Cases For Con Law

Williamson vs Lee Optical Company

(1938) Oklahoma passed a law that prohibited optometrists putting new glasses on a person or replacing damaged lenses without a prescription from an Opthemologist. Williamson challenges this law, and the Supreme Court says in an Opinion by Justice Douglas: this may be a foolish law, but it is the responsibility of the legislatures of the legislatures, not the courts to balance this new requirement. We are no longer going to ask the question of wether it is reasonable or not, we are just going to assume that it is. Justice Douglas concludes "the day is gone that the Supreme Court uses the due process clause to strike down state laws in regulatory or industrial conditions because they may be unwise or....out of harmony with a particular train of thought. We resort to what they said in Munn V Illinois, that if people are unhappy with the state legislature, then they must resort to the polls, not the courts." Substantive due process in economic and regulatory matters are basically out the window except with one exception: that one exception has to do with punitive damages.

West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette

(1943) In 1942, the West Virginia Board of Education required public schools to include salutes to the flag by teachers and students as a mandatory part of school activities. The children in a family of Jehovah's Witnesses refused to perform the salute and were sent home from school for non-compliance. They were also threatened with reform schools used for criminally active children, and their parents faced prosecutions for causing juvenile delinquency. Did the compulsory flag-salute for public schoolchildren violate the First Amendment? In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court overruled its decision in Minersville School District v. Gobitis and held that compelling public schoolchildren to salute the flag was unconstitutional. In an opinion written by Robert Houghwout Jackson, the Court found that the First Amendment cannot enforce a unanimity of opinion on any topic, and national symbols like the flag should not receive a level of deference that trumps constitutional protections. He argued that curtailing or eliminating dissent was an improper and ineffective way of generating unity.

Schneck v. U.S.

(1919) During World War I, socialists Charles Schenck and Elizabeth Baer distributed leaflets declaring that the draft violated the Thirteenth Amendment prohibition against involuntary servitude. The leaflets urged the public to disobey the draft, but advised only peaceful action. Schenck was charged with conspiracy to violate the Espionage Act of 1917 by attempting to cause insubordination in the military and to obstruct recruitment. Schenck and Baer were convicted of violating this law and appealed on the grounds that the statute violated the First Amendment. Did Schenck's conviction under the Espionage Act for criticizing the draft violate his First Amendment right to freedom of speech? The Court held that the Espionage Act did not violate the First Amendment and was an appropriate exercise of Congress' wartime authority. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes concluded that courts owed greater deference to the government during wartime, even when constitutional rights were at stake. Articulating for the first time the "clear and present danger test," Holmes concluded that the First Amendment does not protect speech that approaches creating a clear and present danger of a significant evil that Congress has power to prevent. Holmes reasoned that the widespread dissemination of the leaflets was sufficiently likely to disrupt the conscription process. Famously, he compared the leaflets to shouting "Fire!" in a crowded theatre, which is not permitted under the First Amendment.

Ex parte Milligan

(1866) Lambdin P. Milligan had been arrested in 1864, charged with aiding the Confederacy, conspiring to free Confederate prisoners, and inciting insurrection. Arrested in his Indiana home by the Union general in command of the state, Milligan had been active in a secret society friendly to the Confederate cause. He was tried by a military court established in Indiana under the authority of President Abraham Lincoln, found guilty, and sentenced to hang. Milligan's lawyers sought a writ of habeas corpus, contesting the constitutionality of the military trial. Does a civil court have jurisdiction over a military tribunal? The case eventually reached the Supreme Court, which unanimously declared that the president had no power to set up military tribunals in secure areas where civil courts were functioning. A majority of the Court also declared that Congress, too, lacked such authority. Milligan, as a consequence, had been deprived of his constitutional right to trial by jury and was freed after 18 months in jail. Justice Davis delivered the opinion. Ruled that a civilian cannot be tried in military courts while civil courts are available.

The Slaughter-House Cases

(1873) Significant because the "privileges and immunities" clause of the 14th Amendment does not apply to states or individuals. in American history, legal dispute that resulted in a landmark U.S. Supreme Court decision in 1873 limiting the protection of the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. In 1869 the Louisiana state legislature granted a monopoly of the New Orleans slaughtering business to a single corporation. Other slaughterhouses brought suit, contending that the monopoly abridged their privileges and immunities as U.S. citizens and deprived them of property without due process of law. When the suit reached the Supreme Court in 1873, it presented the first test of the Fourteenth Amendment, a Reconstruction measure ratified in 1868. By a five-to-four majority, the Court ruled against the other slaughterhouses. Associate Justice Samuel F. Miller, for the majority, declared that the Fourteenth Amendment had "one pervading purpose": protection of the newly emancipated blacks. The amendment did not, however, shift control over all civil rights from the states to the federal government. States still retained legal jurisdiction over their citizens, and federal protection of civil rights did not extend to the property rights of businessmen. Dissenting justices held that the Fourteenth Amendment protected all U.S. citizens from state violations of privileges and immunities and that state impairment of property rights was a violation of due process. The Slaughterhouse Cases represented a temporary reversal in the trend toward centralization of power in the federal government. More importantly, in limiting the protection of the privileges and immunities clause, the court unwittingly weakened the power of the Fourteenth Amendment to protect the civil rights of blacks.

Munn vs. Illinois

(1877) First case that Due Process played a large role. Supreme Court upheld the right of a state to regulate businesses of a public nature, such as railroads. Illinois Constitution began regulating grain houses and grain elevators and moderating the amount of interests they could charge. Munn (Who owns a grain house) says hey, you are infringing on my private property and not allowing me to charge what is necessary. This violates due process Chief Justice Waite and the court upheld the Louisiana Legislature because there are certain businesses that are simply clothed with a public interest, and if you are providing a public accommodation, if you are serving the public in a way on certain key things, you are going to be serviced to legislation. Used argument that says that the phrase of "Due Process" has originated since the Magna Carta in England and has been used to regulate ferries, carries, hackman, bakers, innkeepers, etc. "From time in memorial" 15th century phrase, "Back to that time when the memory of man runneth not the concrete" 1189 King Richard I Property does become a matter of public interest when used in a manner to make it a public consequence and effect the community at large. When one devotes a use to the public for its use, it must submit to be controlled by the public for the common good to the extent of the interest he has created. If you don't wanna have how much you want to charge on you, close your warehouse Waite admits that this power can be abused, but it is no argument against its existence. For its protection against abuses by legislatures, people must resort to the polls, not the courts

Lochner v. New York

(1905) Lochner was the the most notorious Supreme Court cases with the exception of Dred Scott, because the court rarely played the role to strike down state laws. It was also an example of Substantive Due Process. The most famous contract clause case is Lochner. New York passed an act that limited the number of hours, Lochner allowed his bakers to work more than 60 hours a week of work. Lochner said that this case infringed on the 14th amendment freedom of liberty as it infringed on the contacts between employers and employees. Does the bakeshop act violate the 14th amendment? Court decided it did. Justice Peckam delivered the opinion. The law limiting bakers' working hours did not constitute a legitimate exercise of state police powers, so was unconstitutional. Allowing workers to work over 60 hours a week did not provide any harm on the worker, specifically baking was not a harmful profession. The Court said it failed the rational basis test Declared unconstitutional a New York act limiting the working hours of bakers due to a denial of the 14th Amendment rights.

Gitlow v. New York

(1925) Gitlow, a socialist, was arrested in 1919 for distributing a "Left Wing Manifesto" that called for the establishment of socialism through strikes and class action of any form. Gitlow was convicted under New York's Criminal Anarchy Law, which punished advocating the overthrow of the government by force. At his trial, Gitlow argued that since there was no resulting action flowing from the manifesto's publication, the statute penalized utterances without propensity to incitement of concrete action. The appellate division affirmed his conviction, as did the New York Court of Appeals, the highest court in that stat Does the First Amendment prevent a state from punishing political speech that directly advocates the government's violent overthrow In an opinion authored by Justice Edward Sanford, the Court concluded that New York could prohibit advocating violent efforts to overthrow the government under the Criminal Anarchy Law. Citing Schenck and Abrams, the Court reasoned the government could punish speech that threatens its basic existence because of the national security implications. Despite the small scale of Gitlow's actions, the majority was not persuaded that they were too insignificant to have an impact. The Supreme Court previously held, in Barron v. Baltimore (1833), that the Constitution's Bill of Rights applied only to the federal government. Gitlow partly reversed that precedent and established that while the Bill of Rights was designed to limit the power of the federal government, the incorporation principle allows it to be applied to states. In dissent, Justice Olver Wendell Holmes held that Gitlow had not violated the clear and present danger test used in Schenck. Since Gitlow's call to action was abstract and would not resonate with a large number of people, Holmes concluded that there was not sufficient imminence to warrant punishing the speech.

Near v. Minnesota

(1931) In a Minneapolis newspaper called The Saturday Press, Jay Near and Howard Guilford accused local officials of being implicated with gangsters. Minnesota officials sought a permanent injunction against The Saturday Press on the grounds that it violated the Public Nuisance Law because it was malicious, scandalous, and defamatory. The law provided that any person "engaged in the business" of regularly publishing or circulating an "obscene, lewd, and lascivious" or a "malicious, scandalous and defamatory" newspaper or periodical was guilty of a nuisance, and could be enjoined from further committing or maintaining the nuisance. The state supreme court upheld both the temporary injunction and the permanent injunction that eventually issued from the trial court. Does the Minnesota "gag law" violate the free press provision of the First Amendment? In an opinion authored by Chief Justice Charles Hughes, the Court held that the statute authorizing the injunction was facially unconstitutional, meaning the decision was based on an analysis of the law's general applications, not the specific context of this case. The Court held that the statutory scheme constituted a prior restraint and hence was invalid under the First Amendment. (The majority used the incorporation doctrine to apply the rights granted under the Bill of Rights to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment.) The Court established as a constitutional principle the doctrine that, with some narrow exceptions, the government could not censor or otherwise prohibit a publication in advance, even though the communication might be punishable after publication in a criminal or other proceeding. In some situations, such as when speech is obscene, incites violence, or reveals military secrets, the government might be able to justify a prior restraint.

