AOWS Total War

Craig, Gordon - The Political Leader as Strategist

Key Idea: Hitler, Churchill, and FDR offer a wide variety of political leaders who served as head of state and supreme commanders of their militaries... each used their experiences to shape their conduct and each demonstrated the desire to take a lot of responsibility on their own shoulders... each also subjugated military action to policy objectives and strategy... didn't work for all of them... so subjugation to strategy appears as a pretext and requirement of success rather than a guarantee Hitler -Uncontested leader of the party, the Reich and supreme commander of Supreme Wehrmacht Command (OKW) -Resented any form of counsel or criticism -Advanced form of megalomania -Wanted to make Germany the dominant world power... first Europe... then on from there -Did show political aptitude in disgusting his true intentions until time to go -Britain foiled much of his plan by refusing to "agree to a reasonable peace"... never let hm focus on the Russians the way he wanted to... felt he had to move first against Russia (Summer 1941) -Left his staff often bewildered by the rapids succession of ideas and focus areas.... as well as lack of prioritization.. even placed the extermination of the Jews ahead of destroying enem's will to fight -Always chasing squirrels...subject to his own emotions rather than strategy and emotion... for example, total commitment to destroying Stalingrad because of name rathe than strategic importance -By the end, concerned regularl in operations and tactical details, relegating his generals to "overpaid NCOS" Churchill -Deeply influenced by his war experience and the nation's losses in WWI -Served with Hussars in 1895, politics, First Lord of the admiralty, -Centralized everything under him as PM and supreme commander -formed a combined HQ for the fusion of joint planning and staff functions -Combative personality and powerful imagination -Recogized that the material and financial support of the US was critical and that the only chance at winning was success in Europe -He was able to delay the cross-channel crossing to 1943... offered North Africa as suitable alternative and BATNA... also saw the need to further exhaust the Germans and establish a foothold in Italy to fix the Germans before the crossing -saw the rise of Soviets and set to build defined spheres of influence well before the end of the war FDR -Handled the outbreak fo war and the overall strategic direction of the US with mastery -Had served as assistant secretary of the Navy -Intended to keep military power of the US under his control and subservient to Policy -Preferred to keep his options open and keep his ultimate decisions in his own hands -Understood even before the outbreak of war that the US would have to back UK... in ay 1940, he committed the US to all-out support of the Brits and the allies WRIT LARGE -Lend-Lease legislation - provided material and equipment support to allies for the war -Had Gen King go on offensive in Pacific as opportunities presented themselves -Retained ability to gauge pubic opinion -Proposed legistialtin dealing with civilian manpower -Chose Eisenhower for Overlord because Marshal was too important as the Chief of the Army for his ability to maneuver in Washington and strategic vision -He put first-things-first -maintained the long view... German defeat would still be followed by more fighting -Saw the strategic need for the US to shape a new world order and set conditions for a lasting peace

Gole - 90th Division Goes to School - General William E DePuy

Key Idea: 90th Division was a division on the brink of absolution to outfit others because leadership within the unit was so bad. Poor planning. Inexperienced people. Low Morale. Learned and implement,ended change as needed -Antitank guns concealed on Ave of approach -Communications security -Effective use of maps -Effective employment of IDF and MGs Effective MTC skills -Emphasized thinking and adherence to SOPS -Published training memos -Fired ineffective commanders -Admired Afragstactic -Selected new leaders based off asking "who can get this job done" Climate turned from fatalism to optimism - -Normandy was a disaster for th division... as it was or so many In many ways, the transformation of the 90th was a common story of learning much from he trial by fire

Bell to Bisbee letter (1900)

Key Idea: Do what you have to do to get the job done but don't be an idiot and if I hear about it, I will be obligated to take action on things that exceed Order 100 and Martial Law... mission command; use good judgment

Kuehn - Coral Sea and Midway

Key Idea: The ability of the American Navy to respond quickly from Pearl Harbor and rapidly assimilate lessons on the fly regarding the growing importance of Naval Aviation deployed from carriers and advanced bases allowed the Navy to achieve operational and strategic success early in the conflict at both Coral Sea and Midway that not only stopped Japanese expansion, but dealt the Japanese Navy and Naval Aviation a serious blow in capabilities and Human Resources that it would never recover from. Chance played a large part in it all. Japanese spread the power of their Navy across the Pacific to accomplish three objectives -MI - destroy American Navy -MO - Port Mosbey in New Guinnea (isolation o Australia) -AL - Alutian Island Chains (ended up being a wasteful dissipation of IJN Naval Power) -Pearl Harbor was painful but not crippling, since the three carriers were out to sea and they didn't cripple key logistics capabilities CORAl SEA -Intercepts indicated that the IJN was continuing to move to isolate AUstralia in winter 1942 -ADM Fletcher positioned himself in Coral Sea to interdict the Port Mosbey invasion force -First battle where Fleets fought without ever seeing one another due to Naval aviation launched from carriers -The battle of Coral Sea resulted in good lessons learned for the Americans in terms of how to sequence and mass their naval aviation -Tactically, each side lost a carroer.... the Shoho or the IJN and the Lexington for the US -Operationally and strategically, the battle marked the high weather mark for the IJN and they withdrew with plans to return another time -IJN thought they sunk numerous American carriers... an assumption that would drive them toward pursuing a decisive battle at Midway -USA also learned the importance of fire and damage control in ship design MIDWAY -IJN saw Midway of strategic importance due to its airfield and the ability to control the seas... also saw it as the key to drawing out the Pacific Fleet for destruction in a decisive battle like Tsushima Straight -IJN divided its force into numerous TFs that ended up lacking in ability to provide mutual support >Mobile carrier strike group >Submarine screening force >Main force of battleships >Midway invasion force >Cruiser covering force >Mainbod of cruisers -US Navy operating off intercepts understood objective of IJN -Fed into IJP expectations through radio transmissions in the clear that convinced the IJN that a massive fleet was inbound to fix a water purification system -IJN closed on Midway... 3 June: bombers dispatched to attack invasion fleet... served enough of a distraction to prevent IJN from detecting or preparing for USN carrier TFs 4 June: IJN launched its carrier aircraft to attack Midway... defenders were prepared and destroyed many AC... more importantly, a decisive counter attack was launched by the Carrier TFs under Spruance and Fletcher... caught IJN unprepared as they did not have ability to recover A/C and could not generate effective CAPs to protect the IJN 5 June: IJN began its withdrawal A JPN Zero was recovered and became the model used to design the Hellcat

Barnett - The Swardbearers

Key Idea: Petain took command of the French Army in the summer of 1917 and saved it and the French people from total dissolution in the wake of Nieville and 3 years of bloodletting that had most recently hit a tipping point at Verdun... his biggest contributions... he was the right man at the right place at the right time to clean a substantial military reform from military obtuseness since the defeat by the Prussians in 1871...: -Built TRUST amongst the troops -Finally got the French out of the mindset of seaking a Napoleonic success -Lead by force of personality and example... led by wandering around -Improved morale of force through leavereform, aiding in comfort and hygiene of troops away from the front line -Put down the mutiny that almost cost them the entire wire -Brought alcohol amongst the force under control.. found it to be a barrier to reality and control -Retrain the whole force (brough criticism from politicians... said he needed to do more digging and less training) -Refit... new armament with heavy guns and air craft -Focus on limited offensive objectives and the defense until the Americans showed up in once to rebalance the powers -Reorganization of the military with a greater focus on detailed planning and staf work -Encouraged comradeship, open mental climate -Got them away from the stubborn honor and aire of superiority that had shaped so many decisions in the first three years -Saw the collapse of Russia and the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with the Russians as an existential problem that would free-up 100 extra German divisions to launch a fresh offensive in the spring o 1918 that the triple entente needed to prepare for -Eventually began to take heat from Clemenceau and Foch for not being offensively-minded -French and German militaries almost total opposite in their development from the end of the Franco-Prussian War -The second consent of France in 1917 to continue the war in the face of bad "peace offers from Germany"

Zumbro - Retreat to the Reich - Battle for the Ruhr

Key Idea: Summer and Fall 1944 were disasters and tumultuous for the Germans marred by a constant collapse until Hitler demanded a massive counteroffensive that was doomed to fail... and it did. Morale was crushed and Christmas brought the last gasp. Model assigned by Hitler with the huge task of halting the massive allied advance amidst a collapsing Wehrmacht (Kluge even committed suicide). COntinued giving Broun in July and August Runsted eventually placed in charge of West, leaving Model to COmmand Army Group B 11 September, 20 days after liberating Paris, Allief forces on the German border IVO Aachen Continual withdrawal and wear on the Wehrmacht destroyed morale within the army Front slightly stabilized by the time fighting hit the Hurgen FOrest Model had concerned with Hitler's call for an offensive 16 December the battle of the bulge began, striking VII COrps by surprise Once Americans realized it was a full-out offensive, they responded decisively On 22-23 December skies cleared and allied air showed up By Christmas the offensive had failed

Mansoor - The GI Offensive in Europe

Key Idea: The success of the US in 1944 in the ETO was in no small measure a result of the ability of the US to generate credible (if not tested) combat divisions through its training program. In the line, lessons learned weren't shared equally across the force, but Divisions largely owned the responsibility of training and preparing combat replacements for integration along with troop retrained in new techniques. This all helped feed effective small-unit leaders and the leveraging of combined arms to play an instrument a role in the success of the battles and operations in the ETO. Also much advatage lay in tactics, fire power and mobility and air. -Air -Fires Log -Intel -Training (MTP) Cohesion -personnel management Broad front to eep Germans bus in an unsustainable fashion -Ability to refer Nate combat power USA willing to run into Breach on continent; Brits much more reluctant following losses of WWI OP FORTITUDE - MILDEC shaping for OP OVERLORD/NEPTUNE Poor prep fires as Normandy due to poor weather and good defenses... didn't help that many lessons from Pacific went unlearned OP NEPTUNE for landing was a very detailed and inflexible plan... couldn't predict realities of difficulties with bottlenecks at beach exits... relied very much on PLT and Co leadership to carry the day Omaha Beach highly contested; Utah Beach very lightly defended.. follow on- expand beach head, log shaping, break-out AI and effective control of key nodes prevented effective displacement of German least-engaged his or op/strat reserve Hedgerows in Normandy demanded small0unit fighting and innovation again, given limed space and ability to mass effects from large formations Cotentin Peninsula - had Cherbourg at west side... defeated by first cutting across peninsula to isolate then reducing Cherbourg Lessons learned in Africa were very important to fighting inFrance German defenses in Hedgerows allowed them to fight their system of elastic defense in depth that had evolved little from WWI while leveling the playing field in light of US advantages in Logistics and aviation ... Germans also supplanted manpower shortages with automatic weapons... both MG-24 an MP-40 submachine gun No formalized lessons learned system across allies USA personnel policy and system allowed for generation and replenishment of manpower and human capital that the Germans could not replicate OP COBRA - Break-out Bagration and COBRA presented a terrible situation for Germans with simultaneous disasters on each end of the empire Cobra penetration on 5 mile front with infantry leading way for Armor exploitation force... same as Russians... opposite of German Blitz Tactical communications shortfalls led to coordination issues between various arms Ultra provided great intelligence and information regarding Germain C/D/S and plannned actions -50K German soldiers escaped the Falaise Gap US divisions built for fires and mobility... comes at a cost though and a bigger tail Much transport conducted by organic transport of units operating in relays Log was limiting actor in pursuit Log planning based off of phaselines and projected movement speed ashore, but advance was uneven as the need to repair rails and lay pipes could not keep up. Additionally, liberation of Paris cam with it the requirement to provide a lot of humanitarian supplies that cut into lit capacity Red ball express... 118 MT companies running 24 hours a day.. each branch supported an Army... continuous ops drove up accidents from fatique and resulted i high maintenance readiness issues due to wear and tear and ack o repair parts despite the logitics greatness.... tires ARTY AMMO = LARGEST SHORTFALL QM distributed to REGTS and SVC platoon ran division distribution point Op Pause by September OP Market Garden to capture key crossing sites across Rhine Failed for two reasons: 1. German escape from Falaise 2.failure to capture Antwerp Port ahead of Market Garde. Siegfried Line Hurtgen Forest - very costly blunder over indecisive terrain... decision to fight in forest deprived us of much advatage that we enjoyed throughout ETO.. air, Arty, armor et... also poor planning and unrealistic expectations Real failure was operational planning and maneuver... 33K needless casualties WWI signaled shift to individual replacements as opposed to whole-sale unit trades... hampered trust and human capital development until they were tested Biggest issues getting divisions to fight: 1. Port discharge capacities 2. Lack of logistics infrastructure and network ashore Significant risk in river crossings when force is lit between two sides Patton: Moselle river crossing... greatest of all time German C2 never able to keep pace, even when in trenches

