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Zhou Enlai

Zhou Enlai (Chinese: 周恩来; Wade-Giles: Chou En-lai; 5 March 1898 - 8 January 1976) was the first Premier of the People's Republic of China, serving from October 1949 until his death in January 1976. Zhou served along with Chairman Mao Zedong and was instrumental in the Communist Party's rise to power, and later in consolidating its control, forming foreign policy, and developing the Chinese economy. A skilled and able diplomat, Zhou served as the Chinese foreign minister from 1949 to 1958. Advocating peaceful coexistence with the West after the stalemated Korean War, he participated in the 1954 Geneva Conference and the 1955 Bandung Conference, and helped orchestrate Richard Nixon's 1972 visit to China. He helped devise policies regarding the bitter disputes with the U.S., Taiwan, the Soviet Union (after 1960), India and Vietnam. Zhou survived the purges of other top officials during the Cultural Revolution. While Mao dedicated most of his later years to political struggle and ideological work, Zhou was the main driving force behind the affairs of state during much of the Cultural Revolution. His attempts at mitigating the Red Guards' damage and his efforts to protect others from their wrath made him immensely popular in the Cultural Revolution's later stages. As Mao Zedong's health began to decline in 1971 and 1972, Zhou struggled against the Gang of Four internally over leadership of China. Zhou's health was also failing, however, and he died eight months before Mao on 8 January 1976. The massive public outpouring of grief in Beijing turned to anger towards the Gang of Four, leading to the Tiananmen Incident. Although succeeded by Hua Guofeng, it was Deng Xiaoping, Zhou's ally, who was able to outmaneuver the Gang of Four politically and eventually take Hua's place as paramount leader by 1978. Extent of cooperation[edit] Zhou's activities immediately after his removal from his positions at Whampoa are uncertain. An earlier biographer claims that Chiang Kai-shek put Zhou in charge of "an advanced training center for the CCP members and commissars withdrawn from the army".[71] More recent Chinese Communist sources claim that Zhou had an important role at this time in securing Communist control of Ye Ting's Independent Regiment. The regiment and Ye Ting later played a leading role in the Communists' first major military action, the Nanchang Revolt.[61] In July 1926, the Nationalists began the Northern Expedition, a massive military attempt to unify China. The Expedition was led by Chiang Kai-shek and the National Revolutionary Army (NRA), an amalgam of earlier military forces with significant guidance from Russian military advisors and numerous Communists as both commanding and political officers. With the early successes of the Expedition, there was soon a race between Chiang Kai-shek leading the "right-wing" of the Nationalist Party and the Communists, running inside the "left-wing" of the Nationalists, for control of major southern cities such as Nanjing and Shanghai. At this point the Chinese portion of Shanghai was controlled by Sun Chuanfang, one of the militarists targeted by the North Expedition. Distracted by fighting with the NRA and defections from his army, Sun reduced his forces in Shanghai, and the Communists, whose party headquarters was located in Shanghai, made three attempts to seize control of the city, later called "the three Shanghai Uprisings", in October 1926, February 1927, and March 1927. Activities in Shanghai[edit] Zhou was transferred to Shanghai to assist in these activities, probably in late 1926. It seems he was not present for the first uprising on 23-24 October,[72] but he was certainly in Shanghai by December 1926. Early accounts credit Zhou with labor organizing activities in Shanghai after his arrival, or, more credibly, working to "strengthen the indoctrination of political workers in labor unions and smuggle arms for the strikers."[73] Reports that Zhou "organized" or "ordered" the second and third uprisings on 20 February and 21 March exaggerate his role. Major decisions during this period were made by the Communist head in Shanghai, Chen Duxiu, the Party's general secretary, with a special committee of eight party officials coordinating Communist actions. The committee also consulted closely on decisions with the Comintern representatives in Shanghai, headed by Grigori Voitinsky.[74] The partial documentation available for this period shows that Zhou headed the Communist Party Central Committee's Military Commission in Shanghai.[75] He participated in both the February and March actions, but was not the guiding hand in either event, instead working with A. P. Appen, the Soviet military advisor to the Central Committee, training the pickets of the General Labor Union, the Communist controlled labor organization in Shanghai. He also worked to make union strong arm squads more effective when the Communists declared a "Red Terror" after the failed February uprising; this action resulted in the murder of twenty "anti-union" figures, and the kidnapping, beating, and intimidation of others associated with anti-union activities.[76] The third Communist uprising in Shanghai took place from 20-21 March. 600,000 rioting workers cut power and telephone lines and seized the city's post office, police headquarters, and railway stations, often after heavy fighting. During this uprising, the insurrectionists were under strict orders not to harm foreigners, which they obeyed. The forces of Sun Chuanfang withdrew and uprising was successful, despite the small number of armed forces available. The first Nationalist troops entered the city the next day.[77] As the Communists attempted to install a soviet municipal government, conflict began between the Nationalists and Communists, and on 12 April Nationalist forces, including both members of the Green Gang and soldiers under the command of Nationalist general Bai Chongxi attacked the Communists and quickly overcame them. On the eve of the Nationalist attack, Wang Shouhua, who was both the head of the CCP Labour Committee and the Chairman of the General Labour Committee, accepted a dinner invitation from "Big-eared Du" (a Shanghai gangster) and was strangled after he arrived. Zhou himself was nearly killed in a similar trap, when he was arrested after arriving at a dinner held at the headquarters of Si Lie, a Nationalist commander of Chiang's Twenty-sixth Army. Despite rumors that Chiang had put a high price on Zhou's head, he was quickly released by Bai Chongxi's forces. The reasons for Zhou's sudden release may have been that Zhou was then the most senior Communist in Shanghai, that Chiang's efforts to exterminate the Shanghai Communists were highly secretive at the time, and that his execution would have been noticed as a violation of the cooperation agreement between the CCP and the KMT (which was technically still in effect). Zhou was finally only released after the intervention of a representative of the Twenty-sixth Army, Zhao Shu, who was able to convince his commanders that the arrest of Zhou had been a mistake.[78] Flight from Shanghai[edit] Fleeing Shanghai, Zhou made his way to Hankou (now part of Wuhan), and was a participant at the CCP's 5th National Congress there from 27 April to 9 May. At the end of the Congress, Zhou was elected to the Party's Central Committee, again heading the military department.[79] After Chiang Kai-shek's suppression of the Communists, the Nationalist Party split in two, with the Nationalist Party's "left-wing" (led by Wang Jingwei) controlling the government in Hankou, and Chiang and the party "right-wing" (led by Chiang Kai-shek) establishing a rival government in Nanjing. Still following Comintern instructions, the Communists remained as a "bloc inside" the Nationalist Party, hoping to continue expanding their influence through the Nationalists.[80] After being attacked by a warlord friendly to Chiang, Wang's leftist government disintegrated later in May 1927, and Chiang's troops began an organized purge of Communists in territories formerly controlled by Wang.[81] In mid-July Zhou was forced to go underground.[80] Pressured by their Comintern advisors, and themselves convinced that the "revolutionary high tide" had arrived, the Communists decided to launch a series of military revolts.[82] The first of these was the Nanchang Revolt. Zhou was sent to oversee the event, but the moving figures seem to have been Tan Pingshan and Li Lisan, while the main military figures were Ye Ting and He Long. In military terms, the revolt was a disaster, with the Communists' forces decimated and scattered.[83] Zhou himself contracted malaria during the campaign, and was secretly sent to Hong Kong for medical treatment by Nie Rongzhen and Ye Ting. After reaching Hong Kong, Zhou was disguised as a businessman named "Li", and entrusted to the care of local Communists. In a subsequent meeting of the CCP Central Committee, Zhou was blamed for the failure of the Nanchang campaign and temporarily demoted to being an alternate member of the Politburo.[84] Following the failed Nanchang and Autumn Harvest Uprisings of 1927, the Communists began to focus on establishing a series of rural bases of operation in southern China. Even before moving to Jiangxi, Zhou had become involved in the politics of these bases. Mao, claiming the need to eliminate counterrevolutionaries and Anti-Bolsheviks operating within the CCP, began an ideological purge of the populace inside the Jiangxi Soviet. Zhou, perhaps due to his own success planting moles within various levels of the KMT, agreed that an organized campaign to uncover subversion was justified, and supported the campaign as de facto leader of the CCP.[98] Mao's efforts soon developed into a ruthless campaign driven by paranoia and aimed not only at KMT spies, but at anyone with an ideological outlook different from Mao's. Suspects were commonly tortured until they confessed to their crimes and accused others of crimes, and wives and relatives who inquired of those being tortured were themselves arrested and tortured even more severely. Mao's attempts to purge the Red Army of those who might potentially oppose him led Mao to accuse Chen Yi, the commander and political commissar of the Jiangxi Military Region, as a counterrevolutionary, provoking a violent reaction against Mao's persecutions that became known as the "Futian Incident" in January 1931. Mao was eventually successful in subduing the Red Army, reducing its numbers from forty thousand to less than ten thousand. The campaign continued throughout 1930 and 1931. Historians estimate the total number who died due to Mao's persecution in all base areas to be approximately one hundred thousand.[99] The entire campaign occurred while Zhou was still in Shanghai. Although he had supported the elimination of counterrevolutionaries, Zhou actively suppressed the campaign when he arrived in Jiangxi in December 1931, criticizing the "excess, the panic, and the oversimplification" practiced by local officials. After investigating those accused of Anti-Bolshevism, and those persecuting them, Zhou submitted a report criticizing the campaign for focusing on the narrow persecution of anti-Maoists as anti-Bolshevists, exaggerating the threat to the Party, and condemning the use of torture as an investigative technique. Zhou's resolution was passed and adopted on 7 January 1932, and the campaign gradually subsided.[100] Zhou moved to the Jiangxi base area and shook up the propaganda-oriented approach to revolution by demanding that the armed forces under Communist control actually be used to expand the base, rather than just to control and defend it. In December 1931, Zhou replaced Mao Zedong as Secretary of the First Front Army with Xiang Ying, and made himself political commissar of the Red Army, in place of Mao. Liu Bocheng, Lin Biao and Peng Dehuai all criticized Mao's tactics at the October 1932 Ningdu Conference.[101][102] After moving to Jiangxi, Zhou met Mao for the first time since 1927, and began his long relationship with Mao as his superior. In the Ningdu conference, Mao was demoted to being a figurehead in the Soviet government. Zhou, who had come to appreciate Mao's strategies after the series of military failures waged by other Party leaders since 1927, defended Mao, but was unsuccessful. After achieving power, Mao later purged or demoted those who had opposed him in 1932, but remembered Zhou's defense of his policies.[103]

Whampoa Academy

After the death of Yuan Shikai, China fragmented into numerous fiefdoms ruled by warlords. Sun Yat-sen attempted in 1917 and 1920 to set up a base in his native Guangdong to launch a northern campaign to unite China under his Three Principles of the People. However, his government remained militarily weaker than local warlords armies. Calls by Sun for arms and money were ignored by the western powers. Then in 1921 the representative of Comintern, Henk Sneevliet (using the name Maring), met with Sun in Guangxi. He proposed setting up a military academy to train the revolutionary army, which confirmed Sun's ideas and he eventually accepted. The Chinese Communist Party sent Li Dazhao and Lin Boqu to discuss with Sun and his party on how to set up the academy. In 1924, in the 1st National Congress of Kuomintang, the policy of alliance with the Soviet Union and CCP was passed as guidance for KMT. As a result, the final decision of establishment of a military academy was made and preparatory committee was set up accordingly. The money necessary for the construction and support of the Academy in 1924-1925 was provided by the Soviets. Organization, training, and students[edit] Flag of the National Revolutionary Army (now as the Republic of China Army In the beginning, the Academy had only one department which provided soldiers with basic training. While the main Academy goal was preparation of infantry units, it also provided special classes for artillery, engineering, communication, logistical and machine gun units. A special department for preparation of political agitators was established later. The academy concentrated the revolutionary military talents at the time. Sun took the job of Premier of this academy in person although it was just an honorary title. Sun's favorite and rising star Chiang Kai-shek was appointed the first commandant of the academy. Liao Zhongkai, the famous leftist in the Kuomintang and Sun's treasury secretary, was appointed as representative of KMT to the academy. Zhou Enlai, Hu Hanmin and Wang Jingwei were one of the instructors in the political department. He Yingqin and Ye Jianying were once military instructors. The serious lack of expert teachers was the biggest problem for the Academy. That is why lectures delivered by Soviet officers were extremely popular with students. A.S. Bubnov, G.I. Gilev, M.I. Dratvin, S.N. Naumov prepared lectures which explained the development of military thought throughout human history and the division between western and Soviet schools of military thought. Zhou Enlai as Director of the political department, Whampoa Military Academy. Soviet officers taught different military subjects in the Academy using their broad experience gained during the Russian Civil War. Among them were I. Vasilevich (Janovsky), N. Korneev, M. Nefedov, F. Kotov (Katyushin), P. Lunev, V. Akimov. Galina Kolchugina (wife of Vasily Blyukher who was Commander-in-Chief of all Soviet volunteer forces sent to China) read a course of lectures on political agitation. The first two groups of students prepared by the Academy became the core for the formation of the first two National Revolutionary Army regiments (V.A. Stepanov was an advisor provided by the Soviet Union to help in this matter). The first two prepared groups of students included 500 officers, the third one had 800 officers and the fourth group had 2000. Legendary graduates include Nationalist commanders Chen Cheng, Du Yuming, Xue Yue, Hu Zongnan, Hu Lien and Guan Linzheng and Communist commanders Lin Biao, Xu Xiangqian, Zuo Quan, Liu Zhidan and Chen Geng. The young cadets first showed their training and courage in the war against local warlord and dissident of Sun, Chen Jiongming and later the unification of Guangdong province. Then they made greater contributions in the Northern Expedition. The Muslim Ma clique General Ma Zhongying, who commanded the 36th Division (National Revolutionary Army), attended the Whampoa military academy in Nanjing in 1929.[1][2][3]

Deng Xiaoping

Deng Xiaoping (22 August 1904 - 19 February 1997) was a Chinese revolutionary and statesman. He was the paramount leader of the People's Republic of China from 1978 until his retirement in 1989. After Chairman Mao Zedong's death, Deng led his country through far-reaching market-economy reforms. While Deng never held office as the head of state, head of government or General Secretary (that is, the leader of the Communist Party), he nonetheless was responsible for economic reforms and an opening to the global economy. Born into a peasant background in Guang'an, Sichuan province, Deng studied and worked in France in the 1920s, where he was convinced of Marxism-Leninism. He joined the Communist Party of China in 1923. Upon his return to China he joined the party organization in Shanghai, then was a political commissar for the Red Army in rural regions and by the late 1930s was considered a "revolutionary veteran" because he participated in the Long March.[1] Following the founding of the People's Republic in 1949, Deng worked in Tibet and the southwest region to consolidate Communist control. As the party's Secretary General in the 1950s, Deng presided over anti-rightist campaigns and became instrumental in China's economic reconstruction following the Great Leap Forward of 1957-1960. His economic policies, however, were at odds with Mao's political ideologies and he was purged twice during the Cultural Revolution. Following Mao's death in 1976, Deng outmaneuvered Mao's chosen successor, Hua Guofeng. Inheriting a country beset with social conflict, disenchantment with the Party, and institutional disorder resulting from the leftist policies of the Mao era, Deng became the paramount figure of the "second generation" of Party leadership. Some called him "the architect"[2] of a new brand of thinking that combined socialist ideology with pragmatic market economy whose slogan was "Socialism with Chinese Characteristics". Deng opened China to foreign investment and the global market, policies that are credited with developing China into one of the fastest-growing economies in the world for several generations and raising the standard of living of hundreds of millions.[3] Deng was also criticized for ordering the crackdown on the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989, but praised for his reaffirmation of the reform program in his Southern Tour of 1992 and the reversion of Hong Kong to Chinese control in 1997. Deng possibly has ancestry from ethnically Hakka Han family in the village of Paifang (牌坊村), in the township of Xiexing (协兴镇), Guang'an County in Sichuan province,[4][5] approximately 160 km (99 mi) from Chongqing (formerly spelled Chungking). Deng's ancestors can be traced back to Mei County, Guangdong,[5] a prominent ancestral area for the Hakka people, and had been settled in Sichuan for several generations.[6] Deng Xiaoping's daughter Deng Rong wrote in the book "My father Deng Xiaoping" (我的父亲邓小平) that his ancestry was probably but not definitely Hakka. Sichuan was originally the origin of the Deng lineage until one of them was hired as an official in Guangdong during the Ming dynasty but during the Qing plan to increase the population in 1671 they came to Sichuan again. Deng Xiaoping was born in Sichuan.[7] Deng's father, Deng Wenming, was a middle-level landowner and had studied at the University of Law and Political Science in Chengdu. His mother, surnamed Dan, died early in Deng's life, leaving Deng, his three brothers and three sisters.[8] At the age of five Deng was sent to a traditional Chinese-style private primary school, followed by a more modern primary school at the age of seven. Deng's first wife, one of his schoolmates from Moscow, died aged 24 a few days after giving birth to Deng's first child, a baby girl who also died. His second wife, Jin Weiying, left him after Deng came under political attack in 1933. His third wife Zhuo Lin was the daughter of an industrialist in Yunnan Province. She became a member of the Communist Party in 1938, and married Deng a year later in front of Mao's cave dwelling in Yan'an. They had five children: three daughters (Deng Lin, Deng Nan and Deng Rong) and two sons (Deng Pufang and Deng Zhifang). Education and early career[edit] Deng's name is spelled "Teng Hi Hien" on this employment card from the Hutchinson shoes factory in Châlette-sur-Loing, France. Deng worked there on two occasions as seen from the dates, eight months in 1922 and again in 1923 when he was fired after one month. The bottom annotation reads "refused to work, do not take him back". When Deng first attended school, his tutor objected to his having the given name "Xiānshèng" (a near-homophone for the honorific xiānshēng 先生, analogous to "mister", "sir", Sino-Japanese sensei), calling him "Xixian", which includes the characters "to aspire to" and "goodness", with overtones of wisdom.[9] In the summer of 1919 Deng Xiaoping graduated from the Chongqing School. He and 80 schoolmates travelled by ship to France (traveling steerage) to participate in the Diligent Work-Frugal Study Movement, a work-study program in which 4,001 Chinese would participate by 1927. Deng, the youngest of all the Chinese students in the group, had just turned 15.[10] Wu Yuzhang, local leader of the Movement in Chongqing, enrolled Deng and his paternal uncle, Deng Shaosheng, in the program. Deng's father strongly supported his son's participation in the work-study abroad program.[11] The night before his departure, Deng's father took his son aside and asked him what he hoped to learn in France. He repeated the words he had learned from his teachers: "To learn knowledge and truth from the West in order to save China." Deng was aware that China was suffering greatly, and that the Chinese people must have a modern education to save their country.[12] Part of a series on Communism Communist star.svg Concepts[show] Aspects[show] Variants[show] Internationals[show] People[show] By region[show] Related topics[show] Symbol-hammer-and-sickle.svg Communism portal v t e In December 1920 a French packet ship, the André Lyon, sailed into Marseille with 210 Chinese students aboard including Deng. The sixteen-year-old Deng briefly attended middle schools in Bayeux and Châtillon, but he spent most of his time in France working. His first job was as a fitter at the Le Creusot Iron and Steel Plant in La Garenne-Colombes, a south-western suburb of Paris where he moved in April 1921. Coincidentally, when Deng Xiaoping's later political fortunes were down and he was sent to work in a tractor factory in 1974 he found himself a fitter again, and proved to still be a master of the skill.[13] In La Garenne-Colombes Deng met Zhou Enlai, Nie Rongzhen, Cai Hesen, Zhao Shiyan and Li Wenhai.[13] Under the influence of these older Chinese students in France, Deng began to study Marxism and engaged in political dissemination work. In 1921 he joined the Chinese Communist Youth League in Europe. In the second half of 1924 he joined the Chinese Communist Party and became one of the leading members of the General Branch of the Youth League in Europe. In 1926 Deng traveled to the Soviet Union and studied at Moscow Sun Yat-sen University, where one of his classmates was Chiang Ching-kuo, the son of Chiang Kai-shek.[14] Return to China[edit] In late 1927, Deng left Moscow to return to China, where he joined the army of Feng Yuxiang, a military leader in northwest China, who had requested assistance from the Soviet Union in his struggle with other local leaders in the region. At that time, the Soviet Union, through the Comintern, an international organization supporting the communist movements, supported the Communists' alliance with the Nationalists of the Kuomintang (KMT) party founded by Sun Yat-sen. He arrived in Xi'an, the stronghold of Feng Yuxiang, in March 1927. He was part of the Fengtian clique's attempt to prevent the break of the alliance between the KMT and the Communists. This split resulted in part from Chiang Kai-shek's forcing them to flee areas controlled by the KMT. After the breakup of the alliance between communists and nationalists, Feng Yuxiang stood on the side of Chiang Kai-shek, and the Communists who participated in their army, such as Deng Xiaoping, were forced to flee. In 1929 Deng led the Baise Uprising in Guangxi province against the Kuomintang (KMT) government. The uprising failed and Deng went to the Central Soviet Area in Jiangxi province.

Democracy Wall /Wei Jingsheng

Early years[edit] Wei was the oldest of four children, brought up by Chinese Communist Party cadres. In 1966, Wei joined the Red Guards as a 16-year-old student during the Cultural Revolution.[4] He lived in remote rural areas in Northern China and was able to speak with peasant farmers about the widespread famines that had occurred a few years before, during the Great Leap Forward.[5] He uncovered the role that the communist government under Mao Zedong played in causing the famines, and it forced Wei to start questioning the nature of the system he lived under.[3] Wei would later write about this period: "I felt as if I had suddenly awakened from a long dream, but everyone around me was still plunged in darkness."[6] In 1973, he began working as an electrician at the Beijing Zoo.[4] Democracy Democracy Wall[edit] Wei did not publicly voice his feelings until 1978, when he decided to take part in the newly emerged Democracy Wall movement taking place in Beijing. On 5 December 1978, he posted an essay he authored to the wall, entitled, the Fifth Modernization as a response to Paramount leader Deng Xiaoping's essay, the Four Modernizations. Wei's basic theme in the essay is that democracy should be also be a modernization goal for China along with the other four proposed by Deng (the four being: industry, agriculture, science and technology, and national defense).[7] Wei signed the essay with his real name and address. The essay immediately caused a stir because of its boldness and because it was not anonymous. It was also the only essay to address Deng Xiaoping by name, and refer to him as a dictator.[7] Of course, internal problems cannot be solved overnight but must be constantly addressed as part of a long-term process. Mistakes and shortcomings will be inevitable, but these are for us to worry about. This is infinitely better than facing abusive overlords against whom there is no redress. Those who worry that democracy will lead to anarchy and chaos are just like those who, following the overthrow of the Qing dynasty, worried that without an emperor the country would fall into chaos. Their decision was to patiently suffer oppression because they feared that without the weight of oppression, their spines might completely collapse! To such people, I would like to say, with all due respect: We want to be the masters of our own destiny. We need no gods or emperors and we don't believe in saviors of any kind...we do not want to serve as mere tools of dictators with personal ambitions for carrying out modernization. We want to modernize the lives of the people. Democracy, freedom, and happiness for all are our sole objectives.[8] — Wei Jingsheng, excerpt from "Fifth Modernization" essay posted on Democracy Wall (late 1978) Arrest and imprisonment[edit] Wei was also known for his editorial work in the short-lived magazine Explorations (探索) in 1979. He had also published a letter under his name in March 1979 denouncing the inhuman conditions of the Chinese Qincheng Prison, where the 10th Panchen Lama was imprisoned.[9] His dissident writings eventually saw him tried and imprisoned. Writes Orville Schell, a writer and academic specializing in China: On March 25, hearing through the grapevine that a crackdown was imminent, Wei and his colleagues rushed out a special edition of Explorations entitled "Do We Want Democracy or a New Dictatorship?"... Wei and some thirty other Democracy Wall activists were rounded up [soon after]. That October, Wei Jingsheng was brought to trial and accused of "supplying military intelligence [on China's war with Vietnam] to a foreigner and of openly agitating for the overthrow of the government of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the socialist system in China."... For his outspoken views Wei was sentenced to a prison term of 15 years.[10][11] Wei ultimately spent a total of 18 years in different prisons in China. The letters that he wrote while he was in prison explaining his views were compiled into a book, The Courage to Stand Alone: Letters from Prison and Other Writings. Some of the letters were addressed directly to Deng Xiaoping, others to different family members of Wei.[3][12] He remained imprisoned until 14 September 1993, when he was released just one week prior to a vote by the International Olympic Committee over whether to award the 2000 Summer Olympics to Beijing or Sydney. Wei continued to speak out, despite the threat of arrest.[13] On 27 February 1994, Wei met with United States Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights John Shattuck to discuss human rights conditions in China, and also met with journalists. Wei was arrested the following week along with fifteen other democracy and labor activists.[14] Although released shortly afterward and sent into exile in Tianjin, Wei was arrested once more on 1 April 1994 when he tried to return to Beijing. Charged with plotting against the state, he was sentenced to 14 years in prison, but he would only remain in jail until 16 November 1997, when he was released for "medical reasons" and promptly deported to the United States.[14] He was sent to the United States due to international pressure, especially the request by then US President Bill Clinton.[7]

Hu Yaobang

Hu Yaobang (November 20, 1915 - April 15, 1989) was a high-ranking official of the People's Republic of China. He was the leader of the Communist Party of China from 1981 to 1987, first as Chairman from 1981 to 1982, then as General Secretary from 1982 to 1987. Hu joined the Chinese Communist Party in the 1930s, and rose to prominence as a comrade of Deng Xiaoping. During the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), Hu was purged, recalled, and purged again. After Deng rose to power, following the death of Mao Zedong, Deng promoted Hu to a series of high political positions. Throughout the 1980s Hu pursued a series of economic and political reforms under the direction of Deng. Hu's political and economic reforms made him the enemy of several powerful Party elders, who opposed free market reforms and attempts to make China's government more transparent. When widespread student protests occurred across China in 1987, Hu's political opponents successfully blamed Hu for the disruptions, claiming that Hu's "laxness" and "bourgeois liberalization" had either led to, or worsened, the protests. Hu was forced to resign as Party general secretary in 1987, but was allowed to retain a seat in the Politburo. Hu's position as Party general secretary was taken by Zhao Ziyang, who continued many of Hu's economic and political reforms. A day after Hu's death, in 1989, a small-scale demonstration commemorated him and demanded that the government reassess his legacy. A week later, the day before Hu's funeral, some 100,000 students marched on Tiananmen Square, leading to the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989. Following the government's suppression of the 1989 protests, the Chinese government censored the details of Hu's life inside mainland China, but it officially rehabilitated his image and lifted its censorship restrictions on the 90th anniversary of Hu's birth, in 2005. Early PRC politician[edit] Hu Yaobang in 1953 In 1949, the CCP successfully defeated Nationalist forces on mainland China, and the communists founded the People's Republic. In 1952, Hu accompanied Deng to Beijing, and Hu became the leader of the Communist Youth League from 1952-1966.[5] Hu rose rapidly up the Communist Party hierarchy, until Mao sent Hu to work as First Party Secretary of Shaanxi in 1964, saying: "He needs some practical training". Hu may have been assigned to work outside of Beijing because he was judged as being not sufficiently enthusiastic about Maoism.[9] Unlike many of his colleagues, Hu was able to keep his membership within the Party Central Committee until the 9th Party Congress in April 1969. During the Cultural Revolution, Hu was purged twice and rehabilitated twice, mirroring the political career of Hu's mentor, Deng Xiaoping.[10] In 1969, Hu was recalled to Beijing to be persecuted. Hu became "number one" among the "Three Hus", whose names were vilified and who were paraded through Beijing wearing heavy wooden collars around their necks. The other two "Hus" were Hu Keshi, who was the second most senior member of the Communist Youth League, and Hu Qili, who was third most senior in the Communist Youth League and who had also become a close associate of Deng Xiaoping. After being publicly humiliated, Hu was sent to an isolated work camp to participate in "reformation through labour" under strict security. While in political exile Hu was forced to work hauling large boulders by hand.[9] When Deng was temporarily recalled to Beijing, from 1973-1976, Hu was also recalled; but, when Deng was purged again, in 1976, Hu was also purged.[6] After his second purge, Hu was sent to herd cattle.[9] Hu was recalled and rehabilitated a second time in 1977, shortly after Mao's death. After Hu was recalled, he was promoted to directing the Party's organizational department, and later directed Party propaganda through a department of the Politburo.[5] Hu was one of the main leaders responsible for re-assessing the fates of people who had been persecuted during the Cultural Revolution. According to the Chinese government, Hu was personally responsible for exonerating over three million people.[10] Hu tacitly supported the 1978 Democracy Wall protesters, and invited two of the activists to his home in Beijing. Hu opposed Hua Guofeng's "Two Whatevers" policy, and was an important supporter of Deng Xiaoping's ascent to power.[9] Reformer[edit] Public policies[edit] Hu Yaobang's rise to power was engineered by Deng Xiaoping, and Hu rose to the highest levels of the Party after Deng displaced Hua Guofeng as China's "paramount leader". In 1980 Hu became Party Secretary General, and was elected to the powerful Politburo Standing Committee. In 1981, Hu became CPC Chairman, but helped abolish the position of Party chairman in 1982, as part of a broader effort to distance China from Maoist politics. Most of the chairman's functions were transferred to the post of General Secretary, a post taken by Hu. Deng's displacement of Hua Guofeng marked the Party leadership's consensus that China should abandon strict Maoist economics in favor of more pragmatic policies, and Hu directed many of Deng's attempts to reform the Chinese economy.[5] By 1982, Hu was the second most powerful person in China, after Deng.[11] Throughout the last decade of Hu's career, he promoted the role of intellectuals as being fundamental to China's achievement of the Four Modernizations.[10] During the early 1980s, Deng referred to Hu and Zhao Ziyang as his "left and right hands".[12] After advancing to the position of general secretary, Hu promoted a number of political reforms, often collaborating with Zhao. The ultimate goals of Hu's reforms were sometimes vaguely defined. Hu attempted to reform China's political system by: requiring candidates to be directly elected in order to enter the Politburo; holding more elections with more than one candidate; increasing government transparency; increasing public consultation before determining Party policy; and, increasing the degree that government officials could be held directly responsible for their mistakes.[13] During his time in office, Hu tried to rehabilitate the people who were persecuted during the Cultural Revolution. Many Chinese people think that this was his most important achievement. He was also in favor of a pragmatic policy in Tibet after realising the mistakes of previous policies. He ordered the withdrawal of thousands of Chinese Han cadres from the Tibet Autonomous Region following a May 1980 visit to the region, believing that Tibetans should be empowered to administer their own affairs.[14] Han Chinese who remained were required to learn Tibetan.[15] He set out six requirements to improve 'existing conditions', including the increase of state funds to the Autonomous Region, improvements in education, and "efforts to revive Tibetan culture".[16] At the same time, Hu stated that "anything that is not suited to Tibet's conditions should be rejected or modified".[15] Hu made a point of explicitly apologizing to Tibetans for China's misrule of the region during this trip.[9] Hu traveled widely throughout his time as general secretary, visiting 1500 individual districts and villages in order to inspect the work of local officials and to keep in touch with the common people. When he was sixty-five, Hu retraced the route of the Long March, and took the opportunity to visit and inspect remote military bases located in Tibet, Xinjiang, Yunnan, Qinghai, and Inner Mongolia.[17] Controversial political opinions[edit] Hu was notable for his liberalism and the frank expression of his opinions, which sometimes agitated other senior Chinese leaders. On a trip to Inner Mongolia in 1984, Hu publicly suggested that Chinese people might start eating in a Western way (with forks and knives, on individual plates) in order to prevent communicable diseases. He was one of the first Chinese officials to abandon wearing a Mao suit in favor of Western business suits. When asked which of Mao Zedong's theories were desirable for modern China, he replied "I think, none".[18] Hu was not prepared to abandon Marxism completely, but frankly expressed the opinion that Communism could not solve "all of mankind's problems". Hu encouraged intellectuals to raise controversial subjects in the media, including democracy, human rights, and the possibility of introducing legal limits to the Communist Party's influence within the Chinese government. Many Party elders mistrusted Hu from the start, and eventually grew to fear his influence.[17] Hu made sincere efforts to repair Sino-Japanese relations, but was criticized for the scope of his efforts. In 1984, when Beijing recognized the twelfth anniversary of Japan's diplomatic recognition of the People's Republic, Hu invited 3,000 Japanese youth to Beijing, and arranged for them to tour Shanghai, Hangzhou, Nanjing, Wuhan, and Xi'an. Many senior officials considered Hu's efforts extravagant, since Japan had only invited 500 Chinese youths to Japan the previous year. Hu was criticized internally for the lavish gifts that he gave to visiting Japanese officials, and for allowing his daughter to privately accompany Japanese prime minister Nakasone's son when they visited Beijing. Hu defended his actions by citing the importance of strong Sino-Japanese relations, and his belief that the atrocities committed by Japan in China during World War II were the actions of military warlords, and not ordinary citizens.[19] Hu alienated potential allies within the People's Liberation Army when he suggested for two consecutive years that the Chinese defense budget should be reduced, and senior military leaders began to criticize him. Military officials accused Hu of making poor choices when purchasing military hardware from Australia in 1985. When Hu visited Britain, military officials criticized him for drinking soup too loudly during a banquet hosted by Queen Elizabeth II.[20] Zhao and Hu began a large-scale anti-corruption programme, and permitted the investigations of the children of high-ranking Party elders, who had grown up protected by their parents' influence. Hu's investigation of Party officials belonging to this "Crown Prince Party" made Hu unpopular with many powerful Party officials.[13] After Deng refused to support some of Hu's reforms, Hu made private comments critical of Deng Xiaoping for his indecisiveness and "old-fashioned" way of thinking, opinions which Deng eventually became aware of.[21] "Resignation"[edit] In December 1986, a group of students organized public protests across over a dozen cities in support of political and economic liberalization. The protests began in the University of Science and Technology in Hefei, Anhui, where they were led by the controversial astrophysicist, Fang Lizhi, who was then Vice Chancellor of the university. Fang talked openly about introducing political reforms which would end the influence of the Communist Party within the Chinese government. The protests were also led by two other "radical intellectuals", Wang Ruowang and Liu Binyan.[20] Deng Xiaoping disliked all three leaders, and directed Hu to dismiss them from the Party in order to silence them, but Hu refused.[21] In January 1987, after two weeks of student protests demanding greater Western-style freedoms,[5] a clique of Party elders and senior military officials forced Hu to resign on the grounds that he had been too lenient with student protesters and for moving too quickly towards free market-style economic reforms.[4] After Hu's dismissal, Deng promoted Zhao Ziyang to replace Hu as Party general secretary, putting Zhao in a position to succeed Deng as "paramount leader".[13] Hu officially resigned as Party general secretary on 16 January, but retained his seat in the Politburo Standing Committee.[5] When Hu "resigned", the Party forced him to issue a humiliating "self-criticism of his mistakes on major issues of political principles in violation of the party's principle of collective leadership." After 1987 Hu became more reclusive and less active in Chinese politics, studying revolutionary history and practicing his calligraphy in his spare time, and taking long walks for exercise.[6] Hu was generally viewed as having no real power after 1987, and he was resigned to largely ceremonial roles. Hu's "resignation" harmed the credibility of the CCP while improving Hu's own. Among Chinese intellectuals Hu became an example of a man who refused to compromise his convictions in the face of political resistance, and who had paid the price as a result. The promotion of a conservative, Li Peng, to the position of premier after Hu's departure from executive-level positions made the government less enthusiastic to pursue reform, and upset plans of an orderly succession of power from Deng Xiaoping to any politician similar to Hu.[18] Death, protests, and burial[edit] Hu's Statue in his hometown Liuyang Death and public reactions[edit] In October 1987 Hu retained his membership in the CCP's Central Committee at the 13th Party Congress, and was subsequently elected a member of the new Politburo by the first plenary session of the Central Committee. On April 8, 1989, Hu suffered a heart attack while attending a Politburo meeting in Zhongnanhai to discuss education reform. Hu was rushed to the hospital, accompanied by his wife. Hu died several days later, on April 15. He was 73 years old. Hu's last words were that he should be buried simply, without extravagance, in his hometown.[22] In his official obituary, Hu was described as "a long-tested and staunch communist warrior, a great proletarian revolutionist and statesman, an outstanding political leader for the Chinese army".[10] Western reporters observed that Hu's obituary was intentionally "glowing" in order to divert suspicion that the Party had mistreated him.[18] At the memorial service, Hu's widow Li Zhao blamed Hu's death on how harshly the party treated him, telling Deng Xiaoping "It's all because of you people."[23] Although he had become a semi-retired official by the time of his death, and had been removed from positions of real power for his "mistakes", public pressure forced the Chinese government to give him a state funeral, attended by Party leaders. The eulogy at Hu's funeral praised his work in restoring political normality and promoting economic development after the Cultural Revolution.[24] Public mourners at Hu's funeral lined up ten miles long, a reaction which surprised China's leaders. Shortly after Hu's funeral, students in Beijing began petitioning the government to officially reverse the verdict that had led to Hu's "resignation", and to provide a more elaborate public funeral. The government then held a public memorial service for Hu in the Great Hall of the People.[22] On April 22, 1989, 50,000 students marched to Tiananmen Square to participate in Hu's memorial service, and to deliver a letter of petition to Premier Li Peng.[25] Many people were dissatisfied with the party's slow response and relatively subdued funerary arrangements. Public mourning began on the streets of Beijing and elsewhere. In Beijing this was centred on the Monument to the People's Heroes in Tiananmen Square. The mourning became a public conduit for anger against perceived nepotism in the government, the unfair dismissal and early death of Hu, and the behind-the-scenes role of the "old men", officially retired leaders who nevertheless maintained quasi-legal power, such as Deng Xiaoping.[24] The protests eventually escalated into the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989. Hu's promotion of the ideas on freedom of speech and freedom of press greatly influenced the students participating in the protests. Tomb[edit]

