Quiz 4 poli sci 3224

Exceptions to warrant

1. Searches incident to a valid arrest. 2. Searches to ensure that evidence is not lost. 3. Searches based on consent. 4. Searches to ensure the safety of the law 5. enforcement official. 6. Searches does in "hot pursuits." 7. Searches conducted under the plain view doctrine (If the officer sees tools or objects linked to criminal conduct in his plain view).

Berkemer v. McCarty (1984)

Before Berkemer v. McCarty, some courts only required Miranda rights be read for those defendants charged with serious offenses. This case is significant because it made clear that the Miranda rule applies to anyone in custodial interrogation, regardless of the seriousness of the offense.

Brewer v. Williams (1977)

Clarification, indigent defendants are appointed counsel once any adversarial proceedings have begun.

Safford Unified School District #1 v. Redding 8-1

Fact In 2003, Savanah Redding was called from class by the Assistant Principal. In the Principals office, she was shown an unzipped day planner containing several knives, lighters, a permanent marker, and a cigarette. According to Redding the day planner was her but the contents inside the container was not hers. She also said that she let a friend use the container a few days earlier. The principal also confronted Redding with four white prescription strength ibuprofen pills and one over-the-counter naproxen pill. The principal said that he received a report that she was giving the pills to other students and that they were going to take them at lunch. Redding denied the claims and let the administrator and his assistant search her belongings where they found nothing. The principal ordered his assistant to take Savanah to the nurse's office, so she could be strip searched. The nurse prompted her to remove her jacket, socks, and shoes, leaving her in stretch pants and a T-shirt. She was then asked to remove those items and was told to "pull her bra out to the side and shake it, and to pull out the elastic on her underpants, thus exposing her breast and pelvic area to some degree." No pills were found. Her mother later sued for monetary damages from the defendants for conducting a strip search of her daughter in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The federal district court saw no constitutional violation, however, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. Question Was a strip search a reasonable method to finding evidence of drugs on a minor? Were the administrators of the middle school immune from the civil liability of the Fourth Amendment and liable for damges? Conclusion The SCOTUS sided with Redding's mother and the Ninth Circuit when it comes to this case. The circumstances in this case differentiates it from previous cases like T.L.O. Mainly because the school administrators searched the young girl to the point of her underwear being expose. Justice Souter writing for the majority iterated "reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction." that the school did not have enough reasonable suspicion of evidence to "make the quantum leap from outer clothes and backpacks to exposure of intimate parts." At the same time, the justices ruled that the administrators were not liable to damages. Since the administrators were attempting to protect the safety of other children and there isn't any precedent of laws that the administrators could have referred to. Significances Savana Redding's age and gender undoubtedly influenced the court's conclusion that her strip search was unreasonable. Outside the context of the public-school setting, however, the justices have been more tolerant of such intrusive searches. This especially has been the case in the setting of a correctional facility.

Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 5-4

Facts Ernesto Miranda, an indigent, uneducated truck driver, allegedly kidnapped and raped an eighteen-year-old woman outside of Phoenix, Arizona. Ten days after the incident, police arrested him and after two hours of interrogation, he confessed to the murder. There were no misconducts performed by the officers in the case and at no point did Miranda ask for an attorney. After the decision is was in Gideon v. Wainright (1963) it was mandated that all indigent criminal defendants receive a defense attorney at government expense, the trial judge appointed a lawyer to defend Miranda's charges. His attorney inadequately defended him by attempting to prove him mentally defective or insane. Miranda was convicted and received a sentence of twenty to thirty years. Conviction stemmed from the confession and the positive ID from the victim on Miranda. Miranda retained new attorneys, who presented wholly different arguments to the Supreme Court. Where Miranda's appeal was combined with three others presenting similar issues. Question What procedural safeguards are necessary in order to ensure the protection of the defendants Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights? Should the confession in this case be excluded as violating the defendant's constitutional rights? Conclusion The SCOTUS sided with Miranda in this case and created a list of rights that must be recited to a criminal defendant. As the constitutional right to be free from self-incrimination is only effective if individuals are aware of that right, a confession obtained without prior notice to the defendant is inadmissible as a violation of his constitutional rights. Significance Chief Justice Warren's majority opinion in Miranda is a tour de force on self-incrimination, creating the so-called Miranda warnings that police must read to suspects before any custodial interrogation. However, two major question were let open after the decision in Miranda. What is custody? What constitutes an interrogation?

Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health (1983) 6-3

Facts A 1978 ordinance passed by the city council of Akron, Ohio contained five restrictions on the right to an abortion. All post-first-trimester abortions must be performed in a hospital. Minors under the age of fifteen must obtain written consent of a parent of a court prior to an abortion. A woman must give informed consent prior to an abortion. (ex- a physician must tell her that the "unborn child is a human life from the moment of conception") Twenty-four hours must elapse between the time the pregnant woman signs the consent form and the abortion. Doctors who perform abortions "shall insure that the remains of the unborn child are disposed of in a humane and sanitary manner." Question Does the Akron city ordinance violate the right to privacy that is insured under the penumbra of the 14th and 9th Amendment? Conclusion The first four provisions were seen as unnecessary and unconstitutional impediments placed in the way of a woman's right to choose, and the fifth was struck down as unconstitutionally vague. Significance The very first woman to serve on the SCOTUS, Sandra Day O'Connor in her dissent critiqued the decision and trimester notion in Roe v. Wade. To start, she touched on medical advances since the decision in Roe; citing that "viability before 28 weeks was considered unusual," but newer studies indicated viability as early as twenty-five weeks. Even further, she insisted that since the "lines separating viability from nonviability are fading, compelling state interests exist throughout pregnancy. (urged that the trimester approach made by Roe should be abandoned and replaced with one that "protects the woman from unduly burdensome interference with her freedom to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy." Because of her dissent and polarizing opinions, the Justices proposed three different approaches to restrictive abortion laws.

Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey (1992) 5-4

Facts After the court's decision in Webster, Pennsylvania revised its Abortion Control Act, which the court had struck down with a 5-4 vote in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologist (1986). Given the membership changes on the court and the Webster decision, the state thought the court would now uphold the amended law. The Pennsylvania law required: Informed consent and a twenty-four-hour waiting period before abortions could be performed. Parental (or judicial consent for minors.) Spousal notification Comprehensive record keeping and reporting of the following information for each abortion performed: The name of the physician. The woman's age. The number of prior pregnancies or abortions she had had. The weight and age of the aborted fetus. Whether the woman was married. If relevant, the reasons the woman failed to notify her spouse. Before these provisions went into effect 5 women's clinics challenged the provisions constitutionality. Although, a federal district court agreed with clinics, the Third Circuit of U.S. Court of Appeals disagreed. At the time, O'Connor's "undue burden" standard was the law of the land. In use of the standard the Appeals court decided the provisions except spousal consent did not place an undue burden of a woman's right to an abortion. All but the spousal consent provision passed the ration basis test. The spousal consent provision, in the court's view, placed an undue burden on the abortion decision by exposing women to spousal abuse. (Applied strict scrutiny test and provision could not stand). However, Samuel Alito disagreed with his appellate court colleagues on this portion of the decision. Alito dissent to uphold the spousal consent provision caused the appellate court to have a mixed decision. Because of that the state and the clinics appealed the supreme court. The country no longer wanted a vague decision, so the SCOTUS was urged to either affirm or overturn Roe. Question Does the Pennsylvania "spousal consent" provision violate the right to privacy and the right to terminate pregnancy? Should the decision in Roe be overturned? Conclusion The court did not overrule Roe; to the contrary, it reaffirmed the "central holding" of the 1973 decision that a woman should have "some" freedom to terminate a pregnancy. At the same time, the "joint opinion" gutted the core of Roe. The Trimester framework was gone. Under Casey states may now enact laws-regulating the entire pregnancy-that further their interest in potential life so long as those laws are rationally related to that end and do not put an undue burden on the right to an abortion. Laws that do not meet this standard will be subject to strict scrutiny, such as the spousal notification provision at issue in Casey. Significance The Undue burden approach, which O'Connor originally proposed in 1983 in her Akron dissent, could lead to very different outcomes in abortion cases. Justice Scalia's dissent indicates that many provisions at issue in Casey that the court upheld under the undue burden standard would have been struck down under Roe's strict scrutiny approach.

Katz v. United States (1967) 7-1

Facts Charles Katz was suspected of illegal bookmaking (placing bets). Based on surveillance, the agents learned that Katz made daily calls from one of two adjacent public telephone booths located on sunset Boulevard in Los Angeles. To gather evidence, they attached a listening and recording device to the shared outside top of the telephone booths. The FBI agents has a traditional search warrant to seize certain physical objects (gambling records, bet slips, and so on). However, they did have judicial authorization to gather conversational evidence from a phone booth. With the evidence gathered from the recorded conversation to obtain an eight-count indictment. Katz argued against the evidence being used for his trial, since the phone booth is a constitutionally protected area. Question Whether a public telephone booth is a constitutional protected area and are conversations recorded free from being used as evidence against you? Whether physical penetration of a constitutionally protected area is necessary before a search and seizure can be said to be violative of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution? Conclusion The court sided with Katz and deemed that the surveillance did not constitutionally abide by the Fourth Amendment. Katz is important is a landmark case, because first the Court applied the right of privacy to searches and seizures. If citizens have an "expectation of privacy" that "society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable,'" then they are entitled to it. Under such circumstances the Fourth Amendment applies, and police must conform to its requirements. Second, the Fourth Amendment protects people and not places or things. The majority consequently rejected the physical penetration rule. Now unreasonable seizures apply not only to tangible objects but also to intangible things, such as conversations. The new "expectation of privacy" approach to the Fourth Amendment applies not only to electronic surveillance but to all forms of searches and seizures. Significance The main difference between the decision between this case and Olmstead is because of the decision in Griswold. In 1965 in the conclusion of Griswold v. Connecticut the SCOTUS created a constitutional "right to privacy." So, forty years later after Olmstead failing to survive the physical penetration standard, Katz had assistance from the right to privacy in his argument.

Terry v. Ohio (1968) 8-1

Facts Detective McFadden a thirty-nine-year veteran of the Cleveland police force, was patrolling in plain clothes. During his patrol he observed two men (John Terry and Richard Chilton), he watched as the two paced along the street, "pausing to stare in the same store window roughly 24 times." He noticed every time they passed the store the two men would converse. The officer then observed a third man (Carl Katz) join the men then depart briefly after. They met up again several blocks away from the store. Acting on his suspicion that the men were going to rob the store, the officer approached the trio identified himself as an officer and asked the men to identify themselves. The suspects began whispering and Terry mumbled a response. The officer then spun Terry around, patted down his outside clothing, and found a pistol in his overcoat pocket. He prompted the others to put their hands on the wall, so he could pat them down. The officer found another gun on one of the perps and arrested the two of them for having a concealed weapon. Terry challenged the validity of his initial detention and search. The trial court judge agreed he lacked probable cause, but he held that officers have the right to stop and frisk when they believe their lives are in jeopardy. Question Was the search and seizure of Terry by the method of stop and frisk a violation to the Fourth Amendment? Conclusion The court sided with McFadden since he acted on more than just a pure hunch. Justice Warren iterated that "Such a seizure is a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment, and any weapons seized may properly be introduced in evidence against the person from who they were taken." The decision in Terry expanded the authority of police to investigate possible crimes. If an individual exhibits suspicious behavior that would lead a law enforcement official reasonably to suspect that criminal behavior is occurring or is about to occur, the officer can detain the person to investigate, and may also conduct a pat search of the person's outer clothing to search for weapons, provided there is a cause to believe the person may be armed and currently dangerous.

