Poli 150 Midterm 1

How to get back to 1,1 and total cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma

1. Reputation = trust is built up over small interactions 2. International organizations and their enforcement mechanisms = WTO (a court that deals with countries who sue each other over sanctions) 3. Iterated play = you will be interacting in the future, so you have an incentive to build trust

Pax Britannica

"British Peace," a century-long period beginning with Napoleon's defeat at Waterloo in 1815 and ending with the outbreak of World War I in 1914 during which Britain's economic and diplomatic influence contributed to economic openness and relative peace.

Causes of Democratic Peace

1. Causes of Democratic Peace: It's False Democracies tend to be aligned in the postwar period, which means there is no reason to fight. This alliance is causing an absence of conflict. It has nothing to do with democracy. So alignments and power politics actually drive democratic peace. But, evidence holds up pre-Cold War, which casts doubt on this explanation. 2. Causes of Democratic Peace: It's Spurious Gibler and Oswiak (2017) argue the causal arrow is reversed: -Democratic Peace Hypothesis: Democracy → Peace -Alternative: Peace → Democracy Empirically, both propositions would look identical. Pre war Europe - democracies and autocracies; peaceful post war Europe - more democracies 3. Causes of Democratic Peace: Culture Democracies develop norms of non-violent conflict resolution. The norm is arguments not violence These norms translate into relationships between democracies. Leads to respect for human rights, self determination, and general constraints against violence. I'm pretty skeptical of this because democracies do wage war against other states, and are not always supportive of human rights protections nor self determination. Is culture a constraint to violence if democracies attack people internally? Immigrants? 4. Causes of Democratic Peace: Institutions Democratic leaders have less capability to use force without getting cooperation from other parts of government. Difference between democracies and autocracies Autocratic leaders have their own personal forces Democratic leaders have to go through processes to use force Leaders must persuade others to engage in violence, which can be difficult. Harder for democracies to make war in general but it doesn't explain why some wage war sometimes and why some don't other times For example, in the U.S., presidents must persuade Congress, and are constrained by War Powers Act. However, if this is true, why do democracies fight other states? How do they overcome these barriers in those conflicts, but not others? 5. Causes of Democratic Peace: Institutions and Survival Ties work by Fearon and Bueno de Mesquita et al together. Fearon argues that because democracies suffer audience costs in bargaining, they can credibly signal to each other. If a leader makes a promise but backs down they suffer audience costs So, backing down could be more costly than going through with war Escalate rhetoric, escalate rhetoric, escalate rhetoric until they can't back down So, democratic leaders tend to avoid these issues and back down Since democracies know that crises may rapidly escalate, they de-escalate when it is clear that their opponents care about particular issues. Spanish ships in Hudson Bay stealing the Canadian fish Candian navy came and started shooting at the Spanish ships Spain backed off

Bargaining breakdown leads to war. Why?

1. Information asymmetry/Incentives to misrepresent Information based explanation - states are not able to read each other's capabilities and resolves, balance of power can be unclear Incentives to improve their bargaining position in an environment of uncertainty States don't know the consequences of war First strike advantage 2. Commitment problems A treaty may be made but it will become unstable in the future and breakdown (gain land, find oil, etc) 3. Indivisible goods Three kinds of problems can prevent states from settling their disputes in ways that enable them to avoid the costs of war: incomplete information, difficulty in committing to honor a deal, and goods that are hard to divide

Kinds of commitment problems

1. Newfound power The difficulty in bargaining over such objects is that a state will be reluctant to render itself more vulnerable to attack without credible promises that the other side will not exploit that vulnerability in the future. The state may be able to avoid war now by making concessions, but doing so entails a risk that its adversary, made stronger by the deal, will then press new claims. Unless there is some way for the other side to credibly commit not to use its newfound power, a threatened state may decide that it would rather fight today than face a future in which it is considerably weaker. Thus, even if there is some deal that is preferable to war now, it this deal will lead to a change in capabilities that can be exploited later, the state that would be rendered weaker may decide to forgo that deal and gamble on a war. 2. Increased military capabilities A second, related problem arises if the balance of military capabilities is anticipated to change because of factors external to the bargaining process. A common source of this kind of power shift is different rates of economic growth. Can bring the development of nuclear weapons 3. Indivisible goods A third kind of problem that can prevent states from reaching mutually beneficial settlements of their disputes because the disputed good cannot be divided.

China vs US

1. Thucydides's Trap, Graham Allison 2. Examples of when war did/didn't happen 2. Realist View - War South China Sea China's military buildup 3. Institutionalist View - Peace Nuclear Deterrence Non-contiguous borders Economic interconnectedness Depth of institutions

Crisis bargaining

A bargaining interaction in which at least one actor threatens to use force in the event that its demands are not met

States

A central authority with the ability to make and enforce laws, rules, and decisions within a specified territory. States are social constructions - there is nothing 'natural' about them. They are, however, the way the world's politics are now primarily decided.