Palko vs Connecticut

(1937) Franco Palko was charged with first-degree murder but got sentenced to Second-Degree murder/life inprisonment. Then the state of Connecticut with permission of a trial judge appealed to the Connecticut Supreme Court and they tried Palko again for first degree murder. Palko said that it violated the 14th Amendment of Due Process because you can't try someone for the same crime twice. Justice Cordozo delivered the opinion. Supreme Court introduces 'fundamental liberties' and which sections of the Bill of Rights apply to the States. Cordozo determines that Palko should have been charged twice because the rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause were not fundamental. Connecticut retried Palko because his first trial had serious errors. Defendants are allowed to get retrials when their first trials have errors. Cardozo said it made the system more fair to give both defendants and states the right to have error free trials. This ruling was overturned in Benton v. Maryland

West Coast Hotel Company vs Parrish

(1937) Washington enacted a minimum wage law covering women and minors. Parrish was employed by the West Coast Hotel Company and she sued the hotel for not paying her minimum wage. In a 5-to-4 decision written by Justice Charles Evans Hughes, the Court held that the establishment of minimum wages for women was constitutional. Echoing Muller v. Oregon (1908), the majority ruled that the state may use its police power to restrict the individual freedom to contract. The decision overruled Atkins and marked the Court's departure from the expansive view of the freedom to contract. The decision is generally regarded as having ended the Lochner era, a period in American legal history in which the Supreme Court tended to invalidate legislation aimed at regulating business. While Justice Hughes wrote the opinion, the stark doctrinal shift resulted from Justice Owen Josephus Roberts changing his perspective on this issue. According to Hughes, President Franklin Roosevelt's reelection in 1936 and the impressive achievements of the New Deal caused Roberts to abandon his affiliation with the Court's conservative justices. The willingness of the court to second-guess the legislation of the states is out the window in this case.

Unites States vs Carolene Products Company

(1938) In what became a famous footnote in an otherwise unimportant case, Justice Stone developed the justification for "more exacting judicial scrutiny" where infringements of civil liberties (as opposed to economic rights) are involved Justice Stone delivered the opinion. A 1923 act of Congress banned the interstate shipment of "filled milk" (skimmed milk mixed with fat or oil other than milk fat). Carolene Products, a milk manufacturer, was indicted under the Act. The trial court dismissed the indictment. On appeal to the federal government, the court was tasked with determining whether the Act was unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment. Carolene Products argued that the law lacked rational basis and also that Congress did not regulate the use of oleomargarine, which substituted vegetable fats for butter fat, in interstate commerce. Does the law violate the Commerce Power granted to Congress in Article Section 8 and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment? In an opinion authored by Justice Harlan Fiske Stone, the Court upheld the act. The majority reasoned Congress may restrict shipments of certain milk substitutes without also restricting butter. Considering that Congress had held many hearings prior to passing this law, it was reasonable to conclude that Congress believed it was necessary for public welfare. Carolene Products failed to meet its burden of proving that no rational basis for the law existed.

Everson v. Board of Education

(1947) A New Jersey law authorized reimbursement by local school boards of the costs of transportation to and from schools, including private schools. 96% of the private schools who benefitted from this law were parochial Catholic schools. Arch R. Everson, a taxpayer in Ewing Township, filed a lawsuit alleging that this indirect aid to religion violated both the New Jersey state constitution and the First Amendment. After losing in state courts, Everson appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court on purely federal constitutional grounds. Did the New Jersey statute violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment? Justice Black delivered the opinion. A divided Court held that the law did not violate the Constitution. Justice Black reasoned that the law did not pay money to parochial schools, nor did it support them directly in anyway. It was rather enacted to assist parents of all religions with getting their children to school. New Jersey provides funds for kids going to school to ride public transportation to get to school In this case it was not supporting a specific religion because we wouldn't keep police officers from going to the aid of religious people It wasn't done for religious purposes it was done for student safety In a 5-4 case, Supreme Court incorporates establishment clause to apply to the states

Dennis v. United States

(1951) Refined the clear and present danger test In 1948, eleven Communist Party leaders were convicted of advocating the violent overthrow of the US government and for the violation of several points of the Smith Act. The Act made it unlawful to knowingly conspire to teach and advocate the overthrow or destruction of the United States government. The party members who had been petitioning for socialist reforms claimed that the Act violated their First Amendment rights. Party leaders were found guilty and lower courts upheld the conviction Did the Smith Act violate the First Amendment? Opinion written by Justice Vinson. In a 6-to-2 decision, the Court upheld the convictions of the Communist Party leaders and found that the Smith Act did not "inherently" violate the First Amendment. In the plurality opinion, the Court held that there was a distinction between the mere teaching of communist philosophies and active advocacy of those ideas. Such advocacy created a "clear and present danger" that threatened the government. Given the gravity of the consequences, the Court held that success or probability of success was not necessary to justify restrictions on the freedom of speech. Justices Frankfurter and Jackson concurred in separate opinions. Justices Black and Douglas dissented in separate opinions. Justice Black stressed that the petitioners were not charged with an attempt to overthrow the Government or any overt acts designed to overthrow the Government. They were not even charged with saying anything or writing anything designed to overthrow the Government. The charge was that they agreed to assemble and to talk and publish certain ideas at a later date. "No matter how it is worded, this is a virulent form of prior censorship of speech and press, which I believe the First Amendment forbids."

Barenblatt v. United States

(1959) During hearings of the House Committee on Un-American Activities, Lloyd Barenblatt, a university professor, refused to answer questions concerning his political and religious beliefs along with his associational activities. He was found in contempt of Congress for failing to cooperate with the committee investigation. Did the House Committee's investigation into Barenblatt's affiliations with the Communist Party transgress his First Amendment protections which limit congressional inquiries? The divided Court found that the Committee's actions did not violate the First Amendment and, thus, upheld Barenblatt's conviction for contempt of Congress. JUSTICE HARLAN noted that the First Amendment does not protect a witness from all lines of questioning. As long as the Congressional inquiry is pursued to "aid the legislative process" and to protect important government interests, then it is legitimate.

Sherbert v. Verner

(1963) Adeil Sherbert, a member of the Seventh-day Adventist Church, was fired from her job after she refused to work on Saturday, the Sabbath Day of her faith. The Employment Security Commission ruled that she could not receive unemployment benefits because her refusal to work on Saturday constituted a failure without good cause to accept available work. Under South Carolina law, employers were not allowed to require employees to work on Sunday. Did the denial of unemployment compensation violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments? The Free Exercise Clause prohibits the government from setting unemployment benefits eligibility requirements such that a person cannot properly observe key religious principles. In a majority opinion written by Justice Brennan, the Court held that the state's eligibility restrictions for unemployment compensation imposed a significant burden on Sherbert's ability to freely exercise her faith. Furthermore, there was no compelling state interest which justified such a substantial burden on this basic First Amendment right. Justices Douglas and Stewart concurred in separate opinions. Justice Harlan, joined by Justice White, dissented on the ground that Seventh-Day Adventist was unavailable for Saturday work just as anyone who refuses Saturday work for personal reasons is unavailable, and that the effect of the Court's decision was to require South Carolina to make an exception in favor of those whose unavailability for work stems from religious convictions.

School District of Abington Township, Pennsylvania v. Schempp

(1963) Under Pennsylvania law, public schools were required to read from the bible at the opening of each school day. The school district sought to enjoin enforcement of the statute. The district court ruled that the statute violated the First Amendment, even after the statute had been amended to permit a student to excuse himself. The Court consolidated this case with one involving Maryland atheists who challenged a city rule that provided for opening exercises in the public schools that consisted primarily of reading a chapter from the bible and the Lord's Prayer. The state's highest court held the exercise did not violate the First Amendment. The religious character of the exercise was admitted by the state. Did the Pennsylvania law requiring public school students to participate in classroom religious exercises violate the religious freedom of students as protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments? Public schools cannot sponsor Bible readings and recitations of the Lord's Prayer under the First Amendment's Establishment Clause. In an opinion authored by Justice Clark, the majority concluded that, in both cases, the laws required religious exercises and such exercises directly violated the First Amendment. The Court affirmed the Pennsylvania decision, and reversed and remanded the Maryland decision because the mandatory reading from the bible before school each day was found to be unconstitutional. Justice Stewart dissented, expressing the view that on the records it could not be said that the Establishment Clause had necessarily been violated. He would remand both cases for further hearings.

New York Times v. Sullivan

(1964) During the Civil Rights movement of the 1960s, the New York Times published an ad for contributing donations to defend Martin Luther King, Jr., on perjury charges. The ad contained several minor factual inaccuracies. The city Public Safety Commissioner, L.B. Sullivan, felt that the criticism of his subordinates reflected on him, even though he was not mentioned in the ad. Sullivan sent a written request to the Times to publicly retract the information, as required for a public figure to seek punitive damages in a libel action under Alabama law. When the Times refused and claimed that they were puzzled by the request, Sullivan filed a libel action against the Times and a group of African American ministers mentioned in the ad. A jury in state court awarded him $500,000 in damages. The state supreme court affirmed and the Times appealed. Did Alabama's libel law unconstitutionally infringe on the First Amendment's freedom of speech and freedom of press protections? To sustain a claim of defamation or libel, the First Amendment requires that the plaintiff show that the defendant knew that a statement was false or was reckless in deciding to publish the information without investigating whether it was accurate. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Brennan, the Court ruled for the Times. When a statement concerns a public figure, the Court held, it is not enough to show that it is false for the press to be liable for libel. Instead, the target of the statement must show that it was made with knowledge of or reckless disregard for its falsity. Brennan used the term "actual malice" to summarize this standard, although he did not intend the usual meaning of a malicious purpose. In libel law, "malice" had meant knowledge or gross recklessness rather than intent, since courts found it difficult to imagine that someone would knowingly disseminate false information without a bad intent.

Duncan vs Lousiana

(1968) Gary Duncan, an African American man, was sued for assault by a white man by slapping his arm. He as for a trial by jury to which the Judge declined stating "state constitution permitted just trials only in instances in which hard labor or capital punishment may be imposed." Duncan appealed to the Supreme Court Justice White delivered the opinion of the court Was the State of Louisiana obligated to provide a trial by jury in criminal cases such as Duncan's? Yes. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment guarantee of trial by jury in criminal cases was "fundamental to the American scheme of justice," and that the states were obligated under the Fourteenth Amendment to provide such trials. Petty crimes, defined as those punishable by no more than six months in prison and a $500 fine, were not subject to the jury trial provision. However, Louisiana's law regarding petty crimes were outdated and thus appellant deserved a right to a trial by jury Significant because apples the sixth amendment trial by jury as a fundamental liberty that are applied to the states

Brandenburg v. Ohio

(1969) Brandenburg, a leader in the Ku Klux Klan, made a speech at a Klan rally and was later convicted under an Ohio criminal syndicalism law. The law made illegal advocating "crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political reform," as well as assembling "with any society, group, or assemblage of persons formed to teach or advocate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism." Did Ohio's criminal syndicalism law, prohibiting public speech that advocates various illegal activities, violate Brandenburg's right to free speech as protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments? The Court's Per Curiam opinion held that the Ohio law violated Brandenburg's right to free speech. The Court used a two-pronged test to evaluate speech acts: (1) speech can be prohibited if it is "directed at inciting or producing imminent lawless action" and (2) it is "likely to incite or produce such action." The criminal syndicalism act made illegal the advocacy and teaching of doctrines while ignoring whether or not that advocacy and teaching would actually incite imminent lawless action. The failure to make this distinction rendered the law overly broad and in violation of the Constitution

