Soc Core Fall 2016 Final
N. 2. If Kuhn's account of knowledge itself represents a paradigm, what grounds could he offer us for accepting it? If we accept it could we be rationally justified in accepting it? How does the problem of reflection for Kuhn compare to Hume's "skeptical solution" to the problem of induction?
Kuhn could offer himself as a foundationalist, and so his paradigm about paradigms would justify itself since he is still in line with the creation of a paradigm. His idea says that people will eventually discard the current paradigm and accept a new one, and so on. This implies that his paradigms are going to be discarded eventually, making one question why it should be accepted at all. Plus, he argues that moving from one paradigm to another is irrational, and so moving to his is included in that. This is similar to Hume's problem of induction because they would both appeal to foundationslism in providing self-justification.
U. 16. Should it matter to Peirce's pragmatic account of knowledge that we may never in fact learn the full truth about the real? Explain.
No it doesn't. the pragmatic account for knowledge suggests we are justified for embracing our pragmatic beliefs since they help us solve problems. even if we don't really understand the full truth of the real, we will adjust our views as necessary to maintain a stable lifestyles. inquiries into our actions are only needed when they fail us in the reals.
P. 5. If Monty decided to choose the door he opens at random, would Marilyn's answer still be right? Justify using probability theory.
No, Marilyn's answer will not be right. The probably of winning a car will be 50/50. In this scenario, another case is introduced in which Monty can possibly accidentally reveal the car in the middle step. This increases the probability of getting a goat in the switch.
O. 2. What might the success or progress of science consist of for Kuhn?
Normal science is the pursuit of puzzle solving. Whether or not we converge on actual truth, science's ability o provide answers to our problem questions, is central to his view of scientific progress.
U. 9. What are the four reasons Peirce gives for his commitment to objective empirical inquiry?
1. No doubt of this ever arises in the practice of this method 2. the psychology of belief and doubt suggests that we cannot resist believing that there is objective truth and that inquiry can deliver it 3. most everyone uses the scientific method whenever they know how to use it 4. the scientific method has an excellent track record of guiding successful action
T. 7. What might Pierce's explanation be for why such unreliabilities (of our beliefs and belief forming mechanisms) are unsettling? How might he recommend getting settled again? Explain with ex of change blindness
He would tell us to settle with inquiring using scientific method. It's unsettling bc we seek success in our actions. WE compare things with the external world to test the beliefs we develop from inquiry. Belief in the external world is this extra step of error. but being able to compare them leads to more success.
T. 3. What might Peirce say about Hume's skeptical solution to the problem of induction?
Hume: we are humans and make mistakes Pierce: psychology and how we fix beliefs so we don't make the same mistake again may never constitute truth Both agree that induction = good way to form beliefs because its reliable Pierce says you can't just give up and say we're just human, he says we have to replace doubt with belief
X. 5. Explain why one might not care to have anything stronger if local justification is grounded in what one in fact believes. How is this point related to Hume's skeptical solution to the problem of induction?
If someone's local justification is grounded in belief, then that justification will have more apparent foundation than actuality. this si shown through inductive reasoning relating to hume, power, we don't need to worry about rational justification if we are applying local. if a belief is locally justified, it is consistent with other beliefs and is most likely useful to us when solving problems
U. 2. What does Peirce mean by inquiry?
Inquiry - the process of replacing doubt with belief for the purpose of successful action.
T. 6. One might say inquiry is driven, and doubts are thereby replaced by beliefs, by our fear of failure in action on Pierce's view. Explain
Inquiry = process of seeking out belief to replace doubt. Doubt is toxic for our mentality, causing discomfort, and leads us to inaction. Then we drive our inquiring actions to reach a higher level of comfort. Truth cannot be the motivator for inquiry Truth is a constant exterior to the mind, and is independent of opinion.
U. 11. Explain how inquiry, action, the reals, and the truth fit together in Perice's belief-revision model of knowledge.
