con law final

A state recently enacted a liability act for later term abortions: "Any person who performs an abortion after the first trimester will be strictly liable to the biological father of the aborted fetus in an action for wrongful death." When the biological father is unknown, the Attorney General may bring suit to recover damages. A doctor performs abortions in this state and is concerned about liability under the act. The doctor has filed a lawsuit against the state's attorney general seeking an injunction against enforcement, as well as a declaration that the act is unconstitutional. While the lawsuit is pending, the state medical board suspends the doctor's medical license for persistent failure to fulfill the board's continuing medical education requirement. To regain her license, the doctor must complete three months of continuing medical education courses and apply for reinstatement. The doctor has submitted an affidavit stating that she is currently enrolled in the required courses. The board must reinstate her license if it finds that she has satisfactorily completed the courses. The board's decision on reinstatement is unreviewable. Does the doctor's suspension moot her lawsuit? A. Yes, because during the doctor's suspension she cannot perform the abortion procedure that would trigger liability under the act. B. No, because the act still threatens the doctor with future liability given that she will very likely regain her medical license. C. Yes, because reinstatement is within the sole, unreviewable discretion of the state medical board, making it purely speculative whether the doctor will ever practice medicine again. D. No, because the doctor's injury is capable of repetition yet evading review.

B

A federal statute requires the President to return any personal property that has been wrongfully confiscated from a United States citizen at an airport security checkpoint. A U.S. citizen believes that her property was improperly confiscated and wishes to file a lawsuit in federal court seeking an order directing the President to return the property. The citizen files an original proceeding in the United States Supreme Court seeking a writ of mandamus directing the President to do so, relying on a federal statute that grants the Supreme Court original jurisdiction to order mandamus against the President. If the President seeks to dismiss this original proceeding, will the Supreme Court grant the President's request? A. Yes, because the Supreme Court is prohibited from reviewing actions of the President. B. Yes, because Congress has enacted a statute that grants the Supreme Court original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus against the President, which is outside Article III's grant of jurisdiction to the Supreme Court. C. No, because the Supreme Court may exercise judicial review over the constitutionality of a statute enacted by Congress. D. No, because the Supreme Court may only exercise judicial review over the constitutionality of a statute enacted by a state, not by Congress.

B [MArbury v. Madison]

A state law provides that a person who has been divorced may not marry again unless he or she is current on all child-support payments. A woman who was refused a marriage license pursuant to this law sued the appropriate state officials. What standard should the court apply in reviewing the constitutionality of this law? A. The state must show that the law is necessary to serve a compelling government interest. B. The state must show that the law is substantially related to an important government interest. C. The woman must show that the law serves no important public purpose. D. The woman must show that the legislature did not have a rational basis for enacting the law.

The correct answer is A— The state must show that the law is necessary to serve a compelling government interest. Substantive due process is the principle that, even if procedural due process is satisfied and the Constitution does not expressly recognize certain rights—the Bill of Right's text and structure implies certain unwritten fundamental "life, liberty, or property" rights protected against unjustified governmental interference that are incorporated against the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. One such right is the right to marriage. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia. Where a fundamental right is infringed by state of local official action, strict scrutiny applies and the defendant state actor must show the challenged action is narrowly tailored to achieving a compelling government interest.

Under the authority of a federal voting rights statute, some states drew congressional districts in a manner calculated to increase the likelihood that members of historically disadvantaged minority racial groups would be elected. The U.S. Supreme Court declared these districts to be unconstitutional, as improper racial gerrymanders. In response to this ruling, Congress passed a new statute that explicitly denies the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over all future cases challenging the constitutionality of action taken under the authority of the federal voting rights statute. Which of the following is the most persuasive argument for the constitutionality of the new statute restricting the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction? A. Article III of the Constitution explicitly states that the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction is subject to such exceptions and regulations as Congress shall make. B. The constitutional principle of separation of powers authorizes Congress to pass statutes calculated to reduce the effects of Supreme Court decisions that interfere with the exercise of powers that have been delegated to the legislative branch. C. The establishment and apportionment of congressional districts directly affect interstate commerce, and the Constitution authorizes Congress to use its plenary authority over such commerce for any purpose it believes will promote the general welfare. D. The Fifteenth Amendment authorizes Congress to enforce the amendment's voting rights provisions by appropriate legislation, and Congress could reasonably determine that this restriction on the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction is an appropriate means to that end.

The correct answer is A—Article III of the Constitution explicitly states that the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction is subject to such exceptions and regulations as Congress shall make. Article III, § 2, cl. 3 of the Constitution states that the Supreme Court "shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make." Here, the most persuasive argument for the constitutionality of the new federal statute is provided by Congress's authority to restrict the Court's appellate jurisdiction under the Exceptions Clause. See, e.g., Ex parte McArdle (dismissing appeal from denial of habeus corpus petition by D-neo-Confederate newspapermen, holding law passed by Congress immediately after SCOTUS oral argument nonetheless a valid exercise of Congress's Exceptions Clause power to limit SCOTUS's appellate jurisdiction, depriving SCOTUS of deciding merits of McArdle's due process challenge on appeal of lower court's denial of habeas relief).

