International Relations Comprehensive

Jensen 2006

Question: What is the effect of democracy on FDI inflows? Summary: Political institutions, rather than government fiscal policy, are the central determinants of FDI inflows. Democracies attract higher levels of FDI than authoritarian regimes. Why? Causal mechanisms: Democracies provide valuable information (transparency and free press); and offer representation (direct and indirect i.e. lobbying) to MNCs to influence policy. Also, ensure higher levels of credibility because of veto points that stop policies hostile to MNC interest. In sum, these mechanism reduce the political risk for MNCs, i.e. solve time inconsistency problem. Political federalism attracts MNCs because higher levels of political stability -- i.e. less likely friendly MNC policies will be reversed. Why? Federal institutions enable governments to provide credible commitments to MNCs because there are veto players who can block hostile changes to the status quo. Challenges race to the bottom thesis: • Race to the bottom thesis: Because MNCs invest in countries with lower levels of govt's spending and taxation, gov'ts compete with each other, forcing pol leaders to decide b/w fiscal policy autonomy and attracting FDI. • Problem: assumptions of perfect market assumption and high levels of capital mobility • Empirics: weak relationship between capital mobility and gov't spending/taxation. • Implication: MNCs investment decisions does NOT challenge gov't fiscal policy autonomy Criticism: Focus on OECD countries

Dietrich 2016

Question: Why are some OECD donors more likely to use government bypass tactics in countries with poor governance, whereas others prefer to stick with government-to-government aid? Summary: Donor differences in aid delivery preferences are a function of beliefs about the role of the state in public service delivery (market-oriented vs. statist) and governance characteristics in recipient countries. Find donors with political economies that emphasize the market in goods and service delivery more likely to bypass governments with poor governance than than their counterparts from political economies that emphasize a stronger role of the state in goods provision. That is, economic ideology (market-oriented or statist) influences aid delivery preferences.

Murray 2010

Question: Why did Germany pursue naval expansion at the turn of the twentieth century? Short Summary: Germany pursued naval expansion at the turn of the 20th century b/c of its social desire to be recognized by others as a great power -- not to maximize security. Argues for expanding motivational assumptions regarding states -- not just physical security, but also social recognition. Sometimes they pursue social recognition, at the expense of physical security. Detailed Summary: At turn of 20th century, Germany reoriented its foreign policy to challenge British world dominance, which included building a powerful naval to challenge British naval dominance. Example of "sub-opitmal arming" b/c it harmed Germany's security (diverted resources away from continental security and signalled revisionist intentions to Britain, France, and Russia which increased likelihood of war). Argues that Germany's decision to challenge British naval hegemony motivated by its social desire to be recognized as having great power status -- not strategic imperative to maximize power due to anarchy. Deviant case for realists: • Germany should've focused on continental security • States seek physical security, and pursue material power due to external pressures of anarchy (uncertainty, self-help, etc.) Explanation requires broadening motives that drive state behavior: social recognition. • States desire social recognition b/c it contributes to their identity stability. Under anarchy, securing identity is full of insecurity b/c formed through social interaction and subject to unpredictable responses of other states. • Social insecurity → material competition • Murray argues states acquire material power to secure their identity. Material competition that characterizes power politics is a manifestation of a social struggle to secure state identity -- i.e. power maximization is a constituent part of identity construction. Thus, material practices are expressions of identity, not security imperatives induced by external structure.

Goodman and Pauly 1993

Question: Why did industrialized states liberalize between the late 1970s and early 1990s? And why did some states eliminate capital controls more rapidly than others? Summary: Systemic economic int'l pressure → national policy-making by changing and privileging interests of firms, once embedded in policy difficult to move back Movement away from controls not a result of common norms or ideas about benefits of unfettered capital mobility, nor power of U.S. Instead, driven by expansion of international financial markets and globalization of production, which made it easier for firms to pursue strategies of evasion and exit: • Evasion - evade capital controls by using subsidiaries to raise or lend funds on foreign markets • Exit - escape controls by transferring activities abroad This constrained government policy choices: Domestic savings decrease if MNCs move operations offshore. Gov'ts facing capital inflows liberalized sooner than those facing capital outflows. Why? Asymmetric impact on foreign exchange reserves: • Countries facing outflows: Outflows weaken exchange rates and deplete foreign reserves -- govts adopt controls before reserves depleted • Countries facing Inflows -- reserve position not threatened, easier to abandon controls

Reinhart and Rogoff 2009

Question: Why do financial crises recur? Why do policymakers fail to see the warning signs of crises? Summary: Debt accumulation poses systemic risk for financial crises b/c economy becomes vulnerable to crises of confidence. Demonstrate that financial meltdowns typically follow real-estate bubbles, rising indebtedness and gaping current-account deficits. Why do policymakers fail to see the warning signs? This-Time-Is-Different Syndrome: Firmly held belief that financial crises are things that happen to other people in other countries, not us. The current boom, unlike the many booms that preceded catastrophic collapses in the past, is built on sound fundamentals, structural reforms, technological innovation, and good policy. They conclude by arguing for international financial regulatory institution -- promote transparency with respect of government indebtedness and coordinate financial regulation. Types of financial crises: • external debt crises (gov't defaults on its external or domestic debt obligations or both) - more for poor countries • banking crises (banking sector becomes insolvent after heavy investment losses, banking panics, or both) - for poor and rich countries • currency crashes (exchange rate crises in which country's currency falls precipitously) inflation crises (20% or higher)

Mearsheimer 2001

Rational and unitary Anarchy Seeking security > power Uncertainity Offensive capability Need to contain China! It can't rise peacefully - will lead to conflict with the United States. Bipolarity is more stable than multipolarity. No more great power war is a naïve claim. Rare to find status quo states in international system. Non-security goals only if it doesn't conflict with Balance of power logic. Great powers will not work to promote world order for its own stake; could also be a bi-product of self-interested behavior. Relative gains are great than absolute gains and concerns with cheating.

Ikenberry 2003

Unilateralism is not inevitable feature of unipolarity. Bush administration's unilateralis is merely an attack on specific types of multilateralism, not the foundations of it. Circumstances that led to U.S. multilateralism still exist Functional for cooperation Hegemonic power management Externalize internal U.S. rules of law Types: system, ordering, contract Sources: system, institutional, domestic, agentic. No general decline of U.S. multilateralism, just massive proliferation of available contracts U.S. power allows it to resist entanglements Shifting power divergent interests between the U.S. and the rest.

Hiscox 2002

Unlike Rogowski (1989) who focuses on factor abundance, Hiscox (2002) concentrates on factor mobility to explain domestic political coalitions. Extent to which factors of production are mobile between industries affect the types of political coalitions that form in trade politics. • High factor mobility → class coalitions are more likely and stronger as class-based parties and peak associates are more unified on trade. • Low factor mobility → industry coalitions are more likely and stronger, as industry lobby groups take a more active role in policy-making. Historical evidence: • Early industrialization is marked by higher mobility, whereas later industrialization marked by lower mobility. • post-Civil War to 1950's: high factor mobility, strong class coalitions (protectionist business and labor alliance against free-trading rural constituency) • post-1950's: low mobility, weak class coalition, strong industry lobbying Criticism • Insufficient attention to role of government policy (e.g. trade sanctions) in influencing coalitions

Waltz 1979

Waltz 1979: Theory of International Politics Two levels: states and the international system. Reductionist versus systemic theory. Balance of power system: bipolarity (more stable) versus multipolar (less stable) No rational assumption. State system in oligopolistic system. "price takers" who get sselected out. States seek security. Interdependence == mutual vulnerability.

Kydd and Walter 2006

What types of goals do terrorists have and what do they use to pursue these goals? 5 goals: (1) attrition; (2) intimidation; (3) provocation; (4) spoiling; (5) outbidding. Attrition: persuade the enemy that the terrorists are strong enough to impose considerable costs if the enemy continues a particular policy. Intimidation: convince the population that the terrorists are strong enough to punish disobedience and that the government is too weak to stop them, so that people behave as the terrorists wish. A Provocation: attempt to induce the enemy to respond to terrorism with indiscriminate violence, which radicalizes the population and moves them to support the terrorists. Spoilers: persuade the enemy that moderates on the terrorists' side are weak and untrustworthy, thus undermining attempts to reach a peace settlement. Outbidding: use violence to convince the public that the terrorists have greater resolve to fight the enemy than rival groups, and therefore are worthy of support.

Schultz 2005

When threat is low but sustained, cooperation is more likely to be initiated by a moderate hawk - moderate from a hawkish party. While dovish leaders are better at eliciting cooperation in the short run, mutual cooperation is most likely to endure if it is initiated by a hawk.

Sil and Katzenstein 2010

While paradigm bound research has generated powerful insights in IR, it has fostered tunnel-vision that hinders program and widens the chasm between theory and policy. --there needs to be more pragamatic and eclectic style of research (Connect to Hemmer and Katzenstein - NATO in Asia)

Chiozza and Goemans 2011

Why do leaders decide to go to war? The decision to initiate war is largely based on a political leader's calculations about their fate once they leave public office Regular (peaceful) means Irregular (forcible) means Those who fear losing by forcible means are more likely to fight or gamble for survival through war (potential gains are high)

Keohane 1984

Why do states cooperate under anarchy? • Assumes that states are rational egoists - they seek wealth and security. States build international regimes in order to promote mutually beneficial cooperation. International regimes (clusters of principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures) reduce transaction costs for states, alleviate problems of asymmetrical information, and limit the degree of uncertainty that members of the regime face in evaluating each others' policies. • Note: Information is a key variable that reduces uncertainty. Why do states comply with agreements? • Despite lack of enforcement of regimes, two reasons for compliance: o States value the institution enough to cooperate even when they prefer not to (in a single instance) so as to maintain the institution. o States know that failure to comply now may lead to retaliation by others playing tit-for-tat. Moreover, states involved in iterated interactions worry about reputation, as it affects opportunities for future cooperation. All we need assume for these mechanisms to work is that (a) states value future interactions and (b) states keep track of who reneges (they monitor one another). Do they affect state behavior? • Moreover, regimes exert influence on state policies by changing the costs and benefits of alternative actions. Thus, they do not override self-interest, but rather affect calculations of self-interest. Is hegemony necessary for cooperation under anarchy to occur? • Despite "state of war," anarchy, and decline of U.S. hegemony, cooperation persists. Although hegemony can facilitate cooperation, it is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for cooperation. Common interests also insufficient, as they can lead to cooperation and discord. For cooperation to occur, there must be the possibility for mutual gain and institutions that reduce uncertainty and limit asymmetries in information. • Challenges hegemonic stability theory

Hopf 1998

Why is IR skeptical? Anti-positivist Difficult reconciling with the theoretical distinctiveness of normal science Failure to advance alternative research progress Conventional constructivism Actors/structures are mutually constitutive Anarchy an imagined community Identities/interests ensure predictability Power of practice - discursive reinforcement and giving meaning to social practice Change in World Politics CRITICAL Constructivism - criticism of conventional constructivism because it shares methods and epistemology with rationalism There is no account of how identities change, nor how they are created. Research agenda - shared with rationalism but are obviously rooted in shared ideas. Democratic peace Security dilemma Neoliberal cooperation Balance of threat. Constructivism is an approach.

Eichengreen 1996

Why was the gold standard stable during pre-WWI period? Not British hegemony, but credibility of the official commitment to gold and international cooperation: the credibility induced financial capital to flow in stabilizing directions, buttressing economic stability; the cooperation signaled that support for the gold standard in times of crisis transcended the resources any one country could bring to bear. WWI eroded credibility of official commitment and international cooperation. These factors, along which the constraining effects of the gold standard on policymaking, led to Great Depression. More specifically, gold standard of the 1920s heightened fragility of the international financial system, transmitted and magnified shock from US to the rest of the world, and prevented policymakers from averting bank failures and containing the spread of financial panic. Recovery possible only after abandoning the gold standard. • Responds to hegemonic stability theory, Kindleberger's great depression, conventional wisdom that assumes that the gold standard was a source of stability. • The Gold Standard and the 'bad' ideas that supported it were the principal threat to financial stability and economic prosperity between the wars. • Contrary to the conventional wisdom which associates the Gold Standard with stability, Eichengreen argues that the gold standard and its widespread linkage of domestic and international economies led to the Depression. He claims that the stable pre-war gold standard was a decentralized and multipolar system, not the result of British hegemony. The functioning of the gold standard depended on 1. Credibility, and 2. Cooperation. • The Gold Standard acted as both an institution and an ethos-- recovery from the Great Depression meant abandoning both in order t depreciate currency. • Eichengreen claims that durable cooperation is most likely when the balance of economic power is multipolar • Credibility and Cooperation: • Eichengreen defines credibility as the confidence invested by the public in the government's commitment to a policy. In the prewar period, there was no doubt that the authorities would do anything necessary to maintain the convertibility of currency to gold. This commitment was credible because international and overlapping interests made international cooperation reliable. When the particular pre war constellation of political power changed, the gold standard was no longer credible and cooperation was not possible. What changed? i.The increased role of unionization raised the costs of unemployment and the costs of adjustments to maintain the Gold Standard became more contested. When employment and balance of payments clashed, it was no longer clear as to which one would dominate. ii. The security competition of the interwar years made international politics more difficult to maneuvre iii.States faced incompatible conceptual frameworks over how to reconstruct the international monetary system

Oye 1985

cooperation when cc>DD and CD> DC Three important factors 1) Payoff structure: c not applicable to deadlock or anarchy. But to PD and SH; only once in chicken Play helps depends on shadow of the future - magnitude of payoffs matter Can change payoff structure Unilaterally - build weapons/defense Bilaterally - issue linkage Multilaterally - institutions, treats, information, norms 2) Iteration - shadow of the future Improves prospects for cooperation in PD/SH Effectiveness of tit for tat punishment and detection if possible when one side reneges. 3) Number of Players with increase in numbers Increasing transaction and information costs vary Multilateral institutions help. Increasing chances of cooperation with repeated interactions which reward cooperation and punishes defection. Alters payoff structures.

Waltz 1959

3 images 1. Individuals/human nature 2. States, domestic political structures 3. International system - anarchy 1 and 2 are proxy causes for war, but 3 is what makes it possible. 1 and 2 important but highly specific to time and place. Force as a means for achieving ends.

Allison 1969

3 models which might correctly explain what happened during the Cuban Missile crisis. Model 1: the state as unitary rational actors to make decision (rational policy paradigm) • Views states as black boxes and sees the actions of those states as the consequences of innumerable and often conflict smaller actions by individuals at various levels of bureaucratic organization. Basic unit of analysis in policy as national choice. A stable nuclear balance reduces the likelihood of a nuclear attack. A stable nuclear balance increases the probability of a limited war. Model II: Organizational Process Model Sees leaders of organizations as players in their own right. Policy is apolitical and emerges from compromise, coalition, competition, and confusion. Important government decisions - collages of individual acts, outcomes of major/minor games or foul ups.

Lieber 2000

Central concept of offense-defense theory -- balance of technology -- is deductively and empirically flawed. Looks at emergence of railroads, innovation of the tank, and artillery and small arms revolution. Perceptions of offense/defense balance have little effect on likelihood of war.

Abdelal 2006

Content - social goals purpose, relational comparison (what identity is), cognitive world views model, constitutive norms Contestation - degree of agreement over content of the shared category Methods - surveys, experiments, text analysis, discourse analysis, mapping.

McDermott 2015

Critical review of literature linking gender to violence, saying literature is sprawling and not in conversation with itself. Literature divided on ontological basis for gendered motivations for fighting. Social versus biological factors. The author privileges a biological approach. Critique: methodological gamble?

Renshon 2016

Demonstrates how international conflict can help a state elevate its status. Status deficits associated with increased likelihood of war. New methodology status and for networks, focusing on community detection algorithms. Critique: measure of status is problematic.

Beckley 2015

Does U.S. extensive defense pacts, entangle it conflicts it would rather avoid? Answer: No. United States builds in "wiggle room" or "freedom of action" that enables it avoid conflicts that are contrary to its nationalist interests. Criticism: How is national interest being defined?

Sagan 1996/1997

Domestic politics model envisions nuclear weapons as political tools to advance parochial domestic/bureaucratic interests. Security model: build nukes to increase national security against foreign threats. Norms model: under which nukes decisions are made because weapons acquisition/restraint provides a normative symbol of modernity and identity.

Schultz 1999

Effects of democratic institutions on international crises - increases likelihood of states reciprocating threats against them. Institutions: democracies are constrained, costs of war are high: threats are less credible. Information: democracies are more constrained: only make threats they will follow through (audience costs) - targets less likely to reciprocate. Finds support for the information mechanism.

Biddle 2004

Explanation for why states fail or succeed in mid-to-high intensity wars. Looks at previously overlooked dimension of power capabilities: in the modern system of force employment, a non-material military doctrine of combined arms maneuver -- is a powerful determinant of capability Why? Modern firepower makes arms vulnerable, so they militaries need to focus on protection, suppression, and combined arms maneuver (techniques used against German storm troop tactics).

Kindleberger 1978

Financial manias are usually set off by a change in expectations or "displacement" often caused by some kind of innovation. That innovation then generates over trading and the emergence of a bubble driven by a kind of excessive optimism and heard behavior. When the bubble eventually bursts, panic ensues.

Kindleberger 2000

Financial manias set off by a change in expectations or "displacement," often caused by some kind of innovation. That innovation generates overtrading and the emergence of a bubble driven by excessive optimism and herd behavior. Bubble bursts, panic ensues.

Gyrnaviski 2014

IR scholarship often assumes shared knowledge and understandings leads to cooperation, but this book argues that actually False Intersubjective Beliefs (FIBs) have facilitated cooperation. It also makes argument for IR to develop its own approach that is distinct from sociological approaches. Case: U.S. Soviet Detente. Critique: When falsity of beliefs is uncovered, how fast does it unravel?

Meger 2016

IR scholarship treating sexual violence (rape) as exceptional phenomenon in war Scholarship, policy, and advocacy groups do this. It fetishizes sexual violence, decontextualizing it and homogenizing sexual violence. distracts from the environments that enable these forms of gender discrimination to occur in the first place.

