Intro to Criminal Law Midterm

Keeler v Superior Court of Amador County

1970 Case from California S.C. Woman divorces husband, gets pregnant with the child of another man. Husband confronts her and begins to beat her. She is left near dead and goes to hospital, where she has to have a C-Section. The child is delivered stillborn, and the blunt force sustained in the attack. Defendant is charged with murder I on top of the various other assault charges. He motions to set aside information at trial, denied. Now appeals to S.C. of California. Question if the fetus was a human being, as according to the California Statute, which would allow for the murder charge. They must determine the original intent of the legislature. To find this, they look back to the common law definition of feticide, as the homicide statute was derived from common law. This definition held how a fetus could not be the subject of a homicide unless it is in the process of being born. This ruling remains consistent with the precedent of a case the people cite: People v. Chavez. There, the court found that a mother that negligently delivered her child and he died could be found guilty of murder. However, in this case the child was not born alive, and therefore it would be a legal impossibility to prosecute him under the murder statute, since it would exceed judicial power and violate due process to extend the doctrine. In the aftermath, the California legislature amended the law to include a fetus.

Graham v. Florida

2011 case delivered by Kennedy. Graham had a rough childhood, with addict parents, metal issues, and early substance abuse. When he was 16, he tried to rob a barbecue restaurant with three accomplices, he knocked the manager out who required stitches. He was charged as an adult and plead to armed burglary w/ assault, received 12 months in county, 3 years probation. Less than 6 months later, he commits another armed robbery. He is again caught and, for violation of his parole, he is sentenced by the trial judge (against the recommendation of the prosecutor), to life without parole. He was clearly frustrated with Graham's inability to reform, and he believes the court can't help him anymore. Appeal rejected as not a violation of the 8th, ends up in S.C. after Florida S.C. refuses to hear. Question is whether or not LWOP is cruel and unusual for non-homicide offences. The case Roper v. Simmons had previously outlawed the death penalty for minors. Uses 8th + 14th (incorporation) For this case, the court is asked to look at placing categorical restriction on LWOP for minors, the first case of its kind, as categorical restrictions had only previously been granted to the death penalty, thus creating new precedents. To determine this, the severity of the the crime must be looked at compared to the sentence, to determine if it is "inherently barbaric or disproportionate." This standard is drawn by, according to the majority, by a consensus of the nation. They begin by looking at the national standard, and find no consensus approving this. Although a super majority of states allow this, only 11 jurisdictions currently have minors serving sentences for this. Only 104 juveniles are serving this term, and 77 of them are in Florida. This mere legality of the sentencing does not provide evidence of acceptance. They then analyze how, using the findings in Roper, minors lack mental maturity, which leads to such a sentence being unable to fulfill the four penological goals: retribution, deterrence, incapacitate, and rehabilitation. Retribution is less effective as they are not as mentally culpable and, therefore, less deserving of retribution. Deterrence is an ineffective method as, since juvenile minds work differently, they don't take this into account before committing a crime. It is also impossible to determine if a minor must be incapacitated for the rest of his life, since his brain has not fully developed. Finally, Kennedy strongly focuses on the obligation to rehabilitate. They may demonstrate, after rehabilitation that would be deprived under LWOP, that they are valuable to society. They argue that this is too subjective to even allow for a case-by-case evaluation. Kennedy concludes with an international look, stating how Israel is the only other country that actively practices this, again raising the issue of Article VI. Roberts concurs that this sentence is a violation of the 8th, but a blanket ban is not needed. Instead of looking categorically, he looks at the disproportional of the sentence. Agrees in the mental differences of minors, and that they deserve this as a mitigating circumstance, but there are still some instances where LWOP is deserved for minors. In fact, Roper was made relying on the possibility of LWOP. There are some juveniles that do not possess the diminished culpability and deserve such severe sanctions, such as the teens that forced a mother to perform oral sex on her 12 year old son. We must assume the competency of the court to make this case-by-case distinction, and pick out the very few time where they fail, like here. In this case, in now way does Graham's sentence seem proportional. In fact, Graham's sentence for this mere armed robbery is more severe than the average sentence for rape or murder in the state of Florida. Only the trial judge seemed to believe LWOP was needed. Most people would only serve 5-10 years for armed robbery, on average, not even taking age into account. Even without mitigating circumstances, this seems disproportionate, but with them it is incredibly clear. As mentioned by the majority, Florida seems too willing to impose this sentence on minors. Thomas + co. dissent: They emphasize how this is another moral issue on which the Constitution is silent and instead the court is making a moral judgement. 37 states seem to believe that this level of punishment is okay, and the disuse only further justifies that states are wary to use it. And even following the majority's logic, there is no need for a national consensus for, just one against. Cruel and unusual is only defined by the founding father's intent, and it is hypocritical of the court to declare this violating the 8th as they are not saying the sentence is unconstitutional, as it can still apply in murder cases, but not here. Beyond this, the founding fathers did not intend for proportional sentences, which was a court-invented concept. This is not the role of the court to determine "who gets what" but instead a legislative goal. There are plenty of juveniles who deserve this, taking the case of Budder who was sentenced to LWOP recently in Oklahoma (a state which had not used the statute recently as defined by the majority) after he attempted to murder a 17 year old girl after raping her by slitting her throat. This demonstrates responsibility in this sentence and the tool should be available when needed.