A federal statute authorizes a federal agency to issue rules requiring that state legislatures adopt laws of limited duration to reduce water pollution from gasoline-powered boat motors. The purpose of these rules is to assist the agency in attaining the clean water standards required by the statute. After the agency issued such rules, several states filed an action challenging the rules on the sole ground that they are unconstitutional. Should the court uphold the constitutionality of the agency's rules? A. No, because the federal government may not compel a state legislature to enact into state law a federally mandated regulatory program. B. No, because the Tenth Amendment grants states immunity from all direct federal regulation. C. Yes, because the rules serve an important purpose, and the requirements they impose on the states are only temporary and do not excessively interfere with the functioning of the state governments. D. Yes, because the supremacy clause of Article VI requires states to enforce federal law.

The correct answer is A—no, because the federal government may not compel a state legislature to enact into state law a federally mandated regulatory program. In New York v. United States, the Supreme Court invalidated the "take title" provision of the federal Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 as violating the Tenth Amendment. The Court explained that Congress cannot "commandeer" state governmental functions such as by compelling them to legislate according to the federal regulatory scheme—i.e., take title and assume liability for radioactive waste. Similarly, here the federal statute impermissibly authorizes a federal agency to adopt rules "requiring that state legislatures adopt laws ..."

A large privately owned and operated shopping mall is open to the public and includes small shops, major department stores, and restaurants that are located around a pedestrian area. It also has several movie theaters, an ice-skating rink, a small amusement park, and a branch of the local public library. The mall is advertised as "a small town with a big-town feel." During shopping hours, a group of 10 protesters gathered in the pedestrian area near the entrance to a department store to denounce the sale of animal fur products in that store. The protesters were peaceful and did not interfere with traffic into or out of the store, but they carried signs and vocally communicated their message to people walking in the area. Mall management quickly broke up the protest and required the protesters to leave the mall. The protesters have sued the mall, claiming that their right to freedom of speech guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments was violated. Should the protesters prevail? A. No, because the mall is private property, and there was no state action to which the freedom of speech guarantees of the First and Fourteenth Amendments apply. B. No, because the prohibition of protests adjacent to the entrance of a department store during shopping hours is a constitutionally proper limitation on the time, place, and manner of speech. C. Yes, because the mall is functionally equivalent to a town and, therefore, its actions are subject to the Constitution's guarantees of freedom of speech and assembly. D. Yes, because the mall's restriction on the protesters' speech was broader than necessary to ensure proper access to the department store.

The correct answer is A—no, because the mall is private property, and there was no state action to which the freedom of speech guarantees of the First and Fourteenth Amendments apply. On first glance, this fact pattern seems most analogous to Marsh v. Alabama (finding state action satisfied where deputized officer of private company town-owned mall arrested Jehovah's Witness evangelizing on sidewalk). But the facts are actually more analogous to the later (and dispositive) case Hudgens v. NLRB, in which the Court distinguished the deputized officer in Marsh from the private shopping mall manager effecting the deprivation in Hudgens, as well as implicitly distinguishing between the Marsh's isolated company-owned town that exercised a range of government-like functions from privately owned and operated shopping centers held open to the public exclusively for commercial retail purposes.

A state law provides that only U.S. citizens may serve as jurors in the state courts of that state. A woman who is a lawful resident alien and who has resided in the state for many years was summoned for jury duty in a state court. The woman's name was selected from a list of potential jurors that was compiled from a comprehensive list of local residents. She was disqualified from service solely because she is not a U.S. citizen. The woman has filed an action for a declaratory judgment that the state law is unconstitutional. Who should prevail in this action? A. The state, because a state may limit to U.S. citizens functions that are an integral part of the process of self-government. B. The state, because jury service is a privilege, not a right, and therefore it is not a liberty interest protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. C. The woman, because the Constitution gives Congress plenary power to make classifications with respect to aliens. D. The woman, because the state has not articulated a legitimate reason for prohibiting resident aliens from serving as jurors in the state's courts.

The correct answer is A—the state, because a state may limit to U.S. citizens functions that are an integral part of the process of self-government. The state law discriminates against legally resident non-citizens with regard to participating in jury service. While rational basis review applies to state laws excluding resident non-citizens legally present in the U.S. from governmental functions, strict scrutiny applies to all other state laws discriminating against resident aliens. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson (strict scrutiny for state law denying non-citizen legal permanent residents welfare benefits); Foley v. Connelie (rational basis review for state law forbidding employment of non-citizen legal permanent residents as state troopers). Here, deliberating and voting on a jury is a governmental function is integral to the process of self-government such that rational basis review applies.