Inquiry: fixing belief to eliminate error in description and action Action: that may be successful or in error The reals: that explain how beliefs can be objectively in error Truth: error free belief that is descriptive of the reals his belief-revision model begins with failure in action due to a conflict between beliefs and the reals --> causes doubt and discomfort motivated to alleviate discomfort by undertaking an inquiry, gather evidence to revise belief to remain consistent with our observations of the reals revised belief can be considered closer to the truth than before the revision
P. 2-3. What was Marilyn von Savant's solution to the Monty Hall problem? Was she right? What's her argument?
It is rational to switch. She is correct. Assuming Monty knows what is behind each door and will always reveal a goal door, you have a 2/3 chance of winning the car if you switch. You start with an initial 2/3 chance of winning a goat, but when he reveals the goat in the intermediate switch, it transfers the 2/3 probability to the car door.
P. 4. What does the Monty Hall problem show us about naive human reasoning?
It shows that human reasoning cannot always correctly identify, or sometimes ignores the variables that influence probabilities of events. In this cause, it's intuitive to assume a 50/50 chance no matter the variables, since you're choosing between 2. But this is an example of baseline fallacy.
X. 2. What should count as knowledge in a belief revision model of knowledge like Peirce's? In one like the Bayesian model? Explain
Knowledge in Peirce's model is a revised belief that now satisfies our current observations of reals, which should converge closer to the truth. Bayesian model incorporates degrees of belief. Knowledge is more about understanding the probabilities of certain events, which is fluid and can be constantly updated with the incoming flow of evidence. Pierce's model is more about absolute statements being the format of truth
T. 1. Explain how Pierce's belief revision and Quine's belief revision, web of belief models of knowledge differ from something like Descartes' foundationalism with respect to rational justification.
Pierce -can't justify beliefs starting with nothing. they don't just sit there -recognizes the impossibility to answer the persistent skeptic and see it as beginning of justification -saw Descartes doubting method as ridiculous and recognized how we can always change our beliefs based on new info -pRAGMATIC sense of truth Quine -core of analytics that aren't rock solid as a foundation -all beliefs are malleable. some are more resistant to change if its more foundational -beliefs are justified through local justifications relative to connective beliefs, while foundationalist searches for beliefs with global justification
T. 5. Hume suggests that one simply learns to live with the whimsical nature of humans with all the cognitive mistakes we make. Does Pierce think it is psych possible for us to do that? What prevents us from simply laughing off our cognitive mistakes
Pierce believes that humans can't just brush off our mistakes in action. These failures produce doubt, which then motivates inquiry Inquiry leads to testing of our opinions, and ends when we can form opinions that coincide with our observations of action in real life opinions then turn into beliefs which gives us satisfaction
U. 13. How is Peirce's believe-revision model, where one updates full beliefs, different from a simple Bayesian model, where one updates degrees of belief? What is a full belief? What is a degree of belief?
Pierce's model says we should hold onto our error beliefs until enough evidence shows the contrary, at which point our belief shifts completely. Bayesian model says that as evidence comes in, we progressively update our beliefs, and don't switch from belief to non belief instantly. Full belief - when you are very sure, 100% Degrees of belief - levels of partial belief that can be related to probabilities.
T. 4. Given his attitude towards Descartes' pretended doubt, what might Pierce's psychological strategy be for responding to the persistent skeptic?
Pierce's response to the persistent skeptic is that the persistent skeptic cannot doubt the real world because he has to eat and sleep, actions that relate to the real world, and actions are the physical presence of belief
U. 10. Does Peirce take these reasons to justify his belief that he can learn the truth about the real by empirical inquiry
Price does not try to provide foundational justification for the scientific method or even try to convince others to use it
Q. 1. What are prior probabilities and posterior probabilities?
Prior probability: the probability that an observation will fall into a group before you collect the data. Posterior probability: the probability of assigning observations to groups, given the data. If you know or can estimate probabilities, a discriminant analysis can use prior probabilities in calculating the posterior probabilities. In simple parlance, the prior is what you believe about some quantity at a particular point in time, and the posterior is your belief once additional information comes in.
S. 3. Quine compares his own belief in the existence of atoms to the ancient Greek belief in the existence of Zeus and concludes they have the same status. Would Kuhn agree? Explain.
