Metaphysics: What is Metaphysics?

In spite of the fact that there are no generally accepted methods of approach in metaphysics, it is still possible to state some general guidelines that should be followed in metaphysics unless there is good reason to set them aside. Here are some of them:

1. Metaphysical study should begin with and take into account the things we already know or have reason to believe are true before we begin doing metaphysics. 2. State the metaphysical problem you are trying to solve and what gives rise to the problem. After the problem is stated, list the different metaphysical alternatives to the problem, along with the assumptions made by each alternative, draw the implications of each alternative, and see which is most reasonable. It is also important to state the implications that follow from either accepting or denying that something is real. 3. Use thought experiments as sources for counterexamples to metaphysical arguments. In metaphysic, we are interested in what something must be, not in what is merely happens to be. (May be helpful to use modal logic possible world semantics for assessing metaphysical claims.) 4. In metaphysics, as with other forms in knowledge generally, we are not constrained to operate within the bounds of sense experience.

The naturalist has three tasks before he or she can defend naturalism as a broad metaphysical view:

1. The naturalist must show that mental entities are not real: (a) by denying their existence outright (e.g. believing they don't exist like one "believes" a flat earth doesn't exist) or (b) by reducing them to physical entities, processes, or events in space and time (e.g., beliefs exist, but they are really nothing but states of the brain) or (c) by trying to show that in some way or another they depend on the physical world for their existence. 2. The naturalist must deny that properties and relations are abstract entities by either: (a) denying that they exist (extreme nominalism) or (b) accepting the existence of properties and relations but treating them as material realities that are wholly inside of space and time (nominalism and impure realism). 3. The naturalist must show that abstract entities are not real by either: (a) denying their existence outright (e.g., propositions, like witches, do not exist at all) or (b) reducing them to physical entities in space and time (e.g., propositions exist, but they are really nothing but physical scratchings called sentences).

"A metaphysical problem is usually a puzzle about some ultimate kind of issue expressed in a question like one of the following: (?) Examples include (?)

A metaphysical problem is usually a puzzle about some ultimate kind of issue expressed in a question like one of the following: How could there be x's, given that certain things are the case? For example, how could there be living things, given that everything in the universe is matter? How could there fail to be x's, given that certain things are the case? For example, how could there fail to be abstract objects called numbers, given statement of arithmetic are necessarily true?

A set of categories is:

A set of categories is a collection of the ultimate categories (substance, property, relation) of all existent entities whatsoever such that (1) each entity will fit into a specific category and (2) the categories taken as a group will allow us to classify all entities. (A set of categories is a set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive classifications of all entities. A set of categories is mutually exclusive in that a given category will have a distinguishing feature that makes them distinct from the entities in the other categories. A set of categories is exhaustive in that all entities [except the transcendentals- features that characterize all the different kinds of entities that exist] will fit into one of the categories.)

Along with (?) and (?), metaphysics is the most basic part of philosophy.

Along with logic and epistemology, metaphysics is the most basic part of philosophy.

Besides general ontology, a second area of study in metaphysics is called special metaphysics. In special metaphysics, two different types of concerns are in view:

Besides general ontology, a second area of study in metaphysics is called special metaphysics. In special metaphysics, two different types of concerns are in view: First, there is the study of specific topics of special interest: Is there a soul or mind? Are humans free or determined? Is there such a thing as personal identity, that is, do persons remain the same through change or are persons best viewed as a series of events called person-stages? Is there such a thing as causation? Second, there is the second-order metaphysical clarification and investigation of other fields of study, for example, sociology, biology, physics, and psychology. Here, the metaphysician asks questions like, Are there electrons and, if so, what are they? Do social groups exist as wholes that are "more than" the sum of their parts? And so on.