League of Nations

A collective security organization founded in 1919 after World War I. The League ended in 1946 and was replaced by the United Nations.

The Commitment Problem

A commitment problem exists when promises are not credible The heart of this explanation focuses on change For example, State A and State B are fighting. State A is winning, and is in a position to dictate terms to B. In theory, the most efficient outcome would be for A to offer B a negotiated settlement that reflected the balance of power, which B should accept. But let's think dynamically... Suppose that B is on track to eventually develop nuclear weapons At some point in time, B will get the weapon. B might then be considered on par with A in terms of power But, the agreement disproportionately favored A So, once if B gets nuclear weapons, and is therefore more powerful, it is only a matter of time before B challenges A

Security dilemma

A dilemma that arises when efforts that states make to defend themselves cause other states to feel less secure; can lead to arms races and war because of the fear of being attacked

Indivisible good

A good that cannot be divided without diminishing its value Example: Jerusalem Ways to resolve - 1. Shared control: the Israelis and Palestinians jointly control portions of Jerusalem 2. Compensation on another issue: The object is made divisible by adding a new dimension to the deal

Bargaining model of war

A means to represent the potential gains and losses and ultimate outcome of war between two actors as a bargaining interaction. Two sides. Each side has a win set that would lead them to a bargain. Each side has a lose set that would lead them to war.

Warsaw Pact

A military alliance formed in 1955 to bring together the Soviet Union and its Cold War allies in Eastern Europe and elsewhere; dissolved on March 31, 1991, as the Cold War ended.

Autocracy

A political system in which an individual or small group exercises power with few constraints and no meaningful competition or participation by the general public

Democracy

A political system in which candidates compete for political office through frequent, fair elections in which a sizable portion of the adult population can vote Liberal democracies have numerous protections for individuals' civil liberties

Politics

A process through which societies decide how their resources are allocated (who gets what, when, how, where).

Incomplete information

A situation in which actors in a strategic interaction lack information about other actors' interests and/or capabilities

Brinksmanship

A strategy in which adversaries take actions that increase the risk of accidental war, with the hope that the other will "blink" (lose its nerve) first and make concessions. The costs of war are such that, if faced with a simple choice of whether to jump or not, no sane decision maker would jump. But rational leaders might decide to step out onto the "slippery slope" and thereby increase the risk that war would start inadvertently.

Coercion

A strategy of imposing or threatening to impose costs on other actors in order to induce a change in their behavior

Preemptive war

A war fought with the anticipation that an attack by the other side is imminent (about to happen). A key motivation for preemption is that shifts in the strategic situation may make today's deals non-credible. This is true even though all sides should prefer some deal to conflict. This can lead to pre-emptive conflicts to ensure that deals are protected, or in anticipation that sustaining peace deals will be costly in the future.

Preventive war

A war fought with the intention of preventing an adversary from becoming stronger in the future. Preventive wars arise because a state whose power is increasing cannot commit not to exploit that power in future bargaining interactions.

Interstate war

A war in which the main participants are states

Civil war

A war in which the main participants are within the same state, such as the government and a rebel group

Agenda setting

Actions taken before or during bargaining that make the reversion outcome more favorable for one party

Military-industrial complex

An alliance between military leaders and the industries that benefit from international conflict, such as arms manufacturers The ability to topple a government gives military organizations significant influence over foreign and domestic politics

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

An alliance formed in 1949 among the United States, Canada, and most of the states of Western Europe in response to the threat posed by the Soviet Union. The alliance requires its members to consider an attack on any one of them as an attack on all.

Compellence

An effort to change the status quo through the threat of force. A compellent threat is intended to coerce the target state into making a concession or changing a current policy

Deterrence

An effort to preserve the status quo through the threat of force. Used to preserve the status quo by threatening the other side with unacceptable costs if it seeks to alter the current relationship

War

An event involving the organized use of military force by at least two parties that reaches a minimum threshold of severity. Conflict involving at least two states that results in 1,000 military fatalities. Military fatalities mean uniformed military personnel. The purpose of warfare is to obtain something the state wants (territory, states' policies, regime type).

Realism

Anarchy; States operate with self interest; States are epiphenomenal; International institutions have no bearing on state behavior

Difficult to measure power

And, states may seem powerful, but may be less so. On the eve of the collapse of the Soviet Union, it seemed as powerful as the U.S. And perhaps it was - it could still destroy the U.S. multiple times over. Leads to poor information because power is hard to measure, but also because the actors are not always giving us the truth about their power. Every state should strategically signal that they are very powerful.

interests, interactions, institutions

Explanations of international political events begin by specifying the relevant actors and their interests. As actors pursue their interests, they interact with other actors; the nature of these interactions affects the outcomes and whether actors can get what they want. Institutions may also influence the outcomes of interactions by providing rules that facilitate cooperation.