Quine argues that his beliefs in atoms is on the same level of authority as the ancient Greek's belief in Zeus. However, Quine's belief seems more legitimate than the Greek's to contemporary scholar,s because the belief in atoms is more pragmatic than the Greek gods. Kuhn would probably agree with Quine. To Kuhn, the Greek gods and atoms are two different paradigms. So as unreasonable as it seems, it can be just as legitimate. Quine acknowledges that the belief in atoms s only as elevated in authority as much as the pragmatic view allows, which is parallel to Kuhn's descriptions of how paradigms become a primary school of thought.
S. 1. Describe Quine's model of scientific knowledge. In what sense is it a pragmatic account of knowledge?
Quine's model of scientific knowledge is a web of beliefs connected to experience on the other fringes. Experience can shift these other beliefs, then shift around the inner beliefs. Any belief can be held true given enough shifting in the web. Since the boundary conditions of the total field is undefined, there is some latitude when determining which beliefs are shifted as well as to what extent. All thoughts are thoroughly pragmatic because to quine, analytic and synthetic beliefs are not as prearranged. Analytic beliefs are more resistant to shifting than synthetic ones, but ultimately, there is no split between the two that we pragmatically accept because of their continued verification.
O. 3. Does Kuhn or Quine give a more accurate or realistic picture of belief change in science? Explain the sense in which each succeeds and fails. What evidence does, or might, each give in support of his own account, as applied to science?
Quine: anything is up for revision, and any of your other beliefs are available for resources for justification. Quine seek local justification - We will revise beliefs that are least disruptive. His model for belief revision represents the Neurath's boat stand on one while belief while fixing others. Evidence: Constitution. Using rules about how to revise other rules. It succeeds because we can't just give up all our beliefs and start revision from scratch. It fails because even the web of beliefs itself is up for revision. Kuhn: belief change in science takes form in paradigm shifts. However, there's no rational justification for switching between paradigms, and the structure of scientific revolutions doesn't converge on truth. So he fails in both aspects, and not a lot of success. Ex. Aristotelian vs. Newtonian mechanics.
M. 5. Why, according to Kuhn, are scientific revolutions largely invisible?
Scientific revolutions are invisible because they're only apparent to / affect those within the paradigm in question, or the field.
Q. 5. How does the degree of rational justification relate to the strength of an inductive argument? How then might Bayes' theorem provide one with local justification for the conclusion of an inductive argument? One might say that this fails to solve the problem of induction but still provides a response to the problem.
The inductive strength of an argument is the degree to which premises support the conclusion. In in an inductive argument, the premise has the evidence of the conclusion - if the evidence strongly supports the conclusion, then the argument is strong. If the evidence doesn't increase the probability of the conclusion much, then it's weak. We need background assumptions.
O. 4. Can Quine's picture of knowledge be applied reflexively without undermining itself? Can Kuhn's? Explain.
The problem of reflection isn't a problem for Quine since his picture of knowledge itself is a dot on the web of knowledge. He recognizes that his beliefs is just a belief in another web, and he isn't trying to justify it.
U. 3. What does Peirce say is the sole object of inquiry? What might he say to someone who insisted that the only knowledge worth having is knowledge as true justified belief?
The sole object of inquiry is the settlement of opinion. Once a new belief is fixed, inquiry ends. He would respond that we may feel the need for a "true opinion", but once we put our belief to the test, we will find that a firm belief makes us entirely satisfied, whether the belief is true or false.
Z. 4. Is it possible to have objective scientific knowledge if we cannot, due to the failure of first person authority, reliable judge how our beliefs are formed? Explain.
We don't have an issue of first person authority in a direct way. Scientific knowledge relies more on the community ppl coming into community prob forma belief with one of the other way son forming belief,a nd there will be disagreement. but this leads to inquiry. a diverse community helps us see that our beliefs are reliable
U. 4. Is it possible to distinguish between mere opinion and the sort of opinion that Peirce values as scientific knowledge? Explain.
