Soc 105 Ch. 12

eminent domain

the right of a government or its agent to expropriate private property for public use, with payment of compensation. - legal strategy that allows a federal or local government to seize private property for public use. The seizing authority must pay fair market value for the property seized.

the Dodgers and Chavez Ravine

Because of the renewal process, Mexican neighborhoods were kept in a state of flux throughout the 1950s, as they became the targets of developers. In October 1957, the city removed Mexican homeowners from the Chávez Ravine neighborhood, near the center of Los Angeles, giving more than 300 acres of private land to Walter O'Malley, owner of the Dodgers baseball team. The Dodgers deal angered many Angelenos as well as residents of Chávez Ravine, who resisted physically. - In one instance in 1959, the county sheriff's depart- ment forcibly removed the Aréchiga family. Councilman Ed Roybal condemned the action: "The eviction is the kind of thing you might expect in Nazi Germany or during the Spanish Inquisition." Supporters of the Aréchigas protested to the City Council. Victoria Augustian, a witness, pointed a finger at Council Member Rosalind Wyman, who, with Mayor Norris Poulson, supported the giveaway. Poulson was a puppet of the Chandler family, who owned the Los Angeles Times, which backed the land handover. Joseph Eli Kovner, publisher and editor of the Eastside Sun, exposed connections between the may- or's office and capitalist interests in Los Angeles, and urban renewal proposals in Watts, Pacoima, Canoga Park, Bunker Hill, and Boyle Heights (Watts is a black community and the other four are predominantly Mexican). Kovner cited a memo from the Sears Corporation to its executives, instructing them to support urban renewal because the company had an economic interest in protecting its investment. The presence of too many minorities in an area depressed land values and the trade was deprived of white middle-class customers. *Urban renewal ensured construction of business sites and higher-rent apartments that inflated property values*. On July 31, 1958, the Eastside Sun exposed the Boyle Heights Urban Renewal Committee's plot to remove 480 homes north of Brooklyn between McDonnell and Mednick and to displace more than 4,000 people.

El Paso: In search of a home

By the 1950s, El Paso Mexicans no longer lived exclusively in Chi- huahuita or its neighboring El Segundo Barrio, the oldest barrios in the city. The Alamito housing projects warehoused 2.3 percent of the south side neighborhood's housing. Landlords fought the construction of more public housing because federal grants brought stricter oversight in the form of more rigid housing codes. The El Segundo Barrio, or the "Second Ward," home to the poorest of the poor, deteriorated to the point that the military brass at Fort Bliss complained.24 The lack of decent housing continued to be a major problem. (small number of families had showers and tubs; on average there were 71 people per toilet) The area housed slightly more than 19 percent of the city's population, yet it registered just over 88 percent of its juvenile crime, 51 percent of its adult crime, and two-thirds of its infant mortality. Not surprisingly, poverty pushed up street crime. The El Paso press meanwhile blamed the victims and depicted Mexicans as murderers, drug users, and rapists. Conditions became so bad that, without the intervention of church agencies and local Mexican American organizations, the Second Ward would have self-destructed. The Paisano Drive highway (1947), intended to improve transportation to the central city business district, dis- placed 750 families—6,000 residents of the Second Ward. The highway further isolated South El Paso, caus- ing a "shanty" boom—with jacales (shacks) made of plywood, sheet metal, and cardboard replacing former homes.

The Cold War

By the end of 1949, reversals in the Cold War heightened American angst, and *Communism was promoted as the country's number 1 enemy*. Consequently, the 1950s saw the rise of McCarthyism and the simultaneous escalation of the Cold War, at home and abroad. Cold War anxieties agitated a red scare, which peaked from 1946 to 1952. Red hunters such as FBI director J. Edgar Hoover played on the Euro-American belief of a monolithic, worldwide conspiracy directed from Moscow. The presidential Loyalty Review Board continued its purges of "reds" in the unions, universities, and entertainment industry. A renewed military draft for the Korean War further ensnared the nation in the battle against Communism, while the *1940 Smith Act* made it a criminal offense to advocate violent overthrow of the government or to be a member of a group devoted to such advocacy. - Using the pretext of that act, the federal government prosecuted leaders of the Communist Party and the Socialist Workers Party, most of whom did not support such actions. By the early 1950s, Republican politicians such as Richard Nixon and Joseph McCarthy and Democrats such as Senator Pat McCarran played on this paranoia to boost their careers and advance their pro-business ideology.

Los Angeles

California's Mexican population of 760,453 in 1950 trailed that of Texas, which num- bered over a million. Californian Chicanos were the most urbanized in the Southwest, making Los Angeles the favorite destination in California. Los Angeles differed structurally from San Antonio. The majority of Mexicans did not live in one section; instead, enclaves or barrios dotted the entire Los Angeles basin. The G.I. Bill encouraged the suburbanization of the Mexican American middle class. Like other Angelenos, Mexicans followed the freeways. Much of the internal migration was toward the east from East Los Angeles, following Interstate 10 (the San Bernardino Freeway) to new communities like Pico-Rivera, La Puente, and Covina. Many Mexicans remained in outlying localities such as Wilmington, San Pedro, Ven- ice, San Fernando, and Pacoima, many of which were once agricultural colonies. Overall, Mexicans were not as isolated in Los Angeles as they were in Texas. Mexican neighborhoods such as Boyle Heights were more polyglot ethnically and racially, with Japanese, Jews, Armenians, and others living close to each other. Intermarriage also increased dramatically after the war. Politically, Mexican Americans in Los Angeles mostly voted for Democrats and the party took them for granted. Politicos gerrymandered their districts, not so much to keep Mexicans powerless as to maintain their incumbents in office. Liberal incumbents benefited from this manipulation of electoral districts. Unlike the San Antonio elite, the Los Angeles ruling class did not need a traditional political machine to stay in office. It was white power all the way, and this group made huge profits by promoting the development of West Los Angeles and the San Fernando Valley. From 1940 to 1960, the freeway system expanded dramatically, accelerating suburbanization and degrading city centers in the process. To revive the downtown area, the power elite formed the Greater Los Angeles Plans, Inc., which set three goals—to build a convention center, a sports arena, and a music center. This decision had far-reaching consequences for minorities and the poor, since these projects encroached on their living space. Until 1958, the downtown elite was entirely Republican; then the group expanded and supported "responsible" Democrats. Over the next few years, a committee of 25, based within the Chamber of Commerce, would informally plan and control the future of Los Angeles. Meanwhile, an important change took place in East Los Angeles that would impact succeeding gen- erations of Mexican Americans. In January 1948, the new East Los Angeles College campus was opened near Atlantic Boulevard and Floral Avenue; and in 1956, the Los Angeles State College campus was opened on Los Angeles's East Side. The proximity of the two new campuses made higher education easier for working- class students who continue working to survive. Unlike UCLA, the new campuses were more accessible to the working student, and student fees ran less than $10 a semester. A new social awareness also became possible through forums sponsored by Los Angeles State.