How do we know if a state is powerful?

Arable land - A country's ability to feed itself; Land available to do this Labor Force - How productive is your labor force?; Efficiency; Technology Population - Provides the labor force; Determines the labor force; More powerful if you have a large population because you have a larger labor force Technological development - A lot of aircraft carriers but easy to destroy them Military forces - Global reach; PLA vs US Military

Bueno de Mesquita et al Explanation of Democratic Leaders

Assumption: Primary motivation of leaders is retention. Retention can bring policy benefits. Retention could also bring power benefits or legacy. Regardless - all leaders need to stay in power to accomplish whatever their objectives are. Staying in power 51% of the voting public/selectorate is a great deal of people. There simply is not enough resources to buy all of them off using private goods. Therefore, democratic leaders have incentives to provide successful public policy. This includes foreign policy, which democratic leaders can often take full credit for. If they fail in crises, democratic leaders cannot minimize what occurs. Failure cannot be offset by private goods, reputation, or other factors. George Bush with the Iraq War in 2006 Opposition will magnify any failure. Flip Hypotheses: democratic leaders will avoid entering into major crises unless they have a high probability of winning. The electoral competition forces the leader to perform well. Leaders therefore devote the maximum level of resources to succeeding in crises. Empirical expectation is that democracies will perform well in crises - due to electoral pressures. Contrary to claims that democracy decreases foreign policy performance - actually enhances it! If Democracy A knows that Democracy B must prevail in a crisis... And Democracy B signals that it is serious about an issue... Democracy A will acquiesce to B's demands. On the other hand, if B is weaker than A, B will likely select out and avoid starting a crisis to begin with. Hence, we have the democratic peace.

Credibility

Believability. A credible threat is a threat that the recipient believes will be carried out. A credible commitment or promise that the recipient believes will be honored.

Dispute in the South China Sea as an example of a war over a source of power

China (PLA) is building unsinkable aircraft carriers/islands in the South China Sea China claims the largest portion of the area based on a map it issued in 1947. The "nine dash line" stretches for hundreds of miles off the coast. Vietnam disputes the map, citing documents from the 17th century. Complicating matters is that the Philippines also claims control over the Scarborough Shoal. Malaysia and Brunei also lay some claim to the islands. So Why the Islands? - Rumored to hold large quantities of natural resources, including petroleum and natural gas. Senkaku and Spratly islands are vital shipping lanes. Several trillion dollars worth of economy there Could potentially cut Japan off from its energy imports The power to make Japan do something it would not normally do is growing China's assertion of control over these areas could lead to future gains in capability. This is why Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Brunei are all wary of China's activities in the region... China is increasing its ability to makes these countries do something they would not normally do They could shift power and create a commitment problem.

War as a Failure of Bargaining

Clausewitz argues that war itself provides no value. Instead, war is a means to accomplish something else. Presumably, since war is waged between states, governments want to accomplish some political objective. Ex. Redefine territorial borders, force another state to adopt a new policy/respect human rights, seize markets. We assume that war itself is costly. We can also assume that we do not know the outcome of a war before it starts, so war is risky. So the decision to initiate wars should be less attractive precisely because of these characteristics. Instead, states should prefer to negotiate a solution to disputed issues. Fearon Seminal finding: if the parties can negotiate, there should always be some negotiated settlement that is preferred to war. In other words, why couldn't the parties negotiate? Question is then: when can they reach settlements to avoid war? In almost all cases of international politics, states face this bargaining problem. Basic question: how to split the gains from cooperation? But, this is done in an environment of secrecy - both sides maintain private information to get a better deal.

Relative power

Compares the power of at least two states.

Definition of war (criteria)

Conflict involving at least two states that results in 1,000 military fatalities. Military fatalities mean uniformed military personnel. The 1,000 criteria is arbitrary, but captures most of the conflicts we think of as wars... World Wars I, II, Korean Conflict, Gulf War, etc. While leaving out conflicts we don't typically think of as wars. 1986 bombing of Libya, Hainan Island incident, 2017 bombing of Syria.