Mapp v. Ohio (1961) 6-3

Facts Dollree Mapp who was suspected of carrying on a number of illegal activities in her Cleveland home. The police continuously attempted to shut down her operations, but she often eluded their capture. This time in May of 1957, the officers tried to enter her home on the grounds that she was harboring a fugitive who was suspected of bombing Don King's home. Upon first arrival the police attempted to enter the home, but Mapp refused since they did not have a warrant. The sergeant radioed for a warrant, left and kept the house under surveillance. Three-hours later, the sergeant returned to the home and tried to enter. This time Mapp did not come to the door, so police forced it open. Mapp's attorney who she called when the cops first came, arrived at her house and was denied entry. At the same time, Mapp was arguing with the officers for breaking in where she was shown a piece of paper (supposed warrant) and stuffed it down her blouse. Mapp was apprehended, and the officers retrieved the supposed warrant and continued to search the house. The officers seized at the time illegal obscene books and pictures from her home. At trial the prosecution failed to produce the warrant with no explanation of why. Mapp was found guilty and sentenced to prison for a term of one to seven years. Her attorney appealed to the SCOTUS and attacked the constitutionality of the obscenity laws and the harsh sentence she received. However, the justices ignored both the claims of the state and Mapp and rather focused instead on their interest in the search and seizure aspects of the case. Question Were the confiscated materials protected by the First Amendment? (ignored) (Focused rather) If the search that was conducted in the raid of the defendants home violated against their Fourth Amendment? Conclusion The court ruled in favor for Mapp believing that the main violation of rights stemmed from the Fourth Amendment. Justice Clark writing for the majority stated "the ignoble shortcut to conviction left open the state tends to destroy the entire system of constitutional restraints on which the liberties of the people rest. Having once recognized that the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment is the enforceable against the States, and that the rights to be secure against rude invasions of privacy by state officers is, therefore, constitutional in origin, we can no longer permit that right to remain an empty promise. Because it is enforceable in the same manner and to like effect as other basic rights secured by the Due Process Clause, we can no longer permit it to be revocable at the whim of any police officer who, in the name of the law enforcement itself, chooses to suspend its enjoyment." Significance The application of the exclusionary rule provides yet another example of the Warren Court's revolutionary treatment of the rights of the criminally accused. It also illustrates the highly politicized nature of criminal law. Since 1961, when the court informed states that they must adopt it, the exclusionary rule has been attacked and defended by scholars, lawyers, and judges. Opponents argue that letting a guilty person go free is too great a price for society to pay just because a police officer violated search and seizure guidelines. Supporters fear that if the exclusionary rule is eliminated, police will have no incentive to respect the law.

Harris v. McCrae (1980) 5-4

Facts During the late 1970's the SCOTUS upheld three statues from cases concerning the state or local restrictions on the funding of abortions. Beal v. Doe (upholding a Pennsylvania law limiting Medicaid funding "to those abortions that are certified by physicians as medically necessary"). Maher v. Roe (upholding a Connecticut Welfare Department regulation limiting state Medicaid "benefits for first trimester abortions {to those} ... that are 'medically necessary'") Poelker v. Doe (upholding a St. Louis policy directive that barred city-owned hospitals from performing abortions) All three cases the court rejected claims that the restrictions at issues interfered with the fundamental right to an abortion as articulated in Roe and that they discriminated on the basis of socioeconomic status and against those choosing abortion over childbirth. After the SCOTUS upheld these cases an even bigger battle erupted over the Hyde Amendment, which limited federal Medicaid funding of abortions to those "where the life of the mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried to term. Pro-choice groups quickly challenged the regulation on three grounds: It violated due process because it impinged on a fundamental right. It denied equal protection because it discriminated against women, especially poor women. It violated the First Amendment because it burdened religious exercise and constituted religious establishment guarantees. Question Did the Hyde Amendment violate a fundamental right to privacy and abortion? Did it fail strict scrutiny for targeting the rights of poorer women guaranteed from the equal protection clause? Did the Amendment violate religious exercise and establish a religion? Conclusion The court rejected all three claims from the pro-choice groups and upheld the regulations. Writing for the majority Justice Stewart stated "cannot overturn duly enacted statues simply because they may be unwise, improvident or out of harmony with a particular school of thought. Even further he asserted that "regardless of whether the freedom of a woman to choose to terminate her pregnancy for health reasons lies at the core or the periphery of the due process liberty recognized in Roe v. Wade, it simply does not follow that a woman's freedom of choice carries with it a constitutional entitlement to the financial resources to avail herself of the full range of protected choices . . . . Although government may not place obstacles in the path of a woman's exercise of her freedom of choice, it need not remove those not o its own creation. Indigency falls in the latter category."