The diaspora: An American Odyssey

As the Mexican centers of population in the Southwest swelled, Mexican migrants fanned out to the north, west, and east in search of other opportunities. Euro-Americans continued to consider Mexican Americans, especially migrants, as foreigners—even though 90 percent of the children were born in the United States. In the case of New Mexico and Colorado migrants, U.S. nativity went back as far as their great-grandparents. ex. "the Gallegos family" - Originally from the New Mexican highlands, the family moved in the 1930s to the valley called Amalia, part of the Sangre de Cristo land grant of the 1870s. The family tried farming, working in sugar beets, but the white farming barons nudged them out. During the 1950s, the Gallegos family worked on various farms from Colorado to Washington. Mechanization began with crops that needed the least care in handling, such as sugar beets and potatoes, crops in which Mexicans and Chicanos were concentrated. The Gallegos family went from place to place on recommendations of friends, finally settling in the Yakima Valley in Washington, one of the 10 most productive valleys in the United States. - they constantly suffered discrimination - In Odessa, Texas, Mexicans were not allowed in motels, and restaurants denied them service. In Prosser in the Yakima Valley, proprietors allowed Mexicans into the theater only on Sundays. During the week, Mexicans in the town ran the risk of being hassled by cops.

El Paso

Chicanos in El Paso were politically more active during this decade - The illusion was that Chicanos could win if they ran politicos whom white people would accept. [1957- Raymond Telles, a MA and a retired Korean War Air Force lieutenant colonel, ran for mayor of El Paso The city elite opposed Telles though he took every opportunity to assure voters of his Americanism. Members of the El Paso business establishment openly said they did not believe that a Mexican was qualified to be mayor. Conservatives billed Telles's Euro-American opponent as the "candidate for all El Paso." Telles's victory shattered the myth that Mexicans would not turn out to vote—90 percent of eligible Mexicans voted. - Despite generating high hopes, Telles's election brought little change. The 1960 Census showed little improvement in living conditions for Mexican Americans; 70 percent of the Southside housing remained deteriorated or dilapidated. (pg. 283)

Los Angeles Politics

From 1949 to 1962, Edward R. Roybal dominated the political history of Chicanos in Los Angeles. Roybal's rise is linked to the emergence of the Community Service Organization (CSO), California's most important Chicano association. CSO differed from LULAC in employing more strident tactics. The CSO used the strategies of the Industrial Areas Foundation (IAF) and its founder, Saul Alinsky. Many CSO leaders were middle class, and unlike LULAC professionals, they did not monopolize the leadership; leaders frequently came out of the labor movement. "By 1963 the CSO had established thirty-four chapters across the South- west (primarily in California), with over 10,000 paid members. The roots of the CSO were in the small towns beyond East Los Angeles—in Chino, Ontario, and Pomona, where Ignacio López organized civic or unity leagues. In 1946, he formed the Pomona Unity League, and soon unity leagues sprang up in Chino, Ontario, and Redlands. Fred Ross of the American Council on Race Relations joined López. The leagues emphasized mass action, bloc voting, and neighborhood protests. Organizers held meetings in homes, churches, and public buildings. Their first order of business was to encourage Mexican Americans to run for political office, and get them elected to city councils. Soon after, López and his organizers established unity leagues in San Bernardino and Riverside, Cali- fornia, where school discrimination was a primary issue. The leagues in turn influenced the IAF in the Back of the Yards area of South Chicago in the late 1940s. The IAF planned to work with Mexicans in the Los Angeles area. A group known as the Community Political Organization (CPO) formed in East Los Angeles about the same time. Not wanting to be confused with the Communist Party or with partisan politics, the CPO changed its name in 1947 to the *Community Service Organization* (CSO). The organization evolved from Chicano steelworkers and from volunteers in Roybal's unsuccessful bid for a Los Angeles City Council seat in 1947. The IAF moved to Los Angeles and merged efforts with the CSO. Although the CSO was supposedly not political, it registered 12,000 new voters. This increase in registered Chicano voters helped elect *Roybal* to the Los Angeles City Council in 1949—the first person of Mexican descent to serve on that body since 1881. After Roybal's victory, the CSO did not support another candidate for office. Instead, it concentrated on fighting housing discrimination, police brutality, and school segregation. In 1950 the CSO fielded 112 volunteer deputy registrars; within three months, 32,000 new Latino voters were registered. The CSO grew to 800 members in two years. By the early 1960s, it had 34 chapters with 10,000 dues-paying members. The CSO promoted understanding of local governance among taxpayers and urged them to press for better public services. As a member of the City Council, Roybal had an outstanding career, confronting the Los Angeles power elite in defense of principle. The 1950 Census showed that the Los Angeles population was 81 percent white, 9 percent black, and 8 percent Latino/a. Roybal fought for a strong Fair Employment Practices Commission (FEPC) ordinance, opposed the registration of Communists, supported rent con- trols and public housing, and campaigned against urban renewal. He also criticized police brutality. However, Roybal had few allies on the City Council, where most of the members supported growth at the expense of minority areas. There was considerable bias on the council; on Roybal's first day on the job, the council president introduced him as the "Mexican Council member, elected by the Mexican people of his District." additional content on Roybal = pg. 282