Lemon v. Kurtzman

(1971) Both Pennsylvania and Rhode Island adopted statutes that provided for the state to pay for aspects of non-secular, non-public education. The Pennsylvania statute was passed in 1968 and provided funding for non-public elementary and secondary school teachers' salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials for secular subjects. Rhode Island's statute was passed in 1969 and provided state financial support for non-public elementary schools in the form of supplementing 15% of teachers' annual salaries. The appellants in the Pennsylvania case represented citizens and taxpayers in Pennsylvania who believed that the statute violated the separation of church and state described in the First Amendment. Appellant Lemon also had a child in Pennsylvania public school. The district court granted the state officials' motion to dismiss the case. In the Rhode Island case, the appellees were citizens and tax payers of Rhode Island who sued to have the statute in question declared unconstitutional by arguing that it violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The district court found in favor of the appellees and held that the statute violated the First Amendment. Do statutes that provide state funding for non-public, non-secular schools violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment? Yes. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger delivered the opinion for the 8-0 majority as to the Pennsylvania statute and 8-1 as to the Rhode Island statute. The Court held that a statute must pass a three-pronged test in order to avoid violating the Establishment Clause. The statute must have a secular legislative purpose, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither promotes nor inhibits religion, and it must not foster "excessive government entanglement with religion." The Court held that both the state statutes in question had secular legislative purposes because they reflected the desire of the states to ensure minimum secular education requirements were being met in the non-public schools. The Court did not reach a holding regarding the second prong of the test, but it did find that the statutes constituted an excessive government entanglement with religion. In the Rhode Island program, the amount of oversight of teachers and curricula required to ensure that there is no unnecessary injection of religion into secular topics would require the government to become excessively involved in the nuances of religious education. The same danger holds true for the Pennsylvania statute, which additionally provides state funding directly to a church-related organization. Government financial involvement in such institutions inevitably leads to "an intimate and continuing relationship" between church and state. The Court also noted the potential political implications of public funding, as there is a risk of religious issues becoming politically divisive.

New York Times v. United States

(1971) In what became known as the "Pentagon Papers Case," the Nixon Administration attempted to prevent the New York Times and Washington Post from publishing materials belonging to a classified Defense Department study regarding the history of United States activities in Vietnam. The President argued that prior restraint was necessary to protect national security. This case was decided together with United States v. Washington Post Co Did the Nixon administration's efforts to prevent the publication of what it termed "classified information" violate the First Amendment? Yes. In its per curiam opinion the Court held that the government did not overcome the "heavy presumption against" prior restraint of the press in this case. Justices Black and Douglas argued that the vague word "security" should not be used "to abrogate the fundamental law embodied in the First Amendment." Justice Brennan reasoned that since publication would not cause an inevitable, direct, and immediate event imperiling the safety of American forces, prior restraint was unjustified.

Branzburg v. Hayes

(1972) After observing and interviewing a number of people synthesizing and using drugs in a two-county area in Kentucky, Branzburg, a reporter, wrote a story which appeared in a Louisville newspaper. On two occasions he was called to testify before state grand juries which were investigating drug crimes. Branzburg refused to testify and potentially disclose the identities of his confidential sources. Similarly, in the companion cases of In re Pappas and United States v. Caldwell, two different reporters, each covering activity within the Black Panther organization, were called to testify before grand juries and reveal trusted information. Like Branzburg, both Pappas and Caldwell refused to appear before their respective grand juries. Is the requirement that news reporters appear and testify before state or federal grand juries an abridgement of the freedoms of speech and press as guaranteed by the First Amendment? No. The Court found that requiring reporters to disclose confidential information to grand juries served a "compelling" and "paramount" state interest and did not violate the First Amendment. Justice White argued that since the case involved no government intervention to impose prior restraint, and no command to publish sources or to disclose them indiscriminately, there was no Constitutional violation. The fact that reporters receive information from sources in confidence does not privilege them to withhold that information during a government investigation; the average citizen is often forced to disclose information received in confidence when summoned to testify in court.

Wallace v. Jaffree

(1985) An Alabama law authorized teachers to conduct regular religious prayer services and activities in school classrooms during the school day. Three of Jaffree's children attended public schools in Mobile. Did Alabama law violate the First Amendment's Establishment Clause? Yes. The Court determined the constitutionality of Alabama's prayer and meditation statute by applying the secular purpose test, which asked if the state's actual purpose was to endorse or disapprove of religion. The Court held that Alabama's passage of the prayer and meditation statute was not only a deviation from the state's duty to maintain absolute neutrality toward religion, but was an affirmative endorsement of religion. As such, the statute clearly lacked any secular purpose as it sought to establish religion in public schools, thereby violating the First Amendment's Establishment Clause.

Nollan vs California Coastal Commission

(1987) Nolan had a house on the Pacific Ocean. Little old brown shackel. He wanted to be able to build a big elaborate fancy house. He had to apply for a permit to do the renovation, but the California Coastal Commission said that they will allow you to build that house, but we want the public to have use of that beach. So they sketched out an area for the Nolan's that showed that the Nolan's had to give up their private property for public use. Nolan's brought it to court saying that there had been a regulatory taking. Majority five desicion, with Scalia writing the opinion of the court. The rejects the claims of the CA Coastal Commissions Yes. The Court agreed that a legitimate interest may be served by maintaining a "continuous strip of publicly accessible beach along the coast." However, reasoned Justice Scalia, if California wished to use its power of eminent domain to do so, it must provide just compensation to the Nollans and other beachfront property owners for the public use of their land.

Texas v. Johnson

(1989) In 1984, in front of the Dallas City Hall, Gregory Lee Johnson burned an American flag as a means of protest against Reagan administration policies. Johnson was tried and convicted under a Texas law outlawing flag desecration. He was sentenced to one year in jail and assessed a $2,000 fine. After the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the conviction, the case went to the Supreme Court. Is the desecration of an American flag, by burning or otherwise, a form of speech that is protected under the First Amendment? In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that Johnson's burning of a flag was protected expression under the First Amendment. The Court found that Johnson's actions fell into the category of expressive conduct and had a distinctively political nature. The fact that an audience takes offense to certain ideas or expression, the Court found, does not justify prohibitions of speech. The Court also held that state officials did not have the authority to designate symbols to be used to communicate only limited sets of messages, noting that "[i]f there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the Government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable."

Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith

(1990) Two counselors for a private drug rehabilitation organization ingested peyote -- a powerful hallucinogen -- as part of their religious ceremonies as members of the Native American Church. As a result of this conduct, the rehabilitation organization fired the counselors. The counselors filed a claim for unemployment compensation. The government denied them benefits because the reason for their dismissal was considered work-related "misconduct." The state appellate court reversed the denial of benefits, finding that the denial violated their First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion. The state supreme court affirmed the appellate court. The U.S. Supreme Court vacated the Oregon Supreme Court's judgment against the disgruntled employees, and returned the case to the Oregon courts to determine whether or not sacramental use of illegal drugs violated Oregon's state drug laws (485 U.S. 660 (1988)). On remand, the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that while Oregon drug law prohibited the consumption of illegal drugs for sacramental religious uses, this prohibition violated the Free Exercise Clause. The case returned to the U.S. Supreme Court in this new posture. Can a state deny unemployment benefits to a worker fired for using illegal drugs for religious purposes? Yes. Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the majority, observed that the Court has never held that an individual's religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that government is free to regulate. Allowing exceptions to every state law or regulation affecting religion "would open the prospect of constitutionally required exemptions from civic obligations of almost every conceivable kind." Scalia cited as examples compulsory military service, payment of taxes, vaccination requirements, and child-neglect laws.

Lucas vs South Carolina Coastal Council

(1992) Does the construction ban depriving Lucas of all economically viable use of his property amount to a "taking" calling for "just compensation" under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments? Scalia in 1992, writes again in a regulatory takings case involving the east coast and the South Carolina Coastal Council Lucas bought a couple pieces of property side by side on the isle of Palms. It was his plan to build a house on one of the plots of land, and then build a second house to sell to someone else. He spent $175,000 on each plot. After he purchased them, SC Coastal Council passed a law that prevents building structures on the Isle because of fear of beach erosion. This left Lucas with a million dollars worth of property that he could not build on. In the litigation that ensued, the state acknowledged that the law had deprived Lucas of all economic advantages of the property. If the state had not made that concession, then the case may not have turned out the same. But with that concession, it was easy for the court to hold that if you are going to pass a regulation that removes economic advantage from the property, then this is a taking that requires just compensation The trial court had found Lucas's two front lots to be valueless Yes. In a 6-to-2 decision, the Court relied on the trial court's finding that Lucas's lots had been rendered valueless by the state law. "[W]hen the owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good...he has suffered a taking."

Lee v. Weisman

(1992) In keeping with the practice of several other public middle and high school principals in Providence, Rhode Island, Robert E. Lee, a middle school principal, invited a rabbi to speak at his school's graduation ceremony. Daniel Weisman's daughter, Deborah, was among the graduates. Hoping to stop the rabbi from speaking at his daughter's graduation, Weisman sought a temporary restaining order in District Court - but was denied. After the ceremony, where prayers were recited, Weisman filed for a permanent injunction barring Lee and other Providence public school officials from inviting clergy to deliver invocations and benedictions at their schools' ceremonies. When the Court of Appeals affirmed a District Court ruling against the schools, Lee appealed to the Supreme Court and was granted certiorari. Does the inclusion of clergy who offer prayers at official public school ceremonies violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment? Yes. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that government involvement in this case creates "a state-sponsored and state-directed religious exercise in a public school." Such conduct conflicts with settled rules proscribing prayer for students. The school's rule creates subtle and indirect coercion (students must stand respectfully and silently), forcing students to act in ways which establish a state religion. The cornerstone principle of the Establishment Clause is that government may not compose official prayers to recite as part of a religious program carried on by government.