Obergefell v. Hodges

5-4 decision delivered by Kennedy in 2015. Legalized same sex marriage under Equal Protection and Due Process. Thomas and Scalia dissent saying how nowhere in the Constitution is marriage a fundamental right.

Hurst v Florida

8-1 decision in 2010 delivered by Sotomayor Hurst is charged with killing a woman in a botched robbery in 1998. Under Florida State criminal law a jury can convict up to a life sentence. Ten, an additional proceeding occurs to determine if the death penalty is warranted. There is an evidentiary hearing with a trial judge, where the jury advice, based on a simple majority, the judge. He then makes the final decision after weighing aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Hurst is convicted and the jury recommends, judge agrees. He is granted a new trial and the same result occurs. Florida S.C. affirms. Appeals to the S.C. based on the 6th and 14th. The court strikes down the law finding all of Florida's arguments to be invalid. They argue that the jury has to consider aggravating and mitigating circumstances, but the problem still remained that they were only an advisory. The supreme court had also previously upheld the Florida scheme, however the court opts to not follow stare decisis in this case as they feel the precedent is not appropriate. In the aftermath, 450 death row inmates had appeals. The state of Florida revises the law, requiring a supermajority for a death sentence, which is also struck down, which leads to a unanimous verdict that must be reached by a jury to allow for the death penalty.