The struggle to preserve the barrios

Government transportation policy and federal loans accelerated the decay of the inner city. Thousands of miles of highways or freeways integrated the nation. At the same time, these programs helped segregate the United States, setting housing patterns that still exist in all metropolitan areas in the United States. Federal loan policy allowed federal administrators and the housing industry to work hand in hand with developers, separating the suburbs and inner cities. The highway policy gave the states hundreds of millions of dollars to link their disparate parts, and encouraged white middle-class workers to move to the suburbs: white flight did not occur by accident or by the invisible workings of the market. *the Depression and industrialization had accelerated the Mexicans' move to the city, and housing and urban redevelopment policies enacted during the New Deal and postwar yrs encouraged the abandonment of inner cities by those who could afford to leave, reinforcing separation based on race + class*

CA

In February 1950, Los Angeles county sheriffs raided a baby shower at the home of Natalia Gonzáles. Sher- iffs had given the occupants three minutes to evacuate the premise. They arrested some 50 guests for charges ranging from disturbing the peace to resisting arrest. The Maravilla Chapter of the ANMA petitioned the county supervisors for relief. But the supervisors refused to intervene. Lieutenant Fimbres of the sheriff's foreign relations bureau whitewashed the incident. Virginia Ruiz, along with the ANMA, then formed the *Maravilla Defense Committee* On May 26, 1951, police raided a baptismal party at the home of Simon Fuentes. Officers had received a call complaining that the music was too loud. Police broke into the house without a warrant and assaulted the guests. They pushed an eight-months-pregnant woman and a disabled man to the floor. Police broke Frank Rodríguez's leg when he went to the aid of the disabled man. ANMA played an active role in this case as well. In the "Bloody Christmas" case, on December 24, 1951, approximately 50 Los Angeles police took seven young Mexicans out of their cells at the Lincoln Heights jail and brutally beat them. Police mauled Danny Rodella so badly that jailers had to send him to Los Angeles County General Hospital. Public outcries from the white, black, and brown communities forced the district attorney's office to bring charges against the officers. - On May 8, 1953, Los Angeles deputy sheriffs Lester Moll and Kenneth Stiler beat David Hidalgo, age 15; other deputies looked on as Hidalgo pleaded for mercy. Hidalgo's stepfather, Manuel Domínguez, pressed a civil suit against the Los Angeles County sheriff's department. La Alianza Hispano-Americana (the Hispano-American Alliance) supported his lawsuit. Two years later, the court awarded Domínguez damages of $1,000. The *Alianza* - handled the appeals in the murder and conspiracy conviction of Manuel Mata, Robert Márquez, and Ricardo Venegas, whom the state found guilty of murdering William D. Cluff in a fight in Los Angeles on December 6, 1953; Cluff intervened in a fight involving the three defendants and a marine. The defense introduced expert medical testimony that Cluff died of an enlarged heart, advanced arteriosclerosis of cerebral blood vessels, and arterial heart disease; *he had not died of injuries inflicted during the fight*. Los Angeles newspapers inflamed public rage, and the court convicted the three Mexican Americans. After a series of appeals, the defendants received a new trial. The CSO, along with the ACLU, assumed the leadership in police brutality cases in East Los Angeles. Chicano activist Ralph Guzmán wrote in the Eastside Sun on September 24, 1953, "It is no secret that for years law and order in the Eastside of Los Angeles County has been maintained through fear and brutal treatment." Los Angeles newspapers whipped up hysteria against Mexicans. Guzmán, again in the Eastside Sun, wrote on January 7, 1954, "It is becoming more and more difficult to walk through the streets of Los Angeles—and look Mexican!" On January 14, 1954, he continued, "Basically, Eugene Biscailuz's idea to curb kid gangs is the evening roundup, a well known western drive." Guzmán then vehemently castigated the Los Angeles press for its irresponsibility.

San Antonio

In Texas, the poll tax continued to frustrate voter registration drives. The leading Chicano politician was *Henry B. González*, whose parents were political refugees from Durango, Mexico, where they owned a mine. González was born in 1916; he graduated from St. Mary's Law School and then worked for a time as a juvenile officer. He was involved in civic affairs and ran unsuccessfully for state representative in 1950; a year later, he won a City Council seat. González, who did not belong to the LULAC clique, put together a grassroots campaign. González often clashed with the Good Government League (GGL), established in the early fifties, which ran the city of San Antonio. Like Edward Roybal in Los Angeles, González championed Civil Rights causes. In 1956 he ran for the State Senate, winning by 282 votes. The campaign of Albert Peña, Jr., for county commissioner greatly helped González. The race issue resurfaced, with opponents frequently accus- ing González of being a leftist. In the State Senate, González championed liberal causes. In 1958, he unsuc- cessfully ran for governor. A primary component in the politics of segregation, segregated schools continued to be the norm throughout Texas: in east Texas, legislators introduced a dozen bills in the 1956-1957 session to withhold funds from integrated schools and prohibit interracial sporting events. Nonetheless, some changes were tak- ing place during the 1950s that would alter the political landscape of the late 1970s: an increasing number of legislative districts changed from rural to urban—which transformation favored those living in cities— and Mexican Americans who were now concentrated in cities developed a growing political awareness. [ Veterans' organizations such as the Loyal American Democrats, the West Side Voters League, the Alamo Democrats, the School Improvement League, and the American G.I. Forum (AGIF) would challenge the old machines. The names of the new organizations were mostly in English, suggesting feelings of patriotism and a desire to assimilate. However, another explanation is that the political environment in Texas and the impact of McCarthyism might have coerced many Mexican Americans to adopt this sort of expression of Americanism to defuse racism and red-baiting, which were prevalent there]