Constructivism

Disagrees that were are governed by anarchy, but instead by international norms (individual norms → national norms → international norms)

Two broad ways in which democratic domestic institutions can affect the likelihood of war

Either by influencing the interests of states and their leaders or by influencing the bargaining interaction between and among countries Influencing the interests of states and their leaders: The costs of war are paid by society at large but generally not by the leader who makes the decision to wage war Political institutions that foster broad representation would serve to align the interests of the ruler and the ruled, making those with the power to decide on war sensitive to the costs that their decisions impose on others The primary mechanism through which political institutions influence decisions about war and peace is accountability Even if political leaders do not bear the costs of war, they can be punished politically if they make decisions that harm the people or groups on whom they rely to stay in power Influencing the bargaining interaction between and among countries Democratic institutions and processes make it easier to overcome informational problems More transparent than nondemocratic systems Free press Opposition parties can freely voice approval or disapproval Politically costly to back down from a threat Public threats made by democratic leaders are more informative because they are costlier to make Credibly communicate their resolve Adhere to norms of mutual respect and nonviolence in their dealings with one another Guided by norms that favor compromise over force

Peace of Westphalia

Gave the princes control over the territory they confiscate from the Catholic Church and the Hapsburgs. Allowed for independent decision making for the princes and the proto-states. Established sovereignty over territories under their control. They are the only entities that control and tax that land. Control shifts from the church and emperor to local state units - state is now considered sovereign. Citizens now give loyalty to local states. Because of this history, states are the key actors in IR.

Interest groups

Groups of individuals with common interests that organize to influence public policy in a manner that benefits their members

Risk-return trade-off

In crisis bargaining, the trade-off between trying to get a better deal and trying to avoid war

The Cost of Peace

Maintaining peace can be expensive. Preparing for war is expensive Investment in weapons/military gives no return It takes quite a bit of resources to invest in defense to deter your opponent, and to build alliances to improve security. Therefore, it might be preferable to bite the bullet and simply wipe out your adversary. If I can fight and win today, and there is a chance I will lose that ability in the future, it's better for me to fight today. (Cold War Example - Eisenhower appears worried that the costs of peace may compel him to initiate war. While the US was ahead in nuclear power, and the Soviets were projected to pass the US in the future, Eisenhower proposed to strike the Soviet Union while they were ahead.) This would be costly in the immediate term, but would allow you to enjoy the peace dividend over the long haul.

Liberalism

Institutions have an impact on states

US/Iran rivalry

Iran developing nuclear weapons Fight them while they don't have them Wait and fight them when they have nuclear weapons If they have nuclear weapons, they have more power in the Middle East and take over territory there Why do we care if Iran gets nuclear weapons? Historically, Iran has paramilitary groups that go into other countries and help insurgent groups Support Iraq to maintain its anti-US stance Influence in Syria and Lebanon threatens Israel Saudi Arabia has been a stabilizing global energy force Iran has supported Shiite rebels in an eastern territory of SA If SA loses this territory, major oil fields are now controlled by Iran, which affects the US and the world Also threatening Bahrain, which is where the US holds military power (Fifth Fleet) The Strait of Hormuz - ⅓ of global energy Bab El-Mandeb Iran can cause enormous shock to the global economy Nuclear weapons provides security at home and paramilitary groups provide influence abroad Can we trust Iran to commit to not doing all of this? Shifts in power/territorial power cause commitment problems.

Interactive effect

It is easier to understand these dynamics in isolation, but they likely work together. Leaders seek to maximize their retention. They respond to special interests that will maximize their retention, given the institutional setup. These interests will therefore pay less of the cost of conflict, but gain more of the benefits. These interests will then work to keep the leader in power if they deliver.

Iraq War as an example of a commitment problem

Justification of the Iraq War - Consider the "agreement" reached at the end of the first Gulf War Saddam Hussein was defeated. He was forced to withdraw from Kuwait. He was also forced to accept UN inspections and no fly zones over his territory. The agreement reflected the fact that the US was overwhelmingly victorious, and that he was weaker. But, things change over the 1990s - The anti-Saddam coalition begins to fragment. Push is made to eventually repeal sanctions. Support for Saddam within rival Arab states grows. Simultaneously, Saddam appears to be revamping his nuclear and chemical weapons program. He appears to obstruct UN weapons inspectors, and eventually kicks them out. New Fear - What happens once Saddam gets a nuclear weapon? Some argue: nothing. Others suggest he will use his newfound power to make greater territorial demands, or further challenge the US. And, the argument is that if the US doesn't stop Saddam before he gets the weapon, the US will be unable to do anything once he does. Argument for Regime Change - The only way, therefore, to get the US out of this situation is to go all the way Remove Saddam from power, and Saddam will be unable to blackmail ever again

Where does power come from?

Military resources, size of economy, territory, population, regime's ability to harness both territory and population

Rana Dasgupta, "The Demise of the Nation State".