United States v. Leon (1984) 6-3

Facts In 1981 police in Burbank California received a tip from a person of unproven reliability identifying Patsy Stewart and Armando Sanchez as drug dealers. The informant specified that the pair possess small quantiles of weed in their home and larger amounts in a separate on Price Drive. Police began surveillance in the area and spotted a car belonging to Ricardo Del Castillo, who had a history of drug possession. Further inspection into Del Castillo probation records led them Alberto Leon, a known drug dealer. After continued surveillance of the residents, and information from a second informant, Officer Cyril Rombach, a veteran detective, drew up an affidavit to obtain a search warrant, which a judge issued. With the warrant, police searched several residences and seized large quantities of drugs. Leon, Stewart, Sanchez, and Del Castilo were arrested. In the trial stage the defendant's attorneys argued that the search warrant was invalid. Since the informant lacked established credibility, the judge did not have probable cause to issue the warrant. The government's lawyers admitted that the defendant had a valid point but insisted that the courts decline to throw out the entire case because of a defective warrant. They said the officers had acted in "good faith" that the police believed they had a legitimate warrant and acted accordingly. Question Does the exclusionary rule bar the admission of evidence obtained pursuant to a search warrant when there is insufficient probable cause to support the warrant? Conclusion `The court sided with United States and accordingly modified the exclusionary rule. Justice White delivered the opinion to the court saying, "In the absence of an allegation that the magistrate abandoned his detached and neutral role, suppression is appropriate only if the officers were dishonest or reckless in preparing the affidavit or could not have harbored an objectively reasonable belief in the existence of bored an objectively reasonable belief in the existence of probable cause." In Justices White's opinion he views that the purpose of exclusionary rule is to serve as a deterrent against police misbehavior. When police act in good faith, as they did in this case, the punitive aspect of the exclusionary rule become irrelevant. Significance This case and a similar case Nix v. Williams weakened the exclusion rule a bit that was mandated in the court's decision in Mapp. In Nix the court established an additional exception to the exclusionary rule, the inevitable discovery exception. After 1984 the justices appeared to have reached a truce of sorts over the exclusionary rule. The liberal justices seemed pleased that the conservatives had not succeeded in overruling Mapp altogether, and the conservative justices were satisfied that they had introduced sufficient exceptions to make the exclusionary rule reasonable. As a consequence, the status of the status if the exclusionary rule did not undergo significant change for the next two decades.

Arizona v. Gant (2009) 5-4

Facts In August of 1999 Tucson police officers received an anonymous tip that a residence under their jurisdiction was being used to sell drugs. As officers went to the residence, they knocked on the door and Rodney Gant answered the door. He told them the owner wasn't home and that he would return later. When the officers left the house, they checked police records and discovered that Gant had an outstanding warrant for a suspended license. The officers returned with back up, upon arrival they arrested a man in the back yard for giving false identification and a woman in the front of the house for drug paraphernalia. As they were being apprehended, Gant pulled into the drive way and got of his car. When the officers spotted him, an officer called his name and Gant walked towards him and ten to twelve feet away from his parked car. He was immediately placed under arrest for the driving with a suspended license. The officers called for back-up and placed him into one of the officer's car since the other two were in the previous two. As he was in the back of the cop car the officers searched his vehicle where a gun and a bag of cocaine was found. He was then charged with drug violations from the evidence found. His attorney argued that the evidence should be inadmissible because the officers conducted a warrantless search in violation of the fourth amendment. The state insisted that the search was valid since it was done on "incident to the arrest" of the vehicle recent occupant. The trial court aggreged and he was sentenced to three years in prison. The Arizona Supreme Court reversed the decision. Question Was the search conducted on Gant's car a sufficient "incident of a valid arrest" exception to the requirement of a warrant even though the suspect was already handcuffed and placed in the back of the cop car? Conclusion The SCOTUS sided with Gant and the Arizona Supreme Court in this case. Justice Stevens writing for the majority stated that "police may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offence of arrest. When these justifications are absent, a search of an arrestee's vehicle will be unreasonable unless police obtain a warrant or show that another exception to the warrant requirement applies. The Arizona Supreme Court correctly held that this case involved an unreasonable search." Significance The majority opinion in Gant rigorously applies the requirement in Chimel that a search incident to a valid arrest can extend only to the area under the arrested suspect's immediate control. Therefore, once a suspect has been secured and placed in a patrol car, a search of his vehicle is no longer justified on that basis. However, the court also recognizes the "circumstance unique to the vehicle context" by allowing searches of the automobile after arrest and without warrant, if it is reasonable to believe that the car contains evidence associated with the offense upon which the arrest is based.

Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health (1990) 5-4

Facts In January 1983, Nancy Beth Cruzan was in a serious car accident that led to her being found in a ditch lying face down w/o detectible respiratory or cardiac function. Although, they were able to restore her breathing and heartbeat, Cruzan remained unconscious and was taken to the hospital. As short- and long-term medical efforts failed she began to degenerate to a persistent vegetative state. She required feeding and breathing tubes to remain alive. Although, experts suggested she could live another 30 years, there was no prediction of improvement from her condition. Her parents Lester and Joyce asked doctors to remove her feeding tubes, a step that would leave to Nacy's death. When the hospital staff refused, the Cruzans sought permission from a state court. They argued that "someone in Nancy's condition had a fundamental right to refuse or direct the withdrawal of 'death prolonging procedures.'" They even presented that she one told a friend that "she would not wish to continue her life unless she could live it at least halfway normally." The trial court ruled in their favor, but the state supreme court reversed. Told the parents they needed "clear and convincing evidence" that their daughter would have wanted her feeding tubes withdrawn. Question Does the right to privacy allow a family to remove necessary feeding tubes to live in a loved one who is under persisting vegetative state guaranteed in the due process clause? Conclusion The court clearly ruled that the 14th Amendment's due process clause permits a competent individual to terminate medical treatment. As to incompetent patients, the majority of the justices suggested that states may fasion their own standards, including those that require "clear and convincing evidence" of the patient's interests. Therefore, the parents petitioned a Missouri court two months after the decision and brought along three of Nancy's coworkers who testified that she would not want to live "like a vegetable."