the Korean War: Historical Amnesia

It is ironic, if not tragic, that the Korean War has been called the "Forgotten War." Some 33,665 U.S. military personnel were killed in action and 3,275 died from nonhostile causes. Some 92,134 were wounded in action, and from June 25, 1950, to July 27, 1953, 1,789,000 served in the Korean theater. The Korean conflict began in June 1950 between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) and the Republic of Korea (South Korea). An estimated 3 million people lost their lives in this war, which was not officially called a war but a "conflict." The United States joined the war on the side of the South Koreans. The People's Republic of China (PRC), which had been established just two years earlier, eventually came to Communist North Korea's aid. The UN forces, however, ignored the warnings and crossed the 38th parallel into North Korea with the expressed purpose of "unifying" North and South Korea. In November 1950, China entered the war and approximately 180,000 Chinese troops drove the Allied troops southward. For the next two and a half years, both sides fought a bloody trench-and-guerrilla war. Many people feared the possibility of a global conflict. The heavy casualties and reports of South Korean atrocities made the war unpopular back home in the United States. - opposition to the war started slowly and then expanded, much like with the more recent war in Iraq. The war ended in July 1953, when the United States declared an armistice. The importance of the war globally was that it established a precedent for U.S. intervention to contain the so-called Communist expansion. Six Mexican Americans won Medals of Honor during this conflict. - According to anthropologist Carlos Vélez-Ibáñez, who served in Korea, "The disproportion of Mexi- cans fighting and dying in wars continued through Korea and Vietnam." - Company E of 13 Infantry battalion U.S. Marine Corps Reserve of Tucson, Arizona, for example, was composed of 237 men, 80 per- cent of them Mexicans, when the company was called to active duty on July 31, 1950. Two months later, Company E landed as part of an invasion force in Inchon, Korea. The U.S. Marines had shipped these young Mexicans and others overseas with a scant two to three weeks of training, teaching them how to fire M-1 rifles and machine guns aboard ship and giving them only another two weeks of basic training in Japan. Ten of the 231 Tucsonense Chicanos who fought in Korea lost their lives. College deferments were available during most of the Korean War and sometimes led to draft avoidance. These deferments were beyond the reach of most Mexican Americans. The Educational Test- ing Service of Princeton, New Jersey, developed a nationwide Selective Service College Qualification Test for deferring draftees based on test scores. The Testing Service administered the test to college students and potential college students in the spring of 1951. It sent test scores to the students' local draft board along with their class standing. The draft maintained the armed forces throughout the Cold War. The Selective Service System drafted 1.5 million men during the Korean War; 1.3 million volunteered—mostly in the Navy and Air Force. *Again, education was a litmus test for admission into the "safer" military branches* It was a vicious circle: U.S. Mexicans had to go into the army because of a lack of education and then they could not take advantage of the education stipends of the GI Bill, again because of a lack of education.

Mexican Americans

Mexicans and Mexican Americans continued to live primarily in the five southwestern states of Texas, New Mexico, Colorado, Arizona, and California in 1950. - over 2/3's of Mexican Americans lived in cities (major urban centers were Los Angeles, El Paso, and San Antonio; how- ever, large concentrations also lived in the Lower Rio Grande Valley, the Salt and Gila Valleys of Arizona, and Fresno County, California) - most were young w/ a median age of 26 In the Southwest, Mexican Americans completed way less amount of schooling compared to whites and nonwhites - A rule of thumb was that the lower the median, the more segregated the schools were and the poorer the community. - The first- and second-generation Mexicans comprised a large percentage of the total Latino popu- lation. Mexicans based in the United States were a people on the move. Between 1955 and 1960, close to 60 percent of the interstate movers went to California; 17 percent went to Texas. (where Mexicans moved out in one place, they went elsewhere in America; - they all developed regional differences) -------------------- ex. Tejanos, for example, wore boots and cowboy hats and spoke English with a Texas tang, saying "Y'all" and calling men "Sir!" Everyone seemed to want to move out of Texas during that time—the state was the principal exporter of Mexican workers to other regions. Still, many Mexican Americans who lived in the Midwest yearned for the sounds of the accordion—or the warmth of the sun. In Chicago, Mexicans lived in those brownstone houses that had no front lawns and always seemed cold. Perhaps because of their isolation, Midwestern Chicanos appeared to be more Mexican than Mexicans elsewhere—or than Tejanos, as the case may be. In New Mexico, *New Mexicans said they were not Mexicans, but "Spanish Americans," and lived under the illusion that they were the founders of the state*. Californians had no set identity—Californian Mexicans, it seemed, came from everywhere but California - later generations of Mexicans assimilated more into the American culture, they would be called "pochos" = they did not speak Spanish very well and of course were more assimilated than their parents or previous generations [though, there were exceptions and it all depended on regions where people lived]

National Spanish-Speaking Council

Middle-class Mexican American organizations remained active during this period. Most preferred to fol- low the path set by the civil rights tradition, and to work within the mainstream. On May 18-19, 1951, leaders of many of these associations met in El Paso for the founding convention of the American Council of Spanish-Speaking People. George I. Sánchez chaired the convention. The Alianza Hispano-Americana, CSO, LULAC, the Texas G.I. Forum, and the Community Service Club of Colorado composed the core group. Chicano leaders such as Gus García, Tony Rios, Ignacio López, José Estrada, and Dennis Chávez, Jr., U.S. senator from New Mexico, attended the convention. Tibo J. Chávez, the lieutenant governor of New Mexico, was elected president of the council, and George I. Sánchez served as its executive director. In 1952, the organization received a grant from the Robert Marshall Foundation to be used in promoting the civil rights of Chicanos. The council worked closely with the Alianza in desegregation cases. In 1952, for instance, in Arizona, these groups made challenges in Glendale, Douglas, Miami, and Winslow. In the case against Glendale and the Arizona Board of Education, the council challenged school segregation. The Glendale board refused to go to court, knowing that they would be forced to integrate. *cooperation between the Alianza and the NAACP was significant since the Alianza itself had excluded African Americans* - pg. 286

