbank is a model of central bank independence. been copied All international governance and democracy ratings rank Germany highly. r the dithering over humanitarian interventions in the former Yugoslavia, there is much respect for post war and post unification Germany's "civilian" ethos stressing conflict resolu-tion, peace-building, and international development. Institutionally, this"normative power" has been buttressed by "self-binding" (Einbindungspoli-tik), which has embedded the country in a dense network of international institutions. official development assistance Germany's foundational role and continuing strong support for the movement towards European unity must also be highlighted. Also crucial have been material sacrifices—Germany as paymaster—including unquestioned support for the EURO. Although such policies appear to violate traditional notions of self-interest, some have argued that such a stance has been generated by eminently pragmatic motives such as Finally, many may look at Germany as a model of coming-to-terms with a difficult past. Unfortunately, there may be a dark side to Germany's current global popularity. Daring More Patriotism? All-in-all, Germany has posted a noteworthy record of achievement over the last twenty years, especially when we keep in mind the challenges that unification created must continue to address the challenges at home and abroad—East Germany, an ageing and declining population, integration of immigrants, a volatile and less democratic world that will demand greater intervention, the short and long-term fallout from the post 2008 financial and economic crisis, climate change, and the composition of the economy. In light of the various achievements outlined above, perhaps contem-porary Germans finally can allow themselves to "dare more pride." Recent discussions on national identity and patriotism do reveal attitudi-nal changes. more pride? Mass attitudes similarly have evolved To d a y , h o w e v e r , a m o r e " n o r m a l " l e v e l o f p a t r i o t i s m i s w i d e s p r e a d : The inflection point seems to have been the summer of 2006—what some have called a fairy tale (Sommermärchen)—when the country hosted the World Cup. had an authenticity that rarely occurs—certainly not on command because of whatever official anniversary happens to be looming.

Dilley 2019.pdf

Explained: What sparked the protest culture of modern Germany? Protestors against rent increases in front of Hamburg town hall in May 2019. Photo: DPA. Though national stereotypes purport that Germans adore order and rules, Germany is not shy of protests and demonstrations. Here is a look at what sparked the protest culture of today. -Fridays for Future or 'rent insanity' The student movement in the 1960s -Many consider the 1960s' student protests in West Germany to be a significant starting point for modern German protest culture. -Crucially, this protest movement saw the concept of Vergangenheitsbewältigung (coming to terms with the past) -Whilst these protests were not wholly successful, this period saw a massive shift in the political consciousness of the West German youth and a move towards a more open discussion of National Socialism. Montags Demonstrationen??? -These meetings at the Nikolaikirche in Leipzig had been occurring for around ten years by 1989 and a number of organizations such as Demokratie Jetzt (Democracy Now), Demokratischer Aufbruch (Democratic Awakening) and das Neue Fourm (New Forum) had sprung up to criticize the government and push for change. The Beginning of the End -In autumn of 1989 East Germans were frustrated by and angry about the lack of freedom of movement and democracy in the GDR. The opening of Hungary's borders in June 1989 saw a significant level of emigration out of the GDR in August of the same year and also planted the seeds of hope for a peaceful revolution in East Germany. -Monday evening demonstrations on the streets of East German cities took place over three months and gathered momentum rapidly; the relative lack of response from the authorities emboldened the population to fight harder for change. -Peace was a central tenet of these protests. -fall of Berlin Wall and opening of borders Modern Monday demonstrations -Whilst Germans no longer need to protest for unity and democracy, the format of the Monday demonstrations and their spirit have remained a contributor to Germany's protest culture today. -Demonstrators opposed to proposed Hartz IV reforms in 2004 arranged for their protests to fall on Mondays as democracy protests in East Germany had done before them. These reforms pledged to cut back significantly on social welfare for the long-term unemployed. -PEGIDA Climate concerns -Just as East German protestors chose a specific day to voice their opinions, Greta Thunberg's Fridays for Future movement has sparked a wave of change as monumental as those which began in the late 20th century in Germany. Similar to protests in the 1960s, this movement has mainly seen students in Germany, and other parts of Europe, as the main driving force demanding policy change. -Cologne Rents and workers' rights -Rising rent prices in Germany also cause a stir in Germany. Earlier this year there were a number of protests in response to the continual increase in rent prices in large German cities, notably Cologne, Munich, Berlin and Frankfurt. -This protest culture in Berlin reaches its peak every year on May Day trade unions and the Social Democrats organize rallies and protests which are paralleled by extensive demonstrations in Berlin. -Much of Berlin's current revolutionary attitude and protest culture was cultivated by the events leading up to 1989 and the freedom in the immediate aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall.

Alessi 2013

How Afghanistan Changed the German Military In Afghanistan, dangerous combat has helped post-war Germany's reluctant armed forcesgain self-confidence and expertise. But with the public and politicians loath to enter intonew conflicts, what will the military's role be going forward? The German military entered Afghanistan over a decade ago as a peacekeeping force tasked with aiding in the reconstruction and development of infrastructure and civil society. Today, it leaves the country as a combat force that engaged in deadly warfare. Kiesewetter cites the apparent failure of the military to correctly advise politicians about the war as a major factor in a controversial 2009 German-ordered air strike on two hijacked tanker trucks that ultimately left dozens of civilians dead. The Bundeswehr has since learned how to more transparently advise politicians on its aims, he says, even if it still has more to learn about acting as an offensive -- and not merely defensive -- force in pursuing its political and military objectives. 'Political Disengagement' from Military Policy -The ministry, Mölling explains, is working to streamline the Bundeswehr and make it a "highly deployable force." But the political discourse has not caught up with the military advances, he argues. "Therehas been political disengagement from a comprehensive, multilateral defense policy." While the overall success of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has been hotly contested, Kujat argues that the military aspect of the NATO mission worked "quite well," including the German contribution. "The political part of the mission did not succeed," A Reluctant Public German support for the war has dropped significantly since the start of the conflict, from 65 percent in 2005 to 37 percent in 2011, "The lesson learned by the German public was that it wasn't worth the money," Then former German Defense Minister Karl-Theodor zuGuttenberg became the first German official to label German operations in Afghanistan as a "war,"bringing the reality back home to the German public. "The preferred German perception is of theGerman soldier building schools and digging wells in Afghanistan, it is likely Germany will be called on to assist with future international armed missions, However, Keller acknowledges an inherent tension between Germany's "strategic interest," which he says is to help protect a rule-based, liberal international order, and its "political will," which he believes is hobbled by a post-war disinclination to use force. 'A Question of Responsibility' But how much responsibility is Germany actually willing to bear? The question comes back to the broader issue of Germany's hesitation to play a leading role in European Union and global affairs. We don't feel we are responsible for finding a solution to international conflicts." "There is a need for leadership within the EU," he says. "Germany could be a partner to create synergy between EU states ... to take over responsibility where others are not willing to."

Stammtisch: There's no place like home - Germany's housing crisis

It is tough, was cheaper back in the day, still better than Washington -real estate agents have a LOT of power -Berlin wages Monopoly -old flats in former East Berlin, might have landlords who want to do renovations, but that will drive up the price/or they will kick you out. over last 3 decades Berlin has become political center without catching up economically. not cheap for Berliners in comparison to 15 to 20 yrs ago. -talked about shrinking cities a while ago bc of shrinking population, but now rising populations/interest rates. property and Germany became an attractive place because of the financial crisis for foreign investors to put their money but that means that a lot of locals have missed the boat. -you get a mortgage, but you can not afford it. Frankfort is becoming a banking and financial center. afraid of Brexit so moving here. lot of money coming in and pricing out old inhabitants there. Berlin has brought in a lot of start ups-these people have a lot of money -small family house on the outskirt of Munich. does not exist. airport in Berlin will never be finished? giving policemen extra money to live in Munich, Germans do not want society to work like that (police should not have to struggle) -those were the problems Solutions: evil laugh. baddies: the mega landlords and other companies like them. own thousands of apartments in Berlin 100,000. buy from the city. City sold all of the apartments when it was struggling years ago, and is now wondering why there is a housing crisis. solution: a referendum, would establish that living is a human right, and all landlords who own over 3,000 apartments would have to give them up/would be compensated/controversial. legally possible? really popular, left wing govt in favor. German President to not instrumentalize this hot button issue for political favor. expensive proposal 30 billion euros. expensive on the long run, dependent on those investors in the long run as a city and if you do this they will not want to build new apartments. does not create new apartments. very popular, Huge demonstration. rental price break law: limit how much rent can rise each time you rent a property out again. already exists. wants to tighten it further. someone desperately to find an apartment will not want to go through the court even if you are paying more than you should/will throw you out next chance. social unrest bc children on tenants can move in and kick people out. ave rent because ridiculously low bc will take in outside properties (Berlin is large). not very representative, want to tie it into legal requirement. this is not working according to people now. too many exceptions for landlords to opt out. too much responsibility for tenant to have to prove the landlord is overcharging them. insect: Locusts!!!!!!! they are the investors, foreign investors, making big money on destroying local communities, blocking foreign investors to Berlin housing market? populist and unrealistic. cities used to be desperate for these types of people. that was how you got properties fit for renting. solutions that could actually work: flats with maximum rent, developers have to have a certain percentage of their flats with low rents. build flats on airport space? referendum failed. political failure needs to be considered. lack of trust in the govt's plan to develop. build more flats to ease more mkts. Merkel has said they will, but how to go about doing it? who should do it? where? Berlin missed the boat on that, sold off lots of flat to fix budget. but still lots of gaps where you can build housing. need plan or new criteria on how to sell of this land and attach strings to it. rising costs to build new housing. keeps getting more expensive. why is govt not using this land? they do not know. costly and long process? much faster process of new housing being built needed. this will only get worse. dangerous: many places have low housing prices in some place and high in others: low housing means retirees will not get a lot for selling their houses and many can not afford others. politicians need to do something. bubble situation? US housing crisis not possible here: bc hard to get mortgage with German banks personal solution: people living in flat share, putting pressure on govt to actually come up with a solution -space available/consider renting out basement apartments -new concepts of family, living among generations,

Wolf 2015

Mythology that blocks progress in Greece A Greek exit would help the eurozone. A Greek exit would help Greece. It is Greece's fault Greece has done nothing The Greeks will repay Default entails a Greek exit A seventh myth — possibly most dangerous of all — is that reforms agreed under duress work. They rarely do.