We should use our knowledge from Christianity to help us do metaphysics in at least three ways:

First, certain truths in theology require metaphysical study to help clarify them. The doctrine of the Trinity illustrates this. Second, truths from Christianity can be used as background knowledge to guide us in rejecting certain metaphysical positions and in seeking further, independent reasons for that rejection. If we take physicalism to be the view that a human being is simply a material object, nothing more and nothing less, then the Old and New Testament teaching about the soul, understood in the most natural way exegetically and in keeping with the history of the church, will lead us to reject physicalism as false and unreasonable, and we will do metaphysics to find further, independent reasons for our understanding of the Christian view. This can, of course, be abused. So we need to be careful that we have understood Christian teaching on the issue carefully and with a sense of integrity regarding genuine options within orthodox theology. But theology is still an important source of propositions for doing metaphysics. Third, Christian theology can remove certain intellectual barriers that force some thinkers to adopt positions in metaphysics in a one-sided way. In these cases, the Christian philosopher can be more open than his or her secular counterpart to seeing both sides of a dispute. For example, philosophers who hold to physicalism as a metaphysical worldview cannot embrace the existence of abstract objects (nonphysical entities that do not exist in space or time) such as numbers because they are not material. The Christian philosopher can be open to embracing the existence of numbers as abstract objects or to rejecting them since he or she is not forced to do metaphysics in light of physicalism. On the other hand, Christian teaching can introduce metaphysical problems of its own. For example, if abstract objects like numbers exist, then since they are neither in time nor space, they did not come into being at a moment of time. This means that they were not created in the same way that trees and rivers were created, so the Christian philosopher who embraces abstract entities must harmonize their existence with the doctrine of God as creator of everything.

General ontology is the most basic aspect of metaphysics, and there are three main tasks that make up this branch of metaphysical study:

First, general ontology focuses on the nature of existence itself. What is it to be or exist? Is existence a property that something has? Does nothingness itself exist in some sense? Is there a sense of being such that fictional objects like the winged horse Pegasus have being even though they do not exist? The nature of existence will be part of the focus of chapter nine. Second, in general ontology we study general principles of being, general features that are true of all things whatsoever. Medieval philosophers used the term transcendentals to stand for all those features that characterize all the different kinds of entities that exist. The notions of existence, unity, truth, and goodness have been taken by some to be examples of a transcendental. Everything that is, say a carbon atom, a person, a number, or the property of being green, is such that it exists, is a unity (i.e., is one entity in some sense), and is true and good. Third, general ontology includes what is called categorial analysis. It is possible to classify or group things that exist in various ways ranging from very specific to very broad types of classification. For example, consider a light brown dog, Spot, standing to the left of a desk. The dog itself can be classified in broader and broader ways according to the following scheme: an individual dog, a mammal, an animal, a living thing, a substance. The color of the dog can be classified in this way: light brown, brown, a visible property, a property. The relationship between Spot and the desk can be grouped as follows: to the left of, a spatial relation, a relation.

Metaphysics is rooted in wonder and puzzlement about what we know or have reason to believe, and it is an attempt to analyze, clarify, and account for those items of knowledge and rational belief. There are at least four sources of these beliefs:

First, metaphysics focuses on what we know from the critical use of common sense. By this we mean that our common sense beliefs, when we are "critical" of them in the sense of being aware of them, reflecting carefully about them, seeing if they make sense and stand up to scrutiny, provide material for metaphysical study. For example, it would seem to be an item of critical common sense that an apple is both red and sweet. The redness of the apple is real, is different from the sweetness of the apple, and is the color of the apple's surface. Metaphysics tries to account for this item of common sense. Critical common sense can, of course, be wrong, but it should be trusted unless there is good reason to abandon it. Second, we should use our knowledge from Christianity. Third important source of information for metaphysics is our knowledge of our own self. A careful description of our awareness of our own selves, for instance, that we seem to be continuing, enduring beings who are distinct from the rest of the world (one's desk is not part of oneself), that we are conscious, make decisions, have beliefs and sensory experiences, could (at least) possibly survive the death of our bodies and so forth, can give us insights into metaphysics. Any broad metaphysical system must take into account what we have reason to believe about our own selves. A fourth source of beliefs for metaphysical reflection is reliable information from other fields of study. If a business professor claims that corporations have moral responsibility, does this mean that corporations exist? If the self can "split" in brain operations or in cases of multiple personality, can we still make sense of the soul as a unified entity? If living organisms evolved, can we still believe that they have natures? In cases like these, other disciplines provide material for metaphysical study.