Nation states everywhere are in an advanced state of political and moral decay from which they cannot individually extricate themselves. After so many decades of globalisation, economics and information have successfully grown beyond the authority of national governments. Today, the distribution of planetary wealth and resources is largely uncontested by any political mechanism. If we wish to rediscover a sense of political purpose in our era of global finance, big data, mass migration and ecological upheaval, we have to imagine political forms capable of operating at that same scale. The current political system must be supplemented with global financial regulations, certainly, and probably transnational political mechanisms, too. That is how we will complete this globalisation of ours, which today stands dangerously unfinished. Its economic and technological systems are dazzling indeed, but in order for it to serve the human community, it must be subordinated to an equally spectacular political infrastructure, which we have not even begun to conceive. But there is no possibility that al-Shabaab, the Janjaweed, Seleka, Boko Haram, Ansar Dine, Isis or al-Qaida will provide that way out. The situation requires new ideas of political organisation and global economic redistribution. There is no superpower great enough, any more, to contain the effects of exploding "quasi-states". Barbed wire and harder borders will certainly not suffice to keep such human disasters at bay. The first is clear: global financial regulation. Today's great engines of wealth creation are distributed in such a way as to elude national taxation systems (94% of Apple's cash reserves are held offshore; this $250bn is greater than the combined foreign reserves of the British government and the Bank of England), which is diminishing all nation states, materially and symbolically. Second: global flexible democracy. As new local and transnational political currents become more powerful, the nation state's rigid monopoly on political life is becoming increasingly unviable. Nations must be nested in a stack of other stable, democratic structures - some smaller, some larger than they - so that turmoil at the national level does not lead to total breakdown. The EU is the major experiment in this direction, and it is significant that the continent that invented the nation state was also the first to move beyond it. Third, and finally: we need to find new conceptions of citizenship. Citizenship is itself the primordial kind of injustice in the world. It functions as an extreme form of inherited property and, like other systems in which inherited privilege is overwhelmingly determinant, it arouses little allegiance in those who inherit nothing. it is unjust to preserve the freedom to move capital out of a place and simultaneously forbid people from following.

Audience costs

Negative repercussions for failing to follow through on a threat or to honor a commitment

Collective action problems

Obstacles to cooperation that occur when actors have incentives to collaborate but each acts with the expectation that others will pay the cost of cooperation

Treaty/Peace of Westphalia

Peace treaty that ended the Thirty Years' War in 1648; Created the modern state system because states were expected to respect one another's sovereignty within their borders

Is power all about guns? No.

Persuasion - The most effective technique countries use; Trades, bargains; Most international relations are done this way Rewards - Resources, access to a market Camp David Accords - Peace between Israel and Egypt, At war for years, The US told both states that if they stopped fighting the US would give them aid, Hasn't been a military conflict since Threats - If you don't engage in the behavior that I want, there will be consequences; Shame/publicizing can be very compelling; Not working right now - International community shamed the US for pulling out of the Paris Accords, Democratic candidates saying that they will rejoin the Paris Accords as soon as they become president; Freeze on diplomatic relations; Economic sanctions; Military force Non-Violent Punishment - Freeze on diplomatic relations; Economic sanctions; Iran and oil 2014 Use of Force/Violence - Physically force a country to do what you want; How effective is this?; Not gonna use force right away (all the other options haven't worked)

Tradeoffs

Policies have benefits and cons; need happy medium; how do states respond to tradeoffs?Each of these issues involve policies that produce winners, but also create some that either do not gain as much, or lose as a result of the decision (Example = healthcare).

Why do states initiate preemptive wars?

Preemption stems from dynamic shifts that lead to a phenomenon known as commitment problems, which render negotiated settlements non-credible States therefore preempt when they believe the dynamics of their relationship with others are changing And that their opponents will not rationally honor their commitments in the future Preempt = to take action in order to prevent (an anticipated event) from happening. Parties may prefer threatening to initiate wars to improve bargaining terms But parties shouldn't necessarily want to go through with it Since both sides know conflict is costly and risky, both sides should agree to settle So why don't they?

Public goods

Products that are nonexcludable and nonrival in consumption, such as national defense

Absolute power

Refers to how much power a state has or the amount of resources a state has.

So Why not make a Deal?

Remember, the international system is noisy and often information poor. In a bargaining situation, both sides keep private information about their true military power. Both sides have incentives to overstate your power - if you convince your opponent that you are strong, your opponent might back down in bargaining. Manipulating incomplete information is beneficial in this way, but...it raises the possibility of war if your bluff is called. Both sides also may prefer to strike first to seize initiative (first strike advantage). This is the heart of Fearon's explanation. Both sides try to get a better deal by overstating their military capabilities and willingness to fight. This might convince an opponent that it could do better fighting as opposed to settling. Since both sides prefer to strike first to gain a military advantage, one side may choose to initiate war rather than continue bargaining.