COVID-19 Is a Severe Test for Germany's Postwar Constitution

On March 22, in response to a stark reassessment of the risk of infection with the novel coronavirus and skyrocketing increases in case numbers, Germany finally took drastic measures. Chancellor Angela Merkel—who only days before had emphasized her reluctance to issue an ultimatum and appealed to Germans' sense of responsibility—declared that she had agreed with the minister presidents of the 16 states on what at the time amounted to a two-week nationwide lockdown. These measures, she said, were no longer just recommendations: "They are rules." in contrast to admiring coverage in English-language media—many in Germany have criticized the government's response as dangerously slow, hampered by public bickering among mayors, state leaders and the federal government over who is in charge. While the mayor of Berlin insisted that soccer matches needed to go ahead, the minister president of Bavaria jumped the gun and declared a statewide emergency, angering his peers who were still discussing a coordinated approach. All this has reopened a debate about the strengths and weaknesses of Germany's federal constitutional order under conditions of a national catastrophe. The contest over the next leader of the CDU was to have been decided at a special party convention in April that has now been postponed indefinitely. As a result, leadership battles and crisis management are now inextricably entwined. . The pandemic, which disregards any and all borders, is now threatening to overwhelm not just local public health authorities but also the life of the nation in a way not seen in Germany since—as Chancellor Merkel herself poignantly said in a rare and unscheduled televised speech—the end of the second world war. First, does the German constitution (the Grundgesetz, or Basic Law) give the federal government emergency powers to act? Second, is German federalism suited to handle the current moment effectively—and can the separation of powers between executive, the legislature and the judiciary be maintained? And third, how can the government square civil rights and data privacy with the necessity of using surveillance to counter the virus? The "external" emergency (Articles 115 a-i) is intended to cover the case of an armed attack from outside the country's borders, obviously not applicable in the current situation. The "internal" emergency is regulated in Articles 35 and 91. Article 35 allows the federal or state governments, in case of a threat to public order or a natural disaster, to call in the federal police or the armed forces for support. other online And sentence 3 concludes that in cases where the threat transcends state borders, and inasmuch as necessary, the federal government may "give instructions" to state governments. "slow motion natural catastrophe," meaning that the federal government is entitled to invoke a supraregional catastrophic state of emergency under Article 35. -Yet Thielbörger and Behlert also point out that the wording of Articles 35 and 91 is woefully inadequate for the current situation because of the limited focus on certain tools of executive power—including the police and civil service—and the extremely high threshold necessary to trigger federal intervention rights. That is, for the federal government to intervene, there must be a threat to the existence or constitutional order of the state. All three authors advise that Germany should—when the country returns to normal—examine this experience and revise the emergency powers rules in the Basic Law to include pandemics. But it appears highly unlikely that any such effort will be undertaken during the crisis itself. That leaves Germany's authorities to make do with the powers granted to them by the existing constitutional framework. The pandemic touches on two key "state ordering principles": federalism and the separation of powers. over the past decades the states have waged a mainly losing war against Berlin. Egregious failures recently to coordinate between states on issues such as counterterrorism—in the Anis Amri case—and counterextremism—including attacks by right-wing extremists on immigrants, Jews and state officials—have strengthened the case for centralization of police powers. federal Infection Protection Act (Bundesinfektionsschutzgesetz) of 2001, which gives the states—and local governments—front-line responsibility for threat prevention and maintenance of public order, leaving only a minimal coordinating role for the federal government and the Robert Koch Institute, the federal agency and research institute responsible for disease control and prevention. When the pandemic began to emerge in late January, Germany thus had not one but 16 preparedness plans, most of them out of date. As it became clear that this situation was untenable, and that the constitutional emergency provisions were not applicable, Chancellor Merkel and the states agreed to ask the legislature to give the federal government broad powers in managing the epidemic. The revised Infection Protection Act, enacted on March 27 as part of a massive legislation package that included €750 billion ($834 billion) in state subsidies for the economy, permits the federal government to declare a national emergency in case of an "epidemic situation of national significance" (Paragraph 5) for a period of 12 months. It gives the health ministry the power to mandate identity and health checks at the borders, to enact regulations "for the preservation of health care[,]" and to recruit and deploy medical personnel. Two law professors, Klaus Ferdinand Gärditz and Florian Meinel, argued that this revision effectively allows the declaration of a state of emergency based on statutory law—a problematic lowering of the constitutional threshold for the triggering of such exceptional powers. The constitutional scholar Christoph Möllers, in a similarly withering analysis, callsthis "the most massive collective encroachment on fundamental rights in the history of the Federal Republic of Germany." In his view, the health ministry's new powers are both overbroad and overly vague, and their concentration in a single agency "carries the depoliticization of far-reaching decisions to an extreme." Still, the revised law corrected health minister Jens Spahn's original draft in key points: The revisions are in force only for the next 12 months, it is the federal legislature rather than the health ministry that decides on the beginning and end of the state of emergency, and a passage providing for the tracking of cellphones used by citizens carrying the coronavirus was dropped. On March 25, the Bundestag passed the most comprehensive set of salvage measures in Europe: an expansion of Kurzarbeit ("short-time work," whereby the state covers around two-thirds of the forgone wages of workers whose hours are cut), €400 billion ($434 million) in liquidity guarantees for larger firms and direct grants for 3 million small companies and freelancers, totaling around €700 billion ($834 billion)—the equivalent of two annual national budgets. To accomplish this, the government had to invoke an emergency clause to that most sacred of all sacred Teutonic cows: the Schwarze Null (black zero) constitutional debt brake, limiting government borrowing to 0.35 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). This, no doubt, is just the beginning of an all-out effort by the machinery of the executive akin to the postwar rebuilding of the country. And it raises the question of how to preserve the balance of powers—notably, the prerogatives of the legislature—under extraordinary circumstances. , it might be time to talk about virtual plenary sessions Further, he urged the party group leaders to consider the establishment of an "emergency committee," analogous to the "Joint Committee" of 48 members of the Bundestag and the Bundesrat—the legislative "upper house" representing the 16 state governments—during a "state of defense" under Article 53 of the Basic Law, yet another of the scattershot elements of the "state of emergency" reforms of 1968. Schäuble argued that a smaller entity meeting in person would preserve the deliberative nature of the legislature, a constitutionally preferable measure to virtual meetings or electronic voting. On the whole, the dramatic events of the past weeks have demonstrated the resilience, adaptability and vitality of Germany's constitutional architecture , yet they have also made clear that it now faces historically unprecedented challenges. Incidentally, the judiciary—the third branch of government—has not yet been given an opportunity to intervene in the debate about federalism and the separation of powers in a crisis context. But it is almost certain that at some point Germany's courts will be asked to review the sweeping expansion of federal executive powers granted over the past month. In particular, it's worth keeping in mind that opposition party groups also have standing to bring such a complaint. The far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD), which has been notably faltering of late, mostly abstained—with two yea and two nay votes—on the economic package bill; yet it must be presumed that it will soon be searching for opportunities to confront the government and regain public attention and support Individuals can, however, bring constitutional complaints—known as Verfassungsbeschwerde, Article 93 of the Basic Law—against legislation or administrative ordinances based on allegations of an infringement of civil rights and freedoms. And the emergency regimes generated by the coronavirus pandemic raise a host of fundamental rights and freedom issues, from the right to life and bodily inviolability to freedom of faith, movement and assembly—to name only a few. A new Wiki website, lexcorona.de, is already recording more than 80 court decisions in lawsuits filed over the measures; almost all, so far, have been dismissed. But the issue taking center stage in Germany currently is the tension between public health and data privacy . The only solution, the paper says—pending the development of a vaccine or a cure—is through the broadest possible expansion of testing. A second scenario, called "stretch case," would involve much more stringent restrictions on personal freedoms. The price, here, is only 220,000 deaths but a national shutdown lasting seven months and "huge" negative macroeconomic effects. A third scenario, "hammer and dance" (based on the influential article of the same name by Tomas Pueyo), projects a broad-based early testing and isolation strategy leading to around 12,000 fatalities and a state of exception for only two months, with a need for continued vigilance against renewed outbreaks. economic collapse? The economic best-case, after a rigorous lockdown combined with broad testing and suppression measures, would be a GDP shrinkage of 4 percent—as opposed to 6 percent during the global economic crisis of 2009. It would see case rates go down by the end of April and permit a phased return to economic and social normalcy, with potential interruptions in the case of new flare-ups. "coronavirus trilemma": Countries "can pick two of three things but cannot have them all: limit deaths, gradually lift lockdowns, or uphold cherished civil liberties." This is the analytical background to the scramble for a cellphone-based location-tracking app enabling public health authorities to reconstruct the social contacts of infected patients To understand just how fraught this issue is, it helps to remember that if the EU is home to the world's strictest data-privacy regime, Germany is probably the member state with the most national rigorous protection rules. Yet in Brussels, EU Internal Markets Commissioner Thierry Breton has been pushingfor data-sharing. And most European governments are currently racing to develop their own apps, with data regulators largely standing back. what does this mean? host of ?s Elsewhere, state governments are attempting to pressure public health agencies into handing over data, so much so that Germany's current federal commissioner for data security and freedom of information, Ulrich Kelber, has added his name to a Europe-wide appeal demanding that "all new measures must pass the test of whether they are genuinely fit for purpose, necessary and adhere to the constitutional principle of proportionality." In Germany, it would work by generating a randomized ID number, and would use low-energy Bluetooth frequencies to create a digital logbook of all cellphones the user had been in close proximity to; if the owner tested positive for the coronavirus, the app could automatically send encrypted and anonymized warnings to all other people he or she had been in contact with for the past two weeks that they too should get tested. Most importantly, it would function entirely without communicating personal or location data to the app users' personal contacts or to the authorities. depends on smartphone owners (just short of 58 million out of a total population of 83 million) actually downloading the app and using it. It also requires strict compliance—with the infected person following through and sharing his or her infection status with the app.. And the program also expects users to trust in authorities not to abuse their data. Finally, it requires testing capabilities large enough for persons informed that they might have been in dangerous proximity to an infected individual to be able to be tested immediately; expecting them to self-quarantine immediately based on suspicion alone may be too much to ask in an individualistic society used to prosperity and freedom. " So far, the German government's actions in the coronavirus pandemic mostly have been regarded as remarkably considered, consensus-oriented and carefully communicated; the exceptions—the revision of the Infection Protection Act and individual states like Bavaria jumping the gun with stricter measures—stand out for precisely that reason. Another notable aspect of this unprecedented national situation is the degree of voluntary self-restraint—again, with visible exceptions—that Germans have exercised. 73 percent of respondents wanted the federal government rather than the states to be in charge. Another 57 percent said they were less or not at all concerned that their rights and freedoms might be infringed upon for a longer duration. Respondents were nearly evenly split, however, on whether they would use a cellphone app to track infections: 47 percent said they would, while 45 percent said they would not. On April 15, just days ahead of the deadline it had set for the lockdown, and given a recent flattening of the infection curve, the government recommended a cautious, step-by-step loosening: The challenge of the moment is to balance the preservation of the lives of German citizens and of German democracy. . Strikingly, the AfD has fared badly in the pandemic—the DeutschlandTrend survey cited above has the far-right party stuck at just 10 percent, down from its previous national high of 15 percent. Despite the fact that it is now represented in all state legislatures as well as in the Bundestag, it has been engaged in vicious infighting and has few, if any, credible policy prescriptions to offer. It has, however, proved remarkably resilient in the past, and its strategists have shown their ability to plan and patiently wait for the right moment to strike. So what is at stake in this pandemic crisis for Germany's constitutional order? Its legal architecture appears to be remarkably shock-proof 75 years after the end of World War II; when things return to normal, that might provide Germans with the confidence to modernize and clarify the constitutional rules for a state of emergency. It is too early to say whether all this will or should result in a permanent centralizing shift toward the federal executive.