It is difficult, if not impossible, to come up with an adequate definition of metaphysics. Usually, it is characterized as the philosophical study of the nature of (?) or (?) and the ultimate (?) or (?) of things that are (?).

It is difficult, if not impossible, to come up with an adequate definition of metaphysics. Usually, it is characterized as the philosophical study of the nature of being or reality and the ultimate categories or kinds of things that are real.

Let us call (?) the sum total of everything whatever that exists including nonspatiotemporal abstract entities as well as the spatiotemporal universe of physical entities. The metaphysical debate (since Plato) can now be put as follows: Do abstract entities exist? Or put another way: (?) How do ontologists and naturalists relate to these topics?

Let us call the world the sum total of everything whatever that exists including nonspatiotemporal abstract entities as well as the spatiotemporal universe of physical entities. The metaphysical debate alluded to by Plato can now be put as follows: Do abstract entities exist? Or put another way: Does the world exist or is there only a universe? Ontologists are those philosophers who, like Plato, believe in the world and abstract entities. The term naturalism has many different meanings, but a standard use of the term defines it as the view that the universe alone exists. Since most current forms of naturalism are physicalist in flavor, naturalism has come to mean that reality is exhausted by the spatiotemporal world of physical objects accessible in some way to the senses and embraced by our best scientific theories.

Let us define the universe as (?), in some way (?) and to (?). The universe consists of (?) that exist within space and time. For any entity in the universe, it is appropriate to ask (?) it is. In addition to the universe, many philosophers believed in another realm of entities that are called abstract objects. Abstract objects are (?) that do not exist inside space and time; instead, they are (?). It makes no sense to ask (?) they exist. There have been many examples of abstract entities: (?)

Let us define the universe as the total spatiotemporal system of matter and (impersonal) energy, that is, as the sum total of material objects, in some way accessible to the senses and to scientific investigation. The universe consists of individual things, events, and processes that exist within space and time. For any entity in the universe, it is appropriate to ask where and when it is. In addition to the universe, many philosophers believed in another realm of entities that are called abstract objects. Abstract objects are immaterial (i.e., nonphysical) entities that do not exist inside space and time; instead, they are timeless and spaceless. It makes no sense to ask where or when they exist. There have been many examples of abstract entities: properties, relations, sets, numbers, and propositions.

Naturalists hold that reality is exhausted by the spatiotemporal world of physical objects embraced by our best scientific theories. In their view, science is the main approach to investigating the world, not philosophy. Many who embrace this sort of naturalism see the role of metaphysics to be:

Naturalists hold that reality is exhausted by the spatiotemporal world of physical objects embraced by our best scientific theories. In their view, science is the main approach to investigating the world, not philosophy. Many who embrace this sort of naturalism see the role of metaphysics to be that of clarifying our use of language, especially our use of scientific language. The methodology of the metaphysician is to take scientific theories, analyze and clarify the use of metaphysical terms within those theories, and formulate a worldview built on those theories. Metaphysics is not the study of reality—science is—but rather of our talk, especially scientific talk of reality. On this view, linguistic analysis is the main tool of the philosopher engaged in metaphysics. He or she will analyze and clarify the scientist's use of the terms substance and property in sentences like "carbon is a substance with such and such properties."

Now, in metaphysics, a philosopher will often argue that some entity P is really nothing but Q. For example, heat is really nothing but the motion of molecules, the mind is really nothing but the brain, the color red is really nothing but the word red being used of an object or, perhaps, red is just a certain wavelength of light. At other times, a philosopher will argue that C is the very essence of D, that is, that D could not exist without C existing and being the very nature of what D is. For example, some have claimed that the very essence of the number two is to be the smallest even number greater than one, the nature of squareness is to be a shape, the essence of being a person is to be a material object, and the essence of existing is to be located at a place in space and time. In each of the examples cited, we can test the proposal it illustrates by using a thought experiment to suggest a (?) that runs contrary to the proposal in question. These thought experiments can be seen as attempts to state a possible world where one can (?). For example, if there is a possible world where there are minds without brains (say in a disembodied form of existence) or brains without minds (a zombie world), then the proposal that minds are nothing but brains is false. Furthermore, if C is offered as the very nature of D, then in every world where D exists, C must exist also. If we can state a possible world where (?), then C cannot be taken to be the essence of D. If C is "Uncle Larry's favorite number" and D is the number two, then there could be a world where D (the number two) exists but C does not (in worlds where Uncle Larry is dead or hates the number two). This possible world is a counterexample to the proposal in question.