Morrison 2012

--Individuals matter! Role of intellectuals Adam Smith persuades Earl of Schelburne. - Britain opened up economy (trade) in 1780s in multipolar system which theories would predict would lead to increasing vulnerability and competition/protectionism. Argues against HST

Kirshner 2008

1. Globalization in aggregate, and on average tends to reduce the autonomy and capacity of states. In some ways states may find their powers enhanced 2. Because globalization affects the relative capacities of states differently it affects the Balance of Power between states 3. The US finds its own autonomy encroached upon, and challenged because of globalization

Poznansky 2015

Responding to criticism of democratic peace from covert war literature. Decisions based on perceptions of whether the other country will remain a democracy: democratic stasis -- continuing democratic peace. Democratic decay, restraints go away. Two types of interventions: democracy promotion and forcible regime change. Democracy promotion of decay moderate, forcible regime change if decay looks extreme. Critique: Cold War geopolitical logic or perceptions of democracy driving state behavior?

Wright 2009

• Dictators with large distributional coalitions who have a good chance of winning fair elections tend to respond to aid by democratizing. • In contrast, aid helps dictators with the smallest distributional coalitions to hang on to power. • Wright argues that aid is not always inimical to democratization. The conventional wisdom thus far has been that aid keeps dictators in power. Dictators who would fail without the aid are thus strengthened by foreign aid. This article challenges that core claim.

Simone and Wright 2016

• Economic aid increases the likelihood of transition to multiparty politics. Democracy aid furthers democratic consolidation and reduces the incidence of multiparty failure and electoral misconduct • The article looks at sub-Saharan Africa, where half of all the democratic transitions in the world between 1989 and 2008 occurred. • Two mechanisms are examined i. When donors attach democracy promotion conditions to economic aid. Result: When this happens, this is a catalyst to democracy promotion ii. When Donors directly invest in democracy promotion through activities aimed at strengthening governance institutions and civil society Result: When this happens there is a stabilizing effect on multiparty regimes and decrease in the incidence of electoral misconduct • There is no evidence that funding the opposition helps in the democratization process. Thus, government-led political reform is desirable.

Bennet and Stam 2003

• Even though new explanations and descriptions of inter-state war appear frequently, "new ideas rarely supersede" existing ideas. For them, there is no single theory which is a "dominant predictor of international conflict" with a high predictive power. • They suggest that theories looking for any single explanatory variable is most likely misguided as there are a multitude of explanatory variables that have statistically significant, however, substantively weak associations with international conflict • They call for methodological pluralism through multiple perspectives and levels of analyses

Neumayer and De Soysa 2011

• Higher women's economic and social rights in foreign countries lead to a spillover into better rights in the laggard states when they are connected by trade and FDI • Trade and investment linkages perpetuate empowerment • Positive effect of globalization on women's rights (States driven paper---no mechanisms really)

Kirshner 2000

• Kirshner (2000) - rational war can occur with complete information b/c experts can rationally come to different expected outcomes assessing the exact same information (football analogy); and relevant information unknowable in context of war (e.g. will to fight) (Aron, 1966) • Response to Fearon's article and strikes at the core of the argument about private information. Kirshner argues that "not only rational leaders, but rational experts" can look at the same information and come to different conclusions about the outcomes expected. He uses the useful analogy of a football game and argues that if experts, in the presence of such large sets of information about how actors/adversaries behave when they meet each other, still get their predictions about expected outcomes wrong, then in international relations given the "dramatically smaller amount of information" whether the information is private or not makes no difference. • He really gets at the rational actor assumption that Fearon makes. In essence saying that actors process similar information differently. So, assuming that there is one rational path in presence of full information is incorrect.

Ross 2008

• Oil, not Islam is responsible for the lack of gender equality in the Middle East. Oil production reduces the number of women in the labor force which in turn reduces their political influence. This leaves oil producing states with strong patriarchal norms. • When the labor force is segregated by gender, women have little political power • Petroleum Perpetuates Patriarchy - This can be seen as a part of the resource curse literature • The conventional explanation explaining the low status of women in the Middle East has been Islam. This article shows that is not the case. Critique: The problem is only visible in the middle east. Why isn't the same visible in advanced oil rich economies like Norway?

Eastin and Prakash 2013

• Question: Under what conditions does economic development improve gender? • There is a Gender Kuznets Curve. Effects of economic development on gender has a curvilinear relationship and depends on the particular developmental phase. There are three phases. In the first phase economic development improves gender equality. In the second phase, equality plateaus out/declines slightly. In the third phase, it rises again. • This is important, because development alone does not improve gender equality. This is derived from analysis of a panel with 146 countries from 1980-2005 • As the economy liberalizes, there is greater women's participation in the labor force. However, deep patriarchal norms can lead to a perverse pushback, thus leading to a plateau in the second phase

Ikenberry 1998/1999

• The Persistence of stable and cooperative relations among advanced industrial democracies after the Cold War is puzzling. Especially because at the end of the cold war, there were dramatic shifts in the global distribution of power. • Neorealism expects that with the disappearance of the Soviet Union, there would be a breakdown of cooperation and alliances. • This is explained by the fact that: i. There is a legitimate order in place, where the US has exercised Strategic Restraint to reassure weaker states that they will not be abandoned or dominated ii. Strategic restraint is possible because of the binding effects of international institutions iii. The post war order has been acceptable to Europe and Japan because American hegemony is built around liber features iv. The western order has become more stable over time and embedded in the wider structures of politics and society

Deudney and Ikenberry 1999

Sources of the liberal international order U.S. strategic restraint; security provisions Multilateral institutions - partial sovereignty Economic openness Order is robust to Cold War

Fearon and Wendt (2002)

Stymie new debate (Katzenstein et al. 2008 suggestion) of rationalism versus constructivism. Argument: Rational Choice theories can use constructivist explanations for identity and preferences. critique: maybe some forms of constructivism are more compatible with rationalism than others

Gaddis 1996

Theory creating is better than hypothesis testing; although both are important. There is a trend towards testing of well-verified empirical regularities, but less effort toward theory building. Privileging hypothesis testing is mistaken, because there is insufficient attention to theory, leading to mis-specified models and misleading measures and key concepts. Also, poor quality of data make it less likely to creat cumulative knowledge. This shift closely related to professionalization. It also widens the gap between the ivory tower and the real word. Theory should be a simplified picture of reality that explains how the world works in a particular domain. They focus on the most important factors to tell a causal story, but stories must reflect reality. Three ways to test a theory: -- 1) inspect its logical soundness: logical consistency. 2) covariation: hypothesis testing - causal inferences in correlation analysis to tease out the independent causal effects of A on B; 3) Process tracing: to determine whether a theory's causal mechanisms are actually operating in the real world in the manner it depicts. The virtues of theory. 1) Provide overarching frameworks: "the big" picture of what is happening in myriad realms of activity. Provides economical explanations for a wide array of phenomena. 2) Revolutionize thinking: can transform our understanding of important issues and explain puzzles that previously made little sense 3) Enables prediction 4) Essential for diagnosing policy problems and making policy decisions 5) Crucial for effective policy evaluation - identifies indicators we can use to determine whether a particular policy is working 6) Our theory informs retrodiction: enables to look at the past I different ways and better understand our history. 7) Is especially helpful when facts are sparse 8) Theory is critical for conducting valid empirical testing - hypothesis testing depends on having well-developed theory.

Mearsheimer and Walt 2013

Theory creating is better than hypothesis testing; although both are important. There is a trend towards testing of well-verified empirical regularities, but less effort toward theory building. Privileging hypothesis testing is mistaken, because there is insufficient attention to theory, leading to mis-specified models and misleading measures and key concepts. Also, poor quality of data make it less likely to creat cumulative knowledge. This shift closely related to professionalization. It also widens the gap between the ivory tower and the real word. Theory should be a simplified picture of reality that explains how the world works in a particular domain. They focus on the most important factors to tell a causal story, but stories must reflect reality. Three ways to test a theory: -- 1) inspect its logical soundness: logical consistency. 2) covariation: hypothesis testing - causal inferences in correlation analysis to tease out the independent causal effects of A on B; 3) Process tracing: to determine whether a theory's causal mechanisms are actually operating in the real world in the manner it depicts. The virtues of theory. 1) Provide overarching frameworks: "the big" picture of what is happening in myriad realms of activity. Provides economical explanations for a wide array of phenomena. 2) Revolutionize thinking: can transform our understanding of important issues and explain puzzles that previously made little sense 3) Enables prediction 4) Essential for diagnosing policy problems and making policy decisions 5) Crucial for effective policy evaluation - identifies indicators we can use to determine whether a particular policy is working 6) Our theory informs retrodiction: enables to look at the past I different ways and better understand our history. 7) Is especially helpful when facts are sparse 8) Theory is critical for conducting valid empirical testing - hypothesis testing depends on having well-developed theory.

Walt 1999

This article critically analyzes contributions of formal modeling Three criteria for evaluating a theory: 1) its logical consistency; 2) degree of originality; 3) its empirical validity (last two most important) *critiques; old wine in new bottles, little empirical support, not user friendly, method driven rather than problem driven research.

Tomz 2007

Tomz attempts to conduct an experimental study to determine whether domestic audience costs are a real phenomenon and, if so, which factors affect the severity of reactions from the domestic populace. By doing so, this article hopes to stem criticism that challenges the existence of audience costs and demonstrate that empirical studies can have a significant bearing upon IR studies. This study samples over 1,000 Americans, showing that leaders who made empty threats were more likely to face disapproval from the public than those who never became involved in the conflict. This shows that domestic audiences do feel more hostility towards leaders who break public promises, even if the consequence of the situation ends up the same. Further, leaders who initially use force to try and deter the other side, but eventually renege on their promise, face even more disapproval than leaders who just use empty rhetoric. The study also shows that if the state that the leader was acting against had little or no impact on U.S. interests, then there is even more disapproval, since the benefit of the empty rhetoric seems minimal. Finally, the article explains that people care about the broken promises for three separate reasons: a) harm to state legitimacy; b) people dislike leaders who are normatively dishonest or inconsistent; or c) the behavior is potentially escalatory, which harms domestic interests. Themes: domestic politics, regimes, audience costs, international crises Question: Do democratic citizens disapprove of their leaders who make threats and then back down? Why do citizens disapprove? Summary: Survey experiment embedded in public opinion survey. Finds audience costs exist for American public in context of international security crises, i.e. public disapproves of president who makes a threat and then backs down. Effect is stronger as crises escalates (threats to force display to use of force). Why do citizens disapprove? Some evidence for reputation mechanism -- public concerned that empty threats undermine U.S. credibility. Criticisms: Standard critiques of survey experiments: 1) Duration of effect? Long-enough in real-time for aud cost mechanism to matter politically; 2) External validity? Better to embed in media portrayals than public opinion surveys?

Margalit 2011

Voters much more sensitive to loss of local jobs when it resulted from competition, especially offshoring, than job losses caused by other factors. Evidence for sector-level preferences, not direct support for Rogowski, who argues sector-level preferences in short-run, but factor-level preferences in longer-term.

Pape 2003

What explains the rise in suicide terrorism? (leading group Tamil Tigers) Suicide terrorism isn't irrational or fanatical, but a coercive tool used for political objectives. Terrorists use it because it works. Looks at dataset 1980-2001, Crucial case of Hamas. Not demonstrative or destructive terrorism, but coercive Three properties that make it strategic. "Timing" "nationalist goals" and "democracies as targets"

Kang 2009

• Kang responds to Michael Ross. She argues that Islam and political institutions affect the results that Ross gets. He does not take into account quotas for women in political institutions. • She argues that gender quotas have increased women's participation in Muslim majority and non-Muslim majority countries in both oil rich and in oil poor countries. Thus, the Oil may not be perpetuating patriarchy. • She argues that authoritarian states may be more likely to disregard women's demands than democratic countries under similar conditions of plentiful oil.

Barnett and Finnemore 1999

• Look at how International Organizations behave after they are created. Constructivist approach rooted in sociological institutionalism to explain both the power of IOs and they propensity for dysfunctional behavior • The rational-legal authority that IOs embody give them power independent of the states that created them. • Characteristics of bureaucracy as a generic cultural form shape IO behavior • Global organizations do more than just facilitate cooperation. They also create actors, specify responsibilities, define work that the actors should do, and give them meaning and normative value • Basic points: i. IOs are independent of states that create them, ii. IOs are powerful actors in global politics iii. IOs have bureaucracies and they can be inefficient, ineffective, repressive,etc. Thus, if IOs are bad, it's because of their own bureaucracies, and not necessarily because of the principal-agent problem.

Morrison 2012

• Resource Curse- the tendency of countries with high levels of natural resources to exhibit worse economic and political outcomes • The resource curse is a function of the institutional environment in which these resources are found and how they are used. Bad governance leads to curse. • Donor countries should only interact with countries with well governed natural resources. When donors try to attach conditionality with their aid to states with badly governed natural resources, it does not work. Studies show that there is no connection between conditionality and policy reform.

Wolhforth et al. 2014

Status - collective beliefs about a state's ranking on valued attributes - subjective and relative Status accommodation: when high status actors acknowledges the state's position Power, prestige, and authority all closely related to status.

Larson and Schevchenko 2010

Status can expand our understanding of how states can meet their concerns. It may even act as motivation for states to engage responsibly with the international order. Chinese and Russian post-Cold War behavior has been motivated by efforts to restore great power status. Realism focuses too much on material factors. Liberalism focuses too much on material factors and democratic norms. When groups/states want positive social identities, they may pursue 3 strategies: Social mobility Social competition Social creativity.

Barnhart 2016

Status competition can lead states to engage in seemingly irrational behavior, as states seek to increase status for domestic and international audiences. Using status to understand European "scramble for Africa".

Ward 2017

Status immobility produces social psychological and domestic political forces that transform rising powers toward paths of radical revisionism. Distributive versus normative dissatisfaction.

Lake and Powell 1999

Strategic Choice Approach Strategic problems and Interactions as the unit of analysis A rationalist framework Critiques: 1) theoretical distinction between actors and environments (Constructivist criticize this) 2) determinants/formation of basic preferences or a priori beliefs (where do they come from?) 3) Aggregation of units (can we treat subsystems as distinct and decomposable -- similar to OEP approach?)

Marinov 2005

Summary: Argues destabilization of target leaders is a necessary condition for successful coercion. Using a statistical analysis that compares cases in which coercion took place and was absent, finds that that the presence of sanctions against a government leader in a given year makes him significantly more likely to lose power in the following year. That is, finds that sanctions lead to destabilizing pressures - it increase the political costs of leaders, thus making them more likely to alter their policies.

Simmons 1998

Realist theory: international law is merely an epiphenomenon of interests or is only made effective through the balance of power. --o/w - highly skepetical of formal agreements also most focus on variables of power and interest. Rational-fucntionalist: institutions are built to solve common problems that states have difficulties solving any other way. shares realist concerns with states incentives to comply with or disregard international agreements. Focuses on benefits of a system of rule-based behavior and individual incentives for states to contribute to/detract from such a system. Securing compliance through reputation. Like realists - they agree that states delegate sovereignty begrudgingly Uncertainty shifts preferences towards shorter and less stringent punishments to reduce the cooperative demands of the treaty. Administrative capacity is crucial. Domestic regimes: regime-type is crucial to understanding law in international relations. Countries with independent judiciary more likely to respect international judicial process Absorption of the rule of law into the corpus of domestic regulation itself Importance of democracy for law compliance Normative approaches: norms are capable of driving perceptions of intersts and that has been the best way to understand normative influence. - Through a subjective framework and meaning - Substance of the rule underpinning its force/legitimacy INGOs, NGOs and Transnational Actors play significant roles in normative processes.

Reiter 2015

Recently, growing convergence between IPE and CPE. Driven by view that IPE topics like trade and currency flows can't be explained without reference to domestic political/economic forces, and CPE topics like development can't be explained without reference to global economy

Waltz 1979

Reductionism versus systemic theory Under anarchy bipolarity (stable)/multipolarity (unstable) Internal and internal versus external balancing.

Brooks, Ikenberry, and Wohlforth 2012/2013

Refuting "Come Home America article" and advocates of U.S. retrenchment and offshore balancing. Refutes claims: 1) U.S. decline relative to potential rivals 2) U.S. allies can protect themselves; 3) U.S. grand strategy leads to systemic pushback; 4) late-scale retrenchment could defuse global anti-American sentiments and end free riding by U.S. allies. Not free riding, exclusive goods. Global level balancing unlikely (regional is possible), pacifier effect of United States. Costs of hegemony are exogenous to actually maintaining hegemony.

Singer 2010

Remittances mitigate the political costs of lost monetary policy autonomy b/c they react countercyclically to economic downturns and insulate policymakers from economic volatility. For example, increases in remittances during recessions enables individuals/households to bolster consumption and maintain investments, which has a multiplier effect -- triggering additional investment and consumer spending. By softening the blow from economic downturns, governments face lower political costs for giving up monetary policy autonomy. Therefore, remittances increase likelihood that policymakers adopt fixed exchange rates.

Katzenstein 1996

Resurrect sociological perspectives in IR Interests constructed through a process of social interaction. 2 underattended determinants of national security. • Cultural and institutional context of policy • Constructed identity of political actors Norms - collective expectations of appropriate behavior or identity Identity: constructions of state-/nationhood based on political conflicts. Culture - collective models of identity is evaluative and cognitive standards. Conceive environment of states not just in terms of the physical capability of states. Focusing on aspects of institutions besides their impact on interests. Collective identity contexts - interests/strategies shaped by a never ending process that generates publicly understood standards for action. Collective identity: institutions constitute the actors themselves. Social rules and convention.

Walt 1992

Revolutions cause war by altering the balance of threat between the revolutionary state and its rival. Each state sees the other as a looming danger and a vulnerable adversary: war seems necessary and attractive. Substituting balance of threat for balance of power and engaging with revolutions impact on international conflicts adds in a host of domestic variables that realists would otherwise disregard.