Young and Semmler 2011

Sovereign Debt Crisis -Only a decade ago, slow growth and high unemployment plagued Germany, but the "sick man of Europe" has now moved to outperform the Eurozone average growth since the second quarter of 2010. This confirms Germany's recovery and its status as the growth engine of the continent. This surely is a success story. -In short, German export performance and the sustained pressure for moderate wage increases have provided German exporters with the competitive advantage to dominate trade and capital flows within the Eurozone. Thus, Germany is seen as the main beneficiary of the EURO. -Germans disagree -Many economists and political leaders reject this argument and point to the flagrant lack of fiscal discipline in many of the peripheral countries. -euroskepticism -Greece was the starting point of crisis -have argued that the asymmetries in the Eurozone are the outcome of German wage moderation, which have driven down unit-labor costs relative to Germany's competitors.? -Peripheral countries, so assert the critics of Germany, not only entered the Eurozone at an uncompetitive exchange rate, but Germany's wage moderation also was equal to a real devaluation against other members in the Eurozone, since its unit wage costs rose at a slower rate of any European Union (EU) countries (see Figure 3).??? asymmetric effect -Large capital outflows, according to Sinn, deprived Germany of necessary investments and led to the lowest growth rates—second only to Italy—between 1995 and 2005. -This position was quickly challenged by Martin Wolf who argued that the EURO was not responsible for low levels of investment, and the capital outflows did not really benefit the peripheral countries, since it mostly led to an unsustainable consumption and construction boom. Rather, low German growth rates were the result of weak domestic demand, structural rigidities, and globalization. -Are German firms stubbornly holding down real wages to ensure an export boom and in so doing, splitting the Eurozone into countries with current account surpluses (Germany, Austria, and the Netherlands) and the rest into current account deficit countries? -Or, are German wages too high, accounting for the export boom and low growth rates during 1995-2009? Whether Germany benefits from the EURO is also a deeply political question illuminating the future role and commitment of Germany in the Eurozone. The slow German rescue response to the peripheral countries, in particular Greece, raises at least some questions regarding whether Germany is pursuing more national prerogatives and a reduced European strategy. After all, a strong European Union and Eurozone depend especially on the commitment of Germany and the Berlin-Paris axis. The argument that "Germany is not benefiting from the EURO" and Angela Merkel's mixed signals during the negotiations of a rescue package for the peripheral countries suggests that the Eurozone could be confronted with a less committed Germany and thus even a possible collapse of the Eurozone. Conversely, the crisis could provide an opportunity to create a more coordinated and politically integrated Union. Will we see a revival of the European idea or a strengthening of the Euroskeptics? Both directions will depend to a large extent on Germany. 1. The Sovereign Debt Crisis and Germany's Muted Response -the sovereign debt crisis of the European peripheral countries has to be understood in the context of the financial and credit crisis of 2007-2009. Initially, the fiscal deficit was rising in all EU countries. This was due to: (online) -In fact, part of the periphery countries' sovereign debt meltdown was the result of the institutional mechanisms surrounding the EURO. The Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact forced members of the Eurozone to enforce fiscal discipline to ensure budget deficits of no higher than 3 percent of GDP, and a debt-to-GDP ratio no higher than 60 percent of GDP. (Greece, pack was supposed to prevent this) -The crises of Spain, Portugal and Ireland are of a different nature, since they are mostly due to private debts, particularly household debt. Even if the debt is private, however, it becomes public through the rescue operation, which drives up the sovereign debt. -The crisis was finally stabilized with a rescue package in May 2010 after months of uncoordinated, fragmented, and acrimonious recriminations against Greece and its culture of fiscal profligacy and Germany's resistance to turn the Eurozone from a monetary into a transfer union. -This resulted in a number of formal complaints to the German Constitutional Court arguing that the rescue plan breaks the "no bail-out clause" of the European treaties, the centrality of which has been upheld previously by that court. -Instead of reaping the benefits for these, quite often, painful efforts over the last decade, German taxpayers are now supposed to bail out the countries with lax fiscal policies that irresponsibly relied on low interest rates to create an unsustainable consumption and real estate boom in their respective countries. -Given these domestic sentiments, it is not surprising that Merkel declared in a parliamentary debate on the rescue package for Greece that it should only be granted as an ultima ratio. she won -More critical domestic and international voices argued that Merkel's hesitant intervention between February and May 2010 actually made the rescue package more expensive since the uncertainties in the Eurozone markets drove the credit default swaps and yields on government securities to ever greater heights. -Others speculated that her hesitancy had to do with party politics, in particular that she did not want to confront voters with the prospect of bailing out Greece before a critical Land election in North Rhine Westphalia on 9 May 2010. -CDU lost 10 % -constraints of constitutional court -fault of Maastricht Treaty: focused on stable prices and The Lisbon Treaty does not provide a mechanism for countries to default, -Nevertheless, Article 122 (2) may be invoked to assist a member state that is seriously threatened with severe difficulties caused by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences beyond its control. -sure she was constrained by the court, but cannot detract from a Germany that has become more inward-looking and pursuing more closely its national interests— a point to which we return in the final part of this paper. 2. Is Germany to Blame for the Sovereign Debt Crisis in the Eurozone? -In other words, countries with current account surpluses need countries with current account deficits. -Despite the initial expectation that EMU would lead to economic convergence, divergence has been the rule in regard to economic growth rates and current accounts -One is that countries with relative strong domestic demand tend to import more and thus depress the current account and vice versa. The other explanation points to differences in export performance and therefore price competitiveness. -Critics of Germany's economic policies have cited both insufficient domestic demand and price competitiveness as causes for the macroeconomic imbalances that weakened the position of the (southern) peripheral countries. -The fundamental criticism against Germany had to do with the way it achieved its much contested export boom and concomitant current account surpluses. The culprit was seen in Germany`s labor market policy. -Chancellor Gerhard Schröder focused on reducing non-wage labor costs, making labor markets more flexible, and stressing innovation—all of which made fiscal consolidation possible and also raised domestic savings. With domestic savings rising faster than investment, current account surpluses increase. -The German labor force was under heavy pressure resulting from the high rate of unemployment in East Germany. Labor income moved at an almost identical pace to productivity, while in peripheral countries nominal labor costs rose faster than productivity, with Greece in the lead. As a result, peripheral countries had been losing competitiveness relative to Germany and showed large current account deficits. -noneven playing field? -These countries joined EMU at generally low promised inflation rates, but this did not materialize for them. The higher inflation rate produced low real interest rates and allowed for heavy borrowing. -are wages to blame? A Contrasting View: Germany Does not Benefit from the EURO -As mentioned above, Hans-Werner Sinn disputes that low wages have given Germany a competitive advantage relative to other trading partners. -he concluded that the export boom and weak domestic growth are two sides of the same coin, and were the result of labor market rigidities. -Sinn looks at average hourly wages and confirms Germany's leading role in Europe on this variable. Low-wage competition from Eastern European countries and Asia, and Germany's relatively high wage costs have meant that products are prefabricated abroad and re-imported for final assembly in Germany. -Thus, we face two contradictory arguments: 1) German unit labor costs are too low relative to countries such as Greece, Spain, Ireland, Portugal, Italy, and even France, and that this has led to a devaluation in real terms making German products more competitive in the Eurozone, producing an export surplus; and 2) Sinn's argument that the high wage costs have led to a pathological export boom from which the German economy does not benefit. -Critics forget, however, that regardless of whether the Deutsche Mark or the EURO appreciated, German exports are internationally competitive. -Thus, neither the Keynesian argument that Germany is holding down wages and that this equals a real devaluation against other members in the Eurozone, nor Hans-Werner Sinn's argument that wages are too high, is persuasive. -In light of the fact that Germany's Eurozone partners absorb about 40 percent of its exports, it was surprising that Sinn maintains in a recent paper that Germany has not benefited from the Eurozone. -Germany is in fact the "biggest gainer from the cre- ation of the Eurozone." -The outflow of capital was only possible because the EURO created a common European capital market leveling the previous divergences in nominal interest rates through interest rate convergence. Hence, capital exports for Germany meant capital imports for the peripheral countries and in fact created a boom in some of their sectors (for example in the Spanish con- struction sector). -With the introduction of the EURO, the threats of devaluation disappeared and, as a result, interest rates moved down and converged. -The outflow of capital, a result of the common European capital market, boosted "Eurozone output, increased national income and resulted in an employment boom that benefited the bulk of the population, while it reduced German GDP and hurt most of the German people." -The peripheral countries including Greece, Portugal, and Ireland experienced a demand-driven boom, with a current account deficit financed by cheap foreign credit, creating real economic growth as a result of the construction boom. While these countries witnessed a period of rapid growth, Germany had the lowest growth rate of all EU countries from 1995 to 2009. -The weak growth rate of Germany, according to Sinn, is the result of the low net investment rate as a percentage of net domestic product. Once again, this is due to Germany exporting its savings instead of using it as loans for domestic investment. Germany's Euro-skeptic Role in Stabilizing the Eurozone -German Euro-skepticism was again visible in the latest round of negotiations regarding a rescue package for Ireland in the amount of EURO 85 billion in November 2010 over a period of three years, as well as in the subsequent negotiations to impose a permanent sovereign debt resolution mechanism to safeguard the financial stability of the EURO. Merkel's main message was that "nobody would be left alone, nobody will be abandoned," but only under strict conditions. -Merkel criticized for bond market demands, Germany attacked -These remarks were seen as frightening the bond markets, thus increasing the yields Ireland and other peripheral countries had to pay on the capital markets. As a result, the sovereign debt crisis worsened... -Finally, Germany was able to push its conception of a permanent mechanism through the European Council on 17 December 2010 to safeguard the financial stability of the Eurozone. (France and Germany agreement) -First, a permanent liquidity facility, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) will replace the European Financial Stability Facility put together during the Greek crisis in May 2010, which expires in 2013. This new ESM is intended to help indebted countries with severe cash flow problems. -Second, standardized and identical collective action clauses (CACS) will be included for all new EURO area government bonds starting in June 2013 -This means that if a government is unable to service the debt, it will allow all debt securities issued by a member state to be considered together in negotiations, including those who disagree with the majority vote. -2013. Whether the ESM is the appropriate strategy to deal with future sovereign defaults, however, is in doubt before the stability mechanism has come into force. If German policymakers had intended to calm the bond markets in the Eurozone with the permanent crisis mechanism and stem the harsh criticism against the fiscal discipline imposed on EURO member states, they were wrong on both counts. -Portugal -Thus, the financial markets are not convinced that the indebted countries will be able to fund their public debt. -who argued that Germany has become increasingly isolated within Europe by insisting on a "German Europe" rather than a more "European Germany." Tough fiscal discipline with limited emergency funding at high interest rates, and draconian domestic adjustments is a cure that most believe will kill the patients. Surely the question is whether "voters in Ireland, Portugal, Greece or Spain tolerate a decade of austerity just to stay in a union with Germany." -In response to these criticisms, Steinmeier and Steinbrück along with many other European leaders call for a combination of debt restructuring for holders of Greek, Irish, and Portuguese debt, debt guarantees for stable countries backed by an enhanced rescue fund so that countries such as Spain and Italy are not drawn into the downward spiral of bond speculation, and the limited introduction of European bonds to cover only a limited share of public debt. -To release indebted countries from some of their debts and to empower European institutions to enforce tighter control over fiscal stability, emphasis has to be placed on minimum standards on wage and welfare policies. -There is a general belief that painful spending cuts and structural reforms alone will not resolve the debt problem of the peripheral countries. -Germany was unwilling (even obstinate) to talk about restructuring the debt (in this case Irish debt) since they feared the impact it would have on their own banking systems. -Yet, the majority of the German public, as exemplified in the print media, in particular the Bild Zeitung's aggressive attacks against Greece with such headlines "Fear for our money" and "We are no longer the Paymaster of Europe" supports the argument that Greece has lived beyond its means while the Germans have pursued a culture of frugality and discipline. -cultural differences -find fault in the American "quasi-religious belief in the market" and the different risk and investment cultures across the Atlantic. -A second argument as to why Germany was slow in supporting France to stem the sovereign debt crisis may have to do with the increasing economic weakness of France. -France seems to have accepted Germany's dominant role. not a quote. open conflict could have been bad for them. A third explanations as to why Germany may have progressed to a more "muted normality," in the course pursuing a more self-confident nationalist policy, has to do with the generational change from political leaders such as Helmut Kohl, Hans Dietrich Genscher, Helmut Schmidt, who with their counterparts in France ( Jacques Chirac, François Mitterrand, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing) had personal memories of the horrors of World War II. -the EU was the answer to the slaughters of Verdun or Stalingrad. Coming from the same generation -Thus we may witness a lesser commitment to a European political union by this generation with no personal memories of the war and destruction. CONCLUSION!!!!

LC Ch 10, 351-372

The European Union The impact of European Integration on Germany The Euro The Euro Crisis Never ending crisis (refugee)

LC, ch. 10 (pp. 337-351 only)

The Return and Limits of German Power -The Federal Republic's Foreign and European Policy The German Question Postwar Transformation Institutions and Socialization Reconciliation Soft Power Multilateralism The Postunification Period: A new version of the German Question From the 1991 Gulf War to Kosovo Into the Twenty-First Century

Germany extends global travel warning until at least 14 June

The German Foreign Office has extended its global travel warning until at least 14 June. This will mean vacation cancellations for anyone who had planned trips over the coming holidays for Day of the Ascension and Pentecost. However, the fate of Germany's summer holidays remains up in the air, as the government cabinet will reassess the situation in early June. ''Meanwhile, all children in Germany should be able to return to school for at least a few days before the summer holidays, according to a plan drafted by Germany's 16 state education ministers following a conference on Tuesday (28 April). However, physical distancing requirements mean that schools cannot go back to class as usual. Instead, the plan advocates a combination of classroom teaching, digital learning, and homeschooling. In school, class meetings should be staggered and involve smaller groups, and physical distancing should be enforced both in the classroom and on the playground. Additionally, schools must have a hygiene plan and ensure there is enough soap available and ensure sufficient time for hand-washing. As of Wednesday (29 April) morning, there are 157,641 confirmed COVID-19 cases in Germany, according to the Robert Koch Institute (RKI). So far, Germany has recorded 6,115 deaths, and around 120,400 have recovered. On Tuesday (28 April), RKI announced that the virus' reproduction number rose to 1.0, meaning every infected person infects another person. This is an increase from 0.9 just a few days ago. The government has warned that this number must remain below 1.0 to contain the epidemic, although officials are now emphasising that this is one metric among many. More strings on bailouts German Economy Minister Peter Altmaier (CDU) wants to attach further conditions on coronavirus aid funding to corporations. In an interview with the radio station Deutschlandfunk on Monday (27 April), he said that companies accepting state money should forgo paying shareholder dividends and that management should make a contribution. This comes on the heels of the country providing more than half a billion euros to the budget airline Condor. However, the country's flagship airline, Lufthansa, is still in talks with the government about a possible bailout. These discussions are generating a rift in Germany's grand coalition, particularly around state representation on the company's board which is supported by the Social Democrats (SPD). Some officials critical of the paramount goal of saving lives Over the weekend, Bundestag President Wolfgang Schäuble of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) advocated for a more even calculus between public health and the economic and social consequences of a prolonged shutdown, fearing an overload of state capacities. He also disagreed with subordinating all other concerns to the goal of saving lives, claiming "this in its absolutism is not correct," as the German constitution's right to human dignity "does not exclude the possibility that we must die." "We must not leave decisions to the virologists alone, but must also weigh up the enormous economic, social, psychological and other implications. To simply shut everything down for two years would have terrible consequences," he told EURACTIV's media partner Der Tagesspiegel in an interview published Sunday (26 April). Boris Palmer (Greens), the mayor of the southwestern university town of Tübingen and frequently a controversial figure, took this one step further. "Let me say it to you quite brutally: In Germany, we are possibly saving people who would have died in half a year anyway, due to their age and previous illnesses," he said in a television interview on Tuesday (28 April). No race to restart tourism Foreign Minister Heiko Maas (SPD) warned against a race to restart tourism, claiming it "will lead to unacceptable risks" in an interview on Sunday (26 April). Instead, there should be common European criterion for removing the restrictions on freedom of travel "as quickly as possible, but as responsibly as necessary." Decentralised coronavirus tracking app Officials now say that the coronavirus tracker app will not store data centrally in a win for privacy advocates. Instead of in a centrally managed server, government officials will advocate to store the information locally on the user's device, In the works since March, this tracking app developed by the Robert Koch Institute would anonymously notify users when they come into contact with someone confirmed to have COVID-19. When Health Minister Jens Spahn (CDU) first advocated using Big Data to combat the spread of the virus in late March, German Social Democrats (SPD) and Free Democrats (FDP) emphasised that this would only be acceptable if the app is voluntary. Additional €10 billion aid package Germany's governing coalition of Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and Social Democrats (SPD) reached an agreement for a new COVID-19 aid package worth €10 billion on Thursday (23 April), which increases the amount of money for workers in the country's short-term work scheme. It also provides an additional €500 million to schools to speed up the transition to online learning. The German Bundestag approved an initial multi-billion-euro round of aid on 25 March, including a €600 billion "Economic Stabilisation Fund," intended to help businesses, freelancers, and renters. It is the largest rescue package in German history. Mask-wearing becomes mandatory across Germany All of Germany's 16 states have decided to begin enforcing mandatory mask-wearing on public transport and in shops. Most of these measures will go into effect on 27 April, but exact plans vary from state to state. Oktoberfest cancelled For the first time in over 70 years, Bavaria has cancelled its annual Oktoberfest celebrations, set to begin in mid-September. Bavarian premier Markus Söder (CSU) explained his decision on 21 April, saying "a beer tent lives from proximity, from not keeping a distance." Merkel urges caution In a virtual conference with the CDU executive committee on Monday (19 April), Chancellor Angela Merkel (CDU) harshly criticised certain states, where her cautious plans kicked off "opening discussion orgies," and claimed this could reverse the country's progress in containing the virus, dpa and AFP reported. Most restrictions continue until at least 3 May The German government is set to maintain its current restrictions until at least 3 May as Merkel and the 16 state-presidents agreed to continue with the measures for the rest of the month, after which there will be a gradual reopening from 4 May. "The overall spirit is so in agreement, it's almost miraculous for a federal state," Merkel told reporters at a press conference on 15 April. Due to Germany's federal structures, the liftings of these restrictions will look different across the country. Notably, Bavaria is maintaining their closures longer. "As long as there is no vaccine, as long as there is no medicine, and as long as the death figures continue to rise, absolute caution is called for," state premier Markus Söder (CSU) explained. 'Marshall Plan' for the South warning that "Italy and Spain will not forget this if Europe and above all us Germans for a hundred years if we [...] let them down now. And that is exactly what we are doing." Their plan, which would go to countries hardest hit by the virus, includes providing emergency medical assistance, financing through medium- and long-term European credit, and creating an innovation programme to improve the countries' economic future. Another recession? In line with the predictions of experts, Economy Minister Peter Altmaier of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) had warned citizens that the country "will again experience a recession at the beginning of this year" in a press conference on 2 April, adding that the economy should recover in the second half of the year. As part of their biannual spring forecast published on 8 April, some of the country's top economic experts foresee a quick recovery after the country will have gone through a severe economic recession this year. According to a report from the Council of Economic Experts, also known as the "Economic Wisemen", Germany will go into an "unavoidable" recession and experience a 5.4% slump. However, if restrictions are lifted by mid-May, the economy would only shrink by 2.8%