R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul

(1992) Several teenagers allegedly burned a crudely fashioned cross on a black family's lawn. The police charged one of the teens under a local bias-motivated criminal ordinance which prohibits the display of a symbol which "arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender." The trial court dismissed this charge. The state supreme court reversed. R.A.V. appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. Is the ordinance overly broad and impermissibly content-based in violation of the First Amendment free speech clause? Yes. In a 9-to-0 vote, the justices held the ordinance invalid on its face because "it prohibits otherwise permitted speech solely on the basis of the subjects the speech addresses." The First Amendment prevents government from punishing speech and expressive conduct because it disapproves of the ideas expressed. Under the ordinance, for example, one could hold up a sign declaring all anti-semites are bastards but not that all Jews are bastards. Government has no authority "to license one side of a debate to fight freestyle, while requiring the other to follow the Marquis of Queensbury Rules." Opinion written by Scalia

Rosenberger v. University of Virginia

(1995) Ronald W. Rosenberger, a University of Virginia student, asked the University for $5,800 from a student activities fund to subsidize the publishing costs of Wide Awake: A Christian Perspective at the University of Virginia. The University refused to provide funding for the publication solely because it "primarily promotes or manifests a particular belief in or about a deity or an ultimate reality," as prohibited by University guidelines. Did the University of Virginia violate the First Amendment rights of its Christian magazine staff by denying them the same funding resources that it made available to secular student-run magazines? Yes. The Court, majority opinion written by Kennedy in a 5-to-4 opinion, held that the University's denial of funding to Rosenberger, due to the content of his message, imposed a financial burden on his speech and amounted to viewpoint discrimination. The Court noted that no matter how scarce University publication funding may be, if it chooses to promote speech at all, it must promote all forms of it equally. Furthermore, because it promoted past publications regardless of their religious content, the Court found the University's publication policy to be neutral toward religion and, therefore, not in violation of the establishment clause. The Court concluded by stating that the University could not stop all funding of religious speech while continuing to fund an atheistic perspective. The exclusion of several views is as offensive to free speech as the exclusion of only one. The University must provide a financial subsidy to a student religious publication on the same basis as other student publications.

Hamdi vs Rumsfeld

(2004) In the fall of 2001, Yaser Hamdi, an American citizen, was detained by the United States military in Afghanistan. He was accused of fighting for the Taliban against the U.S., declared an "enemy combatant," and was held in Guantanamo Bay. Upon learning he was an American citizen, he was transferred to a military prison in Virginia. Hamdi's father, Esam Fouad Hamdi, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus naming himself as Hamdi's "next friend," in an attempt to have Hamdi's detention declared unconstitutional. Justice O'Conner in an 8-1 decision established that although Congress authorized Hamdi's detention, Fifth Amendment due process guarantees give a citizen held in the United States as an enemy combatant the right to contest that detention before a neutral decisionmaker. The plurality rejected the government's argument that the separation-of-powers prevents the judiciary from hearing Hamdi's challenge. The case of Hamdi v. Rumsfeld established a number of important legal precedents regarding due process, elucidating the nature of executive power over enemy combatants in an age where the lines of battle had been blurred and US citizens might be found in a legal grey area of cavorting with enemy terrorists against the US. Whereas, previously, the level of rights that such US citizens suspected of fighting against the US had was unclear, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld strongly upheld that a US citizen, even one that was suspected of fighting for an enemy force, was entitled to the legal right to due process under legal law and all that said right entailed, including the right to habeas corpus, the right to have an attorney, and the right to challenge their detainment. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld also established a number of clear limitations on the power of the federal government, specifically its power to declare and detain enemy combatants. Whereas the the Executive Branch before Hamdi v. Rumsfeld held that it had sole prerogative to declare enemy combatants, which could not be challenged, the Supreme Court shot down these assertions in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, stating in no uncertain terms that the Judiciary had a legitimate and important check on Executive power in this regard, and that the power to secure national security did not extend to the power to try enemy combatants without the intervention of judicial authorities. Ruled that unlawful combatants in US have due process rights (even w/o citizenship)

Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union

(1997) Several litigants challenged the constitutionality of two provisions in the 1996 Communications Decency Act. Intended to protect minors from unsuitable internet material, the Act criminalized the intentional transmission of "obscene or indecent" messages as well as the transmission of information which depicts or describes "sexual or excretory activities or organs" in a manner deemed "offensive" by community standards. After being enjoined by a District Court from enforcing the above provisions, except for the one concerning obscenity and its inherent protection against child pornography, Attorney General Janet Reno appealed directly to the Supreme Court as provided for by the Act's special review provisions. Did certain provisions of the 1996 Communications Decency Act violate the First and Fifth Amendments by being overly broad and vague in their definitions of the types of internet communications which they criminalized? Yes. The Court held that the Act violated the First Amendment because its regulations amounted to a content-based blanket restriction of free speech. The Act failed to clearly define "indecent" communications, limit its restrictions to particular times or individuals (by showing that it would not impact adults), provide supportive statements from an authority on the unique nature of internet communications, or conclusively demonstrate that the transmission of "offensive" material is devoid of any social value. The Court added that since the First Amendment distinguishes between "indecent" and "obscene" sexual expressions, protecting only the former, the Act could be saved from facial overbreadth challenges if it dropped the words "or indecent" from its text. The Court refused to address any Fifth Amendment issues.

City of Boerne v. Flores, Archbishop of San Antonio

(1997) The Archbishop of San Antonio sued local zoning authorities for violating his rights under the 1993 Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), by denying him a permit to expand his church in Boerne, Texas. Boerne's zoning authorities argued that the Archbishop's church was located in a historic preservation district governed by an ordinance forbidding new construction, and that the RFRA was unconstitutional insofar as it sought to override this local preservation ordinance. On appeal from the Fifth Circuit's reversal of a District Court's finding against Archbishop Flores, the Court granted Boerne's request for certiorari. Did Congress exceed its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement powers by enacting the RFRA which, in part, subjected local ordinances to federal regulation? Yes. Under the RFRA, the government is prohibited from "substantially burden[ing]" religion's free exercise unless it must do so to further a compelling government interest, and, even then, it may only impose the least restrictive burden. The Court held that while Congress may enact such legislation as the RFRA, in an attempt to prevent the abuse of religious freedoms, it may not determine the manner in which states enforce the substance of its legislative restrictions. This, the Court added, is precisely what the RFRA does by overly restricting the states' freedom to enforce its spirit in a manner which they deem most appropriate. With respect to this case, specifically, there was no evidence to suggest that Boerne's historic preservation ordinance favored one religion over another, or that it was based on animus or hostility for free religious exercise.

Zelman v. Simmons-Harris

(2002) Ohio's Pilot Project Scholarship Program provides tuition aid in the form of vouchers for certain students in the Cleveland City School District to attend participating public or private schools of their parent's choosing. Both religious and nonreligious schools in the district may participate. Tuition aid is distributed to parents according to financial need, and where the aid is spent depends solely upon where parents choose to enroll their children. In the 1999-2000 school year 82 percent of the participating private schools had a religious affiliation and 96 percent of the students participating in the scholarship program were enrolled in religiously affiliated schools. Sixty percent of the students were from families at or below the poverty line. A group of Ohio taxpayers sought to enjoin the program on the ground that it violated the Establishment Clause. The District Court granted them summary judgment, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Does Ohio's school voucher program violate the Establishment Clause? No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the program does not violate the Establishment Clause. The Court reasoned that, because Ohio's program is part of Ohio's general undertaking to provide educational opportunities to children, government aid reaches religious institutions only by way of the deliberate choices of numerous individual recipients and the incidental advancement of a religious mission, or any perceived endorsement, is reasonably attributable to the individual aid recipients not the government. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that the "Ohio program is entirely neutral with respect to religion. It provides benefits directly to a wide spectrum of individuals, defined only by financial need and residence in a particular school district. It permits such individuals to exercise genuine choice among options public and private, secular and religious. The program is therefore a program of true private choice."

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell

(2003) Curtis Campbell, who has his car insurance with State Farm, was sick of the winding road and decided to take a different road and the result was the death of the Campbell Family. Campbell family sues, wanting payment for their death of family member. Campbell family sues State Farm for failing to live up to its obligations. Court awarded in 2.6 million in compensatory damages and 145 million in punitive damages. Supreme Court of Utah reinstated the 145 million punitive damages. State Farm appeals to the Supreme Court Justice Kennedy uses the three guideposts in the BMW case in this case: How egregious was the conduct by the defendant? How big is the ratio between the actual and punitive? How consistent was the punitive damages to what the state legislature could pass in terms of fines for comparable action? Court concludes that the punitive damages were off the scale They haven't said it violates the due process clause to charge more than three times the punitive damages than compensatory damages, but if you are over ten times, you can expect the party to try to overturn and you can expect the court to support them With the exception of punitive damages, the court is not going to look at economic due process substantively. If you do not like what the state legislature did, vote them out of office. Example of substantive due process in an economic liberties case

Kelo vs City of New London

(2005) Eminent domain case: Local governments may force the sale of private property and make way for private economic development when officials decide it would benefit the public. Concerned a town called New London, Connecticut. A pharmaceutical giant, Phaiser, announced it was going to build a $300 million research facility that the town that would rejuvenate the area and stimulate their tax revenues. A redevelopment agency, to build this facility, used the Takings clause to justify taking the land for public use Kelo and few other homeowner refused to sell their property and claimed that taking their property violated the public use discretion in the Takings clause. They felt that the property was being taken to build a property for a private individual: company Phasier Question: Wether New London's actions qualified as a public use? Supreme Court ruled 5-4 (Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion) in favor of New London, arguing that anything that serves a public purpose can qualify as public use, and since the town had proven that there will be tax benefits for the economic well being of the town if they built the facility, it did not violate the public use clause. They also relied on the precedent set in the Burman case The precedent stated that anything that serves a public purpose qualifies for public use. They said public use and not public purpose, but the court over time began to really redefine public use to mean public purpose, starting with the Clark decision.

McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties Union

(2005) The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) sued three Kentucky counties in federal district court for displaying framed copies of the Ten Commandments in courthouses and public schools. The ACLU argued the displays violated the First Amendment's establishment clause, which prohibits the government from passing laws "respecting an establishment of religion." The district court and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled the displays violated the establishment clause. Do Ten Commandments displays in public schools and in courthouses violate the First Amendment's establishment clause, which prohibits government from passing laws "respecting an establishment of religion?" 2. Was a determination that the displays' purpose had been to advance religion sufficient for the displays' invalidation? Yes and yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice David Souter, the majority held that the displays violated the establishment clause because their purpose had been to advance religion. In the case of each of the displays, the Court held, an observer would have concluded that the government was endorsing religion. The first display for presenting the Ten Commandments in isolation; the second for showing the Commandments along with other religious passages; the third for presenting the Commandments in a presentation of the "Foundations of American Law," an exhibit in which the county reached "for any way to keep a religious document on the walls of courthouses."

Van Orden v. Perry

(2005) Thomas Van Orden sued Texas in federal district court, arguing a Ten Commandments monument on the grounds of the state capitol building represented an unconstitutional government endorsement of religion. Orden argued this violated the First Amendment's establishment clause, which prohibits the government from passing laws "respecting an establishment of religion." The district court and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled against Orden and said the monument served a valid secular purpose and would not appear to a reasonable observer to represent a government endorsement of religion. Does a Ten Commandments monument on the grounds of a state capitol building violate the First Amendment's establishment clause, which barred the government from passing laws "respecting an establishment of religion?" No. In 5-4 decision, and in a four-justice opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the establishment clause did not bar the monument on the grounds of Texas' state capitol building. The plurality deemed the Texas monument part of the nation's tradition of recognizing the Ten Commandments' historical meaning. Though the Commandments are religious, the plurality argued, "simply having religious content or promoting a message consistent with a religious doctrine does not run afoul of the establishment clause."