Bailey - Military History and the Pathology of Lessons Learned - RUS-JPN War

Key Ideas: Uses the RUS-JPN War complete with new technologies, the industrialization of war, and the large number of foreign observers to demonstrate that the value of military history is that it provides educated/informed judgement to make better decisions in future, novel circumstances... he suggests that had people paid attention, WWI may have been a little less novel It does this through: -Objective Data -Visionaries and imagination o project ideas into the future -Avoiding Corruption or disregard of lessons learned by those in power or due to organizational inertia -Will and resources are very important to meaningful change -Resist tmplates and dogma -Observers were plentiful.. some had accounts that contradicted others... all brought back ideas about the future of war... all were subject to the cultural and values lens from which they viewed it -Boer War had provided some clue as to the new-found lethality of war, although many in Europe thought that morale was the key to success and could overcome the brutality of war and the new weapons -Jean de Bloch - foresaw the coming of total war that wuld entail famine, bankruptsy, and social collapse as well as ground for revolution -Japanese saw the growth of Western influence in Asia and their furture role as victims -Signs shold have indicated that it would only be a matter of time until a titantic clash between the East and West -Japanes prepared well: >understood russians >prep for deep operations >undermining Russian empire >use of spies >maturing international loans >modeled off Prusso-germans >ofensive action >recognized need for short, decisive win >made offers to avoid total contempt from international community >high morale and disciplin >ENsured that national spirit was in place >Wanted Port Arthur to be their Sedan >Admiral Togo had used same naval shock tactics agains Chinese in 1894 >storm tropper tactics that would be seen in 1917 -Russians: >littl rigor >japanese as artists and geshas -1 Russian = 3 Japanese >Looked t 1812 for model >saw retreats to stretch en LOCs to the point of collapse, as with Napoleon as the way forward (terrible for morale) >Bayonette Big innovatons -High-veocity rifles delivering effects at 1000 yards -Need for indirect fire with greater range and arch to have effects in trenches/fortifications that grew in response to lethality of the defense -Americans and Europes still had a flawed understanding of the ramifacitons of innovation in arty... to include size and lgistics strain Inantry and arty developments led to closer combat as trenches and fortifications sprouted... the SPADE replaced the SHIELD -War was no longer a struggle between armies... but between nations and races Lessons identified but not learned -Deense would dominate offense -Frontal assaults would lead to serious loss -All-arms planning -Armies discarded many of the lessons by glossing over failure and desire not to be too radical -Engineers preparing the war\y Other lessons -Wrong assumption that future war would be short -Some tired to apply new technologies as a way to return to the old way -Cost of change was difficult... particularly in democracies who had to justiy expensive orrganizaitonal and equipant changes -Some observers even re-wrote their accounts after WWI -Japan's victory was more a signal f what was to come than the end of an era -Emotion corrupts thought... US viewed positives of Japanese growth... until they became a threat... then looke ddown on their capabilities -

Linn- US Army and nation building / pacification in the Philippines

Key idea: -The Philippines is a great study of nation building and COIN even today... although it was more of a colonial venture not nation building at its heart... beware of academic orthodoxy which claims that it was an exercise in racism, cruelty, and perhaps even genocide 5 Key Lessons: -Insurgents are not invulnerable -in wars for control of the people, local commanders are critical -must maintain control of punitive or retaliatory policies without imposing unrealistic constraints or barriers to the use of force to achieve needed objectives -use of local auxiliaries - crucial during the occupation and beyond -If you want to be good at small wars stuff then you have to study it -Be careful of applying past lessons in the terminology of today -PI ops can tell us useful methods, techniques, and approaches used -Terms used today can lead to confusion and ambiguity; terms of the past, such as pacification, punitive expeditions, and imperial policing are far more accurate even if offensive -POTUS McKinley had no intend of turning PI into a separate nation... reduce Spanish power; benefit to US in its possession... was not seen as territory; rather, it was essentially a colony to him... "benevolent assimilation" -tons of civic projects sprung-up everywhere the US placed garrisons- schools, roads, markets, suppressing slavery and violence -Most Americans saw themselves as superior and views the Filipinos in much the same way as the American Indians... -Uplifting and protecting the civilian population were central to the Army's mission in the Philippines... military governance wherever they spread -Emilio Aguinaldo's government was not recognized by US... contributed to outbreak of fighting 4 feb 1899 -Insurgent Challenge >retaliation against collaborators—exert control over the population through terror and reprisal >shadow governments... that paralleled USA government and in some cases used people serving in both... inhibited through lack of central control, communication, or capacity to exert enough control over local shadows... also, insurgents tried to de-populate areas, which failed because people discovered they couldn't survive i the country... also only took one informant to spoil it all Military pacification benefitted from central control... two objectives... remove PI military; establish military governance Local commanders mattered... made of character, initiative, and humanity... working in isolated garrisons had to be self-supporting, build intelligence, foot-out shadow governments, and work with local populace... they also demonstrated great capacity to balance military and civil affairs as administrators Garrisons in 600 towns with 12-16 month rotations and close tied to local town Army CG: Gov of PI; COLs = provincial governors; CAPT/LT = mayors etc Attacked and destroyed guerrilla and their support bases when necessary... did lead to quite a bit of burning of crops and collective punishment Joint operations between Army and Navy were effective... Naval blockade stopped Tigre-island trade... amphibious operations where necessary Demonstrated the ability to adjust tactics suited for battlefield to jungle operations thanks to small-unit leadership and cohesion Intelligence was critical, but was strongest on local and provincial levels until later in the involvement Logistics was primitive but still capable of sustaining forces afield unlike the opposition Philippine auxiliaries were also crucial... support logistics... security... and even local military and paramilitary forces

Frieser - Panzer Group Kleist and the Breakthrough France 1940

Key idea: Operation SICKLE CUT represented an operational encirclement that demonstrated the first employment of armor on the operational level that hadn't been rehearsed and wasn't prepared to achieve full success as a result of unanticipated movement control issues, the inability to maintain long range communications, and the out-pacing of logistics enablers... although it reached its operational objective of reaching the channel, it signaled the coming s construction of operations freedom as Hitler began to meddle in military affairs and deprived them of the freedom of action that may well have been a necessary precursor and only shot at winning a decisive victory and defeat of forces on the western front • • Key People -Manstein - Planned Operation SICKLE CUT and Blitzkrieg -Guderian - Panzer Corps commander -Army group B (north) -Army GrouP A (south) Operation SICKLE CUT - German Blitzkrieg shot at cutting through allies to the channel with Panzer Corps B followed by an encirclement against Panzer Group B to the north, thus ensnaring much of the allied combat power available in northern France an dBelgium • This was the first OP-level employment of armor... never rehearsed due to OPSEC concerns • Initial gains were strong, but the Blitzkrieg rapidly out-ran its own supply trains despite having stepped off fully loaded for self-sustained operations • French operational reserve was largely ineffective because they were either smashed in place while consolidating or never had a chance to form ○ 5th Motorized Army destroyed in minutes while parked along a road ○ Lacked the ability to concentrate and mass tanks on the operational level to meet the Blitz • Rommel and his 7th Panzer Division displayed Aufstratctic by continuing to push with violence and aggression toward the operational objective despite losing communications with his higher headquarters • The Germans again recognized the need for a quick decisive blow as they did in WWI but stil failed to achieve that... General Erik Von Manstien was the author of the plan • Traffic and movement control in the Ardennes seriously detracted from the effectiveness fo blitzkrieg and its supporting elements as they attempted to deploy a force of 41K vehicles that stretched for 1000 miles through 4 movement routes... resulted in a traffic jam 170 miles long • Germans used CAS from Luftwaffe to compensate for inability to deliver adequate IDF capabilities into the fight in a fast enough manner ○ Did however employ ~300 ADA assets to support river crossing site • Hitler became a victim of the "catastrophic success" and began exerting more and more influence on operational and tactical level decisions, thus undercutting austratactic and denying his commanders freedom of action in execution

Lewis, Adrian - The American Culture of War - Legacy of WWII... Man vs. Machine

Key idea: WWII reinforced the cultural norms of the American way of war and created new cultures in each of the revives based on new technologies... a number of doctrines were created that would support other decisive factors Allocation of the nation's human capital shows its preferred way of war and value of human life... investment in technology... huge levels of support personnel... fight in wars of abundance with the "Arsenal old Democracy"... wasting huge wars over long supply chains.. every man is created equal and man is not a means to an end... therefore, we culturally will do all we can to avoid the loss of life -Army way of War >Battles win wars >Man is key -Infantry and the rifle in close combat... all other arms support it -Manhood and honorable behavior -Quality of people above quality of weapons -High value of lift leads to investment in tech no preserve life and we will spend vast $ to keep men alive -aced better trained and experienced Germans... complicated with individual augmentation rather than unit rotation -Grew rom 187k to 81mil -Arty into three groups: pre-planned, on-call, counterbattery >relied heavily on AirPower to provide decisive advatage -Glamour weapon was the tank Air power -Strategic bombing: >human capital >industrial capacity >extermination warfare -Churchill saw it as his only possible path to victory.. others could lose it but were not decisive... RAF was also a product of a culture that never had a large land army -Strategic bombing had an effect on the people, but not enough to get a country to collapse... was difficult to convince Germans to quit when it was other people murdering them -USAAF deviated from Brit's views on bombing through the pursuit of precision bombing of industry rather than civilian centers... also avoids the ire of the international community and retaining the moral high ground... hid a lot of assumptions that didn't hold up in practice... ability to find the right targets, accuracy, anti-ar defense -USAAF saw CAS as a waste of time -Eventually US had no choice but to resort to bombing civilian population centers -Bomber escorts were deceive... eventually led to domination of skies and ability to strike railway system etc -Germans more resilient than anticipated thanks to unused capacity in economy and the ability to find suitable substitutes Lemay's strategic bombing aims >dominance of AirPower over ground and sea power >destroy will of Japan govt >Destroy JPN industry >Destroy the people running the industry -European bombing - industry; Japan bombing - "industrialized cities" -Atomic mob saved lives... bombing had already killed 900K Japanese and ~200 square miles of city Navy and USMC -Carrier = dominant platform -Long-range strategic bomber presented a new in Stu=intuitional challenge to Navy -Marines have always been trying to justify existence... established itself as anti-army -Amphibious doctrine = USMC strategic contribution to success -WWII, Korean War, Vietnam, OIF would have been the same without USMC -Preferred Westin way of war was not the Marine way of war... Marines have little experience in fighting western militaries... is that because we are expeditionary force in readiness... far more often committed to other operations... we aren't built to fight western militaries just as the US Army is not built for amphibious operations -COmmand of the sea is only a means to an end -MARINES FOUGHT IN BATTLES THAT THERE WAS NO WAY TO LOSE... Japanese literally had no way to survive - -Army held that Man was the dominant instrument in war... its in our cultural bias of all men created equal... employed infantry and armor doctrine -4 main doctrines created in the war: Amphibious, carrier task force, Wolfpack submarine tactics (German against merchants), and anti-submarine warfare

Holwitt - Reappraising the Interwar Navy

Key idea: contrary to traditional views, the interwar Navy possessed transformational leaders who drove much innovation through fleet exercises and an internal review process that maintained focus on competition with Japan despite a number of treaties imitations and budget constraints that limited the Navy's ability to bring additional/new surface and subsurface combatants Interwar navy was not caught preparing or the last war... it instead was in the process of converting from a battleship force to a three dimensional force that leverages surface, subsurface and aviation capabilities to win War plan orange represented 40 years of development of the plan to fight Japan... started with Thrusters who envisioned a blitz across the pacific but slowly came to the realities of the coming fight thanks to people like Ellis who helped turn it into a series of progressive moves across the pacific While war plan orange got a lot of things wrong, it did get the strategic principles right... it also provided the American naval strategists with a common template from which to map out the manner in which the pacific war would unfold "Fleet problems" massive joint exercises in the Caribbean, Hawaiian islands, and panama... these proved great skills, allowed the navy to test ideas, and also enabled portions of War Plan Orange to get tested... they also played an important role in developing Naval aviation Likewise... it helped develop submarine and anti submarine warfare... particularly important in developing a submarine fleet capable of distributed, independent operations as a result of their slow speed precluding them from keeping pace with the fleet An important evolution in thought became the philosophical backing and desire to hunt and destroy the enemy's carrier force before anything else Combat tested, experienced leaders from the Asiatic fleet operating in PI and te Yangtze RIver during the interwar period also gave the navy some combat tested individuals The catastrophes in the Pacific as the Navy found their footing found themselves less as a failure to prepare and more as a result of a very difficult problem set that had been amplified by a peacetime navy, the Washington naval treaty, and a lack of funding... also,,, the need to build a whole new fleet on the eve of war as well as the rapid advance of technology that increased in the years leading up to the war Other big advancements facilitated by acquisitions and innovation facilitated by the General Board -Floating dry-docks for maintenance afloat -UNREP/fleet support ships WP Orange game shared strategic template; fleet problems laid out common operational background Fleet problems also tested leaders with realistic, tough training that made a difference during the stress and pressure of war... also allowed them to weed out the guys who weren't fit for it Navy also found adept leaders from the CNO down capable of operating the peacetime bureaucracy to find creative ways to use the law in their favor and request special sorts of appropirations... they understood and worked the system... just like the Corps A huge advancement was the creation of fleet doctrine that gave a soldiers baseline based off of fleet problems and gaming at the Naval war college