Iteration

Repeated interactions with the same partners

Institutions

Sets of rules (known and shared by the community) that structure interactions in specific ways Examples: UN, IMF, WTO, World Bank Jobs: Setting standards of behavior, Verifying compliance, Reducing the costs of joint decision making, Resolving disputes All institutions contain policy bias (based on the bargaining strength of the actors)

But is the Democratic Peace Really True? Some Close Calls

Spanish/American war in 1898. Popular sentiment was that Spain was treating its colonies bad and that the US was obligated to take over/free its colonies World War II? Hitler rose to power through a democratic election Rose to power fueling international anger and outrage Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974. Kargil war between India and Pakistan in 1999. Both look democratic but they end up in a shooting war US/Iran Iran is more democratic in nature than most of its neighbors Iran has elections Iran is somewhat democratic but its on the edge of war with the US Consider the current internal conflict in Libya between the UN recognized Government of National Accord (GNA) and the Tobruk faction led by Khalifa Haftar. U.S. officially supports the GNA. However, weapons sold to France (a U.S ally and democracy) recently ended up with Haftar's army. U.S. proxy is seemingly fighting a French proxy. Is this consistent with the democratic peace? Maybe...democracies aren't fighting directly, but...

States vs. Nations

States are tied to physical geography - they have a set of demarcated borders. Nations, on the other hand, are a group of people with a common lineage, culture, or customs. Nations may be confined within a particular state, or...Nations may spread across several states. Example: Kurdish population who is Concentrated in Syria, Iran, Iraq, and Turkey.

The Economist - U.S./Iran Tensions Threaten the World's Most Important Shipping Route & The Washington Post - The oil route that could be behind the escalating Trump/Iran threats-explained

The Strait of Hormuz, a narrow stretch of water connecting the Persian Gulf to the rest of the world's oceans, has long been recognized as the most important choke-point for global oil supplies. Accounting for about a third of the world's sea-borne oil (and a fifth of the world's total oil exports), the strait links oil and gas producers in the Middle East with consumers around the globe, including those in Europe, Asia and America. Were it to be blocked, the world's supply of oil would fall, and prices would spike. The risk of such an event is growing, and oil prices are rising as a result. In May last year, President Donald Trump pulled out of a nuclear deal with Iran and reimposed crippling sanctions on the country. Hassan Rouhani, Iran's president, responded by threatening to block oil shipments; if Iran could not export oil, nor could others. The country could try to block the strait using speed boats, anti-ship missiles and mines. But doing so would probably be a desperate act of last resort. Iran would be risking a war with America and its regional allies. And military analysts think that America's Fifth Fleet, based in Bahrain, would be able to re-open the waterway within weeks. The United States would not be the only nation interested in resolving a dispute as quickly as possible, however, as the vast majority of supplies are delivered to Asian markets, in particular to Japan, India and China.

Where does sovereignty come from?

The Thirty Years War was the catalyst for sovereignty. Started as a war between Protestants and Catholics in the Holy Roman Empire. Evolved into a war between the alliance of the Catholic Church with the Hapsburgs in Spain and Austria against everyone else (France, German princes, Swedes). Began with Holy Roman Emperor Ferdinand (a Hapsburg, and titular head) trying to assert Catholicism over Protestant areas within the empire. Control of the empire was already dissolving into localities - so this was an effort to establish control from the center. Division of European states exported to other areas of the world

Power

The ability of Actor A to get Actor B to do something that B would otherwise not do; the ability to get the other side to make concessions and to avoid having to make concessions oneself. If Y agrees to do what X says, but Y wanted to do that anyway, that's not an exercise in power. But if Y prefers to do something other than what X wants, yet does what X wants anyway, X exercises some power.

Accountability

The ability to punish or reward leaders for the decisions they make, as when frequent, fair elections enable voters to hold elected officials responsible for their actions by granting or withholding access to political office

Anarchy

The absence of a central authority with the ability to make and enforce laws that bind all actors. There is no central authority in interstate relations, meaning that states must decide outcomes for themselves. So bargaining in world politics is VERY difficult! International politics are fraught with tradeoffs.

Outside options

The alternatives to bargaining with a specific actor

Actors

The basic unit for the analysis of international politics; can be either individuals or groups of people with common interests. Key actors: States, politicians, industries, classes, bureaucracies, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations

Bureaucracy

The collection of organizations - including the military, diplomatic corps, and intelligence agencies - that carry out most tasks of governance within the state

"Destined For War", Graham Allison.