District of Columbia vs Heller

(2008) Heller was a D.C. special police officer who was authorized to carry a handgun while on duty. He applied for a one-year license for a handgun he wished to keep at home, but his application was denied. He sued the District of Columbia. He argued that this violated his Second Amendment right to keep a functional firearm in his home without a license. The Court held that the ban on registering handguns and the requirement to keep guns in the home disassembled or nonfunctional with a trigger lock mechanism violated the Second Amendment. Significant because there was this debate of wether the 2nd Amendment applied to individual rights or militias due to the language of the second Amendment. FIRST CASE TO ESTABLISH THAT THE 2nd AMENDMENT APPLIED TO INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS In a 5-4 ruling issued on June 26, the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's ruling. In so doing, it endorsed the so-called "individual-right" theory of the Second Amendment's meaning and rejected a rival interpretation, the "collective-right" theory, according to which the amendment protects a collective right of states to maintain militias or an individual right to keep and bear arms in connection with service in a militia. Writing for the majority, Antonin Scalia argued that the operative clause of the amendment, "the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed," codifies an individual right derived from English common law and codified in the English Bill of Rights (1689). The majority held that the Second Amendment's preamble, "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State," is consistent with this interpretation when understood in light of the framers' belief that the most effective way to destroy a citizens' militia was to disarm the citizens. The majority also found that United States v. Miller supported an individual-right rather than a collective-right view, contrary to the dominant 20th-century interpretation of that decision. (In Miller, the Supreme Court unanimously held that a federal law requiring the registration of sawed-off shotguns did not violate the Second Amendment because such weapons did not have a "reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia.") Finally, the court held that, because the framers understood the right of self-defense to be "the central component" of the right to keep and bear arms, the Second Amendment implicitly protects the right "to use arms in defense of hearth and home."

Boumediene vs. Bush

(2008) In 2002 six Algerians were arrested in Bosnia and Herzegovina on suspicion of plotting to attack the U.S. embassy in Sarajevo; designated enemy combatants, they were imprisoned at the Guantánamo Bay detention camp on the U.S. naval base at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. One of the detainees, Lakhdar Boumediene, petitioned in federal district court for a writ of habeas corpus, which was denied on the grounds that the camp was outside U.S. territory and therefore not within the court's jurisdiction. In 2004, however, the Supreme Court held in Rasul v. Bush that the "plenary and exclusive" jurisdiction of the United States over the Guantánamo Bay naval base entitled foreign nationals held there to habeas corpus privileges. Foreseeing a rash of habeas corpus petitions by hundreds of foreign detainees in the camp, Congress passed the MCA, which stripped the federal courts of jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus petitions on behalf of foreign detainees who had been designated enemy combatants according to procedures established in the Detainee Treatment Act (DTA) of 2005. The main issue to be decided was whether the MCA violated the Suspension Clause of Article I of the Constitution, which states: "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it." In a 5-4 ruling issued on June 12, 2008, the court held that the MCA did violate the Suspension Clause. Writing for the majority, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy argued that "because the DTA's procedures for reviewing detainees' status are not an adequate and effective substitute for the habeas writ, [the] MCA...operates as an unconstitutional suspension of the writ." Detainees "are not barred from seeking the writ or invoking the Suspension Clause's protections because they have been designated as enemy combatants or because of their presence at Guantánamo." In his separate dissenting opinion, Justice Antonin Scalia memorably warned that the court's decision "will almost certainly cause more Americans to be killed." case that ruled that a non-US citizen detained outside the US cannot be denied access to US courts unless there are adequate substitute procedures.

Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission

(2010) Citizens United sought an injunction against the Federal Election Commission in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to prevent the application of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) to its film Hillary: The Movie. The Movie expressed opinions about whether Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton would make a good president. In an attempt to regulate "big money" campaign contributions, the BCRA applies a variety of restrictions to "electioneering communications." Section 203 of the BCRA prevents corporations or labor unions from funding such communication from their general treasuries. Sections 201 and 311 require the disclosure of donors to such communication and a disclaimer when the communication is not authorized by the candidate it intends to support. Citizens United argued that: 1) Section 203 violates the First Amendment on its face and when applied to The Movie and its related advertisements, and that 2) Sections 201 and 203 are also unconstitutional as applied to the circumstances. The United States District Court denied the injunction. Section 203 on its face was not unconstitutional because the Supreme Court in McConnell v. FEC had already reached that determination. The District Court also held that The Movie was the functional equivalent of express advocacy, as it attempted to inform voters that Senator Clinton was unfit for office, and thus Section 203 was not unconstitutionally applied. Lastly, it held that Sections 201 and 203 were not unconstitutional as applied to the The Movie or its advertisements. The court reasoned that the McConnell decision recognized that disclosure of donors "might be unconstitutional if it imposed an unconstitutional burden on the freedom to associate in support of a particular cause," but those circumstances did not exist in Citizen United's claim. The Supreme Court overruled Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce and portions of McConnell v. FEC. (In the prior cases, the Court had held that political speech may be banned based on the speaker's corporate identity.) By a 5-to-4 vote along ideological lines, the majority held that under the First Amendment corporate funding of independent political broadcasts in candidate elections cannot be limited. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote for the majority joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts and Justices Antonin G. Scalia, Samuel A. Alito, and Clarence Thomas. Justice John Paul Stevens dissented, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen G. Breyer, and Sonia Sotomayor. The majority maintained that political speech is indispensable to a democracy, which is no less true because the speech comes from a corporation. The majority also held that the BCRA's disclosure requirements as applied to The Movie were constitutional, reasoning that disclosure is justified by a "governmental interest" in providing the "electorate with information" about election-related spending resources. The Court also upheld the disclosure requirements for political advertising sponsors and it upheld the ban on direct contributions to candidates from corporations and unions.

McDonald vs Chicago

(2010) Significant because it deemed that the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which guarantees "the right of the people to keep and bear Arms," applies to state and local governments as well as to the federal government. The case arose in 2008, when Otis McDonald, a retired African American custodian, and others filed suit in U.S. District Court to challenge provisions of a 1982 Chicago law that, among other things, generally banned the new registration of handguns and made registration a prerequisite of possession of a firearm. The next day the National Rifle Association and others filed separate lawsuits challenging the Chicago law and an Oak Park, Ill., law that generally prohibited the possession or carrying of handguns and the carrying of other firearms except rifles or shotguns in one's home or place of business. Each suit alleged that the law violated the right of individuals to possess and carry weapons, which the Supreme Court had found to be protected by the Second Amendment in District of Columbia v. Heller (2008). (Anticipating this finding, the plaintiffs in McDonald v. City of Chicago filed suit on the same morning that the decision in Heller was announced.) The crucial question, however, was whether the Second Amendment is applicable to the states and their political subdivisions. Citing "selective incorporation," the Supreme Court's gradual application to the states of most of the protections of the Bill of Rights through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (which prohibits the states from denying life, liberty, or property without due process of law), the plaintiffs argued that the Second Amendment is applicable through that clause as well as through the amendment's "privileges or immunities" clause (which forbids the states from abridging the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States). Writing for the majority, Samuel A. Alito, Jr., argued on the basis of Heller that the Second Amendment is incorporated—i.e., that it should be selectively incorporated as applicable to the states through the due process clause—because the individual right to possess and use firearms for traditionally lawful purposes, particularly self-defense, is fundamental to the American "scheme of ordered liberty and system of justice." Essentially that standard, the court maintained, was applied by the Supreme Court in the 1960s to incorporate a number of rights related to criminal procedure, including the right to trial by jury (Duncan v. Louisiana [1968]). The court held that the Duncan standard constituted a departure from the less-inclusive test that had been used in incorporation cases since the late 19th century—namely, whether the right is of "the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty" (Palko v. Connecticut [1937]) or a "principle of natural equity, recognized by all temperate and civilized governments" (Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. Chicago [1897; Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. Chicago]). The incorporation precedents established on the Duncan standard thus compelled the court to reject on stare decisis grounds the defendant's main argument, that the Second Amendment is not incorporated because it is possible to imagine (and indeed there are) civilized legal systems in which an individual right to possess and use firearms is not recognized. The plaintiff's argument that the Second Amendment is incorporated under the privileges or immunities clause was also dismissed.

Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association

(2011) Associations of companies that create, publish, distribute, sell and/or rent video games brought a declaratory judgment action against the state of California in a California federal district court. The plaintiffs brought the claim under the First and Fourteenth Amendments seeking to invalidate a newly-enacted law that imposed restrictions and labeling requirements on the sale or rental of "violent video games" to minors. The district court found in favor of the plaintiffs and prevented the enforcement of the law. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that: (1) violent video games did not constitute "obscenity" under the First Amendment, (2) the state did not not have a compelling interest in preventing psychological or neurological harm to minors allegedly caused by video games, and (3) even if the state had a compelling interest, the law was not narrowly tailored enough to meet that objective. Does the First Amendment bar a state from restricting the sale of violent video games to minors? Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court order in an opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia. "Like the protected books, plays, and movies that preceded them, video games communicate ideas—and even social messages—through many familiar literary devices (such as characters, dialogue, plot, and music) and through features distinctive to the medium (such as the player's interaction with the virtual world). That suffices to confer First Amendment protection." Justice Samuel Alito concurred in judgment, joined by Chief Justice John Roberts. Alito noted that he disagreed "with the approach taken in the Court's opinion. In considering the application of unchanging constitutional principles to new and rapidly evolving technology, this Court should proceed with caution. We should make every effort to understand the new technology." Justices Clarence Thomas and Stephen Breyer filed separate dissents. Adhering to his strict understanding of the Framers' intent with the Constitution, Thomas wrote: "The Court's decision today does not comport with the original public understanding of the First Amendment." Breyer argued that the California statute met current constitutional standards.

Snyder v. Phelps

(2011) The family of deceased Marine Lance Cpl. Matthew Snyder filed a lawsuit against members of the Westboro Baptist Church who picketed at his funeral. The family accused the church and its founders of defamation, invasion of privacy and the intentional infliction of emotional distress for displaying signs that said, "Thank God for dead soldiers" and "Fag troops" at Snyder's funeral. U.S. District Judge Richard Bennett awarded the family $5 million in damages, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the judgment violated the First Amendment's protections on religious expression. The church members' speech is protected, "notwithstanding the distasteful and repugnant nature of the words." Does the First Amendment protect protesters at a funeral from liability for intentionally inflicting emotional distress on the family of the deceased? Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision in an opinion by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. The Court held that the First Amendment shields those who stage a protest at the funeral of a military service member from liability. Justice Stephen J. Breyer filed a concurring opinion in which he wrote that while he agreed with the majority's conclusion in the case, "I do not believe that our First Amendment analysis can stop at that point." Justice Samuel Alito filed a lone dissent, in which he argued: "Our profound national commitment to free and open debate is not a license for the vicious verbal assault that occurred in this case."