Cinto - The Culminating Point (Barbarossa)

• Barbarossa was a new kind of war... more than a contest of arms... also a contest of ideologies willing to exterminate one another... The National Socialists vs. the communist, Jewish Bolshevist... it also marked a shift in the war for the Germans were there system designed for quick, lethal operations came against a colossus who could hold them in place until they wore themselves down and became open to counterattack... in many ways, December 1941 was the turning point for the Germans in the war: Pearl Harbor, Declaring war on USA, Soviet Counterattack to Barbarossa, and perhaps most importantly Hitler firing his great generals and appointing himself to the head of the OKH, effectively crippling the German Way of War • Classic German Front-loaded campaign that required a swift blow to win... destroy the Red Army before it could withdraw... the German nightmare was a withdraw of the Red Army behind the great river lines of the Dina and Dnepr • Red Arm's initial floundering along the front in Poland was typical of a peacetime army with lots of toys but no experience • Campaign ○ North - Hoepner... half way to Leningrad 5 days in ○ Center § Hoth northern pincer § Guderian southern Pincer § 270 miles in 7 days... three great Kessels or pockets □ Bialystok □ Minsk □ Smolensk § The Kessels while a sign of success proved to be very problematic... trying to seize small cities in themselves § Red Army also never stopped counterattacking □ Resulted in Hitler diverting Hoff North to support Army Group North and Gudarian South to help with Ukraine and Kiev § These diversions wasted precious time that should have been used in pursuit of Moscow ○ South - Klieg • Soviet equipment was far better than German • German intelligence failed to recognize the enormity of the Soviet Colossus ○ Soviets fielded 600 divisions by December of 1941 ○ Maps inadequate ○ Impacts of weather on the roads • Operation Typhoon - final assault on Moscow ○ October 1941 ○ 3 armies and 3 panzer groups ○ Rains of fal came and the who tire operation collapsed into an operational disaster ○ Inched forwar to have the Kremlin in sight by December as it continued to grid on in spite of logic that a pause was needed and that the soviet forces were building ○ As the Operation neared it's culminating point, the Soviets launched a massive counterattack of 4 separate armies § Led by Zhukov § Massive sharp frontal blow with powerful thrusts on the flanks § Caught Germans by total surprise ○ Hitler orders :stand-fast order" and fired Leeb (AG North), Bock (AG Center), Brauchistch (Cedric in chief of OKH)... takes head of OKH • December of 1941 marks the death of German auftragstaktik and the turning point of the war for the Germans ○ Pearl Harbor ○ Soviet Counteroffensive ○ Germany declares war on USA ○ Hitler takes head of OKH... micromanaging and installing his "good Nazis" to lead from that point forward • The shift to Hitler to commander in chief of OKH led to a system that stymied auftragstaktik in that every detail had to be reported and that commanders were expected to execute as "obedient soldiers" ○ To further complicate this the technology had changed much ○ Instant communications by radio ○ The predominance of the skies, meaning that the whereabouts o units had to be understood at al times to effectively communicate and direct complex operations ○ There was little room for truly independent armies on the modern battlefield

House - Operation Bagration (When Titans Clashed)

• Key Idea: Operation Bagration was highly effective offensive carried out against AG Center that ultimately was slowed due to logistics and operational reach rather than German forces. The advance decimated AG Center ad delivered the Red Army to the borders of the Reich... as the Red Army rested along the Vistula River, it began to plan or • March 1944... Soviets in search of a opportunities to exploit, knowing that he allies would land in France within a number f months ○ 4 COAS § Atk AG South § Atk NW through Ukraine and Poland § Atk N into Finland § Atk AG Center • Bagration was the centerpiece of a series of 5 offensives planned for summer 1944 • Zhukov - Chief of General Staff • March 1944, commenced operations against Finland to re-coupe captured land, demanding concessions, reparations, Finnish demobilization, and break diplomatic relations with Germany • Finish campaigns distracted Germans and allowed the Russians to re-work task organization into more "fronts" with their own independed stadds with high-ranking commanders capable o exerting appropriate C2 over such large force • Plans also focused heavily on deception • Preliminary plan envisioned a massive encirclement of AG Center ○ Initial encirclement of German Anchr positions on the N and S Flanks o AG Center • 31 May 1944.. STAVKA issues order for Bagration ○ Massive secret staging of depots and strategic redeployment of forces into positions to support the offensive ○ Each Front given limited and achievable objectives within 150 km IOT prevent them rom out-running supplies ○ Strategic deception in North and South.. Achieved even great efects because its what. The Germans expected to happen • Germans were holding a 600 km front with limited reserves ○ Divisions holding 32km fronts, far too wide to be effective ○ No real reserves because they were busy fighting partisans ○ No real defense in depth... lacked suffienct resources ○ Still had poor intel picture... failing to catch the consolidation of 3 combined arms armies ○ HHQ ignored warnings o coming offensive... not recognizing it until 3 days prior • Attack ○ 19 June 1944 - coordinated partisan attacks throughout German force in depth, particularly against key transportation nodes and network ○ 22 June - Massive bombing of German rear areas ○ 23 June - offensive advances with combined arms armies of tanks, self-propelled guns, and infantry supported by air... § Attack along high-speed Ave of approach Moscow-Minsk highway § Columns led by massive mech engineer capabilities to clear abstables § Significant use of illum and searchlights at night to negate German night vision § Continuous thrusts of armor columns into german read areas to disrupt and seize key nodes and crossing points § Attempts at withdrawal stopped by hitler who told them to fight to the end § Slow-going in Belorussian due to terrain and vegetation that resulted in ambushes and tough cross-country mobility § Turned into a series of enveopmetns and encirclement that were reduced by exploitation forces § Soviets gained air supremacy and used air to good effect on elements of AG Center § Continues, pus toward Baltic, cutting LOCs to support AG North and AG Center ○ 28 June - Advance ordered on all fronts ○ Continued push into Poland § Polish Home Army rose and increased resistance against Germans, anticipating arrival of Red Army □ Brutal defeat by Germans in Warsaw □ Poles accused Red Army of slowing the advance to Warsaw in an effort to achieve greater bloodletting of the Poles

Trinquier - A French View of Counterinsurgency

-Big Idea: Counterinsurgency has to be deliberately planned and executed at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels, with various planning considerations at each level all with the overall themes of: -Intelligence collections and rapid dissemination of intel -Isolation of the population from the Guerrillas -Control of areas, expanding outward -IT's important to ID the enemy exactly and understand the cause of the insurgency rather than symptoms -Must establish networks at peacetime, but be ware that the enemy will exploit and hide behind the benefit of our laws -The enemy consists not of just a few bands of guerrillas, but instead a vast network of supporters The important part in modern warfare is to control the populace -narrative -assure the people -fight the bad guys -organizations capable of detecting elements of the enemy... a huge intelligence network built and integrated ahead of conflict >best agents come from the enemy >benevolent contributors that we can guarantee protection for -Intelligence action service -fought amongst the inhabitants on an unrestricted battlefield -must prepare the populace to also defend itself... organization and training -organize into districts, sub-districts, and groups of houses -Census of the people/cards -A sociopolitical organization to control the needs of a society in emergency >Manage resources >Control food and animals -Find young, ambitious leaders to carry your movement forward with a local face/governance, particularly since terrorism and violence by enemy will likely claim many key leaders before and during the fighting -Destroy opponents before they constitute a danger... we need authorization to do this at the earliest opportunity to prevent their exploitation -Security of clandestine organizations is guaranteed through compartmentalizations -To have an entity that the enemy can't overthrow in conflict >Prepare ourselves >Enable people to defend themselves >intelligence to understand what the enemy is doing Internal warfare within a population: -Police Operation >remove en organization from populace >supported Army providing outward overwatch of sorts >protection for those that will assist in ID the enemy who they are in constant contact with... must guarantee their protection >Muster, interrogate, census, control, arrest those >curfews to enable arrests, ambushes, deny transit of people/material, and give freedom of movement to FF >Relocation camps should be built ahead of time and have conditions that don't develop further hate a -Propaganda effort >war aims must be clearly knew to the people >support and fight for that aim >sense of justice >crush those who suppress them >should not deceive them >War is always a calamity for the people; we need to recognize that -Social program (civil affairs) >Lessen the miseries >prudent application of resources and means for aid >material and moral support ROLE OF POLICE: protection of the people ROLE of ARMY: Protection of the National territory and regime ROLE of AUXILIARIES: Support The major weapon in urban environment - terrorism Guerrilla warfare - somewhere between politics and conventional war >climate of insecurity >territorial control >avoid losses >maintain support and contact with populace >weapons are much different than conventional weapons -populace support -surprise -Good connections to undertrained FF movements -auxiliary force to support them... almost like an ADVON that moves ahead and prepares provisions and bivouac each day Typical response: >establish expensive military outposts in critical areas to secure HVY equipment and LOCs >limited duration patrols that Guerrillas can track by local informants >isolated, ineffective ambushes >large-unit sweeps that are predictable and traceable When the enemy opens hostilities, it's an indicator that specific conditions have been met Conventional forces tend to be slaves to its doctrine, training, and toys, and we tend not to study who we are fighting in depth To fight a guerrilla... yo must get him off his turf... doesn't need to be brought to, nor will he show-p to, a decisive show-down... get him away from his support network where he cannot hide or get support -his reliance on specific terrain and the people is the guerrilla's KEY WEAK POINT Two objectives in counter-guerrilla operations 1. Destroy the Guerrillas 2. Eradicate their influence on the populace Organized approach to dividing up the area in a network approach >Districts, zones, regions, sectors and communes General descriptions >Towns/population centers >Refuge Areas Three keys to defeating Guerrillas 1. Cut them from the populace 2. Render Guerrilla operational zones untenable 3. Coordinated wide-area, deliberate operations to systematically address the Guerrillas Strategic hamlets >impassible perimeters >police operations within >All exits controlled >No supplies or Money in or out without correct procedures >census / interrogation of entire populace... census cards issued Interval troops - mobile, strategic reserve Intermediate area >employ interval troops... foot mobile; self-sustaining >intensive searches of terrain and removal of cashes >night ambushes >establish districts, sub-districts, house-groups etc >Hold people accountable to their groups/districts etc Refuge areas - irregular terrain to which access is difficult, and usually in land divided by administrative boundaries >Allows guerrillas to establish support bases >we must use INTERVENTION TROOPS to address these areas >INTERVENTION Troops should be committed quickly via whatever means (airborn, helo, etc) that can be employed after the isolation of that refuge area and systematically remove the people to relocation areas and then to destroy the enemy forces within their refuge Thought: at the theater level, figure out where you want to get the Guerrillas to and then systematically drive them that direction where you can isolate them and then mass on them at one time Don't set timelines... it's all conditions based Troops >grid units - key areas >interval troops - intermediate areas >intervention units - specifically-trained

Matloff - 90 Division Gamble

-Marshall made a huge gamble by maintaining a 90 division army through the war... it was the "cutting edge" that would provide warfightign capability without crippling the "arsenal of democracy" an the economic capacity of the US which was decisive in the war... this reduction from original estimates of ~214 divisions required the assumption of some risk, particularly in reserves... Marshall did much to guard these resources to ensure sufficient capability to support the cross-channel invasion... this cable likely wouldn't have worked without the USSR holding up its-end of the deal -Army showed great acceptance in understanding that they had to share te manpower of the nation with the rest of the the productive capacityy of the US... the 90 divisions was a great attempt to balance modern warfare with policy aims that supported allies and maintained viability of the US economy -Much of the US planning was based off of the need to balance combat power with support, air, industry, agriculture... they did not want to collapse the productive capacity of the YS Initial victory plan in 1941 was for 213 divisions Estimated that of 25 million able-bodied males, only 15-16 million cold be mobilized without affecting industry and economy Delay of cross channel invasion gave more time to mobilize and leverage effects of air power 1 year to train a division... logistics throughput of 4 divisions/month to ETO Continually downgraded the estimates for number of divisions required based off of survival of USSR and general progress of war... also realized that they couldn't afford to invest anymore material support for allies at higher levels without reprint their forces of the war fighting needs -Logistic transportation and the needs for other programs such as the B-29 all affected Throughput of manpower was another issue facing the allies

