4th Amendment

Search incident to lawful arrest (SILA)

2 purposes (important): Secure any weapons in arrestee's possession (protection of officers' safety) Secure evidence to prevent loss or destruction

U.S. v. Mendenhall (

** .................. The respondent was brought to trial in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan on a charge of possessing heroin with intent to distribute it. She moved to suppress the introduction at trial of the heroin as evidence against her on the ground that it had been acquired from her through an unconstitutional search and seizure by agents of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). The District Court denied the respondent's motion, and she was convicted after a trial upon stipulated facts. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding the search of the respondent's person to have been unlawful. We granted certiorari.... I ... The respondent arrived at the Detroit Metropolitan Airport on a commercial airline flight from Los Angeles early in the morning on February 10, 1976. As she disembarked from the airplane, she was observed by two agents of the DEA, who were present at the airport for the purpose of detecting unlawful traffic in narcotics. After observing the respondent's conduct, which appeared to the agents to be characteristic of persons unlawfully carrying narcotics,1 the agents approached her as she was walking through the concourse, identified themselves as federal agents, and asked to see her identification and airline ticket. The respondent produced her driver's license, which was in the name of Sylvia Mendenhall, and, in answer to a question of one of the agents, stated that she resided at the address appearing on the license. The airline ticket was issued in the name of "Annette Ford." When asked why the ticket bore a name different from her own, the respondent stated that she "just felt like using that name." In response to a further question, the respondent indicated that she had been in California only two days. Agent Anderson then specifically identified himself as a federal narcotics agent and, according to his testimony, the respondent "became quite shaken, extremely nervous. She had a hard time speaking." After returning the airline ticket and driver's license to her, Agent Anderson asked the respondent if she would accompany him to the airport DEA office for further questions. She did so, although the record does not indicate a verbal response to the request. The office, which was located up one flight of stairs about 50 feet from where the respondent had first been approached, consisted of a reception area adjoined by three other rooms. At the office the agent asked the respondent if she would allow a search of her person and handbag and told her that she had the right to decline the search if she desired. She responded: "Go ahead." She then handed Agent Anderson her purse.... A female police officer then arrived to conduct the search of the respondent's person. She asked the agents if the respondent had consented to be searched. The agents said that she had, and the respondent followed the policewoman into a private room. There the policewoman again asked the respondent if she consented to the search, and the respondent replied that she did. The policewoman explained that the search would require that the respondent remove her clothing. The respondent stated that she had a plane to catch and was assured by the policewoman that if she were carrying no narcotics, there would be no problem. The respondent then began to disrobe without further comment. As the respondent removed her clothing, she took from her undergarments two small packages, one of which appeared to contain heroin, and handed both to the policewoman. The agents then arrested the respondent for possessing heroin.... II... A The Fourth Amendment's requirement that searches and seizures be founded upon an objective justification, governs all seizures of the person, "including seizures that involve only a brief detention short of traditional arrest." [United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975)]. Accordingly, if the respondent was "seized" when the DEA agents approached her on the concourse and asked questions of her, the agents' conduct in doing so was constitutional only if they reasonably suspected the respondent of wrongdoing. But "[o]bviously, not all personal intercourse between policemen and citizens involves 'seizures' of persons. Only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a 'seizure' has occurred." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. [1, 19, n. 16(1968)].... We adhere to the view that a person is "seized" only when, by means of physical force or a show of authority, his freedom of movement is restrained. Only when such restraint is imposed is there any foundation whatever for invoking constitutional safeguards. The purpose of the Fourth Amendment is not to eliminate all contact between the police and the citizenry, but "to prevent arbitrary and oppressive interference by enforcement officials with the privacy and personal security of individuals." United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554 [(1976)]. As long as the person to whom questions are put remains free to disregard the questions and walk away, there has been no intrusion upon that person's liberty or privacy as would under the Constitution require some particularized and objective justification. Moreover, characterizing every street encounter between a citizen and the police as a "seizure," while not enhancing any interest secured by the Fourth Amendment, would impose wholly unrealistic restrictions upon a wide variety of legitimate law enforcement practices. The Court has on other occasions referred to the acknowledged need for police questioning as a tool in the effective enforcement of the criminal laws. "Without such investigation, those who were innocent might be falsely accused, those who were guilty might wholly escape prosecution, and many crimes would go unsolved. In short, the security of all would be diminished." Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. [218, 225 (1973)]. We conclude that a person has been "seized" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.6 Examples of circumstances that might indicate a seizure, even where the person did not attempt to leave, would be the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be compelled. In the absence of some such evidence, otherwise inoffensive contact between a member of the public and the police cannot, as a matter of law, amount to a seizure of that person. On the facts of this case, no "seizure" of the respondent occurred. The events took place in the public concourse. The agents wore no uniforms and displayed no weapons. They did not summon the respondent to their presence, but instead approached her and identified themselves as federal agents. They requested, but did not demand to see the respondent's identification and ticket. Such conduct without more, did not amount to an intrusion upon any constitutionally protected interest....