New Mexico: The Illusion of it All

Most adult New Mexicans were eligible to vote and, as they made up almost half the state, they believed they had power. They did elect U.S. Senator Dennis Chávez, Jr., who supported the New Deal and the Fair Deal. Despite having more Mexican American elected officials than other states, New Mexico suffered from what the eminent Texas political scientist Rodolfo Rosales has called the "illusion of inclusion." Drought, depression, and World War II had almost ended the New Mexican way of life. *From 1940 to 1960, government had spent enormous sums of money to accelerate the industrialization of the state*. Chain stores, national corporations, and large-scale finance institutions displaced merchant houses and specula- tive capital. In 1949, there were 1,362 farms operating in Taos; 10 years later, only 674 farms remained. Throughout the 1950s, the rural population declined. In 1947, the median per capita income in the seven northern counties was only $452.26, compared with $870.04 in the seven Euro-American counties. Why was it that after 100 years of U.S. rule, New Mexicans lived in a "Third World" environment? - Mexican Americans lived in 7 northern counties, while EA's controlled eastern and southern NM - Racism worsened after WWII when large #'s of white Texans arrived to work in the oil fields - "little Texas" in the eastern half of the state harbored discrimination against Mexicans, barring them from the "better" barbershops, restaurants, hotels, and amusement centers Mexicans attended separate schools and churches, and Mexican American war veterans could not even join the local American Legion Post. Simply said, New Mexicans lacked education, a key factor in the new labor market. Illiteracy was 16.6 percent for Mexicans compared with 3.1 percent for others. Teachers in Mexican counties had less- than-adequate training: 46.2 percent held BAs, compared with 82.2 percent in the Euro-American counties. According to the 1950 U.S. Census, the median education for Mexicans was 6.1 years, compared with 11.8 for Euro-Americans.

Toward Equality

One of the main tactics on the civil rights front involved high-profile court cases that challenged the legality of de facto discrimination by public agencies, such as schools and police. A giant of these times was Texas attorney Gustavo C. García. Born in Laredo, García moved to San Antonio and graduated with a law degree from the University of Texas. During World War II, he served with the Judge Advocate Corps. In April 1947, he filed suit against school authorities in Cuero to force closure of the Mexican school there. Aided by Robert C. Eckhardt of Austin and A. L. Wirin of the Los Angeles Civil Liberties Union, García filed Delgado v. Bastrop ISD (1948). *The case decision made illegal the segregation of children of Mexican descent in Texas*. García played a leading role in revising the 1949 LULAC Constitution to permit non- Mexican Americans become members. More on Garcia - pg. 284 Mexican Americans in Texas applauded the landmark Brown v. Board of Education school deseg- regation decision.43 A 1954 poll showed that Chicanos approved of integration in larger numbers than did African Americans or whites. Although 77 percent of all Mexicans surveyed supported integration of African Americans, only 62 percent of the African Americans themselves supported integration. In April 1955, Chicanos sued the schools of Carrizo Springs and Kingsville, Texas. In Kingsville, Austin Elemen- tary had been segregated since 1914; it was known as the "Mexican Ward School," with a 100 percent Chicano student population. Of the 31 Chicano teachers in Kingsville, all but four taught in this all- Mexican school. - the Texas G.I. Forum also fought police brutality forces: On June 20, 1953, in Mercedes, the Forum brought enough pressure to force the resignation of Darrill F. Holmes, a policeman who intimidated George Sáenz and his wife at their grocery store; as a result of the police abuse, Sáenz was treated for a nervous con- dition. The Forum was also involved in the Jesse Ledesma case. On the afternoon of June 22, 1953, Austin police officer Bill Crow stopped Ledesma, who was suffering from insulin shock. Crow claimed Ledesma looked drunk and beat him up, inflicting a one-inch cut on the right side of his head and bruises on his legs, back, and shoulders. *Hernandez case* - pg. 285

Civil Rights

Organizationally, the Mexican Americans as a community evolved to the point that they became angrier at injustices directed at them and had the ability to respond. Some people will call this militancy, which after all is merely getting angry enough at an injustice to respond collectively. As the optimistic illusions of many Mexican Americans turned into skepticism, a sense of moral outrage developed and militancy increased. Inequality became more obvious to many as real wages fell 5 percent and corporate profits rose 69 percent during the so-called "Happy Days" of the 1950s. The gap between white people and people of color widened. This was in spite of the tax rate for the top bracket, those earning over $400,000, being 91 percent. (In 2003 it fell to 35 percent.) In 1950, in California, a Latino male earned 69.5 percent of the wages of a Euro- American male counterpart; Latinas, correspondingly, earned 37.4 percent. Ten years later Latino males still earned 69.5 percent, and the rate for Latinas had fallen further to only 34.1 percent.39 The power of labor declined as its leaders buckled under rightist pressure to clean out the left. Some of the expelled members had been the strongest advocates for increasing labor's inclusion of minorities. And in the mid-1950s, the CIO once again merged with the AFL, curtailing many of the CIO's community-oriented projects and low- ering the admission of minorities. Still, a cadre of politicized Mexican Americans had developed within the middle and working classes despite efforts to repress them.