Hong Xiuquan / Taiping Rebellion

Hong Xiuquan (哄秀全) (1 January 1814[1] - 1 June 1864), born Hong Huoxiu and with the courtesy name Renkun, was a Hakka Chinese leader of the Taiping Rebellion against the Qing Dynasty, establishing the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom over varying portions of southern China, with himself as the "Heavenly King" and self-proclaimed brother of Jesus Christ. In 1837, Hong attempted and failed the imperial examinations for a third time, leading to a nervous breakdown.[18] Delirious for days, his family feared for his life.[19] While convalescing, Hong dreamt that he visited Heaven and discovered that he possessed a celestial family distinct from his earthly family, which included a heavenly father, mother, elder brother, sister-in-law, wife, and son.[20] His heavenly father, wearing a black dragon robe and high-brimmed hat with a long golden beard, lamented that men were worshiping demons rather than him and presented Hong with a sword and golden seal with which to slay the demons infesting Heaven.[21] Hong dreamt that he did so with the help of his celestial older-brother and a heavenly army.[22] The father figure later informed Hong that his given name violated taboos and must be changed, suggesting as one option the "Hong Xiuquan" moniker ultimately adopted by Hong.[23] In later embellishments, Hong would declare that he also saw Confucius being punished by Hong's celestial father for leading the people astray.[24] His acquaintances would later claim that after awakening from his dreams Hong became more careful, friendly, and open, while his pace became imposing and firm and his height and size increased.[25] Hong stopped studying for the imperial examinations and sought work as a teacher. For the next several years Hong taught at several schools around the area of his hometown. In 1843, Hong failed the imperial examinations for the fourth and final time.[26] It was only then, prompted by a visit by his cousin, that Hong took time to carefully examine the Christian pamphlets he had received.[27] After reading these pamphlets, Hong came to believe that they had given him the key to interpreting his visions: his celestial father was God the Father (whom he identified with Shangdi from Chinese tradition), the elder brother that he had seen was Jesus Christ, and he had been directed to rid the world of demon worship.[28][29] This interpretation led him to conclude that was the literal son of God and younger brother to Jesus.[30] In contrast to some of the later leaders of his movement, Hong appears to have genuinely believed in his ascent to Heaven and divine mission.[31] After coming to this conclusion Hong began destroying idols and enthusiastically preaching his interpretation of Christianity.[2] As a symbolic gesture to purge China of Confucianism, he and the cousin asked for two giant swords, three chi (about 1 metre) long and nine jin (about 4.5 kg), called the "demon-slaying swords" (斬妖劍), to be forged.[32] Hong began by burning all Confucian and Buddhist statues and books in his house, and began preaching to his community about his visions. Some of his earliest converts were relatives of his who had also failed their examinations and belonged to the Hakka minority, Feng Yunshan and Hong Rengan.[33] He collaborated with them to destroy holy statues in small villages, to the ire of local citizens and officials. Hong and his converts' acts were considered sacrilegious and they were persecuted by Confucians who forced them to leave their positions as village tutors. In April 1844, Hong, Feng Yunshan, and two other relatives of Hong left Hua county to travel and preach.[34] They first journeyed to Guangzhou and preached in the outlying areas before heading northwest to White Tiger Village.[35] There, Hong and Feng Yunshan split off and traveled some 250 miles to the southwest to the village of Sigu, Guiping county, Guangxi, where distant relatives of Hong's resided, including two early converts who had returned home.[36] It is in or near Sigu that Hong begins to draft "Exhortations to Worship the One True God," his first substantial work.[37] In November 1844, after having preached in Guangxi for five months, Hong returned home without Feng and resumed his previous job as a village teacher, while continuing to write religious tracts.[38] The God Worshippers[edit] In 1847, Hong Xiuquan was invited by a member of the Chinese Union to study with the American Southern Baptist missionary, Reverend Issachar Jacox Roberts.[39] Hong accepted and traveled to Guangzhou with his cousin Hong Rengan.[40] Once there, Hong studied Karl Gützlaff's translations of the Old and New Testaments and requested to be baptized by Roberts.[41] Roberts refused to do so, possibly due to Hong being tricked by the other converts into requesting monetary aid from Roberts.[42] Hong left Guangzhou on July 12, 1847 to search for Feng Yunshan.[43] Although robbed of all of his possessions, including his demon-slaying sword, by bandits in the town of Meizixun, he eventually reached Thistle Mountain on August 27, 1847.[44] There, he reunited with Feng and discovered the Society of God-Worshippers Feng had founded.[45] In January 1848, Feng Yunshan was arrested and banished to Guangdong, and Hong Xiuquan left for Guangdong shortly thereafter to once again reunite with Feng.[46] In Feng and Hong's absence, Yang Xiuqing and Xiao Chaogui emerged to lead the God Worshippers.[47] Both claimed to enter trances which allowed them to speak as a member of the Trinity; God the Father in the case of Yang and Jesus Christ in the case of Xiao.[48] When Hong and Feng's return in the summer of 1849, they investigated Yang and Xiao's claims and declared them to be genuine.[49] Most of Hong Xiuquan's knowledge of the scriptures came from the books known as "Good Words to Admonish the Age" by the Chinese preacher Liang Fa as well as a localized Bible translated into Chinese. Many Western missionaries grew jealous of Hong and his local ministry. These missionaries were fond of spreading rumors about him, one such rumor being that he had not been baptized (Hong and his cousin were in fact both baptized according to the way prescribed in the pamphlet "Good words to admonish the age").[50] In 1847, Hong began his translation and adaptation of the Bible, what came to be known as "Authorized Taiping Version of the Bible, or "The Taiping Bible", which he based on Gutzlaff's translation. He presented his followers with the Bible as a vision of the authentic religion that had existed in ancient China before it was wiped out by Confucius and the imperial system. The deity of the Old Testament punished evil nations and rewarded those who followed his commandments, even music, food, and marriage laws.[51] Hong made some minor changes in the text, such as correcting misprints and improving the prose style, but adapted the meaning elsewhere to fit his own theology and moral teachings. For instance, in Genesis 27:25 the Israelites did not drink wine, and in Genesis 38:16-26 he omitted the sexual relations between the father and his son's widow.[51] Hong preached a mixture of communal utopianism, evangelism, and Christianity. While proclaiming sexual equality, the sect segregated men from women and encouraged all its followers to pay their assets into a communal treasury.[52] When Hong returned to Guangxi, he found that Feng Yunshan had accumulated a following of around 2,000 converts. Guangxi was a dangerous area at this time with many bandit groups based in the mountains and pirates on the rivers. Perhaps due to these more pressing concerns, the authorities were largely tolerant of Hong and his followers. However, the instability of the region meant that Hong's followers were inevitably drawn into conflict with other groups, not least because of their predominately Hakka ethnicity. There are records of numerous incidents when local villages and clans, as well as groups of pirates and bandits, came into conflict with the authorities, and responded by fleeing to join Hong's movement. The rising tension between the sect and the authorities was probably the most important factor in Hong's eventual decision to rebel. Rebellion and the Heavenly Kingdom[edit] Main article: Taiping Rebellion By 1850 Hong had between 10,000 and 30,000 followers. The authorities were alarmed at the growing size of the sect and ordered them to disperse. A local force was sent to attack them when they refused, but the imperial troops were routed and a deputy magistrate killed. A full-scale attack was launched by government forces in the first month of 1851, in what came to be known as the Jintian Uprising, named after the town of Jintian (present-day Guiping, Guangxi) where the sect was based. Hong's followers emerged victorious and beheaded the Manchu commander of the government army. Hong declared the founding of the "Heavenly Kingdom of Transcendent Peace" on 11 January 1851. Despite this evidence of planning, Hong and his followers faced immediate challenges. The local Green Standard Army outnumbered them ten to one, and had recruited the help of the river pirates to keep the rebellion contained to Jintian. After a month of preparation the rebels managed to break through the blockade and fight their way to the town of Yongan (not to be confused with Yong'an), which fell to them on 25 September 1851. Hong and his troops remained in Yongan for three months, sustained by local landowners who were hostile to the Manchu-ruled Qing Dynasty. The imperial army regrouped and launched another attack on the rebels in Yongan. Having run out of gunpowder, Hong's followers fought their way out by sword, and made for the city of Guilin, to which they laid siege. However, the fortifications of Guilin proved too strong, and Hong and his followers eventually gave up and set out northwards, towards Hunan. Here, they encountered an elite militia created by a local member of the gentry specifically to put down peasant rebellions. The two forces fought at Soyi Ford on 10 June 1852 where the rebels were forced into retreat, and 20% of their troops were killed. However, in March 1853, Hong's forces managed to take Nanjing and turned it into the capital of their movement. After establishing his capital at Nanjing Hong implemented an ambitious programme of reforms. He created an elaborate civil bureaucracy, reformed the calendar used in his kingdom, outlawed opium use, and introduced a number of reforms designed to make women more socially equal to men.[2] Hong ruled by making frequent proclamations from his Heavenly Palace, demanding strict compliance with various moral and religious rules. Most trade was suppressed, and some communal land ownership was introduced. Polygamy was forbidden and men and women were separated, although Hong and other leaders maintained groups of concubines. Yang Xiuqing, also known as the "East King", was a fellow Taiping leader who had directed successful military campaigns and who often claimed to speak with the voice of God. Hong became increasingly suspicious of Yang's ambitions and his network of spies. In 1856, he and others in the Taiping élite had Yang and his family murdered in a purge that spiralled out of control, resulting in the further purge of its main perpetrator Wei Changhui.[53] Following a failed attempt by the Taiping rebels to take Shanghai in 1860, Qing government forces, aided by Western officers, slowly gained ground.

hukou registration system

Household registration in the Chinese mainland[edit] An individual household's register or hukou booklet; the local police station would hold a copy of these records in its central register The Communist Party promoted a command economy when it came to power in 1949. In 1958, the Chinese government officially promulgated the family register system to control the movement of people between urban and rural areas. Individuals were broadly categorised as a "rural" or "urban" worker.[9] A worker seeking to move from the country to urban areas to take up non-agricultural work would have to apply through the relevant bureaucracies. The number of workers allowed to make such moves was tightly controlled. Migrant workers would require six passes to work in provinces other than their own.[10] People who worked outside their authorized domain or geographical area would not qualify for grain rations, employer-provided housing, or health care.[11] Rationale[edit] With its large rural population of poor farm workers, hukou limited mass migration from the land to the cities to ensure some structural stability. The hukou system was an instrument of the command economy. By regulating labour, it ensured an adequate supply of low cost workers to the plethora of state owned businesses.[12] For some time, the Chinese Ministry of Public Security continued to justify the hukou system on public order grounds, and also provided demographic data for government central planning.[13] The Hukou system has been viewed by some scholars as instrumental to the political stability of China by better monitoring of "targeted persons", people who are politically dubious by the Party's standards. It is a type of institutional exclusion that helps to organize and manage the Chinese population, contributing to the Chinese economic growth but creating significant ethical problems.[14] This is still a significant function as of 2006.[15] Prior to the Chinese economic reform that began in the late 1970s, the system succeeded in limiting population growth in the cities.[16] Enforcement[edit] From around 1953 to 1976, police periodically rounded up those who were without valid residence permits, placed them in detention centres, and expelled them from cities.[17] Administration regulations issued in 1982 known as "custody and repatriation" authorized police to detain people, and "repatriate" them to their permanent residency location.[citation needed] Although an individual is technically required to live in the area designated on his/her permit, in practice the system has largely broken down[citation needed]. After the Chinese economic reforms, it became possible for some[who?] to unofficially migrate and get a job without a valid permit[citation needed]. Economic reforms also created pressures to encourage migration from the interior to the coast[citation needed]. It also provided incentives for officials not to enforce regulations on migration. Technology has made it easier to enforce the Hukou system as now the police force has a national database of official Hukou registrations. This was made possible by computerisation in the 1990s, as well as greater co-operation between the different regional police authorities.[15] During the Great Leap Forward's famine[edit] During the mass famine of the Great Leap Forward from 1958 to 1962, having an urban versus a rural hukou could mean the difference between life and death.[18] During this period, nearly all of the approximately 600 million rural hukou residents were collectivized into village communal farms, where their agricultural output - after state taxes - would be their only source of food. With institutionalized exaggeration of output figures by local Communist leaders and massive declines in production, state taxes during those years confiscated nearly all food in many rural communes, leading to mass starvation and the deaths of more than 30 million Chinese.[19] The 100 million urban hukou residents, however, were fed by fixed food rations established by the central government, which declined to an average of 1500 calories per day at times but still allowed survival for almost all during the famine. An estimated 95% or higher of all deaths occurred among rural hukou holders. With the suppression of news internally, many city residents were not aware that mass deaths were occurring in the countryside at all, which was essential to preventing organized opposition to Mao's policies.[20] Major functions[edit] The hukou system's primary function is to register residents, collect and store information about the populace, provide personal identification, and certify relations and residences. It performs three additional functions:[21] It is the basis for resource allocation and the provision of subsidies for selected groups of the population. This function has shaped much of Chinese economic development in the past half-century by politically affecting the movement of capital, goods, and human resources, favoring the urban centers with investment and subsidies. It allows the government to control and regulate internal migration, especially rural-to-urban migration. Permanent, large scale migration to urban areas in China, as a consequence, has been relatively small and slow compared to their economic development levels. It manages so-called targeted people (Chinese: 重点人口; pinyin: Zhòngdiǎn rénkǒu). Based on hukou files, the police maintain a confidential list of the targeted people in each community (generally less than five percent of the community's total population) to be monitored and controlled, making it difficult for people and organisations with differing political opinions to develop.[citation needed] Effect on rural workers[edit] See also: Migration in China The hukou system is closely associated with social issues regarding migration in China and excludes migrant workers, also known as farm workers or peasant workers, from city-wide social welfares in urban areas.[22] From around 1953 to 1976, the restriction of a citizen's rights by his domicile caused rural citizens to be separated into an underclass. Urban citizens enjoyed a range of social, economic and cultural benefits that China's rural citizens did not receive.[12] The ruling party did however make some concessions to rural workers to make life in rural areas more tolerable.[23] During China's transition from state socialism to market socialism (1978-2001), migrants, most of whom were women, worked in newly created export-processing zones in city suburbs under sub-standard working conditions.[10][23] There were restrictions upon the mobility of migrant workers that forced them to live precarious lives in company dormitories or shanty towns where they were exposed to abusive treatment.[24] The impact of the hukou system upon migrant labourers became onerous in the 1980s after hundreds of millions were ejected from state corporations and cooperatives.[10] Since the 1980s, an estimated 200 million Chinese live outside their officially registered areas and under far less eligibility to education and government services, living therefore in a condition similar in many ways to that of illegal immigrants.[12] The millions of peasants who have left their land remain trapped at the margins of the urban society. They are often blamed for rising crime and unemployment and under pressure from their citizens, the city governments have imposed discriminatory rules.[9] For example, the children of farm workers (Chinese: 农民工; pinyin: nóngmín gōng) are not allowed to enroll in the city schools, and even now must live with their grandparents or other relatives in order to attend school in their hometowns. They are commonly referred to as the home-staying children. There are around 130 million such home-staying children, living without their parents, as reported by Chinese researchers.[25

Jiang Zemin

Leading China[edit] In the early 1990s, post-Tiananmen economic reforms had stabilized and the country was on a consistent growth trajectory. At the same time, China faced a myriad of economic and social problems. At Deng's state funeral in 1997, Jiang delivered the elder statesman's eulogy. Jiang had inherited a China rampant with political corruption, and regional economies growing too rapidly for the stability of the entire country. Deng's policy that "some areas can get rich before others" led to an opening wealth gap between coastal regions and the interior provinces. The unprecedented economic growth and the deregulation in a number of heavy industries led to the closing of many state-owned enterprises (SOEs), breaking the iron rice bowl.[citation needed] As a result, unemployment rates skyrocketed, rising as high as 40% in some urban areas. Stock markets fluctuated greatly. The scale of rural migration into urban areas was unprecedented anywhere, and little was being done to address an ever-increasing urban-rural wealth gap. Official reports put the figure on the percentage of China's GDP being moved and abused by corrupt officials at 10%.[16] A chaotic environment of illegal bonds issued from civil and military officials resulted in much of the corrupted wealth ending up in foreign countries. The re-emergence of organized crime and a surge in crime rates began to plague cities. A careless stance on the destruction of the environment furthered concerns voiced by intellectuals.[citation needed] Jiang's biggest aim in the economy was stability, and he believed that a stable government with highly centralised power would be a prerequisite, choosing to postpone political reform, which in many facets of governance exacerbated the ongoing problems.[17] Jiang continued pouring funds to develop the Special Economic Zones and coastal regions. Beginning in 1996, Jiang began a series of reforms in the state-controlled media aimed at promoting the "core of leadership" under himself, and at the same time crushing some of his political opponents. The personality enhancements in the media were largely frowned upon during the Deng era, and had not been seen since the Mao era in the late 1970s.[citation needed] The People's Daily and CCTV-1's 7 pm Xinwen Lianbo each had Jiang-related events as the front-page or top stories, a fact that remained until Hu Jintao's media administrative changes in 2006. Jiang appeared casual in front of Western media, and gave an unprecedented interview with Mike Wallace of CBS in 2000 at Beidaihe. He would often use foreign languages in front of the camera, albeit not always fluently. In an encounter with a Hong Kong reporter in 2000 regarding the central government's apparent "imperial order" of supporting Tung Chee-hwa to seek a second term as Chief Executive of Hong Kong, Jiang scolded the Hong Kong journalists as "too simple, sometimes naive" in English.[18] The event was shown on Hong Kong television that night, an event regarded to be in poor taste outside China. Expulsion of Falun Gong[edit] In June 1999, Jiang established an extralegal department, the 6-10 Office, to expel Falun Gong from mainland China.[19] On 20 July, security forces abducted and detained thousands of Falun Gong organizers that they identified as leaders.[20] The persecution that followed was characterized a nationwide campaign of propaganda, as well as the large-scale arbitrary imprisonment and coercive reeducation of Falun Gong organizers, sometimes resulting in death.[21][22][23] Foreign policy[edit] Jiang Zemin with Bill Clinton in 1999. Jiang went on a groundbreaking state visit to the United States in 1997, drawing various crowds in protest from the Tibet Independence Movement to supporters of the Chinese democracy movement. He made a speech at Harvard University, part of it in passable English, but could not escape questions on democracy and freedom. In the official summit meeting with US President Bill Clinton, the tone was relaxed as Jiang and Clinton sought common ground while largely ignoring areas of disagreement. Clinton would visit China in June 1998, and vowed that China and the United States were partners in the world, and not adversaries. When American-led NATO bombed the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in 1999, Jiang seemed to have put up a harsh stance for show at home, but in reality only performed symbolic gestures of protest, and no solid action.[17] Jiang's foreign policy was for the most part passive and non-confrontational. A personal friend of former Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien,[24] Jiang strengthened China's economic stature abroad, attempting to establish cordial relations with countries whose trade is largely confined to the American economic sphere. Despite this, there were at least three serious flare-ups between China and the US during Jiang's tenure. The first was in 1996 when President Clinton dispatched warships to the Taiwan area during a period when the PLA appeared to be making threatening gestures. The second was the above-mentioned NATO bombing of Serbia and the third was the shootdown of a US spyplane over Hainan in April 2001.[citation needed] Economic development[edit] Jiang did not specialize in economics, and in 1997 handed most of the economic governance of the country to Zhu Rongji, who became Premier, and remained in office through the Asian financial crisis. Under their joint leadership, Mainland China has sustained an average of 8% GDP growth annually, achieving the highest rate of per capita economic growth in major world economies, raising eyebrows around the world with its astonishing speed. This was mostly achieved by continuing the process of a transition to a market economy. Strong party control over China was cemented by the PRC's successful bid to join the World Trade Organization and Beijing winning the bid to host the 2008 Summer Olympics.[citation needed] Entrenching Three Represents[edit] Main article: Ideology of the Communist Party of China Before he transferred power to a younger generation of leaders, Jiang had his theory of Three Represents written into the Party's constitution, alongside Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, and Deng Xiaoping Theory at the 16th CPC Congress in 2002. Critics believe this is just another piece added to Jiang's cult of personality, others have seen practical applications of the theory as a guiding ideology in the future direction of the CPC. Largely speculated to step down from all positions by international media, rival Li Ruihuan's resignation in 2002 prompted analysts to rethink the man. The theory of Three Represents was believed by many political analysts to be Jiang's effort at extending his vision to Marxist-Leninist principles, and therefore elevating himself alongside previous Chinese Marxist philosophers Mao and Deng. "Three Represents"[edit] Formally, Jiang's theory of "Three Represents" was enshrined in both Party and State constitutions as an "important thought," following in the footsteps of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought and Deng Xiaoping Theory. However, the theory lacked staying power. By the time of the 17th Party Congress in 2007, the Scientific Outlook on Development had already been written into the constitution of the Communist Party, a mere five years after the Three Represents, overtaking the latter as the guiding ideology for much of Hu Jintao's term. While his successors paid lip service to "Three Represents" in official party documentation and speeches, no special emphasis was placed on the theory after Jiang left office. There was even speculation following Xi Jinping's assumption of power in 2012 that the Three Represents would eventually be dropped from the party's list of guiding ideologies.[42] The Three Represents justified the incorporation of the new capitalist business class into the party, and changed the founding ideology of the Communist Party of China from protecting the interests of the peasantry and workers to that of the "overwhelming majority of the people", a euphemism aimed at placating the growing entrepreneurial class. Conservative critics within the party, such as hardline leftist Deng Liqun, denounced this as betrayal of "true" communist ideology.[42]

Lin Biao

Lin Biao (Chinese: 林彪; December 5, 1907 - September 13, 1971) was a Marshal of the People's Republic of China who was pivotal in the Communist victory in the Chinese Civil War, especially in Northeast China. Lin was the general who commanded the decisive Liaoshen and Pingjin Campaigns, in which he co-led the Manchurian Field Army to victory and led the People's Liberation Army into Beijing. He crossed the Yangtze River in 1949, decisively defeated the Kuomintang and took control of the coastal provinces in Southeast China. He ranked third among the Ten Marshals. Zhu De and Peng Dehuai were considered senior to Lin, and Lin ranked directly ahead of He Long and Liu Bocheng. Lin abstained from taking an active role in politics after the civil war ceased in 1949. He led a section of the government's civil bureaucracy as one of the co-serving Deputy Vice Premiers of the People's Republic of China from 1954 onwards, becoming First-ranked Vice Premier from 1964. Lin became more active in politics when named one of the co-serving Vice Chairmen of the Communist Party of China in 1958. He held the three responsibilities of Vice Premier, Vice Chairman and Minister of National Defense from 1959 onwards. Lin became instrumental in creating the foundations for Mao Zedong's cult of personality in the early 1960s, and was rewarded for his service in the Cultural Revolution by being named Mao's designated successor as the sole Vice Chairman of the Communist Party of China, from 1969 until his death. Lin died on September 13, 1971 when a Hawker Siddeley Trident he was aboard crashed in Öndörkhaan in Mongolia. The exact events of this "Lin Biao incident" have been a source of speculation ever since. The Chinese government's official explanation is that Lin and his family attempted to flee following a botched coup against Mao. Others have argued that they fled out of fear they would be purged, as Lin's relationship with other Communist Party leaders had soured in the final few years of his life. Following Lin's death, he was officially condemned as a traitor by the Communist Party. Since the late 1970s Lin, and Mao's wife Jiang Qing (with her Gang of Four) have been labeled the two major "counter-revolutionary forces" of the Cultural Revolution, receiving official blame from the Chinese government. Youth[edit] Lin Biao in Kuomintang uniform Lin Biao was the son of a prosperous merchant family in Huanggang, Hubei province.[1] His name at birth was "Lin Yurong".[2] Lin's father opened a small handicrafts factory in the mid-late 1910s, but was forced to close the factory due to "heavy taxes imposed by local militarists". After closing the factory, Lin's father worked as a purser aboard a river steamship. Lin entered primary school in 1917,[3] but moved to Shanghai in 1919 to continue his education.[2] As a child, Lin was much more interested in participating in student movements than in pursuing his formal education.[4] Lin joined a satellite organization of the Communist Youth League before he graduated high school in 1925. Later in 1925 he participated in the May Thirtieth Movement and enrolled in the newly established Whampoa (Huangpu) Military Academy in Guangzhou.[1] As a young cadet, Lin admired the personality of Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi), who was then the Principal of the Academy.[4] At Whampoa, Lin also studied under Premier Zhou Enlai, who was eight years older than Lin. Lin had no contact with Zhou after their time in Whampoa, until they met again in Yan'an in the late 1930s.[5] Lin's relationship with Zhou was never especially close, but they rarely opposed each other directly.[6] After graduating from Whampoa in 1926, Lin was assigned to a regiment commanded by Ye Ting. Less than a year after graduating from Whampoa, Lin was ordered to participate in the Northward Expedition, rising from deputy platoon leader to battalion commander in the National Revolutionary Army within a few months. It was during the Northward Expedition that Lin joined the Communist Party.[1] By 1927 Lin was a colonel. When he was 20 Lin married a girl from the countryside with the family name "Ong". This marriage was arranged by Lin's parents, and the couple never became close. When Lin left the Kuomintang to become a communist revolutionary, Ong did not accompany Lin, and their marriage effectively ended.[4] Chinese Civil War[edit] After the Kuomintang-Communist split, Lin's commander, Ye Ting, joined forces with He Long and participated in the Nanchang Uprising on August 1, 1927.[2][7] During the campaign Lin worked as a company commander under a regiment led by Chen Yi.[8] Following the failure of the revolt, Lin escaped to the remote Communist base areas, and joined Mao Zedong and Zhu De in the Jiangxi-Fujian Soviet in 1928. After joining forces with Mao, Lin became one of Mao's closest supporters.[6] Lin became one of the most senior military field commanders within the Jiangxi Soviet. He commanded the First Army Group, and achieved a degree of power comparable to that of Peng Dehuai, who commanded the Third Army Group. According to Comintern representative Otto Braun, Lin was "politically... a blank sheet on which Mao could write as he pleased" during this period. After Mao was removed from power in 1932 by his rivals (the 28 Bolsheviks), Lin frequently attended strategic meetings in Mao's name and openly attacked the plans of Mao's enemies.[9] Within the Jiangxi Soviet, Lin's First Army Group was the best-equipped and arguably most successful force within the Red Army. Lin's First Army became known for its mobility, and for its ability to execute successful flanking maneuvers. Between 1930 and 1933, Lin's forces captured twice the amount of prisoners of war and military equipment as the Third and Fifth Army Groups combined. The successes of Lin's forces are due partially to the division of labour within the Red Army: Lin's forces were more offensive and unorthodox than other groups, allowing Lin to capitalize on other Red Army commanders' successes.[10] During the Communists' defense against Chiang's 1933-34 Fifth Encirclement Campaign, Lin advocated a strategy of protracted guerilla warfare, and opposed the positional warfare advocated by Braun and his supporters. Lin believed that the best way to destroy enemy soldiers was not to pursue them or defend strategic points, but to weaken the enemy through feints, ambushes, encirclements, and surprise attacks. Lin's views generally conformed with the tactics advocated by Mao.[11] After Chiang's forces successfully occupied several strategic locations within the Jiangxi Soviet, in 1934, Lin was one of the first Red Army commanders to publicly advocate the abandonment of the Jiangxi Soviet, but he was opposed by most Red Army commanders, especially Braun and Peng Dehuai.[12] After the Communists finally resolved to abandon their base, later in 1934, Lin continued his position as one of the most successful commanders in the Red Army during the Long March. Under the direction of Mao and Zhou, the Red Army finally arrived at the remote Communist base of Yan'an, Shaanxi province, in December 1936. Lin and Peng Dehuai were generally considered the Red Army's best battlefield commanders, and were not rivals during the Long March. Both of them had supported Mao's rise to de facto leadership at Zunyi Meeting in January 1935. Lin may have become privately dissatisfied with Mao's strategy of constant evasion by the end of the Long March, but continued to support Mao publicly.[13] The American journalist Edgar Snow met Lin Biao in the Communist base of Shaanxi in 1936,[14] and wrote about Lin in his book, Red Star Over China. Snow's account focused more on the role of Peng than Lin, evidently having had long conversations with, and devoting two whole chapters to, Peng (more than any individual apart from Mao). But he says of Lin: Lin Biao did not present the bluff, lusty face of Peng Dehuai. He was ten years younger, rather slight, oval-faced, dark, handsome. Peng talked with his men. Lin kept his distance. To many he seemed shy and reserved. There are no stories reflecting warmth and affection for his men. His fellow Red Army commanders respected Lin, but when he spoke, it was all business ... The contrast between Mao's top field commanders could hardly have been more sharp, but on the Long March they worked well together, Lin specializing in feints, masked strategy, surprises, ambushes, flank attacks, pounces from the rear, and stratagems. Peng met the enemy head-on in frontal assaults and fought with such fury that again and again he wiped them out. Peng did not believe a battle well fought unless he managed to replenish—and more than replenish—any losses by seizure of enemy guns and converting prisoners of war to new and loyal recruits to the Red Army.[15] With Mao Zedong, Lin Biao shared the distinction of being one of the few Red commanders never wounded. Engaged on the front in more than a hundred battles, in field command for more than 10 years, exposed to every hardship that his men have known, with a reward of $100,000 on his head, he miraculously remained unhurt and in good health. In 1932, Lin Biao was given command of the 1st Red Army Corps, which then numbered about 20,000 rifles. It became the most dreaded section of the Red Army. Chiefly due to Lin's extraordinary talent as a tactician, it destroyed, defeated or outmanoeuvered every Government force sent against it and was never broken in battle .... Like many able Red commanders, Lin has never been outside China, speaks and reads no language but Chinese. Before the age of 30, however, he has already won recognition beyond Red circles. His articles in the Chinese Reds' military magazines ... have been republished, studied and criticised in Nanking (Nanjing) military journals, and also in Japan and Soviet Russia.[16] (Within a year of Snow's reporting this, Lin was seriously wounded).[17] Lin and Mao generally had a close personal relationship,[18] but some accounts claim that Lin sometimes made disparaging comments about Mao in private, and that Lin's support of Mao was largely for the pursuit of power.[19] After arriving in Yan'an, Lin became the principal of the newly founded Chinese People's Anti-Japanese Military and Political University. In 1937, Lin married one of the students there, a girl named Liu Ximin, who had earned the nickname "University Flower".[20] Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945)[edit] Lin Biao with wife Ye Qun and their children In August 1937, Lin was named commander-in-chief of the 115th Division of the Communist 8th Route Army[2] and ordered to aid Yan Xishan's forces in repelling the Japanese invasion of Shanxi province. In this capacity, Lin orchestrated the ambush at Pingxingguan in September 1937, which was one of the few battlefield successes for the Chinese in the early period of the Second Sino-Japanese War (the War of Resistance Against Japan). In 1938, while he was still leading Chinese forces in Shanxi, Japanese soldiers who had joined the Communists and were serving under Lin's command presented Lin with a Japanese uniform and katana, which they had captured in battle. Lin then put the uniform and katana on, jumped onto a horse, and rode away from the army. While riding, Lin was spotted alone by a sharpshooter in Yan's army. The soldier was surprised to see a Japanese officer riding a horse in the desolate hills alone. He took aim at Lin and severely injured him.[21] The bullet grazed Lin's head, penetrating deep enough to leave a permanent impression on his skull.[22] After being shot in the head, Lin fell from his horse and injured his back.[21] Recovering from his wounds and ill with tuberculosis, Lin left for Moscow at the end of 1937, where he served as the representative of the Communist Party of China to the Executive Committee of the Communist International. He remained in Moscow until February 1942, working on Comintern affairs and writing for its publication.[2] Lin was accompanied by his wife, Liu Ximin, but their relationship deteriorated in Moscow, and Lin eventually returned to Yan'an without her.[21] While in Moscow, Lin became infatuated with Zhou Enlai's adopted daughter, Sun Weishi, who was studying in Moscow from 1938 to 1946.[23] Before returning to China, in 1942, Lin proposed to Sun and promised to divorce his wife, from whom Lin had become estranged. Sun was not able to accept Lin's proposal, but promised to consider marrying Lin after completing her studies. Lin divorced Liu Ximin after returning to China, and married another woman, Ye Qun, in 1943. The relationship between Sun and Ye was notably bad.[24] After returning to Yan'an, Lin was involved in troop training and indoctrination assignments. Liaoshen Campaign[edit] Lin with high-ranking officers under his command (Harbin, 1946) Lin as commander-in-chief of the Manchurian Field Army. Lin was absent for most of the fighting during World War II, but was elected the sixth-ranking Central Committee member in 1945 based on his earlier battlefield reputation.[17] After the Japanese surrender, the Communists moved large numbers of troops to Manchuria (Northeast China), and Lin Biao moved to Manchuria to command the newly created "Communist Northeast Military District" in the fall. The Soviets transferred Japanese military equipment that they had captured to the Communists, making Lin's army one of the most well-equipped Communist forces in China. By the time that units from the Kuomintang (Nationalist) were able to arrive in the major cities of Manchuria, Lin's forces were already in firm control of most of the countryside and surrounding areas.[25] By the end of 1945, Lin had 280,000 troops in Manchuria under his command,[26] but according to Kuomintang estimates only 100,000 of these were regular forces with access to adequate equipment. The KMT also estimated that Lin also had access to 100,000 irregular auxiliaries, whose membership was drawn mainly from unemployed factory workers. Lin avoided decisive confrontations throughout 1945, and he was able to preserve the strength of his army despite criticism from his peers in the Party and the PLA.[27] For the sake of bargaining with the Kuomintang in peace negotiations in 1946, Mao ordered Lin to assemble his army to take and defend key cities, which was against the previous strategy of the Red Army. Lin disagreed with this position, but was ordered by Mao to draw the KMT into a decisive battle and "not give an inch of land" around Siping, Jilin province. In April 15, Lin orchestrated an ambush and forced KMT forces there to withdraw with heavy casualties. When the local KMT commander, Du Yuming, launched a counterattack on April 18, Mao ordered the troops there to hold the city indefinitely. The fighting continued until Mao finally allowed Lin to withdraw on May 19, which Lin did immediately, barely saving his army from encirclement and destruction.[28] Du pursued Lin's forces to the south bank of the Songhua River, where they halted due to Du's concerns about his army becoming overextended. According to Communist sources, Lin's army lost 15,000 soldiers in the fighting and withdrawal, but Nationalist sources claim that 25,000 soldiers also deserted or surrendered, and that Lin's force of 100,000 irregular auxiliaries suffered from mass desertion during the retreat. On June 10, the two forces agreed to a ceasefire brokered by George Marshall, and fighting temporarily ceased. Mao ordered Lin to counterattack that winter, but Lin refused, replying that his forces were exhausted and not logistically prepared to do so.[29] When Du led the majority of his forces to attack Communist forces on the Korean border in January 1947, Lin finally ordered 20,000 of his soldiers to cross the Songhua River, where they staged guerrilla raids, ambushed relief forces, attacked isolated garrisons, and avoided decisive confrontations with strong units Du sent to defeat them. While they did so, they looted large quantities of supplies and destroyed the infrastructure of the KMT-held territories that they passed through, including bridges, railroads, fortifications, electrical lines, and boats. When Du sent his forces back south, they were ambushed and defeated. When Du requested reinforcements from Chiang Kai-shek, his request was rejected.[30] On April 8, Lin moved his headquarters from Harbin to Shuangcheng in order to be closer to the front. On May 5, he held a conference with his subordinates and announced that his armies would change tactics, engage in a large-scale counterattack, and seek to defeat Du's forces in a decisive battle. On May 8, Lin launched the first of his "three great campaigns", the Summer Offensive, intending to engage a large garrison at Huaide while a second force positioned itself to ambush the force that would predictably be sent to relieve it. On May 17, they won a major victory and forced the survivors to retreat to Changchun and Siping. By the end of May 1947, Lin's forces had taken control of most of the countryside (everything except for the rail lines and several major cities), infiltrated and destroyed most KMT forces in Manchuria, and re-established contact with isolated Communist forces in southern Liaoning province.[31] After the victory of the Summer Offensive, Lin's forces gained the initiative and Kuomintang defensive strategy became static and reactionary. Lin ordered his forces to besiege Siping, but they suffered very high casualties and made little progress, partially due to the defenders' strong entrenched position and air support, and due to the attackers' poor artillery support (Lin only had seventy pieces of artillery around Siping). Lin's forces broke into the city twice and engaged in street-to-street fighting, but were driven back both times with heavy casualties. By June 19, Lin's assault troops had become increasingly exhausted, and Lin began to rotate them to prevent them from becoming completely ineffective. On June 24, Nationalist reinforcements arrived from the south to lift the siege. Lin recognized that he did not have enough manpower left to defeat them, and on July 1, he ordered his forces to retreat back to the north of the Songhua River.[32] The Communists suffered over 30,000 losses at Siping, and may have suffered a desertion rate of over 20% during the withdrawal, while the Nationalist garrison at Siping fell from 20,000 to slightly over 3,000 before the siege was broken. Lin volunteered to write a self-criticism after the defeat. He also criticized his commander at Siping, Li Tianyou, for demonstrating poor tactics and for lacking "revolutionary spirit". Despite the army's setbacks he reorganized the army, combining surviving regiments and raising local militia forces to the status of regular units. By the fall of 1947, he had 510,000 soldiers under his command, approximately equal to Nationalist forces in the region.[33] Before Du's replacement, Chen Cheng, could cross north and begin an offensive, Lin moved his army south and began the Autumn Offensive, in which his forces destroyed rail lines and other infrastructure, attacked isolated Nationalist units, and attempted to provoke and ambush strong Nationalist forces. Chen's forces responded to the campaign by withdrawing into their city garrisons. The Communists were not able to provoke a decisive confrontation, and the Autumn Offensive ended in a stalemate.[34] Chen's forces remained static and reactionary, at the end of 1947, Lin led his armies back south in his final Liaoshen Campaign, the Winter Offensive. His initial plan was to repeat the goal of his last offensive, to besiege Changchun, Jilin province and ambush its relief force, but after reviewing Kuomintang troop dispositions he determined that southern Manchuria would be an easier target. On December 15, Lin's forces attacked Fakui, Zhangwu, and Xinlitun. Chen sent reinforcements to relieve Fakui, and when the Communist ambush failed, Lin ordered his forces to withdraw and join in the siege of Zhangwu. When Chen did not intervene and the town fell on December 28, Lin assumed the main part of the campaign was over and he dispersed his forces to rest and attack secondary targets.[35] Chen saw Lin's withdrawal as an opportunity to seize the offensive. He ordered his forces to attack targets in northern Liaoning on January 1, 1948, and on January 3, Lin successfully encircled the isolated Nationalist 5th Corps. Its commander, Chen Linda, realized that he was being surrounded and requested reinforcements, but Chen Cheng only responded that he would "allow" Chen Linda to withdraw. The attempted breakout failed, and the 5th Corps was destroyed on January 7. After this defeat, Chen Cheng was replaced with Wei Lihuang ten days later, but Wei was not able to prevent the Communists from capturing Liaoyang on February 6, destroying the 54th division, and severing an important railroad that linked Wei's forces from their ports on the Bohai Sea.[36] Lin continued his advance, defeating all garrisons in western Manchuria or inducing them to defect by late February. On February 26 Lin reorganized his forces as the Northeast Field Army and began preparations to return and take Siping, whose garrison had been transferred elsewhere by Chen Cheng and never re-strengthened. Lin began the general assault on the city on March 13, and took the town one day later. The capture of Siping ended Lin's Winter Offensive. The KMT nearly lost all of Manchuria by the end of the campaign and suffered 156,000 casualties, most of which survived as prisoners of war that were indoctrinated and recruited into Lin's forces. By the end of winter 1948 the Kuomintang had lost all of its territory in the Northeast, except for Changchun, Shenyang, and an area connecting the rail line from Beiping to those cities.[37] Following Lin's Winter campaign, Mao wanted him to attack targets farther south, but Lin disagreed because he did not want to leave a strong enemy at his back, and he believed the defeat of a strong city would force Chiang to abandon the Northeast. By May 25, 1948, the Northeast Field Army had completely encircled Changchun, including its airfield, and for the rest of the siege the Nationalist commander, Zheng Tongguo, depended entirely on supplies airdropped into the city. On May 19, Lin submitted a report to Mao in which he expected heavy casualties. By July 20 the siege was at a stalemate, and Lin deferred to Mao, allowing some of his army to attack Jinzhou farther south, beginning the Liaoshen Campaign. When Chiang airlifted reinforcements to defend Jinzhou, Lin ordered his army to abandon the siege and return to Changchun, but Mao disagreed and overruled him, and Lin was ordered to engage the defenders in a decisive confrontation. On October 14, the Northeast Field Army began its assault on Jinzhou with 250,000 men and the bulk of Lin's artillery and armour. After nearly 24 hours of fighting, Lin's forces were victorious, suffering 24,000 casualties but capturing the enemy commander, Fan Hanjie, and 90,000 enemy soldiers.[38] After hearing the news about the defeat at Jinzou, a KMT regiment from Yunnan and its commander, Zeng Zesheng, defected and abandoned its position on the outskirts of Changchun on October 14. This doomed the remaining Nationalist forces in the city, and Zheng Tongguo was forced to surrender two days later. Chiang ordered an army of 500,000 men to travel north and take Jinzhou, but Lin directed nearly all of his forces to stop them, and they began to encircle it on October 21. After a week of fighting, the Nationalist army was destroyed on October 28. Remaining KMT garrisons in the Northeast attempted to break out of the region and flee south, but most were unsuccessful. After Changchun, the only major KMT garrison in the Northeast was Shenyang, where 140,000 KMT soldiers were eventually forced to surrender. By the end of 1948 all of Northeast China was under Communist control.[39] Defeating the Kuomintang[edit] After taking control of the Manchurian provinces, Lin then swept into North China. Forces under Lin were responsible for winning two of the three major military victories responsible for the defeat of the Kuomintang. Lin suffered from ongoing periods of serious illness throughout the campaign.[17] Following the victory in Manchuria, Lin commanded over a million soldiers, encircling Chiang's main forces in northern China during the Pingjin Campaign, taking Beijing and Tianjin within a period of two months. Tianjin was taken by force, and on January 22, 1949 General Fu Zuoyi and his army of 400,000 men agreed to surrender Beijing without a battle, and the PLA occupied the city on January 31. The Pingjin Campaign saw Lin remove a total of approximately 520,000 enemy troops from the enemy's battle lines. Many of those who surrendered later joined the PLA.[40] After taking Beijing, the Communists attempted to negotiate for the surrender of the remaining KMT forces. When these negotiations failed, Lin resumed his attacks on the KMT in the southeast. After taking Beijing, Lin's army numbered 1.5 million soldiers. By the end of 1949 the Red Army succeeded in occupying all KMT positions on mainland China. The last position occupied by Lin's forces was the island of Hainan. Lin Biao was considered one of the Communists' most brilliant generals after the founding of the People's Republic of China, in 1949. Lin was the youngest of the "Ten Marshals" named in 1955, a title that recognized Lin's substantial military contributions.[17] Politician[edit] Illness[edit] Lin Biao continued to suffer from poor health after 1949, and chose to avoid high-profile military and political positions. His status led him to be appointed to a number of high-profile positions throughout most of the 1950s, but these were largely honorary and carried few responsibilities. He generally delegated or neglected many of the formal political responsibilities that he was assigned, usually citing his poor health as an excuse.[17] After Lin's injury in 1938, he suffered from ongoing physical and mental health problems. His exact medical condition is not well understood, partially because his medical records have never been publicly released. Dr. Li Zhisui, then one of Mao's personal physicians, believed that Lin suffered from neurasthenia and hypochondria. He became ill whenever he perspired, and suffered from phobias about water, wind, cold,[41] light, and noise.[4] He was said to become nervous at the sight of rivers and oceans in traditional Chinese paintings, and suffered from diarrhea, which could be triggered by the sound of running water.[41] Li's account of Lin's condition is notably different from the official Chinese version. In another study, Lin is described as having symptoms similar to those seen in patients of schizoid personality disorder. Lin's personality traits including his aloofness, lack of interest in social relationships, secretiveness, and emotional coldness he exhibited during the Cultural Revolution suggest Lin suffered from symptoms similar to those seen in schizoid personality disorder. The challenge of Lin's personality problems in conjunction with the turbulent political climate of the Cultural Revolution impacted his overall ability to govern his position.[42] Lin suffered from excessive headaches, and spent much of his free time consulting Chinese medical texts and preparing traditional Chinese medicines for himself. He suffered from insomnia, and often took sleeping pills.[43] He ate simple meals, did not smoke, and did not drink alcohol.[41] As his condition progressed, his fear of water led to a general refusal to either bathe or eat fruit. Because of his fear of wind and light, his office was gloomy and lacked any ventilation. Some accounts have suggested that Lin became a drug addict, either to opium[4] or morphine. As early as 1953, Soviet doctors diagnosed Lin as suffering from manic depression. Lin's wife, Ye Qun, rejected this diagnosis, but it was later confirmed by Chinese doctors. Lin's fragile health made him vulnerable, passive, and easily manipulated by other political figures, notably Ye Qun herself.[41] Lin's complaints got worse with time and age. In the years before his death, the fiancee of Lin's son reported that Lin became extremely distant and socially and politically detached, even to the extent that he never read books or newspapers. His passivity made him difficult to connect with at any meaningful level: "usually he just sat there, blankly". In Lin's rare periods of activity, he used his time mostly to complain about, and seek treatment for his large variety of medical Alliance with Mao[edit] Lin, like most of the Politburo, initially held serious reservations about China's entry into the Korean War, citing the devastation that would result if the "imperialists" detonated an atomic bomb in Korea or China. Lin later declined to lead forces in Korea, citing his ill health.[45] In early October 1950, Peng Dehuai was named commander of the Chinese forces bound for Korea, and Lin went to the Soviet Union for medical treatment. Lin flew to the Soviet Union with Zhou Enlai and participated in negotiations with Joseph Stalin concerning Soviet support for China's intervention, indicating that Mao retained his trust in Lin. Due partially to his periods of ill health and physical rehabilitation in the Soviet Union, Lin was slow to rise to power. In the early 1950s Lin was one of five major leaders given responsibility for civil and military affairs, controlling a jurisdiction in central China. In 1953 he was visited by Gao Gang, and was later suspected of supporting him.[46] In 1955 Lin was named to the Politburo.[17] In February 1958 Peng Dehuai, then China's Defense Minister, gave a speech for the fortieth anniversary of the Soviet Red Army in which he suggested increasing the military cooperation between China and the Soviet Union. Mao wanted to distance China from the Soviet Union, and began grooming Lin Biao as a viable successor to Peng.[47] In 1958 Lin joined the Politburo Standing Committee[48] and became one of China's Vice-Chairmen. After the 1959 Lushan Conference, at which Peng criticized Mao's disastrous Great Leap Forward, Peng was arrested and removed from all government positions.[17] Privately, Lin agreed with Peng and was strongly opposed to Peng being purged, but Lin's fear of being purged himself kept him from publicly opposing Mao's efforts to purge Peng,[49] and Lin publicly condemned Peng as a "careerist, a conspiracist, and a hypocrite".[50] Under Mao's direction, Peng was disgraced and put under indefinite house arrest.[49] Lin became the senior leader most publicly supportive of Mao following the Great Leap Forward,[51] during which Mao's economic policies caused an artificial famine in which tens of millions of people starved to death.[52] Lin initially refused to replace Peng, but eventually accepted the position at the insistence of Mao Zedong. As Defense Minister, Lin's command of the PLA was second only to Mao, but he deferred many of his responsibilities to subordinates. The most important figures to whom Lin deferred the day-to-day operations of China's armed forces were Luo Ruiqing, Chief of Staff, and He Long, the Central Military Vice-Chairman.[17] On October 1, 1959, Lin Biao, as defense minister, surveyed the honor guards at the military parade celebrating the 10th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China. As Defense Minister, Lin's policies differed from those of his predecessor. Lin attempted to reform China's armed forces based on political criteria: he abolished all signs and privileges of rank, purged members considered sympathetic to the USSR, directed soldiers to work part-time as industrial and agricultural workers, and indoctrinated the armed forces in Mao Zedong Thought.[53] Lin's system of indoctrination made it clear the Party was in command of China's armed forces, and Lin ensured that the army's political commissars enjoyed great power and status in order to see that his directives were followed.[48] Lin implemented these reforms in order to please Mao, but privately was concerned that they would weaken the PLA (which they did).[54] Mao strongly approved of these reforms,[17] and conscientiously promoted Lin to a series of high positions.[55] Lin used his position as Minister of Defense to flatter Mao by promoting Mao's cult of personality.[56] Lin devised and ran a number of national Maoist propaganda campaigns based on the PLA, the most successful of which was the "learn from Lei Feng" campaign, which Lin began in 1963.[57] Because he was the person most responsible for directing the "learn from Lei Feng" campaign, Lin may have directed the forging of Lei Feng's Diary, upon which the propaganda campaign was based.[56] Because of Lin's fragile health, Ye Qun controlled many aspects of Lin's public life during the 1960s, including who would see Lin and what others would know about him. Mao encouraged Ye to act on Lin's behalf, giving her an unusual amount of power and responsibility. In 1965 Mao asked Ye to publicly criticize Lin's chief of staff, Luo Ruiqing, on Lin's behalf, even though Ye did not yet hold any high political position. When Lin discovered that Ye had done so (after Luo was purged), he was angry at Ye, but powerless to alter Luo's disgrace.[58] Lin often read speeches prepared by others, and allowed his name to be placed on articles that he did not write, as long as these materials supported Mao. One of the most famous articles published in Lin's name[59] was the 20,000-word pamphlet on revolution in developing countries, Long Live the Victory of the People's War!, which was released in 1965. This article made Lin one of China's leading interpreters of Mao's political theories. The article likened the "emerging forces" of the poor in Asia, Africa, and Latin America to the "rural areas of the world", while the affluent countries of the West were likened to the "cities of the world". Eventually the "cities" would be encircled by revolutions in the "rural areas", following theories prevalent in Mao Zedong Thought.[48] Lin made no promise that China would fight other people's wars, and foreign revolutionaries were advised to depend mainly on "self-reliance". Lin worked closely with Mao, promoting Mao's cult of personality. Lin directed the compilation of some of Chairman Mao's writings into a handbook, the Quotations from Chairman Mao Zedong, which became known as the Little Red Book.[60] Lin Biao's military reforms and the success of the 1962 Sino-Indian War impressed Mao. A propaganda campaign called "learn from the People's Liberation Army" followed. In 1966, this campaign widened into the Cultural Revolution.