[N] othing in the record suggests that the respondent had any objective reason to believe that she was not free to end the conversation in the concourse and proceed on her way, and for that reason we conclude that the agents' initial approach to her was not a seizure. Our conclusion that no seizure occurred is not affected by the fact that the respondent was not expressly told by the agents that she was free to decline to cooperate with their inquiry, for the voluntariness of her responses does not depend upon her having been so informed. We also reject the argument that the only inference to be drawn from the fact that the respondent acted in a manner so contrary to her self-interest is that she was compelled to answer the agents' questions. It may happen that a person makes statements to law enforcement officials that he later regrets, but the issue in such cases is not whether the statement was self-protective, but rather whether it was made voluntarily.... B Although we have concluded that the initial encounter between the DEA agents and the respondent on the concourse at the Detroit Airport did not constitute an unlawful seizure, it is still arguable that the respondent's Fourth Amendment protections were violated when she went from the concourse to the DEA office. Such a violation might in turn infect the subsequent search of the respondent's person.... The question whether the respondent's consent to accompany the agents was in fact voluntary or was the product of duress or coercion, express or implied, is to be determined by the totality of all the circumstances, and is a matter which the Government has the burden of proving. The respondent herself did not testify at the hearing. The Government's evidence showed that the respondent was not told that she had to go to the office, but was simply asked if she would accompany the officers. There were neither threats nor any show of force. The respondent had been questioned only briefly, and her ticket and identification were returned to her before she was asked to accompany the officers. On the other hand, it is argued that the incident would reasonably have appeared coercive to the respondent, who was 22 years old and had not been graduated from high school. It is additionally suggested that the respondent, a female and a Negro, may have felt unusually threatened by the officers, who were white males. While these factors were not irrelevant, neither were they decisive, and the totality of the evidence in this case was plainly adequate to support the District Court's finding that the respondent voluntarily consented to accompany the officers to the DEA office. C Because the search of the respondent's person was not preceded by an impermissible seizure of her person, it cannot be contended that her apparent consent to the subsequent search was infected by an unlawful detention. There remains to be considered whether the respondent's consent to the search was for any other reason invalid.... III We conclude that the District Court's determination that the respondent consented to the search of her person "freely and voluntarily" was sustained by the evidence and that the Court of Appeals was, therefore, in error in setting it aside. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings.... Mr. Justice POWELL, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and Mr. Justice BLACKMUN join, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. ... I do not reach the Government's contention that the agents did not "seize" the respondent within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. In my view, we may assume for present purposes that the stop did constitute a seizure.1 I would hold—as did the District Court—that the federal agents had reasonable suspicion that the respondent was engaging in criminal activity, and, therefore, that they did not violate the Fourth Amendment by stopping the respondent for routine questioning. Mr. Justice WHITE, with whom Mr. Justice BRENNAN, Mr. Justice MARSHALL, and Mr. Justice STEVENS join, dissenting.... I Beginning with Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the Court has recognized repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment's proscription of unreasonable "seizures" protects individuals during encounters with police that do not give rise to an arrest.... Mr. Justice STEWART believes that a "seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment occurs when an individual's freedom of movement is restrained by means of physical force or a show of authority. Although it is undisputed that Ms. Mendenhall was not free to leave after the DEA agents stopped her and inspected her identification, Mr. Justice STEWART concludes that she was not "seized" because he finds that, under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person would have believed that she was free to leave. While basing this finding on an alleged absence from the record of objective evidence indicating that Ms. Mendenhall was not free to ignore the officer's inquiries and continue on her way, Mr. Justice STEWART'S opinion brushes off the fact that this asserted evidentiary deficiency may be largely attributable to the fact that the "seizure" question was never raised below. In assessing what the record does reveal, the opinion discounts certain objective factors that would tend to support a "seizure" finding,3 while relying on contrary factors inconclusive even under its own illustrations of how a "seizure" may be established.4 Even if one believes the Government should be permitted to raise the "seizure" question in this Court, the proper course would be to direct a remand to the District Court for an evidentiary hearing on the question, rather than to decide it in the first instance in this Court.... II Assuming, as we should, that Ms. Mendenhall was "seized" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when she was stopped by the DEA agents, the legality of that stop turns on whether there were reasonable grounds for suspecting her of criminal activity at the time of the stop.... None of the aspects of Ms. Mendenhall's conduct, either alone or in combination, were sufficient to provide reasonable suspicion that she was engaged in criminal activity.... person has been seized only if, in view of all circumstances, a reasonable person would have believed he or she was not free to leave (E.g. threatening presence of several officers; display of weapon; physical touching; verbal command). You will NOT be expected to cite this case specifically, but we will rely on this definition to understand whether a person is "seized".