Yes. There are certain premises vs. implied premises. There is validity based purely on fact, and not just of thinking.
V. 5. Can Laudan accept Peirce's claim that inquiry can lead us to the Truth about the real? why?
he might accept it. in Laudan's terms, the truth of the real lies at the center of the overlap between paradigms. both of them don't really call that the truth of the real, necessarily, but lead to the most successful interaction with the real
U. 14. the job of the concept of the real in Perice's theory is to 1. explain how it is possible for a belief to be in error and 2. explain how its possible to fail in action. explain.
it holds us accountable to our beliefs. if there is nothing to evaluate, there is nothing for us to believe in. the real world prevents us from succeeding in all action and allows us to fail
P. 1. What is the Monty Hall problem?
there are three doors: 1 has a car, the other 2 have goats. After you choose one, he opens another door to reveal a goat. He gives you a choice about whether to switch your choice or not.
Q. 7. What is a bet? Odds?
A bet on statement S is an agreement were the bettor gets payoff A if S is true, and loses B if S is false. So the odds are B/A. One can tell how strongly one believes S to be true by what odds one would take as fair bet, where a bet is fair if and and only if the expected return is zero. If one takes B/A to be the odds on a fair bet on the truth of S, then one takes the probability of S being true to be B/(A+B). This probability (aka betting quotient) is a measure of the agent's subjective degree to belief in the truth of S.
U. 15. Kuhn says that there is no standard of truth higher than the consensus of the community. How might Perice argue adjacent that view?
He would argue that the standard of truth that we should identify is what agrees with the reals. The consensus of the community isn't necessarily correct. these beliefs are still opinions and not the truth
U. 12. What is fallibilism? Why is it essential to Peirce's model of scientific knowledge? How does it connect to the possibility of error, the role played by the reals, and the idea of scientific knowledge being objective?
Fallibilism: the ability for humans to make errors in their actions and beliefs, yet still be justified by them. Essential to Perice's model because if we weren't justified to hold beliefs in error, then we would never be able to revise them thru inquiry, which is not an instant process possibility of error is part of the definition of fallibilism: humans can experience error but still be justified the reals is what shows us our errors in our beliefs. scientific knowledge is objective since truth is independent of opinion
M. 10. Kuhn compares a scientific revolution to a political revolution. Explain the analogy and at least one disanalogy.
For both, a sense of malfunction leads to crisis, making up the prerequisite to revolution. For both, there is a crisis of society and people are divided into competing groups, one to defend the old and one to bring in something new. The community ultimately decides which group wins for both types of revolutions.
X. 3. How is knowledge different from mere opinion on such a model? Does knowledge have any odd properties on such model? Explain
Generally, knowledge is an opinion that is supported by evidence without any contradicting evidence. Knowledge on Peirce / Bayesian models is that knowledge, while backed by evidence, may not be consistent with the truth
M. 7. Why does the strong Kuhn thing that there can be no standard of scientific progress? How does Kuhn soften his position on the possibility of progress in the Postscript? Why does the strong Kuhn thing that there can be no notion of scientific theories getting closer to the truth over time? Does he give this up int he postscript?
He does not deny that there is progress in science, but he denied that it is progress toward anything. He compares it to the metaphor of biological evolution - a process driven from behind, rather than pulled toward a fixed goal that it grows closer to.
S. 5. Might Quine's attitude to his own and ancient Greek belief lead to a problem of reflection for Quine's own beliefs? Explain.
He says any belief can be held true given enough shifting. Ultimately expresses that some beliefs that we hold to be true may not actually be true in reality - this can be applied to his beliefs of his own model of scientific knowledge. HOWEVER, he is open to revising his own beliefs, and isn't trying to justify his own beliefs.
M. 8. Why does strong Kuhn believe that scientists working in different paradigms are in fact working in different worlds with different truths? How does his argument rely on there being no higher authority? How does he argue there is no higher authority?
He states that paradigms are radically different from each other because they come about in radically different contexts, by radically different people. The cultures / beliefs / tech's / and people of each era died truth very different so their work and discoveries are made in light of that. They had different goals and reasons for their work, so to Kuhn, there cannot be one single standard or authority upon which to judge each paradigm.