Kapur 2014

Scholars should give attention to four channels through which migration leads to political consequences: • Prospective: How do expectations about emigrating affect current behavior? o Elites who send children outside, identity formation (people expect to leave less connected to cultural identity) • Absence: What happens to those left behind? o Loss of skilled labor, brain drain, etc. • Diaspora: How does diaspora impact politics back home? o Flow of resources, ideas, expertise, etc. • Return channels: How do those who return affect politics? o Return with higher capital, skills, foreign ideas and connections, etc. Migration plays a role in intra-national conflict. • Diaspora resources, transnational fighters, etc. Migration plays a role in the transmission of ideas and institutional practices • Example: Nelson (2014) - Governments with policymakers trained in US economics departments received preferential lending from IMF b/c of shared beliefs.

Keohane 2012

Since the 1990s Increasing legalization Increasing moralism/legalism Decreasing coherence of some regimes. Embedded in multilateralism and domestic interventionism Institutions serve a social purpose and are essential for cooperation Legalisation/coherence are properties of institutions. Legalism/moral - seek to refute the anarchy/order dichotomy and bring in legal order. Legalism frequently misattributes causality and can constrain policy. Institutions rest on power - changes in power generate changes in institutions. Decreasing coherence in institutions leads to increasing diversification of power/interests. But collapse is avoided: norms/institutions are difficult to eradicate/rearrange But progress towards increasing coherence has also come to a halt.

Keohane 1984

States are rational egoists Regimes built for mutually beneficial cooperation Decreasing transaction costs, assymetrical information and uncertainity States value institutions: Cooperation even when they prefer not to. Ability to detect defection and punish ---Tit For Tat They do not change interests but do alter costs and benefits It can facilitate cooperation but is neither necessary nor sufficient Must be potential for mutual gains.

Frieden and Rogowski

Themes: "exogenous easing of international exchange," relative prices, Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) trade model, Stopler-Samuelson (SS) Theorem, Ricardo-Viner (RV) approach Short Summary: Internationalization affects the preferences of domestic actors through relative price changes. These changes create domestic pressures to liberalize. One can make many predictions and observe many anomalies with these approaches. Summary: What is the effect of the international economy on trade policy preferences for domestic actors? International trade affects domestic politics, namely aggregate national preferences and the preferences of groups (classes, industries, firms). The main explanatory variable is the "exogenous easing of international exchange." Reduced costs of international trade, due to innovation in transportation, infrastructure, government policies, economies of scale and total factor productivity, lead to increases in international trade. This reduction in barriers to trade (relative price changes) manifests itself as price convergences or shocks. The "exogenous easing of international exchange" will lead to domestic pressures to liberalize. Democratic governments will be more sensitive to this. - HO model: The economy will export goods intensive in abundant factors of production and import goods intensive in scarce factors of production. - RV approach: sector-specific. If factors are tied to a sector, then relative price changes will create sectoral (not factoral) cleavages. - Economies of scales approach: focuses on firm size and costs of adjusting to the increasing global trade. - SS Theorem: The groups that own factors of production that are intensive for sectors that experience price growth will want greater trade liberalization. Political cleavages will arise based on the specificity of factors along sectoral lines. Critiques: There may be many empirical anomalies. Many countries that are not democratic are also ones that were the first to liberalize (i.e. Latin American in the 1980s). This chapter is important because it outlines different ways the international economy can affect domestic politics (second-image reversed).

Gartzke 2007

Themes: Democratic peace, capitalism, economic interdependence Question: Is the democratic peace actually caused by democracy? Summary: • Democratic peace is not actually caused by democracy. • Rather it is capitalism that causes peace amongst states for several reasons: o Markets provide economic opportunities that make war more unlikely o Territorial conquest is no longer necessary (land and resources are no longer the most important assets rather it is intellectual and financial capital) o Financial and monetary integration increases the costs of war o Political destabilization from war interrupts investment and trade

Weeks 2012

Themes: comparative authoritarianism, conflict initiation, 1st and 2nd images Why are some authoritarian regimes less likely to initiate conflict? What political institutions encourage leaders to initiate conflict? Two dimension: presence of audience, and composition of audience (civilian or military) • Personalistic dictatorships (e.g. N Kor, Iraq) do not face domestic audience AND personalist regimes select more bellicose/militaristic leaders b/c of challenges of maintaining absolute power → initiate more conflict than non-personalistic leaders • Non-personalistic authoritarian leaders do face domestic audiences → punish leaders who behave recklessly or incompetently o Civilian elite audience (machine) → less likely than juntas to initiate conflict o Military elite audience (junta) → more likely than machines to initiate conflict Significance: • Importance of investigating backgrounds of elites in order to understand preferences • Machines (non-personalistic regimes with civilian elite audience) are no more belligerent than democracies -- face similar institutional constraints, just smaller selectorates?

Mesquita et al 1999

Themes: domestic politics, regimes, institutions Question: Why does DP occur? Summary: Provide a game-theoretic argument for DP that results from institutional constraints, not liberal democratic norms). Assuming democratic leaders are self-interested and want to retain office, democratic leaders mobilize greater resources for war efforts than autocratic leaders because former more likely to lose office following military defeat. Therefore, democracies exert more resources for the war effect and only fight when they are confident they'll win. This makes dems unattractive targets. Hence, DP. Criticisms: • rationalist assumptions • assume autocratic leaders know the implications of democratic institutional constraints

Schultz 1999

Themes: domestic politics, regimes, institutions, war, international crisis, audience costs Question: How do domestic political institutions affect the way states interact in international crises? Do states interpret threats made by democracies as more credible than non-democracies? Summary: Statistical study of MIDS during 19th and 20th century. Investigates effect of domestic political institutions on international crises, specifically likelihood that states will reciprocate military threats made against them. Two mechs: 1) Institutional constraint -- b/c dems face higher political costs for waging war, threats are less credible. Therefore targets more likely to reciprocate. 2) Informational mechanism -- dems less likely to bluff b/c of transparency and audience costs. Therefore, targets less likely to reciprocate. Finding: Empirical support for informational mech -- when target threatened militarily, likelihood of reciprocation is lower when initiating state is a dem. Criticisms: Big stat study. Needs historical process-tracing to determine if mechs work

Keohane and Goldstein 1993

Theoretical middle ground, but can and should be studied using empirical tools of ... - Three types of beliefs 1) World views - too broad to talk about in a meaningful way. 2) Principled beliefs - right versus wrong 3) Causal beliefs - cause-effect relationship Impact of foreign policy Road maps: limits choices to those logically dictated by selected ideas. Focal points and glue: create pareto-efficient solutions; choose between multiple equilibria and help sustain cooperation. Institutionalization - once embedded they constrain policy and are difficult to dislodge.

Singer 1961

Theories must describe, explain and predict By focusing on international system we can study patterns of interaction which the system reveals and generalize about such phenomena. It does tend to exaggerate the impact of the system upon national actors (whose impact it concisely discounts) It requires that we postulate a high degree of uniformity in foreign policy. We get one singularly manageable needed without the empiricism required for lower levels of analyses. ν National/State Level Traditionally the focus of Western IR Permits significant differentiation among actors in the system. But it eventuates in gross comparisons on relatively crude dimensions/characteristic This may lead to an exaggeration of differences among sub-systemic actors. Also, only within do particular framework can we expact any useful application of theories/decision-making approach. Also, and to distinguish between those acting on behalf of a state in formulating interests in executing policy. Also- do we examine objective factors or actors perceptions of these "objective" factors Also interactions between second and third images.

Press 2004/2005

Theorizing credibility: Do leaders make inferences from past actions or current calculus? Past actions theory versus current calculus theory. Current calculus wins. Cases: "appeasement of Germany" in 1939 during three crises (a hard case for the theory). Hitler and military leaders cared more about things like the balance of power. This piece has informed literature skeptical about reputations (e.g.. for whom do reputations adhere: states, leaders?)

Gilpin 1981

Theory of International Change: Established hegemony undermined by differential growth rates among states. Benefits for hegemon maintaining system fall relative to the increasing costs. Like Carr: International Order built on distribution of power. Prestige anarchy analogous to authority. Three types of change: System change: change in actors in system; Systemic change: change in governance; Interaction change: Change in rules and rights of system. Incremental versus revolutionary change. Mature societies less innovative, costs of maintaining system. Free riding allies, moral corruption (superiority)

Lanoszka and Hunzeker 2015

Theory of conflict escalation and continuation that is distinct from rationalist rationalist and soc.-psychological explanations for war. When a country's honor is at stake, less likely to settle without inflicting "humiliation" on opponent. Case: Great Britain in World War I GB didn't settle when Germans offered peace deal in 1916. Seeking to restore "honor" and social psychology, fall prey to psychological biases and overoptimistic.

Gibler 2007

This article upends conventional wisdom about the supposed causal mechanisms undergirding the observed "democratic peace," arguing that it is spurious. According to this article, while it is true that democracies are less likely to go to war with one another, it is not because of the anything intrinsic to democracies. Instead, the same factors that lead a country to be democratic or authoritarian, are also likely to decide whether the country is likely to go to war. More specifically, countries are more likely to go to war over border, territorial disputes, and the existence of these disputes makes a country more likely to be authoritarian. Countries that have resolved their territorial disputes are less likely to go to war, and are more likely to be democratic. This argument contributes to the "second image reversed" (Gourevitch 1978) line of scholarship that illustrates how international factors can influence the internal workings of a state. At the micro-level, citizens within a state are likely to be deeply concerned about territorial disputes on their border - whether it triggers a biological fear of being conquered and subjugated, or losing resources - or, at a social-psychological level, it leads to fear of an external outgroup. For these reasons, territorial issues are particularly salient, and citizens are likely to support a large military force to defend against these threats, even if it is at the expense of domestic liberties. Moreover, countries with domestically powerful militaries are more likely to be authoritarian. Steps to war, more likely to escalate to war than others. Can deal with a crisis by making concession. Militarization makes escalation from crisis to war more likely. They are also interested in issues are more likely to escalate to war. Territorial issues are more likely to be militarized, and escalate to war. They centralize governments. Steps to war issues. Territorial. A very microfoundational account about why people. Page 124, concept of spuriousness- this chart is good. Page 117 how he is measuring settled borders. 129 Same colonial master unlikely to be settled.

Bob 2012

Transnational activism is conflictual, and groups must compete with each other. Not all groups competing are progressive or "left leaning" -- some are conservative.

Pelc 2013

US citizens are concerned about their country being branded violator of IL, specifically violating WTO agreements. Finds evidence that US citizens engage in "information-seeking" (web searches proxy for information-seeking, aspect of political mobilization). Common assumption among IL theories of compliance: When international legal institutions inform constituents of their governments' violations, these constituents will react by withdrawing political support, whether at the polls or through popular forms of dissent. Because of the threat of such ex post costs imposed by constituents, leaders make those international commitments, As with all audience cost models, the credibility of hand tying is built on the expectation of constituents' forceful reaction in the event of broken commitments,

Bender and Hammond 1992

The internal logic of all three of Allison's models and its logical structure are problematic. Difficult to determine the assumptions so the hypotheses drawn are only loosely related to the model. Assumptions related to the number of actors - in II and III he seems to assume that actors goals conflict. Degree of rationality attributed to decision-makers Assumes rationality but also that actors are imperfectly informed. What about pervasive uncertainty about the capabilities, motives, and actions of others. Levy 1986 - Organizational Process and Causes of War. Standard Operating Procedures are trouble - restricting and can facilitate the path to war: Schlieffen plan ...

Carr 1939

The most vital problem - how to bring about revisionism without war appease rising/revisionist powers: treaties are a reflection of the status quo without any inherent moral value. International law/norms - no inherent moral value. Law is a false solution: international society is insufficiently developed.

Finnemore 2009

3 social mechanisms that limit unipolar power and shape its possible uses. Legitimation: in order to exercise power effectively, unipoles must legitimate in the act of doing so, it must diffuse it. Institutionalization - of unipolar power: once in place, laws, rules, and institutions have powers and internal logics that unipoles find difficult to control. This also contributes to the diffusion from control. These two structures can trap and punish unipole too. But a judicious use of hypocrisy can provide crucial strategies for melding ideas/interests. Hypocrisy has 3 elements 1) Actors actions are at odds with its proclaimed values 2) Alternatives are available. 3) The actors is likely to deceive others about the mismatch between its actions and values.

Sambanis, Skaperdas, and Wohlforth 2015

A second image reversed argument: Outcomes of international wars affecting patterns of domestic social identification. Increasing international status, helps with nation-building and developing state capacity, so states likely to engage in conflict. Case: Franco Prussian War

Walt 1991

* Surveys field of Security Studies *Earlier Preoccupation with nukes * expanded to grand strategy, conventional warfare, domestic sources of conflict *Work is more rigorous and theoretically inclined *Improved standing in academia and social science

Tannenwald 2005

* how do ideas contribute explanations in world politics, security? *difference between causal and constitutive explanations * provides tests of how ideas matter. * ideas as "hooks" - materialist versus ideational explanations.

Krause 1998

*"Disciplining" power of rationalist and neorealist security studies scholarship *Critical security studies: how threats and responses are constructed. * how objects of security are constructed * possibilities for transforming security dilemmas

Ikenberry et al 2009

-unipolarity does have a profound impact on international politics. Poles are defined not on an absolute scale, but relative to each other and other states. Consequences depend on: Behavior of the unipole Actions of other states. Properties of the international system. Walt and also Mastanduo: the increased concentration of capabilities in the unipole may elicit increased opposition from other states. Walt: structural shift to unipole removed a major motivation for the middle powers to defer to the United States. Mastanduo: collapse of unifying threat US has less control over adjustment struggle with principal economic partners. Finnemore: to use capabilities, unipole must legitimate its control, which imposes limits on unipoles ability to translate capabilities into power. Snyder et. al.: impact of domestic politics under unipole - Bush administration has taken advantage of the structural discretion offered by unipolarity to engage in risky foreign policy. Finnemore and Walth consider the behavior of other states. They also discuss the use of international institutions. Unipolar system is less war prone - none of the causal mechanisms for war are relevant to unipole's interactions with other great powers. But Monteiro disagrees - this absence of war is likely to be overdetermined.

Goddard 2008

1860s-71 Prussia waged many wars - rapid rise that altered Balance of Power Yet - no balancing coalition emerged to check Prussia's rise, but other powers sat on the sidelines and allowed transformation of power Not multipolarity or domestic politics, but Prussia legitimation strategies - the way it justified its expansion - that undermined a potential balancing coalition. Prussia expanded and appealed to shared rules/norms and strategically chose rhetoric to resonate with other great powers. Signaled restraints Rhetorical traps Increasing ontological security - its need to secure its identity in international politics Expanded without opposition Shows how legitimation strategies prevented the creation of a balancing coalition.

Johnston and Sarbahi 2016

Analyzes effects of U.S. drone strikes on terrorism in Pakistan. Finds drone strikes: decrease incidence and lethality of terrorists attacks and retribution against local tribal leaders. Critique: Sketchy methodology, not focusing on longer radicalization; duration of effects.

Jervis 1978

Anarchy encourages behavior that leaves all worse off than they would otherwise be. Perceptions of state behavior depend on statements understanding of the security dilemma Offense-defense balance. Distinguishability of offense-defense weapons and advantage. Stag hunts and repeated PD help explain cooperation.

Hall 2017

Article examines Franco-Prussian war from perspective of provocation and outrage. Kaiser intentionally provoking France. Puzzle: why did French leaders hastily declare war on Prussia in 1870. Provocations: "Actions or incidents that state actors perceive as intentionally and wrongfully challenging or violating their values and goals." Three mechanisms: Personal outrage performative, and popular.

Alesina and Dollar 2000

Aid giving is primarily dictated by political and strategic considerations. Factors such as shared colonial past and voting patterns in the UN explain distribution of aid more than political institutions or economic policy of recipients. Also, countries that democratize receive surge in foreign aid. Thus, foreign aid responds to "political" openness, whereas FDI responds to "economic" openness Most of US aid goes to Israel and Egypt

Gibler 2012

Democratic Peace Finding is spurious, falls out when controlling for territorial conflict. Territorial conflicts lead to war and to authoritarian conflicts. Resolving territorial conflicts, leads to peace and democratization.

Choi 2009

Democratic countries do attract more FDI than authoritarian countries. Challenges Li and Resnick (2003), which does NOT account for influential outliers, namely China. After controlling for China, democratic institutions have a positive effect on FDI inflows in developing countries. Use FDI/GDP (instead of net FDI flows) as measure to reduce influence of outliers

McDermott 1998

Developing psychological framework, in contrast to rational choice (which she views as normative) Depends on domain is framed. Prospect theory: humans more likely to gamble in domain of loss than in domain of gain.

Lake 2013

Development of "mid-level or eclectic theories of world politics" Features of mid-level theories: • no strict adherence to any single set of assumptions; • willingness to violate levels of analysis; • no primordial units of analysis, only methodological "bets" about which unit of aggregation is most likely to produce powerful explanations; • methodological pluralism; • focus on parts of political process, rather than the whole; • focus on causal mechanisms. Eclectic b/c "mixing and matching" of assumptions, issue areas, units, and interests.

Leblang 2010

Diaspora networks - connections b/w migrants residing in investing countries and their home country -- influence FDI by reducing transaction and information costs, thus facilitating FDI. That is, they provide information to investors about their home countries and facilitate transactions through sharing contacts (e.g. business) or information about regulations. Finding: Diaspora networks → higher FDI from investing to home country.

Doyle 1986

Different types of liberalism - but they tend to be pacific towards each other, but often prone to war too. Shumpeter - individualized, democratic and rationalized Machiavelli - fear domination, and individuals are diverse and unequal Kant - republics tame absolutist monarchies and respect for individual rights perpetual peace is the endpoint for Kant. Liberal wars fought for liberal purposes.

Hall 2011

Diplomacy of anger involves vehement and overt state-level display of anger in response to perceived violation. Threatens precipitous escalation in the face of further violations but can be ameliorated by conciliatory gestures and will subside over time absent new provocations. Can also exercise reciprocal influence on the emotional dispositions and those that practice ift Contributes to constructing particular issues as sensitive and volatile and thus outside the realm of standard bargaining interaction. Case: Taiwan Strait Crises: '95-'96 when Clinton allowed the visit of Taiwanese President to Cornell. China was raging given prior understandings between China and the United States regarding China's aims of isolating Taiwan. Lee was unhappy and appealed for more international space. PRC subsequently responded with rhetorical attacks and large-scale military exercises.