A "search" for 4th Am. purposes is:

A governmental intrusion On a legitimate expectation of privacy One that is both subjectively maintained And one that is objectively reasonable "Search" is a legal term, so be specific about what you mean! 4th Am. does not prohibit all searches Only prohibits unreasonable searches

Exceptions for warrantless searches:

A search conducted without a warrant by a neutral judge is an unreasonable search. It is presumptively unreasonable. But there's a few exceptions. Search warrant protections: Neutral and detached judicial officer determines probable cause Probable cause is found BEFORE the search Warrants detail specifically the area to be searched and LIMIT the scope of the search

Exceptions to Warntless Searches

Consent: Voluntarily acquiescing or complying with a request, by someone of sufficient mental capacity; a decision made in the absence of coercion or duress. Whether or not a party has given voluntary consent is determined by the totality of the circumstances. Frisk: Making contact with a suspect's outer clothing in order to determine, through touch, whether or not a concealed weapon is present. An officer is not allowed to perform a frisk (or "pat-down") to look for mere contraband, evidence of a crime, fruits of a crime, or instrumentalities of a crime, but only for the presence of a weapon that might put the officer or other people in the area at risk. A frisk is not a full search. If the frisk reveals the likely presence of a weapon, a more thorough search may be permissible, and anything found at that point can be used as evidence at trial. There are six major exceptions to the warrant requirement. 1. Search Incident to Lawful Arrest A search incident to lawful arrest does not require issuance of a warrant. In other words, if someone is lawfully arrested, the police may search her person and any area surrounding the person that is within reach (within his or her "wingspan"). See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). The rationale is that the search is permissible as a protective measure for police safety and to secure evidence that might be destroyed. EXAMPLE: Pursuant to an arrest warrant, John is taken into custody in his home. As the police escort John out of his house, they search the area within his wingspan. After securing John in his vehicle, the officers search the basement of the house. Any evidence gathered from the basement will be excluded because it was not within John's wingspan as he left the home. A search incident to lawful arrest also applies to the search of a vehicle, specifically when officers arrest the occupants of a vehicle. In Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009) the U.S. Supreme Court held that an officer may search a vehicle if the officer has a reasonable belief that the vehicle harbors weapons accessible to the arrestee (a continuing threat to officer safety) and/or if the officer believes the vehicle harbors evidence concerning the crime of arrest. 2. Plain View Exception No warrant is required to seize evidence in plain view if the police are legitimately in the location from which the evidence can be viewed. For example, an officer cannot illegally enter a suspect's back yard and then use the plain view exception to seize an illegally kept alligator living in the pool. But, if on the premises to serve a warrant duly issued to search for marijuana plants, the alligator, if in plain view, can rightly (though by no means easily) be seized. EXAMPLE: The police are called to Donald's house by neighbors who see him beating up his wife, Victoria. After properly entering the house (without a search warrant - see emergency exception below), police notice Donald's prized gun collection hanging on the wall. Fortunately for the officers, the guns are not loaded. Unfortunately for Donald, many of them are illegal and Donald is arrested for battery as well as for the illegal guns, which are seized. 3. Consent If consent is given by a person reasonably believed by an officer to have authority to give such consent, no warrant is required for a search or seizure. So, if a suspect's "significant other" provides police with a key to the suspect's apartment, and police reasonably believe that she lives there, the search will not violate suspect's Fourth Amendment rights even if she did not live there and even if she, in fact, lacked authority to consent. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990). Officer Warren knocks on a murder suspect's door. The door is answered by the suspect's 6-year-old child, Timmy. The officer asks Timmy, "Is it okay if I come in and talk to your Dad? He's expecting me." And then walks into the apartment. He then sees the suspect, Roland, sitting on the sofa oiling his illegal Tommy-gun, the suspected murder weapon. He arrests Roland for possession of the gun and seizes the evidence. Because Timmy, being a small child, was not legally able or authorized to give consent, the entry was illegal and the evidence will be excluded. 4. Stop & Frisk Police may stop a suspect so long as there is a reasonable suspicion of a criminal act and the officer can articulate facts leading to that suspicion. The evidence necessary for "reasonable suspicion" here is something beyond mere suspicion, but is less than the level required for probable cause. If there is reason to believe that the person may be armed and dangerous, the police can also frisk the suspect. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). EXAMPLE: Officer P. Harker's peers often joke that he has something akin to a "spidey-sense" which tells him when folks are up to no good. While enjoying a cup of coffee at his favorite donut shop, Officer Harker's neck hairs stand up straight. He immediately goes outside where he sees Ivan walking down the street, carrying a small duffel bag. He orders Ivan to stop and drop the bag. When the bag falls, Officer Harker hears the clanging of metal against metal. He then frisks Ivan and discovers a hidden pistol in Ivan's pocket. He then searches the duffel bag and discovers ammunition and several illegal hunting knives. Despite the fact that Officer Harker's "spidey-sense" proved accurate once again, the evidence will be excluded as he cannot articulate any reason why he stopped Ivan, other than his unusually active neck hairs. 5. Automobile Exception Because vehicles are obviously highly mobile, a warrant is not required to search vehicles if police have probable cause to believe the vehicle contains evidence of a crime, the instrumentalities of crime, contraband, or the fruits of a crime. Although commonly referred to as the "automobile exception," this rule applies to any vehicle, including boats. While in some ways, it is quite a broad exception, this rule limits the ability to search those areas that might contain evidence of the type suspected to be present. In other words, if police suspect that the occupant of a boat is smuggling people across the border, searching a small tackle box on board would not be permissible. However, if they were looking for drugs, they could search the tackle box. The rationale is that, if an officer has to take the time to obtain a warrant, the vehicle might be out of reach before the warrant can be issued and executed. See Carroll v. United States, 267 US. 132 (1925). EXAMPLE: Officer Demidum has reason to believe that an abandoned car on the corner contains illegal drugs in the trunk. The car is missing all four wheels and is up on cinder blocks, and the engine was stolen long ago. Assuming that the automobile exception applies, Officer Demidum uses a crowbar to force open the still-working lock on the trunk. There, he finds 10 kilos of cocaine. Rushing back to the station house to show off the evidence to his Captain, Officer Demidum runs into Judge Sosad. Judge Sosad says "You should have called me first. While it's great to get the drugs off the street, unfortunately we can't use this as evidence against anyone. The search was illegal, as the automobile exception to the warrant requirement only applies when the vehicle is actually capable of being moved. That's the whole point of the exception!" A dejected Demidum continues on to the station, where he has to tolerate cars drawn in shaving cream on his locker for the next month. 6. Emergencies/Hot Pursuit The rationale here is similar to the automobile exception. Evidence that can be easily moved, destroyed or otherwise made to disappear before a warrant can be issued may be seized without a warrant. Furthermore, if a suspect enters private property while being pursued by officers, no warrant is required to enter that property in order to continue pursuit, even if the suspect is in no way connected with the property owner. In Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452 (2011), the U.S. Supreme Court clarified exactly how far the exigent/emergency exception applies. In King, Kentucky police attempted to purchase illegal drugs from a suspect. After the transaction, the suspect proceeded toward a nearby apartment complex. An officer radioed that he saw the suspect go into the apartment on the right. When officers entered the apartment building, they smelled marijuana emanating from the apartment on the left, therefore, they knocked, extremely hard ("as loud as they could"), on the door and announced their presence. After the officers heard shuffling and a toilet flush, noises considered to be "consistent with the destruction of evidence," the officers kicked in the door and found a gentleman (not the original suspect) on a sofa smoking marijuana and cocaine. Upon further search of the apartment law enforcement located more illegal drugs and paraphernalia. At trial, King filed a motion to suppress, but was denied at both the state circuit court and court of appeals levels. On review, the Kentucky Supreme Court reversed and held the search violated the Fourth Amendment. The case then proceeded via writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. The United States Supreme Court, reversing the Kentucky Supreme Court, held that no warrant was required because the officers faced exigent circumstances, an emergency situation, where it was reasonable to conclude that evidence was being destroyed. EXAMPLE: While running from police, Fred enters Joe's garage and the police follow Fred in. (They are not required to give up pursuit until such time as they can obtain a search warrant for the premises.) While in Joe's garage, police notice illegal drugs in plain view. They can arrest Fred for his crimes, and they can also seize the drugs and arrest Joe for possession of the drugs, even though Joe had nothing to do with Fred and the police were in Joe's garage only because of the hot pursuit of Fred! Unless the fact-pattern fits one of the six exceptions discussed above, a warrant is required for police to conduct a search or seizure. Note that for Exception 1, search incident to a lawful arrest, and Exception 5, the automobile exception, although no warrant is required, there is a probable cause requirement. For a search incident to a lawful arrest, the officer must have had probable cause for the original arrest. If the original arrest was unreasonable or unlawful, the evidence discovered from the search will be excluded as fruit of the poisonous tree (see the subchapter on the Exclusionary Rule). For the Automobile Exception, the officer must have probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains evidence of a crime, instrumentalities of a crime, contraband, or fruits of a crime, whether the vehicle is moving or already stopped. Exception 4 ("stop and frisk") does not require probable cause, but does require "reasonable suspicion." Only Exception 3 (consent) requires no grounds on the part of the police for making the search.