The defining question about global order for this generation is whether China and the United States can escape Thucydides's Trap. The Greek historian's metaphor reminds us of the attendant dangers when a rising power rivals a ruling power—as Athens challenged Sparta in ancient Greece, or as Germany did Britain a century ago. Most such contests have ended badly, often for both nations, a team of mine at the Harvard Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs has concluded after analyzing the historical record. In 12 of 16 cases over the past 500 years, the result was war. When the parties avoided war, it required huge, painful adjustments in attitudes and actions on the part not just of the challenger but also the challenged. A risk associated with Thucydides's Trap is that business as usual—not just an unexpected, extraordinary event—can trigger large-scale conflict. When a rising power is threatening to displace a ruling power, standard crises that would otherwise be contained, like the assassination of an archduke in 1914, can initiate a cascade of reactions that, in turn, produce outcomes none of the parties would otherwise have chosen. Note that Thucydides identified two key drivers of this dynamic: the rising power's growing entitlement, sense of its importance, and demand for greater say and sway (China is seeking more power in international institutions), on the one hand, and the fear, insecurity, and determination to defend the status quo this engenders in the established power, on the other. In fact, in 12 of 16 cases over the last 500 years in which there was a rapid shift in the relative power of a rising nation that threatened to displace a ruling state, the result was war. As Singapore's late leader, Lee Kuan Yew, observed, "the size of China's displacement of the world balance is such that the world must find a new balance. It is not possible to pretend that this is just another big player. This is the biggest player in the history of the world." Everyone knows about the rise of China. Few of us realize its magnitude. Never before in history has a nation risen so far, so fast, on so many dimensions of power. 2 parts to his argument 1. If nothing changes, the US and China will go to war 2. But if things change, war can be averted Examples of when war happened: Germany was threatening the power of Britain and France Because tensions were so high, an everyday occurrence (assassination of an archduke) set off war Examples of when war didn't happen: Cold War

Bretton Woods System

The economic order negotiated among allied nations at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, in 1944, which led to a series of cooperative arrangements involving commitment to relatively low barriers to international trade and investment.

Sovereignty

The expectation that states have legal and political supremacy - or ultimate authority - within their territorial borders.

Diversionary incentive

The incentive that state leaders have to start international crises in order to rally public support at home

Six Day War as an example of a war over a source of power

The issue in dispute itself is a source of power. For example, consider the case of the Golan Heights. This territory is a plateau between Israel and southwest Syria. The territory is only about 40 miles from Damascus, and overlooks a significant part of Northern Israel. A high ground between Israel and Syria - military advantage Prior to the Six Day War - By virtue of the Golan Heights position, any peace deal between Israel and Syria was unstable. Suppose Israel were to make a peace deal. If so, Syria could use the position of the heights to mobilize troops that might eventually engage in a surprise attack. Or, Syria could simply shell Israel at low cost - which would decrease the stability of a settlement. The Six Day War - June 5, 1967: Israeli airstrikes destroy two thirds of Syria's air force. June 10: The Golan Heights falls under Israeli control. Game changer: the war decreases Syria's ability to undermine peace deals, but... Increases Israel's willingness to resist future peace deals that would involve surrendering this territory (shifts in power = potential commitment problems)

Linkage

The linking of cooperation on one issue to interactions on a second issue

Gold Standard

The monetary system that prevailed between about 1870 and 1914, in which countries tied their currencies to gold at a legally fixed price; The traditional international medium of exchange

Democratic peace

The observation that there are few, if any, clear cases of war between mature democratic states

Treaty of Versailles

The peace treaty between the Allies and Germany that formally ended World War I on June 28th, 1919

Hegemony

The predominance of one nation-state over others

Decolonization

The process of shedding colonial possessions, especially during the rapid end of the European empires in Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean between the 1940s and the 1960s

Interactions

The ways in which the choices of two or more actors combine to produce political outcomes. Cooperation = an interaction in which two or more actors adopt policies that make at least one actor better off relative to the status quo without making others worse off Coordination = a type of cooperative interaction in which actors benefit from all making the same choices and subsequently have no incentive not to comply Collaboration = a type of cooperative interaction in which actors gain from working together but nonetheless have incentives not to comply with any agreement Bargaining = an interaction in which two or more actors must choose outcomes that make one better off at the expense of another. Bargaining is redistributive: it involves allocating a fixed sum of value between different actors.

Resolve

The willingness of an actor to endure costs in order to acquire a particular good. A state's willingness to bear the costs of fighting and how much the state values the object of dispute relative to those costs.

Free ride

To fail to contribute to a public good while benefiting from the contributions of others

Bargaining range

The set of deals that both parties in a bargaining interaction prefer over the reversion outcomes. When the reversion outcome is war, the bargaining range is the set of deals that both sides prefer over war.

First-strike advantage

The situation that arises when military technology, military strategies, and/or geography give a significant advantage to whichever state attacks first in a war.