Congress enacted a federal statute providing that any state may "require labeling to show the state or other geographic origin of citrus fruit that is imported into the receiving state." Pursuant to the federal statute, a state that produced large quantities of citrus fruit enacted a law requiring all citrus fruit imported into the state to be stamped with a two-letter postal abbreviation signifying the state of the fruit's origin. The law did not impose any such requirement for citrus fruit grown within the state. When it adopted the law, the state legislature declared that its purpose was to reduce the risks of infection of local citrus crops by itinerant diseases that have been found to attack citrus fruit. A national association of citrus growers has sued to have the state law declared unconstitutional. The association claims that the law is prohibited by the negative implications of the commerce clause of the Constitution. Which of the following is the best argument in favor of the state's effort to have this lawsuit dismissed? A. Any burden on interstate commerce imposed by the state law is outweighed by a legitimate state interest. B. Congress has the authority to authorize specified state regulations that would otherwise be prohibited by the negative implications of the commerce clause, and it has done so in this situation. C. The state law does not discriminate against out-of-state citrus growers or producers. D. The state law furthers a legitimate state interest, the burden it imposes on interstate commerce is only incidental, and the state's interest cannot be satisfied by other means that are less burdensome to interstate commerce.

The correct answer is B—Congress has the authority to authorize specified state regulations that would otherwise be prohibited by the negative implications of the commerce clause, and it has done so in this situation. Even when a state law unduly burdens interstate commerce such that it violates DCC, it is valid if Congress's expressly approves such state laws and the state law at issue is within the scope of the congressional approval. See, e.g., W&S Life Ins. Co. (rejecting Ohio company's DCC challenge to facially discriminatory CA state retaliatory tax because congressional federal statute expressly approved state taxation of insurance). Here, the citrus labeling requirement is within the scope of the congressional authorization for states to regulate and require the labeling of imported citrus fruits.

Congress passed a statute directing the United States Forest Service, a federal agency, to issue regulations to control campfires on federal public lands and to establish a schedule of penalties for those who violate the new regulations. The statute provides that the Forest Service regulations should "reduce, to the maximum extent feasible, all potential hazards that arise from campfires on Forest Service lands." The Forest Service issued the regulations and the schedule of penalties directed by Congress. The regulations include a rule that provides for the doubling of the fine for any negligent or prohibited use of fire if the user is under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Which of the following arguments best supports a finding that the rule providing for the fines is constitutional? A. The executive branch of government, of which the Forest Service is part, has inherent rule-making authority over public lands. B. The rule was issued pursuant to a valid exercise of Congress's power to delegate rule-making authority to federal agencies. C. The rule is justified by a compelling government interest in safeguarding forest resources. D. The rule relates directly to law enforcement, which is an executive rather than a legislative function, and hence it does not need specific congressional authorization.

The correct answer is B—because the rule was issued pursuant to a valid exercise of Congress's power to delegate rule-making authority to federal agencies. Here, the executive branch agency (U.S. Forest Service) rulemaking was authorized by Congress. Put in the terms of Justice Jackson's Youngstown Steel concurrence, the Forest Service rulemaking is within "Zone 1," in which the executive power is "at its maximum." And while federal governmental actions within Zone 1 may be downgraded if Congress does not have constitutional power to authorize in the first place, here there is no such impediment to Congress and the legislation empowering executive discretion constitutes a valid delegation of legislative authority. Under the non-delegation doctrine (whether the precedential "intelligible principle" test or Justice Gorsuch's three-part proposed test in his Gundy dissent), Congress's delegation of decision making authority to the Forest Service of determining and setting fines that "to the maximum extent feasible" deter forest fires clearly identifies the policy objective and the scope of Forest Service discretion.

A toy manufacturer that has its headquarters and sole manufacturing plant in a particular state has developed a "Martian" toy that simulates the exploration of Mars by a remote-controlled vehicle. It accurately depicts the Martian landscape and the unmanned exploratory vehicle traversing it. The toy is of high quality, is safe and durable, and has sold very well. Other toy manufacturers, all located outside of the state, have developed similar toys that are lower in price. These manufacturers have contracts to sell their Martian toys to outlets in the state. Although these toys are safe and durable, they depict the Martian landscape less realistically than the toys manufactured in the state. Nevertheless, because of the price difference, sales of these toys have cut severely into the sales of the Martian toys manufactured in the state. The state legislature has recently enacted a law "to protect the children of this state from faulty science and to protect in-state toy manufacturers from unfair competition." The law forbids the sale in the state of any toy that purports to represent extraterrestrial objects and does not satisfy specified scientific criteria. The Martian toy manufactured in the state satisfies all of these criteria; none of the Martian toys of the competing manufacturers meet the requirements. Is the state law constitutional? A. No, because it abrogates the obligations of the contracts between the other toy manufacturers and the in-state outlets that have agreed to sell their Martian toys. B. No, because it imposes an undue burden on interstate commerce. C. Yes, because it deals only with a local matter, the sale of toys in stores located within the state. D. Yes, because the state's interest in protecting the state's children from faulty science justifies this burden on interstate commerce.