M. 6. Describe 6 ways that Kuhn believes competing paradigms are incommensurable. Give at least one argument for each type of incommensurability Kuhn describes.
1. Quasi-Metaphysical commitments - different commitments about what is actually in the world. Natural theology vs. Darwinism. 2. Exemplars - the most important thing to be explained about a paradigm. Sets example for how to apply paradigm to other phenomena. We cannot use an exemplar of one paradigm to explain another. Darwin's finches. 3. Puzzles - the act of normal science, solving problems within the paradigm. Puzzles are not comparable between paradigms, so scientists in each paradigm are interested in normal science rather than problems of other paradigms. 4. Standards of Evaluation - the changing standards of evaluation - meaning vs. science, accuracy vs. simplicity 5. Data - adherents of different paradigms live in different worlds, so, like puzzles, they cannot try to explain the same things. Paradigms shape the experiences and the date it receives and uses. 6. Language - talking about incommensurable worlds, words have different meanings in different paradigms.
R. Know the axioms of probability theory, the definition of conditional probability, Bayes' theorem, the total probability theorem, and the principle of strict conditionalization and be able to use these to calculate probabilities for stuff like (also be able to say exactly which axioms you used by name or by writing down the axiom):
1. Tautology: P(T) = 1. 2. Contradiction: P(F) = 0. 3. Logical Equivalence: If R and S are logically equivalent, then P(R) = P(S). 4. Negation: P(~S) = 1 - P(S). 5. Special Disjunction: If R and S are mutually exclusive, then P(R v S) = P(R) + P(S). 6. General Disjunction: P(R v S) = P(R) + P(S) - P(R & S). 7. Special Conjunction: If R and S are statistically independent, then P(R & S) = P(R) P(S). 8. General Conjunction: P(R & S) = P(R) P(S|R). conditional probability: P(S|R) = P(R&S)/P(R) Bayes' theorem: P(H|E) = P(H)P(E|H)/P(E) total probability theorem: if H1, H2, . . . are mutually exclusive and exhaustive, then P(E) = P(H1&E) + P(H2&E) + · · · = P(H1)P(E|H1) + P(H2)P(E|H2) + · · · . So P(E) = PP(Hi)P(E|Hi) principle of strict conditionalization: PN (H) = PO (H|E)
U. 5. Given how Peirce understands belief, doubt, and inquiry, describe at least 3 mistakes that Descartes made.
1. never tested his beliefs against the real 2. attempted to doubt everything, which is impossible 3. inquiry was not based on resolving doubt and he made his beliefs unmodifiable
U. 8. 4 features of the scientific method that Peirce describes?
1. the real exists, and is independent of my beliefs 2. i have the ability to interact with the real 3. if i fail in action, it is bc my belief is not aligned with the real, and i update my belief accordingly 4. the real works. if i avoid descriptive error, i am led towards the truth about the real
R. 1. Consider rolling three 6-sided fair dice. What is the probability of rolling a sum of 2? 3? 4?
2: 0 3: 1/ (6^3) 4: three permutations of 1/1/2 (using axiom 5); 3/(6^3) 5: three permutations of 1/1/3, three permutations of 1/2/2, 1/36
Q. 4. How does Bayes' Theorem together with the principle of strict conditionalization allow one to move from prior to posteriors?
Bayes' Theorem tells us how evidence, E, affects the probability of a hypothesis, H. You assign prior probabilities P(H) - how strongly one believes H before E P(E|H) - how well one would the H to explain E P(E) - how likely one takes E's occurrence to be. These priors are background assumptions that are required to determine the strength of an inductive argument. The inductive strength of an argument from premise E to conclusion H is then P(H|E)/P(H) - this measures how strongly evidence E affects the degree of belief of hypothesis H. If it is 1, then the evidence does not matter to the probability of the conclusion (irrelevant to H). If it is much greater than 1, then the inductive argument is strong. If it is close to 0, then the evidence forms a strong argument AGAINST the hypothesis. The Principle of Strict Conditionalization provides a way of updating probabilities given new evidence. So priori leads to posterior.