Now, in metaphysics, a philosopher will often argue that some entity P is really nothing but Q. For example, heat is really nothing but the motion of molecules, the mind is really nothing but the brain, the color red is really nothing but the word red being used of an object or, perhaps, red is just a certain wavelength of light. At other times, a philosopher will argue that C is the very essence of D, that is, that D could not exist without C existing and being the very nature of what D is. For example, some have claimed that the very essence of the number two is to be the smallest even number greater than one, the nature of squareness is to be a shape, the essence of being a person is to be a material object, and the essence of existing is to be located at a place in space and time. In each of the examples cited, we can test the proposal it illustrates by using a thought experiment to suggest a counterexample that runs contrary to the proposal in question. These thought experiments can be seen as attempts to state a possible world where one can have P but not Q or Q but not P. For example, if there is a possible world where there are minds without brains (say in a disembodied form of existence) or brains without minds (a zombie world), then the proposal that minds are nothing but brains is false. Furthermore, if C is offered as the very nature of D, then in every world where D exists, C must exist also. If we can state a possible world where D exists without C, then C cannot be taken to be the essence of D. If C is "Uncle Larry's favorite number" and D is the number two, then there could be a world where D (the number two) exists but C does not (in worlds where Uncle Larry is dead or hates the number two). This possible world is a counterexample to the proposal in question.

Define properties, relations, sets, numbers, and propositions:

Properties are entities that can be exemplified by many things at the same time (e.g., redness, goodness, triangularity, humanness) and relations are entities that can relate two or more things and can be in more than one group of things at the same time (e.g., brighter than, father of, larger than). Properties and relations are called universals because, as was mentioned, they can be in more than one thing at once or can relate more than one group at once. Several apples can have the same color of red and several groups of people can enter into the "father of" relation. A set is a group or collection of things called the members of the set. The set of all numbers from one to ten is an example of a set. Numbers are the things that enter into certain mathematical relationships, for example, addition, subtraction. Propositions are the contents expressed in declarative sentences and contained in people's minds when they are thinking. Propositions are also the things that are either true or false and that can be related to each other by means of the laws of logic (e.g., "if, then," "if and only if").

Why is the naturalists approach to metaphysics wrong-headed?

Science presupposes philosophical and metaphysical doctrines. Thus metaphysics is conceptually prior to science, not vice versa. Science may offer help to metaphysics in various ways, but science cannot dictate to the metaphysician what they ought to believe about reality or the methods to be used in metaphysics. Moreover, language (including scientific language) itself exists. Therefore, metaphysics cannot be reduced to language because language itself is part of metaphysical study.

What kind of "is" statements are the following? 1. Socrates is real. 2. Socrates is the teacher of Plato. 3. Socrates is human. 4. Socrates is white. 5. Socrates is skin and bone.

Sentence (1) uses an "is of being or existence". It asserts that Socrates exists. This sense of "to be" raises the question, what is it to exist or not exist? What is it about something that accounts for its existence? Sentence (2) uses an "is of identity". It says that Socrates is identical to, is the very same thing as, the teacher of Plato. This raises another question: What does it mean for some thing x and some thing y to be the same thing? What is it for something to be identical to itself and different from everything else? Sentence (3) employs an "is of essential predication". It says that being human is the very essence of Socrates. This raises the question, what does it mean to say that something (being human) is the essence of something else (Socrates)? Do things really have essences and, if so, what are they? Sentence (4) contains an "is of accidental predication". It says that Socrates has a property, being white, that is "present in" him. This raises the question of whether properties exist and, if so, what are they? Is there a distinction between essential and accidental properties? Does humanness relate to Socrates in a way different from the way whiteness relates to Socrates? Finally, sentence (5) uses an "is of constitution", sometimes called "a part-whole is". It says that Socrates is a whole with skin and bones as parts. Socrates is constituted by these parts. This raises the question of whether parts are different from properties. Can something lose parts and still be the same thing? These five sentences and the questions they surface form the most basic area of metaphysical investigation. Philosophers have reflected on them for some time, and their reflections have led to some widely accepted subbranches of metaphysics.