The correct answer is B—no, because it imposes an undue burden on interstate commerce. Even if a law is facially neutral, it violates the negative Commerce Clause if its purpose or effect is to unduly burden out-of-state economic actors. See, e.g., West Lynn Creamery (holding that taken together a facially neutral pricing order and in-state subsidy to MA dairy farmers are discriminatory in purpose and effect and impose undue burden on interstate commerce).

A state law provides for an award of damages against anyone who publishes the name of a rape victim. Pursuant to that law, a woman sued a local newspaper in state court after the newspaper identified her as a rape victim. The state trial and appellate courts rejected the claim, holding that the state law was invalid under both the state constitution and the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The state supreme court affirmed, holding specifically: "We think that this well-intentioned law very likely violates the First Amendment of the federal Constitution. We need not, however, decide that issue, because the law assuredly violates our state constitution, which provides even greater protection to the right of the press to report the news." The woman petitioned for review in the U.S. Supreme Court. Is the U.S. Supreme Court likely to review the state supreme court judgment? A. No, because the First Amendment prohibits the imposition of liability for the publication of truthful information. B. No, because the judgment of the state supreme court rests upon an adequate and independent state-law ground. C. Yes, because the supremacy clause does not permit a state to create rights greater than those conferred by the federal Constitution. D. Yes, because the U.S. Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction extends to cases arising under federal law.

The correct answer is B—no, because the judgment of the state supreme court rests upon an adequate and independent state-law ground. The state constitutional ruling is "adequate and independent" because it in-and-of itself is sufficient to dispose of the case and the state high court concluded the provision adopts greater free speech protections than the First Amendment of the federal Constitution. Put another way, the state court's interpretation of the state constitutional provision is not inextricably intertwined with the U.S. Supreme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence.

In an effort to counteract a steep increase in juvenile crime, a state enacted a law terminating the parental rights of any state resident whose child under 16 years of age is convicted of a violent crime in the state. The law directs the state juvenile court to enter a termination order in such a case after the parent has been afforded notice and an opportunity for a hearing at which the only relevant issues are the age of the child and whether the child has been convicted of a violent crime in the state. Is the state law constitutional? A. No, because the law is not narrowly tailored to serve a substantial state interest. B. No, because the law is not necessary to serve a compelling state interest. C. Yes, because a state's police power authorizes it to punish criminal behavior with appropriate sanctions. D. Yes, because the law is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.

The correct answer is B—no, because the law is not necessary to serve a compelling state interest. Substantive due process is the principle that, even if procedural due process is satisfied and the Constitution does not expressly recognize certain rights—the Bill of Right's text and structure implies certain unwritten fundamental "life, liberty, or property" rights protected against unjustified governmental interference that are incorporated against the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. One such right is the right to parental care and custody of one's children. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois (invalidating Illinois state law requiring children automatically becomes wards of state upon death of unmarried mother and reversing termination of P unmarried father's custody of child as violating substantive due process absent prove of unfitness). Where a fundamental right is infringed by state of local official action, strict scrutiny applies and the defendant state actor must show the challenged action is narrowly tailored to achieving a compelling government interest. Here, while counteracting a steep increase in juvenile crime is a compelling government interest in and of itself, the state law and judicial hearing at issue are not narrowly tailored to advancing that interest. Similar to the automatic custody termination law declared unconstitutional in Stanley due to the absence of an individualized hearing to determine the best interests of the child and relative parental fitness, here at the state judicial hearing "the only relevant issues are the age of the child and whether the child has been convicted of a violent crime in the state." Undoubtedly, there is too tenuous a connection between mere parental custody of a child that has committed a crime and the parent's own culpability for that criminal activity—only if the state law required evidence of the parent's unfitness could the law withstand constitutional challenge.

City police officers shot and killed the plaintiff's friend as he attempted to escape arrest for an armed robbery he had committed. The plaintiff brought suit in federal district court against the city police department and the city police officers involved, seeking only a declaratory judgment declaring unconstitutional the state statute under which the police acted. That newly enacted statute authorized the police to use deadly force when necessary to apprehend a person who has committed a felony. In his suit, the plaintiff alleged that the police would not have killed his friend if the use of deadly force had not been authorized by the statute. The federal district court should: A. Decide the case on its merits, because it raises a federal question. B. Dismiss the action, because it involves a nonjusticiable political question. C. Dismiss the action, because it does not present a case or controversy. D. Dismiss the action, because the Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from deciding cases of this type.

The correct answer is C—dismiss the action, because it does not present a case or controversy. The claimant lacks standing because he cannot show he either personally suffered or imminently will suffer the relevant injury (i.e., shot or skilled by police after his commission of a felony) and his friendship with the decedent is not sufficient for third-party standing.