Lawrence v. Texas

Opinion delivered by Kennedy in 2003. Police lawfully search apartment of Lawrence, find him engaged in anal sex with another man. This is prohibited under Texas law (which targets specifically homosexual conduct), and he was slapped with a misdemeanor. This case pits the 10th amendment right to police power up against the 14th's due process/equal protection clauses. Current precedent is Bowers v. Hardwick. Look at if Bowers should be overturned, do these laws violate homosexual conduct under the 14th's equal protection, and is sodomy protected as a liberty under the 14th. In comparison, Bowers applied to sodomy in general, not just homosexuality, and Bowers was also not prosecuted in the case. Kennedy begins by looking into the historical precedent that Bowers cited, as he believes they misinterpreted the history when making their decision. Going back to the 1500s, to English common law, which was by extension colonial law. Firstly, these laws were designed to prohibit sodomy between ANY sex, not just gays. Secondly, these laws weren't really enforced in the case of consensual sex, only in the cases of rape. Instead, this persecution of homosexuals came into practice only in the 70s. Therefore, the "ancient roots" that Bowers refers to do not exist. Also cites how this is a law steeped in Judeo-Christian values, and that the laws of this nation are more important than such values. In fact, there even seems to be a shift away from this moral enforcement, both nationally and globally. Griswold v. Connecticut, for example, prohibited the regulation of birth control, demonstrating this shift away from regulation of consensual acts behind closed doors. The Model Penal Code also does not support this. In terms of the global community, both British Parliaments and European Courts have ruled against such laws (Dudgeon v. U.K.). This is controversial in that Kennedy cites foreign precedent which, under Article VI, has no binding in the U.S. Finally, S.C. precedent has weakened the logic used in Bowers, and therefore makes it able to be overturned. For example, in Romer v. Evans, a constitutional amendment in Colorodo that placed homosexuals in their own class was struck down as a violation of Equal Protection, as it placed a negative stigma around homosexuals, essentially marking them. This law does the same thing. Finally, they choose to decide under Due Process, and not equal protection, as they believe all sodomy laws to be a violation of liberty behind closed doors. There has not been a demonstrated governmental concern to invite such invasion of liberty. O'Connors concurs using Equal Protection and not due process. She believes moral regulation such as sodomy to be proper, but they can't target a single group with these laws. Scalia + co. dissents. He stresses how the proper level of scrutiny is not used here to strike down the law under due process. Strict scrutiny is only used if it is a fundamental right, which the court has not defined sodomy as. Instead, it is subject to the rational basis test. By stating that this law does not even pass the lowest level of scrutiny, it is opening up all moral legislation, from incest to bestiality, to overturning. This is also a violation of stare decisis. The court is also taking sides in a moral debate, when they should be amoral and non-partisan. Instead, this moral issue should be left to the legislature. This decision opens the door for many other homosexual rights advancements. Bowers is overturned.

Kansas v. Crane

Breyer majority in 2002 Crane is a sexual offender and a recidivist. His actions fall under the Kansas SVPA due to the danger he possessed to society along with the coupling of a mental illness (anti-social personality disorder) allowed for him to be civilly confined. He, however, moves for summary judgement as there is evidence that he has the ability to control himself. He claimed this was a violation of his due process as the prosecution did not prove a full lack of control. The court doesn't agree, clarifies the standard, and remands. In overturning the case, the Kansas S.C. cited Kansas v. Hendricks as requiring a full demonstration of lack of control before civil confinement could be applied. They state how Hendricks only required the demonstration of difficulty to control, not an absolute lack of control. This standard was best not obtained mathematically through a bright line test, due to the ever changing science, but instead in light of the context of each individual case. They determine, however, that there has to be some level of lack of control presence, so this is a Pyrrhic victory. In light of the decision, the DA decided they did not have ground to further prosecute. 5 months later, Crane kidnapped and raped a woman.

People v. Ochoa

California S.C. After consuming some 17-22 beers, man goes to sleep for no more than two hours. He then gets in his car and begins to drive home, when he hits rear ends a car, causing an accident which kills two. His BAC was found to be .15, twice the legal limit. He was convicted on two counts of gross vehicular manslaughter, which an appeals court downgrades to regular vehicular manslaughter as they find no gross negligence. They cite his attempt to sleep, his minor speeding, and his cautionary driving as signs of no gross negligence. The appeal is 2-1 with a strong dissent. The court reverses the appellate decision. They stress how the evidence must be viewed in the most favorable light for the People since they won at trial. Gross negligence, which requires the conscious disregard and indifference, is determined using a reasonable person standard. In light of all this, the fact that the BAC was twice the legal limit, he was going double the speed limit, and constant swerving between lanes demonstrates no evidence that gross negligence did not occur and no reason to overturn. Any reasonable person would have observed the risks involved here. These were not mere traffic violations and the appeals court ignored established review standards.