Kirshner 2012

Disagrees with Mearsheimer - Realism is wrong and dangerous - harming U.S. economcy, decreasing U.S. influence, interdependence with China; war with China would provoke nationalism. Accommodate China's rise - hegemonic bids have failed - states are influenced by history Classical realism - sensitive to anarchy and balance of power and would be alarmed by China's rise. Great Powers have considerable discretion in their decision-making abilities.

Jervis 2013

Discusses how we could tell whether leaders have a huge impact in international relations. Ideas that personalities of leaders lead to outcomes is often subject to hindsight bias. Leaders do have influence on the environments they are in that may make certain policies more plausible. Leadership skill also susceptible to a similar criticism. Overall, the article is skeptical about the amount of influence leaders have in international relations. Empirical example is the Bush Administration. Nothing unique about this administration to make you expect this outcome.

Mercer 1995

Does anarchy necessarily lead to self-help? If the neorealist assumption is wrong then neorealism is out. Can anarchy generate a system of "other-help"? The absence of structure doesn't give agents a free hand unless we devise a way to escape from cognitive biases. Would states in the state of nature relate to one another before identity, interests, and insecurity? What does that say about international politics today? By understanding that identities are created through interaction, we would open the door to systematic change. Waltz's theory cannot explain systemic change and leaves little room for agency. Mercer argues that our cognitions and desire for a positive social identity generate competition. But, by emphasizing a more sociological approach to the study of IR, Wendt has brouth attention to more process-oriented approach that may help figure out how to live in a better self-help system - but that does not imply that we can overthrow it.

Putnam 1988

Domestic politics international politics. Level 1: international bargaining Level II: domestic ratification Level II: Imposes constraints Level 1 and Level II need an equilibrium that accounts for both. ν "win set" for constitutency Larger the win set, the greater likelihood of bargaining success; decreasing bargaining power Distribution of power/preferences and coalitions Strategies and negotiation Skill of negotiator Stumbling block: uncertainty, incentives to misrepresent, incentives to defect.

Bailey et al 1997

During 19th and early 20th centuries, protectionist interests dominated Congress, thus high trade barriers. In 1934, Democrats passed legislation lowering tariffs -- Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (RTAA). Law had two rule changes: 1) mandated reciprocal, not unilateral, tariff reductions (i.e. coupling US tariff cuts with foreign cuts), and 2) authorized trade agreements through simple majority vote, not supermajority.

Dancygier and Laitin 2014

Economic Causes of Immigrant-Native Violence • Grievance: worsening economic conditions → anti-immigrant violence • Political opportunities o Rise of right-wing parties - political elites signal tacit approval for anti-immigrant violence o Rise of right-wing parties - participation in politics substitutes for violence • More research on consequences of violence -- segregation and economic perfo mance Political institutions and policy regimes can reduce barriers to immigrants' economic integration • Proportional representation promotes immigrant interests better than first-past-the-post electoral systems? Evidence suggests yes • Policy regimes: o Do multicultural or assimilationist policies promote immigrant economic integration, e.g. improve prospects in labor market? o Promoting citizenship, instead of just work permits, promote integration? Integration - removal of barriers to participation in society, e.g. economy. Integration NOT assimilation b/c does not require elimination of cultural distinctiveness.

Mosley and Singer 2015

Effects of global production on labor: • What we know o Increases bargaining power of employers vis a vis labor b/c contemporary globalization is marked by legal barriers to immigration (unlike first era in early 20th century). Barriers prevent workers from credibly threaten to exit. But capital can exit. That is, labor more fixed, capital more mobile → bargaining power to capital. o Mixed evidence for race to the bottom: ♣ FDI flows do not seem to follow lower wages, regulations, etc. ♣ Evidence that multinational corporations (MNCs) tend to offer high wages and better working conditions than domestic firms in developing countries • A lot we still don't know o Effects of economic openness on labor require micro-logic based on firms decisions (country, region, or industry wrong unit of analysis) ♣ Need more micro data firm-level data on FDI and subcontracting and individual-level data ♣ Without it, causal mechanism obscured Political impacts of remittances • Scholars use logic of substitution o Do remittances disrupt clientelistic ties by allowing households to substitute remittances for patronage, thereby disrupting clientilistic ties? Or do remittances allow governments to shift resources away from public goods and towards political patronage, thereby strengthening their political power?

Baele, Sterck, and Meur 2016

Examines connection between individual and collective dimensions of emotion. Examining 2011 Palestinian statehood bid in UN

Trachtenberg 2012

Examines ten crises historically where audience costs mechanism should work, but he finds no evidence of this. Evidence from 1800s through the Cold War.

Rogowski 1989

Expansion and decline of trade will generate different societal cleavages, based on the scarcity and abundance of capital, land, and labor. Because abundant factor(s) benefit from free trade, they will oppose scarce sector(s) that support protectionism. Conversely, because scarce factor(s) benefit from protectionism, they will oppose abundant sector(s) that support free trade. Abundant factors gain political power with trade expansion, while scarce factors gain political power with trade decline. (Note: Power gains and losses do not determine who "wins" politically.)

Kaufmann and Pape

Explain costly moral action - Britain's abolition and slavery Realists: this would make sense if it were an expensive endeavor, but benefits of slavery were much higher than the costs. Liberal: would make sense if there was cooperation and an institutional push towards abolition to prefer free-riding and boost national intersts. Constructivism: would make sense if preference influenced through norms and cosmopolitanism. That we are all members of one singular race. NONE of these were applicable! So, what then? Domestic politics: saintly logrolling. Saints viewed society as corrupt and making society just greater than material costs. Condition politics: both parties were incentives to make concessions with saints.

Li 2009

Finds empirical support for Li and Resnick (2003) -- property rights protection, not democratic institutions, increase FDI inflows. Challenges Choi (2009): FDI/GDP bad measure because it is analytically distinct from net FDI inflows. FDI/GDP reflects country's openness to or reliance on foreign capital, whereas net FDI net FDI inflows indicate the amount of investment. Cannot draw correct inferences about impact of democracy on the amount of FDI from FDI/GDP. Also can't separate independent effects of FDI and GDP.

Ahmed 2012

Foreign aid and remittances constitute unearned foreign income that authoritarian regimes exploit in order to extend their tenures. This occurs through two mechanisms: 1) income effect - governments direct some foreign aid to finance patronage; and 2) substitution effect - governments respond to shocks in remittances by diverting expenditures from welfare to patronage. Finds that combination of aid and remittance inflows reduces the likelihood of government turnover for autocracies.

Frieden 1991

Assesses distributional implications of capital movements from a specific-factors approach (sectors), as opposed to a factoral approach as in Heckscher-Ohlin model (capital, labor, and land). International capital mobility creates a cleavage between those sensitive and those less sensitive to exchange rate flucuations and between those who favor currency appreciation and those who favor depreciation. International investors and traders willing to give up national monetary policy autonomy for fixed exchange rates (stability), whereas nontradable and domestic-oriented sectors prefer autonomy (flexible). However, producers of tradable goods prefer monetary expansion (depreciation), whereas producers of nontradable goods/services and international investors prefer monetary contraction (appreciation) (450) See Figure 1: Fixed or Flexible Exchange Rate ("flexibility"): _ Export-oriented producers of tradable goods and international investors -- prefer fixed or currency stability ... b/c exchange rate volatility makes their business riskier and less concerned about domestic macroecon conditions b/c they can shift business to other countries in response to depressed local demand. _ Producers of nontradable goods/services and producers of import-competing tradable goods for domestic market -- prefer flexible exchange or national monetary policy autonomy ... b/c it allows national government to affect domestic prices, thereby stimulating domestic demand. High or Low Exchange Rate ("level") _ (tradable sectors) Export-oriented producers of tradable goods and import-competing producers of tradable goods for domestic market -- low exchange rate or depreciated currency ... b/c makes products more competitive in home and foreign markets _ a) Nontradable sectors -- high exchange rate or appreciated currency .... b/c raises domestic relative price of their products b) International traders/investors -- high exchange rate or appreciated currency .... b/c they purchase assets overseas (444 - 446)

Weiss 2013

Authoritarian states can credibly signal their intentions in international crises by tolerating anti-foreign protests. critique: how generalizable is this? just specific to China?

Buthe and Milner 2009

BITs constitute a commitment to economically liberal policies, and BITs boost inward FDI because they make such commitments more costly to break and hence more credible for foreign investors. Why? BITs provide info about developing gov'ts' commitment to and (non)compliance with these policies, and they often have an enforcement mechanism - binding arbitration. Also, because info benefits accrue to foreign investors in general, BITs boost FDI in general, not just bilateral (184, 186, 199, 213). BITs reduce policy autonomy -- institutions that "bind the hands" of policymakers and impose ex post costs for violating them (214). Additional Notes: _ FDI particularly vulnerable because of asset specificity. BITs solve time inconsistency problem created by this (181) _ BITs distinct from other IL because of binding arbitration (187) _ BITs address expropriation and broad range of gov't interventions into mkt

Helleiner 2011

Background: U.S. housing bubble burst and growth of mortgage defaults, leading to U.S. financial meltdown, which affected major financial centers across the world. U.S. and European banks pulled back their international loans, triggering severe financial problems and debt crises around the world. This led to a collapse in international trade and other spillover effects through the "real economy" such as collapsing exports, commodity prices, and remittance payments. Causes of the 2007-8 Financial Crisis: 1. Transformation in financial systems by securitization -- such as increasingly complex mortgage-backed securities and new kinds of derivatives like credit default swaps (CDS). a. Increase in risk, which was difficult to evaluate and the large-scale buying and selling of these complex securities and derivatives concentrated among a small number of financial institutions, which concentrated risks 2. Regulatory authorities -- took "market friendly" approaches and trusted private actors to self-regulate . Legislative background: U.S. political decisions -- Congress separated investment and commercial banking (1999), Securities and Exchange Commission lowered leverage ration, and US authorities didn't do enough to stop growth of poor mortgage lending practices, esp subprime loans a. Why? a) private interests -- financial sector influence over policymakers, b) ideational influences -- embrace of pro-market beliefs, and c) statist -- U.S. and British state interests, supported growth of financial sector power 3. Global financial flows into U.S., which helped U.S. finance deficits, i.e. live beyond its means . Boom in oil prices in 2002 → surplus funds which many countries used to invest in U.S., like China, Japan, and oil-exporting countries and developing countries Politics of reserve accumulation a) Bretton Woods II thesis: Goal to promote rapid export-oriented industrialization. Gov'ts maintained undervalued exchange rates by accumulating for exchange reserves, which they recycled into U.S. assets in order to keep major foreign market economically healthy enough to continue purchasing their exports b) Preserve national political autonomy or "self-insurance" thesis: Build war chest of reserves to defend against volatile capital flows and reduce dependence on IMF, which reflects distrust of international financial system Lessons/Future Research: _ Need to open the "black box" of global finance and capital mobility-- more attention to specific practices, institutions and rules, ideas and culture that make up global financial markets (7) _ Politics of reserve accumulation

Wohlforth 2008

Balance of Power theory predicts balancing in unipolar systems - but we haven't seen this! Concentration of power in a state is way above the threshold at which states can balance - it is too costly. U.S. faces constraints through functions of bargaining and routine politics. Themes: unipolarity, balancing Summary: Does balancing occur under conditions of unipolarity? Why have other great powers not acted to constrain the United States during the unipolar era through counterbalancing? Balance-of-power theory predicts counterbalancing should be occurring in unipolarity. But it hasn't. Theory's causal mechanism is not operative under unipolar conditions. Instead, "as the concentration of power in a state increased beyond a certain threshold, systemic constraints on its security policy become generally inoperative," because the unipole's material primacy makes counterbalancing for the other states "prohibitively costly." Since systemic balancing in the sense of building up their relative capabilities vis-a-vis the United States is too costly for the other major powers, argue the constraints the U.S. has faced are a function of "bargaining," i.e. the routine politics governed by the "constellation of interests" that surround any given issue.

Kirshner 2008

Globalization in aggregate tends to reduce the autonomy of states, although in some ways it can also enhance it Because globalization affects the relative capacities of states different - it affects the balance of power. The U.S. finds its own autonomy encroaches upon and challenges because of globalization.

Farnham 1990

By failing to take into account the essential features of political context, ANALYTICAL, COGNITIVE and MOTIVATED explanations of decision-making fall short. Failure to understand the decision-maker's perceptions of the constraints of the political context, and may result in labeling as error or distortion behavior, which is quite reasonable when viewed from the perspective of the context. Need—to combine psychological theories about decision-making processes Rationalist models Bureacratic models: process of internal debate. Cognitive research program. Need to account for the political context! Invariant variables of political context: • Acceptability - not just max (U), but to accomplish various goals within the political context.

Gruber 2001

Challenges institutionalist assumption that international institutions and cooperation necessarily facilitate mutual gain relative to the status quo (i.e. a "Pareto improvement" in which no one is harmed but at least one person is helped by new arrangement). Actors may prefer noncooperative status quo, but cooperate voluntarily and without coercion because another actor possesses "go-it-alone power" -- the ability to remove the original status quo from the choice sets of others (fait accompli). Therefore, cooperation less costly than non-cooperation with new status quo.

Bailer and Weiler 2014

Climate change negotiations at the Copenhagen climate summit in 2009: reducing emissions and financing climate change mitigation b/w developed and developing countries. DV: ex ante bargaining positions in climate change negotiations (not negotiation outcomes): more cooperative (ex ante bargaining position closer to median position of all negotiation positions) or less cooperative (position farther away from median)? Findings: • Vulnerable countries more cooperative for mitigation finance (i.e. willing to demand less), but uncooperative for emissions reduction. • Economic power (strategic): more powerful economically, less cooperative • Democracy (domestic): o Compensation mechanism: Democracies do not commit to substantial emission reductions due to industry pressure, but they are willing to finance climate mitigation projects as compensation for their uncooperativeness on reducing emissions. Finding shows the significance of "within agreement linkage" • IO membership does NOT encourage governments to choose more cooperative negotiation positions -- contradicts liberal institutionalism literature

McKeown 1983

HST difficulty explaining tariff policy among European states during the 19th century. If HST correct, we should see activist British policy of lowering tariffs, Britain using bargaining power (i.e. linkage) to induce other European states lower tariffs, and these efforts succeeding. But Britain was often reluctant to reduce its protectionist policies, made scattered attempts to lower others' tariffs, and did not succeed much. Other states (e.g. France and Prussia) often lowered tariffs for reasons unrelated to British power. In fact, Prussia did so well before Britain!

Jackson and Krebs 207

Constructivism is an approachRhetorical coercion: when claimant is talked into a corner to endorse a stance they would otherwise reject Top-down and bottom up. Impossible to parse out effect of persuasive power of rhetoric from changes in incentives. Rhetorical innovation is difficult - no hegemonic rhetoric, but also not in a permanent state of flux. Framing contest and implications contest. Not all structures are conducive to rhetorical coercion. Model does not work when opponents accept the claim and implications without argument.

Krasner 1976

Hegemonic distribution of power leads to an opening trade structure, because it's in the hegemon's best interest to promote openness and it can use its economic and military power[1] to induce weaker states to open up. Theory predicts expansion of free trade during hegemonic ascendancy and movement towards protectionism during hegemonic decline. But theory can't predict several periods -- British free trade preference in opening decade of 20th century, U.S. protectionism during the interwar period, and U.S. free trade preference since 1960. The role of cataclysmic events and domestic political structure must also be taken into account. State-centric explanation focuses on four state interests: political power, aggregate national income, economic growth, and social stability.

Helleiner 2014

Helleiner does not buy Drezner's story. The system didn't work, the Fed acted as the bank of last resort with its bilateral swap program from 2007-2010. So, the US really fixed it. • The role of the G20 in the management of the crisis has been overstated.

O'Neal, Russett, and Berbaum 2003

Higher levels of democracy, higher levels of joint membership in intergovernmental organizations, higher volume of trade associated with lower probability of militarized interstate dispute at the dyadic level. Critique: Kitchen sink regression.

Ansell 2014

Homeowners experiencing housing price appreciation will become less supportive of redistribution and social insurance policies b/c increase house prices increase the permanent income of individuals and provide a hedge against hard economic times. Asset ownership and increases in asset prices → increase permanent income → reduces eligibility for redistribution and reduces need social insurance when out of labor market → lowers support for redistribution and social insurance policies (especially among right-wing voters) Right-wing parties will respond to these preferences by cutting social spending during housing booms.

Frank 1985

Humans are biologically predisposed to care about their position relative to others. Also care more about local than global hierarchies.

Kahler 1997

IR theory post 1945. It's event-driven, great debates, and professionalization. IR's theoretical alternatives rise and fall over time to correspond with international events. These changes do not always signal progress. Sweeping history of the field with little attention to the role of scholars in paradigm development. 1st debate: idealism versus realism - Realism was then reinforced in the profession. 2nd debate: methodology/science versus theory/law - during the 1960s; neorealism >neoliberalism and dependency theory. 3rd debate possibly between mainstream IR and post-modernism/sociological paradigm. But boundaries in profession have hardened and there is less room for the consideration of new paradigm. Realism is most appealing during periods of international insecurity and most open to criticism during periods of relative stability. This article doesn't really discuss how quickly paradigms can shift to accommodate international changes. It's also inadequate to account of impact of individual scholars.

Hopf 1998

Identifies constructivism contributions to IR theory Five elements of constructivist approaches: 1) actors and structures are mutually constituted 2) Anarchy as imagined community 3) identities and interests are focus of inquiry 4) power and practice -- power to reproduce intersubjective meanings 5) how we understand change Differences between critical and conventional constructivism Conventional -- causal explanations, positivist Critical a theory of power relations, inability to ever access true reality.

Rasler and Thompson 1985

It is quite likely that global structural change impacts have widespread repercussions, but their theoretical interest is on the actors and process that are most central to the functioning of the global political economy. - Economic growth - Democratization - Protectionism - Polarity - Rivalry

Tversky and Kahneman 1995

Judgement under uncertainty People revert to heuristics and biases that hinder our ability to judge probabilities of uncertain events. representive heuristics: people make judgements based on how well it represents or is similar to a stereotype they are familiar with .... That affects how (and if) they consider prior probabilities == they are insensitive to prior probabilities, sample size, chance, predictability Biases: information available, imaginability, subjective probabilities. Prospect Theory - critique of expected utility theory. Differentiates between the editing and evaluation phases of decision-making Think of alternatives in terms of gains and losses -People behave as if they would compute a value (utility) based on the potential outcomes and their respective probabilities and then choose the alternative having a higher utility.