Seizure

Search and Seizure is a procedure used in many civil law and common law legal systems by which police or other authorities and their agents, who, suspecting that a crime has been committed, commence a search of a person's property and confiscate any relevant evidence found in connection to the crime.

United States v. Robinson (1973):

Warrantless search incident to lawful arrest is per se reasonable in ALL cases; DOES NOT have to be justified on a case by case basis Arrest already diminished privacy Brief Fact Summary. The defendant, Robinson (the "defendant"�), was pulled over for driving with a revoked license. He was then arrested and the police officer proceeded to do a thorough search of the defendant's person whereby the officer found a closed cigarette pack which contained heroin. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Incident to a lawful arrest, even for a driving violation, a thorough search (frisk) of an arrestee's person for weapons and also to prevent the concealment or destruction of incriminating evidence is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution ("Constitution"�). Facts. The defendant was pulled over by the police because he was driving with a revoked license. Thereafter, the officer searched the defendant and felt an object under the defendant's coat. The officer proceeded to remove a closed cigarette pack from the defendant's coat which contained heroin. Issue. May a police officer conduct a thorough search of a person beyond frisking for weapons when the arrestee has committed only a traffic offense? Held. Yes. A search of an arrestee's person beyond frisking for weapons is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution, even where there is no reason to believe the arrestee committed any crime other than the traffic violation. Dissent. Where there is no evidence that an arrestee committed any other crimes besides a traffic violation, the police may not conduct a search beyond frisking for weapons. Any additional search is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution. Discussion. Once a person has been lawfully arrested, the police may conduct a search of the arrestee beyond frisking for weapons, in order to preserve any incriminating evidence.

Kentucky v King (2011)

"The exigent circumstances rule applies when the police do not create the exigency by engaging or threatening to engage in conduct that violates the Fourth Amendment." Police officers in Lexington, Ky., entered an apartment building in pursuit of a suspect who sold crack cocaine to an undercover informant. The officers lost sight of the suspect and mistakenly assumed he entered an apartment from which they could detect the odor of marijuana. After police knocked on the door and identified themselves, they heard movements, which they believed indicated evidence was about to be destroyed. Police forcibly entered the apartment and found Hollis King and others smoking marijuana. They also found cash, drugs and paraphernalia. King entered a conditional guilty plea; reserving his right to appeal denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained from what he argued was an illegal search. The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that exigent circumstances supporting the warrantless search were not of the police's making and that police did not engage in deliberate and intentional conduct to evade the warrant requirement. In January 2010, the Kentucky Supreme Court reversed the lower court order, finding that the entry was improper. The court held that the police were not in pursuit of a fleeing suspect when they entered the apartment, since there was no evidence that the original suspect even knew he was being followed by police. Question Does the exclusionary rule, which forbids the use of illegally seized evidence except in emergency situations, apply when the emergency is created by lawful police actions? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 8-1 DECISION FOR KENTUCKY MAJORITY OPINION BY SAMUEL A. ALITO, JR. John G. Roberts, Jr. Roberts Antonin Scalia Scalia Anthony M. Kennedy Kennedy Clarence Thomas Thomas Ruth Bader Ginsburg Ginsburg Stephen G. Breyer Breyer Samuel A. Alito, Jr. Alito Sonia Sotomayor Sotomayor Elena Kagan Kagan The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the lower court order in a decision by Justice Samuel Alito. "The exigent circumstances rule applies when the police do not create the exigency by engaging or threatening to engage in conduct that violates the Fourth Amendment," Alito wrote for the majority. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg dissented, contending that "the Court today arms the police with a way routinely to dishonor the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement in drug cases. "