Koontz vs St. Johns River Water Management District (2013)

(2013) Koontz requested a permit from St. John's to manage more of his land than the original permit allowed, he wanted to develop more of his land. St. John's required that Koons also do work on wetlands that were a couple of miles away from his original property or he was only allowed to develop 1 acre his property and give the rest of his property to St. John's. Koons agreed to deed but not the litigation work and as a result he was denied the request. Koons sued stating that it was a unreasonable exercise of the state's police power as they took his land without just compensation. Florida trial court upheld Koons's argument 5th district court reaffirmed that decision Supreme Court ruled in reverse Essential question: Can the government refuse to issue a permit until the land owner agrees to to dedicate personal resources for a project? Is that considered a violation of the Takings clause? 5-4 majority. Justice Alito delivered the Opinion: The government cannot conditionally approve the land use permits unless they're approximately proportional to the effects of the proposed land use which is what proportionally refers to. This standard applies even before the government approves the permit. The burden of asking from the applicant for property or money diminishes the value of the land, which violates the taking clause They equate monetary payment as equal to real estate taking. The court held that the government demand of property from a land-use permit applicant must satisfy the guidelines even when the government denies the permit and even when the demand is met The dissenting opinion argued the majority opinion created a limitation on the government ability to conditionally approve land-use permits and would interfere with governments being able to charge permit fees It is considered a taking if you are forced to pay money for property or ditch-draining miles away. You are not giving up your property but you are being extorted in return for the willingness of the water company to grant you access to your own property

McCullen v. Coakley

(2014) In 2009, the Massachusetts state legislature created a 35-foot buffer zone around the entrances, exits, and driveways of abortion clinics. The petitioners, individuals who routinely engage in "pro-life counseling" outside of state abortion clinics, sued in federal district court and argued that the law violated the First Amendment protection of free speech. The district court held that, although the law placed a restriction on the time, place, and manner of speech, the law was constitutional because it was content-neutral and still left adequate, if not perfect, alternative means of communications. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed and held that the Supreme Court, in Hill v. Colorado had already affirmed a similar statute in Colorado that prohibited certain activities within 100 feet of abortion clinics. 1. Did the First Circuit err in upholding the Massachusetts law under the First Amendment, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment? 2. If the Supreme Court's ruling in Hill v. Colorado applies, should that ruling be limited or overruled? es, unanswered. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 9-0 majority. The Court held that the Massachusetts law was content-neutral on its face because a violation depends not on the speech itself but on the location of the speech, and therefore does not need to be analyzed under strict scrutiny. However, the Court also held that the law is still not sufficiently narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest because it places too great a burden on the petitioners' First Amendment Rights. By denying the petitioners the ability to engage in conversation and leafleting on public streets and sidewalks, the law prevents the petitioners from engaging in exactly the transmission of ideas the First Amendment is meant to protect. The Court also held that, in enacting the law, Massachusetts overlooked other options that could serve the same interests without placing an undue burden on historical avenues of speech and debate. In his opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Antonin Scalia wrote that the law is content-based and therefore must be examined under strict scrutiny. A blanket prohibition of speech in areas where only one type of politically charged speech is likely to occur cannot be content-neutral. Justice Scalia also pointed out that the majority opinion did not address the question of whether Hill v. Colorado should be limited or overruled. Because Justice Scalia argued that the law was content-based and therefore subject to strict scrutiny, he wrote that Hill should be overruled because it contradicts First Amendment jurisprudence. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy and Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the opinion concurring in judgment. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote a separate opinion concurring in judgment in which he argued that the law's exemption for clinic employees and volunteers constitutes viewpoint discrimination because it silences abortion opponents while allowing clinic workers and supporters to express their views.

Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores Inc.

(2014) The Green family owns and operates Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., a national arts and crafts chain with over 500 stores and over 13,000 employees. The Green family has organized the business around the principles of the Christian faith and has explicitly expressed the desire to run the company according to Biblical precepts, one of which is the belief that the use of contraception is immoral. Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), employment-based group health care plans must provide certain types of preventative care, such as FDA-approved contraceptive methods. While there are exemptions available for religious employers and non-profit religious institutions, there are no exemptions available for for-profit institutions such as Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. On September 12, 2012, the Greens, as representatives of Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., sued Kathleen Sebelius, the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, and challenged the contraception requirement. The plaintiffs argued that the requirement that the employment-based group health care plan cover contraception violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA). The plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the enforcement of tax penalties, which the district court denied and a two-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court also denied relief, and the plaintiffs filed for an en banc hearing of the Court of Appeals. The en banc panel of the Court of Appeals reversed and held that corporations were "persons" for the purposes of RFRA and had protected rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Does the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 allow a for-profit company to deny its employees health coverage of contraception to which the employees would otherwise be entitled based on the religious objections of the company's owners? Yes. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that Congress intended for the RFRA to be read as applying to corporations since they are composed of individuals who use them to achieve desired ends. Because the contraception requirement forces religious corporations to fund what they consider abortion, which goes against their stated religious principles, or face significant fines, it creates a substantial burden that is not the least restrictive method of satisfying the government's interests. In fact, a less restrictive method exists in the form of the Department of Health and Human Services' exemption for non-profit religious organizations, which the Court held can and should be applied to for-profit corporations such as Hobby Lobby. Additionally, the Court held that this ruling only applies to the contraceptive mandate in question rather than to all possible objections to the Affordable Care Act on religious grounds, as the principal dissent fears.

Town of Greece v. Galloway

(2014) The town of Greece, New York, is governed by a five-member town board that conducts official business at monthly public meetings. Starting in 1999, the town meetings began with a prayer given by an invited member of the local clergy. The town did not adopt any policy regarding who may lead the prayer or its content, but in practice, Christian clergy members delivered the vast majority of the prayers at the town's invitation. In 2007, Susan Galloway and Linda Stephens complained about the town's prayer practices, after which there was some increase in the denominations represented. In February 2008, Galloway and Stephens sued the town and John Auberger, in his official capacity as Town Supervisor, and argued that the town's practices violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment by preferring Christianity over other faiths. The district court found in favor of the town and held that the plaintiffs failed to present credible evidence that there was intentional seclusion of non-Christian faiths. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and held that the practices violated the Establishment Clause by showing a clear preference for Christian prayers. Does the invocation of prayer at a legislative session violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment even in the absence of discrimination in the selection of prayer-givers and content? No. Justice Anthony Kennedy delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the context and jurisprudence surrounding the First Amendment suggested that the Establishment Clause was never meant to prohibit legislative prayer, which created the proper deliberative mood and acknowledged religion's role in society. The content of this prayer does not need to be non-sectarian, because such a requirement would place the courts in the role of arbiters of religious speech, which would involve the government in religion to an extent that is impermissible under the Establishment Clause. The Court thus held that the prayers in question do not violate this tradition and are therefore acceptable under the First Amendment. Justice Kennedy further argued that legislative prayer is primarily for the members of the legislative body, and therefore such prayers do not coerce the public into religious observance. Though the respondents testified that they felt offended by these prayers, Justice Kennedy distinguished between offense and coercion and noted that the former does not violate the Establishment Clause. Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Clarence Thomas did not join in this portion of the opinion.

Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar

(2015) During her candidacy for County Court Judge in Hillsborough County, Florida, Lanell Williams-Yulee personally solicited campaign contributions. She stated that she served as the "community Public Defender" - although her title was "assistant public defender" - and inaccurately stated in the media that there was no incumbent in the judicial race for which she was running. The Florida Bar filed a complaint against Williams-Yulee and alleged that her actions during the campaign violated the rules regulating The Florida Bar. A referee was appointed who suggested that Williams-Yulee receive a public reprimand. Williams-Yulee appealed the referee's finding, and the Supreme Court of Florida held that Williams-Yulee violated bar rules for directly soliciting funds for her judicial campaign. Williams-Yulee appealed and claimed that The Florida Bar rule prohibiting a candidate from personal solicitation of funds violated the First Amendment protection of freedom of speech. Does a rule of judicial conduct that prohibits candidates for judicial office from personally soliciting campaign fund violate the First Amendment? No. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that rules limiting speech in charitable solicitation contexts have typically been subjected to strict First Amendment scrutiny because such speech often deals with issues of public concern in precisely the manner the First Amendment was meant to protect. Therefore, the government may only restrict the speech of a judicial candidate when the restriction is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. The Court held that the restriction in this case serves the compelling state interest of preserving public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary and is sufficiently narrowly tailored to that interest. Although Williams-Yulee claimed that the rule's underinclusivity was evidence that it was not sufficiently narrowly tailored, First Amendment jurisprudence does not require that a state take an all-or-nothing approach to regulating problematic speech.

Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate War Veterans, Inc.

(2015) In August 2009, the Texas division of the Sons of Confederate Veterans (Texas SCV), a non-profit organization that works to preserve the memory and reputation of soldiers who fought for the confederacy in the Civil War, applied to have a new specialty license plate issued by the Texas Department of Motor Vehicles (TDMV). The proposed license plate had two confederate flags on it: one in the organization's logo, and one faintly making up the background of the plate. The TDMV had a policy stating that it "may refuse to create a new specialty license plate if the design might be offensive to any member of the public." The board in charge of approving new specialty plates received multiple negative comments from the public regarding this plate and ultimately voted to deny Texas SCV's application. Texas SCV sued in federal district court claiming their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated. The TDMV argued that the Free Speech Clause did not apply in this case because license plates are a form of government speech; therefore, they were within their rights to choose which messages and views they wanted to express on the plates. The district court disagreed and held that the plates were private, non-governmental speech, and that the TDMV's denial was a reasonable, content-based restriction of speech in a non-public forum. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and held that TDMV's denial was a form of viewpoint discrimination that "discriminated against Texas SCV's view that the Confederate flag is a symbol of sacrifice, independence, and Southern heritage." 1. Do specialty license plates constitute government speech that is immune from any requirement of viewpoint neutrality? 2. Does preventing the confederate flag from appearing on license plates constitute viewpoint discrimination? Yes, no. Justice Stephen G. Breyer delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the government choosing the content of its speech is not unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination because that expression is the product of the democratic electoral process. Based on the analysis from Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, Texas's specialty license plate is an example of such government speech (as opposed to a forum open for private expression) because Texas and other states have long used license plates to convey messages. Moreover, the public associates license plates with the State. Finally, Texas maintains direct control over the messages on its specialty plates from design to final approval. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., wrote a dissent in which he argued that, with over 350 varieties of specialty plates, an observer would think that the plates were the expression of the individual drivers, not Texas. Because the specialty license plates are a limited public forum for private expression, Texas rejecting the confederate flag design because it might be offensive is unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., Justice Antonin Scalia, and Justice Anthony M. Kennedy joined in the dissent.