The House of Representatives voted to impeach a federal judge accused of accepting bribes, even though no criminal charges had been filed. The Senate conducted a trial, declared the accusations credible, and voted to remove the judge from the bench. The judge—who had been appointed by a president of a different party from that in control of both chambers of Congress—claimed that partisanship drove the impeachment proceedings and filed an appeal in federal court. Does the federal court have jurisdiction to hear the appeal under the Constitution? A. Yes, because federal courts have jurisdiction under Article III of the Constitution over questions arising under the Constitution or the Laws of the United States. B. Yes, because the judge has suffered an injury in fact and therefore has standing to bring the case. C. No, because the case involves a nonjusticiable political question. D. No, because the Senate trial has concluded, rendering the case moot.

The correct answer is C—no, because the case involves a nonjusticiable political question. Federal courts have no jurisdiction to hear nonjusticiable political questions. Political questions are those that are inherently political, rather than legal, in nature. The Supreme Court in Baker v. Carr set forth six "factors" that tend to indicate a case involves a political question, specifically whether: (1) there is a textual commitment of the matter to another branch of government; (2) there is a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving the question; (3) resolving the case would require a policy decision better left to the discretion of someone other than a federal judge; (4) hearing the matter would indicate a lack of respect to other branches of government; (5) there is an unusual need to abide by a decision that has already been made; and/or (6) there is a likelihood of embarrassment caused by multiple decisions on the same issue. The facts here implicate the first criterion, because Article I of the Constitution vests the "sole power" to impeach to the House of Representatives and the "sole power" to try impeachments to the Senate impeachment authority in Congress, which is a demonstrable textual commitment of the matter to another branch of government. For this reason, in Nixon v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that federal courts cannot hear challenges to the process by which the Senate conducts an impeachment trial.

Insurance is provided in a particular state only by private companies. Although the state insurance commissioner inspects insurance companies for solvency, the state does not regulate their rates or policies. A particular insurance company charges higher rates for burglary insurance to residents of one part of a county in the state than to residents of another section of the same county because of the different crime rates in those areas. A resident of that county was charged the higher rate by the insurance company because of the location of her residence. The resident sues the insurance company, alleging that the differential in insurance rates unconstitutionally denied her the equal protection of the laws. Will the resident's suit succeed? A. Yes, because the higher crime rate in the resident's neighborhood demonstrates that the county police are not giving persons who reside there the equal protection of the laws. B. Yes, because the insurance rate differential is inherently discriminatory. C. No, because the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is not applicable to the actions of these insurance companies. D. No, because there is a rational basis for the differential in insurance rates.

The correct answer is C—no, because the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is not applicable to the actions of these insurance companies. Due to the state action requirement recognized in the Civil Rights Act Cases, private entities like the insurance companies are not amenable to suit for violating individual rights or equal protection provisions of the Constitution. The only exceptions recognized are for public functions traditionally and exclusively performed by government and where a private entity is so 'entangled" with the government so as to fairly describe them as a state actor. Here, the county insurance commissioner only inspects insurance companies for solvency—the county does not regulate the insurance companies' rates or policies. Compare with Jackson v. MetroEdison (rejecting procedural due process challenge brought by customer against electrical company granted a partial monopoly by state utility commission where the state and commission extensively regulated other aspects of the utility but did not specifically regulate or direct its termination procedures).

A state law requires any lawn mower sold in the state to meet a specified minimum level of fuel efficiency. A new federal statute requires all power equipment, including lawn mowers, to be labeled with energy efficiency stickers to permit purchasers to make informed choices when buying such equipment. The statute does not expressly preempt state law. Assume that no other federal statute or administrative regulation addresses the energy efficiency of power equipment. Which of the following is the best argument the state can make for the continued validity of its law? A. Congress cannot preempt state laws requiring a specified minimum level of fuel efficiency for lawn mowers, because the use of such equipment is a wholly local event and, therefore, is beyond the regulatory authority vested in Congress by the commerce clause. B. The law is unaffected by the federal statute, because Congress did not expressly prohibit state laws requiring power equipment to meet specified levels of fuel efficiency. C. The purpose of the law is consistent with the purpose of the federal statute, enforcement of the law would not interfere with the full execution of the statute, and there is no evidence that Congress intended to preclude the states from enacting supplemental laws on this subject. D. There is a very strong presumption that a specific state law on a subject normally within the state's police power prevails over a more general federal statute, because the Tenth Amendment reserves to the states primary authority over matters affecting public health, welfare, and safety.

The correct answer is C—the purpose of the law is consistent with the purpose of the federal statute, enforcement of the law would not interfere with the full execution of the statute, and there is no evidence that Congress intended to preclude the states from enacting supplemental laws on this subject. Under implied obstacle preemption doctrine, a state or local law or policy will only be overridden by federal law or regulation where the state law or policy would interfere with (a.k.a. frustrate the objectives of) intended by Congress in enacting the federal law. Put another way, the state law will be preempted if it's an obstacle to the accomplishment of the purpose of the federal law intended by Congress. Here, the intent of Congress in requiring energy efficiency information labels is clearly stated as to empower "purchasers to make informed choices when buying such equipment." And the state law requiring any lawn mowers sold in the state to satisfy state minimum fuel efficiency standards does not interfere with Congress's intended purpose of informing consumers. One easy way to reach this answer is by process of elimination. The fact patter removes express preemption from the equation, and field preemption is inapposite because the fact pattern also tells you to assume no other federal law or regulation addresses the energy efficiency of power equipment. Physical impossibility preemption can be dismissed because a lawn mower manufacturer or seller can comply with both the state and federal requirements at the same time—selling only lawn mowers that meet the state standards and slapping the information labels on those lawn mowers sold. Thus, only obstacle preemption as articulated by C is left standing.