California v Acevedo

"The police may search an automobile and the containers within it where they have probable cause to believe contraband or evidence is contained." California police officers saw Charles Acevedo enter an apartment known to contain several packages of marijuana and leave a short time later carrying a paper bag approximately the same size as one of the packages. When Acevedo put the bag in the trunk of his car and began to drive away, the officers stopped the car, searched the bag, and found marijuana. At his trial, Avecedo made a motion to suppress the marijuana as evidence, since the police had not had a search warrant. When the trial court denied his motion, Acevedo pleaded guilty and appealed the denial of the motion. The California Court of Appeal reversed the trial court, ruling that the marijuana should have been suppressed as evidence. The Supreme Court had ruled previously that officers can thoroughly search an automobile if they have probable cause to believe there is evidence somewhere in the vehicle ( U.S. v. Ross ), and also that officers need a warrant to search a closed container ( U.S. v. Chadwick ). The California Court of Appeal decided that the latter case was more relevant. Since the officers only had probable cause to believe the bag contained evidence - not the car generally - they could not open the bag without a search warrant. The California Supreme Court denied review, but the Supreme Court granted the State's petition. Question Under the Fourth Amendment, may police conduct a warrantless search of a container within an automobile if they have probable cause to believe that the container holds evidence? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 6-3 DECISION FOR CALIFORNIA MAJORITY OPINION BY HARRY A. BLACKMUN Thurgood Marshall Marshall Byron R. White White Harry A. Blackmun Blackmun William H. Rehnquist Rehnquist John Paul Stevens Stevens Sandra Day O'Connor O'Connor Antonin Scalia Scalia Anthony M. Kennedy Kennedy David H. Souter Souter Yes. In a 6-3 decision authored by Justice Harry Blackmun, the Court reversed the Court of Appeal and ruled that the "automobile exception" to the Fourth Amendment's general search-warrant requirement is broad enough to cover a situation where the police only have probable cause to believe there is evidence in a specific movable container within the car. The Court noted that the warrant requirement previously had depended on a "curious line between the search of an automobile that coincidentally turns up a container and the search of a container that coincidentally turns up in an automobile." In place of that uncertain distinction, the Court adopted a single rule: "The police may search an automobile and the containers within it where they have probable cause to believe contraband or evidence is contained." Justices White, Stevens, and Marshall dissented.

Florida v JL (2000):

: An anonymous tip that a person may be carrying a gun does not justify a stop and frisk under the Fourth Amendment unless there is additional corroboration to ensure that the tip has "sufficient reliability" to create reasonable suspicion justifying a stop. On October 13, 1995 Miami-Dade police received an anonymous tip that a black male wearing a plaid shirt was standing near a bus stop carrying a gun. The two officers who responded found three black males, one of which, J.L., a 15 -year-old, was wearing a plaid shirt. After frisking him, the officers did find a firearm. J.L. was charged with carrying a concealed weapon without a license. At trial, he moved to suppress the gun as evidence, arguing that the frisking performed by the officers was illegal under the Fourth Amendment. The trial court granted the motion, but was reversed by the immediate appellate court. The Florida Supreme Court overruled the appellate court and suppressed the evidence. Question Did searching J.L. solely on the basis of the anonymous tip received by the Miami-Dade police violate his Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable search and seizure? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology UNANIMOUS DECISION MAJORITY OPINION BY RUTH BADER GINSBURG William H. Rehnquist Rehnquist John Paul Stevens Stevens Sandra Day O'Connor O'Connor Antonin Scalia Scalia Anthony M. Kennedy Kennedy David H. Souter Souter Clarence Thomas Thomas Ruth Bader Ginsburg Ginsburg Stephen G. Breyer Breyer Yes. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court concluded that J.L. the anonymous tip did not meet the minimum requirements to perform a warrantless search. Justice Ginsburg, drawing from the Court's logic in Terry v. Ohio and Adams v. Williams, indicated that an anonymous tip must posses a moderate level of reliability, including "predictive information" that offers police a "means to test the informant's knowledge or credibility." An accurate description of a person without a reliable assertion of illegality or description of the crime in question, as was the anonymous tip in this case, does not meet this standard. "All the police had to go on in this case was the bare report of an unknown, unaccountable informant who neither explained how he knew about the gun nor supplied any basis for believe he had inside information."

