Philosophy of Psychology Exam 2

problem of false representations

beaver ex?

Stampe and Dretske try to give an account of "representations functioning correctly" in terms of "natural signs", like the danger signal that lots of animals use. What is Millikan's objection to that approach?

Millikan - how to account for situations when mental representation is representing correctly and when it is not ex smoke = natural sign(requires regular correlation) for fire - "functioning normally/correctly" would mean that the representation happens when the represented (thing happens in the environment) is present beaver ex

how is folk psychology successful (according to Churchland)

empirical theory open to refutation - not like other Folk theories bc success - true conception of cognitive theory - claims we posit these entities bc of their role in explanatory theory of behavior

What does it mean to say that functional states are "described syntactically"?

functional roles don't depend on intrinsic features, like qualia or semantic content

Eliminative Materialism

the doctrine that there are no mental states - theory that all reference to them mental concerning humans should be eliminated in the favor of neurobiology terms and concepts

How are the Homunculi Headed Robot and the China Mind objections supposed to challenge Functionalism? Do you think that Functionalism can defeat either or both objections? If so, how?

- identify every causal role w/ little robot (changes overall state of computer results in change of behavior) - China brain: have a person (acting for nodes in cognitive architecture) play role in your cognitive economy (w/ cell phones) replicate consciousness (have a flow chart) - each person in China represents a node? simulate causal flow chart - would it produce conscious states? would they have your experience? if no, functionalism is false, simulation does not equal the real thing

Chinese Room Argument - what is it? what is in the room?

- room with a person who does not speak Chinese-given super speed, super ability and super boredom - given book of rules - takes symbols and rules and essentially matches them - understands it but doesn't actually learn it

3 Non-Reductive Physicalist attempts to resolve the new mind-body problem, that Heil considers

1) weaken (alter) concept of causation there would be no ___ seeking behavior w/out pain and intention to find ____ -> results in changes of all views of science 2) tolerate "good" causal determination - mental cause overlapping on physical cause 3) change how you count causal powers/how you group them

How is Kripke's argument for Dualism (and against Type Identity Theory) supposed to work? Do you think the Type Identity Theory could respond to it? If so, how? If not, why not?

1. (cartesian premise): I can imagine, coherently, I could have mental states w/out brain states 2. P1 entails no logical contradiction 3. therefore it is logically possible that mental states are not identical w/ brain states 4. so the identity deemed, if not necessary must be a contingent identity 5. all scientific discoveries are necessary identities (discovering necessary truths) 6. K claims that the appearance of contingency is between the sensation of heat (experience of water) and cause of that sensation 7. type ID cannot be like any other scientific discovery. no space between sensation of pain and pain-just is pain 8. if identity is contingent, pain or brain states would have to be non-rigid 9. if identity is necessary, then we should not be able to imagine the identity not holding, but (P1) we can therefore identity does not hold ID theory is false

What kind of functionalism is the Representational Theory of Mind?

Computer functionalism - mind is to brain as software is to hardware mind is a kind of program -> programs are functions and multirealzable

Churchland invites us to consider folk psychology's failures, history, competition, and the prospects for reduction. What would he have us conclude, and why?

Goes wrong where the part of the corpus callosum is introduced - conclude that

how does eliminative materialism differ from type ID theory?

ID bet on theoretical reduction whereas eliminativists believe there will be no match and no transmission between mind and body - with a level of generality that the theory of the mind will fail

rigid designator

Identifying the same object or individual in every possible world. ex proper names natural kind terms demonstratives

Language of Thought Hypothesis

The idea that thought takes place in a mental language, such that representations in the mind are structured in sentence-like form

distinction between a functional role and realizer role

a functional role identifies pain with a higher-level relational property a realizer role would take a functional theory to provide definite descriptions to a lower-level property to satisfy the functional characterizations

According to Heil, what does it mean to say that "computations are multiply realizable"?

a single mental kind can be realized by many distinct physical kinds the thesis that the same mental property, state, or event can be implemented by different physical properties, states, or even events ex pain

The Absent Qualia Problem

aims to establish that a conscious experience involves nonphysical properties the idea that although someone might have complete physical knowledge about another conscious being they lack knowledge about how it feels to have the experiences of the being ex touching a hot stove and burning hand

How can Functionalism address the objections leveled against Logical Behaviorism (Circularity, Causal Role, Super Spartans)?

circularity - we pass bc we can identify each mental state w/ all the things that cause it and that it causes, w/out mentioning contents of any mental state causal tole - logical behaviorism couldn't allow mental states to cause behaviors Super spartans - functionalists can have mental states that don't result in behaviors

pseudo normal vision

developed by color scientists the idea that a person with real red-green spectrum can be considered to be functionally identical to a person with normal vision r-cone and g-cone receptors are swapped visual processing appears to be normal from the outside view

Millikan considers several possible ways of determining when representations are functioning "normally" or "correctly". Could statistical normality work? Why or why not? Could causal covariation work? Why or why not?