A state owned and operated an electric power system, which included a nuclear power plant. In order to ensure the availability of sites for the disposal of spent fuel from the nuclear power plant, the state refused to supply electric power to out-of-state purchasers residing in states that would not accept spent fuel from the plant for storage or disposal. Assume that no federal statute applies. Which of the following is the strongest argument that the state's action is constitutional? A. A state may condition the sale to out-of-state purchasers of any products produced in that state on the willingness of those purchasers to bear the fair share of the environmental costs of producing those products. B. The generation of electricity is intrastate by nature and therefore subject to plenary state control. C. The state itself owns and operates the power system, and therefore its refusal to supply power to out-of-state purchasers is not subject to the negative implications of the commerce clause. D. The state's action is rationally related to the health, safety, and welfare of state citizens.

The correct answer is C—the state itself owns and operates the power system, and therefore its refusal to supply power to out-of-state purchasers is not subject to the negative implications of the commerce clause. If a state is acting as a market participant—rather than a regulator—the DCC does not apply and its discriminatory actions against out-of-staters is permitted. Like the South Dakota-owned cement plant priority sale policy for in-staters in Reeves, here the power plant is state owned and operated and its sale of electricity decision is at point of sale, not like the downstream regulatory effect that was found impermissible with regards to Alaska's in-state timber-processing requirement in South-Central Timber.

.A state law provides some funding for public schools on a per-student basis from general state revenues, which primarily come from the state income and sales taxes. The law also provides that all other public monies used to support public schools in the state come from locally levied real estate taxes. This results in a large disparity in per-student funding among the state's many public school districts because some districts have higher property values per student than other districts. Public school students who claim to be disadvantaged by this school funding law have challenged the law solely on the ground that it violates the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause. Which of the following best states the burden of persuasion in this action? A. The state must demonstrate that the law is necessary to vindicate a compelling state interest. B. The state must demonstrate that the law is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. C. The students must demonstrate that the law is not rationally related to any legitimate state interest. D. The students must demonstrate that the law is not substantially related to an important state interest.

The correct answer is C—the students must demonstrate that the law is not rationally related to any legitimate state interest. This question tests the burden of persuasion application to Equal Protection Clause challenges. The only potentially discriminatory classification is disparate impact based on wealth, which is subject only to rational basis review.

A police officer was employed on a city's police force for 10 years. When the officer accepted the job, the city's employee benefit plan provided a death benefit to the spouse of any employee who died as a result of any job-related injury. Last year, the city amended its employee benefit plan to deny its death benefit in cases where the death "was caused by the employee's refusal to accept, for any reason other than its excessive risk to life or health, reasonably available medical care prescribed by a physician." After this amendment took effect, the officer was shot while on duty. Because of a sincerely held religious belief, the officer refused to allow a prescribed blood transfusion and, as a result, died from loss of blood. When the officer's spouse applied for the death benefit, the city denied the application on the basis of the amendment to the employee benefit plan. The officer's spouse has challenged the amendment, claiming that, as applied to the officer, it violated the officer's constitutional right to the free exercise of religion. Is the court likely to find the amendment to the employee benefit plan constitutional as applied to the officer? A. No, because it effectively discriminates against a religious practice. B. No, because it violates the vested contractual rights of city employees who were hired before the amendment took effect. C. Yes, because it does not single out religious reasons for the denial of benefits and is a reasonable limitation on the award of such benefits. D. Yes, because it imposes a condition only on the award of a government benefit and does not impose a penalty on an individual's conduct.

The correct answer is C—yes, because it does not single out religious reasons for the denial of benefits and is a reasonable limitation on the award of such benefits. The employment benefits plan amendment is neutral and of general applicability within the meaning of the Employment Division v. Smith test, as death benefits are denied if life-saving care is refused "for any reason other than its excessive risk to life or health." In other words, it does not single out religious reasons for benefits denial, nor is there any evidence of it being motivated by animus (as compared to Masterpiece Cake Shop or Lukumi) or that any comparable secular activity receives more favorable treatment. Thus, rational basis and not strict scrutiny applies and the city's interest in fiscal conservation alone is enough to withstand the challenge.