Whren v. United States (1996):

Absence of extraordinary circumstances, when probable cause of illegal conduct exists, an officer's true motive for searching or detaining a person does not negate the constitutionality of the search or seizure. Pretext stops Whren and Brown were driving in a 'high drug area.' Some plainclothes officers, while patrolling the neighborhood in an unmarked vehicle, noticed Whren and Brown sitting in a truck at an intersection stop-sign for an usually long time. Suddenly, without signaling, Whren turned his truck and sped away. Observing this traffic violation, the officers stopped the truck. When they approached the vehicle, the officers saw Whren holding plastic bags of crack cocaine. Whren and Brown were arrested on federal drug charges. Before trial, they moved to suppress the evidence contending that the officers used the traffic violation as a pretext for stopping the truck because they lacked either reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop them on suspicion of drug dealing. The District Court denied the motion to suppress and convicted the petitioners. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. Question Did the officers conduct an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment? Conclusion No. The unanimous Court held that as long as officers have a reasonable cause to believe that a traffic violation occurred, they may stop any vehicle. In the present case, the officers had reasonable cause to stop the petitioners for a traffic violation since they sped away from a stop sign at an 'unreasonable speed' and without using their turn signal. Thus, since an actual traffic violation occurred, the ensuing search and seizure of the offending vehicle was reasonable, regardless of what other personal motivations the officers might have had for stopping the vehicle. Furthermore, the Court rejected the claim that the anxiety, confusion, and haste which the petitioners experienced from the stop-and-search outweighed the government's interest in traffic safety. While the Fourth Amendment does require a balancing test between a search-and-seizure's benefits and the harm it might cause to the individual, such a test only applies to unusually harmful searches and seizures. There was nothing unusually harmful about this traffic stop.

Katz v. U.S.

Acting on a suspicion that Katz was transmitting gambling information over the phone to clients in other states, Federal agents attached an eavesdropping device to the outside of a public phone booth used by Katz. Based on recordings of his end of the conversations, Katz was convicted under an eight-count indictment for the illegal transmission of wagering information from Los Angeles to Boston and Miami. On appeal, Katz challenged his conviction arguing that the recordings could not be used as evidence against him. The Court of Appeals rejected this point, noting the absence of a physical intrusion into the phone booth itself. The Court granted certiorari. Question Does the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures require the police to obtain a search warrant in order to wiretap a public pay phone? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 7-1 DECISION FOR KATZ MAJORITY OPINION BY POTTER STEWART John M. Harlan II Harlan Hugo L. Black Black William O. Douglas Douglas Potter Stewart Stewart Thurgood Marshall Marshall William J. Brennan, Jr. Brennan Byron R. White White Earl Warren Warren Abe Fortas Fortas Yes. The Court ruled that Katz was entitled to Fourth Amendment protection for his conversations and that a physical intrusion into the area he occupied was unnecessary to bring the Amendment into play. "The Fourth Amendment protects people, not places," wrote Justice Potter Stewart for the Court. A concurring opinion by John Marshall Harlan introduced the idea of a 'reasonable' expectation of Fourth Amendment protection.

Mapp v. Ohio (1961) overuled.. wolf

Evidence seized in violation of the 4th Amendment must be excluded. The purpose of exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct Dollree Mapp was convicted of possessing obscene materials after an admittedly illegal police search of her home for a fugitive. She appealed her conviction on the basis of freedom of expression. Question Were the confiscated materials protected by the First Amendment? (May evidence obtained through a search in violation of the Fourth Amendment be admitted in a state criminal proceeding?) Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology The Court brushed aside the First Amendment issue and declared that "all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by [the Fourth Amendment], inadmissible in a state court." Mapp had been convicted on the basis of illegally obtained evidence. This was an historic -- and controversial -- decision. It placed the requirement of excluding illegally obtained evidence from court at all levels of the government. The decision launched the Court on a troubled course of determining how and when to apply the exclusionary rule.

Wolf v. Colorado (1949)

Julius A. Wolf, Charles H. Fulton, and Betty Fulton were charged with conspiracy to perform an abortion. At trial, Wolf objected to evidence material and admissible as to his co-defendants would be inadmissible if he were tried separately. The Colorado Supreme Court upheld all three convictions in which evidence was admitted that would have been inadmissible in a prosecution for violation of a federal law in a federal court. Question Were the states required to exclude illegally seized evidence from trial under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 6-3 DECISION FOR COLORADO MAJORITY OPINION BY FELIX FRANKFURTER The Fourteenth Amendment does not forbidthe use of illegally seized evidence in criminal trials Felix Frankfurter Frankfurter Hugo L. Black Black William O. Douglas Douglas Frank Murphy Murphy Wiley B. Rutledge Rutledge Stanley Reed Reed Fred M. Vinson, Jr. Vinson Robert H. Jackson Jackson Harold Burton Burton In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment did not subject criminal justice in the states to specific limitations and that illegally obtained evidence did not have to be excluded from trials in all cases. The Court reasoned that while the exclusion of evidence may have been an effective way to deter unreasonable searches, other methods could be equally effective and would not fall below the minimal standards assured by the Due Process Clause. Civil remedies, such as "the internal discipline of the police, under the eyes of an alert public opinion," were sufficient. The petitioner, Julius Wolf (the "petitioner"�) was convicted by a State court of conspiring to commit abortions based upon evidence allegedly obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment's search and seizure clause. Synopsis of Rule of Law. The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause does not prohibit the admission of evidence obtained during an apparently illegal search and seizure in State courts. Facts. The petitioner was convicted of conspiring to commit abortions in a State court and appealed. He alleged that his Fourth Amendment constitutional right to be free from illegal searches and seizures had been violated and that any evidence obtained as a result of the illegal search and seizure should have been excluded from trial as a matter of due process. The conviction was affirmed by the Colorado Supreme Court, and certiorari was granted by the United States Supreme Court ("Supreme Court"�).