People v. Borchers

California S.C. Defendant common law married to his wife. She begins hanging out with a pimp, having sex with him, and siphoning the defendant's money to him. Later becomes suicidal, tries to kill herself. One night, she is holding a gun, threatening herself and the defendant. He takes the gun away from her, she asks him to kill her. He does and is charged with murder 2. Found guilty and motions for a new trial. The judge, in light of the psychiatric testimony, believes that the finding of malice was incorrect and reduces the verdict down to voluntary manslaughter. The people are appealing. The court states how it is the duty of the trial court to weigh evidence and ensure that the correct class of crime is handed out. The prosecution must prove every essential part of the case, and in California's murder statute malice aforethought is an essential part. The trial judge very well could have established how the series of events that lead up to Dotty's death would have created this heat of passion (they use the dictionary definition as it is not stated in the legislation). This would occur even in a reasonable man, as according to precedent. The court actually commends the trial judge for his diligence.

People v. Patterson

California S.C. Defendant provided cocaine to a girl and, while they were inhaling it, she ODed and died. Along with various possession charges, Patterson is charged with murder. He moves for dismissal at trial and it is granted. Affirmed on appeal by the people. People argue he committed and inherently dangerous felony under the Health and Safety Code. The case is reversed and remanded back to trial. The second degree murder doctrine states that if a felony that is inherently dangerous to human life results in a death, the person who committed the felony could be charged with murder. This must be looked at in the abstract nature of the crime, not the specific instance. Such definition is judge made law (People v. Ford), and legal scholars have criticized it. However, the court declines to look at the validity of the doctrine or to expand its scope, and instead say that this is the legislature's job to fix. In regards to this case, they state how the lower courts erred in that the individual, abstract act of furnishing cocaine must be looked at to determine if it's inherently dangerous to human life, not the entire statute as a whole. The court then clarified the guidelines of this definition and remanded it back to trial for them to determine if the act met these standards. They state how the act must have consequences that have a high probability of death, and that the defendant should have engaged in this conduct with reasonable knowledge of the dangers involved. This creates implied malice, which replaces the need to show malice, as they are essentially warned by society.

People v Keith Dare

Case in the city of Albany which involved the rape of a 75 year old woman. Upon his release, the judge refers him to the sex offender management review board for evaluation. He has the possibility to be sentenced to civil confinement under NYS Mental Hygiene Law. However, he falls through the cracks and is not processed, and instead breaks in to a woman's house and rapes her. Enters plea and is sentenced to 25-life.

City of Chicago v. Morales

Decision by Stevens in 1999. After a series of hearings involving the recent increase in gang violence in the City of Chicago, they passed the Gang Congregation Ordinance. The law stated that if the police found two or more people to be loitering with no apparent purpose, and there was reason to believe the gang involvement of one of those members, they could issue an order to disperse. If this order was not followed, then the person could be arrested, regardless of actual gang association. Punishable by up to 6 months in jail (misdemeanor) and a $500 fine. After the case is appealed to the Illinois S.C. by Morales, they deem it unconstitutionally vague and a violation of the 14th amendment's due process (as applied by the incorporation doctrine). In their decision, the court found that the case violated the 14th's due process by being unconstitutionally vague. The overturn the various convictions under this law. Stevens stresses how the the statute arbitrarily deprives the liberty to loiter for innocent purposes. There are two requirements for a law to be unconstitutionally vague: it must fail to provide due notice or it must allow for arbitrary enforcement by failing to provide instructions to law enforcement. In this case, the legislation provides no instruction for what is to be considered to be loitering without an apparent purpose, and provides no instruction for police to determine this. Instead, it provides for law making to essentially be dictated by cops as to what violates this statute. Stricter guidelines are needed to protect innocent loitering, in order to allow for a more controlled enforcement by police officers. The city instead argues that they are not being arrested for loitering, but for violating the order from the cops. The court rebukes this since the initial order is arbitrarily issued in violation of the liberty of loitering. There are simply no standards for enforcement of the law. O'Connors actually gives her own input by giving examples of how the law could have been constructed more narrowly, as for it to be constitutional (should have focused on the issue of gangs dominating specific territory). Thomas dissents arguing how overturning these convictions subjects the people of Chicago to the terror of these gangs, how these people are prisoners in their own homes. He believes that the amount of discretion that is afforded to police officers in this law is standard, as is seen in determining things like probable cause. Abuse of this would be rare and, when it occurs, it is the job of the courts to throw out those cases, not to strike down the law on the face. He also focuses on how the citizens of Chicago are intelligent enough to determine if they have an apparent purpose or not. In the aftermath, the Chicago City Council revised the law adding language similar to that that O'Connors suggested, adding specification specifically for harmful loitering and enforcement guidelines. This is upheld.