A federal statute extends federal minimum wage requirements to all dry cleaning stores. The statute contains express findings that, when combined, the wages received by dry cleaning workers have a substantial impact on the national economy and on the flow of goods and services in interstate commerce. These findings are supported by information presented to Congress during committee hearings on the legislation. A small dry cleaning store operates exclusively within a community in the center of a geographically large state. It has no customers from outside the state. It employs three workers, each of whom is paid less than the federal minimum wage. Must this dry cleaning store comply with the statute imposing the federal minimum wage requirements on all dry cleaning stores? A. No, because the store does no business in interstate commerce. B. No, because the wages of the store's three workers do not have a substantial impact on interstate commerce. C. Yes, because the commerce clause vests Congress with plenary legislative authority over labor relations. D. Yes, because the wages paid by dry cleaning stores have a substantial impact on interstate commerce.

The correct answer is D—because the wages paid by dry cleaning stores have a substantial impact on interstate commerce. The Supreme Court has held that Congress has power to regulate individual activity that, taken in the aggregate, has a substantial impact on interstate commerce. Here, D correctly applies the aggregation standard ("the wages paid by dry cleaning stores").

A city zoning ordinance requires that anyone who proposes to operate a group home obtain a special use permit from the city zoning board. The zoning ordinance defines a group home as a residence in which four or more unrelated adults reside. An individual applied for a special use permit to operate a group home for convicts during their transition from serving prison sentences to their release on parole. Although the proposed group home met all of the requirements for the special use permit, the zoning board denied the individual's application because of the nature of the proposed use. The individual sued the zoning board seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on constitutional grounds. Which of the following best states the appropriate burden of persuasion in this action? A. Because housing is a fundamental right, the zoning board must demonstrate that denial of the permit is necessary to serve a compelling state interest. B. Because the zoning board's action has the effect of discriminating against a quasi-suspect class in regard to a basic subsistence right, the zoning board must demonstrate that the denial of the permit is substantially related to an important state interest. C. Because the zoning board's action invidiously discriminates against a suspect class, the zoning board must demonstrate that denial of the permit is necessary to serve a compelling state interest. D. Because the zoning board's action is in the nature of an economic or social welfare regulation, the individual seeking the permit must demonstrate that the denial of the permit is not rationally related to a legitimate state interest.

The correct answer is D—because the zoning board's action is in the nature of an economic or social welfare regulation, the individual seeking the permit must demonstrate that the denial of the permit is not rationally related to a legitimate state interest. The rational basis test applies because denial of a special use permit for operation of group home for former prisoners implicates no fundamental right or suspect classification under current precedent.

Congress enacts a statute that makes it a federal felony to assault or batter an airline pilot or flight attendant during a commercial domestic or international airline flight. An airline passenger has been arrested and charged under this new law for physically confronting a flight attendant during his flight from Miami to Orlando. After its stop in Orlando, the plane continued to its final destination, Atlanta. In his defense, the passenger argues the statute is an invalid exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause power. The passenger's argument is: A. Correct because violent crime on an intrastate flight is a non-economic activity with only an attenuated link to interstate commerce. B. Correct because violent crime on an intrastate flight is a purely local activity that only the states may regulate. C. Incorrect because the costs and travel disruption associated with violent crime on airplanes, in the aggregate, has a substantial effect on interstate commerce. D. Incorrect because the statute protects the instrumentalities and people that move in interstate commerce.

The correct answer is D—incorrect because the statute protects the instrumentalities and people that move in ISC. As articulated by Lopez, three categories of laws come within Congress's Commerce Clause power: (1) laws regulating the channels of interstate commerce; (2) laws regulating instrumentalities or people that travel or work in the channels of ISC; and (3) laws regulating an economic or commercial activity (or a non-economic activity that is an essential part of a larger economic activity) that has a substantial aggregate effect on ISC. Here, the statute falls within Lopez's second category: laws protecting instrumentalities, people, or things that travel or operate in the channels of ISC. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel (upholding CRA prohibition on racial discrimination in public accommodations as applied to motel adjacent to interstate highways and primarily serving out-of-state travelers, because the CRA provision is rationally related to protecting African American travelers from out-of-state). Here, the statute seeks to protect airplanes and airline employees traveling in interstate channels. By criminalizing the assault or battery of a pilot or flight attendant, the statute validly regulates the activities of people traveling in the channels of interstate commerce.

Congress enacts, and the President signs into law, a statute requiring every adult American to purchase an American-made smartphone and that provides federal financial assistance for the purchase for those below the poverty line. The statute further establishes a free nationwide cellular service for calling 911. The failure to purchase a smartphone under the statute is a federal misdemeanor offense, punishable by a $100 fine. Congress stated that the purpose of the statute was to make Americans safer by ensuring access to reach emergency assistance at all times and that it enacted the statute pursuant to its Commerce Clause authority. Congress reasoned that the statute regulates an economic activity—the purchase of smartphones—and that the failure to purchase smartphones has a substantial aggregate effect on interstate commerce. The legislative record contains extensive testimony and statistical evidence, including that U.S. smartphone sales generate $70 billion annually and that the inability to immediately contact emergency assistance results in substantially greater health costs, crime, and property damage. Is the provision requiring all Americans to purchase American-made smartphones a valid exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause power? A. Yes, because smartphones are products shipped in interstate commerce. B. Yes, because while the penalty applies to a non-economic activity, the legislative record demonstrates the provision is rationally related to an activity that in the aggregate has a substantial effect on interstate commerce. C. No, because the penalty is not the most effective means of improving access to emergency assistance given that Congress could instead have appropriated funds to purchase smartphones directly for all Americans. D. No, because the penalty does not regulate existing activity but instead attempts to compel activity.