The Huk Rebellion

-Prior to WWII, wealthy and owners began migration to cities to exploit industry opportunities... this left land lords and private militias in the countryside to raise rents of peasants and exploit their conditions, driving a larger wedge between the rich and poor... also gave rise to the PKP (communist party) -Japanese invasion on 8 December 41 -Those not killed or captured broke into separate resistance factions >American: USAFFE (USArmed Forced Far East) >PKP >Huks Japanese devastated countryside while also enlisting the support of local collaborators... typically the wealthy who supported the Japanese and profiting by it MacArthur banned the Huks after conclusion of war without offering them any means of assimilation back into rule under Filipino governance Philippines stagnant under a series of leaders who could not steer the newly independent Nation (no nation experience... Spanish since the 1500s then 40 years of American colonial rule)... plus a rich class that wanted to keep that status quo Continued uprising against the government and the landlords and the Philippine constabulary... very circular in terms of provocations and escalations, giving power to the Huks and those who stood agains exploitation...movements fed by >Oppression >Winning over support of people >Protectors of law and order >Ownership of land >Propaganda >Crop sharing Communist leaders were highl educated intellectuals from city Huks came from poor peasant backgrounds Quirino served as president before Magsaysay >Corrupt govt >siphoning off public funds >economy stalled Magsaysay grew-up poor... much like Lincoln... he understood the people >Served in PI military >Congress >Fought with USAFFE >Appointed to SEC of NAT DEF with support of Landsdale and JUSMAG As SEC of NAT DEF -Time in country side -Random inspections... fire leaders on the spot -Reform -Charisma -Listened to people -Deprive Huks of support and space -Reformed PAF -Integrated security forces into Def -Refroms for agriculture, health, roads EDCOR - Economic Development Corps -Gave former insurgents titles to publically-owned land -Built new communities with hospitals, libraries, schools Maintained heavy pressure of HUKS but still gave them the graceful exit and assimilation Magsaysay wins presidency (covert support by US)

Negrier - Some Lessons of the Russo-Japanese War

-Russian conception of War: Defense and counterattack -Russians didn't learn anything from the conflicts the pre-dated it... evidenced by adherence to the bayoneted -Didn't take any lessons from Boer War regarding lethality of weapons or the trench -Trench allowed to spread firepower along the line to serve as reinforcements for flanks or reserve/counter attack force -Russians used barely any intelligence or recon efforts -Japanese had sophisticated collections and recon... would use local Chinese guides and spies 1. Small part rolls 2. Select ground 3. Arrival o force and extend battle line 4. Did trenches 5. Communications and roads etc -Japanese doctrine was Italy western -JPN made special use of cover =avoided bayoneted attacks by day -went into attack with no pack -March and Attack at night; burrow in the dirt by day -Russians repeated the same unimaginative tactics over and over again -Arty must face two coming realities 1. Large ammunition expenditure 2. Large caliber 3. Need for responsive communications 4. Transportation requirements Entrenching tool in priority just behind the rifle JPN used tents to stay in field

Faulkner - The Big Show: The Doughboy in Combat

-The AEF entered war untrained, ill-equipped, and unprepared for TOTAL WAR as a result of how the nation mobilized. Through great loss and material support they showed great resolve despite horrifying losses and learned quickly. While their tactical results weren't dazzling, their strategic impact on the alliance and the course of the war cannot be questioned. Their experience was for the most part, an extremely difficult and spartan experience -Life governed by fiends, environment, Germans, and the maslovian needs of life -Most of their time in battle was in the attack against the advantages of the defense -german defense made great use of: camo, telephone, time, registered fires -put much ope in artillery -Primitive fortifications dug under fire -only protection from elements: shelter halves, blankets, rain coats -staggering casualties -noise, smell, sights, shock of battle -Arty was king - 70% of casualties... merciless, unpredictable -70k hospitalized for gas poisoning >Phosgene / Mustard -Comrades and steadfast leaders made the difference in extending the "breaking point" -Self-inflicted wounds, fear -deprivation: food, water, shelter, gear left during assaults -Significant logistics challenges regarding movement control and traffic management leading to massive delays and challenges during Muse-Argonne -Flu, trench-foot, dysentery, fatigue, hygiene limited

Murray - Strategic Bombing: British, Americans, and Germans

-The evolution of strategic bombing occurred differently in each of the three countries due to geographic, technological, and social factors, all of which drove how the countries perceived the use of air power and assumed how it would contribute to the future of war during the interwar period -All saw air as a means to escape another conflict in the trenches, accompanied with no small bit of mysticism and chivalry perceived about air power in WWI despite the primitive nature of flight at the time Interwar period saw significant technological advancement... word to steel... engine power, radar, air defense systems All parties struggled to develop accurate assumptions about how strategic bombing wold effect the outcome of war and suffered even more from the depth... the unknowns unknowns -Ultimately, the air war came down to the industrial and sustainment capacity of the allies that could far out-pace what the Germans were capable in terms of production, specifically since the Germans didn't fully mobilize air industrial production until too late and invested too much i their revenge weapons like the V1 and V2 -Also, intelligence collection in targeting planning came to play a huge role, since they found it was much more difficult to target key points in industry than initially thought -The Germans had a well balanced approach to evolving strategic bombing and air power, devoting some assets directly to ground support and others to bombing capabilities... they operated off a much more balance and shared vision, but also suffered rom a rather small industry and civilian technological innovation that wasn't nearly as great due to the short distances in inner Europe... >T of V both aided and hurt... prevented them from amassing a huge fleet of obsolete technology >Added to their combined arms perspective on war >Ultimately still suffered from German weaknesses in logistics, supply, and intelligence >Hitler to power in 1933 demanded a rapid build-up... creating problems at all levels, to include lack of experience in a large Luftewafe... it also played a role in bankrupting the nation >Ultimately incapable of adapting during war -Brits saw the bombing of civilian population centers as the key to defeating the will... did not see a need for fighter escorts... >National rejection of war >Small defense budgets >RAF was only independent Air Force >Geography and desire to stay out of continental fight drove thoughts of strategic bombing -US had a civilian industry to drive innovation and saw the need to cripple the Luftwaffe, industrial capacity, and transportation networks... thier key shortfall was the belied that if bombers were fast and armed enough that they could survive as independent formations... did not find need or escorts in support of their day-time high-altitude precision bombing until later >Also not a hug fan of military following WWI >Geographic isolation hampered innovation for bombers... why necessary? >Saw little reason to invest; go back to isolationism >Civil aviation innovation dealing with continental problems did help rom a technology aspect Three operational imperative or the US/Brits 1) avoid trenches 2)institutional imperatives 3)Air power potential German thought driven by traditional combined arms approach... also did a much better job at learning and studying experiences in WWI and the Spanish Civil War

Kuhn - The War in the Pacific 1941 - 1941

-War in the Pacific fomented by 2 primary causes: >fall-out from War in Europe >Conflicting US/JPN interests in China -1933 IJA established puppet state in Manchuria -1937 goes to war in china against the nationalisms and the communists attrocticties such a Nanking continued to isolate JPN from international community USA saw China as an opportunity to tie-down Japan and keep her out f supporting aims in Europe

Futrell- Ideas, concepts and doctrine

-a number of acts in te 20s encouraged growth of aircraft production industry as well as infrastructure to support CONUS navigation such as navigation aids and radio-meteorological stations along established routes -Doctrine also began its development in the text books of the Air Corps Tactical School -Thought and priorities shifted from procurement of observation platforms to offensive capabilities in light of Douhet's writing... -Early bomber conception thought that speed and firepower would provide protection for deep operations and deep strike... this seems to defy the basic logic of physics -Early on recognized the importance of air control and its potential implications on ground operations -Army and navy agreed that Naval aviation platforms ashore wold focus on coastal observation and scouting in peacetime... more teeth in war -By early 30s, Air Corps used work o Douhet, envisioned patrol craft, bombers capable of self-defense, and civilian-style auxiliary transport craft -Air Corps played a big role in development by delivering better and better descriptions of requirements to industry for production -Rainbow 5: included the first comprehensive air plan... three lines of US air effort: >disruption of German power infrastructure, transportation network and petroleum reserves >Neutralization of GER Air >Action against sub factories, and deployment shipyards AWPD-1: >Favored high-altitude, high-speed daylight massed bombings against precision industrial and military targets ahead of civilian targets in Germany >Planned to maintain naval defense against Japan and a credible deterrence from forward staged bombers etc >Saw pursuit aircraft in largely a defensive role >Did not expect ground operations in Europe until air superiority was won >Provided assessment is Summer of 1941 as to the total needs of an air campaign to defeat the allies' rivals via air... identified 154 strategic targets and then worked out what was required in terms f munitions and bomber groups to accomplish the destruction of those targets and where everything would have to be generated from >Received favorable marks but SEC of War noted that the production requirements to meet the needs of AWPD-1 would require a war to leverage the resources >Joint board declared that victory could still only be won with a land army >Joint board and AWDP-1 were not war plans but rather assessments on what wold be needed to win by air >Air corps continued to wild design competitions for bombers of increasingly long range and high altitude capabilities -26 July 1941, FDR recognized the rise of Japan and understood the need for political resolution, passing an executive order to freeze Japanese assets and halt all trade... some military professionals such as Marshall warned that it may force a desperate Japan into further territorial expansion and push it past the brink of war -Air tactical school was closed for a period and then reopened -Also began the Army Air Force Board (AAF) to study the overall picture of Air Force matters it's a view to make recommendations of all matters regarding Air Support, Air Service, strategy, organization, and equipment -HQ AAF established in March 1942 to quickly assemble the world's most powerful Air Force... divisions arose to include: Personnel; Intelligence; Training; Material, Maintenance, and Distribution; Operations; an Plans... -Quickly recognized that the biggest gap was a single narrative and language codified in doctrine to guide thoughts and operations... resulted in THE AIR FORCE IN THEATERS OF OPERATIONS >Biggest problem was raid evolution of TTPs and technology >Operations in North Africa quickly provided a lot of lessons learned,a large part of which was the need to consolidate air forces under an aviator rather than a ground commander -North Africa also began to develop the idea of having a theater commander with subordinate air and ground commanders with forces under their control -Gen Arnold saw the deterrent effect of AirPower as a key aspect of national defense... Gen Marshall saw Air, land and sea all comprising that critical deterrent capability By early 1943 FDR had decided on a policy of Unconditional Surrender for Axis Powers at the Casa Blanca Conferences... garnished great support but may were skeptical of effect on civilian populations in countries content to fight it out to the bitter end Casa Blanca Conferences laid it a logical underpinning to the Combined Bomber Offensive >No central authority >Americans and Brits would pursue their separate strategies with the ultimate objective of progressively destructing and dislocating of German military, industry and economic system while undermining the morale of the german populace.... the offensive would ultimately set conditions for a land invasion of the European mainland 1 Jan 44 Spatz took command of USSTA - US Strategic Air Forces in Europe... this control was passed to Eisenhower for "Overlord" and then to the Combined Chiefs who controlled all strategic bomber forces in Sept 44 1st 8th Air Force daylight bombing mission from UK was on 17 Aug 42... many assets drained to support North Africa until focus was directed back at Europe Initial assumption was that escorts were not necessary to control the skies and conduct effective bombing By June 43 combined command directed attacks against Luftwaffe and A/C industry to gain control of the skies ... Arnold also directed that he wanted fighter escorts within 6th months to protect the December 43, Arnold indicates that overlord and anvil could not succeed without total dominance of air and destruction of AC industry WWI did not provide an effective measure of how effective flak would be in WWII, particularly against bomber formations rather than fighters Germa had adored equal resources to AAA than to A/C development leading into the war... by 44 he enlisted more than 1 mil in air defense network As bombing began Germans dispersed their industries where possible which complicated the fact that they didn't have great intel for targeting to begin with... hitler also was not employing full industrial capacity in the beginning f the war, giving it some cushion APWD-1 assumed fight could be won through air... evolved to APWD-42, which focused on shaping ISO ground invasion still targeting was a very complex matter as they continued to determin which targets would have the greatest impacts... not unlike the cyber attack article and a network analysis approach to it True strategic bombing through massive sustained attempts did not occur until after D-Day, having massive impacts on the Germans by December 44, particularly in the loss of their fuel reserves... ultimately though... it was the crippling of the transportation network that crippled the German economy... see also Sherman in the south Conclusion -Air Power is the immediate ability of a nation to engage in air warfare -Arnold took a Mahanian approach stating that air power was a nations's ability to deliver cargo, people, destructive mussels, and war-making potential through the air to achieve desired purposes... larger than just military making components -MST high brass following WWII agreed that no single service won WWII and that each service was required to work in conjunction with each other in any future conflict -Also agreed that the unified command structure was essential -Destruction of German industry and transportation network had devastating impacts on their ability to fight the war -Bradley: "the air battle must be won if a war is to be won"...Learned that they had to dominate the air before thaey could fight on land... the extrapolation of this idea is that in today's world, we must dominate space, cyberspace and information domains before we move forward with air, sea and land force -entered war with fighters and bombers... exited with massive reliance on transports as well... crucial in today's fight -Arnold's last word... he Air Force cannot allow its doctrines and techniques to be tied solely to the equipment and processes o the moment. Present equipment is a step in the right direction but an Air Force that does not keep its doctrines ahead of its equipment and its vision far into the untrue can only delude the nation into a false sense of security... "must remain flexible at all times and entirely uninhibited by tradition"