Lin Zexu

Lin Zexu (30 August 1785 - 22 November 1850), courtesy name Yuanfu, was a Chinese scholar-official of the Qing dynasty best known for his role in the First Opium War of 1839-42. He was from Fuzhou, Fujian Province. Lin's forceful opposition to the opium trade was a primary catalyst for the First Opium War. He is praised for his constant position on the "moral high ground" in his fight, but he is also blamed for a rigid approach which failed to account for the domestic and international complexities of the problem.[2] The Daoguang Emperor endorsed the hardline policies advocated by Lin, but then blamed Lin for the resulting disastrous war.[3] In March 1839, Lin arrived in Guangdong Province to take measures that would eliminate the opium trade.[5] He was a formidable bureaucrat known for his competence and high moral standards, with an imperial commission from the Daoguang Emperor to halt the illegal importation of opium by the British.[6][7] Upon arrival, he made changes within a matter of months.[6] He arrested more than 1,700 Chinese opium dealers and confiscated over 70,000 opium pipes. He initially attempted to get foreign companies to forfeit their opium stores in exchange for tea, but this ultimately failed. Lin resorted to using force in the western merchants' enclave. A month and a half later, the merchants gave up nearly 1.2 million kg (2.6 million pounds) of opium. Beginning 3 June 1839, 500 workers laboured for 23 days to destroy it, mixing the opium with lime and salt and throwing it into the sea outside of Humen Town. Lin composed an elegy apologising to the gods of the sea for polluting their realm.[8] 26 June is now the International Day against Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking in honour of Lin's work. In 1839, Lin also wrote an extraordinary memorial to Queen Victoria in the form of an open letter published in Canton, urging her to end the opium trade. He argued that China was providing Britain with valuable commodities such as tea, porcelain, spices and silk, with Britain sending only "poison" in return.[6] Lin appears to have been unaware that opium was not banned in the Middle East, Europe and the Americas, and was commonly used for its medicinal rather than recreational effects. He accused the "barbarians" of coveting profit and lacking morality. His memorial expressed a desire that the Queen would act "in accordance with decent feeling" and support his efforts. He wrote: We find that your country is sixty or seventy thousand li from China. Yet there are barbarian ships that strive to come here for trade for the purpose of making a great profit. The wealth of China is used to profit the barbarians. That is to say, the great profit made by barbarians is all taken from the rightful share of China. By what right do they then in return use the poisonous drug to injure the Chinese people? Even though the barbarians may not necessarily intend to do us harm, yet in coveting profit to an extreme, they have no regard for injuring others. Let us ask, where is your conscience? — Lin Zexu, Open letter addressed to the sovereign of England and published in Canton (1839)[9] The letter to the Queen never reached her. Belatedly, it was delivered and published in The Times of London.[10] Lin and the Daoguang Emperor, comments historian Jonathan Spence, "seemed to have believed that the citizens of Canton and the foreign traders there had simple, childlike natures that would respond to firm guidance and statements of moral principles set out in simple, clear terms." Neither Lin nor the emperor appreciated the depth or changed nature of the problem. They did not see the change in international trade structures, the commitment of the British government to protecting the interests of private traders, and the peril to British traders who would surrender their opium. Moreover, the British viewed the opening of China to free trade as a moral issue as well.[3] Open hostilities between China and Britain started in 1839 in what later would be called the "First Opium War". The immediate effect was that both sides, by the words of Charles Elliot and Lin, banned all trade. Before this, Lin had pressured the Portuguese government of Macau, so the British found themselves without refuge, except for the bare and rocky harbours of Hong Kong.[11] Soon, however, the Chinese forces faced a British naval fleet, which included the East India Company's steam warship Nemesis and improved weapons, and were soon routed.[3]

Liu Shaoqi

Liu Shaoqi (pronounced [ljǒu ʂâutɕʰǐ]; Chinese: 刘少奇; 24 November 1898 - 12 November 1969) was a Chinese revolutionary, statesman, and theorist. He was Chairman of the NPC Standing Committee from 1954 to 1959, Vice Chairman of the Communist Party of China from 1956 to 1966 and President of the People's Republic of China, China's de jure head of state, from 1959 to 1968, during which he implemented policies of economic reconstruction in China. For 15 years, President Liu was the third most powerful man in China, behind only Chairman Mao Zedong and Premier Zhou Enlai. Originally groomed as the successor to Mao, Liu antagonized Mao in the early 1960s before the Cultural Revolution and was criticized, then purged, by Mao starting in 1966. Liu disappeared from public life in 1968 and was labelled the "commander of China's bourgeoisie headquarters", China's foremost 'capitalist-roader', and a traitor to the revolution. He died under harsh treatment in late 1969, but was posthumously rehabilitated by Deng Xiaoping's government in 1980 and granted a national memorial service. Early political activities[edit] In 1925 Liu became a member of the Guangzhou-based All-China Federation of Labor Executive Committee. During the next two years Liu led numerous political campaigns and strikes in Hubei and Shanghai. Liu worked with Li Lisan in Shanghai in 1925, organizing Communist activity following the May Thirtieth Incident. After his work in Shanghai Liu traveled to Wuhan. Liu was briefly arrested in Changsha and then returned to Guangzhou to help organize the 16-month-long Canton-Hong Kong strike.[3] In 1927 Liu was elected to the Party's Central Committee, and was appointed to the head of its Labor Department.[4] In 1929 Liu returned to work at the Party headquarters in Shanghai, and was named Secretary of the Manchurian Party Committee in Fengtian.[5] In 1930 and 1931, Liu attended the Third and Fourth Plenums of the Sixth Central Committee, and was elected to the Central Executive Committee (i.e., Politburo) of the Chinese Soviet Republic in 1931 or 1932. Later in 1932 Liu left Shanghai and traveled to the Jiangxi Soviet.[6] Senior leader[edit] In 1932 Liu became the Party Secretary of Fujian Province. In 1934 Liu accompanied the Long March at least as far as the crucial Zunyi Conference, but was then sent to the so-called "White Areas" (areas controlled by the Kuomintang) to reorganize underground activities in northern China, centered around Beijing and Tianjin. In 1936 Liu became Party Secretary in North China, leading the anti-Japanese movements in that area with the assistance of Peng Zhen, An Ziwen, Bo Yibo, Ke Qingshi, Liu Lantao, and Yao Yilin. In 1939 Liu ran the Central Plains Bureau; and, in 1941, the Central China Bureau. Some Japanese sources have alleged that the activities of Liu's organization sparked the Marco Polo Bridge Incident in July 1937, which gave Japan the excuse to launch the Second Sino-Japanese War.[7] In 1937 Liu traveled to the Communist base at Yanan; and, in 1941, Liu became a political commissar of the New Fourth Army.[7] In 1945 Liu was elected as one of five CCP Secretaries at the Seventh National Party Congress. After the Seventh National Party Congress Liu became the supreme leader of all Communist forces in Manchuria and northern China,[7] a stature frequently overlooked by historians. In 1949, Liu became the Vice Chairman of the Central People's Government. In 1954, China adopted a new constitution at the first National People's Congress (NPC). At the Congress's first session, Liu was elected chairman of the Congress's Standing Committee, a position he held until the second NPC in 1959. From 1956 to his downfall in 1966, Liu ranked as the First Vice Chairman of the Communist Party of China.[7] Liu's work focused on party organizational and theoretical affairs.[8] Liu was an orthodox Soviet-style Communist, and favored state planning and the development of heavy industry. Liu elaborated upon his political and economic beliefs in his writings. His best known works include How to be a Good Communist (1939), On the Party (1945), and Internationalism and Nationalism (1952). Presidency[edit] Liu spoke very strongly in favour of the Great Leap Forward at the Eighth CCP National Congress in May 1958.[9] At this Congress Liu stood together with Deng Xiaoping and Peng Zhen in support of Mao's policies against those who were more critical, such as Chen Yun and Zhou Enlai. As a result, Liu gained influence within the party and in April 1959, he succeeded Mao as President of the People's Republic of China. However, Liu began to voice indications of concern about the outcomes of the Great Leap in the August 1959 Lushan Plenum.[9] In order to correct the mistakes of the Great Leap Forward, Liu and Deng led economic reforms which bolstered their prestige among the party apparatus and the national populace. Once, he said to Mao: "People write books about cannibalism!" [10] The economic policies of Deng and Liu were notable for being more moderate than Mao's radical ideas. Conflict with Mao[edit] This section needs additional citations for verification. Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. (July 2012) (Learn how and when to remove this template message) Liu was publicly acknowledged as Mao's chosen successor in 1961[1] but by 1962 his opposition to Mao's policies had led Mao to distrust Liu.[11] After Mao succeeded in restoring his prestige during the 1960s,[12] Liu's eventual downfall became "inevitable". Liu's position as the second most powerful leader of the CCP contributed to Mao's rivalry with Liu at least as much as Liu's political beliefs or factional allegiances in the 1960s,[11] indicating that Liu's later persecution was the result of a power struggle that went beyond the goals and well-being of either China or the Party. By 1966, there were few senior leaders in China that questioned the need for a widespread reform to combat the growing problems of corruption and bureaucratisation within the Party and the government. With the goal of reforming the government to be more efficient and true to the Communist ideal, Liu himself chaired the enlarged Politburo meeting that officially began the Cultural Revolution. However, Liu and his political allies quickly lost control of the Cultural Revolution soon after it was called, as Mao used the movement to monopolize political power and to destroy his perceived enemies.[13] Whatever its other causes, the Cultural Revolution, declared in 1966, was overtly pro-Maoist, and gave Mao the power and influence to purge the Party of his political enemies at the highest levels of government. Along with closing China's schools and universities, and Mao's exhortations to young Chinese to randomly destroy old buildings, temples, and art, and to attack their teachers, school administrators, party leaders, and parents,[14] the Cultural Revolution also increased Mao's prestige so much that entire villages adopted the practice of offering prayers to Mao before every meal.[15] In both national politics and Chinese popular culture, Mao established himself as a demigod accountable to no one, purging any that he suspected of opposing him[16] and directing the masses and Red Guards "to destroy virtually all state and party institutions".[13] After the Cultural Revolution was announced, most of the most senior members of the CPP who had voiced any hesitation in following Mao's direction, including Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, were removed from their posts almost immediately; and, with their families, subjected to mass criticism and humiliation.[14] Liu and Deng, along with many others, were denounced as "capitalist roaders". Liu was labeled as a "traitor" and "the biggest capitalist roader in the Party". In July 1966 Liu was displaced as Party Deputy Chairman by Lin Biao. By 1967 Liu and his wife, Wang Guangmei, were placed under house arrest in Beijing. Liu was removed from all his positions and expelled from the Party in October 1968. After his arrest Liu disappeared from public view. Vilification, death and rehabilitation[edit] This section needs additional citations for verification. Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. (May 2011) (Learn how and when to remove this template message) After his arrest in 1967 Liu was beaten regularly at public denunciation meetings. He was denied medicine for his diabetes, by then a long-term illness, and for pneumonia, which he developed after his arrest. Liu was eventually given treatment only when Jiang Qing feared he would die; she desired that Liu be kept alive to serve as a "living target" during the Ninth Party Congress in 1969.[17] At the Congress, Liu was denounced as a traitor and an enemy agent. Zhou Enlai read the Party verdict that Liu was "a criminal traitor, enemy agent and scab in the service of the imperialists, modern revisionists and the Kuomintang reactionaries". Liu's conditions did not improve after he was denounced in the Congress, and he died soon afterward.[17][18] In a memoir written by Liu's principal physician, he disputed the alleged medical maltreatment of Liu during his last days. According to Dr. Gu Qihua, there was a dedicated medical team in charge of treating Liu's illness; between July 1968 and October 1969, Liu had 7 total occurrences of pneumonia due to his deteriorating immune system, and there had been a total of 40 group consultations by top medical professionals regarding the treatment of this disease. Liu was closely monitored daily by the medical team, and they made the best effort given the adverse circumstance. He died of illness on November 12, 1969, and was cremated next day.[19] Liu Shaoqi, Klim Voroshilov and Soong Ching-ling in Shanghai In February 1980, two years after Deng Xiaoping came to power, the Fifth Plenum of the 11th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China issued the "Resolution on the Rehabilitation of Comrade Liu Shaoqi." The resolution declared Liu's ouster to be unjust and removed the labels of "renegade, traitor and scab" that had been attached to him at the time of his death. It also declared him to be "a great Marxist and proletarian revolutionary" and recognized him as one of the principal leaders of the Party. Lin Biao was blamed for "concocting false evidence" against Liu and working with the Gang of Four to subject him to "political frame-up and physical persecution." A high-profile national memorial ceremony was held for Liu on May 17, 1980 and his ashes were scattered into the sea at Qingdao in accordance with his last wishes.[20][21]

Li Dazhao

Marxist ideas started to spread widely in China after the 1919 May Fourth Movement. In June 1920, Comintern agent Grigori Voitinsky was sent to China, and met Li Dazhao and other reformers. He financed the founding of the Socialist Youth Corps.[1] The Communist Party of China was initially founded by Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao in the French concession of Shanghai in 1921 as a study society and an informal network. There were informal groups in China in 1920, and also overseas, but the official beginning was the 1st Congress held in Shanghai and attended by 12 men in July 1921 and later transferred from Shanghai to Jiaxing. The birth of the party (then having some 50 to 60 members) was declared here in a boat on South Lake. It is therefore considered by the Chinese to be one of the most important historical places of the revolution. The formal and unified name Zhōngguó Gòngchǎn Dǎng (Chinese Communist Party) was adopted and all other names of communist groups were dropped and the final agenda was carried out. The key players were Li Dazhao, Chen Duxiu, Chen Gongbo, Tan Pingshan, Zhang Guotao, He Mengxiong, Lou Zhanglong and Deng Zhongxia. Mao Zedong was present at the first congress as one of two delegates from a Hunan communist group. Other attendees included Dong Biwu, Li Hanjun, Li Da, Chen Tanqiu, Liu Renjing, Zhou Fohai, He Shuheng, Deng Enming, and two representatives from the Comintern, one of them being Henk Sneevliet (also known by the single name 'Maring'[2]). Notably absent at this early point were future leaders Li Lisan and Qu Qiubai. Librarian at Peking University[edit] As a leading intellectual in the New Culture Movement, Li was recruited by Cai Yuanpei to head the library at Peking University. In this position he influenced a number of students in the May Fourth Movement, including Mao Zedong, who worked in the library's reading room.[1] Li was among the first of the Chinese intellectuals to look to China's villages as a basis for a political movement and was among the earliest to explore the Bolshevik government in the Soviet Union as a possible model for China's reform. Even as late as 1921, however, he still maintained warm relations with other New Culture figures such as Hu Shi.[2] Co-founder of the CPC[edit] By many accounts, Li was a nationalist and believed[citation needed] that the peasantry in China were to play an important role in China's revolution. As with many intellectuals of his time, the roots of Li's revolutionary thinking were actually mostly in Kropotkin's communist anarchism, but after the events of the May Fourth Movement and the failures of the anarchistic experiments of many intellectuals, like his compatriots, he turned more towards Marxism. Of course, the success of the Bolshevik Revolution was a major factor in the changing of his views. In later years, Li combined both his original nationalist and newly acquired Marxist views in order to contribute a strong political view to China (Meisner 1967, 178). Li initiated the Peking Socialist Youth Corps in 1920 (Pringsheim 1962, p76), in advance of the first meeting of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in Shanghai in July, 1921. Though Li was unable to attend, he was named[citation needed] co-founder of the CPC, along with Chen Duxiu. Under the leadership of Li and Chen, the CPC developed a close relationship with the Soviet controlled Comintern. At the direction of the Comintern, Li and Chen were inducted into the Kuomintang in 1922. Li was elected to the KMT's Central Executive Committee in 1924. Death[edit] Tensions between the Comintern, the KMT, and the CPC presented opportunities for political intrigue and opportunism. With the collapse of the United Front in 1927, Li was captured during a raid ordered by the Fengtian clique on the Soviet embassy in Peking (Beijing). Along with nineteen others arrested in the raid, he was executed by hanging on the orders of the warlord Zhang Zuolin on April 28, 1927. Notes[edit] Jump up ^ Murray, Stuart. The Library: An Illustrated History. New York, NY: Skyhorse Pub, 2009. Jump up ^ Maurice J. Meisner, Li Ta-Chao and the Origins of Chinese Marxism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967). References

Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)

The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) is a liberal political party in Republic of China (Taiwan), and the dominant party in the Pan-Green Coalition. It is currently the majority ruling party, controlling both the presidency and the unicameral Legislative Yuan. Founded in 1986, the DPP is one of two major parties in Taiwan, along with the historically dominant Kuomintang. It has traditionally been associated with strong advocacy of human rights and a distinct Taiwanese identity. The current leader is President Tsai Ing-wen, the second member of the DPP to hold the office.[1] The DPP is a long-term member of Liberal International and a founding member of the Council of Asian Liberals and Democrats. It represented Taiwan in the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation. The DPP and its affiliated parties are widely classified as socially liberal because of their strong support for human rights, but they also advocate economic liberalism and a nationalistic identity; the DPP is also more willing to increase military expenditures compared to the KMT. The DPP's roots were in opposition to Kuomintang one-party authoritarian rule. It was founded as the Tangwai - or "outside-the-KMT" - movement. This movement culminated in the formation of the DPP as an alternative party on September 28, 1986 when eighteen founding members met at Grand Hotel Taipei.[2] A total of 132 people joined the party that day.[3] The new party contested the 1986 election even though competing parties remained illegal under national law until the next year. The first members of the party drew heavily from the ranks of family members and defense lawyers of political prisoners as well as intellectuals and artists who had spent time abroad. Such individuals were strongly committed to political change that would ensure constitutional support in Taiwan for freedoms of speech, press, assembly, and association. The party did not at the outset give open support to an independent Taiwanese national identity-a move that could have invited a violent crackdown by the Taiwan's Kuomintang rulers. Its platform was pro-environment and pro-democracy. As more and more of its demands were met during the 1990s-such as the direct popular election of Taiwan's president and all representatives in its Legislative Yuan, and open discussion of Taiwan's repressive past as represented in the February 28 Incident and its long martial law aftermath-a greater variety of views could be advocated in the more liberal political atmosphere. Party members began openly promoting a national identity for Taiwan separate from that of China. The DPP supported reform of the Constitution that would make it official that Taiwan's national government represented only the people of Taiwan and made no claims to territory in mainland China or Mongolia. Once the DPP had representation in the Legislative Yuan (LY, or Parliament), the party used the legislature as a forum to challenge the government. However, it did not emerge as a formidable force until 1991, when the elderly LY members elected from the mainland provinces in 1948 retired. Fears that the DPP would one day take control of the legislature led then-President Lee Teng-hui to push through a series of amendments to strengthen presidential power (for example, Taiwan's premier would no longer have to be confirmed by the Legislative Yuan). 2000-2008: in minority government[edit] Former President Chen Shui-bian, the first DPP president (2000-2008) Old DPP logo The DPP won the presidency with the election of Chen Shui-bian in March 2000 with a plurality, due to Pan-Blue voters splitting their vote between the Kuomintang and independent candidate James Soong, ending more than half a century of KMT rule in Taiwan. Chen softened the party's stance on independence to appeal to moderate voters, appease the United States and placate China. He also promised not to change the ROC state symbols or declare formal independence as long as the People's Republic of China did not attack Taiwan. The DPP became the largest party having reached a plurality in the Legislative Yuan for the first time in 2002 following the 2001 legislative election. However, a majority coalition between the KMT, People First Party, and New Party prevented it from taking control of the chamber. In 2004, President Chen Shui-bian was re-elected by a narrow margin. He and Vice President Annette Lu had been involved in an assassination attempt only hours before the election. The KMT candidate, Lien Chan, demanded a recount the following morning. A judicial recount under the jurisdiction of a special panel of the High Court began on 10 May 2004 and ended on 18 May 2004. It was conducted by about 460 teams situated in 21 courthouses across the Taiwan area. Each team had seven members - one judge, two members each from the district court and the local government election authorities and two witnesses each representing the plaintiff (Pan-Blue Coalition) and the defendant (Pan-Green Coalition). Disputed votes were sent to High Court in Taipei for verification. After the recount, President Chen was confirmed the winner of the election by a smaller margin (25,563 as opposed to 29,518 originally). In the later legislative election, the Pan-Blue Coalition opposition retained control of the chamber. The DPP suffered a significant election defeat in nationwide local and county elections in December 2005. The pan-blue coalition captured 16 of 23 county and city government offices under the leadership of popular Taipei mayor and KMT Party Chairman Ma Ying-jeou. The results led to a shake up of the party leadership. Su Tseng-chang resigned as DPP chairman soon after election results were announced. Su had pledged to step down if the DPP lost either Taipei County or failed to win 10 of the 23 mayor/magistrate positions. Vice President Annette Lu was appointed acting DPP leader. Presidential Office Secretary-General Yu Shyi-kun was elected in a three-way race against legislator Chai Trong-rong and Wong Chin-chu with 54.4% of the vote. Premier Frank Hsieh, DPP election organizer and former mayor of Kaohsiung twice tendered a verbal resignation immediately following the election, but his resignation was not accepted by President Chen until January 17, 2006 after the DPP chairmanship election had concluded. The former DPP Chairman Su Tseng-chang was appointed to replace Hsieh as premier. Hsieh and his cabinet resigned en masse on January 24 to make way for Su and his new cabinet. President Chen had offered the position of Presidential Office Secretary-General (vacated by Su) to the departing premier, but Hsieh declined and left office criticizing President Chen for his tough line on dealing with China.