Maliniak, Powers, and Walter 2013

Large-N analysis demonstrating the gender citation gap in the field of international relations Citations integral for career advancement Draws attention to bias

Maoz and Russet 1993

Large-N quantitative test to test whether democratic peace exists and what its causes are. Findings: Democratic Peace Exists Normative model works better than structural model. Normative Model: externalizing domestic norms (dyadic) Structural Model: constrains on executive (supposedly dyadic, but is it really?) Critiques: measuring normative model using stability -- not sure about this.

King 2016

Looking at fighting effectiveness of individual military units. Moving beyond primary group thesis (used in debate to keep women out of military). Focuses on the role of professionalization in military training.

Talmadge 2016

Looking at variation in military organization among states: why do some states develop militaries that reduce rather than maximize their capabilities> Main IV: Fear of coups. Things that make militaries effective, makes them likely to succeed in overthrowing government. Case: Comparing North and South Vietnam military forces. Article responds to realist explanations (Huntington) for force deployment. Critique: What about role of alliances in security calculations?

Tarrow 2001

Mass-based transnational social networks are hard to construct difficult to maintain and have very different relations to states/ Internaitonal organizations vis-à-vis INGOs/TANs Transnational movements are rooted in "contentious politics" when at least one government is a claimant, object of claims are party to them. Also, if claims are realized, this would affect the interests of the claimants. Congealed form of contention - sustained contentious interactions with power holders. A transnational movement is socialized, mobilized groups with constituents in at least two states engaged in contentious politics. INGOs == independent of governments; routine transactions with states, private actors, and institutions. Transnational Activist networks - bound by shared values and common discourse; dense exchange of information and services -High value content and information uncertainty.

Walt 2009

Most alliance literature has focused on: Distribution of burdens within the alliance Alliance cohesion and leadership Twin dangers of abandonment and entrapment Impact of norms and institutions What about: Structural features of unipolarity U.S. status as a single superpower Particular policies adopted by specific U.S. administrations. Need to consider what security problem the alliance was intended to address and why particular leaders adopted particular policies.

Saunders 2009

Most military interventions are not a result of a direct existential threat, but are wars of choice, reflecting the influence of individual leaders. Variation in leadership styles: Internally focused leaders versus externally focused leaders. Policies that make investments in certain capabilities before a crisis occurs. Case: Kennedy and Johnston differences in approach to the Vietnam War critique: is she really just talking about unipolarity?

Finnemore 1996

National Interests in International Society Theme: constructivism Questions: How do states come to define their interests? The international structure not only constrains state behavior, it also changes what they want. States are embedded in dense networks of transnational and international social relations that shape their perceptions and preferences. International organizations are one important component of social structure which redefines state preferences. IOs socialize states to accept new political goals and new social values in ways that have lasting impacts, e.g. on the conduct of war. Example: Conduct of war Why did states decide that the rules enshrined in the first Geneva Convention in 1864 -- humanitarian protections for wounded soldiers and noncombatants -- were "in their interest"? Because of socializing influence of the transnational ngo Red Cross.

Tomz 2007

National-Level survey experiment on audience costs Finding: Those who make empty threats more likely to face disapproval from domestic public Critique: This is if it is in a perfect controlled laboratory setting -- many intervening variables in the real world.

Wendt 1987

Neorealism: individualist ontology World systems theory-holistic ontology. both have "structural" rather than "agentic" theories. - All theories embody an agent structure problem Structural theories and methodlogical individualism take either the system as agent as ontologically primitive - Neorealism and World systems are unable to explain the properites/causal powers of their primary unit of analysis. Feedback/mutual implications of agents and structure - they are codetermined/mutually constituted. Neorealism reduces the structure of the system to the properties of its constituent elements -states. World System reduces state agents to the effects of the reproduction requirements of capitalism. Neorealism: leads to an understanding of system/structure as only constraining the agency of preexisting states. World system/structuralism -generating state/agents themselves. System structures cannot generate agents if they are reduced to the properties of agents in the first place. Neorealism fails to provide a basis for developing an explicit theory of the state. World Systems - they reduce entities -- states and agents to the effects of the structure. They treat the structure of the world system as given and unproblematic.

Mitzen 2006

In addition to physical security, states also seek ontological security/security of ht eself Achieved through routinized relationships and variation in attachment has implications for security seeking. Scales up individual need for ontological security by the state level. Ontological security seeking suggests that states may not necessarily want to escape security dilemma conflict. Event rational security seekers could become attached to conflict. Sheds new light on irrational conflict. Identities emerge from conflict (Adeleal) Perceptions - intentions of rivals (Jervis?) Prospect theory - domain of loss/gain?

Ward 2013

Increasing power insufficient to explain revisionism: states usually prefer to bide their time than run high risks Great Powers may be unwilling/incapable to orient themselves toward reassurance due to domestic political effects that create perceptions of status immobility. Status Quo power is unable to accommodate rising status states. Can produce preferences for revisionism is individual elites. Cal alter discursive/political environment within a state to advantage the advocates of revisionism, facilitate their increased influence on policy case: Japan in the 1930s - revisionism: perceptions of status immobility linked to Japanese understandings of the role of race in a W-dominated system. Japanese nationalists were strengthened vis-à-vis moderates.

Jupille et al 2013

Institutional choices do not simply reflect demands of cooperation problems, but also institutional status quo. When existing institutions work satisfactorily for the problem at hand, states use them. Bounded rationality, risk aversion, and inherent costs of more adventure choices generate a status quo bias towards using an existing institutions. Bounded rationality - idea that in decision-making, rationality of individuals is limited by the information they have, the cognitive limitations of their minds, and the finite amount of time they have to make a decision. Individuals use heuristics and routines rather optimizing.

Milner 1998

International relations now converging with comparative politics and American politics (and their methodology) ν International political not different from Domestic Politics ν Increased cross-fertilization around the importance of institutional analysis ν Mechanisms and collective choice in situation and strategic of interaction. Approach: rational institutionalism States as unitary actors is a problematic assumption - domestic actors become primary unit of analysis across levels of analysis. In situation of strategic interactions, domestic and international institutions provide mechanisms by which preferences are aggregated into collective choices and outcomes. Methodology of non-cooperative game theory can be/is applied across 2nd/3rd images.

Scheve and Slaugher 2001

Investigate individual-level trade policy preferences for Americans determined by factor income and asset ownership. Two findings: 1. Factor type dominates industry of employment in explaining support for trade barriers. Lower skill is strongly correlated with support for new trade barriers; employment in industries more exposed to trade is not. a. Supports Rogowski: factor type dominates preferences i. US well endowed with high-skilled workers relative to rest of world → support free trade ii. US scarce in low-skilled workers → oppose free trade 2. Home ownership (assets) matters - Higher support for trade barriers for home owners in countries with a manufacturing mix concentrated in comparative-disadvantage industries.

Russett 1993

Norms and institutions Norms do take a while to stick; democratizing are more war prone (??) But once they stick they impose constraints on the threat of use of force aginst other democracies . Democratic leaders perceive other democracies are constrained. Allow for time to reach peaceful settlement. Non-democracies - unconstrained. Leaders likely to initiate violence against non-democracies. Non-democracies expect democratic constraints - push for greater concessions - makes democracies more likely to fight rather than concede.

Maoz and Russet 1993

Norms and institutions. Belief that democracies are reasonable, predictable, and trustworthy. Intentions are always pacific towards other democracies. Opportunity for conflict resolution. Both mechanisms matter, but norms more robust.

Neilson and Tierney 2003

Puzzle: World Bank exercised a lot of autonomy during 1980s and resisted reform. How? (It was reined in during 1990s) IOs can behave autonomously. Neither neorealism nor neoliberalism can account for this b/c of state-centric ontologies. Why do IOs behave autonomously? States (principals) create IOs as agents, but face three problems which lead to autonomous action and resistance to organizational reform: • Problem of common agency o If states within collective principal have different preferences, then agent (IO) can play members off each other ("problem of collective principal") o if a state(s) has veto, then IO can be insulated from other principals who want reform ("problem of multiple principles") • Problem of long delegation chains o If reform pressure coming from interest groups within states, then IOs will not change b/c they are more sensitive to governments, i.e. "proximiate principals" Bottom line: IOs can be insulated from external pressure b/c of varying preferences from member states, b/c of ability to get protection from member state(s) w/veto power, and b/c of lack of responsiveness to domestic interest groups.

Early 2015

Question: How does sanction busting assistance (trade and foreign aid) affect the success of sanctioning efforts? Short Summary: External support to target states through trade and foreign aid reduce the likelihood that sanctions will cause target governments to capitulate to the demands of the states sanctioning them. Summary: Puts forth a sanction-busting theory that makes two predictions: 1) The more third-party states engage in trade-based sanctions busting on a target state's behalf, the less likely sanctions are successful. 2) When target states receive foreign aid windfalls from third-party states in a given year, the sanctions imposed against them are less likely to be successful. And when their foreign aid declines, sanctions are more likely to be successful. Finds support for both hypotheses in a statistical study of U.S. sanctions from 1950 to 2002. Thus, external support to target states from third parties profoundly affect the outcomes of sanctioning efforts. Why? Sanction-busting trade alleviates economic damage cause sanctions inflict on target's commercial constituencies, and foreign aid surplus provides leaders of target governments with discretionary resources to alleviate the economic damage and political fallout from sanctions. Case study: UAE busted US sanctions against Iran Despite Iran being a primary threat to UAE and US being its primary security ally, UAE government tolerated sanction busting. Interestingly, UAE sanction busting skyrocketed after its government signed a defense pact with the U.S. in 1994 - illustrating that economic interests can dominate security. Definitions: - sanctions "success" - targets capitulate to sender's demands - Trade-based sanction busters - third party states whose constituents increase their commerce with sanctioned states to profit from commercial opportunities created by sanctions - Aid-based sanction busters - governments that have political interests in seeing the sanctioning efforts against a target state fail and use foreign assistance to undercut sanctions effectiveness Critiques: - theory is obvious - Not much attention to distributional consequences of aid (see Kirshner) - Narrow definition of success (see Kirshner) - Claims greater dominance of sanctioning state's firms in target country, greater leverage. But Bapat and Kwon challenge this (see below)

Malesky 2008

Question: How much FDI is needed for a province to believe it has the bargaining power to challenge central authority? Summary: Finds that increases in provincial FDI increases subnational autonomy of provinces in Vietnam from 1990 to 2000. Mechanism -- FDI provides resources to provinces which increases their bargaining power vis a vis central authorities. FDI also increases importance of subnational policy for econ dev. Because central gov't views econ growth/dev as way to retain power and is reliant on revenue generated by FDI, do not take vigorous action to rein-in illegal experimentation. Instead, used state-controlled media to condemn experimentation to deter weaker provinces from following suit (104, 115). Rational account for why central authorities allow FDI knowing that it will lead to subnational autonomy, which departs from naivity-based explanations. DV: policy autonomy Finding: strong influence of FDI on local autonomous economic reform experiments

Evangelista 2003

Only men writing about gender and war Critique of Fukuyama - predetermined differences Prefers Goldstei's approach - war doesn't come naturally to societies - gender roles are a tool for preparing citizens for war. Gender security dilemma, feminine roles, states/citizens would be at risk from group adhering to traditional masculine roles. IOs could help solve this Goldstein doesn't discuss relationship between gender and equality and nationalism and conflict. "femininity" still used synonymously for weakness

Bull 1977

Order in world politics, defined as an actual or possible situation/state of affairs - Lacks a normative dimension: neither assumes to be desirable nor overriding. System of states: at least 2 states have contact between them and have sufficient impact on one another's decisions. Tends to create some hierarchy/power imbalance. Society of states - group of states conscious of certain common interests and values, conceiving themselves to be bound by a set of rules. Goal: preserve system; preserve independence; peace; goals are common to all.

Levy 1998

Organizational processes and standard operating procedures do not cause war, but they do not contribute to it. Example: Schlieffen Plan: attract France on the East, Russia would be slow to mobilize. After winning on West, turn to Russia. But, attacking France would involve going through Beljium - this would bring in Britain Cluster -F World War 1. Should've attacked Russia. The Kaiser Wilhelm opposed this plan but General Moltke insisted - causing World War One

Finnemore and Sikkink 1998

Origins of norms - norm entrepreneurs and critical mass adopts Never enter in normative vacuum but are contested. Organizational platforms to promote. Norms: standards of appropriate behavior. - Regulative and constitutive. Ideal norm shifts are the main vehicles for system change. - Emergence - entrepreneurs, altruism, empathy, commitment, persuasion tipping point Cascade - under adoption: states, institutions, seeking legitimacy, reputation, esteem through institutions; demonstration and socialization Internationalization - law, professions, bureaucrats, seek conformity through habits/institutions.

Oxley 2008

Political attitudes vary with physiological traits. Individuals with lower sensitivities to sudden noises, threatening visuals, were more likely to support foreign attack, liberal immigration policies, pacifism and gun control. Individuals with higher sensitivies to those same stimuli favor defense spending capital punishment, patriotism and the Iraq war.

Wilcox 2009

Provides a constitutive explanation for how gendered norms made possible the "cult of the offensive" 1. Offensive weapons viewed as "honorable"; 2) nationalism is gendered, assertiveness is masculine, enemy feminized 3) masculinity to protect "weaker members" -- offensive action needed for this.

Goddard and Nexon 2016

Provides a new organizing framework -- focusing on global power politics Post-realist -- challenges realists on centrality of states; focus on military force; and the anarchy drives global politics "politics based on the use of power to influence the actions and decisions of actors that claim, or exercise, authority over a political community" Critique: still views actors as agents and power as a capability? Ukraine Case

Fearon 1995

Short Summary: Why do states fail to find an acceptable ex ante bargain that avoids the costs and risks of fighting? There are three mechanisms that explain why bargaining can fail and why states rationally go to war: • Asymmetric Information -- States have private information over their own capabilities and willingness to fight; they have incentives to misrepresent this information in order to gain a better deal. This leads to rational miscalculation and limits the bargaining range. • Credible Commitment -- States face a commitment problem. Mutually preferable bargains may be unattainable because states have incentive to renege, largely due to anarchy (no enforcement), offensive advantage (odds of winning better if attacks first), and preventive imperative (declining power fights while strong). • Issue Indivisibility -- Some issues may not permit compromise (indivisible), thus states may not be able to find an acceptable bargaining range (i.e. issue indivisibility eliminates possible bargains). Two actor game in dispute over an issue of fixed value (e.g., territory or the gains from trade). Because war is costly, there must exist a negotiated outcome that will leave both sides better off than if they actually fight. War is a failure of bargaining, an inefficient outcome that all parties would avoid in the absence of bargaining imperfections. Three rational reasons why this inefficient outcome occurs (see above). Detailed Summary: • Rational leaders who consider the risks and costs of war land up fighting anyway. Why is this so? • 5 basic reasons why states go to war in the article: i. Anarchy, ii. Expected Benefits greater than costs (Eg. When offense has the advantage like in WWI) iii. Rational preventive war, iv. Rational miscalculation due to lack of information, and v. Rational miscalculation about relative power. • Private Information: One of the primary reasons for these miscalculations lies in the existence of what Fearon calls 'private information' about the relative capabilities and resolve of states Thus, because the other state does not have clear information about the military capability or willingness of its adversary to fight, it will tend to make miscalculations owing to poor information. This will lead to the state having a more limited bargaining range than it would have if there was information sharing. Fearon thus argues that information sharing would lead to a consensus military estimate which in turn would reveal to the states the bargains which would be preferable to a fight. • Commitment Problems: Mutually preferable bargains are unattainable, because states have an incentive to renege on them. Especially a first strike advantage leads states to go to war instead of following through with a bargain owing to the offensive advantages that such a first strike would accrue to them. Such a scenario to Fearon is a result of the fact that in a system of anarchy any bargain or argument is unenforceable and hence likely to incentivize defection. • Issue Indivisibility: Some issues can just not be compromised upon. Since no bargain can be struck, war seems the only preference. (Example of indivisible issue in domestic politics is abortion. In international politics, entrenched territorial disputes like Kashmir)

Kang 2003/2004

"Hierarchy, Balancing, and Empirical Puzzles in Asian International Relations" Themes: hierarchy, balancing and bandwagoning, ethnocentrism, realism, regions Short Summary: The empirical anomaly of East Asia's lack of balancing in 1368-1911 calls into question defensive realism's narrow focus on great powers and its presumption to universal applicability. Summary: Realist theories, in particular Waltz's defensive realist theory, suffer from ethnocentrism. They are derived from the European experience, specifically great power conflict in Europe. East Asian history (1368-1911) does not offer evidence for anarchy-induced balancing, but instead bandwagoning in the form of a hierarchical Sino-centric tributary system. Today, Asian states aren't balancing against China b/c they don't feel threatened. Bottom line: Hierarchy, or systems dominated by a single power, leads to bandwagoning. Kang suggests IDENTITY matters—how China was able to portray itself as non-threatening to East Asian states—was important in shaping East Asian states' perceptions and therefore their non-balancing behavior. Good example that state behavior isn't always neatly predicated on assessment of external threat as realists would suggest. Also claims more war and conflict in Western experience than Asian. Criticism • Too early to rule out anti-China counterbalancing? • Kang's failure to distinguish between economic & security dimensions of balancing/bandwagoning makes his account of contemporary East Asian IR less convincing

Williams 2003

"Securitization" Developed by the Copenhagen School Between Classical Realism of Schmitt and Constructivist Ethics. Challenge by the rise of televisual communication in security relations for understanding process of securitization