Case of Charline Brundige

Expressed symptoms of Battered Woman's Syndrome. Married to her husband and constantly abused by him, never left him. IN 1985, her husband returned home drunk and beats her severely. She takes his gun, loads it, and kills him after he passes out from alcohol. There was a long history of incident reports of him beating her, in front of their children. She was charged with murder, puts together an affirmative defense. There is no actual statute for BWS, so instead must use it as a mitigating circumstance as to her metal state. She is found guilty and gets 15 years to life for murder 2. The judge really has no flexibility in the sentencing. She is a model prisoner and her case comes up for clemency. No precedence in NYS for clemency in murder II cases, first BWS clemency case in the nation. Parole board recommends early parole 6-1, due to influence from interest groups and the first lady, she received clemency. Spent 10 years in prison.

U.S. v Comstock

Federal case involving civil confinement. Breyer writes the decision. Declares that the federal government is able to civilly detain a sexual predator using clear and convincing evidence that the individual would be a danger to society if released. Such power is granted to them under the necessary and proper clause in article I section VIII.

Johnson v U.S.

Justice Scalia delivers majority in 2015 Case has to deal with the Armed Career Criminal Act, specifically the residual clause. The law stated how if a convicted felon had 3+ previous convictions for "violent felonies" are subject to harsher penalties. A violent felony could be described as one that has the element of the use of physical force against another or, under the residual clause, involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. In other cases, the court rejected that this clause was too vague. In this case, Johnson is arrested for possession of a short-barreled shotgun and his sentence is enhanced under this doctrine. Appeals to the S.C. and they again look if it is too vague. They decide to reverse the decision and remand the case, striking down the residual clause (and only the residual clause). They do this despite the stare decisis saying otherwise. Despite recommendations, Congress has failed to fix the issue. The 5th amendment prohibits laws from being unconstitutionally vague, as a violation of due process. Prior cases established that a crime must be looked at categorically (impractical to evaluate otherwise + intent of the legislature) to determine if it qualifies under the the residual clause. If such crime were to create a risk at any point during the average commission, then it would qualify. This denies fair notice due to the abstract nature. Although this is not the role of the court, in the best interest fro the goal of stare decisis (consistency in ruling), causing them to strike down the residual clause. Even simple cases present difficulties. Thomas Concurrence: States how he disagrees with the majority in almost every part, but agrees with the outcome as he does not view owning a double barrel shotgun as a violent felony. He does not believe it is necessary to strike down the entire residual clause, as this could be solved by simple statutory interpretation. Does not believe that the doctrine of vagueness must be applied here, and it is part of a long history of applying this doctrine in too sweeping of a fashion. This concept of substantive due process is a recent invention, not something based in the historical intent (early American courts just refused to enforce cases where the law was too vague). Only has come into place since 1914, and it is a bad habit for the court to begin striking down indefinite concepts as it has here and in Morales. Just because the court messed up the interpretation of this law before does not mean that it should revoke the entire residual clause and ask for a fix from the legislature. In the aftermath, Congress could not agree to a fix and instead just left the law as is, without the residual clause.