Sino-Japanese War 1894-95

The First Sino-Japanese War (1 August 1894 - 17 April 1895) was fought between the Qing Empire and the Empire of Japan, primarily over influence of Korea.[1] After more than six months of unbroken successes by Japanese land and naval forces and the loss of the port of Weihaiwei, the Qing government sued for peace in February 1895. The war demonstrated the failure of the Qing Empire's attempts to modernize its military and fend off threats to its sovereignty, especially when compared with Japan's successful Meiji Restoration.[2] For the first time, regional dominance in East Asia shifted from China to Japan;[3] the prestige of the Qing Empire, along with the classical tradition in China, suffered a major blow. The humiliating loss of Korea as a tributary state sparked an unprecedented public outcry. Within China, the defeat was a catalyst for a series of political upheavals led by Sun Yat-sen and Kang Youwei, culminating in the 1911 Xinhai Revolution. The war is commonly known in China as the War of Jiawu (Chinese: 甲午戰爭; pinyin: Jiǎwǔ Zhànzhēng), referring to the year (1894) as named under the traditional sexagenary system of years. In Japan, it is called the Japan-Qing War (Japanese: 日清戦争? Hepburn: Nisshin sensō). In Korea, where much of the war took place, it is called the Qing-Japan War (Korean: 청일전쟁; Hanja: 淸日戰爭). Background[edit] After two centuries, the Japanese policy of seclusion under the shoguns of the Edo period came to an end when the country was forced open to trade by British and American intervention in 1854. The years following the Meiji Restoration of 1868 and the fall of the Shogunate had seen Japan transform itself from a feudal society into a modern industrial state. The Japanese had sent delegations and students around the world to learn and assimilate Western arts and sciences, with the intention of making Japan an equal to the Western powers.[4] Korea continued to try to exclude foreigners, refusing embassies from foreign countries and firing on ships near its shores. At the start of the war, Japan had the benefit of three decades of reform, leaving Korea outdated and vulnerable. Conflict over Korea[edit] Satirical drawing in the magazine Punch[5] (29 September 1894), showing the victory of "small" Japan over "large" China. As a newly risen power, Japan turned its attention toward its neighbor, Korea. Japan wanted to block any other power from annexing or dominating Korea, resolving to end the centuries-old Chinese suzerainty. As Prussian advisor Major Klemens Meckel put it to the Japanese, Korea was "a dagger pointed at the heart of Japan".[6] Moreover, Japan realized the potential economic benefits of Korea's coal and iron ore deposits for Japan's growing industrial base, and of Korea's agricultural exports to feed the growing Japanese population. On February 27, 1876, after several confrontations between Korean isolationists and Japanese, Japan imposed the Japan-Korea Treaty of 1876, forcing Korea open to Japanese trade. Similar treaties were signed between Korea and other nations. Korea had traditionally been a tributary state of China's Qing Empire, which exerted large influence over the conservative Korean officials who gathered around the royal family of the Joseon kingdom. Opinion in Korea itself was split: conservatives wanted to retain the traditional relationship under China, while reformists wanted to approach Japan and Western nations. After fighting two Opium Wars against the British in 1839 and 1856, and another war against the French in 1885, China was unable to resist the encroachment of Western powers (see Unequal Treaties). Japan saw the opportunity to take China's place in the strategically vital Korea. 1882 crisis[edit] Main article: Imo Incident The flight of the Japanese legation in 1882 In 1882, the Korean peninsula experienced a severe drought which led to food shortages, causing much hardship and discord among the population. Korea was on the verge of bankruptcy, even falling months behind on military pay, causing deep resentment among the soldiers. On July 23, a military mutiny and riot broke out in Seoul in which troops, assisted by the population, sacked the rice granaries. The next morning, the crowd attacked the royal palace and barracks, and then the Japanese legation. The Japanese legation staff managed to escape to Chemulpo and then to Nagasaki aboard the British survey ship HMS Flying Fish. In response, Japan sent four warships and a battalion of troops to Seoul to safeguard Japanese interests and demand reparations. The Chinese then deployed 4,500 troops to counter the Japanese. However, tensions subsided with the Treaty of Chemulpo, signed on the evening of August 30, 1882. The agreement specified that the Korean conspirators would be punished and 50,000 yen would be paid to the families of slain Japanese. The Japanese government would also receive 500,000 yen, a formal apology, and permission to station troops at their diplomatic legation in Seoul. Gapsin Coup[edit] This section does not cite any sources. Please help improve this section by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. (November 2015) (Learn how and when to remove this template message) Main article: Gapsin Coup In 1884, a group of pro-Japanese reformers briefly overthrew the pro-Chinese conservative Korean government in a bloody coup d'état. However, the pro-Chinese faction, with assistance from Qing forces led by the general Yuan Shikai, succeeded in regaining control in an equally bloody counter-coup. These coups resulted not only in the deaths of a number of reformers, but also in the burning of the Japanese legation and the deaths of several legation guards and citizens. This caused a crisis between Japan and China, which was eventually settled by the Sino-Japanese Convention of Tientsin[1] of 1885, in which the two sides agreed to pull their expeditionary forces out of Korea simultaneously, not send military trainers to the Korean military, and give warning to the other side should one decide to send troops to Korea. Chinese and Japanese troops then left, and diplomatic relations were restored between Japan and Korea. However, the Japanese were frustrated by repeated Chinese attempts to undermine their influence in Korea. Yuan Shikai remained as "Chinese Resident", in what the Chinese intended as a sort of viceroy role directing Korean affairs. He attempted to encourage Chinese and hinder Japanese trade, though Japan remained Korea's largest trading partner, and his government provided Korea with loans. The Chinese built telegraphs linking Korea to the Chinese network. Nagasaki incident[edit] This section does not cite any sources. Please help improve this section by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. (September 2012) (Learn how and when to remove this template message) Main article: Nagasaki incident The Nagasaki incident was a riot that took place in the Japanese port city of Nagasaki in 1886. Four warships from the Qing Empire's navy, the Beiyang Fleet, stopped at Nagasaki, apparently to carry out repairs. Some Chinese sailors caused trouble in the city and started the riot. Several Japanese policemen confronting the rioters were killed. The Qing government did not apologize after the incident, which resulted in a wave of anti-Chinese sentiment in Japan. Bean controversy[edit] A poor harvest in 1889 led the governor of Korea's Hamgyong Province to prohibit soybean exports to Japan. Japan requested and received compensation in 1893 for their importers. The incident highlighted the growing dependence Japan felt on Korean food imports.[7] Kim Ok-gyun affair[edit] Kim Ok-gyun photographed in Nagasaki in 1882. His assassination in China would contribute to tensions leading to the First Sino-Japanese War. On March 28, 1894, a pro-Japanese Korean revolutionary, Kim Ok-gyun, was assassinated in Shanghai. Kim had fled to Japan after his involvement in the 1884 coup and the Japanese had turned down Korean demands that he be extradited. Ultimately, he was lured to Shanghai, where he was killed by a Korean, Hong Jong-u, at a Japanese inn in the international settlement. His body was then taken aboard a Chinese warship and sent back to Korea, where it was quartered and displayed as a warning to other rebels. The Japanese government took this as an outrageous affront.[8]

Gang of Four

The Gang of Four (simplified Chinese: 四人帮; traditional Chinese: 四人幫; pinyin: Sìrén bāng) was a political faction composed of four Chinese Communist Party officials. They came to prominence during the Cultural Revolution (1966-76) and were later charged with a series of treasonous crimes. The gang's leading figure was Mao Zedong's last wife Jiang Qing. The other members were Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, and Wang Hongwen.[1] The Gang of Four controlled the power organs of the Communist Party of China through the later stages of the Cultural Revolution, although it remains unclear which major decisions were made by Mao Zedong and carried out by the Gang, and which were the result of the Gang of Four's own planning. The Gang of Four, together with disgraced general Lin Biao who died in 1971, were labeled the two major "counter-revolutionary forces" of the Cultural Revolution and officially blamed by the Chinese government for the worst excesses of the societal chaos that ensued during the ten years of turmoil. Their downfall on October 6, 1976, a mere month after Mao's death, brought about major celebrations on the streets of Beijing and marked the end of a turbulent political era in China. The group was led by Jiang Qing, and consisted of three of her close associates, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, and Wang Hongwen. Two other men who were already dead in 1976, Kang Sheng and Xie Fuzhi, were named as having been part of the "Gang". Chen Boda and Mao Yuanxin, the latter being Mao's nephew, were also considered some of the Gang's closer associates. Most Western accounts consider that the actual leadership of the Cultural Revolution consisted of a wider group, referring predominantly to the members of the Central Cultural Revolution Group. Most prominent was Lin Biao, until his purported flight from China and death in a plane crash in 1971. Chen Boda is often classed as a member of Lin's faction rather than Jiang Qing's.[2] At the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, on November 10, 1965, Yao Wenyuan in one of Yao's most famous pieces of writing published an article "On the New Historical Beijing Opera 'Hai Rui Dismissed from Office'" in Wenhuibao criticizing the play Hai Rui Dismissed from Office.[1] The writing argues that portraying Peng Dehuai's position sympathetically was an attack on Chairman Mao's Great Leap Forward which led Mao to purge Peng.[3][4] This article is cited as launching the Cultural Revolution.[5] Jiang Qing staged revolutionary operas during the Cultural Revolution and met with the Red Guards.[6][7] The removal of this group from power is sometimes considered to have marked the end of the Cultural Revolution, which had been launched by Mao in 1966 as part of his power struggle with leaders such as Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping and Peng Zhen. Mao placed his wife Jiang Qing, a former film actress who before 1966 had not taken a public political role, in charge of the country's cultural apparatus. Zhang, Yao and Wang were party leaders in Shanghai who had played leading roles in securing that city for Mao during the Cultural Revolution. Around the time of the death of Lin Biao, the Cultural Revolution began to lose momentum. The new commanders of the People's Liberation Army demanded that order be restored in light of the dangerous situation along the border with the Soviet Union (see Sino-Soviet split). Premier Zhou Enlai, who had accepted the Cultural Revolution, but never fully supported it, regained his authority, and used it to bring Deng Xiaoping back into the Party leadership at the 10th Party Congress in 1973. Liu Shaoqi had meanwhile died in prison in 1969. Near the end of Mao's life, a power struggle occurred between the Gang of Four and the alliance of Deng Xiaoping, Zhou Enlai, and Ye Jianying. Immediately after the arrests, Hua Guofeng, Marshal Ye Jianying, and economic czars Chen Yun and Li Xiannian formed the core of the next party leadership.[9] These three, together with the newly rehabilitated Deng Xiaoping and Wang Dongxing, were elected party Vice Chairmen at the August 1977 National Party Congress.[10] At the politburo level, the membership of all four living marshals, seven other generals and at least five others with close military ties reflected the deep concern for national stability. It is now officially claimed by the Communist Party of China that Mao in his last year turned against Jiang Qing and her associates, and that after his death on 9 September 1976, they attempted to seize power (the same allegation made against Lin Biao in 1971). Even decades later, it is impossible to know the full truth of these events.

First Five-Year Plan

The first five-year plan (Russian: I пятилетний план, первая пятилетка) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) was a list of economic goals, created by General Secretary Joseph Stalin and based on his policy of Socialism in One Country. It was implemented between 1928 and 1932. In 1929, Stalin edited the plan to include the creation of "kolkhoz" collective farming systems that stretched over thousands of acres of land and had hundreds of peasants working on them. The creation of collective farms essentially destroyed the kulaks as a class, and also brought about the slaughter of millions of farm animals that these peasants would rather kill than give up to the gigantic farms. This disruption led to a famine in Ukraine, Russia, Kazakhstan as well as areas of the Northern Caucasus. Despite the ruinous loss of life, the introduction of collective farms allowed peasants to use tractors to farm the land, unlike before when most had been too poor to own a tractor. Public machine and tractor stations were set up throughout the USSR, and peasants were allowed to use these public tractors to farm the land, increasing the food output per peasant. Peasants were allowed to sell any surplus food from the land. However, the government planners failed to take notice of local situations. In 1932, grain production was 32% below average;[1] to add to this problem, procurements of food were up by 44%. Agricultural production was so disrupted that famine broke out in several districts.[2] Because of the plan's reliance on rapid industrialization, major cultural changes had to occur in tandem. As this new social structure arose, conflicts occurred among some of the majority of the populations. In Turkmenistan, for example, the Soviet policy of collectivization shifted their production from cotton to food products.[3] Such a change caused unrest within a community that had already existed prior to this external adjustment, and between 1928 and 1932, Turkmen nomads and peasants made it clear through methods like passive resistance that they did not agree with such policies.[3] Prior to the enactment of the first Soviet five-year plan, the Soviet Union had been experiencing threats from only external sources. The first war threat emerged from the East in 1924.[4] This war scare arose when Western nations, like Great Britain, began cutting off diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.[5] This created fear among the Soviets that the West was preparing to attack the Soviet Union again; during the Russian Civil War, foreign powers had occupied portions of Soviet territory. The fear of invasion from the west left the Soviets feeling a need for rapid industrialization to increase Soviet war making potential, and to compete with the western allies. At the same time as the war scare of 1927, dissatisfaction among the peasantry was emerging in the Soviet Union. This dissatisfaction arose from the famine of the early 1920s, as well as a growing mistreatment of the peasants.[6] Also during this time the secret police or the NKVD had begun rounding up political dissenters in the Soviet Union.[7] All these tensions had the potential to destroy the young Soviet Union and forced Joseph Stalin to introduce rapid industrialization of heavy industry so that the Soviet Union could address these threats if needed. The central aspect of the first Soviet five-year plan was the rapid industrialization of the Soviet Union. The need for rapid industrialization was once again out of the fear of impending war from the West. If war were to break out between the Soviet Union and the West, the Soviets would be fighting against some of the most industrialized nations in the world. The rapid industrialization would inhibit fears of being left unprotected if War between the Soviets and the West were to occur. To meet the needs of a possible war, the Soviet leaders set unrealistic quotas for production.[8] To meet those unrealistic needs, the facilities had to be constructed to quickly facilitate material production before goods could be produced. During this period 1928-1932, massive industrial centers emerged in areas that were highly isolated before. These isolated areas included Magnitogorsk, Dnieper, and Nizhny Novgorod.[9] During this era of Soviet history heavy industry was supposed to experience a 350% increase in output.[8] To achieve this massive economic growth, the Soviet Union had to reroute essential resources to meet the needs of heavy industry. Programs not necessary to heavy industry were cut from the Soviet budget; and because of the redistribution of industrial funding, basic goods, such as food, became scarce.[10] The Soviet Union then decided that the workers necessary for further industrialization should be given most of the available food.[11] From this rapid industrialization a new working class emerged in the Soviet Union.[12] During this time the industrial workforce rose from 3.12 million in 1928 to 6.01 million at the end of the plan in 1932.[13] The first five-year plan also began a period of rapid agricultural collectivization in the Soviet Union. One reason for the collectivization of Soviet agriculture was to increase the number of industrial workers for the new factories.[8] Soviet officials also believed that collectivization would increase crop yields and help fund other programs.[8] This agricultural collectivization was however a failure for the Soviets. At the end of 1929 the Soviets asserted themselves to forming collectivized peasant agriculture, but the "Kulaks" had to be "liquidated as a class," because of their resistance to fixed agricultural prices.[14] Resulting from this, the party behavior became uncontrolled and manic when the party began to acquisition food from the countryside.[14] In the years following the agricultural collectivization, the reforms would disrupt the Soviet food supply.[14] In turn, this disruption would eventually lead to famines for the many years following the first five-year plan, with 3-4 million dying from starvation in 1933.[15]

one-child policy

The one-child policy, a part of the family planning policy, was a population planning policy of China. It was introduced in 1979 and began to be formally phased out in 2015. The policy allowed many exceptions, and ethnic minorities were exempt. For example, in 2007, 36% of China's population was subject to a strict one-child restriction, with an additional 53% being allowed to have a second child if the first child was a girl. Provincial governments imposed fines for violations, and the local and national governments created commissions to raise awareness and carry out registration and inspection work. According to the Chinese government, 400 million births were prevented. This claim has been called "false" by scholars, because "three-quarters of the decline in fertility since 1970 occurred before the launching of the one-child policy; and most of the further decline in fertility since 1980 can be attributed to economic development."[1] Thailand and Iran, along with the Indian states of Kerala and Tamil Nadu, have had similar declines of fertility without a one-child policy. Although 76% of Chinese people supported the policy in a 2008 survey,[2] it was controversial outside of China. On October 29, 2015, it was reported that the existing law would be changed to a two-child policy, citing a statement from the Communist Party of China. The new law became effective on January 1, 2016, following its passage in the standing committee of the National People's Congress on December 27, 2015. During the period of Mao Zedong's leadership in China, the birth rate fell from 37 per thousand to 20 per thousand.[3] Infant mortality declined from 227 per thousand births in 1949 to 53 per thousand in 1981, and life expectancy dramatically increased from around 35 years in 1948 to 66 years in 1976.[3][4] Until the 1960s, the government encouraged families to have as many children as possible[5] because of Mao's belief that population growth empowered the country, preventing the emergence of family planning programs earlier in China's development.[6] The population grew from around 540 million in 1949 to 940 million in 1976.[7] Beginning in 1970, citizens were encouraged to marry at later ages and have only two children. Although the fertility rate began to decline, the Chinese government observed the global debate over a possible overpopulation catastrophe suggested by organizations such as Club of Rome and Sierra Club. While visiting Europe in 1979, one of the top Chinese officials, Song Jian, read two influential books of the movement, The Limits to Growth and A Blueprint for Survival. With a group of mathematicians, Song determined the correct population of China to be 700 million. A plan was prepared to reduce China's population to the desired level by 2080, with the one-child policy as one of the main instruments of social engineering.[8] In spite of some criticism inside the party, the plan (also referred to as the Family Planning Policy[9]) was officially adopted in 1979.[10][11][12] The plan called for families to have one child each in order to curb a then-surging population and limit the demands for water and other resources,[13] as well as to alleviate social, economic and environmental problems in China.[14] The policy was formally implemented as a temporary measure on September 18, 1980.[15] The one-child policy was originally designed to be a One-Generation Policy.[16] It was enforced at the provincial level and enforcement varied; some provinces had more relaxed restrictions. The one-child limit was most strictly enforced in densely populated urban areas.[17] Beginning in 1980, official policy granted local officials the flexibility to make exceptions and allow second children in the case of "practical difficulties" (such as cases in which the father is a disabled serviceman) or when both parents are single children,[18] and some provinces had other exemptions worked into their policies as well. In most areas, families were allowed to apply to have a second child if their first-born is a daughter.[19][20] Furthermore, families with children with disabilities have different policies and families whose first child suffers from physical disability, mental illness, or intellectual disability were allowed to have more children.[21] However, second children were sometimes subject to birth spacing (usually 3 or 4 years). Children born in overseas countries were not counted under the policy if they do not obtain Chinese citizenship. Chinese citizens returning from abroad were allowed to have a second child.[22] Sichuan province allowed exemptions for couples of certain backgrounds.[23] By one estimate there were at least 22 ways in which parents could qualify for exceptions to the law towards the end of the one-child policy's existence.[24] As of 2007, only 35.9% of the population were subject to a strict one-child limit. 52.9% were permitted to have a second child if their first was a daughter; 9.6% of Chinese couples were permitted two children regardless of their gender; and 1.6%—mainly Tibetans—had no limit at all.[25] The Danshan, Sichuan Province Nongchang Village people Public Affairs Bulletin Board in September 2005 noted that RMB 25,000 in social compensation fees were owed in 2005. Thus far 11,500 R M B had been collected, so another 13,500 RMB had to be collected. Following the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, a new exception to the regulations was announced in Sichuan province for parents who had lost children in the earthquake.[26][27] Similar exceptions had previously been made for parents of severely disabled or deceased children.[28] People have also tried to evade the policy by giving birth to a second child in Hong Kong, but at least for Guangdong residents, the one-child policy was also enforced if the birth was given in Hong Kong or abroad.[29] In accordance with China's affirmative action policies towards ethnic minorities, all non-Han ethnic groups are subjected to different laws and were usually allowed to have two children in urban areas, and three or four in rural areas. Han Chinese living in rural towns were also permitted to have two children.[30] Because of couples such as these, as well as who simply pay a fine (or "social maintenance fee") to have more children,[31] the overall fertility rate of mainland China is close to 1.4 children per woman.[32] Implementation[edit] The Family Planning Policy was enforced through a financial penalty in the form of the "social child-raising fee", sometimes called a "family planning fine" in the West, which was collected as a fraction of either the annual disposable income of city dwellers or of the annual cash income of peasants, in the year of the child's birth.[33] For instance, in Guangdong, the fee is between 3 and 6 annual incomes for incomes below the per capita income of the district, plus 1 to 2 times the annual income exceeding the average. Both members of the couple need to pay the fine.[34] As part of the policy, women were required to have a contraceptive intrauterine device (IUD) surgically installed after having a first child, and to be sterilized by tubal ligation after having a second child. From 1980 to 2014, 324 million Chinese women were fitted with IUDs in this way and 107 million were sterilized. Women who refused these procedures - which many resented - could lose their government employment and their children could lose access to education or health services. The IUDs installed in this way were modified such that they could not be removed manually, but only through surgery. In 2016, following the abolition of the one-child policy, the Chinese government announced that IUD removals would now be paid for by the government.[35] Revolution[edit] In 2013, Deputy Director Wang Peian of the National Health and Family Planning Commission said that "China's population will not grow substantially in the short term".[36] A survey by the commission found that only about half of eligible couples wish to have two children, mostly because of the cost of living impact of a second child.[37] In November 2013, following the Third Plenum of the 18th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, China announced the decision to relax the one-child policy. Under the new policy, families could have two children if one parent, rather than both parents, was an only child.[38][39] This mainly applied to urban couples, since there were very few rural only children due to long-standing exceptions to the policy for rural couples.[40] The coastal province of Zhejiang, one of China's most affluent, became the first area to implement this "relaxed policy" in January 2014.[41] The relaxed policy has been implemented in 29 out of the 31 provinces, with the exceptions of Xinjiang and Tibet. Under this policy, approximately 11 million couples in China are allowed to have a second child; however, only "nearly one million" couples applied to have a second child in 2014,[42] less than half the expected number of 2 million per year.[43] By May 2014, 241,000 out of 271,000 applications had been approved. Officials of China's National Health and Family Planning Commission claimed that this outcome was expected, and that "second-child policy" would continue progressing with a good start.[44]

War of Resistance against Japan

The origin of the Second Sino-Japanese War can be traced to the First Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, in which China, then under the Qing dynasty, was defeated by Japan and was forced to cede Formosa, and to recognize the full and complete independence of Korea in the Treaty of Shimonoseki; Japan had also allegedly annexed the Diaoyudao/Senkaku islands in early 1895 as a result being the victors of this war (Japan claims the islands to have been uninhabited in 1895) .[33][34][35] The Qing Dynasty was on the brink of collapse from internal revolts and foreign imperialism, while Japan had emerged as a great power through its effective measures of modernization.[36] Republic of China[edit] The Republic of China was founded in 1912, following the Xinhai Revolution which overthrew the Qing dynasty (1644-1911). However, central authority disintegrated and the Republic's authority succumbed to that of regional warlords. Unifying the nation and repelling imperialism seemed a very remote possibility.[37] Some warlords even aligned themselves with various foreign powers in their battles with each other. For example, the warlord Zhang Zuolin of Manchuria openly cooperated with the Japanese for military and economic assistance.[38] Twenty-One Demands[edit] In 1915, Japan issued the Twenty-One Demands to extort further political and commercial privilege from China.[39] Following World War I, Japan acquired the German Empire's sphere of influence in Shandong[40] (Shantung), leading to nationwide anti-Japanese protests and mass demonstrations in China, but China under the Beiyang government, remained fragmented and unable to resist foreign incursions.[41] To unite China and eradicate regional warlords, the Kuomintang (KMT, or Chinese Nationalist Party) in Guangzhou launched the Northern Expedition of 1926-28 with the help of the Soviet Union.[42] Jinan incident[edit] The Kuomintang (KMT) National Revolutionary Army (NRA) swept through China until it was checked in Shandong, where conflict erupted as it approached the city of Jinan. Confrontations occurred which culminated in the Jinan incident of 1928, during which time the Japanese military executed several Chinese officials and fired artillery shells into Jinan. Between 2,000 and 11,000 civilians are believed to have been killed. The incident severely deteriorated relations between China and Japan. [43][44] Nominal unification of China[edit] In the same year the warlord Zhang Zuolin was assassinated when he became less willing to cooperate with Japan.[45] Afterwards Zhang's son Zhang Xueliang quickly took over control of Manchuria, and despite strong Japanese lobbying efforts to continue the resistance against the KMT, he soon declared his allegiance to the Kuomintang government under Chiang Kai-shek, which resulted in the nominal unification of China at the end of 1928.[46] Communist Party of China[edit] In 1930, large-scale civil war broke out between warlords, who had fought in alliance with the Kuomintang during the Northern Expedition, and the central government under Chiang. In addition, the Chinese Communists (CPC, or Communist Party of China) revolted against the central government following a purge of its members by the KMT in 1927. The Chinese government expended resources fighting these civil wars, following a policy of "first internal pacification, then external resistance" (Chinese: 攘外必先安內). Invasion of Manchuria, interventions in China[edit] Japanese troops entering Shenyang during the Mukden Incident The internecine warfare in China provided excellent opportunities for Japan, which saw Manchuria as a limitless supply of raw materials, a market for its manufactured goods (now excluded from the influence of many Western countries in Depression-era tariffs), and as a protective buffer state against the Soviet Union in Siberia. Japan invaded Manchuria outright after the Mukden Incident (simplified Chinese: 九一八事变; traditional Chinese: 九一八事變; pinyin: Jiǔyībā Shìbiàn) in September 1931. Japan charged that their rights in Manchuria, established by the Russo-Japanese War, had been systematically violated and that there were "more than 120 cases of infringement of rights and interests, interference with business, boycott of Japanese goods, unreasonable taxation, detention of individuals, confiscation of properties, eviction, demand for cessation of business, assault and battery, and the oppression of Korean residents."[47] After five months of fighting, Japan established the puppet state of Manchukuo in 1932, and installed last emperor of China, Puyi, as its puppet ruler. Militarily too weak to challenge Japan directly, China appealed to the League of Nations for help. The League's investigation led to the publication of the Lytton Report, condemning Japan for its incursion into Manchuria, causing Japan to withdraw from the League of Nations. No country was willing to take action against Japan beyond tepid censure. Incessant fighting followed the Mukden Incident. In 1932, Chinese and Japanese troops fought the January 28 Incident battle. This resulted in the demilitarisation of Shanghai, which forbade the Chinese from deploying troops in their own city. In Manchukuo there was an ongoing campaign to defeat the Anti-Japanese Volunteer Armies that arose from widespread outrage over the policy of non-resistance to Japan. In 1933, the Japanese attacked the Great Wall region. The Tanggu Truce established in its aftermath, gave Japan control of Jehol province as well as a demilitarized zone between the Great Wall and Beiping-Tianjin region. Japan aimed to create another buffer zone between Manchukuo and the Chinese Nationalist government in Nanjing. Japan increasingly exploited China's internal conflicts to reduce the strength of its fractious opponents. This was precipitated by the fact that even years after the Northern Expedition, the political power of the Nationalist government was limited to just the area of the Yangtze River Delta. Other sections of China were essentially in the hands of local Chinese warlords. Japan sought various Chinese collaborators and helped them establish governments friendly to Japan. This policy was called the Specialization of North China (Chinese: 華北特殊化; pinyin: huáběitèshūhùa), more commonly known as the North China Autonomous Movement. The northern provinces affected by this policy were Chahar, Suiyuan, Hebei, Shanxi, and Shandong. This Japanese policy was most effective in the area of what is now Inner Mongolia and Hebei. In 1935, under Japanese pressure, China signed the He-Umezu Agreement, which forbade the KMT from conducting party operations in Hebei. In the same year, the Chin-Doihara Agreement was signed expelling the KMT from Chahar. Thus, by the end of 1935 the Chinese government had essentially abandoned northern China. In its place, the Japanese-backed East Hebei Autonomous Council and the Hebei-Chahar Political Council were established. There in the empty space of Chahar the Mongol Military Government (simplified Chinese: 蒙古军政府; traditional Chinese: 蒙古軍政府; pinyin: Ménggǔ jūn zhèngfǔ) was formed on May 12, 1936. Japan provided all the necessary military and economic aid. Afterwards Chinese volunteer forces continued to resist Japanese aggression in Manchuria, and Chahar and Suiyuan.

Li Peng

Li Peng (Chinese: 李鹏; pinyin: Lǐ Péng; born 20 October 1928) is a Chinese politician. Li served as the fourth Premier of the People's Republic of China, between 1987 and 1998, and the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, China's top legislative body, from 1998 to 2003. For much of the 1990s Li was ranked second in the Communist Party of China (CPC) hierarchy behind then Party General Secretary Jiang Zemin. He retained his seat on the CPC Politburo Standing Committee until 2002. Li was the son of an early Communist revolutionary, but was orphaned as a child when his father was executed by the Kuomintang. After meeting Zhou Enlai in Sichuan Li was raised by Zhou and his wife, Deng Yingchao. Li was trained to be an engineer in the USSR and worked at an important national power company after he returned to China. He escaped the political turmoil of the 1950s, '60s, and '70s due to his political connections and his employment in the company. After Deng Xiaoping became China's leader in the late 1970s, Li took a number of increasingly important and powerful political positions, eventually leading to him becoming premier in 1987. As Premier, Li was the most visible representative of China's government who backed the use of force to quell the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989. During the protests Li used his authority as premier to declare martial law; and, in cooperation with Deng Xiaoping, who was the Chairman of the Central Military Commission, he ordered the June 1989 military crackdown against student pro-democracy demonstrators in Tiananmen Square, Beijing. Li advocated a largely conservative approach to Chinese economic reform, which placed him at odds with General Secretary Zhao Ziyang, who fell out of favour in 1989. After Zhao was removed from office Li promoted a conservative socialist economic agenda, but lost influence to incoming vice-premier Zhu Rongji and was unable to prevent the increasing free-market liberalization of the Chinese economy. During his time in office he was at the helm of the controversial Three Gorges Dam project. He and his family managed a large Chinese power monopoly, which the Chinese government broke up after his term as premier expired. Childhood[edit] Li was born as Li Yuanpeng (李遠芃; Lǐ Yuǎnpéng) in Shanghai, but with ancestral roots in Chengdu, the capital of Sichuan Province.[1] He is the son of writer Li Shuoxun, one of the earliest CPC revolutionaries,[2] who was the political commissar of the Twentieth Division during the Nanchang Uprising.[3] In 1931 Li was orphaned at age three when his father was executed by the Kuomintang for treason and for support of armed splittism.[4] It was generally believed that Li was adopted by Zhou Enlai and Deng Yingchao, but this was refuted by Li himself in 2014 in his own memoirs. According to Li, he met Deng in Chengdu in 1939, who then took him to Changchun to meet Zhou. Zhou was in the Communist base of Yan'an, and they did not meet until late 1940.[5] In 1941, when Li was twelve, Zhou sent Li to Yan'an, where Li studied until 1945.[3] As a seventeen-year-old, in 1945, Li joined the Communist Party of China.[6] Early career[edit] Like other Communist Party cadres of the third generation, Li gained a technical background. In 1941 he began studying at the Institute of Natural Science (the former Beijing Institute of Technology) in Yan'an.[7] In 1948 he was sent to study at the Moscow Power Engineering Institute, majoring in hydroelectric engineering. A year later, in 1949, Zhou Enlai became Premier of the newly declared People's Republic of China.[3] Li graduated in 1954. During his time in the USSR, Li was the Chairman of the Chinese Students Association in the Soviet Union.[6] When Li returned to China in 1955, the country was firmly under the control of the Communist Party. From the time of his return until 1979, Li engineered and managed a number of major power projects across China,[2] beginning his career in Manchuria. Li survived the upheavals of the Cultural Revolution unscathed, due largely to his placement as director and Party secretary of the powerful and influential Beijing Electric Power Administration (from 1966-1980),[6] and due to his family contacts in powerful Communist circles. Li advanced politically after the ascent of Deng Xiaoping, and served as the Vice-Minister and Minister of Power between 1979 and 1983. In 1982-1983 Li served as the vice-minister of Water Conservancy and Power.[6] Much of Li's rapid political promotion was due to the support of Party elder Chen Yun.[8] Li joined the Central Committee at the Twelfth National Congress in 1982. In 1985 he was named minister of the State Education Commission, and was elected to the Politburo and the Party Secretariat. In 1987 Li became a member of the powerful Standing Committee.[2] Premiership[edit] Defender of state control[edit] In November 1987, after Premier Zhao Ziyang was promoted to General Secretary, Li became acting Premier. He was formally elected Premier in March 1988. Within a year of this promotion, Li would play a major role in ending Zhao's career, after Zhao publicly supported demonstrators in Tiananmen Square. At the time of his promotion, Li seemed like an unusual choice for Premier because he did not seem to share Deng's enthusiasm for introducing market reforms.[2] Li was raised to the position of Premier thanks partially to the departure of Hu Yaobang, who was forced to resign as General Secretary after the Party blamed him for a series of student-led protests in 1987. Throughout the 1980s, political dissent and social problems, including inflation, urban migration, and school overcrowding, became great problems in China. Despite these acute challenges, Li shifted his focus away from the day-to-day concerns of energy, communications, and raw materials allocation, and took a more active role in the ongoing intra-party debate on the pace of market reforms. Politically, Li opposed the modern economic reforms pioneered by Zhao Ziyang throughout Zhao's years of public service. While students and intellectuals urged greater reforms, some party elders increasingly feared that the instability opened up by any significant reforms would threaten to undermine the authority of the Communist Party, which Li had spent his career attempting to strengthen. After Zhao became General Secretary of the Communist Party of China, his proposals in May 1988 to expand free enterprise led to popular complaints (which some suggest were politically inspired) about inflation fears. Public fears about the negative effects of market reforms gave conservatives (including Li Peng) the opening to call for greater centralization of economic controls and stricter prohibitions against Western influences, especially opposing further expansion of Zhao's more free enterprise-oriented approach. This precipitated a political debate, which grew more heated through the winter of 1988-1989. Tiananmen Square[edit] Main article: Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 The Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 began with the mass mourning over the death of former General secretary Hu Yaobang, widely perceived to have been purged for his support of political liberalization.[9] On the eve of Hu's funeral, 100,000 people gathered at Tiananmen Square.[10] Beijing students began the demonstrations to encourage continued economic reform and liberalization, and these demonstrations soon evolved into a mass movement for political reform.[11] From Tiananmen Square, the protesters later expanded into the surrounding streets. Non-violent protests also occurred in cities throughout China, including Shanghai and Wuhan. Looting and rioting occurred in various locations throughout China, including Xi'an and Changsha.[12] The Tiananmen protests were partially protests against the affluence of the children of high-ranking Communist Party officials, and the perception that second-generation officials had received their fortunes through exploiting their parents' influence. Li, whose family has often been at the center of corruption allegations within the Chinese power industry, was vulnerable to these charges.[13] An editorial published in the People's Daily on 26 April and bearing the name of Deng Xiaoping, denounced the demonstrations as "premeditated and organized turmoil with anti-Party and anti-socialist motives". This article had the effect of worsening the demonstrations by angering its leaders, who then made their demands more extreme. Zhao Ziyang later wrote in his autobiography that, although Deng had stated many of these sentiments in a private conversation with Li Peng shortly before the editorial was written, Li had these comments disseminated to Party members and published as the editorial without Deng's knowledge or consent.[14] Li strictly refused to negotiate with the Tiananmen protesters out of principle, and became one of the officials most objected to by protesters.[8] One of the protest's key leaders, Wang Dan, during a hunger strike, publicly scolded Li on National Television for ignoring the needs of the people. Some observers say that Wang's statements insulted Li personally, hardening his resolve to end the protest by violent means.[15] Among the other senior members of the central government, Li became the one who most strongly favored violence. After winning the support of most of his colleagues, apparently including Deng Xiaoping, Li officially declared martial law in Beijing on 20 May 1989 and the protests were crushed by the military on 3-4 June. Most estimates of the dead range from several hundred to several thousand people. Li later described the crackdown as a historic victory for Communism,[2] and wrote that he feared the protests would be as potentially damaging to China as the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) had been.[15] Political longevity[edit] Li Peng with Russian President Vladimir Putin in 2000 Although the Tiananmen crackdown was an "international public relations disaster for China", it ensured that Li would have a long and productive career. He remained powerful, even though he had been one of the main targets of protesters, partially because the leadership believed that limiting Li's career would be the same as admitting that they had made mistakes by suppressing the 1989 protests. By keeping Li at the upper levels of the Party, China's leaders communicated to the world that the country remained stable and united.[2] In the immediate aftermath of the Tiananmen protests, Li took a leading role in a national austerity program, intended to slow economic growth and inflation and re-centralize the economy. Li worked to increase taxes on agriculture and export-industries, and increased salaries to less-efficient industries owned by the government.[16] Li directed a tight monetary policy, implementing price controls on many commodities, supporting higher interest rates, and cutting off state loans to private and cooperative sectors in attempts to reduce inflation. Li suffered a heart attack in 1993, and began to lose influence within the Party to vice-premier Zhu Rongji, a strong advocate for economic liberalization. In that year, when Li made his annual work report to the Politburo, he was forced to make over seventy changes in order to make the plans acceptable to Deng.[8] Perhaps realizing that opposition to the market reforms would be poorly received by Deng and other Party elders, Li publicly supported Deng's economic reforms. Li was reappointed Premier in 1993, despite a large protest vote for Zhu. Zhu Rongji eventually succeeded Li when Li's second term expired, in 1998.[2] Li began two megaprojects when he was the Premier. He initiated the construction of the Three Gorges Dam on 14 December 1994, and later began preparations for the Shenzhou Manned Space Program. Both programs were subject to much controversy within China and abroad. The Shenzhou program was especially criticized due to its extraordinary cost (tens of billions of dollars) in a country that sometimes referred to itself as a Third World nation. Many economists and humanitarians suggested that those billions in capital might be better invested in helping the Chinese population deal with economic hardships and improvement in the China's education, health services, and legal system.[17][18]

Peng Dehuai

Peng Dehuai (Chinese: 彭德怀; pinyin: Péng Déhuái; October 24, 1898 - November 29, 1974) was a prominent Chinese Communist military leader, and served as China's Defense Minister from 1954 to 1959. Peng was born into a poor peasant family, and received several years of primary education before his family's poverty forced him to suspend his education at the age of ten, and to work for several years as a manual laborer. When he was sixteen, Peng became a professional soldier. Over the next ten years Peng served in the armies of several Hunan-based warlord armies, raising himself from the rank of private second class to major. In 1926 Peng's forces joined the Kuomintang, and Peng was first introduced to communism. Peng participated in the Northern Expedition, and supported Wang Jingwei's attempt to form a left-leaning Kuomintang government based in Wuhan. After Wang was defeated, Peng briefly rejoined Chiang Kai-shek's forces before joining the Chinese Communist Party, allying himself with Mao Zedong and Zhu De. Peng was one of the most senior generals who defended the Jiangxi Soviet from Chiang's attempts to capture it, and his successes were rivaled only by Lin Biao. Peng participated in the Long March, and supported Mao Zedong at the Zunyi Conference, which was critical to Mao's rise to power. During the 1937-1945 Second Sino-Japanese War, Peng was one of the strongest supporters of pursuing a ceasefire with the Kuomintang in order to concentrate China's collective resources on resisting the Japanese Empire. Peng was the senior commander in the combined Kuomintang-Communist efforts to resist the Japanese occupation of Shanxi in 1937; and, by 1938, was in command of 2/3 of the Eighth Route Army. In 1940, Peng conducted the Hundred Regiments Offensive, a massive Communist effort to disrupt Japanese logistical networks across northern China. The Hundred Regiments Offensive was modestly successful, but political disputes within the Communist Party led to Peng being recalled to Yan'an, and he spent the rest of the war without an active command. After the Japanese surrendered, in 1945, Peng was given command of Communist forces in Northwest China. He was the most senior commander responsible for defending the Communist leadership in Shaanxi from Kuomintang forces, saving Mao from being captured at least once. Peng eventually defeated the Kuomintang in Northwest China, captured huge amounts of military supplies, and actively incorporated the huge area, including Xinjiang, into the People's Republic of China. Peng was one of the few senior military leaders who supported Mao's suggestions to involve China directly in the 1950-1953 Korean War, and he served as the direct commander of the Chinese People's Volunteer Army for the first half of the war (though Mao and Zhou Enlai were technically more senior). Peng's experiences in the Korean War convinced him that the Chinese military had to become more professional, organized, and well-equipped in order to prepare itself for the conditions of modern technical warfare. Because the Soviet Union was the only communist country then equipped with a fully modern, professional army, Peng attempted to reform China's military on the Soviet model over the next several years, making the army less political and more professional (contrary to the political goals of Mao). Peng resisted Mao's attempts to develop a personality cult throughout the 1950s; and, when Mao's economic policies associated with the Great Leap Forward caused a nationwide famine, Peng became critical of Mao's leadership. The rivalry between Peng and Mao culminated in an open confrontation between the two at the 1959 Lushan Conference. Mao won this confrontation, labeled Peng as a leader of an "anti-Party clique", and purged Peng from all influential positions for the rest of his life. Peng lived in virtual obscurity until 1965, when the reformers Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping supported Peng's limited return to government, developing military industries in Southwest China. In 1966, following the advent of the Cultural Revolution, Peng was arrested by Red Guards. From 1966-1970, radical factions within the Communist Party, led by Lin Biao and Mao's wife, Jiang Qing, singled out Peng for national persecution, and Peng was publicly humiliated in numerous large-scale struggle sessions and subjected to physical and psychological torture in organized efforts to force Peng to confess his "crimes" against Mao Zedong and the Communist Party. In 1970 Peng was formally tried and sentenced to life imprisonment, and he died in prison in 1974. After Mao died in 1976, Peng's old ally, Deng Xiaoping, emerged as China's paramount leader. Deng led an effort to formally rehabilitate people who had been unjustly persecuted during the Cultural Revolution, and Peng was one of the first leaders to be posthumously rehabilitated, in 1978. In modern China, Peng is considered one of the most successful and highly respected generals in the history of the early Chinese Communist Party.