Escobedo v. Illinois (1964) 5-4

Facts In January of 1960, police arrested Escobedo for the murder of his brother-in-law, Manuel Valtierra. They attempted to interrogate him, but on the advice of his lawyer, Escobedo refused to make any statements and was released. Afterward Escobedo's friend DiGerlando another suspect told police that Escobedo had indeed shot Valtierra because the victim had mistreated his sister. Ten days after the murder, police again arrested Escobedo, as well as his sister Grace. As they made their way to the station the officers told the two that DiGerlando told them the whole story and that they might as well confess. Escobedo further declined and asked for his lawyer upon arrival at the police station. He was denied council while his lawyer was in the lobby demanding to speak to his client, but he was refused access. Escobedo was questioned for over fourteen and a half hours until he made damaging statements that were later used against him. Both DiGerlando and Escobedo were found guilty in the killing. Escobedo later appealed claiming that he was denied his right to counsel and that counsel should have been present during the interrogation. Question Did the denial of counsel during interrogation constitutes in violation of the Sixth Amendment? And if so, could their statements have been inadmissible, as it was obtained in violation of their fifth and sixth Amendment rights? Conclusion The SCOTUS sided with Escobedo that the denial of council and use of statements during interrogation was a violation. Justice Goldberg writes for the majority that when a criminal case is focused "on the accused and its purpose is to elicit a confession-our adversary system begins to operate, and, under the circumstances here, the accused must be permitted to consult with his lawyer." The statement should have been inadmissible, as it was obtained in violation of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. If a defendant knows their rights it can be voluntarily waived if they choose. If they don't know their right their confession is not voluntary. Significance Danny Escobedo had been denied his right to counsel, and the majority found this right to be a primary defense against violations of the self-incrimination clause. If an attorney is present, it is unlikely that police would use even subtle methods to coerce a confession from a suspect. The Escobedo majority held that the right to counsel begins at the accusatory stage of the process, defined as the point at which the investigation ceases to be general and focuses on a specific individual. The right is in effect for every critical stage of the process, which includes all interrogations.

Illinois v. Gates (1983) 6-3

Facts In the Bloomingdale suburbs of Chicago, police officer received a detailed anonymous letter. In the letter was detailed information on suspected drug traffickers in the area Sue and Lance Gates. The letter proclaimed that the couple often shipped $100,000 worth of drugs from Florida to Illionois. The letter also listed that the two have an upcoming shipment coming and will be going down to Florida to retrieve the drugs. The police department confirmed the evidence and noticed that Lance Gates had an upcoming plane trip to Florida where he was to meet his wife and drive back to Illinois with the drugs. As the officers surveyed the couple in Florida, they retrieved a warrant to search the home and the car. The officers found over 350 pounds of marijuana in their car and evidence of drug trafficking in their house. Gates attorney argued that the officers did not follow the Aguilar-Spinelli test in obtain probable cause from an anonymous letter. Specifically, the letter failed to state how the writer came upon the information a requirement deemed necessary by the test. The judge in the case agreed and said the evidence could not be used at the trial. The prosecution appealed. Question May a judge issue a search warrant on the basis of a "partially corroborated anonymous informant's tip? Conclusion The court found no constitutional violation and argued that the lower court misapplied the Aguilar-Spinelli test. Due to the fact that everything the witness wrote in the letter was either true or partially true. The court felt that the letter showed the anonymous writer's veracity and integrity. Believed that the information obtained most likely came straight from the source of Gates. In order to facilitate police efforts, the SCOTUS created the totality-of-the-circumstances standard. This standard assisted law enforcement agents under these situations: If convinced that probable cause to search exists, a judge may issue a warrant that specifically defines the area to be searched and the person or things to be seized. Police are authorized only to search the area described in the warrant. They may only seize only things listed on the warrant, unless they find items whose very possession is a crime. Finally, police must execute the warrant in an orderly and timely fashion. With these requirements met, the search and seizure are likely to be found reasonable. Significance This cases decision altered the standard of having sufficient probable cause to obtain a warrant. Before this case some felt that it was difficult to gain probable cause from informants. Now the standard is looser to allow officers to conduct their matters as they see fit. As long as it is abided by this new rule.

United States v. Jones (2012) Unanimous

Facts In this Antoine Jones was the owner of Levels, a nightclub in the District of Columbia. He was suspected by the FBI and police department of trafficking cocaine. In their investigation, the agent had surveillance over him, a camera watching outside of his club, a device to register any numbers of phone calls he made or received, and a wiretap of his phone. The wiretap and surveillance all required a warrant, which the police obtained. The agents also received a warrant to covertly track Jones car through a GPS device. The one requirement the agents had was to apply it in a ten-day period and it must be attached within the District of Columbia. At the same time, they changed the batteries of the GPS in another parking lot in Maryland. Tracking over twenty-eight days of evidence and over two thousand pages of data on the car's movement. (couldn't tell who was driving the car, if there were passengers, and what the driver and passenger did it that area). Based on intercepted calls the agent knew of an expected shipment of cocaine in October 2005. After sending several search warrants in various locations. They caught Jones and found a large amount of cash, cocaine, weapons, and drug paraphernalia in the car. He was sentenced to life in a jail and forced to pay $1 million dollars. However, court of appeals reversed the decision based on warrantless use of GPS device. The United States asked the SCOTUS to review the case. Question Whether the attachment of a GPS device to an individual's vehicle. And subsequent use of that device to monitor the vehicle's movements on the public streets, constitutes a sear or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Conclusion In a unanimous decision presented by Justice Scalia he makes clear that the government violates the Fourth Amendment when it physically intrudes on a suspect's constitutionally protected space with the purpose of gathering information against the individual. Katz did not repudiate the trespass approach. Rather, the physical penetration standard and the reasonable expectation of privacy approach exist together. Significance According to the majority in Jones, the combination of these two standard expanded Fourth Amendment protections beyond what would be covered if just one of the two test were be used exclusively.