People v. Jorgensen

NY case having to deal with the death of a fetus. Woman is in a car crash while 34 weeks pregnant. She was under the influence of drugs and alcohol in the crash. C section is performed, child is born alive but dies later due to sustained injuries. Indicted for manslaughter, sighting her doubling the speed limit, alcohol, and not wearing a seat belt as reasons for the prosecution. Jury convicts, appellate upholds. S.C. reverses decision 5-1. Found that, due to the intent of the law as designed by the legislature, there was no way that she could be found responsible unless intent to kill the baby was proven. This is due to the mens rea requirement of the statute. In this case, the defendant would of had to act with knowledge of and in disregard of risk to be responsible for the death of the child. However, they find that the legislature did not intend to place a greater burden on pregnant women through the manslaughter law, and therefore since the crash occurred before the birth of the child, she could not be held responsible. If the legislature intends for the law to be applied this way, they must amend it. Dissent agreed that this decision must be based on the statutory interpretation of the manslaughter statute. However, he disagrees with their interpretation. He finds that the defendant neglected a substantial risk in this case, and she grossly deviated from the acts of a reasonable person. The risk was created through voluntary intoxication and, since the child was born alive, the statute should apply, even though the injuries that resulted in death occurred before.

People v. Santiago

NYS trial court Defendant violates an order of protection against his wife and is charged with aggravated criminal contempt. Order was issued after his wife accused him of violence. She since withdrew the accusation and said she would refuse to testify at trial and lie if forced to. The people move to allow for her grand jury testimony and out of court comments to be admitted to the record, judge calls a Sirois hearing. Defense argues how she is available and willing to testify, so her comments shouldn't be admitted In order for such evidence to be admitted, a defendant would usually 1. be unavailable/refuse and 2. must be at the fault of the defendant, due to his conduct through a clear and convincing standard. This is to ensure the defendant's right granted through the 6th (and 14th) to confront his accuser to. Laws that abridge this right must pass strict scrutiny tests. In the hearing, the court hears testimony from a doctor who describes the cycle of Battered Women's Syndrome. This consists of 1. tension building 2. Violence 3. Honeymoon. Often, the victim remains with the husband and reaches this honeymoon phase where they hope everything will get better as they fear leaving him, are embarrassed, hope for a better life with them, or are dependent. The expert witness states how this is a clear case of BWS due to her constant irrational attainment to her abuser. Due to this, the trial court grants the motion and admits the grand jury testimony. Otherwise, her testimony would have to be impeached and she would be found in contempt. This would only re-victimize her. 100 conversations occurred between the parties, which is a clear attempt to continue this cycle of abuse. Domestic abuse is a unique case, and needs to be treated as such. Therefore, even though there is no direct misconduct, the decision of Angela R. is still being made out of fear and her previous testimony is admissible. This process is difficult as there is no statute regarding BWS, so judge made law is reigning in attempt to protect these victims.

State v. Guebara

S.C. of Kansas Guebara's wife separates from him and presses assault charges against him. She met up with him for an agreed visitation where she informed him that the charges against him would not be dropped. He became enraged and repeatedly shot her. He then went to the police station and turned himself in. At trial, evidence was introduced how the defendant has anti-social personality disorder which, in combination with smoking weed, could have elicited a violent response. He requested that the jury be instructed on the lesser charge of voluntary manslaughter. The trial court refused, saying two elements must be present: Emotional state of heat of passion and sufficient provocation. They said that refusal to drop a misdemeanor charge was not enough. Such heat of passion when combined with provocation would have to allow for a reasonable man to act out of passion, not logic. However, this must be judged on the basis of a reasonable person. The individual peculiarities of the defendant can't be taken into account. Precedent has demonstrated the difficulty of achieving such standard in a reasonable person, and therefore Guebara does not deserve such instruction