Kirshner 1997

"The Microfoundations of Economic Sanctions" Themes: economic sanctions, states not unitary, distributional consequences of policies Question: How should scholars conceptualize economic sanctions? Short Summary: In contrast to scholars who focus on whether sanctions "work," Kirshner argues for microfoundations approach to economic sanctions. To understand the effectiveness of sanctions, scholars must focus on different types of sanctions and their distinct tactical attributes, their differential impact on groups within the target country, and how their effects are filtered through domestic political structures. Summary: Critiques scholars focus on the question of whether sanctions "work." Sanctions should be reconceptualized as a technique of statecraft. Argues for a microfoundations approach to the study of economic sanctions that disaggregates core concepts in literature - "sender," "target", and "sanction". Disaggregating is necessary to understand the utility and relative effectiveness of sanctions because different types of sanctions have distinct tactical attributes, differential impacts on groups within target, and are filtered through domestic political structures. a) Sanctions: Differentiating economic sanctions is crucial because each type has distinct characteristics - trade, aid, finance, currency, and assets b) Sender state: Full range of goals - Sanctions are not simply about compelling the target, but also communicate "sender" preferences, support its allies, deter others from engaging in similar behavior, and dissuade target from expanding objectionable behavior c) Target: States not unitary actors. Should focus on the distributional consequences of sanctions - that is, not how they hurt the target economy as a whole, but particular groups within are affected differentially from sanctions > Key groups: central government and core groups that support regime Mechanisms through which sanctions bring about political change: 1) pressure on gov't and core support groups force target to yield through cost-benefit calculus; 2) pressure leads to overthrow of regime, and 3) differential effects within the central gov't and core groups shifts balance of power within gov't and alters its preferences Cases: US sanctions on Panama in late 1980s • Sanctions led to economic devastation, but not desired political results (collapse of Noriega regime) because they were not sufficiently focused on him and the military. Therefore, the US had to intervene militarily. US sanctions on Dominican Republic in early 1960s • In contrast, tightly focused sanctions in Dominican case had minor effect on overall economy, but achieved political goal (overthrow of Trujillo regime) because they hurt source of wealth for regime - sugar. Additional Notes: - Sanctions as signaling devices: Audiences: constituencies within its own borders, general population of target state, elites in target government, and third parties

Jervis 1976

- Perceptions are key to policy-making and often the cause of conflict. - Deterrence theory can lead to great dangers. - Overestimating aggression of benign states - Underestimating hostility of aggressive states. - These are functions of uncertainty and anarchy - Misreading signals/false perceptions can lead to self-fulfilling prophecies. Security Dilemma: actions taken by one state to increase its own security, threatens the security of other states SD → Spiral model: actions by a state intended to heighten its security, such as increasing its military strength or making alliances, are perceived as threatening to other states, who respond with similar measures, producing tensions that create conflict even when no side really wants it. Example of arms race B/c anarchy, a state might, for defensive purposes, build its military capability. However, since states are not aware of each other's intentions, other states might interpret a defensive buildup as offensive; if so and if offensive action against the state that is only building its defenses is advantageous, the other states might prefer to take an aggressive stance, which will "make the situation unstable". In such situation, an arms race may become a strong possibility Robert Jervis (1976): Perception and Misperception in International Politics, pp. 58-116. • Perceptions of others' intentions are key to policy-making. These perceptions/misperceptions are often the cause of conflict. • Deterrence Theory: Great dangers arise if an aggressor believes that the status quo powers are weak in capability or in resolve. To avoid this states must display the ability and willingness to wage war. • Discusses the dangers of the states falling prey to two pathologies - i. overestimating the hostility of a state with benign intentions, and ii. underestimating the hostility of a state with aggressive and hostile intentions. These two pathologies are functions of the uncertainty about the intentions of the other that marks relations between states. Jervis' concern is that if a state misreads the signals coming from the other side, and misperceives the intentions of its adversary, an initially false image and the reactions that it provokes may infact lead to a self-fulfilling prophecy thereby making the originally false conception become true. • At the heart of this problem lies the security dilemma, which is not necessarily simply a result of imagined threats or misperceptions, but is symptomatic of the anarchic nature of international relations • The perception/misperception calculus in the Security Dilemma also gives rise to the the Spiral Model - When states consider themselves to be benign, but others perceive them to be hostile, thus leading to instability between them. A classic example is the arms race dynamics. Also, when do states have defensive weaponry and when do they have offensive weaponry? What one state considers defensive may be considered offensive by the other------> spiral. • In Chapter 6- Jervis argues that events of the past often give policymakers lessons, which they apply to the present. These learnings sometimes aid

Wendt 1992

- Shouldn't treat interests/identity as given - how does anarchy affect them? - Self-help/power politics do not logically follow from anarchy - they are a result of process and are institutions Identities/interests: relational Actors do not have interests devoid from social context International Relations is socially constructed. Shared ideas determine structures, identities, and interests Institutions - stable set of identities/interests Institutions and identities are mutually constitutive Neorealism and ___ cannot account for changes in the system, but constructivism can.

Schelling 1960

Approach to distributional bargaining -- where what is good for one side is not necessarily good for another "The power to constrain an adversary may depend on the power bind oneself" Hod you make another believe something is true? Make it true. Example of buyers and sellers of home. Not easy to demonstrate your commitment, and some situations make this easier than others.

Drezner 2014

In response to the 2007-8 Great Recession, the system of global economic governance (G-20, IMF, WTO, and other institutions) worked and prevented a global depression. The system helped keep markets open to trade, ensured the supply of liquidity, coordinated macroeconomic policies, and revamped their rules and memberships to better reflect the rise of the advanced developing countries. For example, US, EU, and China adhered to their WTO obligations, ensuring that rest of the world could export to them. World's major central banks coordinated interest-rate cuts to avert a liquidity crisis. And G20 economies coordinated expansionary fiscal policies. China allowed its currency to appreciate in 2010 after international pressure. With respect to revamping rules to better reflect the realities of economic power: G20 supplanted the G7; financial bodies expanded their membership to include Brazil, China, India, and others; IMF moving towards quota reforms to better resemble distribution of world economic power; and World Bank expanded voting power of developing economies. Why did the system work? Power and ideas 1) U.S. was able to exercise effective leadership 2) China supported the rules of global economic governance -- did not act like a revisionist actor, for example by proclaiming a new economic ideology (Beijing Consensus) Note: _ Crisis led to a sharp decline in trade, FDI, and remittances, but soon rebounded to pre-crises levels. _ However, rising inequality, slower growth, and explosion of plutocrats have worsened

Risse-Kappen 1995

Responding to: 1970s debate on transnational relations and state-centered vs. society-dominated distinctions (Katzenstein), Putnam Themes: transnational relations, domestic structures, international institutionalization, policy networks Short Summary: How effective transnational actors will be depends to the domestic structures of the states they aim to influences, as well as the international institutionalization of the relevant issue area. While claiming to bring the transnational back in, the article overlooks the agency of individual actors. Summary: Under what domestic and international circumstances do transnational coalitions and actors who attempt to change policy outcomes in a specific-issue area succeed or fail to achieve their goals? Despite the increased focus and frequency of transnational relations, Risse-Kaplan argues that there is not a clear understanding of the impact of transnational actors on states and IR. He notes that transnational actors do not seem to have the same impact across cases and aims to explain this variation. Instead the impact of transnational actors varies based on 1) differences in domestic structures and 2) the degree of international institutionalization (extent to which the specific issue-area is regulated by bilateral agreements, multilateral regimes, and/or IOs.) Domestic structures determine the availability of channel through which transnational actors can enter political systems, while greater international institutionalization can increase the leverage transnational actors have over domestic politics. Domestic structures mediate policy impact of TNAs: • Centralized state: Difficult to access domestic institutions and leaders, but once access TNAs can have a strong impact on policy • Weak state: Easier to access domestic institutions and leaders, but impact on policy weaker b/c difficult to obtain wide-enough coalition International institutionalization of issue-area mediates impact of TNAs: • Int'l institutions facilitate access to national political processes and emergence of transgovernmental networks • Reduce coalition-building requirements for transnational coalitions Critiques: While claiming to bring the transnational back in, Risse-Kaplan does not give any weight to the agency of transnational actors. The success or failure of their actions is presented as determined by domestic and international structures--the outcome could be predicted before any action is taken. This account does not allow room for innovative strategies or the role of norms and reputation.

Keohane and Nye 1977

Responding to: Realists who think military power is fungible Keywords: power politics, complex interdependence, transnational relations, international regimes Interdependence: the mutual, but not necessarily symmetrical, dependence of states, which expose them to "costly effects" related to sudden change in that relationship. Can be conceived either as a consequence of intentional effects or unguided engagement; it can be characterized by net benefits or by costs. Complex interdependence: multiple channels of action between societies; absence of hierarchy of issues; decline of military force and coercive power. How quickly do changes in one country bring costly changes in another, and how great are the costly effects? 1. Sensitivity: Liability to costly effects imposed from outside before policies are altered to try to change the situation. 2. Vulnerability: an actor's liability to suffer costs imposed by external events even after policies have been altered. Short Summary: "We live in an era of interdependence," and complex interdependence - combined with traditional realist accounts - best captures international political trends today (1970s, 80s). This is an excessively rationalist take on the world. Summary: What concept can best make sense of the world we live in today? Complex interdependence differs from realist accounts in three ways. 1. Multiple channels links societies, stretching between public, private non-governmental, and other actors. These ties impose additional political constraints on state decision-makers, as well as diversifying the interests represented on any one issue; the result is that coalition politics has a decisive impact on international outcomes. 2. The agenda of international issues is not formally structured by dominant states according to hierarchy of priorities and strategic linkages; rather, the agenda is penetrated by different actors, whose capabilities vary according to their issue-specific comparative advantages. These dynamics - epitomized by the interpenetration of domestic, international and transnational interests, deeply circumscribe the state's ability to exert strategic control over the international agenda. 3. The direct utility of military force within interstate relations characterized by complex interdependence, is limited. Military power is not easily fungible into other forms of political, economic or cultural influence. Conclusion: Interdependence is more complicated than a bargaining, cost-based model of using interdependence as a bargaining tool. Applying the wrong image and the wrong rhetoric to problems will lead to erroneous analysis and bad policy. This is why we need the concept "complex interdependence." Critiques: This work relies exclusively on rationalist assumptions. It excludes norms or any ideational factors. It assumes common/perfect knowledge among the actors.

Gourevitch 1978

Responding to: realism Themes: domestic politics, second image reversed, sovereignty, coalitional analysis Short Summary: In his classic response to Waltz, Gourevitch shows how international politics—distributions of power (war) + economic activity (trade)—affect domestic regime type and coalition patterns. Summary: Responding to Waltz (Man, State, War - 1959), Gourevitch argues that international politics — distribution of power (war) + economic activity (trade)—impact domestic regime type and coalition patterns. The methodological implication is that using domestic structure as an independent variable doesn't make sense, since it is in fact being impacted by international politics. Gourevitch's ideas can also be used to critique realism: if international politics shapes domestic politics and state autonomy, then realist assumptions of state sovereignty and full autonomy must also be adjusted. Economic examples: • Gerschenkronian school - the international context of a state's industrialization (whether it is an early/late industrializer) creates different domestic entry costs • Dependency theorists - capitalist system determines state options for regime type and coalition patterns • Wallerstein world systems theory - states 'precipitate' from the international system and can only be understood in the context of a world system Power examples: • Prussia faced greater external threats because of its vulnerable geopolitical location within the international system, and so it developed a strong military and ultimately resulted in the military and monarchy possessing great power (regime type, coalition patterns) He concludes with a plug for the importance of coalitional analysis in understanding states' international behavior. While most of the article looks at international → domestic, he also argues that domestic structures can limit states' range of foreign policy options, and that domestic politics—bargaining games among domestic actors—impacts a state's international economic & foreign policy outcomes. Critiques: □ Krasner: Gourevitch actually looks at two separate impacts of the international system—on coalition patterns (domestic politics) and regime type (domestic authority structures). The first has been easier than the second. (*This is more an observation than a critique)

Christensen 1996

Responding to: realism Themes: power, two-level games Short Summary: Christensen challenges the realist assumption that states can always easily mobilize domestic material resources; he argues that state leaders may manipulate external conflict or use ideological crusades for public mobilization. But his ambiguous definition of 'grand strategy' is stretched to link U.S. & China historical evidence and ignores more particular incidences of such manipulation by leaders. Summary: Christensen argues that realism's emphasis on the material components of national power (e.g. financial capital, industrial production, military) misses the key issue of whether or not state leaders are able to mobilize these resources behind security policy. To create and maintain the national political power necessary for their international security initiatives, state leaders must first mobilize support and resources from the public. In Christensen's general mobilization model, the state's ability to mobilize the public is the key intervening variable between the international challenges it faces and its security strategies. Taking a step further, he argues that leaders may even manipulate external conflict or ideological arguments for domestic mobilization purposes. Mobilization Model - 3 steps: 1. Shifts in int'l power/int'l change → 2. Leaders want to implement (costly) long-term security grand strategies to respond to the shifts/challenges but face domestic hurdles to public and/or resource mobilization → 3. Leaders manipulate external conflict or ideological crusades to achieve the public and/or resource mobilization perceived as necessary to carry out their long-term security grand strategies Critiques: □ Christensen uses an ambiguously defined concept of "grand strategy" to connect his historical evidence from the U.S & China: "the full package of domestic and international policies designed to increase national power and security." What then specifically distinguishes a 'grand strategy' from other sets of policies that are also 'designed to increase national power and security'? □ By only focusing on cases where 'grand strategy' is at stake, he ignores more particular instances where leaders deliberately manipulate conflict to serve domestic or international policy aims.

Tomz 2007

Responding to: theories of iterated play and coordinated bargaining. History matters all the time, not just in cases of tremendous uncertainty. Themes: sovereign debt, reputation, gunboat diplomacy Short summary: States are given credit rates and sovereign debt contracts are sustained based on the reputations states have for repayment. (The argument doesn't consider whether reputations become sticky and doesn't fully rule out an anticipatory role played by threats of sanctions.) Summary: Why do states pay back their debts and why do lenders trust them to do so? Rather than threats of retaliation in future interactions (repeated play) and extrinsic sanctions (issue linkage), Tomz argues that reputation -- and the desire to maintain a good reputation -- is a sufficient explanation for why states repay their debts. Governments and creditors operate in a context of incomplete information about the prospects of repayment and political instability. Creditors use gov'ts' record of (non)repayment and economic circumstances (good or bad) to determine gov't preferences and reputation, which is used to evaluate risks. Governments are divided into three types of reputations based on their record of repayment and economic context: • Stalwarts: Strong preference for debt repayment. Repay during good and bad times. • Fair-weathers: Intermediate preference for debt repayment. Repay during good times, but not bad times. • Lemons: Low preference for debt repayment. Regularly default, even during good times. Reputations shift when a government acts contrary to its perceived type. E.g. fair-weather becomes a lemon when gov't doesn't service debt during good times. To answer why gov'ts would ever act contrary to its reputation (i.e. gov't preferences about about debt shifts), Tomz points to domestic political instability. Thus, he is critical of static-preference models that do not allow for domestic political change via public opinion, ideology, governing coalitions, reforms, revolutions, etc. Using the Great Depression as an example, Tomz suggests that states which make their repayments during hard times are rewarded, but states which fail to make repayments during such crises are not necessarily punished. Additional Notes: -- Def: Reputation of an actor is the impression others hold about its preferences and abilities. Critiques: -- Tomz claims his theory can account for change in political preferences of states; however, he does not consider how sticky reputations may be. There is a potential contradiction in his argument in that if reputations are paramount, even if political conditions change, states should be hesitant to default and potentially harm their future opportunities for investment. Additionally, once a state earns a specific reputation, can we be certain that new information will be processed without bias? How long is the lag between preference changes and reputation changes? Tomz references a probationary period for changed preferences, but are states likely willing to wait this out? -- Additionally, while Tomz demonstrates that creditor sanctions and gunboat diplomacy have rarely been used to enforce debt contracts, he does not rule out the possibility that the threats of such sanctions impacted state behavior.

Bapat and Kwon 2015

Responds to the puzzle of why economic sanctions appear to be ineffective tools of coercive bargaining. Using a game theoretic approach, they argue that a sanctioning state's ("sender") decision to impose sanctions and their effectiveness are a function of its firms' share of the sanctioned state's ("target") market, and predict a curvilinear effect on the probability that sanctions succeed in changing the behavior of the target. They find that sanctions are most likely to be effective when the sanctioning state's firms control a moderate (as opposed to low or high) share of the target's market, but sanctions are unlikely to be observed under this condition. Because the target state anticipates that the sanctions are enforceable (i.e. the firms lack sufficiently strong incentives to risk the costs of evading them) and can damage its economy, it acquiesces before the sender imposes them. This "selection effect," Bapat and Kwon contend, explains the lack of empirical support for the effectiveness of sanctions imposition in the literature. Moreover, they find statistical support for the curvilinear pattern derived from their game theoretic model in the context of OECD government sanctions.