Horne vs Department of Agriculture

(2015) This case got litigated against the Supreme Court twice in three years. The raisin company, when they had to advertise, had to give all their property to the Department of Agriculture. The Department of agriculture would then become responsible for selling it. If there was a bumper car filled with grapes, they might give 50% of that away to schools, foreign countries, this that or the other. Horne was the first to give away 50% of his property. The Department of Agriculture said that this was the only way for price stabilization. They said that too many grapes in circulation would drive the price down. By doing things their way, they kept the price high. Horton family sued the department of agriculture You do not have to file in small claims court before you file in federal district court, so the Horton family refiled and it went before the Supreme Court The Department of Agriculture argues that the Takings clause only refers to real property, not personal property. They also argue that it is really not a taking because they gave back the grapes they were not forced to sell for price stabilization purposes. Supreme Court, 8-1, rejected the claims of the department of Agriculture. First question presented: "Whether the government's categorical duty to pay just compensation but take real property and private property?" Answer was no Takings clause went back to the Magna Carta which saved crops that belonged to farmers. The reserve requirement imposed by the raisin committee is a clear physical taking. Actual raisins are taken from the growers to the government. The government disperses its own amount of raisins as it wishes to stabilize the economy as per it wants Third question: wether a governmental mandate effects a per say taking? Answer: yes Government says, if you do not want your raisins do not grow grapes The Government says that the reserve requirement is not a taking because raisin growers choose to participate in the raisin market. According to the government, if raisin growers did not like it, they can grow different grapes. Turned to Monsanto vs Ruckel-house Wanted a market to sell certain pesticides The government said yes, but only if you provide us with the formula of your pesticides Those selling pesticides refused to give formula as that was personal property Court says you are dealing with a harmful product, and we need to know it so we can deal with the potential repercussions. As a result, pesticide company gave up personal knowledge and was not compensated Chief Justice Roberts: Selling produce and interstate commerce, although certainly subject to reasonable government regulation, is similarly not a simple governmental regulation but the government may hold hostage to be ransomed whatever constitutional protection. Raisins are not dangerous pesticides, they are a healthy snack. The case of conditioning the sale of a hazardous substance is hardly on point." Government itself had calculate that the compensation was $483,000. The government wanted to relitigate that and bring it back to the District court to ask what is just compensation. The Supreme Court said they did not need to do that. The government itself had admitted what the amount of just compensation is, CASE CLOSED

Matel v. Tam

(2017) Simon Tam and his band, The Slants, sought to register the band's name with the U.S. Trademark Office. The Office denied the application because it found that the name would likely be disparaging towards "persons of Asian descent." The office cited the Disparagement Clause of the Lanham Act of 1946, which prohibits trademarks that "[consist] of or [comprise] immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter; or matter which may disparage or falsely suggest a connection with persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into contempt, or disrepute." Tam appealed the trademark officer's decision, and the name was refused a second time by a board comprised of members of the office. Tam appealed to a panel of judges on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which found that the trademark officials were within their rights to refuse the trademark application under the Disparagement Clause. The appellate court then reviewed the case en banc and found that the trademark office was incorrect in refusing the trademark application and that the Disparagement Clause violated the First Amendment. Is the Disparagement Clause invalid under the First Amendment? The Disparagement Clause prohibits trademarks that disparage the members of a racial or ethnic group and violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 8-0 majority. The Court held that, the plain meaning of the text clearly indicated that the Disparagement Clause applied to racial and ethnic groups, and therefore the Clause applied to the mark at issue in this case. The Clause also facially discriminated based on viewpoint, as giving offense constitutes a viewpoint. Because the PTO simply approved trademarks, they were not government speech--to which the First Amendment prohibitions on viewpoint regulation did not apply--and holding otherwise would constitute a massive and unwise expansion of the government speech doctrine. Similarly, PTO approval of a trademark did not constitute government-provided subsidy, an area of cases in which viewpoint discrimination was sometimes determined to be constitutional. The Disparagement Clause was also not a permissible regulation of commercial speech because it was not narrowly drawn to serve a substantial interest. Any asserted interest of avoiding offense clearly contravened the purpose of the First Amendment's protection of free speech, and the Clause was too broad to serve the government's other stated interest of protecting the orderly flow of commerce.

Murr v. Wisconsin

(2017) The parents of Joseph P. Murr and his siblings (the Murrs) purchased two adjacent lots (Lots E and F) in St. Croix County in 1960. The two lots together made up approximately .98 acres. In 1994 and 1995 respectively, the Murrs' parents transferred Lot F and Lot E to their children. In 1995, the two lots were merged pursuant to St. Croix County's code of ordinances. The relevant ordinance prohibits the individual development or sale of adjacent lots under common ownership, unless an individual lot was at least one acre. The ordinance further specified that if each lot is not at least one acre, the lots may be measured together to equal one acre. Seven years later, the Murrs wanted to sell Lot E and not Lot F. The St. Croix County Board of Adjustment denied the Murrs' application to sell the lots separately. The Murrs sued the state and county and claimed the ordinance in question resulted in an uncompensated taking of their property and deprived them of "all, or practically all, of the use of Lot E because the lot cannot be sold or developed as a separate lot." The circuit court granted summary judgement to the state and county. The Court of Appeals of Wisconsin affirmed and held that the Murrs were not deprived of their practical use of the property. In a regulatory taking case, should two legally distinct but commonly owned contiguous parcels be combined for takings analysis purposes? In a regulatory takings case, two legally distinct but commonly owned contiguous parcels should be combined for takings analysis purposes. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion for the 5-3 majority. The Court held that, while generally governmental regulation of property was not a taking, regulation could be so burdensome that it became a taking. The analysis essentially required courts to balance the rights of property ownership against the government's power to adjust rights for the good of the public, which is a fact-intensive inquiry. In order to properly conduct this inquiry, it was necessary to define the scope of the relevant property. The Court had determined that two approaches did not adequately protect the property rights at stake: defining the property as only the portion targeted by the challenged regulation and allowing state law to define the property. Instead, courts should consider factors such as the treatment of land under state and local law, the physical characteristics of the land, and the prospective value of the regulated land. This inquiry was objective and examined the landowner's reasonable expectation about whether the property at issue would be treated as a single parcel or separate ones. In this case, the proper application of these factors meant that the parcels in question should be evaluated as a single unit for takings analysis purposes.

Trinity Lutheran Church v. Comer

(2017) Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. (Trinity) operates a licensed preschool and daycare called The Learning Center that was initially opened as a non-profit corporation but merged with Trinity in 1985. The Learning Center has an open admissions policy and incorporates daily religious instruction into its programs. The Missouri Department of Natural Resources (DNR) offers Playground Scrap Tire Surface Material Grants that provide funds for qualifying organizations to purchase recycled tires to resurface playgrounds. Trinity applied for such a grant but was denied because Article I, Section 7 of the Missouri Constitution states, "no money shall ever be taken from the public treasury, directly or indirectly, in aid of any church, section or denomination of religion." Trinity sued and argued that the denial of its application violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as well as the First Amendment's protections of freedom of religion and speech. The district court granted Missouri DNR Director Pauley's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and Trinity moved for reconsideration and to amend its complaint to include allegations that such grants had previously been given to religious organizations. The district court denied the motions, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal and the denial of the motions to reconsider and amend the complaint. Does the exclusion of churches from an otherwise neutral and secular aid program violate the First Amendment's guarantee of free exercise of religion and the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause? The exclusion of churches from an otherwise neutral and secular aid program violates the First Amendment's guarantee of free exercise of religion. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 7-2 majority. The Court held that the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment protected the freedom to practice religion and subjects laws that burden religious practice to strict scrutiny. First Amendment precedent had established that laws that deny an otherwise generally available benefit because of religious status are unconstitutional, though laws that are neutral and generally applicable may be upheld even if they hamper religion. The distinction was whether the law in question discriminates against some or all religious beliefs. In this case, the Missouri Department of Natural Resources' policy of denying religious organizations from its Playground Scrap Tire Surface Material Grants violated the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause because it discriminated against otherwise eligible organizations based solely on their religious character. The law did not need to prevent the religious organization from practicing its religious; it was sufficient that the law denied a religious organization the same opportunity to compete for a benefit that is otherwise available to all secular organizations. Because the state's interest in using this policy was simply to draw a wide berth around religious establishment concerns, it was not a sufficiently compelling interest. In his opinion concurring in part, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote that the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment clearly prohibited laws that facially discriminate against religion. To the extent that precedent suggested that a state may "disfavor" religion by placing minor burdens on religion in order to avoid state entanglement with religion, that precedent should be construed narrowly and did not apply in this case. Justice Neil Gorsuch joined in the opinion concurring in part. Justice Gorsuch wrote a separate opinion concurring in part in which he argued that the majority opinion's suggested distinction between laws that discriminate based on religious status and those that do so based on religious use was untenable and unsupported by the Free Exercise Clause. Additionally, the majority opinion's footnote that limited the opinion to addressing "express discrimination based on religious identity with respect to playground resurfacing" risked making the opinion too case-specific and not based on general principles. Justice Thomas joined in the opinion concurring in part. In his separate opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Stephen G. Breyer wrote that the First Amendment was clearly not meant to prevent religious organizations from accessing government-provided benefits such as police and fire services. The benefit here was for the health and safety of children and therefore was in the same class of government-provided services that religious organizations should be able to access.

Janus v. AFSCME

(2018) In 1977, the Supreme Court, in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, upheld against a First Amendment challenge a Michigan law that allowed a public employer whose employees were represented by a union to require those of its employees who did not join the union nevertheless to pay fees to it because they benefited from the union's collective bargaining agreement with the employer. Illinois has a law similar to that upheld in Michigan. The governor of Illinois brought a lawsuit challenging the law on the ground that the statute violates the First Amendment by compelling employees who disapprove of the union to contribute money to it. The district court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the governor lacked standing to sue because he did not stand to suffer injury from the law, but two public employees intervened in the action to seek that Abood be overturned. Given that Abood is binding on lower courts, the district court dismissed the claim, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal for the same reason. Should the Court's decision in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education be overturned so that public employees who do not belong to a union cannot be required to pay a fee to cover the union's costs to negotiate a contract that applies to all public employees, including those who are not union members? In a 5-4 vote, the Court reversed and remanded, holding that the State of Illinois' extraction of agency fees from nonconsenting public-sector employees violated the First Amendment, meaning that Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Education, which held otherwise, was overruled. In an opinion authored by Justice Alito, the Court began by stating that the district court had jurisdiction over Janus' suit, as he was undisputedly injured in fact by the state's agency fee system, and the harm he suffered could be redressed if he prevailed in court. Moving on to the merits, the Court concluded that the state's collection of agency fees from nonconsenting public employees was a violation of the First Amendment, and that Abood was incorrect in deciding otherwise. The Court stated that requiring individuals to endorse ideas they disagreed with runs counter to First Amendment principles, and that even under a more permissive standard than the "exacting" strict scrutiny that the Court had applied in evaluating the constitutionality of agency fees in the past, the Illinois scheme could not pass muster. The Court explained that neither of Abood's two justifications for agency fees, which were maintaining "labor peace" and eliminating the risk of "free riders," could survive under this standard, finding that both problems could be mitigated through less restrictive means than agency fees. The Court also rejected newer state interests that had been asserted, which were to support bargaining with a sufficiently funded agent and increasing workforce efficiency, stating that unions could be effective without agency fees. The Court further reasoned that stare decisis principles did not require deference to Abood, finding that Abood was poorly reasoned, lacked workability, and that over time it had become an "outlier" in the Court's First Amendment jurisprudence. It also stated that Abood's uncertain status, along with the short-term nature of collective bargaining agreements and unions' ability to protect themselves when agency-fee provisions were critical to their bargains all militated against giving Abood decisive weight. In light of these reasons, the Court concluded that the practice of states and public-sector unions collecting agency fees from nonconsenting employees was a violation of the First Amendment, and that no further agency fees or other forms of payment to a public-sector union could be collected, nor could attempts be made to collect such payments from employees without their consent.

Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission

(2018) In July 2012, Charlie Craig and David Mullins went to Masterpiece Cakeshop in Lakewood, CO, and requested that its owner, Jack C. Phillips, design and create a cake for their wedding. Phillips declined to do so on the grounds that he does not create wedding cakes for same-sex weddings because of his religious beliefs. Phillips believes that decorating cakes is a form of art through which he can honor God and that it would displease God to create cakes for same-sex marriages. Craig and Mullins filed charges of discrimination with the Colorado Civil Rights Division, alleging discrimination based on sexual orientation under the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA), §§ 24-34-301 to -804, C.R.S. 2014. After the Division issued a notice of determination finding probable cause, Craig and Mullins filed a formal complaint with the Office of Administrative Courts alleging that Masterpiece discriminated against them in a place of public accommodation in violation of CADA. The Administrative Law Judge issued a written order finding in favor of Craig and Mullins, which was affirmed by the Colorado Civil Rights Commission. On appeal, the Colorado Court of Appeals subsequently affirmed the Commission's ruling. Does the application of Colorado's public accommodations law to compel a cake maker to design and make a cake that violates his sincerely held religious beliefs about same-sex marriage violate the Free Speech or Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment? The Court reversed in a 7-2 decision, opinion written by Kennedy, holding that the Colorado Civil Rights Commission's conduct in evaluating a cake shop owner's reasons for declining to make a wedding cake for a same-sex couple violated the Free Exercise Clause. The Court explained that while gay persons and same-sex couples are afforded civil rights protections under the laws and the Constitution, religious and philosophical objections to same-sex marriage are protected views and can also be protected forms of expression. The Colorado law at issue in this case, which prohibited discrimination against gay people in purchasing products and services, had to be applied in a neutral manner with regard to religion. The majority acknowledged that from Phillips' perspective, creating cakes was a form of artistic expression and a component of his sincere religious beliefs. The Court also explained that in 2012, the year that Phillips refused his services to Craig and Mullins, the law in Colorado and across the country with regard to same sex marriage was much more unsettled than it became after United States v. Windsor, 570 US 744 (2013) and Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 US ___ (2015). At the time, the State Civil Rights Division had also concluded in at least three other cases that bakers had acted lawfully in declining to serve same sex couples. Thus it was not unreasonable for Phillips to believe that he was acting lawfully at the time, and his claims before the Commission were entitled to neutral treatment. However, the Court stated that Phillips did not receive this neutral treatment, with members of the Commission showing clear and impermissible hostility toward his religious beliefs. The Court explained that commissioners' comments disparaging Phillips' beliefs and characterizing them as rhetorical were inappropriate, though these comments were not mentioned or disavowed in subsequent legal proceedings. The Court concluded that these comments cast doubt on the fairness of the Commission's consideration of Phillips' claims. The Court also pointed out that disparities between Phillips' case and those of other bakers with objections to making cakes with anti-gay messages, and who were victorious before the Commission, further reflected hostility toward the religious basis for Phillips' position. The Court concluded that the Commission's actions violated the State's duty under the First Amendment not to use hostility toward religion or a religious viewpoint as a basis for laws or regulations. Under the facts of this case, the Court determined that Phillips' religious justification for his refusal to serve Craig and Mullins was not afforded the neutral treatment mandated by the Free Exercise Clause.

Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Mansky

(2018) Minnesota Statute § 211B.II prohibits individuals from wearing political apparel at or around polling places on primary or election days. The text of the statute did not define "political", so Minnesota election officials distributed policy materials to help identify which items fell within the scope of the law. Election officials received instructions to request that anyone wearing apparel which violated the guidelines laid out in the policy materials remove or cover it up. While officials were instructed to allow the person to vote regardless of their compliance, misdemeanor prosecution was a possible outcome, should an individual refuse the removal or cover-up request. This case arose when Andrew Cilek, executive director for Minnesota Voters Alliance, was temporarily prevented from voting at his local polling place in November 2010 because he was wearing a t-shirt with a Tea Party logo and a button that advocated for the requirement of a photo ID to vote. Minnesota Majority, Minnesota Voters Alliance, and Minnesota Northstar Tea Party Patriots, along with their association Election Integrity Watch (EIW), filed a lawsuit against the Minnesota Secretary of State and various county election officials to enjoin enforcement of the statute as unconstitutional. The parties claimed that the statute violated the First Amendment, facially and as-applied, and was selectively enforced, which also violated their Equal Protection rights. Is Minnesota Statute § 211B.II facially overbroad, thus infringing upon the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment by banning all political apparel at a polling place, effectively imposing a "speech-free zone"? The Minnesota statute prohibiting individuals from wearing political apparel at a polling place violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. In a 7-2 opinion authored by Chief Justice John Roberts, the Court reasoned that a polling place is a nonpublic forum under its precedents, which means that the state may place reasonable limits on speech therein. Content-based restrictions on speech must be "reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression" based on the speaker's viewpoint. The text of the Minnesota statute made no distinction based on the speaker's political persuasion, so it would be permissible so long as it is "reasonable." One component of reasonableness is the presence of "objective, workable standards" guiding enforcement of the law. Because the statute in question does not define the term "political" nor any other key terms describing the types of apparel subject to the prohibition, the law affords too much discretion in enforcing the ban and is thus unreasonable.

National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Beccera

(2018) The National Institute of Family and Life Advocates and two other religiously-affiliated pro-life entities engaged in providing pregnancy-related services in the state of California (collectively "NIFLA") sought to enjoin the enforcement of the California Reproductive Freedom, Accountability, Comprehensive Care, and Transparency Act (the "Act"). The law's stated purpose is to ensure access to reproductive health services for all California women, regardless of income. NIFLA argued that the Act's requirements that (1) licensed clinics provide information to patients about free and low-cost publicly funded family planning services, including contraception and abortion, and that (2) unlicensed clinics inform patients of their unlicensed status violated their free speech and free exercise rights under the First Amendment. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California denied NIFLA's motion for preliminary injunction, concluding that they had not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits, as required under Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008), as to either their free speech or free exercise claims. Do disclosures required by a California reproductive rights law violate protections arising from the free speech clause of the First Amendment, applicable to the states through the 14th Amendment? In a 5-4 vote, the Court reversed and remanded, holding that the pro-life pregnancy center petitioners were likely to succeed on their claim that the California Reproductive Freedom, Accountability, Comprehensive Care, and Transparency Act (the "FACT Act" or the "Act") violated the First Amendment. In an opinion authored by Justice Thomas, the Court began its discussion by explaining that the licensed notice was a content-based regulation that likely violated the First Amendment. The court rejected the Ninth Circuit's characterization of the licensed notice as regulating professional speech, stating that the Court had never recognized "professional speech" as a separate category of speech that was subject to different free speech rules. The Court explained that it had only granted lesser protection to professional speech in two situations--where professionals were required to disclose "factual, noncontroversial information in their 'commercial speech,''' and where states regulated professional conduct that incidentally implicated speech--and that neither of those lines of authority were applicable in the instant case. The Court further stated that it had a long history of protecting the First Amendment rights of professionals outside of those two contexts, emphasizing that imposing content-based regulations on professional speech created a risk of the government seeking to suppress unpopular ideas rather than advance legitimate regulatory objectives. The Court also concluded that the licensed notice did not survive even intermediate scrutiny, as it was "wildly underinclusive" in light of the Act's stated purpose of providing low income women with information about the state-sponsored health services at issue.

Barron vs Baltimore

1833. Opinion delivers by Chief Justice Marshall. The case was brought to the court because John Barron's wharf, due to the build up of sand and gravel caused by the redirection fo the course of several streams by the City of Baltimore, devalued the wharf and Barron's property. The Supreme Court ruled that the due process clause of the 5th amendment did not apply to the actions of states. This decision limited the Bill of Rights to the actions of Congress alone.

Korematsu vs US

1944. In 1942, Franklin Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066, allowing the U.S. military to declare parts of the U.S. as military areas and thereby exclude specific groups of people from them. The practical application was that many Japanese-Americans were forced from their homes and placed in internment camps during World War II. Frank Korematsu, a U.S.-born man of Japanese descent, knowingly defied the order to be relocated and was arrested and convicted. His case went to the Supreme Court, where it was decided that exclusion orders based on Executive Order 9066 were in fact Constitutional. Therefore, his conviction was upheld. While the Court acknowledged that citizens were being denied their constitutional rights, it also declared that the Constitution allowed for such restrictions. Justice Hugo Black wrote in the decision that "all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect." He also wrote that "Pressing public necessity may sometimes justify the existence of such restrictions." In essence, the Court majority decided that the security of the general citizenry of the US was more important than upholding the rights of a single racial group, during this time of military emergency. The Korematsu decision was significant because it ruled that the United States government had the right to exclude and forcibly move people from designated areas based on their race. The decision was 6-3 that the need to protect the United States from espionage and other wartime acts was more important than Korematsu's individual rights. Supreme court decided that Japs in camps was justified by Military necessity (national security)

Adamson vs California

1947 Adamson was convicted in California of murder in the first degree. During the trial, the prosecutor, in accordance with a California law, made comments to the jury which highlighted Adamson's decision not to testify on his own behalf. Is a defendant's Fifth Amendment right not to bear witness against himself applicable in state courts and protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause? (Again does the due process clause apply to States) Justice Reed delivered the opinion and said the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause did not extend to defendants a Fifth Amendment right not to bear witness against themselves in state courts. Citing past decisions such as Twining v. New Jersey (1908), which explicitly denied the application of the due process clause to the right against self-incrimination, and Palko v. Connecticut (1937), Justice Reed argued that the Fourteenth Amendment did not extend carte blanche all of the immunities and privileges of the first ten amendments to individuals at the state level. In a lengthy dissent which included a deep investigation of the Fourteenth Amendment's history, Justice Black argued for the absolute and complete application of the Bill of Rights to the states.