Keeping America American

Post-World War II saw the Cold War that fueled a racist nativism, ushering in another kind of war that devastated the foreign born. [Labor activists such as Harry Bridges, later president of the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, saw the danger and became in the American Commit- tee for Protection of Foreign Born (ACPFB) that formed in 1933 to protect immigrants at that time. Bridges, who was accused of being a communist, had been a target of the xenophobes.] Organizers of the ACPFB had seen this danger during the Depression and formed in 1933 to protect immigrants at that time. Among those it defended were labor activists including Harry Bridges, later president of the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union. The Australian-born Bridges, who was ac- cused of being a communist, had been a target of the xenophobes. After World War II, the ACPFB, along with the United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers Union, again led the struggle for the defense of the foreign born. Superpatriots labeled the ACPFB a Communist-led organization; *however, there is evidence that most members were non-Communist*. It had a record of fighting fascism, a fact that was recognized by Franklin Delano Roosevelt and other progressive-minded people. However, once the war ended, the forces of reactionism moved to smear its record with the charge that it was a Communist-front organization. The Los Angeles Committee for Protection of Foreign Born (LACPFB) was a defender of Mexican Americans and a foe of politically driven deportations of the late 1940s and 1950s.9 Within the Mexican American community, the Civil Rights Congress (CRC), the Independent Progressive Party (IPP), the Asociación Nacional México-Americana (ANMA), and the Community Service Organization (CSO)10 also struggled for the defense of the foreign-born throughout the 1950s. (pg. 274) The ACPFB predated McCarthyism, and Mexican American activists were part of this movement. For example, Isabel González of Denver, who was active in defending the rights of Mexican beet workers in the mid-1940s, served as ANMA's vice president. In 1947 she wrote Step-Children of a Nation. Aside from reporting on the oppression of U.S. Mexicans, she described the efforts of the Committee to Organize the Mexican People on behalf of Refugio Ramón Martínez of the United Packing Workers of America,11 and Nicaraguan-born Humberto Silex of El Paso, former regional director of the International Union of Mine, Mill, and Smelter Workers of America. - pg. 274 [They entered the country legally and had U.S.-born children, yet deportation proceedings were brought against both—based on political grounds.13 Because Luisa Moreno refused to cooperate with the House of Un-American Activities Committee, her application for citizenship was denied and she was later deported] The Internal Security Act of 1950 and the McCarran-Walter Act of 1952 gave government broad powers, with which they could harass and deport foreign-born union activists. - Francis E Walter and Pat McCarran sponsored the 1950 McCarran Act to tighten immigration laws and to exclude those the reactionaries said were subversive elements By the late 1940s, the problems of refugees and displaced persons created by World War II had encouraged many liberals to think about scrapping immigration quotas based on national origins. However, McCarran, who thought of himself as protector of the nation's racial purity, saw the admission of any number of foreigners as a threat. [elements of McCarran Act - pg. 275] Equally insidious was the *1952 McCarran-Walter Act*. It made some reforms, but it also included a long list of grounds for the deportation or exclusion of aliens; for example, it allowed the denaturalization of naturalized citizens. - It gave the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) the authority to interrogate so-called aliens suspected of being in the country "illegally." The immigration service could search boats, trains, cars, trucks, or planes and enter and search private lands within 25 miles of the border. The McCar- ran-Walter Act passed in 1952 over President Harry S. Truman's veto. The president opined that the law created a group of second-class citizens; it distinguished between native and naturalized citizens. Truman also objected to the revocation of the citizenship of naturalized citizens for political reasons. - pg. 275 Indeed, the Internal Security and the McCarran-Walter Acts led to gross violations of human rights. The purpose was transparent—to bust unions and intimidate activists. - For example, Humberto Silex, who had faced deportation in 1946, again faced deportation proceed- ings in 1952. Silex organized Local 509 of the United Mine, Mill, and Smelter Workers Union of El Paso; management considered him a troublemaker. Silex had entered the country legally and served in the armed forces. Employed by the American Smelting and Refining Company, he helped organize the local union in 1938. In 1945 Silex got into a fistfight, for which he was arrested and fined $35; the following year, Silex faced deportation proceedings on grounds of "moral turpitude." Although Silex won the case, the court banned him from union organizing. - Many victims of the McCarran-Walter Act waited years for final resolution of their cases. After seven years, in a 5-4 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court absolved José Gastélum of charges that would have resulted in deportation. The LACPFB defended Gastélum. Organizations such as the American Civil Liber- ties Union (ACLU) committed resources to fighting these violations of human rights, and the Community Service Organization (CSO) in Los Angeles extended free legal services to anyone whose human rights were violated by immigration policies

Militarization of the immigration and naturalization service (INS)

Several factors during the 1940s and 1950s contributed to the mass migration of Mexicans to the north. Improved transportation in Mexico eased flow from the interior. In 1940, all-weather roads covered about 2,000 miles; by 1950, the figure increased to just less than 15,000 miles. In addition, there were 15,000 miles of railroad lines. The population of Mexico grew by 2.7 percent per annum between 1940 and 1950, and by 3.1 percent per annum between 1950 and 1960. In 1950 there were 27 million Mexicans (in Mexico); ten years later, 35 million. Cotton production on the Mexican side of the border, especially around Matamoros, gave employment to workers from the interior. Like their counterparts in the United States, Mexican grow- ers advertised for more workers than they needed; thus, many who had migrated from the interior but were unable to find employment continued their journey northward across the border to find work in the cotton fields of the Rio Grande Valley of Texas. Furthermore, the INS intentionally left the border open to cross unimpeded. The INS rarely rounded up undocumented workers during harvest time, and it instructed its agents to withhold searches and deportations until after the picking season. A rule of thumb was that when sufficient numbers of braceros or domestic laborers worked cheaply enough, agents enforced the laws; when a labor shortage occurred, they opened the border's doors, disregarding both international and moral law. Finally, recessions such as that of 1949 resulted in massive roundups of undocumented workers. When the Korean War caused a labor shortage, the U.S. unilaterally opened the border; during the 1953-1955 recession that followed the war the U.S. unilaterally closed it. Newspapers called for the exclusion of the undocumented workers, whom they portrayed as dangerous, malicious, and subversive. Even liberal Democrats supported the border patrol, calling for fines on employers who hired these workers, as did the Mexican government and most Chicano organizations. This erratic U.S. policy brought hundreds of thousands of braceros into the country annually, then kicked them out when the economy slowed, turning the border into a revolving door. According to its press releases, from 1953 to 1955, the INS deported more than a million Mexi- cans annually. Through newspapers and the heavy presence of INS officers in the barrios, it spread terror. Most mainstream Mexican American organizations favored controlling undocumented immigration. - Mexican Americans and long-term Mexican residents in the United States perceived the entry of poor Mexican peasants into the Southwest not only as a source of job competition, but also as a barrier to their full assimilation and acceptance in American society, as they were often poor, illiterate and unfamiliar with the cultural and linguistic norms of the United States.

Seduced by the Game

Some people become involved in politics, believing that they can change things for the better, while others mistrust the political machine so much that they doubt individuals have the power to influence government policy. The Mexican American community walked the fine line between the believers and the doubters: on the one hand, they hoped that participation in the political process would bring their interests to the fore; on the other hand, they knew from past experience that the political machine had a tendency to disempower even its supporters in order to maintain the status quo. For the Mexican American community, even though there were very few elected officials of Mexican origin, *the Democratic Party was the party of choice*. The aura of Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Civil Rights legislation of Harry Truman still lived in the 1950s. The high hopes of the New Deal and Fair Deal were dashed, however, by the radical postwar "turn to the right" of the political spectrum. Although organiza- tions like LULAC and the American G.I. Forum continued to maintain that they were nonpartisan, most of the leadership and rank and file voted Democrat (when not blocked by the poll tax).