Special Economic Zones

Special economic zones of China (SEZs) are special economic zones located in mainland China. The government of China gives SEZs special (more free market-oriented) economic policies and flexible governmental measures. This allows SEZs to utilize an economic management system that is more attractive for foreign and domestic firms to do business in than the rest of mainland China. In SEZs, "...foreign and domestic trade and investment are conducted without the authorization of the Chinese central government in Beijing." [1] SEZs offer "tax and business incentives to attract foreign investment and technology".[1] Since the late 1970s, and especially since the 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee in 1978, the Chinese government decided to reform the national economic setup. The basic state policy has focused on the formulation and implementation of overall reform and opening to the outside world. During the 1980s, China passed several stages, ranging from the establishment of special economic zones and open coastal cities and areas, and designating open inland and coastal economic and technology development zones.[citation needed] Since 1980, China has established special economic zones in Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shantou in Guangdong Province and Xiamen in Fujian Province, and designated the entire province of Hainan as a special economic zone. In August 1980, the National People's Congress (NPC) passed "Regulations for The Special Economy Zone of Guangdong Province" and officially designated a portion of Shenzhen as the Shenzhen Special Economy Zone (SSEZ).[citation needed] In 1984, China further opened 14 coastal cities to overseas investment: Dalian, Qinhuangdao, Tianjin, Yantai, Qingdao, Lianyungang, Nantong, Shanghai, Ningbo, Wenzhou, Fuzhou, Guangzhou, Zhanjiang and Beihai. Since 1988, mainland China's opening to the outside world has been extended to its border areas, areas along the Yangtze River and inland areas. First, the state decided to turn Hainan Island into mainland China's biggest special economic zone (approved by the 1st session of the 7th NPC in 1988) and to enlarge the other four special economic zones.[citation needed] Shortly afterwards, the State Council expanded the open coastal areas, extending into an open coastal belt the open economic zones of the Yangtze River Delta, Pearl River Delta, Xiamen-Zhangzhou-Quanzhou Triangle in south Fujian, Shandong Peninsula, Liaodong Peninsula (Liaoning Province), Hebei and Guangxi. In June 1990, the Chinese government opened the Pudong New Area in Shanghai to overseas investment, and additional cities along the Yangtze River valley, with Shanghai's Pudong New Area as its "dragon head."[citation needed] Since 1992, the State Council has opened a number of border cities, and in addition, opened all the capital cities of inland provinces and autonomous regions. In addition, 15 free trade zones, 32 state-level economic and technological development zones, and 53 new and high-tech industrial development zones have been established in large and medium-sized cities. As these open areas adopt different preferential policies, they play the dual roles of "windows" in developing the foreign-oriented economy, generating foreign exchanges through exporting products and importing advanced technologies and of "radiators" in accelerating inland economic development.[citation needed] Primarily geared to exporting processed goods, the five SEZs are foreign trade-oriented areas which integrate science, innovation and industry with trade. Foreign firms benefit from preferential policies such as lower tax rates, reduced regulations and special managerial systems. In 1999, Shenzhen's new-and high-tech industry reached an output value of high-tech products of 81.98 billion yuan, making up 40.5% of the city's total industrial output value.[citation needed] Since its founding in 1992, the Shanghai Pudong New Zone has made progress in both absorbing foreign capital and accelerating the economic development of the Yangtze River valley. The government has extended special preferential policies to the Pudong New Zone that are not yet enjoyed by the special economic zones. For instance, in addition to the preferential policies of reducing or eliminating Customs duties and income tax common to the economic and technological development zones, the state also permits the zone to allow foreign business people to open financial institutions and run tertiary industries. In addition, the state has given Shanghai permission to set up a stock exchange, expand its examination and approval authority over investments and allow foreign-funded banks to engage in RMB business. In 1999, the GDP of the Pudong New Zone came to 80 billion yuan, and the total industrial output value, 145 billion yuan.[citation needed] In May 2010, the PRC designated the city of Kashgar in Xinjiang a SEZ. Kashgar's annual growth rate was 17.4 percent from 2009, and Kashgar's designation has since increased tourism and real estate prices in the city. Kashgar is close to China's border with the independent states of former Soviet Central Asia and the SEZ seeks to capitalize on international trade links between China and those states.[2]

Great Leap Forward / famine

The Great Leap Forward (Chinese: 大跃进; pinyin: Dà yuè jìn) of the People's Republic of China (PRC) was an economic and social campaign by the Communist Party of China (CPC) from 1958 to 1962. The campaign was led by Chairman Mao Zedong and aimed to rapidly transform the country from an agrarian economy into a socialist society through rapid industrialization and collectivization. However, it is widely considered to have caused the Great Chinese Famine. Chief changes in the lives of rural Chinese included the incremental introduction of mandatory agricultural collectivization. Private farming was prohibited, and those engaged in it were persecuted and labeled counter-revolutionaries. Restrictions on rural people were enforced through public struggle sessions and social pressure, although people also experienced forced labor.[1] Rural industrialization, officially a priority of the campaign, saw "its development... aborted by the mistakes of the Great Leap Forward."[2] It is widely regarded by historians that The Great Leap resulted in tens of millions of deaths.[3] A lower-end estimate is 18 million, while extensive research by Yu Xiguang suggests the death toll from the movement is closer to 55 million.[4] Historian Frank Dikötter asserts that "coercion, terror, and systematic violence were the foundation of the Great Leap Forward" and it "motivated one of the most deadly mass killings of human history".[5] The years of the Great Leap Forward saw economic regression, with 1958 through 1962 being the only period (other than the Cultural Revolution) between 1953 and 1976 in which China's economy shrank.[6] Political economist Dwight Perkins argues, "enormous amounts of investment produced only modest increases in production or none at all. ... In short, the Great Leap was a very expensive disaster."[7] In subsequent conferences in March 1960 and May 1962, the negative effects of the Great Leap Forward were studied by the CPC, and Mao was criticized in the party conferences. Moderate Party members like President Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping rose to power, and Chairman Mao was marginalized within the party, leading him to initiate the Cultural Revolution in 1966. In October 1949 after the defeat of the Kuomintang (now spelled Guomindang), the Chinese Communist Party proclaimed the establishment of the People's Republic of China. Immediately, landlords and wealthier peasants had their land holdings forcibly redistributed to poorer peasants. In the agricultural sectors, crops deemed by the Party to be "full of evil", such as opium, were destroyed and replaced with crops such as rice. Within the Party, there was major debate about redistribution. A moderate faction within the party and Politburo member Liu Shaoqi argued that change should be gradual and any collectivization of the peasantry should wait until industrialization, which could provide the agricultural machinery for mechanized farming. A more radical faction led by Mao Zedong argued that the best way to finance industrialization was for the government to take control of agriculture, thereby establishing a monopoly over grain distribution and supply. This would allow the state to buy at a low price and sell much higher, thus raising the capital necessary for the industrialization of the country. Agricultural collectives and other social changes[edit] Sending government officials to work in the countryside, 1957. Before 1949, peasants had farmed their own small pockets of land, and observed traditional practices—festivals, banquets, and paying homage to ancestors.[1] It was realized that Mao's policy of using a state monopoly on agriculture to finance industrialization would be unpopular with the peasants. Therefore, it was proposed that the peasants should be brought under Party control by the establishment of agricultural collectives which would also facilitate the sharing of tools and draft animals.[1] This policy was gradually pushed through between 1949 and 1958 in response to immediate policy needs, first by establishing "mutual aid teams" of 5-15 households, then in 1953 "elementary agricultural cooperatives" of 20-40 households, then from 1956 in "higher co-operatives" of 100-300 families. From 1954 onward peasants were encouraged to form and join collective-farming associations, which would supposedly increase their efficiency without robbing them of their own land or restricting their livelihoods.[1] By 1958 private ownership was entirely abolished and households all over China were forced into state-operated communes. Mao insisted that the communes must produce more grain for the cities and earn foreign exchange from exports.[1] These reforms (sometimes now referred to as The Great Leap Forward) were generally unpopular with the peasants and usually implemented by summoning them to meetings and making them stay there for days and sometimes weeks until they "voluntarily" agreed to join the collective. Apart from progressive taxation on each household's harvest, the state introduced a system of compulsory state purchases of grain at fixed prices to build up stockpiles for famine-relief and meet the terms of its trade agreements with the Soviet Union. Together, taxation and compulsory purchases accounted for 30 percent of the harvest by 1957, leaving very little surplus. Rationing was also introduced in the cities to curb 'wasteful consumption' and encourage savings (which were deposited in state-owned banks and thus became available for investment), and although food could be purchased from state-owned retailers the market price was higher than that for which it had been purchased. This too was done in the name of discouraging excessive consumption. Besides these economic changes the Party implemented major social changes in the countryside including the banishing of all religious and mystic institutions and ceremonies and replacing them with political meetings and propaganda sessions. Attempts were made to enhance rural education and the status of women (allowing them to initiate divorce if they desired) and ending foot-binding, child marriage and opium addiction. The old system of internal passports (the hukou) were introduced in 1956, preventing inter-county travel without appropriate authorization. Highest priority was given to the urban proletariat for whom a welfare state was created. The first phase collectivization resulted in only modest improvements in output. Famine along the mid-Yangzi was averted in 1956 through the timely allocation of food-aid, but in 1957 the Party's response was to increase the proportion of the harvest collected by the state to ensure against further disasters. Moderates within the Party, including Zhou Enlai, argued for a reversal of collectivization on the grounds that the claiming the bulk of the harvest for the state had made the people's food-security dependent upon the constant, efficient, and transparent functioning of the government. Hundred Flowers Campaign and Anti-Rightist Campaign[edit] In 1957 Mao responded to the tensions in the Party by promoting free speech and criticism under the Hundred Flowers Campaign. In retrospect, some have come to argue that this was a ploy to allow critics of the regime, primarily intellectuals but also low ranking members of the party critical of the agricultural policies, to identify themselves.[8] Some claim[who?] that Mao simply swung to the side of the hard-liners once his policies gained strong opposition. Once he had done so, at least half a million were purged under the Anti-Rightist campaign, which effectively silenced any opposition from within the Party or from agricultural experts to the changes which would be implemented under the Great Leap Forward. By the completion of the first 5 Year Economic Plan in 1957, Mao had come to doubt that the path to socialism that had been taken by the Soviet Union was appropriate for China. He was critical of Khrushchev's reversal of Stalinist policies and alarmed by the uprisings that had taken place in East Germany, Poland and Hungary, and the perception that the USSR was seeking "peaceful coexistence" with the Western powers. Mao had become convinced that China should follow its own path to communism. According to Jonathan Mirsky, a historian and journalist specializing in Chinese affairs, China's isolation from most of the rest of the world, along with the Korean War, had accelerated Mao's attacks on his perceived domestic enemies. It led him to accelerate his designs to develop an economy where the regime would get maximum benefit from rural taxation.[1] Surpass the UK and US[edit] In November 1957, to celebrate the 40th anniversary of the October Revolution, party leaders of the communist countries gathered in Moscow. The first Secretary of the Central Committee Nikita Khrushchev proposed a goal to not only catch up with but exceed the United States in industrial output in the next 15 years through peaceful competition. Mao Zedong was so inspired by the slogan that China put forward its own objective: to catch up with and surpass the UK in 15 years. Comrade Khrushchev has told us, the Soviet Union 15 years later will surpass the United States of America. I can also say, 15 years later, we may catch up with or exceed the UK.[9]

Yuan Shikai

Yuan Shikai (Chinese: 袁世凱; pinyin: Yuán Shìkǎi; 16 September 1859 - 6 June 1916) was a Chinese general, politician and warlord, famous for his influence during the late Qing dynasty, his role in the events leading up to the abdication of the last Qing Emperor, his autocratic rule as the first formal President of the Republic of China, and his short-lived attempt to restore monarchy in China, with himself as the Hongxian Emperor (Chinese: 洪憲皇帝). Yuan's rise to fame began with his nominal participation in the First Sino-Japanese War as commander of the Chinese garrison forces in Korea. Unlike other officers, however, he avoided the humiliation of Chinese defeat by having been recalled to Beijing several days before the outbreak of conflict. As an ally of Li Hongzhang, Yuan was appointed the commander of the first New Army in 1895. As the officer most directly responsible for training China's first modernized army, Yuan gained significant political influence and the loyalty of a nucleus of young officers: by 1901, five of China's seven divisional commanders and most other senior military officers in China were his protégés.[2] The Qing court relied heavily on his army due to the proximity of its garrison to the capital and their effectiveness. Of the new armies that formed part of the Self-Strengthening Movement, Yuan's was the best trained and most effective. The Qing Court at the time was divided between progressives under the leadership of the Guangxu Emperor, and conservatives under the Empress Dowager Cixi, who had temporarily retreated to the Summer Palace as a place of "retirement". After the Guangxu Emperor's Hundred Days' Reform in 1898, however, Cixi decided that the reforms were too drastic, and plotted to restore her own regency through a coup d'état. Plans of the coup spread early, and the Emperor was very aware of the plot. He asked reform advocates Kang Youwei, Tan Sitong and others to develop a plan to save him. Yuan's involvement in the coup remains a matter of debate among historians. Tan Sitong reportedly spoke with Yuan several days before the coup, asking Yuan to assist the Emperor against Cixi. Yuan refused a direct answer, but insisted he was loyal to the Emperor. Meanwhile, Manchu General Ronglu was planning manoeuvres for his army to stage the coup. According to sources, including the diary of Liang Qichao and contemporary Chinese news sources, Yuan Shikai arrived in Tianjin on 20 September 1898 by train. It was certain that by the evening, Yuan had talked to Ronglu, but what was revealed to him remains ambiguous. Most historians suggest that Yuan had told Ronglu of all details of the Reformers' plans, and asked him to take immediate action. The plot being exposed, Ronglu's troops entered the Forbidden City at dawn on 21 September, forcing the Emperor into seclusion in a lake palace. Yuan Shikai as Governor of Shandong Making a political alliance with the Empress Dowager, and becoming a lasting enemy of the Guangxu Emperor, Yuan left the capital in 1899 for his new appointment as Governor of Shandong. During his three-year tenure the Boxer Rebellion (1899-1901) erupted; Yuan ensured the suppression of Boxers in the province, though his troops took no active part outside Shandong itself. Yuan took the side of the pro-foreign faction in the Imperial Court, along with Prince Qing, Li Hongzhang, and Ronglu. He refused to side with the Boxers and attack the Eight-Nation Alliance forces, joining with other Chinese governors who commanded substantial modernized armies like Zhang Zhidong not participating in the Boxer Rebellion. He and Zhang ignored Empress Dowager Cixi's declaration of war against the foreign powers and continued to suppress the Boxers. This clique was known as the The Mutual Protection of Southeast China.[5] In addition to not fighting the Eight-Nation Alliance and suppressing the Boxers in Shandong, Yuan and his army (the Right Division) also helped the Eight-Nation Alliance suppress the Boxers after the Alliance captured Beijing in August 1900. Yuan Shikai's forces massacred tens of thousands of people in their anti-Boxer campaign in Zhili.[6] Yuan operated out of Baoding during the campaign, which ended in 1902.[7] He also founded a provincial junior college (Shandong College, the forerunner of Shandong University) in Jinan, which adopted western ideas of education. In June 1902 he was promoted to Viceroy of Zhili, the lucrative Commissioner for North China Trade, and Minister of Beiyang (北洋通商大臣), comprising the modern regions of Liaoning, Hebei, and Shandong.[8] Having gained the regard of foreigners after helping crush the Boxer Rebellion, he successfully obtained numerous loans to expand his Beiyang Army into the most powerful army in China. He created a 2,000-strong police force to keep order in Tianjin, the first of its kind in Chinese history, as a result of the Boxer Protocol forbidding any troops to be staged close to Tianjin. Yuan was also involved in the transfer of railway control from Sheng Xuanhuai, leading railways and their construction to become a large source of his revenue. Yuan played an active role in late-Qing political reforms, including the creation of the Ministry of Education (學部) and Ministry of Police (巡警部). He further advocated ethnic equality between Manchus and Han Chinese. In 1905, acting on Yuan's advice, Dowager-Empress Cixi issued a decree ending the traditional Confucian examination system in 1906. She and ordered the Ministry of Education to implement a system of primary and secondary schools and universities with state-mandated curriculum, modeled after the educational system of Meiji-period Japan. On August 27, 1908, the Qing court promulgated "Principles for a Constitution", which Yuan helped to draft. This document called for a constitutional government with a strong monarchy (modeled after Meiji Japan and Bismarck's Germany), with a constitution to be issued by 1916 and an elected parliament by 1917.[9] In the hunting-park, three miles to the south of Peking, is quartered the Sixth Division, which supplies the Guards for the Imperial Palace, consisting of a battalion of infantry and a squadron of cavalry. With this Division Yuan Shi Kai retains twenty-six modified Krupp guns, which are the best of his artillery arm, and excel any guns possessed by the foreign legations in Peking. The Manchu Division moves with the Court, and is the pride of the modern army. By his strategic disposition Yuan Shi Kai completely controls all the approaches to the capital, and holds a force which he may utilize either to protect the Court from threatened attack or to crush the Emperor should he himself desire to assume Imperial power. Contrary to treaty stipulations made at the settlement of the Boxer trouble, the Chinese have been permitted to build a great tower over the Chien Men, or central southern gate, which commands the foreign legations and governs the Forbidden City. In the threatening condition of Chinese affairs it might be assumed that this structure had been undermined by the foreign community, but this has not been done, and if trouble again arise in Peking the fate of the legations will depend upon the success of the first assault which will be necessary to take it. The foreign legations are as much in the power of Yuan Shi Kai's troops in 1907 as they were at the mercy of the Chinese rabble in 1900. The ultimate purpose of the equipped and disciplined troops is locked in the breast of the Viceroy of Chihli. Yuan Shi Kai's yamen in Tientsin is connected by telegraph and telephone with the Imperial palaces and with the various barracks of his troops. In a field a couple of hundred yards away is the long pole of a wireless telegraph station, from which he can send the message that any day may set all China ablaze. To-morrow in the East, Douglas Story, pp. 224-226 [10] Yuan Shikai's Han-dominated New Army was primarily responsible for the defense of Beijing, as most of the modernized Eight Banner divisions were destroyed in the Boxer Rebellion and the new modernized Banner forces were token in nature. Retreat and return[edit] The Empress Dowager and the Guangxu Emperor died within a day of each other in November 1908.[4] Sources indicate that the will of the Emperor specifically ordered Yuan's execution. But nonetheless he avoided death. In January 1909 Yuan Shikai was relieved of all his posts by the regent, Prince Chun. The public reason for Yuan's resignation was that he was returning to his home in the village of Huanshang (洹上村), now the prefecture-level city of Anyang, due to a foot disease. During his three years of effective exile, Yuan kept contact with his close allies, including Duan Qirui, who reported to him regularly about army proceedings. The loyalty of the Beiyang Army was still undoubtedly behind him. Having this strategic military support, Yuan held the balance of power between various revolutionaries (like Sun Yat-sen) and the Qing court. Both wanted Yuan on their side. Wuchang Uprising and republic[edit] The Wuchang Uprising took place on 10 October 1911 in Hubei province. The southern provinces subsequently declared their independence from the Qing court, but neither the northern provinces nor the Beiyang Army had a clear stance for or against the rebellion. Both the Qing court and Yuan were fully aware that the Beiyang Army was the only Qing force powerful enough to quell the revolutionaries. The court requested Yuan's return on 27 October, but he repeatedly declined offers from the Qing court for his return, first as the Viceroy of Huguang, and then as Prime Minister of the Imperial Cabinet. Time was on Yuan's side, and Yuan waited, using his "foot ailment" as a pretext to his continual refusal. After further pleas by the Qing Court, Yuan agreed and eventually left his village for Beijing on 30 October, becoming Prime Minister on 1 November 1911. Immediately after that he asked the Regent to withdraw from politics, which forced Zaifeng to resign as regent. This made way for Yuan to form a new, predominantly Han Chinese, cabinet of confidants, with only one Manchu as Minister of Suzerainty. To further reward Yuan's loyalty to the court, the Empress Dowager Longyu offered Yuan the noble title Marquis of the First Rank (一等侯), an honour only previously given to 19th century General Zeng Guofan for his raising of the Xiang Army to suppress the Taiping Rebellion. Meanwhile, in the Battle of Yangxia, Yuan's forces recaptured Hankou and Hanyang from the revolutionaries. Yuan knew that complete suppression of the revolution would end his usefulness to the Qing regime. Instead of attacking Wuchang, he began to negotiate with the revolutionaries. Abdication of child emperor[edit] Yuan Shikai sworn in as Provisional President of the Republic of China, in Beijing, 10 March 1912. The revolutionaries had elected Sun Yat-Sen as the first Provisional President of the Republic of China, but they were in a weak position militarily, so they negotiated with the Qing, using Yuan as an intermediary. Yuan arranged for the abdication of the child emperor Pu Yi in return for being granted the position of President of the Republic of China.[4] Yuan was not present when the Abdication edict was issued by Empress Dowager Longyu on 12 February 1912. Sun agreed to Yuan's presidency after some internal bickering, but asked that the capital be situated in Nanjing. Yuan, however, wanted the geographic advantage of having the nation's capital close to his base of military power. Many theorized that Cao Kun, one of his trusted subordinate Beiyang military commanders, fabricated a coup d'état in Beijing and Tianjin, apparently under Yuan's orders, to provide an excuse for Yuan not to leave his sphere of influence in Zhili (present-day Hebei province). However, the claim that the coup was organized by Yuan has been challenged by others.[11] The revolutionaries compromised again, and the capital of the new republic was established in Beijing. Yuan Shikai was elected Provisional President of the Republic of China by the Nanjing Provisional Senate on 14 February 1912, and sworn in on 10 March of that year.[12][13] Democratic elections[edit] In February 1913, democratic elections were held for the National Assembly in which the Kuomintang (KMT - "Chinese Nationalist Party") scored a significant victory. Song Jiaoren of the KMT zealously supported a cabinet system and was widely regarded as a candidate for Prime Minister. One of Song's main political goals was to ensure that the powers and independence of China's Parliament be properly protected from the influence of the office of the President. Song's goals in curtailing the office of the President conflicted with the interests of Yuan, who, by mid-1912, clearly dominated the provisional cabinet and was showing signs of a desire to hold overwhelming executive power. During Song's travels through China in 1912, he had openly and vehemently expressed the desire to limit the powers of the President in terms that often appeared openly critical of Yuan's ambitions. When the results of the 1913 elections indicated a clear victory for the KMT, it appeared that Song would be in a position to exercise a dominant role in selecting the premier and cabinet, and the party could have proceeded to push for the election of a future president in a parliamentary setting.[14] On 20 March 1913, while traveling to Beijing, Song Jiaoren was shot by a lone gunman in Shanghai, and died two days later. The trail of evidence led to the secretary of the cabinet and the provisional premier of Yuan's government. Although Yuan was considered by contemporary Chinese media sources as the man most likely behind the assassination, the main conspirators investigated by authorities were either themselves assassinated or disappeared mysteriously. For lack of evidence, Yuan was never officially implicated.[14] Becoming emperor[edit] The Yuan Shikai "dollar" (yuan in Chinese), issued for the first time in 1914, became a dominant coin type of the Republic of China. The Flag of Yuan Shikai's "Great Chinese Empire" See also: Empire of China (1915-16) Tensions between the KMT and Yuan continued to intensify. After arriving in Peking, the elected Parliament attempted to gain control over Yuan, to develop a permanent constitution, and to hold a legitimate, open presidential election. Because he had authorized $100 million of "reorganization loans" from a variety of foreign banks, the KMT in particular were highly critical of Yuan's handling of the national budget.[15] Yuan's crackdown on the KMT began in 1913, with the suppression and bribery of KMT members in the two legislative chambers. Anti-Yuan revolutionaries also claimed Yuan orchestrated the collapse of the KMT internally and dismissed governors interpreted as being pro-KMT.[15] Second revolution[edit] Seeing the situation for his party worsen, Sun Yat-sen fled to Japan in November 1913, and called for a Second Revolution, this time against Yuan Shikai. Subsequently, Yuan gradually took over the government, using the military as the base of his power. He dissolved the national and provincial assemblies, and the House of Representatives and Senate were replaced by the newly formed "Council of State", with Duan Qirui, his trusted Beiyang lieutenant, as Prime Minister. He relied on the American-educated Tsai Tingkan for English translation and connections with western powers. Finally, Yuan had himself elected president to a five-year term, publicly labelled the KMT a seditious organization, ordered the KMT's dissolution, and evicted all its members from Parliament. The KMT's "Second Revolution" ended in failure as Yuan's troops achieved complete victory over revolutionary uprisings. Provincial governors with KMT loyalties who remained willingly submitted to Yuan. Because those commanders not loyal to Yuan were effectively removed from power, the Second Revolution cemented Yuan's power.[16] In January 1914, China's Parliament was formally dissolved. To give his government a semblance of legitimacy, Yuan convened a body of 66 men from his cabinet who, on 1 May 1914, produced a "constitutional compact" that effectively replaced China's provisional constitution. The new legal status quo gave Yuan, as president, practically unlimited powers over China's military, finances, foreign policy, and the rights of China's citizens. Yuan justified these reforms by stating that representative democracy had been proven inefficient by political infighting.[17] After his victory, Yuan reorganized the provincial governments. Each province was now supported by a Military Governor (都督) as well as a civil authority, giving each governor control of their own army. This helped lay the foundations for the warlordism that crippled China over the next two decades. During Yuan's presidency, a silver "dollar" (yuan in Chinese) carrying his portrait was introduced. This coin type was the first "dollar" coin of the central authorities of the Republic of China to be minted in significant quantities. It became a staple silver coin type during the first half of the 20th century and was struck for the last time as late as the 1950s. These "dollars" were also extensively forged.[18] Japan's 21 demands[edit] In 1914, Japan captured the German colony at Qingdao. In January 1915, Japan sent a secret ultimatum, known as the Twenty-one Demands, to Beijing. Japan demanded an extension of extraterritoriality, the sale of businesses in debt to Japan and the cession of Qingdao to Japan. When these demands were made public, hostility within China was expressed in nationwide anti-Japanese demonstrations and an effective national boycott of Japanese goods. Yuan's eventual decision to agree to nearly all of the demands led to a decline in the popularity of Yuan's government among contemporary Chinese, but many of the requests were mere extensions of Qing treaties.[19] Western pressure later forced Japan to water down some of its demands. Revival of monarchy[edit] Styles of Hongxian Emperor Flag of the Empire of China 1915-1916.svg Reference style His Imperial Majesty Spoken style Your Imperial Majesty Alternative style Sir To build up his own authority, Yuan began to re-institute elements of state Confucianism. As the main proponent of reviving Qing state religious observances, Yuan effectively participated as emperor in rituals held at the Qing Temple of Heaven. In late 1915, rumors were floated of a popular consensus that the monarchy should be revived. With his power secure, many of Yuan's supporters, notably monarchist Yang Du, advocated for a revival of the monarchy, asking Yuan to take on the title of Emperor. Yang reasoned that the Chinese masses had long been used to autocratic rule, the Republic had only been effective as a transitional phase to end Manchu rule, and China's political situation demanded the stability that only a monarchy could ensure. The American political scientist Frank Johnson Goodnow suggested a similar idea. Negotiators representing Japan had also offered to support Yuan's ambitions as one of the rewards for Yuan's support of the Twenty-One Demands.[20] On 20 November 1915, Yuan held a specially convened "Representative Assembly" which voted unanimously to offer Yuan the throne. On 12 December 1915, Yuan "accepted" the invitation and proclaimed himself Emperor of the Chinese Empire (simplified Chinese: 中华帝国大皇帝; traditional Chinese: 中華帝國大皇帝; pinyin: Zhōnghuá Dìguó Dà Huángdì) under the era name of Hongxian (simplified Chinese: 洪宪; traditional Chinese: 洪憲; pinyin: Hóngxiàn; i.e. Constitutional Abundance). The new Empire of China was to formally begin on 1 January 1916, when Yuan, now the Hongxian Emperor, intended to conduct the accession rites. Soon after becoming emperor, the Hongxian Emperor placed an order with the former imperial potters for a 40,000-piece porcelain set costing 1.4 million yuan, a large jade seal, and two imperial robes costing 400,000 yuan each.[2][12] Public and international reactions to monarchy's revival[edit] The Hongxian Emperor expected widespread domestic and international support for his reign. However, he and his supporters had badly miscalculated. Many of the emperor's closest supporters abandoned him, and the solidarity of the emperor's Beiyang clique of military protégés dissolved. There were open protests throughout China denouncing the Hongxian Emperor. Foreign governments, including Japan, suddenly proved indifferent or openly hostile to him, not giving him the recognition anticipated.[21] Sun Yat-sen, who had fled to Tokyo and set up a base there, actively organized efforts to overthrow the Hongxian Emperor. The emperor's sons publicly fought over the title of "Crown Prince", and formerly loyal subordinates like Duan Qirui and Xu Shichang left him to create their own factions. Abandonment of monarchy and death[edit] Funeral procession of Yuan Shikai in Beijing Faced with widespread opposition, the Hongxian Emperor repeatedly delayed the accession rites in order to appease his foes, but his prestige was irreparably damaged and province after province continued to voice disapproval. On 25 December 1915, Yunnan's military governor, Cai E, rebelled, launching the National Protection War. The governor of Guizhou followed in January 1916, and Guangxi declared independence in March. Funding for the Hongxian Emperor's accession ceremony was cut on 1 March, and Yuan formally abandoned the empire on 22 March after 83 days. This was not enough for his enemies, who called for his resignation as president. More provinces rebelled until Yuan died from uremia at 10 a.m. on 6 June 1916, at the age of fifty-six.[12][21] Yuan's remains were moved to his home province and placed in a large mausoleum. In 1928, the tomb was looted by Feng Yuxiang's Guominjun soldiers during the Northern Expedition. Yuan had a wife and nine concubines, who bore him 17 sons, but only three were prominent: Prince Yuan Keding, Prince Yuan Kewen, and Prince Yuan Keliang.

Treaty of Nanjing 1842

The Treaty of Nanking or Nanjing was a peace treaty which ended the First Opium War (1839-42) between the United Kingdom and the Qing dynasty of China on 29 August 1842. It was the first of what the Chinese later called the unequal treaties on the ground that Britain had no obligations in return.[2] In the wake of China's military defeat, with British warships poised to attack Nanking, representatives from the British and Qing Empires negotiated on board HMS Cornwallis anchored at the city. On 29 August 1842, British representative Sir Henry Pottinger and Qing representatives Qiying, Yilibu, and Niu Jian signed the treaty. It consisted of thirteen articles and was ratified by Queen Victoria and the Daoguang Emperor nine months later. A copy of the treaty is kept by the British government while another copy is kept by the Taiwan Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the National Palace Museum in Taipei. Foreign trade[edit] The fundamental purpose of the treaty was to change the framework of foreign trade imposed by the Canton System, which had been in force since 1760. Under Article V, the treaty abolished the former monopoly of the Cohong and their Thirteen Factories in Canton. Four additional "treaty ports" opened for foreign trade alongside Canton (Shameen Island from 1859 until 1943): Amoy (Xiamen until 1930), Foochowfoo (Fuzhou), Ningpo (Ningbo) and Shanghai (until 1943),[3][4] where foreign merchants were to be allowed to trade with anyone they wished. Britain also gained the right to send consuls to the treaty ports, which were given the right to communicate directly with local Chinese officials (Article II). The treaty stipulated that trade in the treaty ports should be subject to fixed tariffs, which were to be agreed upon between the British and the Qing governments (Article X).[5] Reparations and demobilisation[edit] The Qing government was obliged to pay the British government six million silver dollars for the opium that had been confiscated by Lin Zexu in 1839 (Article IV), 3 million dollars in compensation for debts that the Hong merchants in Canton owed British merchants (Article V), and a further 12 million dollars in war reparations for the cost of the war (VI). The total sum of 21 million dollars was to be paid in installments over three years and the Qing government would be charged an annual interest rate of 5 percent for the money that was not paid in a timely manner (Article VII).[5] The Qing government undertook to release all British prisoners of war (Article VIII) and to give a general amnesty to all Chinese subjects who had cooperated with the British during the war (Article IX).[5] The British on their part, undertook to withdraw all of their troops from Nanking, the Grand Canal and the military post at Zhenhai, as well as not to interfere with China trade generally, after the emperor had given his assent to the treaty and the first installment of money had been received (Article XII). British troops would remain in Gulangyu and Zhaobaoshan until the Qing government had paid reparations in full (Article XII).[5] Cession of Hong Kong[edit] In 1841, a rough outline for a treaty was sent for the guidance of Plenipotentiary Charles Elliot. It had a blank after the words "the cession of the islands of". Pottinger sent this old draft treaty on shore, with the letter s struck out of islands and the words Hong Kong placed after it.[6] Robert Montgomery Martin, treasurer of Hong Kong, wrote in an official report: The terms of peace having been read, Elepoo the senior commissioner paused, expecting something more, and at length said "is that all?" Mr. Morrison enquired of Lieutenant-colonel Malcolm [Pottinger's secretary] if there was anything else, and being answered in the negative, Elepoo immediately and with great tact closed the negotiation by saying, "all shall be granted—it is settled—it is finished."[6] The Qing government agreed to make Hong Kong Island a crown colony, ceding it to the British Queen "in perpetuity" (常遠, Cháng yuǎn, in the Chinese version of the treaty), to provide British traders with a harbour where they could "careen and refit their ships and keep stores for that purpose" (Article III). Pottinger was later appointed the first governor of Hong Kong. In 1860, the colony was extended with the Kowloon peninsula and in 1898, the Second Convention of Peking further expanded the colony with the 99-year lease of the New Territories. In 1984, the governments of the United Kingdom and the People's Republic of China (PRC) concluded the Sino-British Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong, under which the sovereignty of the leased territories, together with Hong Kong Island and Kowloon (south of Boundary Street) ceded under the Convention of Peking (1860), was transferred to the PRC on 1 July 1997.