Rally effect

The tendency for people to become more supportive of their country's government in response to dramatic international events, such as crises or wars The bargaining range shrinks if the leader of State A expects political benefits, in the form of a rally, as a result of war. This benefit increases the value of war to A, offsetting some or all of its costs, but as long as the benefit does not exceed the costs of war to both sides, a bargaining range still exists. When conflict starts, leaders get a support boost Costs of war are offset by the rally effect, so A might push for more concessions from B

Coercive diplomacy

The use of threats to advance specific demands in a bargaining interaction Seeking to wrest concessions from the other side by making the alternative seem unacceptably costly

Thirty Years War

Thirty Years' War starts with the Bohemian Revolt. Ferdinand II replaces Mathias as Holy Roman Emperor. Ferdinand is a fundamentalist Catholic, seeks to force conversion and elevate Catholicism over Lutheranism, Calvinism. May 1618: Bohemian Revolt begins with deposition of two Catholic councilors sent by Ferdinand to rule Prague. Rebellion against Hapsburgs quickly spreads. 1618-1629: The Hapsburgs defeat the German Princes. Swedish and the French are watching, and worry that they are next. 1631: Sweden intervenes from the north on behalf of the German Princes. Fierce battles, tremendous losses, but Sweden turns war around. 1635: France intervenes from the West, also against Holy Roman Empire and Hapsburgs. Seals the fate of the war, but it would take over a decade to come to an end. 1648: The war ends with the Treaty of Westphalia.

War as an Inefficient Outcome

Threatening war can improve your bargaining position. But, actually going through with war is not the best of outcomes. 1.War is Risky: Things can go badly. Ex. Operation Rosario in 1982. 2.War is Costly: Minimum, you lose some of your arsenal. Maximum, you lose soldiers. Regardless, you are guaranteed to lose resources. Ex. Operation Barbarossa in June 1941.

Background on US/Iran

US asking other countries to not buy Iranian oil US goal is to change Iranian behavior: Nuclear program, Aggressive actions in the Middle East (partnerships), Different kind of government in Iran Timeline of relationship 2018 - Trump pulled out of the nuclear deal with Iran In response, Iran has increased its nuclear program Trump put oil sanctions on Iran Iran has violently respond against the US and its allies Trump ordered a drone strike to kill a prominent military leader Iran fired missiles at a US military base in Iraq US wants to end Iran's nuclear program Iran wants to drive the US out of the Middle East

International relations

Understanding interaction between political units (states, militant groups, international institutions, firms, and individuals) in world politics

How Does Domestic Politics Influence Conflict?

Unequal distribution of gains versus costs: People who gain from war are not necessarily those who pay for it. Those who initiate war rarely pay the cost. Those who fight the war suffer from it. Example: Arms industry vs soldiers Do special interests drive foreign policy? Ex. Mearsheimer and Walt argument about AIPAC. Their argument: AIPAC will benefit from the US supporting Israel in the Middle East, so they should lobby for US intervention in the Middle East. But, other organizations have an effect on the US decision, and they may offset the viewpoint of AIPAC. Institutional constraints: Fighting conflict is a bureaucratic process ability to do so is limited by capabilities of bureaucracies. US is spread all over the world - land, sea, and air Most countries don't have that capability because of the constraints of their bureaucracies (how they're designed/funding). Institutions shape what policies are possible, and what actors in a state have power. This can constrain leaders in a bargaining situation. These types of constraints can exist in any system. Rouhani in Iran is constrained by the Iotowa. Congress, "Veto players" Political Survival: Leaders actions are intended to maximize their survival. Most states don't have the capability to initiate war at an international level If Putin goes to war... does it benefit him or hurt him? Maybe both in some aspects. Leaders should rationally make decisions to maximize their chances of survival. Regardless of regime type, there are threats to power and war may potentially give them a boost So, when it comes to war, leaders recognize that there will be an increased risk if they lose. If they win, however, they improve their chances of survival. Even if political leaders do not bear the costs of war, they can be punished politically if they make decisions that harm the people or groups on whom they rely to stay in power

Why do states enter war?

War is a product of bargaining failure. Most of the time, if a deal does not get done, states don't fight. But, empirically, there are some salient issues that contribute to fighting: Ex. territory or terrorism. In these cases, war becomes an outside option should bargaining fail.

Conclusion about War

War results from bargaining failure. States use threat of war to improve their terms, even though they prefer avoiding it. However, they may ultimately go through with it if they believe they can benefit from a first strike. Empirically, we should therefore expect most conflicts to resolve short of war, but that war can result from uncertainty and temptation to strike first.

Interests

What actors want to achieve through political action. 3 categories: power or security, economic or material welfare, and ideological goals

Key Domestic Actors in Foreign Policy

leaders, bureaucracy, interest groups, general public