Faulkner - Combat Physics

Combat physics the training of small unit leaders of the AEF were part o the difficulty in operations at the tactical level in WWI and the inability to achieve success on the "fringes" of attritional/trench warfare... and A big part of understanding the difficulties at the tactical level in WWI comes down to understanding combat physics driven by the realities of humans, the technology, and the environment There were realities caused by the nature of the fight (artillery, craters, mud, weather) and the lack of advancement in things such as transport or reliable wireless communications coupled with massive forces consuming lots of ammo in an environment where everything had to be hand carried Small unit leaders below the brigade level had little to no influence on where they went or what they did... and "H hour was H hour" whether the shaping fires were underway or not TO complicate matters the nature of high turnover and introduction of a lot of new etechnology meant that the human capital wasn't up to par or consistent enough to use all of the new assets (MGs, Arty, Trench mortars) to maximum efficiency or benefit because training just simply wasn't sufficient to cope with constant changes in personnel, weapons, and doctrine Arty was king but it was difficult to work with -wired communications... constantly getting disrupted by -signals -pigeons -runners -Slow to adjust and move up -time to stage ammunition Rolling barrages and fire plans were great, but complex and hard to deviate from... simple delays from carrying equipment or crafters or obstacles could leave a unit at behind its barrage Arty largely unavailable to company and platoon level leaders At the lowest levels MGs and trench mortars were not used to full capacity because they weren't thought of, small unit leaders didn't understand them, they were logistics intensive... the support weapons were also slow to bring into fight, particularly as the eight

Winter - Propaganda and the Mobilization of Consent

Each party in WWI set up agencies to control the flow of information and monitor its influence on public opinion... total war required CONSENT of the population and PROPAGANDA to garnish that support for the CAUSE of the nation before its population and the world State-dominated not the same as state-directed 1914-16: both nations emphasized defense of territory and greatness (pride) Cementing solidarity and support for total war and endurance of a nation... although the Germans for forced into a situation where they didn't have much time to devote time and effort to public opinion The mobilization of minds was needed to mobilize men, munitions, Labour, Most powerful messages from central powers wasn't from the centers of power but rather from politics of hate and mass politics Mobilization of sacred images and words and ideologies Verbal messages transitioned to visual that indicated moralized the conflict and stereotyped the enemy Wartime patriotism sells... governments moved to suppress pacifist messages Overall the fundamental effects f Propaganda are cultural... not political... this would come to visit again in WWII

Strachan - Economic Mobilization: Money, Munitions, and Machines

Extended duration of war found its roots in 1) firepower 2) Universal Military SVC (reserves) 3) Alliance blocs Triple entente had 60% greater economic capacity over central powers.. this advantage, as well as the access to neutral US financing prior to their entry into the war played a critical role in waging total war against the central powers Protracted conflict promised defeat of Germany... needed quick win Bloch - long and indecisive wars in future with cost serving as deterrence Most felt that bulk of bills would have to be paid off after war... taxation played minimal role... relied on borrowing and indirect revenue from customs and excise Financial tools: short-term treasure bills; war bonds; overseas credit Germany rut badly by not being able to tap into the most important neutral money market in the world—New York Production shortfalls in industry consisted of the first huge economic complications of the war... transportation capacity existed to support trench warfare... fire out-stripped production... demand of capital markets played a big consideration of re-tooling industry for production... leavening complex lines for difficult production and using other general industry for simple production Labor played a large role too.. had to balance with manpower requirements... loss of social mobility during total war as well as worker rights Initial invasions led to tough considerations in terms of loss of key resource areas... ex France losing much steel and coal by loss of north eastern territories... Russia loss of much coal and iron ore in Poland Re-tooling industry would lead to over abundance of capacity and irrelevant lines at the end of the conflict Industrialization required Labour policy that was comprehensive in is acknowledgement of the needs for the military, industry, and Labour Central powers also neglected maintenance of rail lines and transportation capacity due to need to feed forces in the fight

Foley - The (re)birth of Ermattungsstrategie

Hans Delbruk (german) - academic - life from establishment of Germany through WWI Engaged in continuous discourse with the military establishment on the topics of operations and strategic thinking believing that the system was close-minded in its approach to learning from the past and its focus on the decisive battle of annihilation Also fought with military thinkers on the true meaning of Frederick The Great's approach to war... pragmatic with battle as an evil only to be embarked upon as a last resort Advocated that Clausewitz was in the process of editing On War as he began considering limited war... many german thinkers saw battlefield victory as the key to producing political results Advocated for ermattungsstrategie a Clausewitz idea of attrition as he realized that his theory which was supposed to be all-encompassing had neglected much of armed conflict of the past when states only had limited objectives or aims Felt that Germany couldn't win a two-front war or a protracted war... also couldn't win quick enough against ether France or Russia Defense alone could not decide a battle; offense still required Germany was not ready to jettison its long-held military culture of the decisive battle going ton WWI but would be forced to reconsider the intellectual underpinnings of its short-war in the years following WWI

Coox - Strategic Bombing in the Pacific

Japan posed some problems to high-altitude daylight bombing due to environmental conditions. By the time Lamar took over the XXI Bomber Command, he devised a system of nighttime mid-altitude bombing conducted below the level of heavy AAA and above the altitude of light AAA... this was enhanced by combinations of explosive bombs and incendiary munitions That said, by 1945, JPN was suffering some serious gaps in air capacity, both from an industrial production capacity (materials, plant, blockade), and their lower quality igniters and interceptors -Fire bombing of Tokyo on 10 Mar 1945, destroyed more than 16 SqMiles of the city, killing 84K and displacing more than a million... critical blow to Japanese morale... so severe that the Empire couldn't hide the truth that the JIAAF and IJN had woefully inadequate AA capabilities to thwarts strategic bombing by that time in the war The Tokyo bombing changed strategic bombing in the pacific theater... legacy thought he could end the war in 4 nights... going on to hit Nagoya, Osaka, and then Kobe... mixed results but exhausted incendiary munitions, forcing them to wait for resupply Two targeting systems -good visibility - day-light HE precision bombing of industry -poor visibility - radar and incendiaries at 6000-9000 feet on urban industrial areas Lemay also believed that with sufficient logistics support that AirPower could win the war... crippling their ability to make war

Parshall - Ignoring the Lessons of Defeat

Key Idea: Midway was the most important Naval battle of the Second World War. It left 4 of Japan's carriers sunk (compared to just 1 American carrier) and it forever hampered their offensive efforts. Yet, despite making a concerted effort to examine the defeat and rebuilt their carrier capabilities which they acknowledged as the Naval Center of Gravity (going into Midway they believed it was the battle ships), the changes were really just superficial and the continued to operate in much the same manner. -Ramped up Naval aviator training -Changed carrier group from 2 to 3 with a dedicated CAP vessel -implemented a scouting line of cruisers to provide I&W with float planes Problems -Were not honest with strategic decision makers or the people -Held no one accountable for Midway -Deliberate cover-up of Midway disaster, keeping the ships on the roles and sending survivors to fight elsewhere -Serious naval shipyard and aircraft production shortfalls compared to US -Failed to see the ability of Radar to do anything more than provide warning or direct fires -Did not develop a CIC like the US Navy to provide overall C2 of forces for naval and aviation integration -Warrior caste system prevented the IJN from effective learning -ack of strategic direction, involvement, and transparency led to strategic folly on numerous occasions for the Japanese

CGSC Lecture on RUS-JPN War

Key Idea: National affairs proceed like lines and will intersect at some point if they are not parallel... the Russians and Japanese vital interests intersected in Manchuria and Korea... both willing to pursue it following the Chinese lease of the June-ting peninsula to Russia in 1890 -Focused heavily on the Battle of the Yalu where the Japanese did much to conduct recon and ID deceive points to cross and penetrate; the Russians on the other hand spread their roughly equal forces across 100 miles of frontage and planned to fight a delay... Japanese saw Yalu as a fixing effort to enable the 2d Army to land and fight on the Liao-Tung Peninsula Port Arthur was the immediate objective of all Japanese operations now that sea control was in place... destroy the Navy in the port or force it out to sea to fight Admiral Togo _crossing began at night against Russians who simply held their line and remained very reactive before triggering into its planned yet uncoordinated withdraw... no collections... no defense at critical crossing points... no lines of retirement or covering forces or rear guards... basically just every unit for themselves -Sea control a central first objective for both Japanese and Russians up-front Russians: -Underestimated Japanese -limited preparations to building some more ships, building the naval base of port Arthur, and completing the Siberian railway... their plan was based on the assumption that the Japanese Navy could not beat their navy -Weak intel apparatus -Vague / ineffective orders -Lack of communications and reporting of changes and decisions Japan: -universal military service -finance a huge navy -focused on mobilization and organization -education to prepare leaders for high command -German system for ARMY -British system for NAVY -Propaganda to mobilize populace -Studied Russians in depth-Emplyed many spies in Russia, Manchuria etc

Parshall and Wagner - Pearl Harbor's Overlooked Answer

Key Idea: The attack on Pearl Harbor was on of the most important events in American military history. It brought us into a war that would project America to superpowerdom and it allowed us to finally see the full potential of massed Naval Aviation projected from across the sea with groups of carriers sustained with UNREP ships not tied to depots. Shouldn't be so surprised that it caught US off guard, since it was very much like 9/11... while intel did fail to ac on key indicators, the Americans also could not have imagined the mass and coordinated attack that unfolded in one morning but would provide great lessons on the potential of naval aviation. IJN carrier fleet—Kido Butai—didn't come to conception until 1940... then built rapidly and trained fast in developing a doctrine to support the PH attacks... unlike physical matters... those of doctrine and training will always be far harder to intel analysts to detect given that they are intangible and much harder to grasp full potential if it exists beyond the mental model of your current system.

French - Pre-war Army and the BEF, 1940 (scan)

Key Idea: Institutionally, the Brits also assumed that the Germans had learned their lesson in WWI that they could not win a long war... assumed that if they could get to the continent fast enough to help the French stop the Germans that they could exploit stabilized fronts with their air and seapower. Dunkirk campaign indicated to the BEF that they had a long list of shortcomings regarding training, equipment, and doctrine to deal with modern mechanized warfare Gort - BEF Commander that got them out of Dunkirk.. he was also an army commander, exceeding his effective span of control Germanscountered british positions along lines of communications with their Stuka Div-bombers Shortages in troops for BEF led to verextended lines incapable of stopping mechanized columns ... left only sufficient reserves for local action, certainly no operational reserve of any sort Training in across BEF was inconsistent and much degreaser thanks to service abroad throughout the empire None of the commanders in 1940 had practiced C2 df large formations during peacetime training evolutions BEF intelligence apparatus inexperienced and undermanned... could not intercept and decipher German code at the time BEF had to rely on more radios than it thought... too inexperienced and too many of the wrong types... it had relied on wire too much, which was not sufficient on a changing, dynamic battlefield... most of that radio experience and capability was limited to armor formations and artillery... not the infantry Lacked realistic training that prepared them for German onslaught Many of the unit HQ were formed n the fly, greatly degrading their ability to C2 nuts -Despite C2 falling apart, Gen Gort understood the absolute need to get the Brits evacuated out of Dunkirk BEF remained a product of a rigid, inflexible, autocratic management system ill suited for rapid decision-making and response to mechanized warfare Unwillingness to implement organizational changes following the defeat f Poland and understanding of what they could expect Underresoucing of BEF reflected industrial bottlenecks as well as British Government malaise BEF was unable to mount wither a successful static defense or a Mobil counter-offensive

Weigley - Normandy to France - Operational Planning in 1944

Key Idea: The Allies demonstrated mastery of the tactical and technical details of planning as well as sound strategic planning in 1944, starting with the Operation Overlord and Operation Neptune (amphibious assault on Normandy). They lacked the ability to plan and execute on the OPERATIONAL level of war though, leaving a gap between tactical success and strategic objectives, and extending the war for months thereby extending the loss of life and destruction of the war in the ETO. Expert detail in planning for Overlord and Neptune but a failed coupling of that with an overall campaign and what should come next once they get off the beach. Sees focus on additional ports in Brittany as a useless diffusion of resources that could have led to the end of the war in 1944. This lack of operational foresight also interacted with personality clashes amongst senior allied leaders from across the alliance that inhibited effective coordination and cooperations toward a shared vision and the inability to capitalize on opportunities in a timely manner that again may have ended the war sooner. Operational pauses caused by poor operational planning also gave the Germans time to escape through the Falaise Gap as well as reduced pressure that allowed the Germans to reset and regenerate forces to prepare for a counter-offensive via the Battle of the Bulge in December 1944 Lack of operational planning also led to a lot of improvisation on the operational level of war Lack of devotion to C2 on the operational level also had grave impacts at times both in extending the war and in fratricidal and in premature launching of bombers ISO Operation COBRA when the 24 hour delay was needed Operational planners also did not take into account the geography ashore in Normandy that would have a significant impact on the time needed to clear the area, sustain the campaign, and leverage massed effects ashore

French - Raising Churchill's Army

Key Idea: The Brits developed a very strong system of combined arms in WWII that aimed to achieve objectives at acceptable cost that was was characterized by -deliberate planning, -heavy artillery preparation; drove fro greater depth in fires as war progressed -mech and infantry integration, -meticulous log planning -avoidance of risk and incessant loss of life wherever possible (probably due to desire to see war through to end and the high cost of WWI) Some down-sides of the Brit system -Shortfalls in British leadership development sometime led to commanders leading in positions that they were under prepared to fulfill -Many senior leaders killed leading from the front -Sometimes attacked on narrow frontage making it easy for enemy to bottle up attacks or at least slow them -Entered war convinced that armor and infantry should be separate Typical failures resulted from -Lack of Recon -Poor fire plans -inadequate preparation time/rehearsal -Communications across arms -lack of radio communication equipment with infantry -Ineffective training as a result of human factors