Commonwealth v. Matos

S.C. of Mass. *Until late, most states had rather relaxed laws on stalking, with mostly misdemeanors. Mass was an exception. Stalking can involve spying, monitoring, harassment, threats, targeting, impersonation, or animal abuse. In this case, a police officer was being followed by Matos. She first told him to stop following her, which prompted him to send over 40 letters to her. These letters detail sexual acts and reference firearms and criminals in an attempt to strike fear into the victim. He makes clear he is watching her. He even contacts her work, falsely alleging that the two have done drugs together, which caused an IA investigation. The defendant eventually became fearful, filed a criminal complaint and changed her address. Def is convicted but filed a motion to find not guilty claiming that the evidence was insufficient to show clear threats with the intent to place the victim in fear. Court finds no issue and affirms the conviction. The def. of stalking is very similar to that of common law assault, and the court turns to that for clarity. This requires that ones actions and words to purposely intend to strike fear into the victim, even if actual violence is not planned. Here, the evidence clearly shows the intent to do so, with the references to guns + watching. However, in Kwiatkowski, the court found the statute he was convicted under to unconstitutionally vague. Here, the court decides to proceed, even though the legislature has not since clarified. They look at the law in the most favorable interpretation for the defendant and, even under that, he is still clearly guilty of stalking. He engaged in a willful pattern of conduct which created reasonable alarm in the victim.

Patterson v NY

SCOTUS decision issued by White. After shooting his wife's lover after finding the two in bed together, Patterson is charged with murder in the second degree. The only requirements to be charged under this is intent to cause death and actually causing it, there is no requirement for malice aforethought. Patterson issues an affirmative defense for extreme emotional distress (mitigating), and the jury is instructed that they must use a preponderance of the evidence to determine if they believe his testimony. He his found guilty of murder, and the jury does not mitigate his affirmative defense. Meanwhile, the court decides Mullaney v. Wilbur, where they determine that forcing the defendant to prove malice aforethought in a murder case in Maine violated due process. Originally in common law, it was the job of the accused to prove extenuating circumstances. in 1895, common law is abandoned and then the mental state must be proven by the prosecutor. The court ruled in Leland v. Oregon that the defendant could be required to prove insanity. Similarly, in this case the defendant is protected by due process until every element of crime as defined by statute is proven against them. This was done so in this case, and the jury was instructed, heard his objections, and still found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The recognition of affirmative defenses by the state is designed to recognize human nature, not to provide more elements that have to be proven. This could lead up to 25 different affirmative defenses having to be disproved, due to NY revised penal law. This is different from Mullaney in that there, malice aforethought was key piece of constituting murder in Maine, and presuming malice until proven otherwise was a violation in due process. In New York, there is no requirement of malice aforethought, so no key element of the crime is presumed.

State v. Jimerson

Washington Court of Appeals Jimerson is driving car when it spins out on ice. Two cops, of duty, recommend he drive more carefully. He gets out to fight them, they identify themselves and return him to his car. He begins to drive away, then turns around and speeds towards them. One opens fire, he swerves at the last minute and misses. Arrested and charged and convicted of second degree assault. He claims he only met to splash them and wants the jury instructed on simple assault, which does not require intent. Judge denies and instructs only on 1 and 2. The court reverses and remands the decision. The difference here is between a felony and a gross misdemeanor. The case state v. workman had established when to instruct on a lesser charge: if the lesser charge contains necessary elements of the greater charge, and there is an inference to support the lesser crime had been committed. In this case, it was not for the trial judge to personally determine if the testimony that Jimerson only desired to splash the officers was credible. Instead, that is up to the jury. Therefore, he should've instructed on the lesser charge.

State v. Mayle

West Virginia S.C. Two men rob a McDonald's in Ohio a steal an employee's car. While in West Virginia, an officer spots them trying to break and enter into a gas station. The two men, later identified as Stacey and Mayle, shoot and kill him. Evidence against them included fingerprints all over the car, the gun, and the ski masks. Mayle was convicted of 1st degree murder and is appealing. Mayle claims that the state did not meet burden of proof. To do so, the state would have had to show 1. the commission of an enumerated felony 2. the participation in that felony 3. the death of the victim. The first two are obvious in this case, however the third point is drawn into question. Mayle claims that, since he was escaping the site of a felony, that the criteria is not met. However, the court found in State v. Wayne that the act of escaping is the attempt to complete the felony, and is part of one continuous act. They found so by drawing on N.C. precedent, since none existed in West Virginia. Therefore, find him to be properly convicted.