Zhang Xueliang

Zhang Xueliang or Chang Hsueh-liang or Chang Hsiao-liang (張學良; 3 June 1901[1] - 15 October 2001), occasionally called Peter Hsueh Liang Chang and nicknamed the "Young Marshal" (少帥), was the effective ruler of northeast China and much of northern China after the assassination of his father, Zhang Zuolin, by the Japanese on 4 June 1928. He was an instigator of the 1936 Xi'an Incident, in which Chiang Kai-shek, the leader of China's ruling party, was arrested in order to force him to enter into a truce with the insurgent Chinese Communist Party and form a united front against Japan, which had occupied Manchuria. As a result, he spent over fifty years under house arrest, first in mainland China and then in Taiwan. He is regarded by the Chinese Communist Party as a patriotic hero.[2][3][4][5][6][7] The Japanese believed that Zhang Xueliang, who was known as a womanizer and an opium addict, would be much more subject to Japanese influence than was his father. An officer of the Japanese Kwantung Army therefore killed his father Zhang Zuolin by exploding a bomb above his train while it crossed under a railroad bridge. Surprisingly, the younger Zhang proved to be more independent than anyone had expected. With the assistance of William Henry Donald, he overcame his opium addiction and declared his support for Chiang Kai-shek. He was given the nickname of 千古功臣 (Hero of history) by PRC historians not because it was good that he was supporting the KMT, but because he wanted China to be reunited and was willing to pay the price and become "vice" leader of China. In order to rid his command of Japanese influence he had two prominent pro-Tokyo officials executed in front of the assembled guests at a dinner party in January 1929. It was a hard decision for him to make. The two had powers over the heads of others. Zhang was a fierce critic of many of the Soviet Union's policies which served to undermine Chinese sovereignty, including its interference in Outer Mongolia. When he attempted to wrest control over a part of the Chinese Eastern Railway in Heilongjiang from the Soviets, he was beaten back by the Red Army.[9] At the same time, he developed closer relations with the United States. In 1930, when warlords Feng Yuxiang and Yan Xishan attempted to overthrow Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang government, Zhang Xueliang stepped in to support the Nanjing government against the northern warlords in exchange for control of the key railroads in Hebei Province and the customs revenues from the port city of Tianjin. A year later, in the September 18 Incident, Imperial Japanese forces attacked Zhang's forces in Shenyang (Mukden), in order to provoke a full-on war with China, which Chiang planned not to have until his forces were stronger. In accordance with this strategy, Zhang's armies withdrew from the front lines without significant engagements, leading to the effective Japanese occupation of Zhang's former northeastern domain.[10] There has been speculation that Chiang Kai-Shek wrote a letter to Zhang asking him to pull his forces back, but later Zhang stated that he himself issued the orders. Apparently Zhang was aware of how weak his forces were compared to the Japanese, and wished to preserve his position by retaining a sizeable army. Nonetheless this would still be in line with Chiang's overall strategic standings. Zhang later traveled in Europe before returning to China to take command of the Communist Suppression Campaigns first in Hebei-Henan-Anhui and later in the Northwest. On 6 April 1936, Zhang met with Zhou Enlai to plan the end of the Chinese Civil War. Chiang Kai-shek of KMT at the time took a non-aggressive position against Japan and considered the communists to be a greater danger to the government of Republic of China than the Japanese, and his overall strategy was to annihilate the communists before focusing his efforts on the Japanese. He believed that "communism was a cancer while the Japanese represented a superficial wound." However, growing nationalist anger against Japan made this position very unpopular, leading to Zhang's action against Chiang known as Xi'an incident. On 12 December 1936, Zhang and another general Yang Hucheng kidnapped Chiang Kai-shek and imprisoned the head of the Kuomintang government until he agreed to form a united front with the communists against the Japanese invasion. After the negotiations, Chiang agreed to unite with the communists and drive the Japanese out of China. When Chiang was released, Zhang chose to return to the capital with him. However, once they were away from Zhang's loyal troops, Chiang had him put under house arrest. From there he was always watched and lived near the Nationalist capital wherever it moved to.In 1949 Zhang was transferred to Taiwan where he remained under a loose house arrest for the next 40 years in a villa in Taipei's northern suburbs. He spent his time studying Ming dynasty literature, Manchu language, and the Bible, receiving occasional guests and collected Chinese fan paintings, calligraphy and other works of art by illustrious artists. A collection of more than 200 works, using his studio's name "Dingyuanzhai" (定远斋), was auctioned with tremendous success by Sotheby's on 10 April 1994. He and his wife, Edith Chao, became devout Christians and also regularly attended Sunday services at the Methodist chapel in Shilin, a Taipei suburb with Chiang Kai-Shek's family. After Chiang Kai Shek's death in 1975, his freedom was restored officially. He emigrated to Honolulu, Hawaii, U.S., in 1993. There were numerous pleas for him to visit mainland China, but Zhang, claiming his political closeness with the KMT, declined. He died of pneumonia at the age of 100 (following the Chinese way of counting, his age is often given as 101) and was buried in Hawaii.

Chen Shui-bian

Chen Shui-bian (Chinese: 陳水扁; pinyin: Chén Shuǐbiǎn; born October 12, 1950) is a retired Taiwanese politician and lawyer who served as President of the Republic of China (Taiwan) from 2000 to 2008. Chen is the first president from Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and ended the Kuomintang's (KMT) more than fifty years of continuous rule in Taiwan. He is colloquially referred to as A-Bian (阿扁; Ābiǎn) or A-pi-a (Chinese: 阿扁仔; Pe̍h-ōe-jī: A-píⁿ-à). A lawyer, Chen entered politics in 1980 during the Kaohsiung Incident as a member of the Tangwai movement and was elected to the Taipei City Council in 1981. He was jailed in 1985 for libel as the editor of the weekly pro-democracy magazine Neo-Formosa, following publication of an article critical of Elmer Fung, a college philosophy professor who was later elected a Kuomintang legislator. After being released, Chen helped found the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in 1986 and was elected a member of the Legislative Yuan in 1989, and Mayor of Taipei in 1994. Chen won the 2000 presidential election on March 18 with 39% of the vote as a result of a split of factions within the Kuomintang, when James Soong ran for the presidency as an independent against the party nominee Lien Chan, becoming the first non-member of the Kuomintang to hold the office of president. Although Chen received high approval ratings during the first few weeks of his term, his popularity sharply dropped due to alleged corruption within his administration and the inability to pass legislation against the opposition KMT, who controlled the Legislative Yuan. In 2004, he won reelection by a narrow margin after surviving a shooting while campaigning the day before the election. Opponents suspected him of staging the incident for political purposes. However, the case was officially closed in 2005 with all evidence pointing to a single deceased suspect, Chen Yi-hsiung. In 2009, Chen and his wife Wu Shu-chen were convicted on two bribery charges. Chen was sentenced to 19 years in Taipei Prison, reduced from a life sentence on appeal, but was granted medical parole on January 5, 2015.[1][2] Chen's supporters have insisted that his trial was an unfair and politically motivated retribution by the Kuomintang for his years in power.[3][4][5]

Chiang Ching-kuo (Jiang Jingguo)

Chiang Ching-kuo (Shanghai/Ningbo dialect: [tɕiã.tɕiŋ.koʔ]) (27 April[nb 1] 1910 - 13 January 1988), Kuomintang (KMT) politician and leader, was a Chinese politician and the son of Generalissimo and President Chiang Kai-shek and held numerous posts in the government of the Republic of China (ROC). He succeeded his father to serve as Premier of the Republic of China between 1972-78 and was the President of the Republic of China from 1978 until his death in 1988. Under his tenure, the government of the Republic of China, while authoritarian, became more open and tolerant of political dissent. Towards the end of his life, Chiang relaxed government controls on the media and speech and allowed Taiwanese Han into positions of power, including his successor Lee Teng-hui.

Marriage Law, 1950

Divorce law The New Marriage Law (also First Marriage Law, Chinese: 新婚姻法; pinyin: Xīn Hūnyīn Fă) was a civil marriage law passed in the People's Republic of China on May 1, 1950. It was a radical change from existing patriarchal Chinese marriage traditions, and needed constant support from propaganda campaigns. It has since been superseded by the Second Marriage Law of 1980. Marriage reform was one of the first priorities of the People's Republic of China when it was established in 1949.[1] Women's rights were a personal interest of Mao Zedong (as indicated by his statement: "Women hold up half the sky"),[2] and had been a concern of Chinese intellectuals since the New Culture Movement in the 1910s and 1920s.[3] Traditionally, Chinese marriage had often been arranged or forced, concubinage was commonplace, and women could not seek a divorce.[1] Marriage reform was one of the first priorities of the People's Republic of China when it was established in 1949.[1] Women's rights were a personal interest of Mao Zedong (as indicated by his statement: "Women hold up half the sky"),[2] and had been a concern of Chinese intellectuals since the New Culture Movement in the 1910s and 1920s.[3] Traditionally, Chinese marriage had often been arranged or forced, concubinage was commonplace, and women could not seek a divorce.[1] Going forward, the use of the rules within the registration system became a stepping stone in the new direction of what The New Marriage law represented. With the help of the registration system, it would help dismantle the traditional and old practice of marriage by ensuring freedom of citizens who would marry and also protect the equality that was granted to women.[7]

Lee Teng-hui

Lee Teng-hui (Chinese: 李登輝; pinyin: Lǐ Dēnghuī, Mandarin pronunciation: [lì tə́ŋ.xu̯éi̯]; born 15 January 1923), sometimes called the "father of Taiwan's democracy",[3][4] is a Taiwanese politician. He was the President of the Republic of China and Chairman of the Kuomintang (KMT) from 1988 to 2000. He presided over major advancements in democratic reforms including his own re-election which marked the first direct presidential election for Taiwan. The first Hakka person to become ROC president and KMT chairman, Lee promoted the Taiwanese localization movement and led an aggressive foreign policy to gain diplomatic allies. Critics accused him of betraying the party he headed, secret support of Taiwanese independence, and involvement in corruption (black gold politics). After leaving office Lee was expelled from the KMT for his role in founding the pro-independence Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU), which forms part of the Pan-Green Coalition alongside Taiwan's Democratic Progressive Party. Lee is considered the "spiritual leader" of the TSU,[5] and has recruited for the party in the past.[6] Lee has been outspoken in support for Taiwan to be a normalized country. In 2013, a first trial cleared him for his hypothetical involvement in a corruption scandal. Lee has regularly defended Japanese sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands since he left office.

Li Hongzhang

Li Hongzhang (also romanised as Li Hung-chang) (15 February 1823 - 7 November 1901), GCVO, was a Chinese politician, general and diplomat of the late Qing dynasty. He quelled several major rebellions and served in important positions in the Qing imperial court, including the Viceroy of Zhili, Huguang and Liangguang. Although he was best known in the West for his generally pro-modern stance and importance as a negotiator, Li antagonised the British with his support of Russia as a foil against Japanese expansionism in Manchuria and fell from favour with the Chinese after their defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War. His image in China remains controversial, with criticism on one hand for political and military mistakes and praise on the other for his success against the Taiping Rebellion, his diplomatic skills defending Chinese interests in the era of unequal treaties, and his role pioneering China's industrial and military modernisation. He was presented the Royal Victorian Order by Queen Victoria.

Lei Feng

Léi Fēng (18 December 1940 - 15 August 1962) was a soldier in the People's Liberation Army and is a communist legend in China. After his death, Lei was characterized as a selfless and modest person devoted to the Communist Party, Mao Zedong, and the people of China. In 1963, he became the subject of a nationwide posthumous propaganda campaign, "Follow the examples of Comrade Lei Feng."[1] Lei was portrayed as a model citizen, and the masses were encouraged to emulate his selflessness, modesty, and devotion to Mao. After Mao's death, Lei Feng remained a cultural icon representing earnestness and service. His name entered daily speech and his imagery appeared on T-shirts and memorabilia.[2] Although someone named Lei Feng probably existed, the accounts of his life as depicted by Party propaganda are heavily disputed,[3][4] leading him to become a source of cynicism and subject of derision among segments of the Chinese population.[5] Nevertheless, Lei's image as a role model serviceman has survived decades of political change in China.[6]

Manchukuo / Manzhouguo

Manchukuo (traditional Chinese: 滿洲國; pinyin: Mǎnzhōuguó; Japanese: 満州国; literally: "State of Manchuria") was a puppet state in Northeast China and Inner Mongolia, which was governed under a form of constitutional monarchy. The area, collectively known as Manchuria by westerners and Japanese, was designated by China's erstwhile Qing Dynasty as the "homeland" of the ruling family's ethnic group, the Manchus. In 1931, the region was seized by Japan following the Mukden Incident and a pro-Japanese government was installed one year later with Puyi, the last Qing emperor, as the nominal regent and emperor.[2] Manchukuo's government was abolished in 1945 after the defeat of Imperial Japan at the end of World War II. The territories formally claimed by the puppet state were first seized in the Soviet invasion of Manchuria in August 1945,[3] and then formally transferred to Chinese administration in the following year.[a] Manchus formed a minority in Manchukuo, whose largest ethnic group were Han Chinese. The population of Koreans increased during the Manchukuo period, and there were also Japanese, Mongols, White Russians and other minorities. The Mongol regions of western Manchukuo were ruled under a slightly different system in acknowledgement of the Mongolian traditions there. The southern part of the Liaodong Peninsula was ruled by Japan as the Kwantung Leased Territory.

household responsibility system

Responsibility system (also contract responsibility system or household responsibility system; simplified Chinese: 家庭联产承包责任制; traditional Chinese: 家庭聯產承包責任制; pinyin: Jiātíng liánchǎn chéngbāo zérènzhì) was a practice in China, first adopted in agriculture in 1979 and later extended to other sectors of the economy, by which local managers are held responsible for the profits and losses of an enterprise. This system partially supplanted the egalitarian distribution method, whereby the state assumed all profits and losses. In traditional Maoist organization of the rural economy and that of other collectivised programs, farmers were given by the government a quota of goods to produce. They received compensation for meeting the quota. Going beyond the quota rarely produced a sizeable economic reward. In the early 1980s peasants were given drastically reduced quotas. What food they grew beyond the quota was sold in the free market at unregulated prices. This system became an instant success[citation needed], quickly causing one of the largest increases in standard-of-living for such a large number of people in such a short time. This system maintained quotas, and thus the element of socialist societies termed in China the "iron rice-bowl" (in which the state ensured food and employment). The secret experiment proved very successful. The famous example was that in Xiaogang village, Fengyang county, Anhui province (安徽省凤阳县小岗村), where 18 households signed a contract with local cadres. The cadres secretly allowed farmers to produce by household and if the cadres were punished for this the farmers agree to take care of the families of the cadres.[1][citation needed] In 1979 similar experiments began in Sichuan and Anhui provinces, both seeing dramatic increases in agricultural productivity. Deng Xiaoping openly praised these experiments in 1980, and the system has been adopted nationwide since 1981.

First Opium War 1839-42

The First Opium War (第一次鴉片戰爭, 1839-42), also known as the Opium War and the Anglo-Chinese War, was fought between the United Kingdom and the Qing dynasty over their conflicting viewpoints on diplomatic relations, trade, and the administration of justice for foreign nationals in China.[5] In the 17th and 18th centuries, the demand for Chinese goods (particularly silk, porcelain, and tea) in the European market created a trade imbalance because the market for Western goods in China was virtually non-existent; China was largely self-sufficient and Europeans were not allowed access to China's interior. European silver flowed into China when the Canton System, instituted in the mid-18th century, confined the sea trade to Canton and to the Chinese merchants of the Thirteen Factories. The British East India Company had a matching monopoly of British trade. The British East India Company began to auction opium grown on its plantations in India to independent foreign traders in exchange for silver. The opium was then transported to the Chinese coast and sold to local middlemen who retailed the drug inside China. This reverse flow of silver and the increasing numbers of opium addicts alarmed Chinese officials. In 1839, the Daoguang Emperor, rejecting proposals to legalise and tax opium, appointed viceroy Lin Zexu to solve the problem by abolishing the trade. Lin confiscated around 20,000 chests of opium (approximately 1210 tons or 2.66 million pounds) without offering compensation, blockaded trade, and confined foreign merchants to their quarters.[6] The British government, although not officially denying China's right to control imports of the drug, objected to this unexpected seizure and used its naval and gunnery power to inflict a quick and decisive defeat,[5] a tactic later referred to as gunboat diplomacy. In 1842, the Treaty of Nanking—the first of what the Chinese later called the unequal treaties—granted an indemnity and extraterritoriality to Britain, the opening of five treaty ports, and the cession of Hong Kong Island. The failure of the treaty to satisfy British goals of improved trade and diplomatic relations led to the Second Opium War (1856-60).[7] In China, the war is considered the beginning of modern Chinese history.

January 28, 1932 (1-28 Incident)

The January 28 Incident or Shanghai Incident (January 28 - March 3, 1932) was a conflict between the Republic of China and the Empire of Japan, before official hostilities of the Second Sino-Japanese War commenced in 1937. After the Mukden Incident, Japan had acquired the vast northeastern region of China and would eventually establish the puppet government of Manchukuo. However, the Japanese military planned to increase Japanese influence further, especially into Shanghai where Japan, along with the various western powers, had extraterritorial concessions. In order to provide a casus belli to justify further military action in China, the Japanese military instigated seemingly anti-Japanese incidents. On January 18, five Japanese Buddhist monks, members of an ardently nationalist sect, were beaten near Shanghai's Sanyou Factory (simplified Chinese: 三友实业社; traditional Chinese: 三友實業社; pinyin: Sānyǒu Shíyèshè) by agitated Chinese civilians. Two were seriously injured, and one died.[2] Over the next few hours, a group burnt down the factory (sources argue this was orchestrated by Japanese agents,[2] though it might have been carried out by Chinese in response to the Shanghai Municipal Police's aggressive anti-riot tactics in the aftermath of the beating of the monks). One policeman was killed and several more hurt when they arrived to quell the disorder.[2] This caused an upsurge of anti-Japanese and anti-imperialist protests in the city and its concessions, with Chinese residents of Shanghai marching onto the streets and calling for a boycott of Japanese-made goods. The situation continued to deteriorate over the next week. By January 27, the Japanese military had already concentrated some 30 ships, 40 airplanes and nearly 7,000 troops around the shoreline of Shanghai to put down any resistance in the event that violence broke out. The military's justification was that it had to defend its concession and citizens. The Japanese issued an ultimatum to the Shanghai Municipal Council demanding public condemnation and monetary compensation by the Chinese for any Japanese property damaged in the monk incident, and demanding that the Chinese government take active steps to suppress further anti-Japanese protests in the city. During the afternoon of January 28, the Shanghai Municipal Council agreed to these demands. Throughout this period, the Chinese 19th Route Army (simplified Chinese: 十九路军; traditional Chinese: 十九路軍; pinyin: shíjǐulùjūn) had been massing outside the city, causing consternation to the civil Chinese administration of Shanghai and the foreign-run Concessions. The 19th Route Army was generally viewed as little more than a warlord force, posing as great a danger to Shanghai as the Japanese military. In the end, Shanghai donated a substantial bribe to the 19th Route Army, hoping that it would leave and not incite a Japanese attack. However, at midnight on January 28, Japanese carrier aircraft bombed Shanghai in the first major aircraft carrier action in East Asia. Barbara W. Tuchman described this as also being "the first terror bombing of a civilian population of an era that was to become familiar with it",[3] preceding the Condor Legion's bombing of Guernica by five years. Three thousand Japanese troops attacked targets, such as the northern train station, around the city and began an invasion of the de facto Japanese settlement in Hongkew and other areas north of Suzhou Creek. In what was a surprising about-face for many, the 19th Route Army, which many had expected to leave after having been paid, stayed to put up a fierce resistance. Though the opening battles took place in the Hongkew district of the International Settlement, the conflict soon spread outwards to much of Chinese-controlled Shanghai. The majority of the Concessions remained untouched by the conflict and it was often the case that those in the Shanghai International Settlement would watch the war from the banks of Suzhou Creek. They could even visit the battle lines by virtue of their extraterritoriality. On January 30, Chiang Kai-shek decided to temporarily relocate the capital from Nanjing to Luoyang as an emergency measure, due to the fact that Nanjing's proximity to Shanghai could make it a target. Because Shanghai was a metropolitan city with many foreign interests invested in it, other countries, such as the United States, the United Kingdom and France attempted to negotiate a ceasefire between Japan and China. However, Japan refused, instead continuing to mobilize troops in the region. On February 12, American, British and French representatives brokered a half-day cease fire for humanitarian relief to civilians caught in the crossfire. The same day, the Japanese issued another ultimatum, demanding that the Chinese Army retreat 20 km from the border of Shanghai Concessions, a demand promptly refused by the Chinese forces. This only intensified fighting in Hongkew. The Japanese were unable to take the city by the middle of February. Subsequently, the number of Japanese troops was increased to nearly 90,000 with the arrival of the 9th Infantry Division and the IJA 24th Mixed Brigade, supported by 80 warships and 300 airplanes. On February 14, Chiang Kai-shek sent his 5th Army, including his 87th and 88th divisions, into Shanghai. On February 20, Japanese bombardments were increased to force the Chinese away from their defensive positions near Miaohang, while commercial and residential districts of the city were set on fire. The Chinese defensive positions deteriorated rapidly without naval and armored support, with the number of defenders dwindling to fewer than 50,000. Japanese forces increased to over a 100,000 troops, backed by aerial and naval bombardments. On February 28, after a week of fierce fighting characterized by the stubborn resistance of the Cantonese troops, the Japanese, supported by superior artillery, took the village of Kiangwan (now Jiangwanzhen) north of Shanghai.[4] On February 29, the Japanese 11th Infantry Division landed near Liuhe behind Chinese lines. The defenders launched a desperate counterattack from 1 March but were unable to dislodge the Japanese. On March 2, the 19th Route Army issued a telegram stating that it was necessary to withdraw from Shanghai due to lack of supplies and manpower. The next day, the 19th Route Army and the 5th Army retreated from Shanghai, marking the official end of the battle.

Shanghai communiqué (February 1972)

The Joint Communiqué of the United States of America and the People's Republic of China, also known as the Shanghai Communiqué (1972), was an important diplomatic document issued by the United States of America and the People's Republic of China on February 28, 1972 during President Richard Nixon's visit to China.[1] The document pledged that it was in the interest of all nations for the United States and China to work towards the normalization of their relations, although this would not occur until the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations seven years later. The US and China also agreed that neither they nor any other power should "seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region".[1] This was of particular importance to China, which shared a militarized border with the Soviet Union. Regarding the political status of Taiwan, in the communiqué the United States acknowledged the One-China policy (but did not endorse the PRC's version of the policy) and agreed to cut back military installations on Taiwan. This "constructive ambiguity" (in the phrase of US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who oversaw the American side of the negotiations) would continue to hinder efforts for complete normalization. The communiqué included wishes to expand the economic and cultural contacts between the two nations, although no concrete steps were mentioned.

May 30th, 1925

The May Thirtieth Movement (simplified Chinese: 五卅运动; traditional Chinese: 五卅運動; pinyin: Wǔsà Yùndòng) was a major labor and anti-imperialist movement during the middle-period of the Republic of China era. It began when Shanghai Municipal Police officers opened fire on Chinese protesters in Shanghai's International Settlement on May 30, 1925. The shootings sparked international censure and nationwide anti-foreign demonstrations and riots. In the aftermath of 1924's Second Zhili-Fengtian War China found itself in the midst of one of the most destructive periods of turmoil since 1911.[1] The war had involved every major urban area in China, and badly damaged the rural infrastructure. As a result of the conflict the Zhili-controlled government, backed by varied Euro-American business interests, was ousted from power by pro-Japanese warlord Zhang Zuolin, who installed a government led by the generally unpopular statesman Duan Qirui in November 1924. Though victorious, the war left Zhang's central government bankrupt and Duan exercised little authority outside Beijing. Authority in the north of the country was divided between Zhang and Feng Yuxiang, a Soviet Union-backed warlord, and public support for the northern militarists soon hit an all-time low, with southerners openly disparaging provincial governors as junfa (warlords).[1] With his monarchist leanings and strong base in conservative Manchuria, Zhang represented the far right in Chinese politics and could claim few supporters. Meanwhile, the KMT (Nationalist) and Communist parties (allied as the First United Front) were running a diplomatically unrecognized Soviet-backed administration in the southern province of Guangdong. Alongside public grief at the recent death of China's Republican hero Sun Yat-sen (12 March), the KMT sought to foment pro-Chinese, anti-imperial and anti-western organizations and propaganda within major Chinese cities.[2] Chinese Communist Party groups were particularly involved in sowing dissent in Shanghai through the far-left Shanghai University. Shanghai's native Chinese were strongly unionised compared to other cities and better educated, and recognised their plight as involving lack of legal factory inspection, recourse for worker grievances or equal rights.[3] Many Chinese families were also aggrieved by an upcoming Child Employment Bill, proposed by the Shanghai Municipal Council, that would have stopped children under the age of 12 from working in mills and factories (many working-class homes relied on wages brought in by children). Educated Chinese were also offended by the Council's plan to introduce a new censorship law, forcing all publications in the Settlement to use the publisher's true name and address. In the early months of 1925 conflicts and strikes on these matters intensified. Japanese-owned cotton mills were a source of contention, and fights and demonstrations between Japanese and Chinese employees around the #8 Cotton Mill became regular occurrences. In February a group of Japanese managers were attacked while leaving work and one of them was killed. In response, Japanese foremen took to carrying pistols while on duty. The escalation of ill-feeling culminated on May 15, when during a violent Neo-Luddite-style riot inside the mill, a Japanese foreman shot a demonstrator named Ku Chen-Hung dead.[4] Over the following weeks Ku Chen-Hung became viewed as a martyr by Chinese unions and student groups (though not by the Chinese authorities or the middle-class, who noted his political affiliations and close family membership to a prominent criminal gang). Numerous protests and strikes subsequently began against Japanese-run industries. A week later a group of Chinese students, heading for Ku's public "state" funeral and carrying banners, were arrested while traveling through the International Settlement. With their trial set for May 30, various student organisations convened in the days before and decided to hold mass demonstrations across the International Settlement and outside the Mixed Court. Aftermath[edit] The incident shocked and galvanized China, and the strikes and boycotts, coupled with further violent demonstrations and riots, quickly spread across the country, bringing foreign economic interests to a near standstill.[8] The 15 "ringleaders" originally arrested on May 30 were given light or suspended sentences by Shanghai's foreign-run Mixed Court. The target of public ire moved from the Japanese (for the death of Ku Chen-Hung) to the British, and Hong Kong was particularly affected (these strikes were there known as the Canton-Hong Kong strike).[7] Further shootings by foreigners upon Chinese protesters occurred at Canton, Mukden and elsewhere, although a reported incident at Nanking which became a cause célèbre for anti-imperialists was apparently carried out by local Chinese authorities. Indeed, the Chinese warlords used the incident as a pretext to further their own political aims. While Feng Yuxiang threatened to attack British interests militarily and demanded a national apology, Zhang Zuolin--who effectively controlled Shanghai's Chinese outskirts--had his police and soldiers arrest protesters and Communists and assist the Settlement forces. Two investigations into the events of May 30 were ordered, one by Chinese authorities and one by international appointees, Justice Finley Johnson (presiding), Judge of the Court of First Instance in the Philippines (representing America), Sir Henry Gollan, Chief Justice of Hong Kong (representing Britain) and Justice Kisaburo Suga of the Hiroshima Court of Appeal (representing Japan). The Chinese authorities refused to participate in the international investigation which, by a vote of 2 to 1, found the shooting justifiable. Only the Justice Finley from America disagreed and recommended sweeping changes, including the retirement of the chief of the Settlement Police, Commissioner McEuen, and Inspector Everson. The forced resignation of these two individuals in late-1925 would be the only official result of the inquiry. By November, with Chiang Kai-shek having finally wrested power from his rivals after Sun Yat-sen's death and with Chinese businesses wishing to return to operation (the Settlement had begun cutting electricity to Chinese mills), the strikes and protests began to fizzle out.[5] In Hong Kong, however, they would not totally end until mid-1926. The Kuomintang's support for the movement, and its Northern Expedition of 1926-27, eventually led to reforms in the governance of the International Settlement's Shanghai Municipal Council and the beginning of the removal of the Unequal Treaties. Transferred to Beijing were the Muslim Chengda College and Imam (Ahong) Ma Songting due to the May Thirtieth events.[9]

Mukden Incident (September 18, 1931)

The Mukden Incident, or Manchurian Incident, was a staged event engineered by Japanese military personnel as a pretext for the Japanese invasion in 1931 of northeastern China, known as Manchuria.[1][2][3] On September 18, 1931, Lt. Suemori Kawamoto detonated a small quantity of dynamite[4] close to a railway line owned by Japan's South Manchuria Railway near Mukden (now Shenyang).[5] The explosion was so weak that it failed to destroy the track and a train passed over it minutes later, but the Imperial Japanese Army accused Chinese dissidents of the act and responded with a full invasion that led to the occupation of Manchuria, in which Japan established its puppet state of Manchukuo six months later. The ruse of war was soon exposed by the Lytton Report of 1932, leading Japan to diplomatic isolation and its March 1933 withdrawal from the League of Nations.[6] The bombing act is known as the "Liutiaohu Incident" (simplified Chinese: 柳条湖事变; traditional Chinese: 柳條湖事變; pinyin: Liǔtiáohú Shìbiàn, Japanese: 柳条湖事件, Ryūjōko-jiken), and the entire episode of events is known in Japan as the "Manchurian Incident" (Kyūjitai: 滿洲事變, Shinjitai: 満州事変, Manshū-jihen) and in China as the "September 18 Incident"(simplified Chinese: 九一八事变; traditional Chinese: 九一八事變; pinyin: Jiǔyībā Shìbiàn). Japanese economic presence and political interest in Manchuria had been growing ever since the end of the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905). The Treaty of Portsmouth that ended the war had granted Japan the lease of the South Manchuria Railway branch (from Changchun to Lüshun) of the China Far East Railway. The Japanese government, however, claimed that this control included all the rights and privileges that China granted to Russia in the 1896 Li-Lobanov Treaty, as enlarged by the Kwantung Lease Agreement of 1898. This included absolute and exclusive administration within the South Manchuria Railway Zone. Japanese railway guards were stationed within the zone to provide security for the trains and tracks; however, these were regular Japanese soldiers, and they frequently carried out maneuvers outside the railway areas. There were many reports of raids on local Chinese villages by bored Japanese soldiers, and all complaints from the Chinese government were ignored. Meanwhile, the newly formed Chinese government was trying to recover the rights of nation. They started to claim that unequal treaties between China and Japan were invalid. China also announced new acts, so the Japanese people (including Koreans and Taiwanese at this time) who had lands, stores or houses in China were expelled without any compensation. Manchurian warlord Zhang Zuolin tried to deprive Japanese concessions too, but he was assassinated by the Japanese Kwantung Army. Zhang Xueliang, Zhang Zuolin's son and successor, joined the Nanjing Government led by Chiang Kai-shek from anti-Japanese sentiment. Zhang continued oppressing Japanese merchants and peasants in Manchuria, therefore many Japanese were wounded, killed or raped under the rule of his army. Japanese every objection was ignored by the Chinese authorities either. In Nanjing in April 1931, a national leadership conference of China was held between Chiang Kai-shek and Zhang Xueliang. They agreed to assert China's sovereignty in Manchuria strongly.[7] On the other hand, some officers of the Kwantung Army began to plot to invade Manchuria secretly. Besides, there were the other officers who wanted to support plotters in Tokyo. Colonel Seishirō Itagaki, Lieutenant Colonel Kanji Ishiwara, Colonel Kenji Doihara, and Major Takayoshi Tanaka had laid complete plans for the incident by May 31, 1931.[10] A section of the Liǔtiáo railway. The caption reads "railway fragment". The plan was executed when 1st Lieutenant Suemori Komoto of the Independent Garrison Unit (独立守備隊) of the 29th Infantry Regiment, which guarded the South Manchuria Railway, placed explosives near the tracks, but far enough away to do no real damage. At around 10:20 PM (22:20), September 18, the explosives were detonated. However, the explosion was minor and only a 1.5-meter section on one side of the rail was damaged. In fact, a train from Changchun passed by the site on this damaged track without difficulty and arrived at Shenyang at 10:30 PM (22:30).[11] On the morning of the following day (September 19), two artillery pieces installed at the Mukden officers' club opened fire on the Chinese garrison nearby, in response to the alleged Chinese attack on the railway. Zhang Xueliang's small air force was destroyed, and his soldiers fled their destroyed Beidaying barracks, as five hundred Japanese troops attacked the Chinese garrison of around seven thousand. The Chinese troops were no match for the experienced Japanese troops. By the evening, the fighting was over, and the Japanese had occupied Mukden at the cost of five hundred Chinese lives and only two Japanese lives.[12] At Dalian in the Kwantung Leased Territory, Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army General Shigeru Honjō was at first appalled that the invasion plan was enacted without his permission,[13] but he was eventually convinced by Ishiwara to give his approval after the fact. Honjō moved the Kwantung Army headquarters to Mukden and ordered General Senjurō Hayashi of the Chosen Army of Japan in Korea to send in reinforcements. At 04:00 on 19 September, Mukden was declared secure. Zhang Xueliang, under implicit instructions from Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Government to adhere to a non-resistance policy in order to battle the Chinese Communists, had already urged his men not to put up a fight and to store away any weapons in case the Japanese invaded (a piece of information that the Japanese advisors to Zhang's army knew ahead of time, hence facilitating the planning). Therefore, the Japanese soldiers proceeded to occupy and garrison the major cities of Changchun and Antung and their surrounding areas with minimal difficulty. However, in November, Muslim General Ma Zhanshan, the acting governor of Heilongjiang, began resistance with his provincial army, followed in January by Generals Ting Chao and Li Du with their local Jilin provincial forces. Despite this resistance, within five months of the Mukden Incident, the Imperial Japanese Army had overrun all major towns and cities in the provinces of Liaoning, Jilin, and Heilongjiang.[14] Chinese public opinion strongly criticized Zhang Xueliang for his non-resistance to the Japanese invasion, even though the Kuomintang central government was responsible for this policy. While the Japanese presented a legitimate threat, the Kuomintang focused their efforts mainly on eradicating the communist party. Many charged that Zhang's Northeastern Army of nearly a quarter million could have withstood the Kwantung Army of only 11,000 men. In addition, his arsenal in Manchuria was considered the most modern in China, and his troops had possession of tanks, around 60 combat aircraft, 4000 machine guns, and four artillery battalions. Zhang Xueliang's seemingly superior force was undermined by several factors. First was that the Kwantung Army had a strong reserve force that could be transported by railway from Korea, which was a Japanese colony, directly adjacent to Manchuria. Secondly, more than half of Zhang's troops were stationed south of the Great Wall in Hebei Province, while the troops north of the wall were scattered throughout Manchuria. Therefore, deploying Zhang's troops north of the Great Wall lacked the concentration needed to effectively fight the Japanese. Most of Zhang's troops were under-trained, poorly led, and had poor morale and questionable loyalty compared to their Japanese counterparts. Japanese secret agents had permeated Zhang's command because of his past (and his father, Zhang Zuolin's) reliance on Japanese military advisers. The Japanese knew the Northeastern Army very well and were able to conduct operations with ease.[15] The Chinese government was preoccupied with numerous internal problems, including the issue of the newly independent Guangzhou government of Hu Hanmin, Communist Party of China insurrections, and terrible flooding of the Yangtze River that created tens of thousands of refugees. Moreover, Zhang himself was not in Manchuria at the time, but was in a hospital in Beijing to raise money for the flood victims. However, in the Chinese newspapers, Zhang was ridiculed as "General Nonresistance" (Chinese: 不抵抗將軍; pinyin: Bù Dǐkàng Jiāngjūn). Chinese delegate addresses the League of Nations after the Mukden Incident in 1932. Because of these circumstances, the central government turned to the international community for a peaceful resolution. The Chinese Foreign Ministry issued a strong protest to the Japanese government and called for the immediate stop to Japanese military operations in Manchuria, and appealed to the League of Nations, on September 19. On October 24, the League of Nations passed a resolution mandating the withdrawal of Japanese troops, to be completed by November 16. However, Japan rejected the League of Nations resolution and insisted on direct negotiations with the Chinese government. Negotiations went on intermittently without much result.[16] On November 20, a conference in the Chinese government was convened, but the Guangzhou faction of the Kuomintang insisted that Chiang Kai-shek step down to take responsibility for the Manchurian debacle. On December 15, Chiang resigned as the Chairman of the Nationalist Government and was replaced as Premier of the Republic of China (head of the Executive Yuan) by Sun Fo, son of Sun Yat-sen. Jinzhou, another city in Liaoning, was lost to the Japanese in early January 1932. As a result, Wang Jingwei replaced Sun Fo as the Premier.[17] On January 7, 1932, United States Secretary of State Henry Stimson issued his Stimson Doctrine, that the United States would not recognize any government that was established as the result of Japanese actions in Manchuria. On January 14, a League of Nations commission, headed by Victor Bulwer-Lytton, 2nd Earl of Lytton, disembarked at Shanghai to examine the situation. In March, the puppet state of Manchukuo was established, with the former emperor of China, Puyi, installed as head of state.[18] On October 2, the Lytton Report was published and rejected the Japanese claim that the Manchurian invasion and occupation was an act of self-defense, although it did not assert that the Japanese had perpetrated the initial bombing of the railroad. The report ascertained that Manchukuo was the product of Japanese military aggression in China, while recognizing that Japan had legitimate concerns in Manchuria because of its economic ties there. The League of Nations refused to acknowledge Manchukuo as an independent nation. Japan resigned from the League of Nations in March 1933.[19][20] Colonel Kenji Doihara used the Mukden Incident to continue his campaign of disinformation. Since the Chinese troops at Mukden had put up such a poor resistance, he told Manchukuo Emperor Puyi that this was proof that the Chinese remained loyal to him. Japanese intelligence used the incident to continue the campaign to discredit the murdered Zhang Zuolin and his son Zhang Xueliang for "misgovernment" of Manchuria. In fact, drug trafficking and corruption had largely been suppressed under Zhang Zuolin.[21]

New Policies

The New Policies (Chinese: 新政; pinyin: Xīnzhèng), or New Administration of the late Qing dynasty (1644-1912), also known as the Late Qing Reform, were a series of political, economical, military, cultural and educational reforms that were implemented in the last decade of the Qing dynasty to keep the dynasty in power after the humiliating defeat in the Boxer Rebellion. The reforms started in 1901 and since they were implemented with the backing of the Empress Dowager Cixi, they are also called Cixi's New Policies. The policies included reforms in almost every aspect of governmental affairs: In education, traditional academies were converted into western-style schools, abolishing the imperial examinations, and military academies were created in each province. In law, there was a new code and judicial system. The system of fiscal control and tax collection was expanded and regularized, an especially important task since the Boxer Indemnity required payments to foreign powers which exceeded the annual income of the national government. Local and regional police forces were organized, and model prisons were opened.[1] The impact of these reforms varied from place to place. Many regions were virtually unchanged, while the provinces in the lower Yangzi valley had already taken the lead. The province of Zhili (roughly present day Hebei) was a model. With the strong support of the Empress Dowager, Yuan Shikai set up a strong bureaucracy to administer tax collection, local schools and police.[2] On 22 July 1908 the Qing government issued the Principles of the Constitution (Qinding Xianfa Dagang), modeled on the Japanese Meiji Constitution, which provided for gradual introduction of an electoral system beginning with local elections in 1908, followed in two years by elections for provincial legislatures, then two years later, elections for a national assembly. Special bureaus were set up in each province to prepare for setting up assemblies, directly subordinated to the provincial governor and consisting of scholars and gentry. They set up regulations for carrying out the elections, a timetable for carrying them out, and notices. The first to hold elections for the provincial assembly was the Jiangsu province, in 1909, and elections occurred on time in all provinces except for Xinjiang.[3] The New Policies also resulted in drastic change of the Manchu policy toward Mongolia from a relatively conservative-protective one to an aggressive-colonial one.[4] The New Policies are judged now to have been a substantive beginning for China's reorganization which was destroyed after the death of the Dowager Empress in 1908 by the intransigent stand of conservative Manchus in the Qing court.