Jervis 1976

Security Dilemma: actions taken by one state to increase its own security, threatens the security of other states SD → Spiral model: actions by a state intended to heighten its security, such as increasing its military strength or making alliances, are perceived as threatening to other states, who respond with similar measures, producing tensions that create conflict even when no side really wants it. Example of arms race B/c anarchy, a state might, for defensive purposes, build its military capability. However, since states are not aware of each other's intentions, other states might interpret a defensive buildup as offensive; if so and if offensive action against the state that is only building its defenses is advantageous, the other states might prefer to take an aggressive stance, which will "make the situation unstable". In such situation, an arms race may become a strong possibility Robert Jervis (1976): Perception and Misperception in International Politics, pp. 58-116. • Perceptions of others' intentions are key to policy-making. These perceptions/misperceptions are often the cause of conflict. • Deterrence Theory: Great dangers arise if an aggressor believes that the status quo powers are weak in capability or in resolve. To avoid this states must display the ability and willingness to wage war. • Discusses the dangers of the states falling prey to two pathologies - i. overestimating the hostility of a state with benign intentions, and ii. underestimating the hostility of a state with aggressive and hostile intentions. These two pathologies are functions of the uncertainty about the intentions of the other that marks relations between states. Jervis' concern is that if a state misreads the signals coming from the other side, and misperceives the intentions of its adversary, an initially false image and the reactions that it provokes may infact lead to a self-fulfilling prophecy thereby making the originally false conception become true. • At the heart of this problem lies the security dilemma, which is not necessarily simply a result of imagined threats or misperceptions, but is symptomatic of the anarchic nature of international relations • The perception/misperception calculus in the Security Dilemma also gives rise to the the Spiral Model - When states consider themselves to be benign, but others perceive them to be hostile, thus leading to instability between them. A classic example is the arms race dynamics. Also, when do states have defensive weaponry and when do they have offensive weaponry? What one state considers defensive may be considered offensive by the other------> spiral. • In Chapter 6- Jervis argues that events of the past often give policymakers lessons, which they apply to the present. These learnings sometimes aid

Keohane and Nye 1977

Sensitivity and vulnerability to "costly" effects of sudden change. Multiple channels of interactions no hierarchy of issues by state interests. Density of linkages between issues and levels of ators. Military power decreasing utility and not fungible Interdependence is more complicated than bargaining

Keck and Sikkink 1998

Short Summary: Argue that transnational advocacy networks have influenced government behavior, particularly in context of human rights violations by states, through a "boomerang pattern" -- domestic NGOs bypass their state and rely on international allies to bring pressure on their states from outside. Detailed Summary: Transnational advocacy networks - forms of organization that link actors across national boundaries who work together on an issue and who are bound together by shared values, common discourse, and dense exchanges of information. Sharing and mobilization of information is key to linking actors across space. Major actors: INGOs and NGOs, social movements, media, parts of gov't, churches, labor unions, intellectuals, etc. Boomerang Pattern: Domestic NGOs bypass their state and search for international allies to bring pressure on their states from outside • State A blocks redress to domestic organizations within it; these organizations activate transnational advocacy networks, whose members pressure their own states and/or intergovernmental organizations to pressure State A Tactics transnational advocacy networks for persuasion, socialization, and press: 1. Information politics - ability to quickly and credibly generate politically usable information 2. Symbolic politics - appeal to audience through symbols, actions, or stories 3. Leverage politics - call upon powerful actors to affect situation through material and moral leverage a. Material power (military and economic aid) b. Moral leverage - "naming and shaming", reputation, etc. 4. Accountability politics - hold powerful actors to their stated policies or principles Conditions under which advocacy networks have influence: • Note: States of influence: 1) Issue creation and agenda-setting, 2) Influence on discursive positions of states and international organizations, 3) Influence on institutional procedures, and 4) Influence on policy change in "target actors" • Networks have been most effective ... o Issue characteristics: issues involving bodily harm to individuals *(especially when there is a short-term and clear causal chain assigning responsibility) and involving legal equality of opportunity o Actor characteristics: Networks are dense, with many actors, strong connections among groups within network, and reliable info flows Critiques: • Treats media as an "essential partner" in network information politics. But the media is not politically neutral. The relationship between activists and media is often contentious or non-existent, despite attempts of activists to use the media

Schultz and Weinglas 2003

Short Summary: B/c constraints on liberal gov't increases likelihood that state will honor its debts, they have greater access to credit than their nondemocratic rivals. This allows them to sustain war-fighting and arms races, without imposing sudden growth-harming taxation. Summary: Access to debt finance is a source of power that helps explain outcomes in international competition between hegemonic rivals. State-lender relationship marred by a problem: creditors lack means of enforcement to ensure that states pay-back their debts ("theory of sovereign debt"). B/c constraints on liberal gov't increases likelihood that state will honor its debts, they have greater access to credit than their nondemocratic rivals. This allows them to sustain war-fighting and arms races, without imposing sudden growth-harming taxation. In short, institutional constraints provide a competitive advantage for liberal democracies in sustained international conflict against illiberal states. Mechanisms of institutional constraints: -- Institutions allow states to make credible commitments (i.e. tie their hands) to lenders, thus reducing the risk for lenders. 1) Legislatures provide low-cost mechanisms for sanctioning leaders who default (e.g. "power over the purse" and "veto players") 2) Elections allow selectorates to punish leaders who renege on their agreements via audience cost-type mechanism. Incentive to punish b/c default is costly to the economy. Therefore, liberal democracies are better able to access finance, with lower interests rates, than illiberal states, which aid financing large wars and long arms races

Evangelista 1997

Short Summary: Domestic structure matters for IR and has the potential to bridge between realist and liberal approaches, act as an intervening variable, and explain global change. The distinction made between strong and weak structures may be too coarse. Summary: • Domestic structure approach links domestic and international levels of analysis by focusing on state-society relations as the nexus of the two. Strength of approach: comparative foreign policy -- answering why states that face similar international pressures and constraints respond very differently. • Why are domestic explanations of international change necessary? o Domestic Structure as a Theoretical Bridge: Katzenstein's study of the responses of the US and France to the 1970s energy crisis is used as an example of how state strength (in terms of the autonomy of central decision-makers from society) determines whether state behavior resembles realist or liberal accounts. ♣ Strong state vis a vis society → realist accounts more apt ♣ Weak state and strong society → liberal accounts more apt ♣ Evangelista's own work on nuclear policies is used to demonstrate that similar principles apply in the realm of international security. o Domestic Structure as Intervening Variable: The responses of Poland and Romania to the 1970s oil crises are used to show that domestic structure can be an intervening variable between domestic politics and foreign policy. Domestic structures in these cases include not only state-society interactions, but also the relationship of state and society to the Communist Party. o Domestic Structure and Global Change: Domestic structures are needed to account for the manner in which changes in the international environment are diffused throughout the system. Publics respond to international stimuli, which are filtered through domestic structures in particular countries and result in foreign policies that eventually produce new interactions among states. It is important to note that Evangelista means domestic structure in the literal sense--he is focused on domestic institutions and their degree of power relative to society. In sum, domestic institutions determine how open states are to international influences and their flexibility in responding to international challenges. Critiques: This is largely a review article which provides a typology for understanding how domestic structure can matter. It could be argued that the strong state/weak state distinction Evangelista uses is too coarse of a division. This chapter does not provide an exhaustive account of the influences of domestic politics, but it also doesn't present itself as such.

Kirshner 2003

Summary: Monetary phenomena (financial liberalization, inflation policy, and central bank independence) are always political! Although market forces exert strong pressures and constrain policy choices and reforms, economic theories are indeterminate; they offer no unambiguous choice as to which policy/reform is the best -- i.e. market forces insufficient to explain policy decisions. Must account for politics to understand decisions on monetary policy, as there are a plausible range of policies/reforms. Three political factors: 1. ideas -- shape beliefs and circumscribe some behaviors: a. beliefs about causal relationships and ideology -- beliefs hardened as "articles of faith" -- skew ways policymakers understand and react to problems; b. norms influence notions of appropriate behavior (ex: states want strong currencies) c. Ideas can be self-confirming, giving legitimacy to winners and masking distributional conflicts 2. interest group conflict -- distributional consequences and political implications of monetary policy for groups and actors within societies . Aggregate data misleading. Composition/distribution of growth, etc. more revealing than aggregate 3. state power -- states seek autonomy, pursue strategic interests, and negotiative over sharing burdens over adjustments Puzzle: Why do states favor deflationary bias in monetary policies, accepting pain of aggressive disinflation rather than risk the uncertain but modest cost of a bit more inflation? • Central banks faith in benefits of low inflation and relationship with Central bankers and financial sector Examples: inflation policy, central bank independence, and capital deregulation • Lack of empirical evidence that moderate levels of inflation have negative effects on real economic performance. Yet, deflationary bias and central bank independence rest on the article of faith that inflation is harmful • Very little evidence that capital account deregulation is always beneficial Case: Asian Financial Crisis • Can not explain IMF and US behavior based on economic theory -- capital deregulation good for recovery o Malaysia - capital controls and recovered better than counterparts o South Korea and Thailand - IMF reforms • IMF committed to faith in capital deregulation, despite Malaysian performance. Interpreted crisis as failure of state-capitalist model, too interventionist. Pressured for sweeping reforms for S. Korea unrelated to crisis, e.g. restrictions on foreign ownership of land, reduce trade barriers and limits on FDI • US geopolitical interests -- use crisis to increase its influence and dominance in Asia. IMF instrument of US policy. US opposed Asian Monetary Fund proposed by Japan to prevent IMF-alternative

Li and Resnick 2003

Summary: Democratic institutions generate competing effects on FDI inflows into developing countries: 1. They hinder FDI inflows by restraining the oligopolistic or monopolistic behaviors of MCNS, by protecting domestic enterprises from competition, and by constraining host governments' ability to offer generous incentives to foreign investors. 2. They promote FDI inflows by ensuring more credible property rights protection and reducing risks for foreign investors. Finding: 1) Democratic institutions reduce FDI inflows in developing countries. 2) Property rights protection increases FDI inflows

Fearon 1994

Summary: Fearon creates a model to show the way that domestic audience costs implicate the way leaders make decisions in cases of international crisis. He finds that the higher the audience costs, the less likely it is that a state will back down once it has made an initial decision to escalate. International crises: When one state resists a threat or demand made by another, with both taking actions suggesting that they may resolve the dispute with military force. 2 key facets of international crises: 1. at each moment of a state can attack, back down, or further escalate 2. if a state backs down, its leaders experience audience costs that increase as the crisis escalates (because of domestic audiences concerned with success of foreign policy) 3 reasons Fearon's conceptualization of crises is "good (according to Fearon)": 1. it's a better way to ask why war occurs. A better model will explain learning and changing perceptions during a crisis, and how that impacts the decision to go to war 2. formal model finds that regardless of initial conditions, states that are more sensitive to audience costs are less likely to back down. This also clarifies the importance of information. States with high public audience costs are more likely to able to clearly communicate their intentions. 3. international crises are different from classic wars of attrition (in the business sense) for 2 reasons: a. states don't have to back down or escalate, they can choose to attack b. only the side that backs down suffers audience costs (in the short-term) Fearon argues that crises are public events carried out in front of domestic political audiences and that inter-state understandings of those costs during crises are key to learning about an opponent's willingness to use force in a dispute. Key facet of crises is that they have horizons, levels at which war is inevitable after the horizon has been breached, because (in some part) of domestic audience costs. Before the horizon has been breached, there is an incentive to settle due to the fear of facing an adversary that will resort to war Failure of diplomacy can occur because while states have incentives to seek out the preferences of other states, to find out if there is room for agreement, they also have incentives to misrepresent their own preferences to try and create a more favorable settlement. 2 types of costs to backing down 1. domestic/international political costs 2. whatever additional costs were incurred by threats, etc. during the crisis historical norms seem to say that a leader who deploys troops and backs down will lose more support than one that does not stand up in the first place. The reason is that one that stands firm in an international crisis is "engaging the national honor," so the leader is perceived to have 'dishonored' the country if they back down. Lack of complete information makes it tough to know when the point of no return for another leader is, creating incentives to escalate a crisis in hopes that one can force the other side to back down. However, standing firm increases domestic audience costs, making it harder to back down in the future. Key implications of the model: 1. the higher the audience costs, the less likely a state is to back down. This means that even if the decision to escalate a crisis is difficult to come by in a democracy, once that decision occurs it is relatively solid, compared to a regime with lower audience costs. 2. the higher the audience costs, the less likely a leader is to initiate an international crisis in the first place. 3. if audience costs are large, fewer escalatory steps are required to credibly demonstrate intentions 4. explains why democracies are more likely to escalate against non-democracies than against democracies??? 2 other implications of model 1. 'weaker' side in a dispute isn't necessarily less likely to back down, because it's less likely to get involved in the crisis in the first place (i.e. more likely to concede). Means that if it DOES get involved in a crisis, it probably has substantial interests in a favorable outcome. 2. observable measures of the balance of interests/capabilities should be unrelated to the probability that a state backs down once both have chosen to escalate This could answer realist arguments about how democratic leaders are constrained in games of realpolitik; because they can more credibly signal intentions and commit to courses of action than other regimes, they may be better able to "cope with the security dilemma."

Nelson 2014

Summary: IMF gives preferential lending to borrowing countries whose key economic policy-makers share similar beliefs with IMF officials -- neoliberalism. When fellow neoliberals control top economic policy positions, IMF loans are larger, conditionality is weaker, and enforcement is less rigid. That is, IMF's organizational culture (e.g. social scripts and logic of appropriateness) influence its lending practices.

Beaulie et al 2012

Summary: Past studies have found that democracies received better prices for credit (i.e. lower interest rates). They find a dual democratic advantage -- better prices and better access to international debt markets compared to autocracies (who often self-select out of bond markets because they know they cannot find tolerable prices).

Lienau 2008

Summary: Two dominant conceptions of sovereignty in the context of questions over who is responsible for a state's sovereign debt: 1) Statist: Successive governments are responsible for debts taken on by previous government. 2) Popular democratic: citizens are not responsible for debts taken on by their governments unless they give consent. Argues for an intermediate, rule of law-based conception of sovereignty in the context of sovereign debt. For a government's sovereign debt to be valid and binding, it must follow its own internal rule of law and the action must serve a legitimate governmental purpose. Thus, if either condition is not met, successive governments may have cause to default on debt. Additional Notes: • Creditor-side moral hazard -- A strict statist alleviates creditors of any due dilligence over what the funds will be used for... encourages greater lending to governments, regardless of how the funds are put to use. E.g. personal enrichment. • Sovereign gov't is both constituted and constrained by law, not exceptional in the sense of being "above the law."

Kim 2005

Summary: U.S. covert campaign in Chile violates normative explanation for DP. Critical of 1,000 battle deaths per year cut-off. US covert action highly destructive.

Keohane 1984

Themes: cooperation, international regimes, hegemonic stability theory Question: Why do states cooperate under anarchy? Why do they comply with agreements? Do they affect state behavior? And is hegemony necessary for cooperation to occur? Scope condition: Cooperation in world political economy among advanced market-economies (ignores North-South and East-West relations) Summary: Why do states cooperate under anarchy? • Assumes that states are rational egoists - they seek wealth and security. States build international regimes in order to promote mutually beneficial cooperation. International regimes (clusters of principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures) reduce transaction costs for states, alleviate problems of asymmetrical information, and limit the degree of uncertainty that members of the regime face in evaluating each others' policies. • Note: Information is a key variable that reduces uncertainty. Why do states comply with agreements? • Despite lack of enforcement of regimes, two reasons for compliance: o States value the institution enough to cooperate even when they prefer not to (in a single instance) so as to maintain the institution. o States know that failure to comply now may lead to retaliation by others playing tit-for-tat. Moreover, states involved in iterated interactions worry about reputation, as it affects opportunities for future cooperation. All we need assume for these mechanisms to work is that (a) states value future interactions and (b) states keep track of who reneges (they monitor one another). Do they affect state behavior? • Moreover, regimes exert influence on state policies by changing the costs and benefits of alternative actions. Thus, they do not override self-interest, but rather affect calculations of self-interest. Is hegemony necessary for cooperation under anarchy to occur? • Despite "state of war," anarchy, and decline of U.S. hegemony, cooperation persists. Although hegemony can facilitate cooperation, it is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for cooperation. Common interests also insufficient, as they can lead to cooperation and discord. For cooperation to occur, there must be the possibility for mutual gain and institutions that reduce uncertainty and limit asymmetries in information. • Challenges hegemonic stability theory Def of cooperation: mutual adjustment (not common interests) Criticism: ◦ unitary states -- interests and existence of common interest taken as given (6): does not explore the processes through which parochial and common interests get defined ◦ does not explore ideas

Rosato 2003

Themes: democratic peace, US dominance Summary: Accepts that democracies do not fight each other. But does not find empirical support for the two causal logics -- normative and institutional. • Liberal democracies do not reliably externalize their domestic norms of conflict resolution, and they do not trust and respect each other when interests clash. • Democratic leaders are not especially accountable to dovish societal groups, not slow to mobilize for war, and democratic competition does not necessarily reveal information about its resolve. Concludes by suggesting that democratic peace is spurious: There is an "imperial peace based on American power." DP restricted to Americas and Western Europe -- regions dominated by U.S. Implication is that DP should hold during postwar period b/c US superpower.

Owen 1994

Themes: democratic peace, causes of war/peace, institutions and norms Summary: Democratic institutions and liberal norms work together to bring about democratic peace -- neither is sufficient on its own. As he writes, "liberal ideas proscribe wars among democracies, and democratic institutions ensure that this proscription is followed." Liberal ideas (independent variable) → liberal ideology and domestic democratic institutions (intervening variables) → foreign policy decisions produce DP. Role of perceptions crucial: For liberal ideology to produce constraints on democratic governments, liberal political elites and/or "opinion leaders" must recognize the other state as a liberal democracy. What if illiberals hold office? Liberals use democratic institutions to block illiberals' push for war -- free speech to express opposition (preventing public support) and competitive elections to punish hawkish leaders. Criticisms • Elitist model: public is passive recipient of arguments by liberals and illiberals. • Why will public be convinced by liberals? What if public is highly hawkish?

Mansfield and Snyder 1995

Themes: democratic peace, democratic transitions Summary: Finds statistical evidence that democratizing states are more likely to fight wars than mature democracies or stable autocracies. Also, partial democracies that backslide into autocracies are more likely to fight wars than states with stable regimes. Why? Threatened elites from collapsing autocratic regime use nationalist appeals to mobilize masses. These elite groups resort to prestige strategies in foreign affairs to enhance their authority, which increases the likelihood of war. Partial democracies lack institutional constraints to prevent this nationalist saber-rattling.

Levy 1986

Themes: domestic politics (military organization), causes of war Summary: • Organizational routines (Standard Operating Procedures) of militaries can lead to war. Eg. World War I. While the routines do not cause war, they can contribute to the outbreak of war • Mobilization sets in action certain course of events that lead to war. • Eg. in 1914, the German Schlieffen Plan sought to attack and defeat France first and then face Russia on the eastern front. This would be facilitated by Russia's slow mobilization.However, the path to do this was through Belgium, an attack on which would bring Britain into the war as well. Russia would seek to defend France and that's how WWI proceeded. Levy argues this was because of the German mobilization plan. • Levy finds evidence that if Germans simply attacked Russia, France and Britain would have remained neutral. The Kaiser wanted to do this, but General Moltke (Army chief) refused. This change in plan would throw the whole army into a disarray. There would have to be a rigid adherence to the existing plans, and this led to war.