Herring v. United States (2009) 5-4

Facts July of 2004, Investigator Mark Anderson learned that Bennie Dean Herring had driven to the coffee county (Alabama) Sheriff's Department to reclaim some possessions from his impounded truck. Anderson knew Herring had history of criminal activity, so he asked his clerk to check for any outstanding records. She found nothing. Then the investigator called the neighboring county (Dale County) and asked if he had any warrants. Dale authorities reported that their computer records listed an outstanding arrest warrant for failure to appear for Herring. Andersons clerk asked for the town to fax over a copy of the warrant for confirmation. At the same time, the investigator and a partner detained and arrested Herring when he drove out of the impoundment lot. A search incident to the arrest revealed meth in Herring's pocket and a pistol in his vehicle (prohibited to have as a convicted felon). However, as soon as Herring was arrested Dale county called back the clerk to inform her that a mistake was made, and the warrant was outdated and canceled. Herring was charged with violations of federal drug and weapons laws. His attorney moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that his client's arrest was based on erroneous information it was unlawful, and the search was therefore invalid. Question Does the Fourth Amendment require exclusion of evidence obtained on the basics of an inaccurate arrest warrant? Conclusion In this case the SCOTUS sided with the United States on the arrest and accepted the exception of the exclusionary rule. The good faith reliance on a facially valid arrest warrant by the police will not require exclusion of the evidence discovered. The purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unreasonable search and seizure. Where the mistake occurs as the result of clerical error, the exclusionary has no deterrent effect. If the officer had a reoccurring process of negligent arrest the decision may have been different. Error was not systemic nor reckless. Significances Hudson and Herring remind us of the controversial nature of exclusionary rule question. In both cases the justices split, 5-4, with the conservative majority rejecting the position that exclusion is required. These decisions underscore the current court's position that suppression of evidence, in Justice Scalia's words, is "our last resort, not our first impulse."

Webster v. Reproductive Health Service (1989) 5-4

Facts Just like in the previous abortion case Akron, the SCOTUS reviewed a Missouri law that attempted to regulated abortion. At the same time, the case was six years after the Akron decision; with additional personnel changes (Rehnquist and Scalia) on the Supreme Court Roe's decision was in possible danger. The Missouri law: Prohibited state employees and public facilities from being used to perform an abortion unless the mother's life was in jeopardy. Banned state employees from encouraging or counseling a woman to have an abortion not necessary to save her life. Required physicians, prior to performing an abortion, to conduct a viability test on the fetus of any woman thought to be pregnant twenty weeks or more. In addition, the statue's preamble declared that human life begins at conception. This case prompted people to believe on both the pro-life and pro-choice sides that Webster was going to be the case to overturn Roe and make abortion illegal. Question: Do the Missouri Statues violate the fundamental right to an abortion and right to privacy? Conclusion As the court was badly fractured in a 5-4 decision, the court refused to strike down any of the law's provisions. The justices believed that the provisions were consistent with the court's funding decisions for Missouri to ban public facilities from being used for abortions and state employees from performing or encouraging abortions. On the other hand, although the pro-life forces were able to attract five votes to uphold the Missouri law, they did not persuade the court to overturn Roe. In-fact, the court explicitly declared that it would not revisit the issue of abortion. Significance Although, the decision may seem as a strike to the right of an Abortion, in Sandra Day O'Connor continuance to push for "undue burden" approach to abortion restrictions. In the end it was her loyalty to this approach that kept Roe alive and kept Webster from being the landmark decision many had expected.

Hudson v. Michigan (2006) 5-4

Facts Michigan police obtained a properly issued warrant to search the home of Booker T. Hudson for drugs and firearms. The officers knocked on the defendant's door, however, they did not wait a reasonable amount of time for Hudson to answer the door; three to five seconds after knocking they entered the home. Inside they found a surprised Hudson and proceeded to search, finding a large quantity of illegal drugs, including cocaine rocks in Hudson's pocket and a loaded gun lodged between the cushion and armrest of his chair. Hudson was charged with unlawful possession of drugs and firearms. His attorneys argued that the evidence should be excluded from the trial because police had failed to comply with the traditional "knock-and-announce" rule. The trial court granted Hudson's motion to suppress the evidence, but the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed. He was convicted of drug possession and later appealed on the argument again. The Michigan Supreme Court affirmed the use of evidence and the conviction. Hudson requested U.S. Supreme Court review. Question Does the Fourth Amendment mandate exclusion of evidence discovered when the police, armed with a warrant, fail to comply with the "knock-and-announce" protocols? Conclusion The SCOTUS sided with Michigan in this case, insisting that the police officers' error did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Justice Scalia wrote in his opinion for the court "In sum, the social cost of applying the exclusionary rule to knock-and-announce are considerable; the incentive to such violations is minimal to begin with, and the extant deterrence's against them are incomparably greater than the factors deterring warrantless entries when Mapp was decided. Resort to the massive remedy of suppressing evidence of guilt is unjustified . . ." Significance In Hudson the court failed to apply the exclusionary rule when the error was committed by the police. The majority reasoned that exclusion is appropriate only when the error directly contributes to the seizure of the evidence. Finding the illegal drugs in Hudson's home in no way was the result of the failure by police to comply fully with the knock-and-announce rule.