Yongzheng

The Yongzheng Emperor (Chinese: 雍正帝) (13 December 1678 - 8 October 1735), born Yinzhen (胤禛), was the fifth emperor of the Manchu-led Qing dynasty and the third Qing emperor to rule over China proper. He reigned from 1723 to 1735. A hard-working ruler, the Yongzheng Emperor's main goal was to create an effective government at minimal expense. Like his father, the Kangxi Emperor, the Yongzheng Emperor used military force to preserve the dynasty's position. His reign was known for being despotic, efficient, and vigorous. Although the Yongzheng Emperor's reign was much shorter than that of both his father (the Kangxi Emperor) and his son (the Qianlong Emperor), the Yongzheng era was a period of peace and prosperity. The Yongzheng Emperor cracked down on corruption and reformed the financial administration.[1] His reign saw the formation of the Grand Council, an institution which had an enormous impact on the future of the Qing dynasty.

Wang Jingwei

Wang Jingwei (Wang Ching-wei; 4 May 1883 - 10 November 1944); born as Wang Zhaoming (Wang Chao-ming), but widely known by his pen name "Jingwei", was a Chinese politician. He was initially a member of the left wing of the Kuomintang (KMT), but later became increasingly anti-communist after his efforts to collaborate with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) ended in political failure. His political orientation veered sharply to the right later in his career after he joined the Japanese. Wang was a close associate of Sun Yat-sen for the last twenty years of Sun's life. After Sun's death Wang engaged in a political struggle with Chiang Kai-shek for control over the Kuomintang, but lost. Wang remained inside the Kuomintang, but continued to have disagreements with Chiang until the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937, after which he accepted an invitation from the Japanese Empire to form a Japanese-supported collaborationist government in Nanjing. Wang served as the head of state for this Japanese puppet government until he died, shortly before the end of World War II. Although he is still regarded as an important contributor in the Xinhai Revolution, his collaboration with the Imperial Japanese is a subject of academic debate,[1][2] and the typical narratives often regard him as a traitor in the War of Resistance.[3][4]

Xi Jinping

Xi Jinping (pronounced [ɕǐ tɕìn.pʰǐŋ], Chinese: 习近平; born 15 June 1953) is the current General Secretary of the Communist Party of China,[2] President of the People's Republic of China, and Chairman of the Central Military Commission. As Xi holds the top offices of the party and the military, in addition to being the head of state through the office of the president, he is sometimes referred to as China's "Paramount Leader"[3][4] and recognized by the party as its leadership "core".[5] As General Secretary, Xi holds an ex-officio seat on the Politburo Standing Committee, China's top decision-making body. The son of Communist veteran Xi Zhongxun, Xi Jinping rose through the ranks politically in China's coastal provinces. Xi was governor of Fujian from 1999 to 2002, and governor, then party secretary of neighboring Zhejiang province from 2002 to 2007. Following the dismissal of Chen Liangyu, Xi was transferred to Shanghai as party secretary for a brief period in 2007. Xi joined the Politburo Standing Committee and central secretariat in October 2007, spending the next five years as Hu Jintao's presumed successor. Xi was vice-president from 2008 to 2013 and Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission from 2010 to 2012. Since assuming power, Xi has attempted to legitimize the authority of the Communist Party by introducing far-ranging measures to enforce party discipline and to ensure internal unity. He initiated an unprecedented and far-reaching campaign against corruption, leading to the downfall of prominent incumbent and retired officials.[6] Xi has also imposed further restrictions over civil society and ideological discourse, advocating the concept of "internet sovereignty". Considered the central figure of the People's Republic's fifth generation of leadership,[7] Xi has significantly centralized institutional power by taking on a wide range of leadership positions, including chairing the newly formed National Security Commission, as well as new steering committees on economic and social reforms, military reform, and the Internet. Xi has called for further market economic reforms, for governing according to the law and for strengthening legal institutions, with an emphasis on individual and national aspirations under the neologism "Chinese Dream".[8] Xi has also championed a more assertive foreign policy, particularly with regards to Sino-Japanese relations, China's claims in the South China Sea, and its role as a leading advocate of free trade and globalization. He has also sought to expand China's regional influence through the One Belt, One Road initiative, played a leading role in the fight against climate change, and invested heavily in energy and natural resources.[6]

Zhao Ziyang

Zhao Ziyang (pronounced [ʈʂâu tsɹ̩̀jǎŋ]; 17 October 1919 - 17 January 2005) was a high-ranking politician in China. He was the third Premier of the People's Republic of China from 1980 to 1987, Vice Chairman of the Communist Party of China from 1981 to 1982 and General Secretary of the Communist Party of China from 1987 to 1989. As a senior government official, Zhao was critical of Maoist policies and instrumental in implementing free-market reforms, first in Sichuan and subsequently nationwide. He emerged on the national scene due to support from Deng Xiaoping after the Cultural Revolution. He also sought measures to streamline China's bureaucracy and fight corruption, issues that challenged the Party's legitimacy in the 1980s. Zhao Ziyang was also an advocate of the privatization of state-owned enterprises, the separation of the Party and the state, and general market economic reforms. Many of these views were shared by General Secretary Hu Yaobang.[1] His economic reform policies and sympathies with student demonstrators during the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 placed him at odds with some members of the party leadership, including Premier Li Peng, former President Li Xiannian and Party elder Chen Yun. Zhao also began to lose favour with paramount leader Deng Xiaoping. In the aftermath of the events, Zhao was purged politically and effectively placed under house arrest for the next 15 years. In 2005, he died from a stroke in Beijing. Because of his political fall from grace, he was not given the funeral rites generally accorded to senior Chinese officials. His unofficial autobiography was published in English and in Chinese in 2009, but the details of his life remain censored inside mainland China. Early career[edit] Zhao (top left) pictured with Mao Zedong in Wuhan, January 1966 Zhao was born Zhao Xiuye (simplified Chinese: 赵修业; traditional Chinese: 趙修業; pinyin: Zhào Xiūyè), but changed his given name to "Ziyang" while attending middle school in Wuhan.[2][3] He was the son of a wealthy landlord in Hua County,[4] Henan, who was later murdered by Communist Party officials during a land reform movement in the early 1940s.[5] Zhao joined the Communist Youth League in 1932,[6] and became a full member of the Party in 1938.[7] Unlike many Party members active in the 1930s and 1940s who later became senior Chinese leaders, Zhao joined the Party too late to have participated in the Long March of 1934-1935. He served in the People's Liberation Army during the Second Sino-Japanese War and the subsequent civil war, but his posts were largely administrative.[7] Zhao's career was not especially notable before he emerged as a Party leader in Guangdong in the early 1950s.[5] Zhao rose to prominence in Guangdong from 1951,[6] initially following a ruthless ultra-leftist, Tao Zhu, who was notable for his heavy-handed efforts to force local peasants into living and working in "People's Communes". When Mao Zedong's Great Leap Forward (1958-1961) created an artificial famine, Mao publicly blamed the nation's food shortages on the greed of rich peasants, who were supposedly hiding China's huge surplus production from the government. Zhao's faith in Mao led him to take a leading role in a local campaign aimed at torturing peasants into revealing their imaginary food supplies. Through supporting the Great Leap Forward, Zhao was partially responsible for the millions of people who died from starvation and malnutrition in Guangdong between 1958 and 1961.[5] Zhao's experiences during the Great Leap Forward led him to support moderate political and economic policies, including those supported by Deng Xiaoping and President Liu Shaoqi. He led efforts to re-introduce limited amounts of private agriculture and commerce, and dismantled the People's Communes.[5] Zhao's methods of returning private plots to farmers and assigning production contracts to individual households were replicated in other parts of China, helping the country's agricultural sector recover.[7] After achieving senior positions in Guangdong, Zhao directed a harsh purge of cadres accused of corruption or having ties to the Kuomintang.[6] By 1965 Zhao was the Party secretary of Guangdong province, despite not being a member of the Communist Party Central Committee. He was forty-six at the time that he first became Party secretary, a notably young age to hold such a prestigious position.[8] Because of his moderate political orientation, Zhao was attacked by Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). He was dismissed from all official positions in 1967, after which he was paraded through Guangzhou in a dunce cap[5] and publicly denounced as "a stinking remnant of the landlord class".[6] Return to government[edit] Zhao spent four years as a fitter in Hunan, at the Xianzhong Mechanics Factory. Zhao Wujun, the youngest of his four sons, worked with him (Zhao also had a younger daughter). While in political exile, Zhao's family lived in a small apartment close to his factory, with a small suitcase in the living room that served as a dinner table.[8] Zhao's rehabilitation began in April 1971, when he and his family were woken in the middle of the night by someone banging on the door. Without much explanation, the Party chief of the factory that Zhao was working at informed Zhao that he was to go at once to Changsha, the provincial capital. The factory's only means of transport was a three-wheeled motorcycle, which was ready to take him.[9] Zhao was driven to Changsha's airport, where a plane had been prepared to fly him to Beijing. Still unaware of what was happening, Zhao boarded the plane. He was checked into the comfortable Beijing Hotel, but wasn't able to get to sleep: he later claimed that, after years of living in poverty, the mattress was too soft.[9] In the morning, Zhao was taken to a meeting with Premier Zhou Enlai at the Great Hall of the People. Soon after they met, Zhao began a speech that he had prepared over the previous night: "I have been rethinking the Cultural Revolution during these years as a labourer..." Zhou cut him off, saying "You've been called to Beijing because the Central Committee has decided to name you as a deputy Party chief of Inner Mongolia."[9] After being recalled from political exile, Zhao attempted to portray himself as a born-again Maoist, and publicly renounced any interest in encouraging private enterprise or material incentive. Zhao's late conversion to Maoism did not last long, and he later became a "principal architect" of the sweeping, pro-market changes that followed the death of Mao. Despite his important role in guiding the economy of China over the course of his career, Zhao had no formal training in economics.[7] Throughout 1972 Zhou Enlai directed Zhao's political rehabilitation. Zhao was appointed to the Central Committee, and in Inner Mongolia became the Revolutionary Committee Secretary and vice-chairman in March 1972. Zhao was elevated to the 10th Central Committee in August 1973, and returned to Guangdong as 1st CPC Secretary and Revolutionary Committee Chair in April 1974. He became Political Commissar of the Chengdu Military Region in December 1975.[10] Zhao was appointed Party Secretary of Sichuan in 1975, effectively the province's highest-ranking official. Earlier in the Cultural Revolution, Sichuan had been notable for the violent battles that rival organizations of local Red Guards had fought against each other. At the time, Sichuan was China's most populous province,[5] but it had been economically devastated by the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, whose collective policies had collapsed the province's agricultural production to levels not seen since the 1930s, despite a great increase in the province's population.[11] The economic situation was so bad that citizens in Sichuan were reportedly selling their daughters for food.[12] Soon after taking office, Zhao introduced a series of successful market-oriented reforms, leading to an increase in industrial production by 81% and agricultural output by 25% within three years.[12] Zhao's reforms made him popular in Sichuan, where the local people created a saying: "yao chi liang, zhao Ziyang". (This saying is a pun on Zhao's name, which can be loosely translated as: "if you want to eat, look for Ziyang.")[9] Reformist leader[edit] Political activities[edit] President Reagan walking with Zhao during his visit to the White House on 10 January 1984. After ousting Hua Guofeng as China's "paramount leader" in 1978, Deng Xiaoping recognized the "Sichuan Experience" as a model for Chinese economic reform.[6] Deng promoted Zhao to a position as an alternate member of the Politburo of the Communist Party of China in 1977, and as a full member in 1979. He joined the Politburo Standing Committee, China's highest ruling organ, in 1980. Zhao became the Leader of the Leading Group for Financial and Economic Affairs and Vice Chairman of the Communist Party of China in 1980 and 1981 separately.[6] After 1978 Zhao's policies were replicated in Anhui, with similar success.[5] In 1980, after serving under Hua Guofeng as vice-premier for six months, Zhao replaced Hua as Premier of the State Council[6] with a mandate to introduce his rural reforms across China. Between 1980 and 1984, China's agricultural production rose by 50%.[5] Zhao was hosted by US president Ronald Reagan at the White House on January 10, 1984 as part of a broader effort to improve China's relations with the West. Zhao developed "preliminary stage theory", a model for transforming the socialist system via gradual economic reform. As premier, Zhao implemented many of the policies that were successful in Sichuan at a national scale, increasingly de-centralizing industrial and agricultural production. Zhao successfully sought to establish a series of special economic zones in coastal provinces in order to attract foreign investment and create export hubs. Zhao's reforms led to a rapid increases in both agricultural and light-industrial production throughout the 1980s, but his economic reforms were criticized for causing inflation. Zhao promoted an open foreign policy, improving China's relations with Western nations in order to support China's economic development.[6] In the 1980s, Zhao was branded by conservatives as a revisionist of Marxism, but his advocacy of government transparency and a national dialogue that included ordinary citizens in the policymaking process made him popular with many.[12] Zhao was a solid believer in the Party, but he defined socialism very differently from Party conservatives. Zhao called political reform "the biggest test facing socialism." He believed economic progress was inextricably linked to democratization.[13] Zhao was a fan of golf, and is credited with popularizing the game's reintroduction to the mainland in the 1980s.[14] Premier Zhao Ziyang of the People's Republic of China on a tour of the USS Arizona memorial on 7 January 1984. While Zhao focused on economic reforms during the early 1980s, his superior, Hu Yaobang, promoted a number of political reforms. In the late 1980s Hu and Zhao collaborated to promote a series of large-scale political reforms with vaguely defined goals. The political reforms of Hu and Zhao included proposals to have candidates directly elected to the Politburo, more elections with more than one candidate, more government transparency, more consultation with the public on policy, and increased personal responsibility directed to officials for their mistakes.[5] Zhao and Hu also began a large-scale anti-corruption programme, and permitted the investigations of the children of high-ranking Party elders, who had grown up protected by their parents' influence. Hu's investigation of Party officials belonging to this "Crown Prince Party" made Hu unpopular with many powerful Party officials. In January 1987 a clique of Party elders forced Hu to resign, on the grounds that he had been too lenient to student protestors. After Hu's dismissal, Deng promoted Zhao to replace Hu as CPC general secretary, putting Zhao in the position to succeed Deng as "paramount leader".[5] One month before Zhao was appointed to the position of general secretary, Zhao was interviewed by an American reporter, stating: "I am not fit to be the general secretary... I am more fit to look after economic affairs."[15] Zhao's vacated premiership was in turn filled by Li Peng, a conservative who opposed many of Zhao's economic and political reforms. In the 1987 Communist Party Congress Zhao declared that China was in "a primary stage of socialism" that could last 100 years. Under this premise, Zhao believed that China needed to experiment with a variety of economic reforms in order to stimulate production.[6] Zhao proposed to separate the roles of the Party and state, a proposal that has since become taboo.[16] Western observers generally view the year that Zhao served as general secretary as the most open in the history of the People's Republic of China. Many limitations on freedom of speech and freedom of press were relaxed, allowing intellectuals to freely express themselves, and to propose "improvements" for the country.[5] Zhao boldly introduced the stock market in China and vigorously promoted futures trading there.[17] In 1984, under the support of Zhao Ziyang, Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou became experimental cities of joint-stock system,some companies issued stock only within own company workers. In November 1985, the first share-issuing enterprise was established in Shanghai and issued 10,000 shares of 50 RMB par value stock publicly, attracted many investors' interest. Zhao Ziyang hosted a financial meeting on 2 August 1986, he demanded that the joint stock system should be carried out nationwide in the following year.[18] Zhao's proposal in May 1988 to accelerate price reform led to widespread popular complaints about rampant inflation and gave opponents of rapid reform the opening to call for greater centralization of economic controls and stricter prohibitions against Western influence. This precipitated a political debate, which grew more heated through the winter of 1988 to 1989.[6] Relationship with party elders[edit] Because Zhao had risen to power through his work in the provinces, he never enjoyed strong connections among the Party leadership in Beijing. Because he had led the Communist Youth League in the 1950s, Zhao often relied on its former members for support, and Zhao's enemies accused him of promoting a "Communist Youth League faction" within the CCP. Among Beijing's Party elders, Chen Yun and Li Xiannian were notably critical of Zhao and his policies.[19] Despite his criticism of Zhao, Chen Yun was the Party elder most respected by Zhao, and Zhao would frequently attempt to consult with Chen before implementing new policies. Li Xiannian resented Zhao personally for Zhao's interest in foreign culture, and for Zhao's willingness to learn from economic models that had been successful outside of China. According to Zhao, Li Xiannian "hated me because I was implementing Deng Xiaoping's reforms, but since it was difficult for him to openly oppose Deng, he made me the target of the opposition."[20] Zhao wrote warmly of Hu Yaobang in his autobiography, and generally agreed with Hu on the direction of China's economic reforms. Although Deng Xiaoping was Zhao's only firm supporter among the Party elders, Deng's support was sufficient to protect Zhao throughout Zhao's career. As late as April 1989, one month before the dramatic end of Zhao's career, Deng assured Zhao that he had secured the support of Chen Yun and Li Xiannian for Zhao to serve two more full terms as Party general secretary.[19] The second half of 1988 saw the increasing deterioration of Zhao's political support. Zhao found himself in multi-front turf battles with the Party elders, who grew increasingly dissatisfied with Zhao's hands-off approach to ideological matters. The conservative faction in the politburo, led by Premier Li Peng and Vice-premier Yao Yilin, were constantly at odds with Zhao in economic and fiscal policy making. Zhao was under growing pressure to combat runaway corruption by rank-and-file officials and their family members. In the beginning of 1989, it was evident that Zhao was faced with an increasingly difficult uphill battle, and he may have seen that he was fighting for his own political survival. If Zhao was unable to turn things around rapidly, a showdown with the Party conservatives would be all but inevitable. The student protests triggered by the sudden death of former CPC general secretary Hu Yaobang, widely admired as a reform-minded leader, created a crisis in which Zhao was forced into a confrontation with his political enemies. Tiananmen Square protests[edit] Main article: Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 Zhao was general secretary for little more than a year before the death of Hu Yaobang on 15 April 1989, which, coupled with a growing sense of public outrage caused by high inflation, provided the backdrop for the large-scale protest of 1989 by students, intellectuals, and other parts of a disaffected urban population. The Tiananmen protests initially began as a spontaneous public mourning for Hu, but evolved into nationwide protests supporting political reform and demanding an end to Party corruption.[5] Student demonstrators, taking advantage of the loosening political atmosphere, reacted to a variety of causes of discontent. The diverse demands of protesters included greater economic liberalization, political democracy, media freedom, freedom of speech and association, rule of law, and to have the legitimacy of the movement recognized. Some protest leaders spoke against official corruption and speculation, price stability, social security, and the democratic means to supervise the reform process.[21] Ironically, some of the original invective was also directed against Zhao. Party hardliners increasingly came to the conclusion that the demonstrations were due to Zhao's rapid pace of reform, which they believed caused a sense of confusion and frustration among college students. The protesters may have been encouraged by the imminent collapse of other Communist governments in Eastern Europe.[6] Zhao treated the protesters sympathetically. The protests may have died down, but on 26 April he was obliged (as the Party General Secretary) to leave for North Korea on a state visit. While he was away Premier Li Peng organized a meeting between Deng Xiaoping and the Standing Committee, in which Li and his allies convinced Deng that the protests were threatening to the Party. Following the meeting Li had the China Daily publish an article (which he attributed to Deng), which criticized the protests as "premeditated and organized turmoil with anti-Party and anti-socialist motives." Following the publication of Li's article the protests grew to over 10,000 and spread to cities across China,[22] notably including Shanghai and Guangzhou.[6] Li attempted to mollify the protesters by engaging in dialogue with student groups. He attempted to institute numerous government reforms, including the creation of a special commission to investigate government corruption; but, according to Zhao, the commission was ineffective because "Li Peng and others in his group actively attempted to block, delay and even sabotage the process." Zhao attempted to arrange a meeting with Deng in order to convince him to retract Li's "April 26 article". Zhao was granted a meeting with Deng on 17 May; but, instead of the private meeting he expected, he found that the entire Standing Committee was present. When Zhao advocated modifying the editorial, President Yang Shangkun proposed declaring martial law according to the decision of National People's Congress.[22] Zhao refused to order the military to crush the demonstrations.[23] Deng eventually decided on declaring martial law. According to the Tiananmen Papers, the standing committee vote was split 2-2 with one abstention, and retired CCP veterans were called in to determine the vote. According to Zhao, there was no vote, and the decision to declare martial law was illegal according to the Party's rules.[22] Shortly before 5 am on 19 May, Zhao appeared in Tiananmen Square and wandered among the crowd of protesters. Using a bullhorn, he delivered a now-famous speech to the students gathered at the square. It was first broadcast through China Central Television nationwide. Here is a translated version: " Students, we came too late. We are sorry. You talk about us, criticize us, it is all necessary. The reason that I came here is not to ask for your forgiveness. What I want to say is that you are all getting weak, it has been seven days since you went on a hunger strike, you can't continue like this. As time goes on, your body will be damaged beyond repair, it could be very life-threatening. Now the most important thing is to end this strike. I know, your hunger strike is to hope that the Party and the government will give you a satisfying answer. I feel that our communication is open. Some of these problems can only be solved through certain procedures. For example, you have mentioned about the nature of the incident, the question of responsibility; I feel that those problems can be resolved eventually, we can reach a mutual agreement in the end. However, you should also know that the situation is very complicated, it is going to be a long process. You can't continue the hunger strike longer than seven days, and still insist on receiving a satisfying answer before ending the hunger strike. You are still young, we are old, you must live healthy, and see the day when China accomplishes the four modernizations. You are not like us, we are already old, so we do not matter. It is not easy for this nation and your parents to support your college studies. Now you are all about 20, and about to sacrifice your lives so easily, students, couldn't you think rationally? Now the situation is very serious, you all know, the Party and the nation is very antsy, our society is very worried. Besides, Beijing is the capital, the situation is getting worse and worse everywhere, this cannot continue. Students, you all have good will, and are for the good of our nation, but if this situation continues, loses control, it will have serious consequences elsewhere. In conclusion, I have only one wish. If you stop hunger strike, the government won't close the door for dialogue, never! The questions that you have raised, we can continue to discuss. Although it is a little slow, but we are reaching some agreement on some problems. Today I just want to see the students, and express our feelings. I hope students could think about this issues calmly. This thing can not be sorted out clearly under illogical situations. You all have that strength, you are young after all. We were also young before, we protested, laid our bodies on the rail tracks, we never thought about what will happen in the future at that time. Finally, I beg the students once again, think about the future calmly. There are many things that can be solved. I hope that you will all end the hunger strike soon, thank you.[24] " After a bow, people began to applaud and some students burst into tears. That was Zhao's last public appearance, for Zhao had been ousted by party elders just before coming to the square (when Deng Xiaoping ordered troops, Zhao turned in his resignation).[23] The phrase "我们已经老了，无所谓了" (Traditional Chinese: "我們已經老了，無所謂了") - "We are already old, we don't matter anymore" - became a famous quotation after that. House arrest[edit] The protesters did not disperse. A day after Zhao's 19 May visit to Tiananmen Square, Premier Li Peng publicly declared martial law, leading to the deaths of hundreds of protesters on 4 June. In the power struggle that ensued, Zhao was stripped of all his positions and was put under house arrest. Following Zhao's dismissal, Jiang Zemin replaced Zhao as General Secretary of the Communist Party of China and successor of Deng Xiaoping.[5] Over thirty ministers were dismissed as Zhao loyalists, and Zhao was widely criticized in the Chinese media.[25] In the end, mentioning his name in the media was banned, while his photographs were airbrushed and he disappeared from textbooks.[26] What motivated Zhao remains, even today, a topic of debate by many. Some say he went into the square hoping a conciliatory gesture would gain him leverage against hard-liners like Premier Li Peng. Others believe he supported the protesters and did not want to see them hurt when the military was called in. After the incident, Zhao was placed under indefinite house arrest.[27] Zhao's rival, Li Peng, later accused Zhao of fomenting the Tiananmen Protests exclusively for political gain. According to Li, "Zhao liaised with Bao Tong immediately after his arrival in Beijing (from Pyongyang). Bao gathered some other of Zhao's supporters to hash out the situation. They feared that Zhao's political future was at stake: Zhao did not succeed in [managing] the economy, was not stellar politically, does not have a power base of his own, and his son was suspected of illegal business dealings. As such, it was likely that Zhao would become the 'scapegoat' of the student movement. These advisors suggested to Zhao that he maintain distance with Deng Xiaoping [and] attempt to win the people's hearts in order to save himself; there were no other options."[28] Because Zhao was never formally charged with any wrongdoing,[12] it cannot be known what evidence Li had to support his claims. Zhao himself addressed Li's claims as "slander".[29] Zhao remained under tight supervision and was allowed to leave his courtyard compound or receive visitors only with permission from the highest echelons of the Party. There were occasional reports of him attending the funeral of a dead comrade, visiting other parts of China or playing golf at Beijing courses, but the government rather successfully kept him hidden from news reports and history books. Over that period, only a few snapshots of a gray-haired Zhao leaked out to the media. On at least two occasions Zhao wrote letters, addressed to the Chinese government, in which he put forward the case for a reassessment of the Tiananmen Massacre. One of those letters appeared on the eve of the Communist Party's 15th National Congress. The other came during a 1998 visit to China by U.S. President Bill Clinton. Neither was ever published in mainland China. After 1989, Zhao remained ideologically estranged from the Chinese government. He remained popular among those who believed that the government was wrong in ordering the Tiananmen Massacre, and that the Party should reassess its position on the student protests. He continued to hold China's top leadership responsible for the assault, and refused to accept the official Party line that the demonstrations had been a part of a "counter-revolutionary rebellion".[7] After his arrest, Zhao eventually came to hold a number of beliefs that were much more radical than any positions he had ever expressed while in power. Zhao came to believe that China should adopt a free press, freedom to organize, an independent judiciary, and a multiparty parliamentary democracy.[30] Zhao lived for fifteen years under house arrest, accompanied by his wife. The hutong in which Zhao lived had once belonged to a hairdresser of the Qing Dynasty Empress Dowager, Cixi.[5] Before his death in 1987 Hu Yaobang had also lived in the house. It was supplied by the Beijing government[31] and is located in central Beijing, close to Zhongnanhai.[7] Despite Zhao's house arrest, no formal charges were ever laid against him, and he was never expelled from the Communist Party.[12] After his arrest, Deng and his successors continued to believe that Zhao and his subordinates had worked secretly to organize the nationwide protests, and worried that his death might trigger protests similar to the protests sparked by the death of Hu Yaobang.[5]

Comintern

Communist International In 1924, the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party joined Comintern.[26] At first, in China both the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang were supported. After the definite break with Chiang Kai-shek in 1927, Stalin sent personal emissaries to help organize revolts which at this time failed.[27]

Third Plenum (1978)

The 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China was a pivotal meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China held in Beijing, China, from December 18 to December 22, 1978. The conference marked the beginning of the "Reform and Opening Up" policy, and is widely seen as the moment when Deng Xiaoping became paramount leader of China replacing Hua Guofeng, who remained nominal Chairman of the Communist Party of China until 1981. The meeting was a decisive turning point in post-1949 Chinese history, marking the beginning of the wholesale repudiation of Mao's Cultural Revolution policies, and set China on the course for nationwide economic reforms. The meeting took place at the Jingxi Hotel in western Beijing. Before the plenum, demands for a repudiation of the Cultural Revolution increased, especially by those who were persecuted during Mao Zedong's last year. In October 1976, the radical Gang of Four led by Mao's widow Jiang Qing was arrested, and Deng Xiaoping himself—Mao's chief rival from 1975 to 1976—was officially rehabilitated in 1977. Although Hua Guofeng, who succeeded "the great helmsman" in 1976, tried to carry on the Maoist rhetoric and to gain an authority like that of Mao's, he also allowed the rehabilitation of many of Deng's allies, who, calling for economic reform, then revolted against him. During the 1978 working conference held in November, preparing the plenum, Chen Yun raised the "six issues"—Bo Yibo, Tao Zhu, Wang Heshou and Peng Dehuai; the 1976 Tiananmen Incident; and Kang Sheng's errors—to undermine the leftists. At the same conference, Deng said it was necessary to go over ideological barriers. Trying to distance from the Cultural Revolution practice which put politics before economy, the Third Plenary Session argued that extensive criticism campaigns against Lin Biao and the Gang of Four were to be abandoned in favour of a greater attention to economics. The "four modernizations" of industry, agriculture, national defence and science-technology were considered the Party's key tasks for the new period. Former President Liu Shaoqi's theory that under socialism, mass class struggle came to an end, and it was necessary to develop relations of production in order to follow the growth of social forces, was openly endorsed, while Mao's theory of continued revolution under socialism was abandoned. Changes in economic management were called for. The new slogan was to "make China a modern, powerful socialist country before the end of this century". Although it did not take any open resolution against Mao, the Plenary Session attacked his leadership, implying that it did not guarantee full democracy or collective leadership. Particularly, it criticized the use of issuing Mao's "instructions", as it was said that "No personal view by a Party member in a position of responsibility, including leading comrades of the Central Committee, is to be called an 'instruction.'" It also put an end to the extensive personality cult towards Mao and Hua, even going as far as to avoid using the titles "Chairman Mao" and "Chairman Hua". Putting forward the "Seeking truth from facts" principle, the plenum started the repudiation of the Cultural Revolution: the "Counterattack the Right-Deviationist Reversal-of-Verdicts Trend" campaign aimed against Deng was openly rejected, and Peng Dehuai, Tao Zhu, Bo Yibo and Yang Shangkun were rehabilitated. The Cultural Revolution was openly rejected only in 1981 at the Sixth Plenary Session. The weakness of the National People's Congress and the Supreme People's Court during this period was criticized as well. Despite its great relevance in advancing Deng Xiaoping's ideas and leadership, during the Third Plenary Session no critical or substantial reshuffle occurred, as opposed to the Sixth Plenary Session held in 1981 when Hua Guofeng was removed from his posts. Important additions were made, however. Chen Yun was appointed Politburo Standing Committee member, as well as Party Vice-Chairman and First Secretary of the newly created Central Commission for Discipline Inspection. Deng Yingchao, Hu Yaobang and Wang Zhen were all made new Politburo members, and they were given important posts in the Discipline Inspection Commission. 9 new members, former Head of the PLA General Staff Huang Kecheng among them, were co-opted in the Central Committee.

Lushan conference (1959)

The Lushan Conference was a meeting of the top leaders of the Communist Party of China held between July and August 1959. The Politburo met in an "expanded session" (Kuoda Huiyi) between July 2 and August 1, followed by the 8th Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China from August 2 - 16. The major topic of discussion was the Great Leap Forward. The Lushan Conference saw the political purge of the Defence Minister, Marshal Peng Dehuai, whose criticism of some aspects of the Great Leap Forward was seen as a personal affront on Mao. The Conference also marked the first time since the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949 where disagreement over the direction of policy spilled into open conflict between party leaders. Mao's response to Peng was also seen as an indication that for the first time, his personal authority trumped the principles of collective leadership of the Central Committee and the Politburo. The conference's name is derived from the meeting place, a resort on Mount Lu in the district of the same name in Jiangxi Province, in southeastern China. Original objective[edit] The original objective of the conference was to review the events in China during 1958 and solve some practical issues brought forth by those events. Mao Zedong also intended to use the conference to contain the "leftist tendency" (zuoqing) elements in the Great Leap Forward. Unexpected twist[edit] On July 14, Peng Dehuai, then PRC's defense minister, wrote a private letter to Mao criticizing some elements of the Great Leap Forward. In the letter, he cautiously framed his words and did not deny the "great achievement" of Mao, but meanwhile showed his disapproval for elements like the "winds of exaggeration" (i.e., over-reporting of grain production), the communal dining and also the establishment of commune militia which he felt would undermine the strength of the People's Liberation Army. He expressed his "confusion" towards "rather large losses" and "epidemic of bragging" in the Great Leap Forward.[1] For this reason, Mao extended the conference for more than ten days. Downfall of Peng Dehuai[edit] On July 23, Mao showed Peng's letter to his comrades and asked them to express their views on the issue. However, not long afterwards, Mao bitterly criticised Peng as being part of a group wavering in the face of difficulties and who were "only 30 kilometres away from the rightists".[2] He was subsequently dismissed, arrested and replaced by Lin Biao. Although the criticism of Peng Dehuai resulted in a victory for Mao Zedong, it also led the leadership to conclude that he had been treated unfairly and that the party's norms had been violated. Consequences of the conference[edit] The Lushan Conference marked a key point of departure in Mao's rule. Criticism of party actions and policies were now equated with criticism of Mao. Mao's speech at Lushan was incredibly passionate and bellicose. He defended himself by saying that he, like all of the great writers, Confucius, Karl Marx, and Lenin had made mistakes and that focusing on them would not help the situation. Moreover, he insisted that not one commune had collapsed yet. His personal victory over Peng Dehuai at the Lushan Conference gave Mao confidence and led him to proceed with the Cultural Revolution. More than 3 million officials within the party were indicted and "class struggle" was brought in for the first time into the upper echelon of the Party apparatus.