CA V Greenwood

Local police suspected Billy Greenwood was dealing drugs from his residence. Because the police did not have enough evidence for a warrant to search his home, they searched the garbage bags Greenwood had left at the curb for pickup. The police uncovered evidence of drug use, which was then used to obtain a warrant to search the house. That search turned up illegal substances, and Greenwood was arrested on felony charges. Question Did the warrantless search and seizure of Greenwood's garbage violate the Fourth Amendment's search and seizure guarantee? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 6-2 DECISION FOR CALIFORNIA MAJORITY OPINION BY BYRON R. WHITE Thurgood Marshall Marshall William J. Brennan, Jr. Brennan Byron R. White White Harry A. Blackmun Blackmun William H. Rehnquist Rehnquist John Paul Stevens Stevens Sandra Day O'Connor O'Connor Antonin Scalia Scalia Anthony M. Kennedy Kennedy Voting 6 to 2, the Court held that garbage placed at the curbside is unprotected by the Fourth Amendment. The Court argued that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy for trash on public streets "readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public." The Court also noted that the police cannot be expected to ignore criminal activity that can be observed by "any member of the public."

Brigham City v Stuart (2006)

Police may enter a building a building without a warrant when they have an objective reasonable basis to believe that in occupant is "seriously injured or threatened with injury" Responding to a complaint about a loud party, police arrived at a house where they saw minors drinking alcohol outside and heard shouting inside. As they approached the house, they saw a fight through the window involving a juvenile and four adults, one of whom was punched hard enough to make him spit blood. The officers announced their presence, but the people fighting did not hear them so they entered the home. They arrested the men for contributing to the delinquency of a minor and other related offenses. The trial court judge, however, refused to allow the evidence collected after the police entered the home because it was a warrantless search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. On appeal, the government argued that the search was covered by the "emergency aid doctrine" because the officers were responding to seeing the man be punched. The Supreme Court of Utah disagreed, however, ruling that the doctrine only applies when there is an unconscious, semiconscious, or missing person who is feared injured or dead. The Court also gave weight to the fact that the officers acted exclusively in a law enforcement capacity, not to assist the injured man. Question What objectively reasonable level of concern is necessary to trigger the emergency aid exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology UNANIMOUS DECISION FOR BRIGHAM CITY MAJORITY OPINION BY JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR. John G. Roberts, Jr. Roberts John Paul Stevens Stevens Antonin Scalia Scalia Anthony M. Kennedy Kennedy David H. Souter Souter Clarence Thomas Thomas Ruth Bader Ginsburg Ginsburg Stephen G. Breyer Breyer Samuel A. Alito, Jr. Alito In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court held that police may enter a building without a warrant when they have an objectively reasonable basis to believe that an occupant is "seriously injured or threatened with such injury." Quoting from Mincey v. Arizona, Chief Justice John Roberts wrote that "[t]he need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury is justification for what would be otherwise illegal absent an exigency or emergency."

United States v Drayton (2002) -

The Fourth Amendment does not require police officers to advise bus passengers of their right not to cooperate and to refuse consent to searches. The officer did request permission to search and gave no indication consent was required. Christopher Drayton and Clifton Brown were traveling on a Greyhound bus. In Tallahassee, Florida, police officers boarded the bus as part of a routine interdiction effort. One of the officers worked his way from back to front, speaking with individual passengers as he went. The officer did not inform the passengers of their right to refuse to cooperate. As the officer approached Drayton and Brown, he identified himself, declared that the police were looking for drugs and weapons, and asked if the two had any bags. Subsequently, the officer asked Brown whether he minded if he checked his person. Brown agreed and a pat-down revealed hard objects similar to drug packages in both thigh areas. When Drayton agreed, a pat-down revealed similar objects. Both were arrested. A further search revealed that Drayton and Brown had taped cocaine to their legs. Charged with federal drug crimes, Drayton and Brown moved to suppress the cocaine on the ground that their consent to the pat-down searches was invalid. In denying the motions, the District Court determined that the police conduct was not coercive and Drayton and Brown's consent to the search was voluntary. In reversing, the Court of Appeals noted that bus passengers do not feel free to disregard officers' requests to search absent some positive indication that consent may be refused. Question Must police officers, while searching buses at random to ask questions and to request passengers' consent to searches, advise passengers of their right not to cooperate? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 6-3 DECISION FOR UNITED STATES MAJORITY OPINION BY ANTHONY M. KENNEDY William H. Rehnquist Rehnquist John Paul Stevens Stevens Sandra Day O'Connor O'Connor Antonin Scalia Scalia Anthony M. Kennedy Kennedy David H. Souter Souter Clarence Thomas Thomas Ruth Bader Ginsburg Ginsburg Stephen G. Breyer Breyer No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment does not require police officers to advise bus passengers of their right not to cooperate and to refuse consent to searches. The Court reasoned that, although the officer did not inform the defendants of their right to refuse the search, he did request permission to search and gave no indication consent was required. Moreover, the Court noted, the totality of the circumstances indicated that the consent was voluntary. Justice David H. Souter, with whom Justices John Paul Stevens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined, dissented. "The issue we took to review is whether the police's examination of the bus passengers ... amounted to a suspicionless seizure under the Fourth Amendment. If it did, any consent to search was plainly invalid as a product of the illegal seizure," argued Justice Souter.