Escherick - Ten Theses on the Chinese Revolution

Key Idea: The Chinese revolution was far more complicated than any single person or linear history can illustrate... thus warranting a fresh look... it was a process and its success of the communist party relied on the right context, the right people, under the right conditions to flourish... it also required the nationalists as well as Japanese imperialism to set conditions for its success 1. KMT rule was a precursor to Chinese revolution ... not so much of a polar opposite as many think... PRC adopted many KMT foundations, models, and personnel 2. Rise of CCP was a replacement of one form of domination with another... it wasn't a revolution for liberty as we typically think of revolutions entailing... peasants wanted a fair shot, less taxes, a say, a stable family life, free of corruption 3.Soviet model of Lenin and Stalin had great impact albeit a different system.. industrialization in USSR vs agrarian 4. Success of CCP required some chance occurences 5. Revolution greatly impacted by Great Depressionn ad Japanese imperial expansionism 6. Structures in china imposed significant constraints on the agents of the revolution and counterrevolution 7. The right individuals made a huge difference... it was a people's war thus required people and passion and everything else that come along with them... struggle, sacrifice, all things that are of the human experience 8. CCP was a sophisticated organization that benefitted from popular support which enabled it to add a number of benefit such as rent reduction, defense, elections, land reform 9. Revolution was a process based on context of the situation in China... series o revolutions... starting from a very primitive organization it sequentially grew as power expanded... example... Guerilla to conventional to large scale 10. Modern China is not a teloglgy o revolution.. CCP was a radical break from t he past 8. -

Doughty - French Operational Art 1888-1940 Maneuvering Masses of Fire

Key Idea: The French took always lessons from the end of WWI into the interwar period that encouraged them to develop highly centralized control of operations conducted with detailed timetables on shallow axis with much mass of artillery and offensive movement in short bounds—methodical battle. This failed to make a connection between tactics and operations. This led to flaws in dealing with the German Blitzkrieg and the penetration at Sedan. French believed that the Germans would try to envelop the Maginot Line and weighted the right flank of second army accordingly... they did not anticipate the germans to break to the west toward the channel -Once they realized a penetration was taking place, the French failed to counterattack against the vulnerable and narrow penetration, delaying for upto 9 hours and thus allowing the Germans (Guradian XiX Panzer Corps) to expand bridgehead and emplacement ADA capabilities French and British AirPower attempted to attack the Germans Bridges byut suffered many losses de to ADA and german fighters Their reliance on firepower and methodical battle in many ways resembled the overly-scientific approach to warfare that the Schlieffen Plan entailed, thus failing to achieve a level of operational art that would have allowed them to prepare for the fight... their overly rigid command structure also serves as a great hindrance to the ability to take initiative at the lowest levels to stop the penetration when it was most vulnerable

Anstruther- Description of the Battle of the Sea of Japan

Key Idea: The battle of the Tsushima Straight ultimately resulted in the ultimate destruction of the Russian Baltic FLeet and thereby, Russia's naval power in one fell swoop the precipitated the end of the RUS-JPN War... it was the Japanese Trafalgar -JPN ships: Grey -RSN ships: Black with yellow... easy to see VADM Rodjestvenski - Russian Admiral... injured early in the fight and passed command off in a less than optimal manner to ADM Nebogatoff who didn't figure out that he was in command until hours afterward Arrival of Baltic Fleet in SCS waters left two options to get to Valoditick -Straights of Korea (short) or around Japan (long way) Adm Togo - JPN -Based off decisiong to coal-up in YTZE river basin, assumed Russian FLeet would attempt to shoot the Korea Straight 27 May... beginnings o battle "the rise and fall of the empire depends upon today's battle... let every man do his utmost" Lines-up... Japanese continued attempted to outflank RSN column by encirclement .. running fight until night time... at night, massive fleet of JPN torpedo boats wreaked havoc on the Russian fleet FInal encirclement of Russian Fleet on 28 May... many RSN surrendered "to sink or blow up the ships would be to devote all the officers and men to certain death" -Baltic Sea had under-taken 2000 mile journey

Mckercher - Economic Warfare

Key Idea: The economic vitality of the allied and central powers in WWI became as important to victory as military strength... the ability to mobilize great resources and in-turn, deny the enemy of that that same capability wither in mobilization or sustaining war was a critical element in the grand strategy of WWI and an element of Total War... Triple entente was more adept at Total Way in large part to its superiority in the ability to conduct economic warfare and undermine the ability of the central powers, particularly Germany to wage war Largely enabled by: bureaucratic structures, industrial production, and commerce Leading economic powers: Britain and Germany Britain was experienced in economic warfare from the Napoleonic wars... alternate trade and commerce schemes to mitigate actions on mainland... maritime blockades and seapower British -maximize input/export of items under Royal Navy Protection -Intercept German vessels and third-party vessels d=conducting indirect trade -blockade: food, material, machines etc -Addition of US Navy made blockade all the stronger Germans -Driven by geopolitical relatives... -reality of two-front fight -Assumed that internal production could sustain Germany for up to 9 months... thus they had to operate fast -Tirpitz and Moltke saw the economic challenges and importance in coming fight -Assumed blockade was inevitable but put no plan into place to combat blockade or prevent BEF from arriving -Attempted restricted and unrestricted submarine warfare to conduct economic warfare US -Increasingly important financial instrument and material supporter for triple entente New York departed WWI as the economic center of the world -US The longer and more total the war... the more important economic warfare becomes Neutrals were forced to find a god balance to maintain vitality of economy between allied and central powers... Netherlands for example gave all trade over to private sector to absolve it from Govt Afairs -blow jade led to much suffering and anger within Germany which ultimately caused social tensions that led to collapse of the state and exile of Wilhelm II... fracturing military strength, industry, and society all at once

Strachan - From Cabinet to Total War

Key Idea: Trenches were built to save lives and hold ground with fewer people... support maneuver elsewhere... same with many of the innovations prior to and during WWI... tanks... flame throwers... air craft... supplement machines for manpower that could be used elsewhere (on the battlefield or in industry) in Total War... it was in keeping with the cult of the offense but enabled in part by the growing strength of the defense -Cult of the offense has created some to overlook the investment and importance of fortifications leading into 1914 -Siege Warfare wasn't accepted in orthodox military doctrine in the years before WWI - Fortifications were justified as agents of the offense... allowed concentration and mobilization away from effects of enemy fire; ground to be held with ever troops, enabling masse de manoevre for decisive ops elsewhere -sieges were precursors in the microcosm of total war... ade even more so by the new "elements" of war -Siege... brought to prominence with new lethality in arty and weapons brought the civilian populace closer to conflict due to expose to IDF and starvation -Mobile warfare continued to focus almost exclusively on the army... it was a matter for professional armies... a planner's world for general staffs and wargames in which the civilian populace had no role -Stabilization of the fronts in WWI enabled protection and stability of civilian populace... leading to siege warfare... and the importance of industry and continued productivity of civilians... simplified lines of supply... reduced consumption The Shleiffen plan represented an OPERATIONAL plan bent on tactical success of Hannibal... meant to wind a campaign in one fell swoop, lacking strategic objective or context .. t also discounted the tactical innovations that would stand so strong against the offense Intellectual failure to distinguishh between levels of war in WWI never rectified... led to further confusion toward end of war... Germans perplexed by their collapse on the strategic an national level which was out of proportion to their tactical accomplishments afield -Failed to recognize that the meaning of command on the operational level had shifted to business of managing and orchaestrating forces rather than leading -Failed to recognize the dominant role of resources and logistics and economics n the evolving character o war -Losses were proportional to preparation and shaping fires in longer battles conducted over months rather than days Aim of attrition.. exhaust th enemy through limited engagement... and element of economic warfare itself... because of these limitations, it drove warfare to become more "total" in nature

Greenwood - The US Military Observes with the Japanese Army during the RUS-JPN War

Key Idea: the ability of militaries to learn the correct lessons of recent wars and then implement the right changes are no less critical today than they were for the observers of the RUS-JPN War... Must discern the important trends rom the unimportant and avid the blinders o bias so that corrections can be made in doctrine, organization, and tactics Although the US observes brought back much good information and certainly went on to use those experiences, they still faced many of the obstacles to change that confronted other military observers in the RU-JPN War Many of the US observations were simply ruled out as irrelevant to the US Army's present or foreseen future roles... part of the problem with democracy and innovation Doctrine and capabilities cant change over night Big lessons -Arty reorganization... need for IDF -MG employment in pairs with surprise and concentration -Commiting reserve at critical moment Mobility of infantry -growing importance of combined arms -Entrenching -Night attacks -Growing tail of war -Good leadership and training -Growing strength f defense and floundering f frontal assault -US Army grew its attaché and observer program in wake of Crimean war -RUS-JPN war did entail vital national interests for the US as a growing trans-pacific power

Douhet - Command of the Air

Key idea: -Command of the Air provides whoever possess it with the advantages of protecting all of his own land and sea territory from enemy aerial offensives and at the same time subjecting the enmey's territory to his own offenses -WWI consisted mostly of auxiliaries and did not give a lot of evidence to support Douhet's theories -The Army and Navy should plan for and pay for the auxiliary air capabilities they need for their missions... they should also have full control of those assets -The only aerial organization whose existence is ugly justified is an independent Air Force -enemy must be deprived quickly of the use of his plans... must attack enemy air in the air, on the ground, in maintenance, and in production... everywhere and as rapidly from the onset of conflict as possible to gain command of the air -Independent Air Force must meet two conditions: 1) ESSENTIAL: must WIN struggle for command of the air 2) INTEGRAL: must EXPLOIT the command of the air with forces capable of crushing the material and morale resistance of the enemy -Independent Air Force must have planes and bombers -Must always have the Air Force ready for combat in a rapid fashion in an intense and violent offensive fashion... defense dooms it to absurdity 4 characteristics: radius, speed, armament, armor protection -Always keep in mind not what aviation is today but what it could be

Pearlman - Force Structure, Mobilization, and American tragedy for Global Coalition War

Key idea: The Allies were not as unified on the direction of the war as some would suppose... The Americans hoped to stay out and use lend-lease to help "win the war"... but when they came in hey were ready to go hard in a cross-channel invasion. Churchill did not want a cross-channel invasion until it was right. Ultimately, the USSR just wanted allies to green the Germans busy to keep pressure off the east front... FDR and others didn't necessarily provide the clearest guidance for the ir subordinates, which resulted in some requirements for the military to find their own way forward, which they demonstrated the ability to do on numerous occasions by picking a target to aim for -At outset of War, most Americans were willing to support Britain, USSR and China, but did not want in -FDR maintained an ambiguous policy toward the war prior t entering it.... George Marshal and others made some plans behind the scenes to prepare for mobilization in the event of war with focus on Europe and Asia next -Attack on Pral Harbor cemented American involvement -Eisenhower... chief of plans for Army... saw an eventual cross-Chanel invasion from Britain as a "target" to aim for in their planning for mobilization -FDR and Churchill recognized industrial strength of US but also believed that Air would be the decisive factor -Brits very interested in replicating the end of WWI in the cross-channel invasion... wanted air superioritiiy and naval blockade to take big too on Germans before attempting it... lots f prudence in delaying -Americans wanted to go head-on with overwhelming force -FDR needed USSR to survive and keep fighting for the Lend-Lease Program to work... he saw it as a way t win the war -Decision to delay cross-change invasion in avor for North Africa was not taken well by USA and many thought FDR out-played by Churchill -Just as Op Torch got underway FDR came around to the idea of a cross-chance invasion ... y 1943 he knew bombing wouldn't win the war, although it did lead to Allies owning the sky... not only did they own the skies over the channel... much of the german AAA had been displaced back to protect cities and industry rather than a channel invasion -America's lend-lease program would result in less well-equipped units which complicated the challenge of mobilizing the smallest percentage of its population among the great powers in an effort not to cut into industrial capacity... Marshal knew air would be crucial to make-up difference -US understood that keeping the Soviets in the war was crucial for any hope of success in the cross-channel invasion