Roe v. Wade (1973) 7-2

Facts Roe, a Texas resident, sought to terminate her pregnancy by abortion. Texas law prohibited abortions except to save the pregnant woman's life. After granting certiorari, the Court heard arguments twice. The first time, Roe's attorney -- Sarah Weddington -- could not locate the constitutional hook of her argument for Justice Potter Stewart. Her opponent -- Jay Floyd -- misfired from the start. Weddington sharpened her constitutional argument in the second round. Her new opponent -- Robert Flowers -- came under strong questioning from Justices Potter Stewart and Thurgood Marshall. Question Does the Constitution embrace a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy by abortion? Conclusion 7-2 decision for Jane Roe The Court held that a woman's right to an abortion fell within the right to privacy (recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut) protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The decision gave a woman total autonomy over the pregnancy during the first trimester and defined different levels of state interest for the second and third trimesters. As a result, the laws of 46 states were affected by the Court's ruling. Significance After the decision in Roe the SCOTUS created a trimester approach to determine when the interest of a woman and the interest of the state was more compelling.

Lawrence v. Texas (2003) 6-3

Facts Similar to the Bowers case it began with a police officer visit to a private residence. After receiving a phone call about a possible weapons disturbance, police officers in Houston entered the apartment of John Geddes Lawrence. Where they observed Lawrence and another man, Tyron garner, engaging in a sexual act. The two men were arrested and eventually convicted of violating a Texas law that made it a crime for two persons of the same sex to engage in sodomy. Unlike the law in Bowers, this law only applied to participants of the same sex. Lawrence and Garner said the statute violated the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment, a similar provision of the Texas constitution, and the due process clause of the 14th Amendment. After Texas courts, relying on the SCOTUS decision in Bowers, they rejected the claims, and the two men appealed to the SCOTUS. Question Did the Texas law violate the right to privacy by outlawing sexual conduct between individuals of the same sex? Conclusion The SCOTUS stuck down the Texas statutes outlawing engaging in sexual conduct between the same sex. In doing so, the decisions in Lawernce v. Texas made the case a constitutional watershed. Not only because of the majority sympathetic treatment of gays and lesbians, but also because it is rare for the court to reverse itself. Kennedy claimed that in Bowers the justices "overstated" the historical premises on which their analyses relied, that they failed "to appreciate the extent of the liberty interest at stake," and that they did not take into account contemporaneous developments regarding the liberty of adults to decide how to conduct their private lives. Finally, note the majority's continuing commitment to a right to privacy flowing from the 14th Amendment's due process clause- and its reach to "personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education. Rather than relying on Stanley to determine the law's constitutionality, the proceedings used cases such as Griswold and Casey.

Gonzales v. Oregon (2006) 6-3

Facts The court took up Oregon's Death with Dignity Act, which permits state-licensed physicians to dispense or prescribe a lethal dose of drugs upon the request of a terminally ill patient. In 2001 the Attorney General John Ashcroft issued a rule asserting that the statute was unlawful. Claimed that the Controlled Substance Act (CSA) of 1970, enacted by congress to regulate the legitimate and illegitimate trafficking of drugs, criminalizes the use of controlled substances to assist suicide. He declared that any physicians dispensing drugs for this purpose were not engaging in the legitimate practice of medicine and could lose their privilege to write prescriptions. The state, a physician, a pharmacist, and some terminally ill state residents challenged the rule. Although, Ashcroft was no longer Attorney general, but his successor Alberto Gonzales stood by Ashcroft's interpretation of the CSA. Question Does the CSA violate the right to privacy in conducting an assisted suicide by a physician? Conclusion The SOTUS expressed its firm disagreement with the Gonzales/Ashcroft rule. In Justice Kennedy opinion written for the majority, he breaks down the context of the CSA act. Noting that the act mainly concerns the prohibition of doctors using their prescription writing powers as a means to engage in illicit drug dealing and trafficking as conventionally understood. However, the statute at face value does not manifest the intent to regulate the practice of medicine generally.

Bowers v. Hardwick (1986) 5-4

Facts When an Atlanta police officer arrive at Michael Hardwick's home to serve him with an arrest warrant for failure to keep a court date. One of Hardwick's housemates answered the door and no idea if Hardwick was home or not but allowed the officer to check the house for him. As the officer walked down the hallway the he spotted Hardwick engaging in sexual conduct with another man. Hardwick was arrested for violating the Georgia law that prohibited the practice of oral and anal sex. Although the DA did not want to pursue the case, Hardwick and his ACLU attorney challenged the law, asserting that it violated the fundamental right to privacy as articulated in Griswold and should be subject to strict constitutional scrutiny. The appeals court ruled for Hardwick, but the state sought the SCOTUS to review the case. Question Did the court of appeals err when it concluded that Georgia's sodomy statute infringes upon the fundamental rights of Homosexuals and required the state to demonstrate a compelling interest to support the constitutionality of the statute? Conclusion Splitting 5 to 4, the court upheld the Georgia law. Writing for himself, Burger, O'Connor, Powell, and Rehnquist, White said, "Fundamental liberties. . . are characterized as those. . . that are "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition"- a type of liberty that, according to White, homosexual sodomy was surely not." At the same time, White's majority opinion also dismissed the importance of Stanley, giving it a rather narrow reading: it protected the performance of some otherwise illegal activity only if the First Amendment was implicated. Because Bowers did not raise a First Amendment objection to sodomy laws, Stanley was not applicable.

Chimel v. California (1969)

Held that a search incident to arrest may only include "the arrestee's person and the area "within his/her immediate control.

Kyllo v. United States (2001)

Overall Danny Kyllo was suspected of growing marijuana by federal drug agents inside of his home in Oregon. In order to gather evidence, the agents set up a thermal imaging device across from his home. The agents believed that they did not need a warrant to set up the devices since they never entered onto his property. When they found what they were looking for and help from an informant the agents got a warrant and arrested Kyllo for having over one hundred marijuana plants. The SCOTUS held that the use of the thermal imaging device without a warrant violated the fourth amendment. The government, therefore, had intruded where Kyllo had a reasonable expectation of privacy.