U. 1. How does Pierce understand belief and doubt? What are the three differences he notes between the two states?
Beliefs: a calm state where we are prepared for action - to have a belief is to have a settled habit that determines one's action. the sensation of belief is one of wanting to pronounce judgment Doubt: an uneasy state that we wish to replace with belief. The sensation of doubt is one of wanting to ask a question Differences 1. Dissimilarity between the sensation of doubting and believing 2. The feeling of believing is a more or less sure indication that there is a habit that will determine our action. Doubt does not have this effect. 3. Both doubt and belief have positive effects upon us, but very different ones. Belief doesn't make us act at once - it makes us act a certain way when the occasion arises. Doubt stimulates us to inquiry until it is destroyed.
X. 1. Concerning fallibilism, if one is interested in using one's beliefs for action, why might one take there to be an important difference between believing something to be true and something being true?
Believing something is true is subject to revision and is prone to error. Something being true is indepdnet of opinion and is constant.
M. 3. What does Kuhn mean by "progress through revolutions"? Does he take this to be progress towards the truth? Explain.
By progress through revolutions, Kuhn means progress of instruments and technology. He does not take this to be progress towards the truth. There's an overlap / accumulation of technology that is used for puzzle solving from paradigm to paradigm, but it doesn't mean we are converting on truth.
S. 4. Would Pierce agree that Quine's belief in atoms is just a useful fiction? Explain
He would agree with the recognition of the pragmatic value of the belief in atoms, for it has been tested rigorously through science without conflicting results. Would acknowledge the possibility that the belief in atoms may be misguided and one day be proven wrong by future research. But would still not call it useful fiction. bc overall the validity of the belief in atoms does not conflict with his assertions as long as the belief is being tested through scientific methods.
Q. 9. What does it mean to say that someone's beliefs are coherent? How does this relate to the possibility of a Dutch Book? Explain how Dutch Book arguments provide synchronic justification for using the axioms of probability theory to regiment one's own degrees of beliefs.
Coherent: beliefs should satisfy the axioms of probability theory. Falling for a Dutch book means you took the axioms and the outcomes to heart and believed in them even though they're against your favor. Basically, a dutch book can happen if in the end, expected returns on all of them added together equal 0 so it would seem fair, but the payoff ends up being unfair. Coherent beliefs do not allow you to fall into a dutch book. Synchronic justification follows coherent beliefs. Diachronic justification is how old beliefs relate to new beliefs, strict conditionalization. Coherent beliefs don't contradict each other. I can believe something as long as none of my beliefs contradict it. By the Dutch book theorem, if i don't have coherent beliefs, someone could dutch book me. One must follow the axioms. Coherent beliefs are synchronically justified.
Q. 6. What is expected return? What is the economic definition of rational action? What does it mean to say a game is fair?
Expected return - the average result of one iteration of a system of events. In the case of a bet of money, the expected return is all exhaustive resultant totals multiple by their corresponding probabilities. The economic definition of rational action - assumes that individuals always make prudent and logical decisions that provide them with the greatest benefit or satisfaction and that are in their highest self interest. A game is fair if the expected value is zero.
M. 9. Kuhn compares a scientific revolution to a Gestalt shift. Explain the analogy and disanalogy according to Kuhn. Would it cause a problem for Kuhn's strong incommensurability position if one could switch back and forth between different paradigms at will?
Kuhn says it wouldn't make sense to acknowledge the previous paradigm and reorient our world to reflect something new. We have a new world, so we should see it as simply, the world. There's less reorientation - one revolution has annihilate the previous paradigm, and bc of incommensurability, it makes no sense for people to see an old thing as something new. It would cause a problem to shift back and forth because if we attempted to, scientists would use the same terms to describe a similar phenomena, and there would be a fallacy that causes confusion. We see a Necker cube 2 ways, but we acknowledge the neutral image as simply being a collection of lines our vision manipulates - but there are no neutral observations present in the larger ideas he proposes, so we can't do the same thing there
X. 4. What is the difference between local justification in the context of a belief revision model of knowledge, and global or absolute justification on a foundational model of knowledge?