Urban Renewal: the day of the bulldozer

The 1949 Housing Act tied urban renewal to public housing, so that the worst slums were to be bulldozed for "a decent home and suitable living environment for every American family."50 Politicians built their political careers on urban renewal, favoring clearance projects that protected downtown business districts from the slums. These policies of urban development perpetuated racial tension and shaped contemporary racist attitudes and stereotypes. Federally financed expressways ripped the urban core and furthered sub- urbanization. Minorities were prevented from buying homes in the suburbs, which created what is today's "underclass." All in all, the gap between people of color and Euro-Americans widened as low-cost housing gave homeowners tax breaks and inflation built home equity. During the 1950s, urban renewal menaced Mexican Americans. By 1963, 609,000 people were uprooted nationwide, two-thirds of whom were minority group members. For Chicanos, Los Angeles was the prototype, and other cities mirrored its experiences. In Los Angeles, the Eastside barrio came under attack by urban-land grabbers engaged in freeway building, business enterprises, and urban renewal. Like other poor people throughout the United States, Mexicans had settled in the older sections near the center of the town. When freeway plans were proposed, planners considered poorer neighborhoods expendable. Government used the power of eminent domain to dislocate Chicanos so that money interests could reap large profits. In the 1950s, the low-income housing stock decreased by 90 percent. By the fall of 1953, the San Bernardino, Santa Ana, and Long Beach freeways already scarred the Mexican area, and Chicanos protested the projected building of still another freeway through East Los Angeles. However, unlike the residents of Beverly Hills, Chicanos were not able to stop the bulldozers, and the $32 million Golden State Freeway wiped out another Mexican sector. In 1957, the Pomona Freeway displaced thousands of Chicanos in the Hollenbeck area. The history of freeways in Los Angeles is one of plunder, fraud, and utter disregard for the lives and welfare of people. Land developers knew just why and where they planned the routes; they conve- niently bypassed the property of powerful corporate interests, such as the large Sears and Roebuck store and the Los Angeles Times facilities. Developers and politicians made millions. [The outcome was the erosion of the city's tax base. As a consequence, downtown developers and other elites pressured the federal government for relief, which they received through the Federal Housing Act of 1949.] - pg. 287

San Antonio

The 1950 U.S. Census showed that San Antonio Mexicans continued to suffer from a lack of education; less than half had gone beyond the fifth grade. Less than 10 percent finished high school, and less than 1 percent completed college. Their limited education checked the Mexicans' upward mobility during a time of prosperity for most Euro-Americans. The state's right-to-work law also hindered the Mexi- cans' advance in occupational status. Mexicans mostly belonged to pick-and-shovel unions—for instance, Mexicans comprised almost 100 percent of the hod carriers and 90 percent of the plasterers. They made up 6 percent of the electricians and just more than 10 percent of the cement masons. And San Antonio unions were weak; thus, wages were lower than in California, for example. Many Mexicans still lived in floorless shacks without plumbing, sewage connections, or electricity. Open shallow wells—sources of water used for drinking and washing—were next to outside toilets. During World War II, San Antonio had had the distinction of having the highest tuberculosis death rate of any large city in the country—a distinction that San Antonio undoubtedly kept into the postwar era. After the war, with the return of thousands of Mexican American veterans, the conditions of overcrowded housing and unpaved streets and sidewalks only worsened. The rapid economic growth brought about by the war and increased government spending in San Antonio attracted south Texans to the Alamo City. Highly segregated, Mexicans still lived mostly on the West Side. (Blacks resided on the East, lower- and middle-class whites on the South, and middle- and upper-class whites on the North Side.) Movement out of the barrio was still infrequent. The lack of union- ization and the size of the reserve labor pool further depressed conditions. [In turn, however, new housing meant jobs, as did the upswing in highway and airport construction] - The Mexican population in San Antonio climbed from 160,420 in 1950 to 243,627 (out of a total of 587,718) by the end of the decade. In 1959, San Antonio was second only to Los Angeles in the number of Mexicans.

the cities

The 1950 U.S. Census still had a difficult time saying "Mexican-origin." Some 83 percent were native-born or naturalized American citizens. Some 16 percent were not born in the United States. Yet 55 percent still had one or both parents born in Mexico. A large portion of U.S. Mexicans lived outside the evolving barrios of El Paso, San Antonio, Los Angeles, and Chicago. Large numbers resided in Brownsville, Corpus Christi, Laredo, Albuquerque, Phoenix, San Diego, and San Francisco. (outside this Southwest belt, they resided in sizable numbers in Kansas City, Detroit, and Milwaukee)

the FHA Mortgage Guarantee and the G.I. Bill

The Federal Housing Administration's (FHA) mortgage-loan guarantees, established by the National Hous- ing Act of 1934, and the Veterans Administration's (VA) loan guarantees of the Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944 (the G.I. Bill) created the suburban building boom that further encouraged segregation. The FHA was a major player in setting housing policy. between 1935 and 1974, the agency insured close to 11.5 million home mortgages. The money went mostly to mortgage insurance that backed the con- struction of new suburban housing. In this way, the FHA propelled the unprecedented flight of millions of Euro-Americans, who left the cities for the suburbs. In all, the FHA and VA programs insured about one- third of all homes purchased. Unfortunately, government administrators shared the real estate industry's view that racial segregation was closely linked to stability of neighborhoods and housing values. When the FHA issued its Underwriting Manual to banks in 1938, one of its guidelines for loan officers instructed them not to integrate new tracts. "A change in social or racial occupancy generally contributes to instability and a decline in values." Thus, government policy encouraged discrimination against Mexican Americans and African Americans who had limited options as to where they could buy.