Wolf v. Colorado (1949)

Overall In this case Wolf was a physician who was suspected of performing illegal abortions. In order to build a case against Wolf, a deputy sheriff took an appointment book from Wolf's office. Authorities followed up on the names in the book, gathering enough evidence to convict him. His attorney argued that because the case against his client rested on illegally obtained evidence, the court should dismiss it. However, to implement his arguments, the court would first have to incorporate the Fourth Amendment to the states and then impose the exclusionary rule on the states. Justice Frankfurter wrote for the court that he agreed the Fourth Amendment should be incorporated to the states by the 14th Amendment. "To be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures was deemed a fundamental right, 'basic to a free society.'" However, the court refused to hold that the exclusionary rule was a necessary part of the Fourth Amendment and upheld Wolf's conviction. The justices felt that the rule was one method of enforcing search and seizure rights, but not the only one. Significance The justices in this time period failed to uphold the importance of the exclusionary rule that was made by the Weeks case in 1914. After this case, there was growing tension between state and federal search and seizure rules. However, due to personnel changes, this was not the last case of the matter.

Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of the County of Burlington (2012)

Overall In this case the justices, held that routine strip searches of incoming detainees at a county jail are constitutionally permissible even when the new inmate faces minor charges and has not yet been convicted. The majority reasoned that jail officials have ample justification to check newly arriving detainees for infectious diseases, weapons, drugs, and other contraband in order to secure the facility and protect other members of the inmate population.

Orozco v. Texas (1969)

Overall Miranda warnings must be given to any person being interrogated who is in custody at the station or outside the station. The D's familiar surroundings did not result in a lack of inherent compulsion caused by the interrogation. If Miranda rights are limited to interrogations in the station house, then police will have an incentive to hold interrogations in other locations so as to evade Miranda requirements. A reasonable person in the D's situation would have felt deprived of his or her freedom of action in a significant way, according to the Miranda custody standard.

Aguilar v. Texas (1964)

Overall The SCOTUS, Chief Justice Earl Warren's leadership, articulated a stringent two-pronged test to determine whether informants' tips or letters could be used as probable cause to obtain search warrants. The tip had to "reveal adequately" the informant's "basis of knowledge." How did the individual come to possess the information given to the police? The tip "had to provide facts sufficiently establishing either the veracity of the affiant's informant, or, alternatively, the 'reliability' of the informant's report." The test was developed further in the Spinelli v. United States, however, many felt that the test was too restrictive to perform the necessary duties in law enforcement. With changing personnel on the court many sought to change the extent of the test.

Carroll v. United States (1925)

Overall This case began the jurisprudence of car search case. In this ruling the SCOTUS held that automobile do not deserve the same degree of protection as people and homes. In general, the court has given th police broad authority to search cars without warrants because: Cars are mobile, and thus evidence can quickly be removed from the area under investigation Automobile windows allow outsiders to look in and thus drivers have a lower expectation of privacy inside a car than they do in their homes. The government has a pervasive interest in regulating cars. Significance In this case the SCOTUS established that cars deserve little constitutional protection from warrantless searches. However, since their blanket decision, the court was faced with many car questions starting in the 70's. Such as: How far may such searches extend? May police search only the area where driver and passengers sit? What about the glove compartment and trunk? Are luggage and other containers in a car fair game? What degree of justification or cause do law enforcement officials need before they can conduct warrantless searches of cars? If an automobile is impounded, may police search and inventory the contents?

New Jersey v. T.L.O. (1985)

Overall This case involved a 14-year-old freshman and a friend who were suspected of smoking in the girls' bathroom. T.L.O was told to come into the Vice Principal's office where she denied the smoking in school. The principal demanded to see her purse, and when she gave it to him, he opened it and saw a packet of cigarettes and after looking further cigarette papers, a small pipe that contained a bit of marijuana, and other items that suggested drug use and distribution. The matter was turned over to the police. The juvenile court over the case moved to suppress the evidence, claiming an unconstitutional search. However, the SCOTUS ruled that the search was a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment. Significance In doing so the justices balanced the student's need for individual privacy against the school's interest in maintaining order, safety, and a proper educational environment. The court concluded that in public school context, warrantless searches do not require probable cause, but only a reasonable suspicion that the student is violating the law or school rules. In subsequent cases, the court used T.L.O rationale to uphold warrantless, suspicion less drug testing of high school athletes as well as drug testing of students involved in other forms of extracurricular activities. Also, age and gender have a big factor of reasonableness or not

Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern NE (2006) Unanimous

Overall facts/conclusion After many state statutes attempted to require minors to receive consent for abortions the SCOTUS decided to hear a case from New England. The SCOTUS held that when states require parental notification, they must include exceptions if the minor's life or health is in imminent danger.

Planned Parenthood v. Danforth (1976)

Short facts After the state of Missouri passed legislation the required women to bring written consent that required women to bring written consent from herself, her spouse, or from an unmarried minor parent before they could receive an abortion. Conclusion Justices found no constitutional violation of requiring a woman to bring written consent for herself. However, struck down spousal and parental consent as a violation of the constitution and inconsistent with Roe. Significance Justice Blackmun in his majority opinion included "We emphasize that our holding parental consent is invalid does not suggest that every minor, regardless of age or maturity, may give effective consent for the termination of her pregnancy." -Opened doors to possibility of some form of required parental consent.

Beckwith v. United States (1976)

The court affirmed petitioner's conviction for federal tax evasion, holding that a special agent of the Internal Revenue Service was not required to give Miranda warnings in an interview with a taxpayer who was not in custody, and that petitioner's statements were thus admissible against him.

Dickerson v. United States (2002)

The petitioner, Charles Thomas Dickerson made a statement regarding a bank robbery to the Federal Bureau of Investigations without receiving his Miranda rights. A federal law was in place that allowed the admission of statements if they were voluntarily made.