Exclusionary Rule

The exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedy used to deter police misconduct in obtaining evidence. Under the exclusionary rule, a judge may exclude incriminating evidence from a criminal trial if there was police misconduct in obtaining the evidence. Without the evidence, the prosecutor may lose the case or drop the charges for lack of proof. This rule provides some substantive protection against illegal search and seizure. The exclusionary rule was constitutionally required only in federal court until mapp v. ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (1961). In Mapp, the Court held that the exclusionary rule applied to state criminal proceedings through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Before the Mapp ruling, not all states excluded evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. After Mapp, a defendant's claim of unreasonable search and seizure became commonplace in criminal prosecutions.

probable cause?

The facts and circumstances are sufficient to justify a person of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed, by a specific individual Reasonable suspicion is defined by a set of factual circumstances that would lead a reasonable police officer to believe criminal activity is occurring. This is different from the probable cause (what a reasonable person would believe) required for an arrest, search, and seizure. If the stop and frisk gives rise to probable cause to believe the detainee has committed a crime, then the police officer should have the power to make a formal arrest and conduct a search of the person.

4th amendment

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. The Fourth Amendment sets rules for how the police can and can't behave when they are trying to figure out if someone has committed a crime. So the police can't go into your house just looking for signs of a crime, for example, and they can't listen to your phone calls or read your mail unless they can convince a judge that they had a really good reason to believe those things would help them solve a specific crime.

Horton v California (1990) -

The seizure of evidence in plain view does not constitute the invasion of privacy. On January 13, 1985, Erwin Paul Wallaker, the treasurer of the San Jose Coin Club, returned home with the proceeds from the annual coin convention, which Terry Brice Horton attended. Upon entering his garage, two robbers accosted Wallaker; one was armed with a machine gun and the other with an electric shocking device. They threw him to the ground, shocked him, bound him, and robbed him of jewelry and cash. During this interaction, Wallaker was able to identify Horton by the sound of his voice. The three witnesses who discovered Wallaker partially corroborated his identification of Horton. They saw someone leaving the scene carrying what looked like an umbrella. Sergeant LaRault determined there was enough evidence to search Horton's home, and obtained a warrant to do so. His affidavit for the search warrant described both the weapons and the proceeds of the robbery, but the warrant only granted permission to look for the stolen property. While searching Horton's house, Sergeant LaRault did not find the property, but he did find an Uzi machine gun, a .38 caliber revolver, two stun guns, and a handcuff key, along with other items linking Horton to the crime. The evidence was admitted into evidence at trial, and Horton was found guilty. The California Court of Appeals affirmed the verdict, and the California Supreme Court denied the petitioner's request for review. Question Does the Fourth Amendment prohibit the warrantless seizure of evidence in plain sight if the discovery of such evidence was not inadvertent? Conclusion No. Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for a 7-2 majority, held that the seizure of evidence in plain view does not constitute the invasion of privacy that the Fourth Amendment is meant to prohibit. Once an officer has a warrant to search a suspect's house, that officer may seize any obviously incriminating evidence that the officer finds in plain view. The Court also held that the "inadvertent" limitation does not limit the scope of the search further than the warrant itself does. In this case, since the warrant was specifically for the stolen property, the officer had to limit his search to the likely places where the property might be kept. Since the officer also had probable cause to believe that certain types of weapons were used in the commission of the crime, he could legally seize the weapons if they were found in the course of that search. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the Fourth Amendment requires police officers to obtain specific warrants from impartial judges and to limit their searches to the items described. He defines the "inadvertent" limitation much more narrowly. It applies only when the officer is legally in a location and did not anticipate the discovery of such evidence. Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent.

Terry v. Ohio:

When an officer observes unusual conduct that reasonably leads him to assume that criminal activity is afoot and that the people he is interacting with are armed, the police officer may conduct a limited search for weapons. Terry stop and frisk: Level of evidence needed: reasonable suspicion Terry and two other men were observed by a plain clothes policeman in what the officer believed to be "casing a job, a stick-up." The officer stopped and frisked the three men, and found weapons on two of them. Terry was convicted of carrying a concealed weapon and sentenced to three years in jail. Question Was the search and seizure of Terry and the other men in violation of the Fourth Amendment? Conclusion Sort: by seniority by ideology 8-1 DECISION MAJORITY OPINION BY EARL WARREN Earl Warren Warren Hugo L. Black Black William O. Douglas Douglas John M. Harlan II Harlan William J. Brennan, Jr. Brennan Potter Stewart Stewart Byron R. White White Abe Fortas Fortas Thurgood Marshall Marshall In an 8-to-1 decision, the Court held that the search undertaken by the officer was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and that the weapons seized could be introduced into evidence against Terry. Attempting to focus narrowly on the facts of this particular case, the Court found that the officer acted on more than a "hunch" and that "a reasonably prudent man would have been warranted in believing [Terry] was armed and thus presented a threat to the officer's safety while he was investigating his suspicious behavior." The Court found that the searches undertaken were limited in scope and designed to protect the officer's safety incident to the investigation.

Rules for Seizure

f police don't have a search warrant, the search is presumptively unconstitutional; the same rule DOES NOT apply with respect to lawful arrest. Warrantless arrests are permissible - because it would be impractical to get a warrant before arresting somebody. However, such arrest must be lawful - based on probable cause