The "Salt of the Earth"

The so-called "Salt of the Earth" strike—pitting the 1,400 members (90 percent Mexican) of Local 890, International Union of Mine, Mill, and Smelter Workers, against Empire Zinc and Grant County—inspired a classic film by the same name that received worldwide acclaim but was banned in the United States. The film depicts the strike as well as the role of women in stopping production. The strike lasted 15 months, from October 1950 to January 1952; it was the longest strike in New Mexico's history. *Although some of its leaders admittedly were Communists, the rank and file were more concerned about abusive working and living conditions than about ideology* The hysteria of the McCarthy period intimidated organized labor. The CIO buckled under political pressure and asked its union officers to sign affidavits that they were not Communists. Government did not even consider that the Communist Party's appeal to workers of color was a product of the racism that they were subject to; it rationalized that Communists were seducing Mexicans. Meanwhile, the Empire Zinc workers suffered indignities such as separate payroll lines, toilet facilities, and housing in the company town. Owners limited Mexicans to backbreaking mucking and underground mining jobs, while assigning whites to surface and craft jobs. Local 890 demanded payment for collar-to-collar work (i.e., compensation for all the time the miners spent underground), holiday pay, and the elimination of the no-strike clause in their contract Mexican Americans comprised 50 percent of Grant County. When the strike began, the county authorities demanded that the governor send the National Guard to the area. The strike itself developed into a typical management-labor dispute until a local judge issued an injunction that the workers stop picketing the mine. At that point, the women's auxiliary, formed in 1948, took over the lines because the injunction did not cover the women. A dramatic confrontation took place between the women and the deputies. At one point, deputies jailed 45 women, 17 children, and a 6-month-old baby. This event caught the attention of other unions and women's groups, who supported the auxiliary. Efforts to suppress the women led to frequent clashes between the women, the scabs, and the sheriff's deputies. The governor intervened, siding with the management, and sent in state troopers, who enforced the injunction and prohibited the blocking of the road leading to the mine. The governor's action thwarted the use of women on the picket line, since the state penitentiary could house all the picketers. The strike halted, with the workers winning minimal gains. Empire Zinc was eager to settle because of wartime profits, but refused to drop charges against union leaders, many of whom eventually spent three months in jail and paid thousands of dollars in fines.

Chicago

World War II revived Mexican migration to Chicago. The repatriation of the 1930s had reduced the official number of Mexicans from 20,000 to 16,000. From 1943 to 1945, the railroads imported some 15,000 braceros. During the 1940s, the official Mexican population grew from 16,000 to 20,000 in the city and from 21,000 to 35,000 in the metropolitan area. In 1953, the INS estimated that 100,000 Mexicans lived in Chicago, of whom 15,000 were, according to the INS, "wetbacks." Several Mexican barrios were located close to places of employment, in small pockets throughout the Chicago area. Until the 1960s, Mexicans shared space in these barrios with other ethnic groups. From the 1930s to the mid-1950s, Mexicans living in Back of the Yards belonged to the meatpackers' unions, which helped them assimilate. Work in the stockyards was stable, and wages were higher than in other industries. The Back of the Yards Neighborhood Council, organized in 1939 by social activist Saul Alinsky, depended on a network of Catholic Church groups South Chicago was untouched by urban renewal; - South Chicago Mexicans thrived economically in comparison to Mexican Americans in other sections of the city By the 1950s, the Mexican immigrant colonies in the communities of South Deering and South Chicago were magnets for new immigrants. Living near Serbian, Polish, Croatian, and other neighborhoods, Mexicans comprised roughly 24 percent of the foreign-born population in South Deering at this time. Still, a Chicago Commission on Human Relations report of the 1950s recognized the existence of inequality, and stated that Mexicans "carry the badge of color which places them as a minority group." Largely, they were unwelcome in the South Side. By the end of the decade, Mexicans were forming enclaves in other parts of Chicago as bulldozers uprooted older barrios. *Gentrification* displaced Mexicans in the Near Westside barrio of La Taylor during the decade, pushing them into the nearby Pilsen district.

Gentrification in the Midwest

gentrification: the process of renovating and improving a house or district so that it conforms to middle-class taste. Urban renewal followed a similar pattern in most cities in which Chicanos lived. The renewal process dis- persed Mexicans throughout Detroit; many moved to the suburbs. As in other cities, a pattern of uprooting by speculators, industrialists, and land developers emerged, disrupting the phenomenon of community building that had been crucial to the security of Mexican Americans for so long. For instance, in the 1960s redevelopment plans wiped out and moved the Bagley Avenue Mexican business district to Vernor. [the G.I. Forum in Detroit defended the civil rights of displaced residents and lobbied to gain access for Mexicans to public institutions] In Chicago, freeways, the expansion of the university campus, and other renewal programs wiped out the Near West Side barrio. In 1947, the city of Chicago organized the Chicago Land Commission to supervise slum clearance and urban "removal." The flight of white families and industries from the city to the suburbs had begun and it cost city jobs. This loss of employment would greatly affect Mexican Americans. Later, the federal interstate high- way program funded construction of five expressways that displaced 50,000 city dwellers. The civil rights movement of the late 1960s prevented most of the rest of Chicago from being gentrified. The targeted Afri- can Americans and other ethnics joined with white ethnic neighborhoods, like Taylor Street's Italian area, to revolt against urban renewal. In the early 1960s, however, developers bulldozed more than 800 houses and 200 businesses—most owned by citizens of Italian, Mexican, and Greek ancestry—to make way for what was then called the University of Illinois Chicago Circle Campus. The aftershock of urban renewal would be felt in the 1960s, when accelerated redevelopment caused a major disruption of the dominant social order. It transformed downtowns and surrounding areas, contributing greatly to the decentralization of the city while centralizing commercial and political power in the hands of a few elites. The most obvious disruption for the poor was the destruction of sound, affordable housing without adequate replacement. Conditions in the inner city worsened as housing and services became overburdened. Unemployment and inflation resulted, and poverty increased—as did crime and neighborhood gang activity. Urban renewal, essentially, also killed public housing, which was labeled socialistic.