Hone - Replacing Battleships with Carriers in the Pacific

Key idea: The advent of carrier based AirPower and the substitution of the carrier for the battleship as the centerpiece of US Naval formations did not simply arise as a necessity of substitution following Pearl Harbor, rather it was an evolutionary process that extended through the interwar period and found many of its roots in the naval wargames and experimentation carried out therein Don't look at the evolution strictly as a carrier force so much as a combined force that leverages all aviation, land, subsurface and surface capabilities ties available to achieve operational objectives Role of central pacific campaign was to place land-based, long range bombers in range of Japan, build staging platforms for the advance into the mainland, and pre-occupy the IJN with naval defense against the advance while submarines inflicted havoc on Japanese maritime shipping Nimitz also brought about many of the modern organizations and capabilities that we utilize today in the Navy—to include intel, replenishment, maintenance and planning require for mobile, wide deployment... fleet support infrastructure PAC-10: a doctrine that gave the force tactical cohesion that enabled formations to adapt to changing circumstances and challenges In many ways, success at sea in the Pacific reflected less of massive personalities, and more of the synchronization of technology, tactics, doctrine, ideas through new organizations of people and capabilities in a way that allowed the organization to achieve success in seemingly impossible times In late 1930s, Turner advocated value of the carrier raids as a means of striking the enemy and attaining information while also defending against e enemy... but it wold still take concentration of air Too few carriers existed before the war to experience the with them fully... this also disguised some of the things that would need to be worked out such as synchronizing operations amongst numerous carriers, replenishment at sea and protection King released first instance of carrier doctrine in 1939 - Operations with Carriers A few key points were known ahead of the war: -essential for carriers to get first strike -enemy would target them -intel and scouting was require to locate enemy carriers first -carriers were not for night fighting -carriers were safest if allowed to roam and attack 1942 played out with carriers as foreseen -raids: -Ambushes: coral Sea; midway -covering force: guadalcanal King's view was to keep on the offensive and maintain a fleet in being... Japanese believed in the need to estrogen t he US carriers which made the IJN susceptible to ambush The IJN understood that by contesting Guadalcanal that they could prevent the US from getting Henderson Field from getting up and running, this keeping the carriers tethered rather than allowing them to roam on the offensive 1942 carrier employment debates... wide ranging opinions on how many carriers could and should be used in conjunction, as with spacing etc to maximize their capabilities 1943 -Sherman aimed to build a doctrine that would enable numerous carriers in the same task group to launch and recover their a/c simultaneously -concept of two carriers employed together: one serves as DUTY carrier ready to launch combat air patrols and scouting flights; one serves as STRIKE Carrier -Carriers needed to be prepared to split from one another with the appropriate number of escort ships to provide protection, screens etc... they also needed to control their own air -published a number of "Battle Experience" publications to capture and disseminate lessons learned -New innovations: VHF, SK search radars, combat information centers, SG Surface search radars, F6F Hellcat, IFF Information friend or foe transponders for A/C -Pacific Fleet Tactical Order and Doctrine; PAC-10... combined existing doctrine, tactical bulletins, instructions, and battle organization doctrine that applied to the hole fleet... got the entire fleet speaking the same language and operating with the same organizations an procedures to include single and split multi-carrier operations... was means as guidance that could be tailored to the situation... was meant to quicken integration of new units an capabilities while also enabling quick substitution of ships between task groups and forces as needed -Raids on Marcus and Wake islands allowed PAC-10 doctrine to get tested without telegraphing FOPS and also proving a enough stand-of to with draw and assess lessons learned... exposed shortfalls in charts, clogged VHF nets, need to CICs on all ships -The move to seize the Gilberts tested the new concepts but on a whole new level that would entail the force as a whole -Demonstrated that ability to disperse to conduct separate raids and the concentrate to cover amphibious assaults... and then going back to raiding... sounds very Moltke like when coordinated effectively on the operational level to concentrate where needed 1944 -The inherent agility of the carrier task groups and amphibious landings in wide spread locations made it extremely difficult for the Japanese to protect any one place and prevented effective coordination between land, sea, and ai defenses with one another... us advance followed with new advanced bases from which operations ere conducted TF-58: designed to concentrate the main combatant strength of the US PAC Fleet to disrupt any attempt of the IJN to respond to amphibious assaults... it would also attack enemy advance bases when not being otherwise employed... very much made possible by the existence of PAC-10 Maturation came from a few sources: PAC-10, Joint Intelligence Center Pacific Ocean Area (JICPOA) which fused and synchronized intel between DC and Hawaii, a service force that enabled the deployment and sustainment of the carrier task groups, planning that enabled a continuous flow of combat power an effects against an objective

Nord - France 1940: Defending the Republic

Key idea: The results of the Battle for France in 1940 were not due to a lack of decline in French Spirit. It came from a military system that prepared in the wrong ways and failed to grasp the fundamental changes in modern warfare in a nation that wanted anything but to repeat the bloodletting of WWI. De Gaulle: Led the French resistance Petain - took over the day before the brokering of the armistice with the Germans Marc Bloch - historian and voice of the Resistance executed by Germans Belgium, England, and Netherlands really weren't any better prepared to fight the Germans.... range just didn't happen to have the Atlantic Ocean, the English Chanel, or the Asian steppe to provide a suitable barrier to the Germans... who chose to violate Belgium neutrality again and in doing so drove right around the Maginot Line French leaders stuck to their hierarchy and remained reactive... German commanders took initiative and fought with intent The penetration into France and toward the Channe was a narrow victory that could have been stopped through counterattack to seal off the penetration force but never was given a full effort in the right way... the French and British had plenty of combat power.. it just wasn't applied effectively on the operational level French also failed to conduct effective collections to prepare for an attack that should have been detected and reached to given advancements in aerial recon, a massive traffic jam in the Ardennes and massive columns The Germans did pull together a masterful example of combined arms, employing air, armor, anti-air, infantry, airborne operations, deception to the north and engineer mobility operations to cross the Meuse and push the penetration German operation was not a sure thing and could have been stopped had the French recognized and invested in developing the ability to mass armor and aircraft on the operational level. Additionally, a rigid command structure prevented local initiative in not only stopping, but defeating the massive penetration by the Germans. The Vichy France represented a temporary excursion from the French Republic that reflected growing discontent with the system... however, after 1940, Vicky lost much appeal -Failed to protect national sovereignty -Allowed German war machine to consume French youth -Implicit support for anti-semetic arrest and deportation of 12K Parisian Jews -the dose of authoritarianism the country needed to get back on the republican path Resistance movements across the country, ranging from overt resistance to simple support for downed fighters, gave the resistance movement an ocean for its fish to win in

Zabecki - Railroads: Strategic Necessity and Strategic Vulnerability

Key idea: WWI started and ended on the rails . Railroads were critical in sustaining modern warfare. Allies showed much more appreciation for the impact of rails throughout the entirety of the war whereas the Germans made operational errors by mounting large, force-on-force attacks rather than attacking the alliance's key vulnerability—the fragile and ver-burdened British logistics network... Amiens was the critical vulnerability of the BEF that would have pushed them out of the war and may have led to German victory -lines of operation decline the orientation of the force both in terms of space an time IRT the enemy -sequencing effects is the most important different experience between the tactical and operational levels of war... individual battles into a cumulative effect that will win the campaign -Logistics becomes far more important over time... targeting the enemy's logistics become -Sequencing was the ke weakness in WWI Germain Operational thinking -DOgma of annihilation distorted German perception regarding the operational level of war... put themselves in their own strategic coffin ... exhaustion, unrestricted sub warfare, America = no alternative but to attack -Germans saw BEF as a center of gravity in 1917... if you push them off the continent, France will collapse -German strategic decision to attack BEF made sense... lack of rear area, reliance on ports...the Germans failed IRT operational level decisions to engage in force-on-force ops rather than key vulnerability -Luddenforf's 5 1918 offenses... not much option... great tactical success at first... each got smaller and smaller with exhaustion of resources and loss of storm troopers who had played a large role in clearing te way for them -Aviation and rails were greatest technological changes with military application... Moltke had studied rails in Civil War -BEF rail system: shallow, tied to seaports, along strategic LOCs -Germain rails: few if any strategic chokepoints, connected to national base, more robust -Capacity of a port comes down to throughput... not how fast I can offload a ship... discharge and clearance is what matters -150 trucks to equal one train -Key points in a rail line: intersections, tunnels, bridges, switching yards, stations -Two key rail yards connecting all ports for British 1. Hazebrouck - North 2. Amiens - South Unified Command - Foch -Unanimous agreement in recognizing that Amiens had to be saved at all costs and that the fate of the war depended on it

Lembke (AOWS) - Landsdale, Magsaysay, America in the Philippines

Key idea: limited intervention success can be achieved in counterinsurgency operations with the right resources, the right people, and the right context... but you HAVE to understand what is causing the insurgency... insurgent violence is a symptom of a problem not a problem in itself Magsaysay and Landsdale worked closely to develop an understanding o peoples' needs, cultural context, and empathy needed to solve the insurgency problem in the years following the Japanese occupation of the Philippines. While Magsaysay was largely propped-up, influenced and successful due to Landsdale's adept political maneuvering (and covert funding), the two made a huge difference, ultimately defeating the Huk insurgency by addressing injustices, providing a an avenue for reintegration, and sweeping reforms to the military and provincial security forces that had long abused the populace and engaged in corruption with the rich land-owners of the Philippines. PI culture is very paternalistic... society backs their protectors 40 years of American colonial rule... effects of war... Philippines were not ready for independence and power struggles pursued... peasants didn't trust their government, the police, the private militias or the large land-owners/Rich... that's what gave the Huks power to rise as the protectors of the people... they could not be defeated until they were deprived of their power base and offered a graceful return to society through integration A change in the status quo represented a threat to the Philippine elite establishment... status quo = stability = good for the rich who were already positioned to control the land and the economy JUSMAG and American support (to include secret support for Magsaysay's campaign) were key to turning the tide and achieving Key insights: -Empathy -Relationships -Mutual trust between all parties -Deep sociocultural understanding -Covert resources and funding if needed for key players/organizations -fill paternalistic void... the people wanted a protector, they found that in the Huk Guerrillas in light of a dysfunctional and distrustful government -reform morale, organization, and discipline of armed forces and police forces alike -Leverage people with deep social understanding and commitment -Partners of character and integrity -Understand what everyone's interests are... how they align, how they conflict etc -YOU MUST UNDERSTAND THE CONTEXT

Hart - Colossal Cracks - The other elements

Montgomery's other elements: -Strategic, Operational, and tactical initiative -Balance of contradictory objectives, concerns, and interests in a rapidly changing battlefield environment -Administration / Logistics organization... a foundational block to success Air Power - devastating effects when combined with artillery Ancillary elements -Grip - planning and C2 -Flank Protection - used geography to assist -Surprise - always sought -Flexibility -Cooperation -Simplicity in planning... complexity and misunderstandings increase the chances of something going wrong -Learning

Hart - Colossal Cracks - Set Piece Battle

Montgomery's set-piece "Colossal Crack" Battle had the characteristics of the master plan, concentration, fire-power based attrition, and caution. He also combined this with his approach of "alternate thrusts" that kept the Germans off-balance in smaller-scale formations and engagements from various perspectives to ultimately wear down the enemy and set the stage for is "Colossal Crack." Think of it as jabs and then the uppercut.

Maurer - Philippine Colonial Rile, Property Rights, and Economic Development

Spanish Colonial Rule: 1565... defeated King of Cebu; established Manila in 1571 -Overtime, population harbored significant resentment, particularly over the friars' control over large feudal estates, -Calvite uprising of 1872 eat stage for the 1896 revolt, led by Emilio Aguinaldo America drew-up war plans for Spanish American war in 1897... called for Asiatic Squadron to take islands IOT deny Spain revenue, provide a base of operation, and gain leverage in the subsequent peace settlement US declared war on 25 April 1898 1 May ADM Dewey sailed into Manila Bay and destroyed the Spanish fleet... US Navy said it needed to control all of Luzon to support a permanent base in Subic Bay Main US interest was the retention of Manila and Subic Bay as a base of operations for the Asiatic squadron -President McKinley... decided he needed all or nothing approachh to the 7K islands in the PI....Benevolent assimilation Insurgency broke-out... two years to get it under contrl

DiMarco - Losing the Moral Compass

The French were very successful at winning against the FLN at the tactical level, but did not understand the ideological component of the struggle or the strategic information operations that was ultimately undermined by the use of torture and brutality to win on the tactical level because they felt the need to employ whatever means necessary to achieve success... ultimately justified use of torture The center of gravity for both the FLN and the French was the CoG The French got really good at eliminating the insurgency in Algeria but they missed the linkage between those ways and the strategic ends, or more importantly, the strategic results... and ultimately set the conductions for political failure in Algiers Official or unofficial condoning of torture is a strategic blunder... while torture will undoubtedly provide proximal success across levels of warfare but will ultimately lose out over time French occupation of Algeria - 1830s; declared a province in 1848 >90% of population denied the political rights of European >10% pied noirs / colons.... held most of the economic and political power Berbers - the people in the Algerian mountains Arabs - coastal area with most of the population Long history of Algerian resistance to the French who cracked-down by >suppression >martial law >wholesale arrests FLN arose as the great vehicle for the insurgency >popular support >Maoist insurgency theory >base among pro Arab and Berber population >eventually expand into urban area >next phase into urban terrorism and guerrilla operations aimed at damaging the prestige and structure of French governmental institutions as well as a means to attain influence in France and the international view >operations helped feed propaganda French response to the problem in Africa was the application of its conventional forces Applied COIN Doctrine from Indochina Isolated FLN -Morice Line -Denying material aid -quadrilateral system >helped isolate the systems at smaller and smaller levels -mobile strike reserve (mech, airborne, Foreign Legion) -Special Administrative Sections (SAS) >local governance and French legitimacy >education >democratic ideals >training harka forces (local security forces) -extensive HUMINT system >former FLN members as paid informants >aggressive interrogation >detention -Useful intelligence is one of the most important challenges of COIN -Reporting on abuses in torture >Erode international and domestic support >Embolden enemy >Control domestic/international damage O