Stancil 2019.pdf

The Neo-Nazi Murder Haunting Germany The assassination of a local politician is waking up the country to the threat of the radical right. "Essentially, we were told we needed to find housing for a thousand people from one day to the next," It was the late summer of 2015, and Chancellor Angela Merkel had made the decision not to close the border to asylum seekers but rather to process their applications inGermany, helping to relieve a desperate situation in countries to the south and east. The choice was made in Berlin, but the work of taking care of the refugees would be carried out at the local level, by city and district officials supported by armies of volunteers. Like Merkel, Lübcke was a member of the mainstream conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU) party Lübcke's enthusiastic leadership of the local mission to help refugees and his stubborn insistence that they be treated humanely earned him hundreds of death threats and sparked an online campaign by Germany's extreme right to vilify him—an effort that continued even after he was shot in the head and killed outside his home. turned out to be a well-known neo-Nazi. leading to questions about whether the structures Germany put in place after 1945 to protect its democracy are ready to deal with the now-resurgent far right. Germany appears well equipped to stamp out any return of radical-right politics. on paper=bans passing themselves off as normal political actors even though their real aim was the destruction of democracy. To have any chance of surviving such manipulation, he said, a democracy needs to be willing to act undemocratically in special circumstances, to take away basic rights from those who would abuse them. A democracy that could do so would be a "militant democracy." it isn't clear that the German state is really using all the tools of militant democracy to monitor and stop extremist violence. If Germany's militant democracy can't stop someone like this, one wonders, who can it stop? For the past 10 years or so, Ernst lived a seemingly quiet life,with a job, a wife, and two kids. But it appears he took his extremist activity online. The Office of Constitutional Protection had a file on him, but after the most recent reports on someone are five years old, data privacy rules prevent officials from accessing the information. -not living up to its name -failed to stop a series of murders of immigrants from 2000 to 2007 by a terrorist cell called the National Socialist Underground. " -There has also been a disturbing wave of violence against local officials. not all right wing extremists -what if people won't run for office? -government employees, said, "My people are afraid everytime the door opens." Perhaps most troubling is that the list was created by police officers, some of whom are suspected of stealing weapons and ammunition from official caches for Nordkreuz to use because for the first time since 1945, there is now a strong right-wing party in German politics, the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD). It has the third-largest caucus in thefederal Bundestag and is represented in all 16 state parliaments. -It has brought the far right back into everyday political life. -To be sure, the AfD officially condemns violence and rejects the extremist label, and its members and officeholders have sometimes been the target of violence themselves. The party's routine professions of loyalty to Germany's democracy seem less than credible when viewed in the context of its radical rhetoric, like that of a state-level leader who said the AfD's goal is to "cause the regime to collapse."And in an appalling example of what some in the AfD think about the Lübcke assassination, one of the party's members in the Bavarian parliament refused to observe a moment of silence for Lübcke. "There is not a direct connection where the AfD is telling people to commit attacks," said Matthias Quent, a sociologist who studies the radical right. "But they very consciously engage in a form of incitement by promoting the idea of catastrophic scenarios that require a drastic response. he was a traitor so received punishment -"The AfD creates a climate that makes violence as a solution thinkable." -But important figures in or near the AfD had participated in the online incitement against Lübcke. The neo-Nazis then edited the video there's no shortage of people willing to commit that violence. But Germany is also a nation where the most popular party in some national polls this summer was the Greens. It is a country where 55 percent of the population participated, in one way or another, in a wave of volunteerism to help refugees. The theory of militant democracy that underpins Germany's Constitution assumes that the state's police powers must be deployed to crush this threat, even if it means sacrificing the basic rights of those under suspicion. But the vast majority of local officials, including those who survived brutal knife attacks, are staying on the job. And when a group of neo-Nazis held a provocative march in Kassel in July, their numbers were dwarfed by thousands of citizens who came out to say, "No, not here." But ultimately, the situation leaves an observer of Germany feeling unsettled.

With broad, random tests for antibodies, Germany seeks path out of lockdown

The unusual visitors had come with an unusual proposal: Would he allow them to test his blood for Covid-19 antibodies? Every month? For a year? Starting next week? "Of course I said yes," said Mr. Germann, a 41-year-old project manager at a media company. "I want to help. This is a collective crisis. The government is doing what it can. Everyone needs to do their bit." With that, Mr. Germann and his girlfriend joined 3,000 households chosen at random in Munich for an ambitious study whose central aim is to understand how many people — even those with no symptoms — have already had the virus, a key variable to make decisions about public life in a pandemic. The study is part of an aggressive approach to combat the virus in a comprehensive way that has made Germany a leader among Western nations figuring out how to control the contagion while returning to something resembling normal life. Other nations, including the United States, are still struggling to test for infections. But Germany is doing that and more. It is aiming to sample the entire population for antibodies in coming months, hoping to gain valuable insight into how deeply the virus has penetrated the society at large, how deadly it really is, and whether immunity might be developing. when to reopen? Chancellor Angela Merkel, a trained scientist, said this week that the aim was nothing less than tracing "every infection chain." That high level of testing has helped her country slow the spread of the virus and keep the number of deaths relatively low. More people in Germany now recover from the virus every day than are infected by it Germany has been criticized for failing to offer forceful leadership to the European Union at a moment of profound crisis. The generosity and solidarity on such striking display inside of Europe's largest and richest economy have been missing in Germany's response to poorer European nations in the south, which were hit hardest by the virus. At home, however, the chancellor's mixture of calm reassurance and clear-eyed realism — as well as her ability to understand the science and explain it to citizens — has been widely praised and encouraged Germans to follow social distancing rules. Her approval ratings are now higher than 80 percent. The Munich antibody study, run by the Division of Infectious Diseases and Tropical Medicine at Munich University Hospital, and cofinanced by the government of the state of Bavaria, is the biggest of several regional studies being rolled out in various corners of Germany. Still, scientists caution that there is no proof yet that the detection of antibodies signals effective immunity and even if it does, it is not known how long that immunity might last. "There's no doubt after reading this paper that asymptomatic transmission is occurring," Dr. Anthony Fauci, Asymptomatic transmission is what has made containment so difficult because a large number of infections are not detected. Measuring the number of hidden infections and getting a sense of the true scale of the disease is key to fine-tuning the gradual loosening of restrictions and minimizing income loss and social isolation, scientists say. The mortality rate in the town, for example, turned out to be 0.37 percent, much lower than the national rate of 3 percent which is calculated based only on detected infections. "We are at a crossroads," said Mr. Hoelscher, the professor. "Are we going the route of loosening more and increasing immunity in the summer to slow the spread of this in the winter and gain more freedom to live public life? Or are we going to try to minimize transmissions until we have a vaccine?" he asked . "This is a question for politicians, not for scientists," he added. "But politicians need the data to make an informed risk assessment." impressed by efficiency of study workers results in June. got idea right before lockdown "You kind of wonder, was that last cold I had corona?"

Stammtisch: German healthcare: The doctor will see you now

drama in German healthcare: -smutty. Carry on Doctor. totally crazy hospital show. innuendos. what makes for good TV? Soap operas. ER -German govt ambitious plans for health care reform. pushed to the side in the news. Merkel: visit an old people's home to figure out the issues. wants it back on the political agenda. is there a crisis? no but system is so big, difficult to reform, lots of money in it Merkel's 64th birthday: what did she do on it? She went to a place......Merkel is not going on holiday, instead her husband is taking the break without her. hiking, chairlifts. she was not going on holiday there. relationship drama? -one of the more serious topics. person accused by German authorities of being Assama bin laden's bodyguard. he was on a plane to tinesiah. blocked his deportation bc he faced possible torture if he went back to tinesiah. He was already deported, but court ruled that he needs to be brought back. chaos. ahead of the rule of law here, slippery slope. more and more of these stories. asylum seekers being sent back in the middle of integration courses to Afghanistan. conservative politicians are so eager to show they have a hard stance on asylum seekers but losing big picture Catholic Church: Archbishop of Munich is criticizing Merkel. can't be nationalist and catholic. backlash against CSU. co-opting issues taken by AfD, but not working. it is not the AfD that is gaining, the Greens are winning. they are not as left as they used to be, and they are clear with their policies/support refugees and immigrants. Bavarian state election. German party system has changed. CSU is Bavaria=could be its end soon. Trump and Putin meeting. Trump made these comments about Germany. called Germany a captive of Russia because of its dependence on Russian gas. criticizing Merkel. Merkel responded strongly, bristled. pointed out the absurdity of comments. should we deepen this relationship? healthcare reform: basics, financed by compulsory insurance system: every employee has to be ensured: employers pays for them too. a lot of money. private insurance. is it statuary or private? private is faster/statuary takes forever to get an appointment. can not really abolish one side or the other. hard to resolve. health politician: his proposals, focusing on long term care and not health care. care of elderly. proposal to bring in people from other countries, bring in money to system. it would not be CDU policy to abolish private bc business. fastest aging population. needs to be addressed. not enough people to care for them. Merkel visited an elderly home. people who work in these homes need to be paid well, tough job, but get a lot back from helping the elderly people, we need them, want people to want to do this job. plan to recruit more people into care: aging population, lack of workers bc of low employment. negative aspects of working in care need to be compensated in wages. 3 year training program is paid but not enough. 25,,000 jobs not filled in the sector. across the board pay system. who is going to fund program? the people? treatment: what can you get for public insurance. eurythmics is a therapeutic form of dance. salts and herbs. rhythmic massage. German medics. always try and give you random plants. homeopathy problem. no one can prove that it helps, can prove that it does not. how much damage does it do? people are health, you will get treatment even if you do have to wait, cities better than rural areas. not enough doctors in rural areas. largely positive experience in comparison to America. Obamacare. ACA. American system: health insurance is communism. does not believe in health care as a right. choice is a right. NHS in Britain. -which would you choose? a better German system. when

Stammtisch: Would I lie to you, baby? Life in the post-truth era

how susceptible are we to fake news? -not a lot of people are -when we see who click on a link, still takes a lot to be convinced. before we consume it, need to have a desire to believe it. love to consume fake news that fits their world view, they are not convinced to change world view based on fake news -fact checkers important. -how people consume information. if I introduce a percentage or a figure, sounds like research has been done, so more believable. political. if you trust the person giving the message, makes people more susceptible to believe it. they all look like they could be a credible news site. social media works because of this. do we trust politicians though? -trust is the one currency that is in deficit across the board. definition of fake news: broad, propaganda, lies, rumors. not sure. we have always had fake news. we are susceptible is some way so will always be used, always been there, changes its shape and appearance but still there. govt started to use fake news for their interests, and that is dangerous. Russian trolls. vote: fake news changes the result of elections or referendums: overwhelming majority agrees. do fake facts influence real elections and other events. skeptical to support the idea because data is not there. easy narrative is fake news. oh this makes sense because I want to believe it. people who were on Facebook who clicked on these, were already of far right ideology. polarized views=old people bc less access to news outlets. dangerous new order. reporting. work that goes into understand this remains. do not understand the human factors behind how we vote, so skeptical. -in many countries, media comes under control of govt. means many people do not believe in them as much anymore, not good at lying. no trust in state broadcasters. examples headlines in Germany -some ex of fake news that people have believed -Research released today have demonstrated that slogan for Merkel came from GDR. false -Bavaria court proceedings today, local bakery faces prosecution for selling bread on a Sunday. true -new figures show that refugees in state blank...can afford to go back to their homes several times a year. fake. why do people believe this? the type of fake news bc animosity toward immigrants, good fake news story, textbook fake news. they come here and get all of these benefits, want it to be true, but is not. critical evaluation. -hotbed for fake facts: solutions -we look with little empathy toward people who believe fake news. should just fact check or believe scientific evidence. what are the real reasons? connect with that? ex -prevent govt control over media. need more variable media outlets and sources. more democratic news atmosphere. need trustable media. education them. emphasis on media education. politicians should be questioned/not trusted. media bubbles.