New Life Movement

The New Life Movement (Chinese: 新生活運動; pinyin: Xīn Shēnghuó yùndòng) was a government led civic movement in 1930s China to promote cultural reform and Neo-Confucian social morality and to ultimately unite China under a centralised ideology following the emergence of ideological challenges to the status quo. Chiang Kai-shek as head of the government and the Chinese Nationalist Party launched the initiative on February 19, 1934 as part of an anti-Communist campaign, and soon enlarged the campaign to target the whole nation.[1] Chiang and his wife, Soong Mei-ling, who played a major role in the campaign, advocated a life guided by four virtues, 'Lǐ' (禮/礼, proper rite), Yì' (義/义, righteousness or justice), lián (廉, honesty and cleanness) and chǐ (恥/耻, shame; sense of right and wrong).[2] The campaign proceeded with help of the Blue Shirts Society and the CC Clique within the Nationalist Party, and Christian missionaries in China.[3] The New Life Movement was founded at a time when China, already weakened by Western imperialism, faced the threats of rising Japanese militarism, domestic factionalism and communism. The launch of the New Life Movement was set in the context the Chiangs' growing concern with corruption, and moral decadence that they blamed on foreign influences. Historian Colin Mackerras writes that "Corruption was an abiding feature of Chiang Kai-shek's rule" and that nepotism and bribery were rife among the bureaucracy. Chiang charged that "If we do not weed the present body of corruption, bribery, perfunctoriness, and ignorance, and establish instead a clean, effective administration, the day will soon come when the revolution will be started against us as we did the Manchus".,[4] Chiang further claimed that the life of a Chinese man could be summarised with words such as "hedonism", to signify his unprincipled and controlled pursuit of pleasure; "laziness" to represent his negligence and carelessness; as well as "unbearable filthiness" in every aspect of his life.[5] Chiang's political rival, Wang Ching-wei described Chinese life as a life of "smoking," "sickness," "gambling," "filth," "ghosts" (i.e., superstition), and "indolence". Wang argued the fundamental psychological basis of such behaviour was "lackadaisicalness" (suibian zhuyi) and "self seekingness" (zili zhuyi). He contended that "lackadaisicalness" led to lives without a sense of right or wrong, and hence with no distinctions or purpose. "Self-seekingness," he argued, led to the rejection of all outside interference with this kind of behaviour as encroachment on "freedom". There was no consideration for others and their rights, only of one's own comfort, inevitably obstructing social life and group solidarity.[6] In Chiang's mind, these concerns were compounded by the influx of foreign ideas following the New Culture Movement and May Fourth Movement which fostered Western concepts such as liberalism, pragmatism and nationalism as well as more radical ideas including Marxism respectively. The Movement attempted to counter such threats through a resurrection of traditional Chinese morality, which it held to be superior to modern Western values. As such the Movement was based upon Confucianism, mixed with Christianity, nationalism and authoritarianism that have some similarities to fascism.[3] It rejected individualism and liberalism, while also opposing socialism and communism. Soong Mei-ling called for a program of spiritual enlightenment. She wrote inForum, an American magazine, in 1935, that "the mere accumulation of great wealth is not sufficient to enable China to resume her position as a great nation." There must be, she continued, "also revival of the spirit, since spiritual values transcend mere material riches. She played a major role both in launching the Movement and in representing its public face.[7] Soong Meiling Stitching a Uniform For Soldiers Chiang Kai-shek used the Confucian and Methodist notion of self-cultivation and correct living for the Movement; to this end it prescribed proper etiquette on every aspect of daily life. He considered the New Life Movement a key part of the program to carry out the "principle of the people's livelihood" in Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles of the People. However implementing the Movement was suspended indefinitely in the approach to the Second Sino-Japanese War. Chiang Kai-shek's September 1934 speech stated that the New Life Movement aimed at the "promotion of a regular life guided by the four virtues," - 'Lǐ' (proper rite), Yì' (righteousness or justice), lián (honesty and cleanness) and chǐ (shame; sense of right and wrong). These virtues, he went on, must be applied to ordinary life in the matter of food, clothing, shelter, and action. The four virtues are the essential principles for the promotion of morality. They form the major rules for dealing with men and human affairs, for cultivating oneself and for adjustment to one's surroundings. Whoever violates these rules is bound to fail, and a nation that neglects them will not survive." [8] Chiang's later extended the four virtues to eight by the addition of "Promptness", "Precision," "Harmoniousness," and "Dignity". These elements were summarized in two basic forms: "cleanliness" and "discipline" and were viewed as the first step in achieving a "new life". People were encouraged to engage in modern polite behaviour, such as not to spit, urinate or sneeze in public. They were encouraged to adopt good table manners such as not making noises when eating.[9]

2-28 Incident (February 28, 1947)

The February 28 Incident or February 28 Massacre, also known as the 2.28 Incident (from Chinese: 二二八事件; pinyin: Èr'èrbā shìjiàn), was an anti-government uprising in Taiwan that was violently suppressed by the Kuomintang-led Republic of China government, which killed thousands of civilians beginning on February 28, 1947. The number of Taiwanese deaths is estimated to be 10,000.[1] The massacre marked the beginning of the White Terror period, in which tens of thousands more Taiwanese went missing, died, or were imprisoned. This incident is one of the most important events in Taiwan's modern history, and was a critical impetus for the Taiwan independence movement. In 1945, following the surrender of Japan at the end of World War II, the Allied Forces handed temporary administrative control of Taiwan to the Republic of China (ROC), thus ending 50 years of Japanese colonial rule. Local inhabitants became resentful of what they saw as high-handed and frequently corrupt conduct on the part of the Kuomintang (KMT) authorities, their arbitrary seizure of private property, and their economic mismanagement. The flashpoint came on February 27 in Taipei, when a dispute between a cigarette vendor and an officer of the Office of Monopoly triggered civil disorder and an open rebellion that lasted for days.[2] The violence spread and led to indiscriminate lynching of mainlanders. The uprising was violently put down by the military of the Republic of China and the island was placed under martial law. The subject was officially taboo for decades. On the anniversary of the event in 1995, President Lee Teng-hui addressed the subject publicly, a first for a Taiwanese head of state. The event is now openly discussed and details of the event have become the subject of government and academic investigation. February 28 has been designated Peace Memorial Day (和平紀念日; hépíng jìniànrì), an official public holiday. Every February 28, the president of the ROC gathers with other officials to ring a commemorative bell in memory of the victims. The president bows to family members of 2/28 victims and gives each one a certificate officially exonerating any victims previously blacklisted as enemies of the state. Monuments and memorial parks to the victims of 2/28 have been erected in a number of Taiwanese cities, including Kaohsiung and Taipei.[3][4] Taipei's former "Taipei New Park" was rededicated as 228 Peace Memorial Park and houses the National 228 Memorial Museum to commemorate the tragic incident. The museum opened on February 28, 1997, and re-opened on February 28, 2011, with new permanent exhibits.[5][6] The February 28 Incident or February 28 Massacre, also known as the 2.28 Incident (from Chinese: 二二八事件; pinyin: Èr'èrbā shìjiàn), was an anti-government uprising in Taiwan that was violently suppressed by the Kuomintang-led Republic of China government, which killed thousands of civilians beginning on February 28, 1947. The number of Taiwanese deaths is estimated to be 10,000.[1] The massacre marked the beginning of the White Terror period, in which tens of thousands more Taiwanese went missing, died, or were imprisoned. This incident is one of the most important events in Taiwan's modern history, and was a critical impetus for the Taiwan independence movement. In 1945, following the surrender of Japan at the end of World War II, the Allied Forces handed temporary administrative control of Taiwan to the Republic of China (ROC), thus ending 50 years of Japanese colonial rule. Local inhabitants became resentful of what they saw as high-handed and frequently corrupt conduct on the part of the Kuomintang (KMT) authorities, their arbitrary seizure of private property, and their economic mismanagement. The flashpoint came on February 27 in Taipei, when a dispute between a cigarette vendor and an officer of the Office of Monopoly triggered civil disorder and an open rebellion that lasted for days.[2] The violence spread and led to indiscriminate lynching of mainlanders. The uprising was violently put down by the military of the Republic of China and the island was placed under martial law. The subject was officially taboo for decades. On the anniversary of the event in 1995, President Lee Teng-hui addressed the subject publicly, a first for a Taiwanese head of state. The event is now openly discussed and details of the event have become the subject of government and academic investigation. February 28 has been designated Peace Memorial Day (和平紀念日; hépíng jìniànrì), an official public holiday. Every February 28, the president of the ROC gathers with other officials to ring a commemorative bell in memory of the victims. The president bows to family members of 2/28 victims and gives each one a certificate officially exonerating any victims previously blacklisted as enemies of the state. Monuments and memorial parks to the victims of 2/28 have been erected in a number of Taiwanese cities, including Kaohsiung and Taipei.[3][4] Taipei's former "Taipei New Park" was rededicated as 228 Peace Memorial Park and houses the National 228 Memorial Museum to commemorate the tragic incident. The museum opened on February 28, 1997, and re-opened on February 28, 2011, with new permanent exhibits.[5][6]

Northern Expedition

The Northern Expedition was a Kuomintang (KMT) military campaign, led by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, from 1926-28. Its main objective was to unify China under its own control by ending the rule of the Beiyang government as well as the local warlords. It led to the end of the Warlord Era, the reunification of China in 1928 and the establishment of the Nanjing government. The Northern Expedition, also known as the Northern March, began from the KMT's power base in Guangdong province. In 1925 the May 30 Movement announced plans for a strike and protest against western imperialism and its warlord agents in China. At the same time the First United Front between the KMT and the Communist Party of China (CPC) was questioned after the Zhongshan Warship Incident in March 1926. Subsequent events made Chiang Kai-shek the paramount military leader of the KMT. Although Chiang doubted Sun Yat-sen's policy of alliance with the Soviet Union and the CPC, he still needed aid from the Soviet Union, so he could not break up the alliance at that time. Notable military leaders and well-trained soldiers came from the Whampoa Military Academy, which was set up by Sun Yat-sen in 1924. The Academy accepted all persons regardless of party alignment. The success of the Northern Expedition can largely be attributed to both the KMT and CPC working together militarily.[2] This unison, at the time, was strongly encouraged by the Soviet Union, which wanted to see a unified China. The main targets of this expedition were three notorious and powerful warlords: Zhang Zuolin, who governed Manchuria; Wu Peifu in the Central Plain region; and Sun Chuanfang on the east coast. Advised by the famous Russian Gen. Vasily Blyukher under the pseudonym "Galen", the KMT/CPC commanders of the Expedition decided to use all its power to defeat these warlords one by one: first Wu, then Sun, and finally Zhang. On July 9, 1926,[3] Chiang gave a lecture to 100,000 soldiers of the National Revolutionary Army (NRA) in a ceremony that was the official commencement of the Northern Expedition. The NRA was set up by cadets trained in the Whampoa Military Academy; its soldiers were far better organized than the warlord armies they faced due to their military advisers and were equipped with Russian and German weapons. In addition, the NRA was regarded as a progressive force on behalf of ordinary people, who were persecuted and mistreated by warlords, and the NRA troops received a warm welcome and strong support from peasants and workers who suffered under the brutal rule of the warlords.[4] It was no surprise the NRA could march from the Pearl River area to the Yangtze River in less than six months and annihilate the main force of Wu and Sun, in addition to increasing its own forces from 100,000 to 250,000. Following the defeat of the Zhili clique, Chiang decided to purge all Communists from the Kuomintang. In the Shanghai massacre of April 12, thousands of Communists were executed or went missing, while others were arrested and imprisoned. The purge caused a split between the KMT's left and right wings. The leftists, led by Wang Jingwei in the KMT capital at Wuhan, condemned Chiang's purge. Chiang, however, subsequently established his own capital in Nanjing. As a result, the Nationalist party and its military forces were in a state of disarray during the summer of 1927. The purge gave the warlords an opportunity to rebuild their armies and counter the now weakened Kuomintang. Sun Chuanfang began to marshal his forces with his ally Xu Kun, one of China's best generals. At the same time Sun was communicating with Zhang Zuolin of Manchuria, requesting assistance of any kind in the hopes of regaining his lost territory, including Nanjing. He brought up an army of 100,000 men and arranged them around the Lower Yangtze River. His plan was to begin an all-out attack on the Nationalist forces of Chiang, Li Zongren and Bai Chongxi, drive them away from the Yangtze and Nanjing and pursue them southward back into Guangzhou, where the expedition had started. Opposing the rejuvenated warlord armies were three Kuomintang Armies, referred to as the "Route Armies": the First Route Army, north of Nanjing in Jiangsu Province; the Second Route, to the west of the First and centered on the city of Xuzhou; and the Third on the west of Xuzhou closer to Wuhan in the south, protecting against any intervention by the leftist Wuhan forces. The Nationalists were able to muster the same amount of manpower but were riven by political tensions and leadership conflicts. In addition, Sun and Xu Kun had the element of surprise on their side, for their attack was not fully expected by Chiang or his commanders. Finally, the Nationalists had stationed many of their troops north of the Yangtze in order to hold Xuzhou, leaving them exposed to the warlord armies and their impending counteroffensive. Thus, many of Chiang's troops were in exposed and isolated positions that they could not defend properly, or with purpose. The stage was set for the last great struggle of the Warlord Era. On July 24 Sun Chuanfang ordered the counterattack to begin. His army, including Xu Kun's forces, tore through the surprised Nationalist troops, resulting in the loss of Xuzhou in northern Jiangsu province. The Second Route Army, stationed in the area, was forced to withdraw south, using the Long-Hai railway as an escape route. The other Route Armies also began to retreat south toward the Yangtze as the warlord armies routed any remaining troops in their path. Chiang, who was astounded to hear that Xuzhou had fallen, sacked the army's commander, Wang Tianpei. Chiang ordered that Xuzhou be retaken, against the advice of Li Zongren, who thought it was better to withdraw south. Chiang exclaimed, "I will not return to Nanjing until Xuzhou is back in our possession." He launched his attack with the Second Route Army in August, which resulted in a devastating defeat for the Nationalists. This led to Chiang's resignation on Aug. 6 as head of the Nanjing government, prompting him to move to Shanghai, where his loyal supporters followed. Following this, Li Zongren and other military leaders evacuated the entire army to the Yangtze, with the principal goal of defending Nanjing. Li Zongren, the de facto leader of the Nanjing government, set out to negotiate a possible reconciliation between the Wuhan Government (Wang Jingwei) and Nanjing government (Chiang Kai-shek/Jiang Jieshi). The talks, however, were interrupted on Aug. 24 when Sun's troops, supported by Wuhan dissenters, attacked the warship in the Yangtze on which Li was staying. Still, the talks had succeeded in getting Wuhan to cooperate with the Nanjing government. Wang Jingwei, upon the end of negotiations, ordered the purging of all Communists in Wuhan. This sparked a counter-coup by Communist troops in Nanchang, Jiangxi Province, resulting in the deaths of 8,000 Nationalist troops, while many others fled. This chaos in Wuhan contributed to its destabilization and the strengthening of the Nanjing government.

Sino-Soviet split

The Sino-Soviet split (1960-89) was the deterioration of political and ideological relations between the neighboring states of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) during the Cold War. In the 1960s, China and the Soviet Union were the two largest communist states in the world. The doctrinal divergence derived from Chinese and Soviet national interests, and from the governments' different interpretations of Marxism-Leninism. In the 1950s and the 1960s, ideological debate between the communist parties of the USSR and China also concerned the possibility of peaceful coexistence with the capitalist West. Yet, to the Chinese public, Mao Zedong proposed a belligerent attitude towards capitalist countries, an initial rejection of peaceful coexistence, which he perceived as Marxist revisionism from the Soviet Union.[1] Furthermore, since 1956 (when Nikita Khrushchev denounced the legacy of Stalin), China and the USSR had progressively diverged about Marxist ideology, and, by 1961, when the doctrinal differences proved intractable, the Communist Party of China formally denounced the Soviet variety of communism as a product of "Revisionist Traitors".[1] The split concerned the leadership of world communism. The USSR had a network of communist parties it supported; China now created its own rival network to battle it out for local control of the left in numerous countries.[2] Lorenz M. Lüthi argues: The Sino-Soviet split was one of the key events of the Cold War, equal in importance to the construction of the Berlin Wall, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Second Vietnam War, and Sino-American rapprochement. The split helped to determine the framework of the Second Cold War in general, and influenced the course of the Second Vietnam War in particular.[3] The divide fractured the international communist movement at the time and opened the way for the warming of relations between the United States and China under Richard Nixon and Mao in 1971. Relations between China and the Soviet Union remained tense until the visit of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev to Beijing in 1989. The split was primarily caused because of two main factors: differing national interests and various interpretations of communist ideology. Origins[edit] Communist state alignments in 1980: pro-Soviet (red); pro-Chinese (yellow); and the non-aligned North Korea and Yugoslavia (black). Somalia had been pro-Soviet until 1977. Cambodia (Democratic Kampuchea) had been pro-China until 1979. A Chinese stamp depicting Mao and Stalin shaking hands following the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship in 1950 While the Communist Party of China (CPC), led by Mao Zedong, engaged in the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-45) against the Japanese Empire, while simultaneously fighting the Chinese Civil War against the Nationalist Kuomintang, led by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek (who made up the vast majority of the anti-Japanese resistance), Mao ignored much of the politico-military advice and direction from Soviet General Secretary Joseph Stalin and the Comintern, because of the practical difficulty in applying traditional Leninist revolutionary theory to China. During the Second World War (1939-45) Stalin urged Mao into a joint, anti-Japanese coalition with Chiang. After the war, Stalin advised Mao against seizing power, and to negotiate with Chiang, because Stalin had signed a Treaty of Friendship and Alliance with the Nationalists in mid-1945; Mao obeyed Stalin's advice and followed his lead, calling him "the only leader of our party". Chiang opposed the USSR's annexation of Tannu Uriankhai, a former Qing Empire province; Stalin broke the treaty requiring Soviet withdrawal from Manchuria three months after Japan's surrender, and gave Manchuria to Mao. Yang Kuisong, a Chinese historian, said that in 1945-46, during the Soviet Red Army occupation of Manchuria, Stalin commanded the USSR Red Army general Rodion Malinovsky to give Mao a huge amount of weaponry that had been spoils of war from the Imperial Japanese forces.[4] Chiang Kai-shek received no assistance during the Berlin Blockade in 1948, because the United States Air Force was putting all its efforts towards helping the people of Berlin during that time. The Americans were preoccupied in Europe and did not turn to help Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang Army in China until the Kuomintang were losing the Liaoshen, Huaihai and Pingjin Campaigns.[5] After the CCP's victory over the KMT, a Moscow visit by Mao from December 1949 to February 1950 culminated in the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance (1950), which included a $300 million low-interest loan and a 30-year military alliance. However, Mao and his supporters argued that traditional Marxism was rooted in industrialized European society and could not be applied to Asian peasant societies. In 1947, Mao gave US journalist Anna Louise Strong documents, directing her to "show them to Party leaders in the United States and Europe", but he did not think it was "necessary to take them to Moscow". Earlier, she had written the article "The Thought of Mao Tse-Tung" and the book Dawn Out of China, reporting that his intellectual accomplishment was "to change Marxism from a European to an Asiatic form... in ways of which neither Marx nor Lenin could dream", which the Soviet government banned in the USSR. Years later, at the first international communist conclave in Beijing, Mao advocate Liu Shaoqi praised the "Mao Tse-tung road" as the correct road to communist revolution, warning it was incorrect to follow any other road; moreover, he praised neither Stalin nor the Soviet communist model, as was practice. However, because of tensions over the partition of Korea, and the possibility of US military intervention there, geopolitical circumstances disallowed any overt split. During the 1950s, Soviet-guided China followed the Soviet model of centralized economic development, emphasising heavy industry, and delegating consumer goods to secondary priority; however, by the late 1950s, Mao had developed ideas for direct advances through the mobilization of China's workers. These ideas became the basis for the Great Leap Forward (1958-61). Origins[edit] Communist state alignments in 1980: pro-Soviet (red); pro-Chinese (yellow); and the non-aligned North Korea and Yugoslavia (black). Somalia had been pro-Soviet until 1977. Cambodia (Democratic Kampuchea) had been pro-China until 1979. A Chinese stamp depicting Mao and Stalin shaking hands following the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship in 1950 While the Communist Party of China (CPC), led by Mao Zedong, engaged in the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-45) against the Japanese Empire, while simultaneously fighting the Chinese Civil War against the Nationalist Kuomintang, led by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek (who made up the vast majority of the anti-Japanese resistance), Mao ignored much of the politico-military advice and direction from Soviet General Secretary Joseph Stalin and the Comintern, because of the practical difficulty in applying traditional Leninist revolutionary theory to China. During the Second World War (1939-45) Stalin urged Mao into a joint, anti-Japanese coalition with Chiang. After the war, Stalin advised Mao against seizing power, and to negotiate with Chiang, because Stalin had signed a Treaty of Friendship and Alliance with the Nationalists in mid-1945; Mao obeyed Stalin's advice and followed his lead, calling him "the only leader of our party". Chiang opposed the USSR's annexation of Tannu Uriankhai, a former Qing Empire province; Stalin broke the treaty requiring Soviet withdrawal from Manchuria three months after Japan's surrender, and gave Manchuria to Mao. Yang Kuisong, a Chinese historian, said that in 1945-46, during the Soviet Red Army occupation of Manchuria, Stalin commanded the USSR Red Army general Rodion Malinovsky to give Mao a huge amount of weaponry that had been spoils of war from the Imperial Japanese forces.[4] Chiang Kai-shek received no assistance during the Berlin Blockade in 1948, because the United States Air Force was putting all its efforts towards helping the people of Berlin during that time. The Americans were preoccupied in Europe and did not turn to help Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang Army in China until the Kuomintang were losing the Liaoshen, Huaihai and Pingjin Campaigns.[5] After the CCP's victory over the KMT, a Moscow visit by Mao from December 1949 to February 1950 culminated in the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance (1950), which included a $300 million low-interest loan and a 30-year military alliance. However, Mao and his supporters argued that traditional Marxism was rooted in industrialized European society and could not be applied to Asian peasant societies. In 1947, Mao gave US journalist Anna Louise Strong documents, directing her to "show them to Party leaders in the United States and Europe", but he did not think it was "necessary to take them to Moscow". Earlier, she had written the article "The Thought of Mao Tse-Tung" and the book Dawn Out of China, reporting that his intellectual accomplishment was "to change Marxism from a European to an Asiatic form... in ways of which neither Marx nor Lenin could dream", which the Soviet government banned in the USSR. Years later, at the first international communist conclave in Beijing, Mao advocate Liu Shaoqi praised the "Mao Tse-tung road" as the correct road to communist revolution, warning it was incorrect to follow any other road; moreover, he praised neither Stalin nor the Soviet communist model, as was practice. However, because of tensions over the partition of Korea, and the possibility of US military intervention there, geopolitical circumstances disallowed any overt split. During the 1950s, Soviet-guided China followed the Soviet model of centralized economic development, emphasising heavy industry, and delegating consumer goods to secondary priority; however, by the late 1950s, Mao had developed ideas for direct advances through the mobilization of China's workers. These ideas became the basis for the Great Leap Forward (1958-61). 1958-59 are often considered the key years in convincing Mao that the USSR was not to be trusted.[22] In 1959, Premier Khrushchev met with US President Dwight Eisenhower (1953-61) to decrease tensions with the Western world. The USSR was astonished by the Great Leap Forward,[citation needed] had renounced aid to Chinese nuclear weapons development, and refused to side with them in the Sino-Indian War (1962), by maintaining a moderate relation with India—actions offensive to Mao. Thereafter, he perceived Khrushchev as too tolerant of the West, despite the sometimes confrontational Soviet stance toward Western powers. The Chinese Communist Party believed that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was focusing too heavily on "Soviet-U.S. cooperation for the domination of the world," with actions counter to Marxism-Leninism.[23] Mao expected Khrushchev's reaction to the American U-2 spy plane incident to be much more aggressive. Khrushchev demanded an official apology at the 1960 Paris Summit from Eisenhower, who refused. Mao and the CCP took Eisenhower's brash response as an affront to all socialist countries, and the PRC responded in kind. Mass rallies were held to demand that Khrushchev take action against the American aggressors. When Khrushchev did not respond with military force, his image in China as a Communist leader was wounded. Mao and Khrushchev then argued at the Bucharest Conference of the World Communist and Workers' Parties, heatedly attacking each other's ideologies. Mao argued that Khrushchev's emphasis on material development would make the people soft and un-revolutionary, while Khrushchev said, "If we could promise the people nothing except revolution, they would scratch their heads and say 'Isn't it better to have good goulash?'"[24] Mao Zedong and Albanian leader Enver Hoxha At first, the Sino-Soviet split manifested indirectly, as criticism towards each other's client states. China denounced Yugoslavia and Tito, who had pursued a non aligned foreign policy, while the USSR denounced Enver Hoxha and the People's Socialist Republic of Albania, which had refused to abandon its pro-Stalin stance and sought its survival in alignment with China, at the peak of Khruschev's De-Stalinization agenda. Bao Sansan described the Party's message to the cadres in China, "When Khrushchev stopped Russian aid to Albania, Hoxha said to his people: 'Even if we have to eat the roots of grass to live, we won't take anything from Russia.' China is not guilty of chauvinism and immediately sent food to our brother country."[25] The USSR also offered moral support to the Tibetan rebels in their 1959 Tibetan uprising against Red China. By 1960, their mutual criticism moved out in the open, when Khrushchev and Peng Zhen had an open argument at the Romanian Communist Party congress. Premier Khrushchev insulted Chairman Mao Zedong as "a nationalist, an adventurist, and a deviationist". In turn, China's Peng Zhen called Khrushchev a Marxist revisionist, criticizing him as "patriarchal, arbitrary and tyrannical".[26] Khrushchev then denounced China with an eighty-page letter to the conference. Khrushchev materially responded to Mao by withdrawing around 1,400 Soviet experts and technicians from China, leading to the cancellation of more than 200 scientific projects intended to foster cooperation between the two nations. To Mao, the Soviet withdrawal of personnel from China justified his accusation that Khrushchev had caused not only the PRC's massive economic failures, but also the famines over the course of the Great Leap Forward. In truth, the Soviet withdrawal did little to aid or hurt the agricultural crisis; only a few Soviet experts were working on alleviating China's famine. Diplomatically, though, the damage had been done. The PRC and the USSR both still had reason to prefer unity. Mao needed to continue economic relations, to help with China's famine and its border problems with India; for his part, Khrushchev had lost significant ground in his policy of détente with the U.S. His accusations of espionage against Eisenhower and the breakdown of diplomacy at the Paris Summit had exacerbated tensions between the two superpowers and the PRC remained the USSR's closest military asset and ally.[27] In November 1960, at a congress of 81 Communist parties in Moscow, the Chinese argued with the Soviets and with most other delegations, but still compromised, wanting to avoid a formal ideological split. In October 1961, however, at the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union they again had an open confrontation.[28] In December, the USSR cut diplomatic relations with China-backed Albania, escalating the dispute from the level of political parties to that of nations. In 1962, the PRC and the USSR finally broke relations. Chairman Mao criticized Premier Khrushchev for withdrawing in the Cuban missile crisis (1962), stating that "Khrushchev has moved from adventurism to capitulationism". Khrushchev replied angrily that Mao's confrontational policies would lead to a nuclear war. At the same time, the USSR was siding with India against China in the Sino-Indian War (1962).[29] When India forcibly occupied the Portuguese enclave of Goa in 1961, Moscow lauded the action while an unimpressed Beijing declared that "India's apparent contribution to anti-imperialist struggle consists of taking on the world's smallest imperialist power." In the wake of the Cuban missile crisis, nuclear disarmament was brought to the forefront of geopolitics. To curb the production of nuclear weapons in other nations, the Soviet Union, Britain, and the U.S. signed the Limited Test Ban Treaty on August 5, 1963. At the time, China was developing its own nuclear weaponry, and Mao saw the treaty as an attempt to slow China's advancement as a superpower. He was angered that Khrushchev had once again failed to deal aggressively with the U.S. This was the final straw for Mao, and from September 1963 to July 1964, he published nine letters openly criticizing every aspect of Khrushchev's leadership. The Sino-Soviet alliance had now completely collapsed, and Mao turned to other Asian, African, and Latin American countries to develop new and stronger alliances and to further the PRC's economic and ideological redevelopment.[30] Formal ideological statements[edit] Each government followed their actions with formal ideological statements. In June 1963, the PRC published The Chinese Communist Party's Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement,[31] and the USSR replied with its Open Letter of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union;[32] these were the last formal communications between them. By 1964, Chairman Mao asserted that a counter-revolution in the USSR had re-established capitalism there; The Soviets broke relations with China, and the Warsaw Pact countries followed. After Leonid Brezhnev deposed Premier Khrushchev in October 1964, Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai travelled to Moscow, to speak with the new leaders of the USSR, Brezhnev and Alexei Kosygin. He returned disappointed to China, reporting to Mao that the Soviets remained firm. Chairman Mao denounced "Khrushchevism without Khrushchev," continuing Sino-Soviet hostility. China accused the Soviet Union of colluding with the United States. During the Glassboro Summit Conference of June 1967, between Kosygin and American president Lyndon B. Johnson, for example, Radio Peking claimed that the two men discussed "a great conspiracy on a worldwide basis ... criminally selling the rights of the revolution of Vietnam people, Arabs, as well as Asian, African, and Latin-American peoples to U.S. imperialists."[33] This was a significant change in power dynamics, with subtle, lasting effects on American-Soviet relations.

Taiwan Relations Act (1979)

The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA; Pub.L. 96-8, 93 Stat. 14, enacted April 10, 1979; H.R. 2479) is an act of the United States Congress. Since the recognition of the People's Republic of China, the Act has defined the substantial but non-diplomatic relations between the people of the United States and the people on Taiwan. In 1978, China regarded itself as in a "united front" with the U.S., Japan, and western Europe against the Soviets and thus established diplomatic relations with the United States in 1979, supported American operations in Communist Afghanistan, and leveled a punitive expedition against Vietnam, America's main antagonist in Southeast Asia. In exchange, the United States abrogated its mutual defense treaty with the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan. The ROC government mobilized its ethnic lobby in the United States to agitate Congress for the swift passage of an American security guarantee for the island. Taiwan could appeal to members of Congress on many fronts -- anti-communist China sentiment, a shared wartime history with the ROC, Beijing's human rights violations and its curtailment of religious freedoms, etc.[1][2] Senator Barry Goldwater and other members of the United States Congress challenged the right of President Jimmy Carter to unilaterally nullify the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty, which the United States had signed with the ROC in December 1954 and was ratified by the U.S. Senate in February 1955. Goldwater and his co-filers of the Supreme Court case Goldwater v. Carter argued that the President required Senate approval to take such an action of termination, under Article II, Section II of the U.S. Constitution, and that, by not doing so, President Carter had acted beyond the powers of his office.[3] The Act was passed by both chambers of the United States Congress and signed by President Jimmy Carter in 1979 after the breaking of relations between the United States and the Republic of China on Taiwan. Congress rejected the State Department's proposed draft and replaced it with language that has remained in effect since 1979. The Carter Administration signed the Taiwan Relations Act to maintain commercial, cultural, and other relations through the unofficial relations in the form of a nonprofit corporation incorporated under the laws of the District of Columbia—the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT)−without official government representation and without formal diplomatic relations.[4] The PRC aligned itself with the Third World countries rather than with the United States or the Soviet Union, engaging itself in various movements such as nuclear non-proliferation that would allow it to critique the superpowers.[1] In the August 17th communique of 1982, the United States agreed to reduce arms sales to Taiwan. However, it also declared that it would not formally recognize PRC's sovereignty over Taiwan, as part of the Six Assurances offered to Taipei in 1982. In the late 1990s, the United States Congress passed a non-binding resolution stating that relations between Taiwan and the United States will be honored through the TRA first. This resolution, which puts greater weight on the TRA's value over that of the three communiques, was signed by President Bill Clinton as well.[6][7] Both chambers of Congress have reaffirmed the importance of the Taiwan Relations Act repeatedly.[8] A July 2007 Congressional Research Service Report confirmed that U.S. policy has not recognized the PRC's sovereignty over Taiwan.[9] The PRC continues to view the Taiwan Relations Act as "an unwarranted intrusion by the United States into the internal affairs of China".[10] The United States continued supplying Taiwan with armaments and China continued to protest.[11] On May 19, 2016, one day before Tsai Ing-wen assumed the democratically elected presidency of the Republic of China, U.S. Senators Marco Rubio (R-FL), a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and Bob Menendez (D-NJ), former chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and co-chair of the Senate Taiwan Caucus, introduced a concurrent resolution reaffirming the Taiwan Relations Act and the "Six Assurances" as cornerstones of United States-Taiwan relations.[12][13][14] The 2016 Republican National Convention in the Republican Party Platform states "Our relations will continue to be based upon the provisions of the Taiwan Relations Act, and we affirm the Six Assurances given to Taiwan in 1982 by President Reagan. We oppose any unilateral steps by either side to alter the status quo in the Taiwan Straits on the principle that all issues regarding the island's future must be resolved peacefully, through dialogue, and be agreeable to the people of Taiwan. If China were to violate those principles, the United States, in accord with the Taiwan Relations Act, will help Taiwan defend itself... As a loyal friend of America, Taiwan has merited our strong support, including free trade agreement status, the timely sale of defensive arms including technology to build diesel submarines..."[15]

First Tian'anmen Incident (1976)

The Tiananmen Incident took place on April 5, 1976 at Tiananmen Square in Beijing, China. The incident occurred on the traditional day of mourning, the Qingming Festival, after the Nanjing Incident, and was triggered by the death of Premier Zhou Enlai earlier that year. Some people strongly disapproved of the removal of the displays of mourning, and began gathering in the Square to protest against the central authorities, then largely under the auspices of the Gang of Four, who ordered the Square to be cleared. The event was labeled as counterrevolutionary immediately after its occurrence by the Communist Party's Central Committee and served as a gateway to the dismissal and house arrest of then-Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping, who was accused of planning the event. The Central Committee's decision on the event was reversed after the Cultural Revolution ended, as it would later be officially hailed as a display of patriotism. China's leaders, namely Jiang Qing (Mao Zedong's wife) and Mao Yuanxin, saw the popular gathering as a threat to the forward movement of the Cultural Revolution. They consulted with Party Chairman Mao Zedong, claiming these people to be "capitalist roaders" who were hitting back at the Proletarian Revolution. Action was taken on the night of April 5, when the number of mourners were a few thousand. Controlled by Jiang Qing and the mayor of Beijing, the militia encircled the area, then went in with clubs and batons to drive the people away from the monument. Four thousand were arrested. The media subsequently linked the event to Deng Xiaoping, then carrying out the daily duties of the Premier. It was rumored that the Gang of Four had become apprehensive of Deng's influence and thus attempted his removal. Deng was an ally of Zhou Enlai, and was placed under house arrest in Guangzhou. After Mao's death and the fall of the Gang of Four in October 1976, Party leaders rehabilitated Deng and brought him back to Beijing, where he emerged as China's Paramount Leader in 1978.

People's communes

The people's commune (Chinese: 人民公社; pinyin: rénmín gōngshè) was the highest of three administrative levels in rural areas of the People's Republic of China during the period from 1958 to 1983 when they were replaced by townships. Communes, the largest collective units, were divided in turn into production brigades and production teams. The communes had governmental, political, and economic functions. The People's commune was born during the Great Leap Forward, when Mao Zedong had a vision of surpassing the United Kingdom and the United States in a short period of time in terms of steel production. Mao also wanted to mobilize peasants to undertake huge water projects during the winter slack seasons in order to improve agricultural productivity. Each commune was a combination of smaller farm collectives and consisted of 4,000-5,000 households. Larger communes could consist of up to 20,000 households. The Peoples' commune was made official state policy in 1958 after Mao Zedong visited an unofficial commune in Henan. In order to put this radical plan into action, Mao used the Anti-Rightist Movement to silence his political opponents so he faced virtually no opposition when he finally implemented the People's communes. Using various propaganda campaigns, Mao gained the initial support of the peasants. The People's communes were formed in support of the Great Leap Forward campaign and remains an inseparable part of the campaign, as shown in the Three Red Banners propaganda poster. Commune life[edit] In the commune, everything was shared. Private kitchens became redundant, and everything in the private kitchen, such as tables, chairs, cooking utensils and pans were all contributed to the commune's kitchen. Private cooking was banned[1] and replaced by communal dining. Everything originally owned by the households, private animals, stored grains and other food items were also contributed to the commune. They were put to different uses as assigned by the commune. All farming activities were to be centrally assigned by cadres every morning. Even money was outlawed in some places.[citation needed] Everybody in the commune were assigned jobs by their commune leaders. The communes exercised management and control of all rural resources such as labor and land. Because of governmental control over resources and bad weather in 1958, 1959 and 1960 famine became widespread amongst the countryside, with many food resources being exported to urban areas.[2] 1958 People's commune free for all kitchen, where members were supposed to be able to eat all they can eat.

Zeng Guofan

Zeng Guofan (Chinese: 曾國藩 pinyin: Zēng Guófān; 26 November 1811 - 12 March 1872), birth name Zeng Zicheng, courtesy name Bohan, was a Chinese statesman, military general, and Confucian scholar of the late Qing dynasty. He is best known for raising and organizing the Xiang Army to aid the Qing military in suppressing the Taiping Rebellion and restoring the stability of the Qing Empire. Along with other prominent figures such as Zuo Zongtang and Li Hongzhang, Zeng set the scene for the Tongzhi Restoration, an attempt to arrest the decline of the Qing dynasty.[1] Zeng was known for his strategic perception, administrative skill and noble personality on Confucianist practice, but also for the ruthlessness of his repression of the rebellion. He also exemplified loyalty in an era of chaos, but is also regarded as a precursor to the rise of warlordism. In 1853, other triumphs led to Zeng being made a baturu, and to his being decorated with a yellow riding-jacket. Meanwhile, in his absence, the rebels retook Wuchang and burnt the protecting fleet. The tide quickly turned, however, and Zeng succeeded in clearing the country round Poyang Lake, and subsequently in ridding Jiangsu Province of the rebels. His father died in 1857, and after a brief mourning he was ordered to take supreme command in Zhejiang Province, and to cooperate with the governor of Fujian Province in defence. Subsequently, the rebels were driven westwards, and Zeng would have started in pursuit had he not been called on to clear Anhui Province of rebel forces. In 1860, he was appointed Viceroy of Liangjiang (covering Jiangxi, Anhui and Jiangsu provinces) and Imperial Commissioner (overseeing military affairs). At this time, and for some time previously, he had been fortunate in having the active support of Zuo Zongtang, who at a later period recovered Kashgar for the Qing Empire, and of Li Hongzhang. Like all true leaders of men, Zeng knew how to reward good service, and when occasion offered he appointed the former to the governorship of Zhejiang and the latter to that of Jiangsu. In 1862, he was appointed Assistant Grand Secretary of State. At this time, the Qing imperial forces, assisted by the Ever Victorious Army, had checked the progress of the Taiping Rebellion, and Zeng was able to carry out a scheme which he had long formulated of besieging Tianjing, the rebel headquarters. While Charles George Gordon of the Ever Victorious Army was clearing the cities on the lower waters of the Yangtze River with support from Li Hongzhang, Zeng drew closer his besieging lines around the city. In July 1864, Tianjing fell into Zeng's hands, and he was rewarded with the noble peerage "First Class Marquis Yiyong" (一等毅勇侯) and the right to wear the double-eyed peacock's feather. He, Zuo Zongtang and Li Hongzhang were collectively called "Zeng, Zuo, Li" - the military leaders who suppressed the Taiping Rebellion. After the suppression of the rebellion, the Nian Rebellion, closely related to the former Taiping movement, broke out in Shandong Province, and Zeng was sent to quell it. Success did not, however, always attend him on this campaign, and by imperial order he was relieved of his command by Li Hongzhang, who in the same way succeeded him as the Viceroy of Zhili, where, after the Tianjin Massacre (1870), Zeng failed to carry out the wishes of the imperial court. Instead of the desired policy towards foreigners, Zeng took on a more diplomatic stance. After this rebuff, he retired to his viceroyalty at Nanjing, where he died in 1872 mysteriously in Hong Xiuquan's former mansion.