Peceny et al 2002

Themes: domestic politics, authoritarian regimes Question: Is there an authoritarian peace? Summary: Disaggregate authoritarian regimes into three types: personalistic dictatorships, single-party regimes, and military regimes. Find that authoritarian regimes were less likely to engage in MIDs than mixed dyads. No pair of personalistic nor military regimes fought wars since WWII. SIngle-party regimes less likely to conflict with each other than mixed dyads. Mechanisms: Dictatorial regimes - weak militaries because they threaten regime Single-party regimes - shared norms, e.g. socialism and communism Military regimes - more focused on internal security Criticisms: • Mechanisms thinly specified and not backed with sufficient historical evidence

Snyder and Borghard 2011

Themes: domestic politics, regimes, audience costs, international crises Question: Do citizens disapprove of their leaders when they make explicit threats but renege? Put differently, is there evidence for audience cost mechanisms? Summary: Investigating "most likely" cases for audience costs mechanism in context of post-WWII international crises, find that audience costs mechanisms largely inoperative for four reasons: 1) leaders rarely make unambiguous threats because they view it as imprudent -- prefer flexibility, 2) domestic publics care more about overall policy substance than consistency between words and deeds, 3) domestic public concern over reputation for resolve ("credibility") largely independent of whether leader has made explicit threat; and 4) authoritarian leaders do not understand domestic audience cost mechanism the way theorists do. Only find evidence for audience costs when public favors hard-line policies and when public pressures leaders to make threats. Cases: most-likely design _ 1956 Suez crisis: British and French publics did not punish leaders for failing to act on their threats against Egypt's seizure of canal _ 1979 Iran Hostage: Carter punished for weakness and incompetence, not for gap between his words and deeds _ Cuban Missile Crisis: public concern about reputation costs, not gap between words and deeds _ Sino-Indian war

Lake 2013

Themes: hierarchy, domestic politics Summary: Hierarchy benefits subordinate countries, but has interstate and intrastate distributional consequences for domestic ruling coalitions and regime types. a) When gains of hierarchy are large and favor subordinate states, or their societies embrace policy preferences similar to those of U.S., greater likelihood that hierarchy will be broadly legitimate and stable and that subordinates will more likely be democratic. Virtuous cycle: Large gains from U.S. hierarchy that are widely distributed in society lead to policy convergence with U.S., leading to greater cooperation. Ex: Western Europe b) When gains are small and benefits concentrated within collaborationist elite, or policy preferences of median citizen are far from those of U.S, hierarchy will be less broadly legitimate, subordinate regimes more likely to be autocrat. Vicious cycle: Small gains from hierarchy captured by collaborationist elite and used to suppress domestic dissent, increase dependence of ruling elite on U.S. and increase anti-Americanism of political opposition. Ex: Latin America and Middle East Implications for Balance of Power: For dominant state (hegemon) to maintain stable regional hierarchy, must provide political orders that are valuable to elites and selectorate. Potential for defiance, perhaps even counter-balancing, higher in states led by narrow, collaborationist autocratic elites, if they are removed from power by opposition.

Reus-Smit 2011

Themes: institutions, Responds to: realists who argue great powers are the principal architects of the international system Question: What explains the waves of expansion of modern state system (systemic expansion), in particular the Westphalian settlement, independence of Latin America, and post-1945 decolonization? Summary: Emphasizes subject people's (subaltern) struggles for recognition of individual rights during the process of systemic expansion. Central problem for empires: How to legitimate imperial hierarchy and regimes of unequal social entitlements? (Empires - systems of rule based asymmetrical distribution of power b/w imperial state and peripheral polities and unequal distribution of social power b/w metropolitan citizens and colonial subjects. Unequal distribution of social power institutionalized in regimes of unequal entitlements.) Causal Sequence: Ideas about individual rights → crisis of imperial legitimacy (i.e. challenge to legitimacy of regime of unequal entitlements sustaining imperial hierarchy) → struggle for sovereignty → imperial breakdown and waves of expansion of sovereign state system Cases: Holy Roman Empire → Westphalian settlement of 1648 Spanish empire → Latin American independence during opening decades of 19th century European colonies → post-1945 decolonization Significance: • Challenges Kupchan's and Ikenberry's US-centric explanation of postwar international order • Postcolonial states played important role in the development of the international human rights regime -- Promoted civil and political rights (liberal ideas) more strongly than US and other Western powers. • They imposed "reputational costs" on these states • Situations struggle for human rights much broader historical trajectory • Power of ideas and int'l law/norms: ideas about individual rights a) foment crises of legitimacy, b) provide discursive resource over debates about legitimate political authority, and c) constitute "deal breakers", i.e. limits on domain of acceptable possibilities

Abbot and Snidal 2000

Themes: int'l law (soft and hard), rationalism Question: Under what conditions do states choose soft law over hard law? Summary: Soft law important in shaping state behavior, not only as a stepping stone to hard law. States face trade-off between choosing levels of legalization. Hard law agreements reduce the costs of operating within a legal framework by strengthening commitments and reducing transaction costs, but they are harder to reach due to greater sovereignty costs. Soft law agreements, on the other hand, can not achieve all the benefits of hard law. But they are easier to achieve for several reasons: lower sovereignty costs, mitigates concern over uncertainty, and more flexible which allows states to modify the agreement as learning occurs. Hard vs. Soft law: obligation, precision, and delegation Benefits of soft law: • lower contracting costs • lower sovereignty costs • mitigates concern over uncertainty Benefits of hard law: • credible commitments: enhances credibility through constraining self-serving interpretations, increasing costs of reneging (esp when linked to broader regime), enhancing enforcement, fixing consequences, domesticating commitments, establishing a discourse that requires justification and persuasion • reducing transaction costs of subsequent interactions • modify political strategies with respect to international agreements

Nexon and Wright 2007

Themes: structural heterogeneity, regions Short Summary: Argues for structurally heterogeneous conception of international system. Systems with preeminent power consist of unipolar, hegemonic, and imperial structural relations. They differ in density of ties b/w units, and generate different behavioral dynamics. U.S. has moved away from imperial relations, but maintains elements of all three. Exs: U.S.-Europe relations are "constitutional" hegemonic, but U.S.-Latin America relations are imperial (indirect) and hegemonic. Note: Conceives as structure from a network perspective. Detailed Summary: • Unipolarity: States are unitary actors operating in an anarchic environment. o Network structure -- Interstate ties are weak and sparse. o Behavioral dynamic: Concentration of power leads to balancing. • Hegemony: States are unitary actors operating in anarchic and hierarchical environment. o Constitutional hegemonic order: Organized around agreed-upon rules that limit exercise of power. Ex: U.S.-Western Europe relations o Network structure -- More interstate ties and interdependence b/w hegemon and lesser powers and be/w lesser powers. o Behavioral dynamic: Stability of hegemonic order depends on hegemon's ability to maintain its economic, military, and technological dominance; perceptions of potential challengers; and propensity of hegemonic overextension. • Empire: Hierarchical relations between core and periphery in which empire rules through intermediaries and engages in heterogenous contracting between core and peripheral political communities. o Network structure -- Dense ties b/w imperial core and periphery, but very weak ties b/w peripheral political units (hub-and-spoke) ♣ Imperial core functions as broker b/w peripheries o Ex: U.S.-Latin America relations (combination of indirect rule and hegemony) o Divide-and-rule (exploit divisions) to prevent spread of resistance and countervailing coalitions in order to maintain hierarchy. Balance-of-power dynamics: Actors form countervailing coalitions to prevent rising power. Maintains anarchy.

Monteiro 2011/2012

Themes: unipolarity, causes of war, balancing Questions: Why does balancing occur under conditions of unipolarity? And why has the unipolar period been exceptionally conflict-ridden, despite the dominant power's presumable capacity to subdue dynamics that lead to conflict? Summary: Unipolar period conflict-ridden, not between great powers, but between great power and other states -- US has been at war for over half the unipolar period (Kuwait, 1991; Kosovo, 1999; Afghanistan, 2001; Iraq, 2003). Unipolar structure generates "conflict-producing mechanisms" based on all strategies pursued by unipole -- defensive and offensive dominance strategies and disengagement. • Defensive-dominance strategy (unipole preserves status quo) → conflict between great power and "recalcitrant" minor powers, i.e. states dissatisfied with status quo and do not accommodate unipole. o Uncertainty about unipole's intentions causes recalcitrant powers to balancing internally (external balancing not an option), leading unipole to wage preventive war. o Uncertainty about unipole's willingness to oppose small changes to status quo cause minor powers to attempt them, leading to conflict. • Offensive-dominance strategy (unipole changes status quo) → conflict between great power and recalcitrant minor powers. o Unipole makes revisionist demands recalcitrant powers unwilling to accept, leading to war. o Recalcitrant powers balance internally for security, leading to conflict. • Disengagement (unipole avoids interfering with balance of power in other regions) → conflict among other states. • Regional competition leads to wars between minor and major powers. Disagrees with Brooks and Wohlforth that balancing doesn't occur under conditions of unipolarity b/c it is "prohibitively costly" for states. Critique: • Are US wars due to mechanisms described above? Afghanistan and Iraq were responses to 9/11 and threat from non-state actors -- "recalcitrant" - unipole dynamics

Walt 1999

Three criteria are especially important: 1) precision and consistency; 2) originality; 3) empirical validity - should be possible to compare to its predictions against appropriate evidence. Rational choice theory - individualistic - outside result from individual choices; each actor seeks to maximize its subjective expected utility; specification of actors' preferences is subject to certain constraints - complete and transitive. Constructing a formal theory requires analysts to specify theory requires analysts to specify the structure of the game. Once the game in fully specified, the analysts usually looks for its equilibrium. Assessing formal theory. Formalization is neither necessary nor sufficient for scientific progress. Formal models are not a pre-requisite for internal validity. Also, complete logical consistency is neither necessary, nor sufficient for scientific progress and the empirical predictions one draws may depend on the particular solution concept that is employed. Formal models have become "less user friendly" with very high opportunity costs involved in relying on any one particular analytic approach. If formalization were to produce policy-relevant knowledge, and other approaches wouldn't, we might disregard these costs Methodological overkill; old wine in new bottles. Very elaborate formal machinery does not necessarily produce very interesting findings formal theory enjoys no particular advantage as a source of theoretical activity mere logical consistency is not sufficient. There also needs to be external validity.

Moravcsik 1997

Topics: Domestic politics - State and its Constituents (Interest Groups) Question: What are the micro-foundations of Liberal Theory? Proposes a set of core assumptions on which liberal theory is based (aka. micro- foundations of liberal theory): • Primacy of Societal Actors: Fundamental Actors in International Politics are individual and Private Groups-rational and risk averse - promote differentiated interests. (bottom-up view) • States Represent a Subset of Domestic Society: The State is a representative institution-a 'transmission belt' through which preferences and social power of individuals and groups are translated into state policy- in extreme cases this empowers narrow bureaucratic classes/dictators like Pol Pot and Stalin. (basically societal pressures can influence state preferences) • Configuration of interdependent state preferences determines state behavior: There are constraints imposed on a state behavior by the preferences of other states. So the international system does matter by creating constraints. • State preferences may also reflect patterns of transnational societal interaction. • Based on the above assumptions there are 3 different kinds of liberalism: o Ideational Liberalism: Views domestic social identities and values as a basic determinant of state preferences. o Commercial Liberalism: Market incentives influence the collective and individual behavior of states. o Republican Liberalism: Privileged societal groups can 'capture' the state government when political representation is biased in favor of particularistic groups. Problem with neoliberal institutionalism (and realism): state preferences as fixed and exogenous

Van Evera 1999

• (2 liner)War is caused by national-level misperception of the fine-grained structure of international power. BUT, the explanation that (mis)perceptions of power and not actual power causes war does not sound like a realist argument, which Van Evera purports it to be. • Van Evera, incorporates the beliefs of leaders and their misperceptions while expanding the explanatory power of realism. In doing so, van Evera unwittingly demonstrates that balance of power is not only material in nature, but also is a result of ideas and social construction. • The hypotheses around which the book is based are, i. war is more likely when states have a false optimism about their ability to win, ii. war is more likely when there is an offense advantage as this leads states to conduct preemptive strikes, iii. Shifts in relative power of states create windows of opportunity for war, iv. War is more likely when resources are cumulative, and v. war is likely when conquest becomes easy • What causes war? The answer: national-level misperception of the fine-grained structure of international power and the actual structure of war. States react to what they perceive. In modern time, there haven't been cases of major first mover advantages or power fluctuations; however, states have wrongly misjudged these things, leading to war. • Van Evera situates himself in the realist camp (state-centric, power-focused). He calls his version "misperception fine-grained structural realisms" [others place him in defensive realism category]. He feels that realism will be more effective if we shift focus from gross to fine grained power and from actual power to national perceptions of power. • Links to other readings: all structural realists (Waltz, etc.); those who discuss balance of power and power shifts, like Levy, Gilpin, and Snyder.

Kuzeimko and Werker 2006

• A country's U.S. aid and U.N. aid increases substantially (by 59% from the US, and 8% from the UN) when it rotates into the UN Security Council (five of the council's 15 seats are permanent, the rest rotate for 2 year terms) • Rotating members are able to extract rents in exchange for their votes on the UNSC. Empirical data support this bribery hypothesis • This suggests that vote-buying at the UNSC could be a thing, and reinforces the assumption that the UNSC is a corrupt institution. • Foreign aid can be a tool for bribery and vote buying

Abdelal, Blythe, and Parson 2010

• A purely materialist view of theory is not tenable. The political economy literature needs to consider the fact that economies may vary for nonmaterial reasons. • Need to engage with constructivism because it emphasizes nonmaterial influences on both institutions and practices. • Social construction matters basically.

Hafner-Burton et. al 2009

• Responds to Realists who think power is derived solely from individual attributes and not from social (inter-state) ties • Network analysis can be a powerful tool for analyzing how networks - defined broadly as interactions between agents - create structures, regulate behavior, and build influence in the international arena; its alternative understanding of power challenges mainstream theories in IR. • Developed in sociology, network analysis operationalizes interactions between nodes or agents within networks to formulate arguments about their behavior. • Three principles of network analysis: 1. Nodes are mutually dependent; 2. Ties serve as channels for transmission of both material and non-material products; 3. The patterns of association among nodes create structures that can define, enable or restrict their behavior of nodes. • Network analysis considers the degree, closeness and betweeness of centrality of each node. • In general, nodes can use network power to enhance or exploit their position within the network or reinforce or counterbalance other forms of power. There are three types of power: social (or access), broker and exit. • Social power is similar to the degree centrality measure; it emphasizes the relationship between number and strength of connections, on the one hand, and increased access to resources, information and decision-making on the other. • Broker power gives advantage to those nodes that bridge structural gaps and interact with otherwise weakly associated nodes. • Exit power concerns the capacity a node has to de-link from the network; it is characteristic of nodes in the periphery. / IR scholars should import the tool of network analysis to make better sense of international relations.

Abdelal 2007

• The Washington Consensus, though primarily thought of as US led and driven was European led. France was particularly important. • The rise of global financial markets in the last decades of the twentieth century was premised on the idea that capital ought to flow across country borders with minimal restrictions and regulation. The IMF began to informally promote capital liberalization and institutions like the EU and the OECD all allowed cross border flows of capital • This trend was a change from the rules that were written for the international financial system in the 1940s and the 1950s. These rules were more restrictive of capital flows • The US approach to globalization has been neither organized nor rule based. It has been very ad-hoc. Most of the liberal rules however were conceived of and promoted by European policymakers • US behaved in a more bilateral way because they didn't want to bind themselves.This was in keeping with realist logic. They did not want to compromise on their power and autonomy. • The EU was more multilateral - French and German motivations were to lock the US in - which is in keeping with realist logic. However, there is a strong domestic politics and ideology related story in the French case. i. By the mid 1980s French left thought that the capital controls hurt middle class The French thus learn from crises. Abdelal focuses on the processes of social learning after financial crises. • The EU and the OECD were norm entrepreneurs and informed the expectations of the financial markets • Other countries conformed to capital mobility for identity related reasons. They wanted to be seen as European --which is why they go along with the rules being set up. This reflects the constitutive effects of institutions

Price 1998

• The conventional wisdom is that the high politics of security is where the state is most autonomous from societal pressures. The influence of transnational non state actors in influencing states in the realm of security policy is thus a hard case. • Price analyzes the campaign to generate an international norm to prohibit anti-personnel (AP) landmines • Realist theories expect that states would give up AP landmines only if they ceased to be of military utility. The support for a comprehensive ban treaty by 122 countries is thus contrary to realist expectations. • This systemic normative change was fostered by transnational civil society by two mechanisms: i. Norm adoption through moral entrepreneurship and emulation ii. Constitution of new interests - changing what states want. Identity being an important factor here. (socialization into a norm) • Members of the civil society were the primary movers in generating worldwide concern about AP land mines but this happened in conjunction with the development of the humanitarian laws of war, work on which was done primarily by the ICRC. • Technologies delegitimized by transnational civil society actors as "weapons of the weak" -- chemical and biological weapons, and landmines • Critique: The major countries which use AP landmines have not signed the treaty. US, South Korea, North Korea, India, Pakistan....

Hehir 2013

• The response to the situation in Libya is better understood as an aberration rather than a new disposition or the harbinger of a new norm • That said R2P was important in the passing of Resolution 1973. New international consensus on the responsibility to protect shows a glimmer of hope. But this has not always been the case (seems like an a-theoretical piece to me. Not sure why this was assigned. I'm not going to even try and remember this one)

Evangelista 1999

• Transnational actors (Pugwash, IPPNW - International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War) explain why the Soviet Union adopted policies which eventually led to the end of the Cold War • Transnational Relations defined as: " regular interactions across national boundaries when at least one actor is a non state agent or does not operate on behalf of a national government or an intergovernmental organization" (Risse-Kappen 1995) • Mechanism: Domestic Politics Important • Domestic structure of Soviet Union conducive for transnational actor influence. Weak, fragmented society dominated by a strong and hierarchical party-state apparatus made it difficult for new ideas to to make it to the top. HOWEVER, once policy entrepreneurs had access to the leadership, the ideas were implemented quickly. More influence • The United States was an open, decentralized, fragmented state, easily influenced by societal and bureaucratic factors. Transnational actors however found it difficult to compete with well established domestic interest groups. Less influence. • He looks at the issue areas of: Nuclear Testing, Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense, and Conventional Forces