Cohen 2019.pdf

see worksheet

Stammtisch: Back to school - German education

rug sacks: German system vs American: high education standards, but slightly behind in terms of infrastructure former GDR vs German system today: everyone turned from black and white to colors. a new world opened up for them. Western stuff, allowed to talk about. people outside of Germany tend to believe that Germans have a good education system streams from age 11 (3): alphas, betas, or gammas at age eleven. Gymnasium takes you to university, highest controversial because separating children too young. definitive. kids from different backgrounds at a disadvantage. not just an integration issue, a social class issue -teachers do not want to teach in poor schools -lack of structure for students who were struggling in any way, disabled students. even in good schools no German as a second language class. system is stacked against kids. depends on which region you live in . why do some areas do better than others? depends on the state which controls education. inability in German politics to agree on education benchmarks. harder to get to university in Bavaria then other places. do not need to pay for school. lack of private schools, do not need them. just like US problem: first, in Eastern part was usually to go to grammar school in 8 years. western schools go 9. advantages? can get more schooling beforehand or go to university earlier. -gymnasium did not have white boards (instead of chalk boards). Richard Nixon was still listed as President in a textbook. investments have not been made. infrastructure investments needed. crappy buildings. no tablets, no computers. not all but many schools. -lack of teachers. miscalculated the numbers of students, lot of teachers go into pension. a lot of refugees came in to Germany. more pupils, education system to become a teacher is too hard. -solutions to teacher crisis? different walks of life now can become a teacher. punishes those who have taken more time to do it the old way. pretty good benefits to become a teacher, pay is good, can not be fired, safe pension. becoming a teacher is almost like a seasonal job. school districts scrambling. insiders go where conditions are best, where not as needed. lost generation of pupils who are not getting the education that they need. good things: investment drive by German govt. costs have gone up though, so might not be enough -level of language instruction is top notch. Germans speak English very well and other languages in comparison to like the US -advantage, university is free. gymnasium prepares you well for university. apprenticeships programs=good. in us has to go to university, but always in debt. do not have to waste your time in Germany. not looked down upon to go to vocational training. top notch. -East system: 6 days a week, West German 5 days a week -formulaic in British school. Germany wants your own interpretation. different. substance. -felt like German high school purpose was to make you a well rounded person, but did not prepare you for university.???????? practical skills???? -still stick with German school. felt well educated. comes down to the specific school and teachers. some combined of the two?

Hall 2013

Anatomy of the Euro Crisis -"Ten years into its existence, the Euro is a resounding success. The single currency has become a symbol of Europe, considered by Euro-area citizens to be among the most positive results of European integration...." Barely five years after the European Commission issued this 2008 celebration of its new currency, the statement seems highly ironic. -The suicide rate in Greece has doubled during the past three years. This economic stagnation is now depressing performance even in Germany, normally the engine of the European economy; -Today, everyone agrees that the institutional structure of economic and monetary union (EMU) is inadequate. -Monetary union was adopted as much for political reasons as for economic ones. -Ironically (in retrospect), the move to EMU was in some respects an effort to escape this need for transnational negotiations about economic policy. -There were also economic payoffs. online But the institutional design of EMU was highly technocratic. Authority over monetary policy was vested in a new European central bank (ECB) entirely independent of political control. Fiscal policy was to be guided by the minimalist rules of a Stability and Growth Pact that limited national deficits to 3 percent and national debt to 60 percent of GDP. There was no institutional provision for medium-term coordination of fiscal policy among countries, and the ECB was forbidden to issue debt to subsidize national governments—a capacity most national central banks have. The Theory Derailed -The conventional answer, popular in northern Europe, is that the southern Europeans and Irish broke the fiscal rules of EMU. There is some truth to this. -Clinging to the illusion that monetary union had freed them from the need for serious negotiations about differing national budgets, the European governments were reluctant to enforce the terms of the pact—especially because the first countries to violate it were Germany and France. -Moreover, much of the lending that fueled the crisis had gone not to spendthrift governments, but rather to the private sector. -With the advent of the single currency, international financiers treated all the member states as safe markets and flooded them with cheap money. -Those seeking deeper causes for the crisis often fasten on the rising imbalances in payments across Europe, as Germany built up large current account surpluses and the peripheral member states deficits. Asymmetrical Economies -What governments and firms can do is conditioned by the organization of the political economy. That is based on institutions that develop over long periods of time and cannot be changed overnight. The EMU joined together several different varieties of capitalism, each of which pursues economic growth in a different way. -Germany's coordinated market economy exemplifies the northern model. That nation can hold down labor costs because its industrial-relations institutions encourage firms and unions to coordinate on modest wage increases. vocational training system, globally competitive -By contrast, Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Italy entered EMU with political economies not well-suited to this type of growth strategy. They have fractious labor movements divided into competing confederations, and weak employer associations. demand-led growth For these countries, entry into monetary union had as many handicaps as advantages. reform to improve competitiveness, but interest groups interfered -they could no longer devalue their national currencies. The result was ballooning current-account deficits. Is There a Euro Future? -The problems are certainly daunting, because the euro crisis is actually three crises in one: a crisis of confidence in the bond markets, a debt crisis in the European financial system, and a growth crisis for the continent as a whole. -politicians blaming Southern European countries. The resulting ill will has made the problem of mobilizing political consent for any adjustment strategy more difficult. -Unfortunately, there is no solution in sight for the growth crisis affecting Europe. -In response, the European Union claims it has a growth strategy based on two pillars: a fiscal compact that will commit most of the member states to balanced budgets, and a program of structural reform that will intensify competition in markets for products and labor. But neither step is of any real value in the short term. -Is there an alternative? In the immediate future, coordinated fiscal reflation, which would see austerity relaxed in the south and government spending increase in the north, would help. But because that could entail fiscal transfers from north to south, it is hard to sell to electorates, and northern governments fear that if they loosen their fiscal demands on the south, the reform process there will stop. -But it is unclear whether Spain, Portugal, and Greece can continue to prosper inside the single currency. The Political, European Union Solution -would be premature to predict the monetary union will break up -Even with more help from the north, it is not clear that the political systems of the south will continue to yield governments willing to take the measures that would make monetary union sustainable. -Unless national governments can mobilize electoral majorities in favor of burden-sharing, the prospects for EMU do not look auspicious

Podcast: "Stammtisch:Going the Distance -Transatlantic relations today"

German airfare machines do not work -flying symbol of deficits in German military capabilities -politician late to New York, late to big meetings, opened speech with sorry. here to look at Germany's role in the world, hand wringing and internal debate, Merkel and others not putting forward big ideas, Berlin missing big strategic debates (Russia and Brexit) U.S. election fake news, Germany and U.S. relationship: the phone Merkel uses scandal (USA spying on her through this) went away quickly though? ready to forget this stuff quickly because Germany wants to have a relationship with the U.S. should allies be able to spy on each other? Germany has also spied on friends the largest BMW assembly plant is located in U.S. not Germany (North Carolina): significant because President Trump has framed the import of German cars to the U.S. as a security risk. Merkel said well German cars are produced there and are not actually coming from Germany haha after fall of Berlin Wall, U.S. troops stayed in Germany. Still in Germany. Trump may bring troops out. Obama. Trump controversial. True or false Donald Trump's father was born in Germany: false, great grandpa was born in Germany. he keeps saying his father was born in Germany. lots of Americans have German background, so that relationship. Initially had a positive relationship, but with Trump's comments afraid that Americans will start viewing Germany in a more negative light and vice versa. Rift is impressive: Germans very concerned about Americans/more negative now, Americans think everything is fine with their relationship with Germany NATO: it is not going anywhere. transformed itself over past decades, believes it can continue doing that. internal challenges, Turkey, President U.S. doesn't believe in it all of the time, most military alliances do not last but this has. open fight between America and Germany over military spending (2% of GDP, German never has). attitude of Trump not liking alliances in general=threatens alliances future. article 5. alluded to doubts about whether or not U.S. should be in alliance. internal German debate about whether or not we should increase our military spending. Merkel has tried preparing Germans in a speech implying that they will have to be more independent from now on/can not rely as much on allies like U.S. security council elected member=Germany. took over presidency from France. dual presidency as sign of friendship as a sign of corporation as a sign of multilateralism a sign of enemies can become friends. what can it do in terms of specific policy proposals=open question. Ukraine is a hard topic, Germany wants to push a democratic mission/peacemakers. Obama is in Germany during podcast. sold out ticket. rockstar. listen to his campaign speeches and saw someone who was in line with European views, similar to Merkel/pragmatist/warm guy. too much nostalgia bc does not speak for U.S. anymore. Germans did not take seriously enough when he was president and gave warnings about U.S. reluctance to pursue european.... current attitude of U.S. might remind Germans of different Americans/Obama. many people have changed their minds on Americans due to Trump, so tour a good thing. trust couldn't be latter. from loved president to hated within 10 years. european relationship (EU). transatlantic relationship (US): security and defense policy. -balance the two. need U.S. but would like to strengthen EU. EU initiatives vs NATO. EU can make member states do what it wants them to do/military mobility. talk of EU doing more, Americans say that EU will become weaker Because bogged down by more rules and institutions, no will have stronger parter and we do not want that because will be able to counter them. number of people in Washington who know this doesn't have to be a bad story. Europe will be weaker or stronger, or waste time and do neither one so Americans not a fan. Merkel has tried, but nothing has worked on Trump. make institutional ties instead, invest in other types of relationships right now. If we raise spending, it would improve transatlantic relationship, but they are not doing it bc of that doing it bc of NATO requirements and they should!!!!! find new projects, China? if Europe and the U.S. were romantically involved how to describe relationship? separate bedrooms but still need times for breakfast, maybe end up in bed again? -ghosting German (Trump). he likes Putin and others, not checking in. need therapy. Europe is son that lives in basement and is finally being encouraged to live a life of his own.

Stelzenmüller 2016

A newly confident and audacious Germany Germany's neighbors and allies mostly concede that the country has taken responsibility for the horrors of its past. What theyGermany's neighbors and allies mostly concede that the country has taken responsibility for the horrors of its past. What they really worry about is what course it charts for the future. "I fear German power less than I am beginning to fear German inactivity." So the new "White Book" policy framework the German Defense Ministry published this week — its first in a decade. NATO -potential weight as a fundamental statement of govt policy -blueprint for designing national strategy and a benchmark for measuring Germany's future performance. -"early, decisively, and substantially" to the protection of Western security -It promises reliability, and to match its funding to its words -affirms commitment to NATO -Germany will work harder to invest 2% of its GDP into defense -Russia -"a willingness to dialogue" -national resilience and a credible allied defense and deterrence -nukes -moves the goalpost for how Germany talks about itself -the Germany of 2016 understands its power and makes deliberate choices, embraces its interdependence with neighbors, seeks to shape its surroundings, pledges to work harder to bridge divisions in Europe. t sees legal, managed immigrationas a necessity. This Germany is pragmatically confident and self-aware. It knows its weaknesses and limitations but wants to rise to its responsibilities. -ambition -the German question -Still, Steinmeier's criticism of NATO (and the praise he received from many Germans for it) shows that this new narrative of greater responsibility remains hotly disputed. The national elections looming in September 2017. SPD doing worse -No longer afraid

Germany's coronavirus response: Separating fact from fiction Germany's low COVID-19 mortality rate has been marveled at by the foreign press. As with any news story constantly in flux, many things get lost in translation.