functioning normally/correctly would mean that the representation happens reliably when represented (thing in environment) is present - beaver ex doesn't always mean danger but signifies it does

new mind-body problem

how can mental states have causal powers? property dualism mental and physical properties are discinct kinds - a thing can have both mental properties depend on physical/material properties - can't have one without the other

According to Heil, what advantages would the Representational Theory of Mind have over the other theories of mind considered so far?

involves intentionality

how is non-reductive physicalism different from substance dualism? how is it different from ID theory? what theories count as NRP?

kind of property dualism theories that are included: functionalism and computer functionalism (RTM)

semantic engine - how does it operate? why is it called this?

mechanisms; non-mysterious no meanings employed only uses formal (syntactic) operations, but behaves as it does use and understand meanings

mental states (according to functionalism) What does it mean to say that a particular mental state is a role in a cognitive economy (or a "total functional system")?

mental states are functional states of the brain mental states are identified by what they do rather than by what they are made of ex minds as computers

What is Searle's positive theory about the nature of the mind, and how it is related to the body?

mental states are intentional - consciousness is an intrinsically biological phenomenon - it would be impossible to recreate the mind -

distinction between necessary and contingent truths

necessary truths - true under all circumstances contingent truths - true but could have been false

How can Functionalism address the objections leveled against the Identity Theory (Neuronal Chauvenism, Kripke's Argument)?

neural chauvinism - only things w/ brains could have mental states. functional roles are multiply realizable Kripke: functional roles are non-rigid like descriptions ex being a heart

What does it mean to say that the mind supervenes on the brain?

no change in mental properties w/out a change in physical properties - some brain states cannot support/realize 2+ differernt mental states - 2+ different physical states cannot give rise to support/realize the same mental state - need to be for memory to be true/succeed

what theories does the Chinese room argument threaten? what challenges does it pose? include the distinction between semantics and syntax

objection to computer functionalism passes the Turing test - syntactic manipulation of uninterperted symbols does not equal understanding meaning

cartesian premise

one has certain knowledge of one's existence bc one cannot think without knowing one exists

cartesian conclusion

only humans have minds mind = separate immaterial substance mind is causally connected to the brain

empirical constraint

our assertions should be evaluated in terms that fit with observed or factual facts "no proposal seriously considered by science should be philosophically rejected as incoherent, untestable or false

folk psychology - what does it aim to explain?

our everyday ability to assign mental states to other people, including beliefs, desires, intentions and so on it aims to explain how we understand others mental states/mind behavior through human analysis factors involving their development

How does Kripke argue that the identity: "pain = c-fiber stimulation" is significantly different from (that is, not analogous to) the identity: "water = H2O"?

pain = c-fibers is contingent - could be something else water = h2o is a necessary truth - can't be anything else

nonrigid designators

pick out different individuals in different circumstances ex tallest person in the room

distinction between priori and posteriori

priori - knowledge independent from experience posteriori - knowledge based on experience or bias

What kind of challenge does pseudonormal vision pose to functionalism? How does Nida-Rumelin's argument against Functionalism work?

pseudo normal vision - real red-green spectrukm inversion a pusedo normal person could be functioanlly identical to a normal person but functionalism left out important part: qualia

If eliminative materialism is correct, what would the future of psychology be like?

scientists will not use the terms of mental states (i.e. beliefs, desires, etc)

How would spectrum inversion pose a threat to functionalism?

spectrum inversion - the possibility that we are all taught that this is red but it might not be red for you, might be green is pseudo normal vision (a sort of possible spectrum inversion) is true psychofunctionalism is false and since psychofunctionalism rules out an empirical possibility, this is a strike against functionalism

systems reply and robot reply to the Chinese room argument

systems - the whole system understands Chinese even if - super-memory able to commit all the rules/symbols to memory - finds the right response when given prompts/questions (therefore passing the Turing test robot reply - connect room to robot - inputs from world, output instructions to move or talk - put person in causal contact with symbols - make sure understand meaning

How does Searle respond to the Systems Reply? How does he respond to the Robot Reply? Do you believe that those responses work or not? Provide your reasons.

systems reply - internalized system, memorize symbols, working with or in a system does not equal the person being an entire system alone robot reply - as long as the person gets the correct it doesn't matter what kind of causal interaction the person is having with the world

Turing Test how is it relevant to the representational theory of the mind

test between computer and human which tries to convince the judge they're human computer wins if 50% of judges are convinced the computer is human if the machine passes the test, we should say it is intelligent and has a mind relevant bc it backs up RTM

Once the problem is posed, it seems like we are forced to choose between having bodily actions be causally overdetermined, having mental states be causally overdetermined, or embracing epiphenomenalism. Explain why those appear to be the only options

theres too many ways of how the mind and body could interact for both and epiphenomenalism states mental properties have no causal powers bc mental properties

types versus tokens

types: categories a species-like level ex humanity tokens: actual concrete individuals ex individual tokens

How are mind and body related to one another, if Functionalism is correct?

what makes something a mental state depends on how it functions or the role it plays in the system not its internal make up