Local justification in a belief revision model can come from other connected beliefs, or a synchronically justified set of evidence that supports the belief in question. On the foundational model of knowledge, the singular node that every belief should trace back to, will have infallible global justification.
U. 7. Briefly describe each of the four methods of fixing belief that Peirce discusses. Describe an advantage and disadvantage for each.What does he favor and why?
Method of tenacity -we can pick some things and believe them (religion - ppl take contradictory evidence and either ignore it or fix belief to fit) -works to a point tis you realize everyone does this so its not sustainable Method of authority -you believe what authority tells you and it just gets passed down, tis you get people who start questioning -ex: catholicism: you believe pope, see heretics as problems like Galileo A priori method -Descartes: sit and think about stuff, introspect, rationalism -think about what things seem like and what is most reasonable, not experience-heavy -no fine tuning and revision mechanisms Method of Scientific Investigation -go back and see what went wrong when we get unexpected results -self revising -fundamental to assume the existence of reality Pierce would like this best: he cares about how we come to believe things and the method must be open to inquiry
U. 6. Given how Peirce understands inquiry, why are methods of fixing belief so important?
Methods of fixing belief is important because we need to obtain a firm belief, which helps guide our actions and gives us peace of mind
M. 4. What is the distinction between seeing and seeing as supposed to be? What does it mean to claim that observation is theory-laden? It is sometimes said that if observation is theory-laden, then there is no distinction to be made between seeing and seeing as. What does it mean to say that there is no paradigm-neutral observation language? Why does Kuhn believe this? If this is right, what are the implications? Explain
Seeing vs seeing as supposed to be = seeing is seeing objects as simply a sensory experience, neutral, object meant to be taken at face value. Seeing as supposed to be = seeing an object and interpreting our sensory input as being correct in what we see. We see the object the way it is because our sensory spectrum dictates that we see it in a way that makes the most sense towards our survival. Observation can be theory laden because we interpret our experience in terms that reflect the current paradigm. The way we describe things would vary between paradigms. Therefore, there is no difference between seeing and seeing as is, bc depending on the paradigm, we will always see things as being representative of that paradigm. Kuhn says there is no paradigm neutral observation language because we can use similar terms from two paradigms that mean completely different things. He believes this bc our worldview, in addition to our interpretation of sensory information, changes completely. Therefore, it wouldn't make sense to use language reflecting a completely different world, in whichever current world we're in.
M. 11. Explain the distinction between strong and weak Kuhn. How far do you think Kuhn does in fact successfully argue - are you only convinced by weak Kuhn or by strong Kuhn as well?
Strong Kuhn argues that paradigms are incommensurable. Later in the postscript, weak Kuhn says there is a neutral language in which there can ben communication between paradigms.
X. 6. What is the difference between synchronic and diachronic justification in a belief revision model of knowledge? Is synchronic justification local or global? Why might someone call diachronic justification "inquiry"?
Synchronic justification - applies to one instance in time along with all of the evidence and current observations. Diachronic justification - applies to the belief revision system of using new evidence to revise old beliefs synchronic is local for that given context and time. diachronic can be considered inquiry since it defines the process by which an inquiry follows to achieve satisfaction in belief
S. 2. Explain the distinction between synchronic and diachronic justification in the context of a belief-revision model of knowledge like Pierce's or Quine's.
Synchronic justification - refers to local justification relative to a certain context or set of evidence / experience. Diachronic justification - refers to global justification which holds under all contexts or worlds. Diachronic is also belief revision, in the form of the strict conditionalization model. Pierce and Quine allude to it by suggesting we revise our beliefs based in new evidence. They both support synchronic justification by talking about coherence of beliefs. Periece seeks coherence through inquiry, Quine seeks it constantly with his web of beliefs.
N. 1. What is the problem of reflection for a theory of knowledge? How does the problem affect the status of Kuhn's own account of scientific knowledge, paradigms, and revolutions?
Take home midterm 2