As of April 7, Germany had reported some 105,000 confirmed cases of the SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus. However the country's death rate from the pandemic remains around 1.5%, according to both US and German disease control experts.* This figure is considerably lower than fellow EU members Spain (9.5%) and Italy (12%). This deviation has garnered a great deal of attention from English-speaking media, with US and UK outlets including the New York Times, Washington Post, The Guardian and several public broadcasters painting a rosy picture of Germany's handling of the crisis. Claim: Germany is testing at one of the highest per capita rates in the world, and is also testing individuals with light or no symptoms Reality: The German Health Ministry has said that it is testing 300,000 people per week in a country of 82 million people; it has already carried out far more tests than Italy, the European epicenter of the pandemic. While that is a massive effort, assuming that each German resident would be tested once, it would take 3 years to test the entire population. Comparing test rates per capita around the world is extremely difficult, as some countries, like the US, do not have a central registrar recording all the tests across the nation. Further complicating the matter are the conflicting numbers even within each country; the usage of different time measurements; and delays in reporting. These factors make it even harder to keep track and say with certainty which nation has the highest number of tests per capita. Moreover, Germany's center for disease control, the Robert Koch Institute, has criticized Germany's methods of testing, complaining for example that too many asymptomatic individuals were being tested. The RKI called for an end to this practice on the grounds that Germany could risk running out of tests. Therefore, asymptomatic people are currently not being recommended for testing. Claim: Germany is allegedly considering issuance of "immunity certificates" to allow individuals who have recovered from the virus to move about freely Reality: The origin of this rumor appears to be a quote by a scientist interviewed by German news magazine Der Spiegel, and reported by Deutsche Welle, who suggested it in connection with a potential research project. It was then picked up by The Telegraph in the UK and Business Insider in the US and reported as German government policy. German virologists are currently working on a test that would determine if a recovered person has antibodies that make them immune to the virus However, the scientific consensus at the moment is that there is no way to measure the length or strength of such immunity, with estimates varying as widely as a few weeks to a year. Claim: Germany's death rate is so low due to advanced planning and an excellent healthcare system Reality: Germany does have a robust public healthcare system that for now appears to be weathering the storm. As in many countries, however, medical professionals in respiratory and intensive care report being massively overworked, and there is a risk of running out of protective equipment. While Germany has enough hospitals, they are chronically understaffed, and medical students are now helping out in the most overwhelmed units. As for advanced planning, Germany's lockdown and social distancing regulations were put in place more than a week after fellow EU members France, Austria, and Spain had imposed similar policies. Despite what was happening in Italy in early March, Germany was actually much slower to react than its neighbors. However, behind Germany's as-yet low mortality rate is a confluence of many other factors. These include the country's federal system of government, which means there are hundreds of health officials overseeing the pandemic response across the 16 states, rather than one centralized response from the country's national Health Ministry. Claim: The US government is trying to steal Germany's vaccines Reality: One of the first coronavirus stories from Germany to be widely reported globally came from an article in the Welt am Sonntag newspaper, which claimed that the administration of President Trump was trying to woo the Tübingen-based biopharmaceutical company CureVac. The paper quoted an anonymous source claiming that Washington was offering a substantial financial incentive to develop a vaccine "only for the US." After the quote was translated, it was reported by The Guardian and other news outlets. Since then, however, it has been denied by US Ambassador to Germany Richard Grenell, German Health Minister Jens Spahn, and CureVac itself. Moreover, CureVac is just one of dozens of German firms racing to create a vaccine, and Germany is just one of the many countries whose scientific community is now focused on immunization for COVID-19. Claim: One reason Germany's mortality rate is low is because Germans immediately stuck to the rules about social distancing Reality: This is a misplaced belief circulated on social media, likely based on old stereotypes of the German national character rather than actual evidence. There are no hard statistics, but widespread anecdotal evidence would suggest otherwise. -online

Lahusen and Bleckmann 2015.pdfLahusen and Bleckmann 2015.pdf???

Beyond the Ballot Box: Changing Patterns of Political Protest Participation in Germany (1974-2008) -Political participation has evolved considerably in Germany since the 1960s. -1959-1960: The vast majority of Germans considered voting and being informed about politics as important activities, but their participation in more active ways, for example in political groups or political discussions, was low. -German citizens had not only developed a stronger commitment towards the new democratic institutions after World War II, documented by continuing high rates of electoral participation. Since the 1960s they also became involved more forcefully in 'unconventional' forms of political participation (e.g. street protests, participation in civic associations, informal means of political influence taking), testifying a generalized will of the population to influence institutionalized politics beyond the periodic call for votes. -The political culture seems thus to have evolved considerably towards active citizenship in both parts of Germany. -The overall level of mobilization (i.e. the number of events and participants) is rather stable since the late 1990s, but follows a process of differentiation and pluralization: more issues are covered, and a wider array of mobilizing organizations and constituencies are involved -On the one hand, the participatory revolution is concentrated more strongly on lawful acts of public claims making (i.e. petitions and demonstrations), while unauthorised or illegal acts (i.e. unofficial strikes and occupations, violent actions) are still a strongly minoritarian choice. -On the other hand, there are regional specificities that are particularly manifest during the 1990s: an almost generalized protest participation in the east mirroring the silent revolution at the end of the GDR, and a stagnation, in part a weak decline of protest participation in the west. -However, there is a remarkable process of convergence between West and East Germans from the 1990s onwards. -Petitions are the type of protest activity that is most prevalent in Germany. -Demonstrations and boycotts are the second most widely used means of political protest. -The class-mobilisation hypothesis has also a rather limited causal effect. Descriptive analyses unveil that occupational groups of the new middle classes (here: technical experts and socio-cultural professionals) reported more often having participated in demonstrations (i.e. 27 per cent and 13 per cent as compared to the average of 7 percent of all respondents). -Third, civic values are particularly relevant because protest behaviour is strongly related to post-materialist values.

Spiegel 2018

Germany and Immigration The Changing Face of the Country Many Germans feel foreign in their own country and are afraid that immigrationis changing their homeland rapidly. Every fifth person in Germany comes froman immigration background and that number will continue to climb. Maike Manz runs her hand across the patient's belly and hopes that the youngwoman in the hospital bed will at least have an inkling of what she's trying to tell her. She shrugs her shoulders. "Different cultures, different understandings of time," says Manz, During prenatal checkups and the actual birth, Manz, who is the chief physician here, always carries index cards with basic vocabulary in Arabic, Farsi, Russian, Romanian and Turkish. When she chooses new staff, Manz also tries to make hires that canhelp her department cope with the new challenges. Abdulhadi is something of a bridge between the cultures. Arab families feel they're ingood hands with Abdulhadi and it's easy for them to explain things to him. Close to 40 percent of the mothers who give birth at Mariahilf were born outside of Germany. also a large segment of society that is anythingbut pleased by the development. They harbor doubts that the government is able to solve the problems already arising out from the lack of integration among some immigrant groups. aimless immigration policy. Such fears of uncontrolled migration are nothing new.: Sarrazin, "Germany Is Doing Away With Itself" Since then, just under 1.4 million refugees have arrived in Germany. One indication of how deeply the anger and rage are simmering in many people is the dangerous power of the conspiracy theory which holds that the chancellor, together with other sinister powers, is planning to swap out the ethnic German population and replace it with foreigners. Part of the reason it became so popular is that society, politicians and the media haven't discussed some of the developments openly and factually - at times out of fear of playing into the hands of xenophobes. Too often, the debate is driven bypeople more focused on showing off their own worldliness and tolerance thanactually addressing the problems. But hopes that the conflicts created through poorly managed immigration might somehow disappear behind the optimism have been dashed. Large segments of the German population are suffering from a kind of stress relating to identity. could be stripped of Heimat, their sense of home At the same time, Germans with immigrant backgrounds feel marginalized and foreign. But it's an altogether different phenomenon for refugees arriving here. When they think about home, it tends to be the one they just lost. German Interior Minister Horst Seehofer of the conservative Christian Social Union(CSU), the Bavarian sister party to Merkel's Christian Democratic Union (CDU), reacted to that sentiment with his recent remarks that Islam doesn't belong to Germany. large parts of German population agree -Merkel's answer to Seehofer, though, namely that Islam does belong to Germany, also isn't helpful There are constant debates over whether to ban the burqa, even though very few women actually wear them in Germany. These discussions serve largely to provide supporters of a ban with a vehicle with which to express their sentiment that tolerance has gone far enough. As Christianity Shrinks in Germany, Islam Grows In Hamburg's Horn neighborhood, the Islamic Center al-Nour community is even in the process of converting a former church into a mosque with the help of funding from Kuwait. nobody is being pushed out. has been empty for years. Even though they feel a bit odd about the fact that Muslims will soon be praying in their former church, they did join a demonstration organized by the Citizens' Initiative Pro Germany five years ago to defend the Muslims' right to convert the church into a mosque. "When you're in the minority, you feel foreign," says Heinz-Jürgen Kammeyer, his wife nodding in agreement. On some bus lines in the neighborhood, she says, shehears more "Swahili than German - people cut in line and show little consideration." She says there is a lackof space in society for the new generation of senior citizens to which the Kammeyersbelong. "Turkish families live here whose daughters are covered as soon as they start to menstruate," he says. He has nothing against Islam, he says, but the waysome Muslims treat women is in his view "incompatible" with the Germanconstitution. "This attitude that a woman is a ***** just because she wears a bikini!" A recent survey taken by Forsa, one of Germany's most respected pollsters, showed that more than one out of four Germans agree that Islam is something that "arouse sfear." A Failure to Differentiate Between Islam and Islamism Often enough, the rejection of Islam manifests itself in the form of vandalism orviolence. Statistics from the German Interior Ministry show there were at least 950 attacks on Muslims and mosques last year .it is assumed that the perpetrators had right-wing extremist motives. A Hefty Headscarf Debate Kayed's headscarf often causes her problems. The law student says she wants to apply for a traineeship in the public sector, but that her chances of getting one are low, Berlin is currently embroiled in a hefty debate over whether the city-state should allow a neutrality law that bans female teachers from wearing the headscarf in class to remain on the books unchanged. sexualizes little girls? Because if you allow teachers to wear the headscarf, you are accepting the risk that girls will feel increasing pressure from the community to do the same. It's wasn't the attacker who scared her the most - it was the passersby who stood around and stared but didn't do anything. What Is 'Heimat'? 'We're Afraid' "It's hell at night," Fessler says. "They buy booze at the discountsupermarket, get drunk or stoned at the train station and in the park and then staggerby us on their way back." He says he's unable to sleep half the night and that he feels like he's being terrorized. Facing the Challenges of Integration Fessler is angry about the stress it has caused him, especially because of the feeling he has that no one is willing to help him in this difficult situation. In the last election, he cast his ballot for the AfD. "I am a protest voter," he says. Fessler isn't the only former CDU voter to have turned his back on the center-right party Many have done so for reasons relating more to a feeling of cultural alienation than to the absolute number of immigrants taken in by Germany. They were concerned about excessive immigration, but they also felt shut out by a societal expectation that they view the newcomers as a benefit to the country. With the CDU following Merkel to the center, they lost their political home as well. A Global Shift in Sentiment The fact that left-wing politicians consistently told these people that their feelings were incorrect, and that immigrants and others would not steal their jobs and homes only made them more furious in the U.S., Hochschild says. Indeed, they began to believe that their problems were being ignored and covered up. In Germany, people adhering to such views have identified politicians and the mediaas the primary culprits. A Small Minority of Troublemakers "It is just a small group that causes problems, but they do so quite effectively." The German government has said it intends to deport a greater number of people. But such returns often fail because would-be deportees disappear, resist or are suddenly able to present medical certificates precluding their deportation. This has led to an additional problem: Terminology. Troubles in the Education System This morning, Küppers is on his way to a Romanian family whose three children, he says, haven't been coming to school since the fall break. -"Many are unfamiliar with ourschool system," Küppers says Nevertheless, Küppers hasn't lost his optimism. Like Küppers, educators and teachers across the country complain about the lack of support and understanding from political leaders. "The focus needs to be on the second-generation immigrants," In generational comparisons, slight improvements have been made, but many immigrant children are still far away from reaching their potential. A Need To Recognize and Address True Problems -More than half of those of working age who receive Hartz IV welfare benefits for the long term unemployed have immigrant backgrounds. -There was a hope in some quarters in 2015 that the incoming Syrians might help resolve Germany's shortage of highly skilled workers, but that has proven illusory. -It would be better to recognize that there are problems associated with immigrationas it is practiced in Germany. And then to explore how many of those problems canbe overcome by way of education, jobs and opportunities for advancement. 'Work Is the Great Equalizer' -Integration means participating in societal structures. -team soccer

Posen 2013

Ghosts in the Machine What is haunting German economic policy -a parallel today between German macroeconomic policymaking and German foreign policymaking in terms of the overhang of historical legacies. -But similarly there were historical images, very searing memories that have shaped the German economic debate today. These have foreclosed the consideration of certain policy options that would behoove the German government, the Bundesbank, and the European institutions they play a part in, to consider opening back up. -This means that inflation fears are vastly exaggerated, and are just a ghost, for if the real side of the economy is sticky, for most cases, inflation is actually pretty sticky, too. -The second ghost that has been lurking around Germany since I first lived here, in 1992, is this idea that unification - however you want to call it - was this very costly, politically necessary but economically unfortunate situation. these two ghosts are informing and guiding German economic policy. It would be good for everyone to get past these. "If we really enforce price stability, and we really make credible a monetary commitment, then those feckless southerners-the Greeks, the southern Italians, the Spanish-they will have no choice but to adapt." This notion played a crucial role in the discussions leading up to the adoption of the euro. wanted convergence -It has since proven to be a pure aspiration. -US and Italy. Again, one-hundred-plus years and very little convergence. You can try to argue that, but the scale of this stickiness is so big, and the scale of the transfer not that great by comparison, that it is unpersuasive to do so. What does this mean for inflation, ghost number one? The risks of inflation going up quickly, or in the long term, are smaller than are usually recognized in Germany. -a deal was made that basically priced Eastern Germany out of employment. -There is no way you can get gainful employment unless you cut your wages massively. But it turns out there are labor agreements, and the East Germans are not allowed to cut their wages massively. So you end up with large unemployment in eastern Germany. -As a result, there was the Solidaritätssteuer, the solidarity tax, and for twenty years western Germans have been shipping a big chunk of their income east. -wrong message about exchange rate: We blew it by being too generous to the East Germans. If we hadn't transferred so much money, if we didn't pay for all these Arbeitsprogramme, they would have had to adapt; -The mistake was getting the intra-German exchange rate wrong and forcing the bulk of the adjustment on eastern German workers. -there was this economic success-and it came from treating all Germans as Germans. This was largely the result of the generosity of the transfers to and the public investment within eastern -The Haunted View claims that the absence of European fiscal rules and institutions results in insufficient fiscal and wage discipline. -Structural reforms will in turn cause convergence and make everything better - and the debts will get repaid. -What really happened is that there were a bunch of bad loans made. These bad loans went bad. And when bad loans go bad, you have to decide who is going to pay for them. Almost all of it is being shifted onto the South (which includes Ireland, for this purpose), who were the borrowers. Almost none of these losses are being borne by the lenders, in northern Europe. -A large part of why Europe has taken this course is that German-led discussions believe there is a high inflation risk from looser policy, and a gain to be had inducing structural reform - both of which are ghosts. Yes, there is political stability and thus majority acceptance of these policies in the South. But that is just too low a bar for success. Absent the ghosts of inflation and unification past, German economic policy might see that and aim higher for the euro area.