Metaphysical study seeks to uncover what numbers, causation, minds, values, properties, and so forth must be. What is their very nature and essence? This aspect about metaphysics leads to an insight about the role of thought experiments as sources of counterexamples for assessing metaphysical claims. To understand this insight, we need to introduce the notion of something called a possible world. When some philosophers talk about the existence of various possible worlds, they mean to describe alternative parallel universes that are all equally real. This is not what we mean by a possible world. Our use of the notion of a possible world can be clarified as follows (clarify actual, impossible, and possible worlds):

The actual world, the real world of all and only entities that exist, can be described by a conjunction of all and only true propositions. The actual world is the world God really created (it also includes God himself). An impossible world is a world that cannot exist; the conjunction of propositions describing it includes a logically impossible proposition. For example, a world with square circles in Missouri is an impossible world. A possible world is a world whose description does not include a logically impossible proposition. A possible world is a world that God could create; it is a world that could have existed even though it may not. For example, a world with unicorns in California is not the actual world, but it is a possible world

The main two divisions of metaphysics are: (?) (sometimes simply called (?)) and (?).

The main two divisions of metaphysics are: general ontology (sometimes simply called ontology) and special metaphysics.

In the history of philosophy, there have been various opinions about the nature of categories, that is, about what a set of categories amounts to. However, two main schools of thought about categories are represented by Aristotle and Immanuel Kant.

The thing of central importance in Aristotle's approach to the categories is that he took them to give us real divisions in the actual world itself as it exists "out there," that is, as it is in itself independent of human thought or language. For him, the categories are the broadest, real divisions of being. (According to Aristotle, there are ten basic categories of reality.) For Kant, the categories (he lists twelve of them in The Critique of Pure Reason) are not divisions of the world as it is in itself (he called this the noumenal world), but rather they express the divisions of the world as it appears to us as knowing subjects (he called this the phenomenal world). Thus Kant's categories express the different ways that knowing subjects organize and classify the world of their sensory experience. A Kantian category is a broadest division of the phenomenal world, the sensory world as it is experienced by us. Thus, according to Kant, a study of the categories does not tell us about real divisions in the world as it is in itself. Rather, it gives us insight about how we as sensing and knowing subjects must divide the world of sensory experience to make it knowable to us.

The ultimate categories used are those of:

The ultimate categories used are those of substance, property, and relation.

There has been a division of opinion about the exact identity and number of the ultimate categories of being. Aristotle thought there were (?) ultimate categories, with the category of (?) being most basic. Others—for example, process philosophers—hold to a different set of categories, with the category (?) being most basic. Still other philosophers have listed various other categories as necessary to make sense of reality. As already mentioned, we will look at only two categories: (?). But one should remember that some philosophers reject these categories while others accept but add additional categories to them.

There has been a division of opinion about the exact identity and number of the ultimate categories of being. Aristotle thought there were ten ultimate categories, with the category of substance being most basic. Others—for example, process philosophers—hold to a different set of categories, with the category "event" being most basic. Still other philosophers have listed various other categories as necessary to make sense of reality. As already mentioned, we will look at only two categories: substance and property. But one should remember that some philosophers reject these categories while others accept but add additional categories to them.

The relationship between a higher, broader and a lower, more specific classification is called (?). Here are some examples of (?) relationships: being a visible property or being brown; being a shape or being a square; being a sound or being the note C; being a spatial relation or being on-top-of.

the relationship between a higher, broader and a lower, more specific classification is called a genus-species relationship. Here are some examples of genus-species relationships: being a visible property or being brown; being a shape or being a square; being a sound or being the note C; being a spatial relation or being on-top-of.