Lewis - Reflections on German Military Reform

The Germans built a system that aimed to enhance military proficiency and showed the willingness t earn from mistakes, particularly those made in Poland which represented the first chance to transition from training to real-life... all of this was incubated from an honest assessment of the Polish campaign taught them: -improvement for organization and training -continued ability to operate in isolation from direction from political leaders German officers saw the western campaign as a mistake... with Hitler the only one bent on war German military took very seriously the flaws and mistakes uncovered in the Polish campaign: -lethargy -camouflage -recon -security -fire discipline Discipline Motorized infantry divisions too big... some given to the Panzer divisions -Light divisions Fred into mech recon forces -Realistic training exercises from October 1939 to May 1940... enabled the assimilation of new members and the exposure of veterans from WWI to adjust to the requirements of their new ranks -Bn commander school -Small unit leadership... training new squads and platoons -Focus on large unit preparations Copy of invasion plan lost to the allies in France in January 1941... led to delay to prepare to adopt the MANSTEIN PLAN... this delay as also caused by many of its commanders and divisions deployed temporarily to places to train

Herwig - 1914 Marne in the Balance

The Marne was a "close-run" thing that could have gone either way if it weren't for the elements of chance, choice, and the human dynamics at play... it ultimately was decisive in that some feel the Germans lost the war in September of 1914... and while the Marne didn't drive the war to continue, it did condition the world to brace for a new barbarity that they couldn't believe was possible... swallowing 10 million soldiers, with 20 mil injured by the end of the War in 1918. The German commands were a tale of two cities Moltke - fought from a distance and remained uninvolved The Germans by in large moved some senior leaders but ended up playing a pick-up game from the Marne on through the war This is contrasted with Joffre who's force of personality as a leader led him to lead from t he futon, communicate, and see the field... he got the wrong people off the bus and the right people into the right seats on the bus... used interior lines to move forces when he met failure at the Fronteirs and Charmes France lost 64% of iron, 62% of steel; 50 % coal Artillery rule the battle field Despite the carnage western morale held... referred to by some as the biggest surprise from the german perspective Carnage was frightful

Prior - The Outside Plan

The Somme on 1 July 1916 was an unmitigated disaster for the BEF that put half a million troops on-line with insufficient artillery preparation against a well-developed German trench system consisting of 3 trench lines... ultimately: -Troops werent trained (so much time had been devoted to Labour in preparation for the offensive) -no consideration for the math against the enemy fortifications and a proven formula for artillery concentration on trenches (half of what had worked at Neuve Chapelle... only one trench line had been attacked there... and the amount of trench matter more than the simple frontage) -Disagreements between Rawlson of the 4th Army and Haig who commanded the BEF.... ultimately caved to GHQ's desires for a deeper penetration, integration of cavalry into the attack, etc -Ambiguous direction to subordinates in terms of employment... resulted in little no effective employment of smoke and large slow-moving waves against a very-well protected enemy -Attacking ratio not even 1:2 -Haige wanted deep penetration with surprise; Rawlings wanted methodical preparation and successive seizures -A command structure and. Tradition that doesn't appear to have value dissent -Poor assumptions about organization and morale of enemy (probably a bad assumption at any time barring a pursuit of a broken foe) -Fresh troops who had little experience and relied on directive leadership to get things down -A command situation wherein the Amry commanders had been division commanders and division commanders had been battalion commanders to start as a result of attrition Combat physics: Preparation for a WWI offensive -build new roads -build new rail lines -establishment of ammunition dumps -laying communications wire -emplacing guns -laying pipe for water -Labor needs detracting from training Arty Challenges -communications -time to move guns between successive advances -ire plans -wear and tear on guns limiting sustained accuracy

Overly, Richard - Why the Allies Won

The allies won the Great War because of the will to win and the ability to turn economic strength into military force backed by coherent strategic objectives... Air proved to be the key competitive advantage to win... but winning would take a bit of chance and the conversion of the USA and USSR into superpowers to take-on the powers of Germany and Japan -GDP won the war for the allies... but you can't buy your way to a win... still need to fight at the end of it all -Germans and Japanese underestimated the allies ability and commitment to fight... also discredited the ability to adjust and learn... good parallel to Napoleon and the war of the coalitions that eventually figured out how to beat him -Axis had significant flaws in organization and logistics capabilities -The axis also committed all of their best human capital to fighting... stymied innovation, industry, and strategy... their systems also suffered from militarized societies that did not have the same flexibility and innovation driven by open, market-economies... axis made industry produce what they wanted as opposed to what the competition drove them to -USA mobilized the whole of society... harnessing the industrial, intellectual and organizational power of a demoncratic, free-market economy -Even still... chance mattered -Luftwaffe was marginalized by the strategic bombing campaigns and the need to withdrawal further back into Germany to fight the bombers... 80% of all air assets devoted to it by 1944... the addition of allies' long range bomber escorts was the nail in the coffin... this all eliminated the ability for the Germans to support the front lines and exert any semblance of air superiority -Anti-submarine warfare from the air brought the threat of U-Boats to a halt -Air gave the allies the greatest competitive advantage -The defeat of Germany... forces USA and USSR to become superpowers of their own -Hitler always found other things other than himself to blame his problems and defeats on... and above all the Jews -1941 made mistake f going to war with USSR, bringing it into war with the 3 largest industrialized economies in the world

Birtle - PI War 1899-1902

The army used a carrot and stick approach to win in the PI... learned that positives incentives alone were insufficient... Aguinaldo and his followers eventually laid their arms down because the cost of war became too high for them... many great lessons that must be maintained in context.... perhaps above all, it must be remembered that the insurgency was fed by dissatisfaction and protection of the people rather than an IDEOLOGY Nation-building in Cuba and Puerto Rico were relatively peaceful affairs... the Philippines was not 7K islands Spanish-American War... rise against Spanish overlords... Filipino revolutionaries rise-up against Americans Aguinaldo fought conventional war up-front... then reverted to guerrilla fighting where they had advantages of the populace, terrain, and acclimation >guerrilla organized into regional, autonomous commands >also built shadow governments >hoped to undermine American will Indian wars influenced thinking about benevolent assimilation... specifically in dispersing ones force for the purpose of protection the population, maintaining presence, and providing bases or prompt, offensive action -More than 600 bases established throughout the country-side -ground mobility and going light became very important -Filipino auxiliaries increasingly important -Employment of the Maccabees to fight the Tagalogs -Intelligence networks and systems -Control and protect the populace -Built trust: medical care, schools, hospitals, roads, governance, rule of law -Demonstrated Ned to be harsh on guerrillas when needed... if you cant retaliate and use violence, the populace will never trust you to protect them when the going gets tough General Chaffee replaced MacArthur and brought the war to a close... another civil war vet who had served in Sheridan's Shenandoah campaign Order 100 - martial law

Neiberg- Fighting the Great War

WWII would not have been necessary without the frustrations that emerged from WWI... the armistice brought about a end to hostilities rather than a lasting peace In the place of great empires, the seeds of fascism, Bolshevism, and authoritarianism arose Introduction of combined arms, aviation, railroad, massed artillery, combined command counsel, machine guns, gas, trenchworks, mechanized warfare, motorized vehicles, lethal small arms, Victory came from the evolution of an administrative, economic, and social support system that drove success... much f it financed through USA who emerged as a world power after investing more and more in the side they thought would have the least likelihood of defaulting on their debts Great book... easy to read

Griffith - Mao and Sun Tzu

• Key Idea ○ Mao was a thinker whose thoughts were heavily influenced by Sun Tzu and the overarching focus on attacking the enemy where his system is weak. If you want to understand Mao, Communist China, or contemporary Chinese thought, you must read Mao and Sun Tzu... its dangerous to assume that Chinese will apply the same pattern of thoughts and behaviors... ack to why you must understand how they think and why they think as posed to what they think • Mao grew up with an abusive father and a mother who employed the "indirect approach" • Mao was drawn to studies of rebellion in school Lai Hsiao-Chen was the biggest influence on Mao... Taiping Rebellion • Felt that Sun Tzu's teachings applied to all types of war • Following Nanchang uprising, appointed as commander of Red Army • Continued cobbling forces together • Began winning good success as a result of his focus on the people and the ease to soldiers... education, control, unified ideals, respect • The Nationalists... illiterate, terrible conditions, nepotistic leaders, disease, terrible medical conditions, poor commanders ○ Ed much desertion which helped bolster the communist party • 5th Campaign served as a severe set-back for the communists ○ Nationalists finally cooperated on a grand scale and did not allow their forces to be separated and defeated in detail § Employed a scorched earth policy § Removed communists from lands ○ Precipitated the Long March • At Pao An ○ Base of support for Reds ○ Mao did most of his thinking and writing ○ Came up with dictum § En advance... we retreat § En halts we harass § En avoids battle... we attack § Enemy retreats, we pursue ○ Idea of drawing enemy further into unknown terror its for defeat in detail ○ Change tactics based off of situaton and conditions • Communist party = people-focused • Nationalists = material-focused (also enabled by foreign support)

Roth - Operational Thought from Schlieffen to Mainstein

• Key idea. In both of the world wars, German political and military leaders got in one another's way, shunting whatever success they may ave been able to potentially achieve on the strategic level. In WWI, the politicians were hand-cuffed by the military and the Schlieffen Plan which achieved great operational success but was a strategic blunder in violating Belgium neutrality and in drawing Russia into the war on the eastern front. In WWII, Hitler served as the ultimate impediment to his own strategic success by hand-cuffing his military leaders' ability to achieve success on the operational and strategic level, calling Operation Sickle Cut short of Dunkirk and failing to let Barbarossa focus on Moscow until it was too late, eventually Irving all of his key leaders in the winter of 1941 and appointing himself as supreme commander of OKH. • War has no logic of its own, but it has a grammar... and Hitler didn't speak that Grammar • Younger Moltke was so enamored by the Cannae of the Schlieffen Plan that the Germans attempted a massive Cannae of an entire theater of war, when thy may have achieved better results by a Cannae of the French in their rapid advance into Lorraine • Tannenberg was another Canna-like envelopment of a single Russian Army... perhaps had the Germans applied a similar, limited-objective strategy in the west they would have met more success • Similar to the Germans, Hannibal won great tactical success at Cannae... but Carthage still failed on the strategic level • Operation CITADEL - Operation against Kursk... a very strong point... Opposite of Sickle Cut which aimed for a penetration at a point of weakness... worse... the Soviets expected the attack against Kursk so there was n surprise and the Soviets also postured a mobile reserve capable of carrying out a second strike against the germans... it was the Turing point of the German-Soviet War • Manstien was a huge advocate for SECOND STRIKE.. What we would call a mobile defense today... strategic defense, allowing the enemy to be sucked in before a decisive counterattack... Hitler didn't buy it and insisted they Germans get back to strategic offense • Hitler's meddling was made worse by his linear, trench warfare mental model of modern warfare... and his "hold-the=line" approach which deprived his ability leaders of the reform of action and initiative they needed to win a long shot of a fight • Case Yellow.. Original plan for the war against the allies in WWII... very similar to Schlieffen Plan and exactly what the French assumed the "dogmatic Germans would do".., the pushed defensive lines into Belgium and prepared a defense that consisted of the Maginot Line to the Right, The barriers of the Ardennes and Muse in the center, and massed forces deployed along the Dyle River • Manstein's Operational Thinking far surpassed that of Schlieffen... driving an armored wedge exactly were it wasn't expected • BH Liddel Hart described it as a bull fight with the Army Group B in the north as the cape and Army Group A in the south as the sword • Moltke's failure n don't of the Marne resulted from a failure to appropriately weight his enveloping force, leaving too much force on the pivot point of his left flank and robbing right wing of 2 additional corps tonight the Russians in the East

Paine - The Wars for Asia

• Key idea: ○ The collapse of the Qing dynasty in china gave rise to massive power vacuum that was further exacerbated by Japanese and external intervention in China... this gave rise to many waring factions in the North as well as the rise of a stabilizing ideology in Beijing. In time Shiang Ki Shek rose to power of the Nationalists and Mao rose to power with the communists § The Nationalists had a formidable army and therefore were the only ones truly capable of countering fighting the Japanese □ Believed in democratic ideals and private property □ Saw destruction of communists as essential to survival of their lives and principles... the communists threatened the middle and upper class which was the Nationalists' base of power § The communists grew out of popular sentiment against. Clas □ Class warfare □ Aimed to eliminate the Nationalists an dkill entire classes of people □ Implemented land reform that gave land back to the people, this tying them inextricably to the direction of the party § 5th encirclement entailed a 6,000 mile march (The Long March)of the communists to north China, but Shang could not take advantage of the opportunity to crush the communists largely due to continuous interference by the Japanese §