Mosel and Smart 2019.pdfMosel and Smart 2019.pdf

Public narratives and attitudes towards refugees and other migrants Germany country profile see other quizlet Overview of German immigration and asylum policies!! A rise in demand for care labour: Key messages and priorities for engagement could include: in the partial pg 4 Segments or 'tribes' of the German population by attitude to refugees and other migrants Examples of good business practice in engaging with refugees

LC, ch. 10 (pp. 351-372 only)

The Return and Limits of German Power The European Union The impact of European Integration on Germany German Federalism and Europe The Euro The Euro Crisis Never-ending crisis

LC Ch.3

The Social and Economic Setting -75 percent of the pre-WWII territory of the Reich. -more neighbors than any other European country -population of about 82.3 million, largest country in Western and Central Europe. -a little more than 1/5 of current population can be attributed to postwar migration into West Germany. says where from on 47 -about 20% of current population has a migration background and the country is a major target country for immigrants. -when Berlin Wall was completed population dropped, emigration that triggered the collapse of the Communist regime reduced the population even more -enormous economic, social, and cultural adjustments made by easterners after forth yrs of division have had a depressing effect on such basic life decisions as marriage and childbirth. in east. indicate the extent of fear and uncertainty felt by many East Germans. govt paying parents $650 premium for every new child in eastern state Brandenburg. pg 48 -Germany is one of the most rapidly aging societies in the world. -median age is over forty-six. The rapidly growing elderly portion of the population is already straining welfare programs and will only worsen the budgetary situation. any population growth will be due entirely to immigration. Urbanization and industrialization -with ninety inhabitants per square mile, Germany is one of the most densely populated countries in Europe -many of these metropolitan regions encompass rather large boundaries and many rural areas. the central cities are usually quite small. German cities are hundreds or thousands of yrs old. much of this urbanization took place during the last quarter of the nineteenth century. -today, the Federal Republic is the world's fourth-largest industrial power. An export-oriented economy -lacking self-sufficiency in food and raw materials, Germany' economic well being, like that of other modern societies, is heavily dependent on successful competition in the International economic area. -almost 90 percent of German exports are manufactured goods-automobiles, chemicals-sent in 2014 to its European (including Russia and Turkey) neighbors; North and South America; Asia; and Africa. -its largest export markets were the US, France, the UK, the Netherlands, and China -imports from china, the Netherlands, France, the US,, and Italy. -over 60% of Germany's energy-especially oil and natural gas-has to be imported. success in this exchange depends on the ability of German industry to sell its manufactured goods at a price greater the the costs of its raw material and production. successful production is in turn strongly related to an adequate supply of skilled, disciplined industrial labor; management expertise; and scientific know-how. -Germans have been very successful in the business of International trade. The balance of trade-that is, the value of exports minus the costs of imports-has been positive since 1955. an extraordinary achievement when one considers that the German population is only about 27 percent as large as that of the US. -the export component of the economy is reaping the benefits of the extensive restructuring of the last fifteen yrs, which included downsizing and liberalizing the labor force, outsourcing of some manufacturing to countries with lower wages like Slovakia, and the importation of low-value added manufactured products especially from China. Achieved with about 5 to 10% of workforce unemployed. The rural sector -the significance of agricultural production for the economy has rapidly declined in the postwar period. the postwar loss of the predominantly agrarian eastern territories reduced the amount of arable land, but even within the western region the percentage of the gross national product contributed by agriculture and the size of the agricultural work force has also dropped steadily. the proportion working in agriculture has declines -in spite of their problems, farmer and their interest organizations, unlike agrarian groups earlier in German history, have not shown any inclination to support anti system parties. This is due in part to the integration of agrarian interests into the democratic political parties, bu it also reflects its the changed structure of rural interests. structure of German agriculture today is more homogenous Regionalism -the enormous postwar migration of expellees, Europe's largest movement of people since the sixth century. -and the general modernization of German society have greatly reduced regional differences in lifestyles, including political behavior and values. regional dialects and customs remain, but economic, social, and political characteristics of the Federal Republic show less of the regional variation common before 1933. -the extensive geographical mobility of postwar Germans has also reduced regionalism in the sense that Germany comprises separate, distinct subcultures. -Germany is a federal system. -the development of particularistic and regional sentiments is further inhibited by constitutional provision requiring a "unity of living standards" throughout all Lander. this takes place through 1: federal redistribution of a proportion of the states' share of certain taxes to poorer states (vertical equalization) and 2: direct payments by the richer states to the poorer ones (horizontal integration). -more north-south differences, loosely corresponding to the Protestant-Catholic divide. -east west difference Occupational and class structure -largest single occupational group (62 percent) comprises white-collar and service occupations, then manual workers, and then "independent" non manual positions. 2 percent in agricultural, forestry, and fishing occupations. -pg 54 why this structure exists in Germany -such structural changes have some increased social mobility in Germany. The economy -Germany. is one of the world's most prosperous societies. Its per capita GDP in 2015 of about $41,000 ranked twentieth in the world. -the sophisticated industrial economy staffed by a highly skilled workforce has made the Federal Republic an affluent, mass-consumption society. substantial capital resources that are by no means equally distributed -market-based or capitalist economy, strong social welfare component. "social mkt economy" -"conservative" party very diff from US -more on pg 55-57 From economic basket case to savior of the Euro -German economy originally waste of the worst performing in Europe: low or nonexistent growth, rapidly rising unemployment, and soaring debt -by 2002, the Economist deemed the country was a "basket case." -after 2010 German economic growth was among the strongest in the EU. -Agenda 2010, Merkel took credit The economy's hidden champions: the mittelstand -another major reason for the rapid comeback following the 2008-2009 recession was the fundamental strength of the country's small and medium-sized companies. -60 percent of all jobs are provided by the economy's "hidden champions" -many of these products are capital goods; they are needed by producers of other industrial products throughout the world. -non of these firms are household names, but they are critical to Germany's economic success: 1: many are family owned, with little or no debt. 2: most of their products are exported. 3: consensual labor relations....pg 59 continued challenges The Eastern German Economy since Reunification -the East German economy was a model of efficiency. but outmoded in construction and design and often inferior in quality, but products were affordable and did not require hard currency to purchase. -thus, to finance these transfers without reducing the western standard of living would require growth levels in the West equal to or greater than the transfer payments. in over 25 yrs since reunification this has rarely happened. -the large sum of transfers, the generous tax breaks for investors in eastern projects, and the pressures to produce an economic upturn led in some cases to waste and inefficiency in the expenditure of this funds. -the largest group of unification winners in the East has been the pensioners. -"silicon Saxony" pg 65 Income structure -although almost all gainfully employed Germans enjoy a relatively high standard of living, there remain persistent and growing gaps in income and capital resources between different occupational and class groups. -high progressive taxes and generous social transfers, however, reduced inequality by over 50 percent from 0.508 to 0.292 Gini coefficient in 2013 -women still earn less than men in both eastern and eastern areas, and westerners are much better compensated than those in the new states. capital resources: -this economic inequality, which has also been reinforced b y the educational system, is largely the result of postwar govt economic policy that gave free rein to mkt forces and created a very favorable atmosphere for investment capital. 1948 currency reforms. Religious composition -at birth, most western germans become members of either the Roman Catholic or the protestant church. -as one of the few social institutions to survive Nazism and the war with its reputation fairly intact. immediate postwar yrs saw the German churches at their mot influential since the Reformation. -very different picture in the former East Germany. only 25 percent reported any religious affiliation. protestants far outnumbering catholics. -jewish community -influx of workers, Muslims, Islam the third-largest religion. -Germany has no strong tradition of church-state separation -church attendance declining Age and family structure -frequent and sudden changes in modern German political history have affected the present age distribution of the population. Family structure -the postwar period witnessed an increase in the importance of the family as a social institution, as well as a change in authority relations within the family. -number of single people in Germany has increased dramatically in recent years The education system -historically has given the basic education to all, but advanced academic training to only a few -three track pattern -system remains heavily class biased -the social background of the parents remains the decisive factor -barriers are even higher for children of foreigners Mass Media The Press Television and Radio

Merkel issues warning over coronavirus lockdown exit German chancellor urges cautions as EU leaders meet to discuss Europe-wide recovery fund

Worried that Germans were relaxing physical distancing efforts amid the reopening of smaller shops this week, the chancellor said some of Germany's 16 states were moving too fast and the country remained "on the thinnest ice" despite its early achievements. Germany has the fifth highest number of confirmed coronavirus cases in the world, but has managed to keep its death toll down to just over 5,000, a far lower tally than in many other countries, mainly through early and extensive testing. Christian Drosten, the director of the Institute for Virology at Berlin's Charité hospital, said reopening shopping malls and larger stores could trigger a second wave in May and June, and the country risked "gambling away" its early advantage. Schools in Germany are due to reopen from 4 May and Merkel and state leaders are due to meet again on 30 April to review how to proceed after that. France, Sweden, and Italy Advertisement As EU leaders haggled over a rescue package that has reignited a bitter north-south divide between member states, Merkel also said Germany was ready to make "significantly higher" EU budget contributions to help the bloc cope with the fallout from the pandemic. She added, however, that calls from some EU countries for common debt with common liabilities were not the way to go. "That would be a very difficult process, cost time and wouldn't even help anyone in the current situation, since we need rapid-fire instruments to tackle the crisis," she said.

Green 2014.pdf

on one hand, Germany one of the primary destination for immigrants in the world. has by far the largest absolute number of non-nationals in the EU living in its territory, and more citizens from outside the EU (so-called third country nationals), who are principally affected by immigration regulations, than any other EU member state. This non-national population is moreover very well settled: in 2010, almost two-fifth had been resident in the country for at least 20 yrs. however, until recently, "not a country of immigrants." -until 1990s, highly restrictive citizenship and barriers to naturalization -de facto immigration but low levels of regulation -underlying tension -lots of policy areas need to be addressed -reassessment of labor migration and the quest for integration and citizenship. historical background: -ethnic germans and labor migrants -immigration increased strongly with German unification -kohl to Schroeder -changes in policy -2005 immigration law: high skilled workers, simplified the residency status of non-nationals, integration courses the reassessment of labor migration -demographic change and skill shortages -increasing life expectancy and low birth rates -Blue Card, few routes for high skilled labor -emigration integration and citizenship -jus sanguinis and jus soli -originally very restrictive. were not encouraged to become German, and barriers were really high anyway as it usually required descent. -2005 changes -change in govt ministries and departments to support immigrants. examples -change in terminology for immigrants: status varies by generation: from foreigner to with migration background, changing situation -football teams -political parties -opening of society but at a snails pace -2000 citizenship law did not actually increase applicants as expected. bc Germany wants them to give up their old citizenship -voting implications -Sarrazin 2010 -is islam apart of germany -islamic headscarves -NSU -extremist right wing parties have failed? ethnic germans, asylum, and family reunification -number of ethnic germans coming has fallen. gives reasons

Lemke and Welsh 2018.pdf

politics and policies in a changing world. migration, immigration, integration -rush of asylum seekers in 2015 -migration difficult to control, push and pull factors -persons with a migration background -EU policies have evolved slowly -immigration landscape remains tense and paradoxical citizenship conceptions privileging economic ties and economic imperatives -division of west and east reinforced ethnic ties bc did not recognize govt but citizens were granted citizenship once reunited updating citizenship, naturalization, and residency the right to asylum and the refugee crisis revision of asylum law in 1993 European immigration and asylum policies the refugee crisis integration foreigners (the discourse) -sarrazin integration in practice Muslims in German -the Turkish community -the headscarf debate -integration definition see other quizlet

Clean Energy Wire 2019.pdf

see worksheet

von Hirschhausen 2018.pdf

see worksheet turned in!!!!!!

Silver 2010.pdf The Social and Economic Setting Social integration

social fractiousness is deeply ingrained in German history, giving rise to a desire to unify the "incomplete nation." Today, when Germans use the term "integration," they rarely have in mind the residents of the "new states" (neue Länder), but instead, former guest workers, immi- grants, and refugees, especially Muslim immigrants from Turkey and their children. But the former citizens of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) are also poorly integrated in the united Germany. Furthermore, integration of the country into an expanding European Union and a global economy causes generalized nervousness about the potential decline of German distinctiveness and contributes to concerns about what holds Germans together. Germans devote an inordinate amount of attention to social integration not only because of their history of late national consolidation and the persistence of deep regional, religious, and class cleavages, but also because of a postwar taboo on addressing the content of nationhood. What is Social Integration Similarly, legal citizenship says little about the social integration of immigrants. Granted, the democratic liberal basis of the German Rechtsstaat has produced a trend towards "de facto multiculturalism," greater accommodation and equal treatment of minorities. The 1990s naturalization reforms, 2000 Citizenship Law, 2005 immigration reform, the creation of a federal Integration Office (Beauftragte der Bundesregierung fur Migration, Fluchtlinge und Integration), and the convening of an Islamic Summit are all indications that Germany is officially recognizing that integration is a "two-way process" of mutual accommodation between immigrants and citizens. The irony is that the groups encountering the greatest discrimination and obstacles to integration are sometimes blamed for their own social exclusion. Socioeconomic integration The paramount concern at the outset of German unification was the political and economic integration of two systems of institutions—capitalist and communist, democratic and autocratic—in which the West, in the broadest sense, imposed its currency, laws, and ways of doing things on the East. Contrary to promises made in 1990, the East German economic situation is still far from one of "flourishing landscapes." Regional cohesion, as reflected in variation in employment rates, was improving until recently. Despite the slowing of convergence, data from the German Socioeconomic Panel suggests that real household incomes rose substantially in East Germany following unification, increasing by over 40 percent between 1991 and 2001. -pensions As a consequence of rising inequality and long-term unemployment, the term Unterschicht (underclass) has crept into German political discourse. It refers to the intergenerational transmission of unemployment, poverty, poor education, and social assistance dependency and implicitly, the impossibility of overcoming this situation. -Sarrazin Foreigners, especially Turks, face widespread discrimination in employment. The Social, Cultural, and Political Integration of East and West -Surveys show that eastern Germans are more sensitive to inequalities and expect more help from the state. They also feel relatively deprived and worry more, regardless of age, than their counterparts in the West. Eastern Germans, whatever their age and politics, agree they are better off in material terms now than they were under the GDR, but there are clear cohort differences. Older easterners lost their status and identity with the Wende, and now use the GDR as a touchstone for criticizing unified Germany. -a romantic longing for the "good old days" of socialist full employment. -This sentiment should nonetheless not be mistaken for a longing to go back to the authoritarian days of the GDR. Rather, it is a reaction to the imposition of west German utopian visions on a society that does not share them. Regional Fragmentation in the 2009 Election -By definition, elections reveal social cleavages, and the 2009 federal elections are no exception. The distribution of votes across political parties changed considerably, suggesting that the German party system is becoming increasingly fragmented. -In the 2009 election, turnout hit an all-time low of 70.8 percent, down from a peak in 1972 of 91.1 percent -Perhaps the biggest surprise was the performance of the Left Party, which won 12.4 percent in 2009 compared to 8.7 percent 2005. Some might interpret this surge in support for Die Linke as an indication of a festering rift between eastern and western Germany Social Relations -The tentativeness of political cooperation across the old border is not the only expression of lingering cultural estrangement between East and West. Personal relationships also reflect poor social integration. -In a society where Easterners were suddenly a minority at best in virtually all federal institutions, social relationships that were already emotionally close in 1989 were reinforced. -In the midst of so much change, what people could safeguard and control were their families -Gender relations long differed between East and West Germany, reflecting eastern women's higher labor force participation and the greater availability of child care. -Easterners who have migrated to western Germany report feeling isolated and experience problems establishing private relations with westerners -fertility rates

LC Ch. 4

the Weimar Republic-"republic without republicans." The formal structures of political democracy-representative institutions, free elections, constitutional guarantees of civil liberties-were not present, but the political attitudes and values of many Germans were not supportive of these structures. -the founding of the Federal Republic initially met with little popular enthusiasm -chapter explores these questions by examining the development of German political culture-that is, attitudes and values toward politics and political behavior-since the founding of the postwar system. National Identity -a problem -an attachment to a particular political system has been the missing component in the German sent of national identity. -such a linkage btw national identity and a specific state form has never been present in Germany. -urging citizens to become democrats but not to develop too strong an attachment to the Federal Republic bc it was only "provisional" -"European idea" -the proportion of West Germans proud of the postwar political system has increased substantially since the early years of the Republic -by 1988, the political system was the area in which Germans had the most pride; it had overtaken the economy -solid majorities of Germans now consider national feelings of patriotism and pride to be important. -increasingly critical of US -1980s, important discussion about German national identity -Bitburg affair Legitimacy -Republic had a problem acquiring legitimacy -there has ben no serious challenge to the authority of the Federal Republic. evidence found in relatively high levels of voter turnout and the concentration of electoral support in the parties committed to the republic. -based in part on the absence of any credible alternative. -opinion surveys -age is an important factor in explaining this change. Democratic values, processes, and institutions -the essentially passive acceptance of the postwar system for a basically negative reason-bc everything else had failed and bc there were Allied troops on the ground to ensure a democratic system-was displaced by a more active, positive orientation to the new Republic. -public opinion data Democratic Support in East Germany -still retain more positive attitudes toward "socialism" and a more class-oriented conception of society than do westerners. -differing conceptions of German history held by citizens of the 2 regions. -differences between younger and older Germans -signs of convergence in the political culture of the once-divided nature. Political Interest and Involvement -the formal, legal rules of the Fed Republic have thus far placed few participatory requirements on citizens beyond periodic voting. -never been a national referendum Social capital -the amount of social capital in West Germany has grown substantially since the 1945 collapse of the Nazi regime. some decline is evident. -lower level of social capital in the East. New Forms of Political participation: citizen groups and movements -the emergence of widespread citizen initiatives and action groups outside the party system is another phenomenon indication of confidence in the role of the citizen. -most Germans now ant more opportunities for political participation than are permitted under the current constitution. Civil Liberties and human rights -Germany did not have a strong civil libertarian tradition -emphasized the duties of the individual vis-a-vis the state rather than the state's responsibilities to protect individual liberties. -student demonstrations of the late 1960s Civil Liberties controversies -The Spiegel Affair -"Radicals" in Public Service -Civil liberties and the census -"the great bugging attack" -Same-sex marriage -Civil liberties after 9/11 Residents with a Migration background -the most significant minority group in the Fed Republic comprises individuals with a migration background, currently over 20% of the population. This is a diverse group, including ethnic Germans who emigrated from the former Soviet Union after 1990, refugees, and their descendants, such as Croats and Bosnians who fled to Germany in the early 1990s, and the most recent group of refugees from places like Syria. -although the liberalization of citizenship laws about a decade ago has led to many from this group gaining German citizenship and thus no longer being classified as "foreigner" (Auslander). -in spite of declines in the number of foreign workers coming to Germany, their higher birth rate and the arrival of family members have actually increased the total number of individuals with a migration background. -there are now two and even 3 generations with migration backgrounds -world's 2nd most popular haven for immigrants after the US -despite positive changes, many native residents long refused to accept the reality that "worldwide migration is a typical and unavoidable feature of modern societies." -kohl's famous statement that Germany is not a land of immigration. -"guest workers" -Turks are by far the largest minority group -in 2008 and 2009, more people actually left Germany than entered, but since then there has been a net plus and in 2014, highest number since 1992 -workers with migration background over 30% of manual workforce, assigned tasks that Germans are no longer willing to perform. Although those major industries receive the same pay as German workers, wage discrimination in smaller firms is not uncommon. -due party to their poor vocation training (by German standards) and language difficulties, and also to discrimination on the part of German employers. but some are covered by govt benefits, social citizenship -German churches and charities -when foreign workers bring families into Germany, problems can be compounded. education of their children has been particularly difficult. -yet their parents cling to the goal of someday returning to their home country and thus want their children to retain its language and values. -young people with migration back have been ill prepared for job mkt. -in 2010, 72% of foreign residents btw ages of 20 and 64 had not completed job training. -among female foreign residents, lack of any academic or vocational training is even greater. -many in western cities live in poverty -many are bored, unemployed, resentful, with little contact with the native population. alienated from the rest of society and increasingly form a kind of underclass. potential for social unrest in this situation is high. -Native germans do not want their children to attend schools with a high proportion of children with a migration background. -germans have been slow to recognize their country is a multicultural society. -major differences of opinion among germans -right demands integration, including stringent language, and citizenship tests, and the left advocates the acceptance of multiculturalism, even parallel societies. -Sarrazin -difficulty of obtaining citizenship. -historically been based more on lineage than on residency. -cannot vote regardless of how long they have lived in Germany. -in 1999, passed legislation to make citizenship easier to get -German-born children of foreigners now have an automatic right to citizenship if at least one of their parents has been living in Germany since age fourteen. Waiting period reduced from 15 to 8 yrs. dual citizenship was allowed until the child reached adulthood (23) and had to choose. -one criticism is the prohibition of dual citizenship. Turkey, and increased fees Current immigration policy -foreign workers are no longer actively recruited, but still possible to enter if highly qualified and prepared to invest -now have access to free or low-cost language classes as well as instruction in the justice system, culture, and history. -new law does not assume immigrant is only a "guest" but a resident who intends to stay and should be introduced to the language and culture of the potential new homeland. -foreign students do not pay any extra tuition as natives Foreign Resident and political asylum. -basic law contained one of the most liberal asylum laws in the world. -violence against asylum seekers in 1991 -sparked demonstrations -constitutional amendment (Article 16) in 1993 that restricted asylum rights. -asylum seekers who enter the Fed Republic from any EU country can be denied asylum. -passage took wind out of the sails of xenophobic far-right groups. number of asylum applications had dropped by 60%, but made easier to get permanent residency permits -depressed asylum applicants for many yrs. -even though the unprecedented influx has been managed relatively peacefully, tensions are mounting, especially after several terrorist incidents in 2016. Berlin Christmas mkt murders. radical right has been reempowered. Women -politics in Germany, as elsewhere, has traditionally been a man's business -less likely to participate in all political activities -Children, church, and kitchen -surveys -since late 1960s a greater awareness and visibility of women in politics has become apparent. catholic women the SPD made gains -now reject ideas traditional -negligible differences in the turnout rate btw men and women. increased female involvement, but low representation -Angela merkel -recent yrs improvements -income differences -Agenda 2010 -German executive suite is still overwhelmingly a male preserve. -legal requirements? -conditions of women under GDR, child care and work Youth -large "postwar generation" that during the past forty yrs has assumed the leadership of the country's economic, social, and political systems. -after all, the postwar generations have grown up in a politically stable and economically prosperous society. -the low birth raters of the past 4 decades and ever-increasing life spans have put today's youth in a distinct minority position. -now an older society -young Germans in general are not a hyper politicized, ideologically radical element in a staid, middle-class society. participation in elections is below that of older groups. -concerned with employment prospects, the quality of their education, vocational training, individual happiness, and a sense of fulfillment-goals with which their elders could hardly disagree. -more likely to have opinions supportive of liberal democratic values and innovative reform policies than older age groups. -green party -"youth" is a bureaucratic category for the estate -binge drinking a problem -young germans less concerned about unification -convergence in attitudes btw young people in eastern and western states. -high unemployment among eastern youth was frequently cited as a major factor in their proclivity to support right-wing radical groups and engage in violence against foreigners. -socialism support lower in east Refugees and Resettlers Political radicals and extremists -legitimacy threshold for extremist movements has been higher in the Fed Republic than in other western european societies. -difficult to be an extremist in Germany -constitutional prohibitions against extremism -offices The Radical Right -1949-1969 nazi led parties -the Republicans -right-wing terrorism increased in November 2011 -NSU, neo nazi group -Doner murders -Merkel trying to outlaw the NPD -AfD, PEGIDA The Radical Left -Marxist groups and terrorist organizations 1960s in large cities and university campuses -Weimar Republic, "humanistic socialism" -developed a socialist theory that rejected and denied legitimacy to the liberalism embodied in the postwar system. -Where have all the left radicals gone? --many took teaching and research positions at colleges and universities and some became active in SPD or Greens, trade unions, churches, journalism, and other middle-class occupations -GDR, Stasi, Red Army Faction Conclusions!!!!