The correct answer is D—no, because the penalty does not regulate existing activity but instead attempts to compel activity. In NFIB v. Sebelius, the Court held the ACA's individual mandate was not within Congress's Commerce Clause authority, because it did not regulate pre-existing activity but instead attempted to create or compel individuals into commerce—forcing purchase of health insurance coverage. The Court indicated that the term "regulate" presupposes the existence of commercial activity. Similarly here, Congress's authority does not extend to the forced the purchase of smartphones.

A federal statute requires the National Bureau of Standards to establish minimum quality standards for all beer sold in the United States. The statute also provides that public hearings must precede adoption of the standards, and that once they are adopted, the standards will be subject to judicial review. While the proposed standards have not yet been announced, several Bureau officials have publicly expressed opinions indicating a belief that pasteurized beer is safer than unpasteurized beer. However, these officials have not stated whether they intend to include a pasteurization requirement in the standards. A brewery that produces unpasteurized beer is concerned that, after the appropriate proceedings, the Bureau may adopt quality standards that will prohibit the sale of unpasteurized beer. The brewery has sued in federal district court to enjoin the Bureau from adopting standards that would prohibit the sale of unpasteurized beer. How should the district court proceed with the suit? A. Determine whether the Bureau could reasonably believe that pasteurization is the safest process by which to brew beer and, if so, refuse to issue the injunction against the Bureau. B. Determine whether the process used by the brewery is as safe as pasteurization and, if so, issue the injunction against the Bureau. C. Refuse to adjudicate the merits of the suit at this time and stay the action until the Bureau has actually issued beer-quality standards. D. Refuse to adjudicate the merits of the suit and dismiss it, because it does not involve a justiciable case or controversy.

The correct answer is D—refuse to adjudicate the merits of the suit and dismiss it, because it does not involve a justiciable case or controversy. Ripeness doctrine prohibits federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over a case until an actual controversy is presented involving a real and immediate threat of injury. For a pre-enforcement challenge to be ripe, the threatened injury must be more than hypothetical or speculative. Generally, pre-enforcement challenges to criminal or regulatory action are unripe for judicial consideration unless there is a credible threat of future enforcement. Alternatively, a claim may be ripe if the issue presented is fit for judicial decision and refusal to hear the case would work a substantial hardship on the claimants, thus rendering the harm present and immediate. D is correct because, while the issuance of standards and review of those standards is inevitable, the standards themselves have not been announced and no formal action taken—the fact that "several Bureau officials" informally suggested interest in issuing a pasteurization standard is not enough to rise to a credible threat of enforcement. Moreover, the claimants have not adduced facts as to substantial hardship akin to those adduced by the drug manufacturers in Abbot Laboratories.

A city council recently passed an ordinance revising the hiring criteria for public transportation workers. The criteria apply to those who operate and maintain public transportation equipment, but not to those on the city's public transportation board, which sets policy for the transit system. One criterion is that transportation employees be United States citizens. The council defended the citizenship requirement as serving the city's interest in having workers of undivided loyalty. Does the city's citizenship requirement violate the Equal Protection Clause? A. No, because the affected employees perform a governmental function. B. No, because the citizenship requirement is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. C. Yes, because these employees do not perform a governmental function. D. Yes, because the citizenship requirement is not narrowly tailored to a compelling government purpose.

The correct answer is D—yes, because the citizenship requirement is not narrowly tailored to a compelling government purpose. The ordinance's classification is based on whether a person is a U.S. citizen, discriminating against persons legally residing in the U.S. While rational basis review applies to state laws excluding resident non-citizens legally present in the U.S. from governmental functions, strict scrutiny applies to all other state laws discriminating against resident aliens. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson (strict scrutiny for state law denying non-citizen legal permanent residents welfare benefits); Foley v. Connelie (rational basis review for state law forbidding employment of non-citizen legal permanent residents as state troopers). The issue is thus whether "operation and maintenance of public transportation equipment" is a governmental function or, in other words, functions that involve policymaking or broad discretion in executing policy.

A state generally provides funding for the medical care of its residents who cannot afford such care. State law, however, prohibits use of this state funding for surgery for any person who has resided in the state for less than one year, except in emergency situations. A woman moved to the state two months ago seeking permanent employment. Her physician recommends non-emergency surgery to treat a medical condition. The surgery would qualify for state funding if the woman had resided in the state for a year. The woman has sued to invalidate the state law that prohibits state funding of her surgery. Should the woman prevail in her action? A. No, because the law reasonably conserves the state's limited resources. B. No, because the law reasonably prevents the expenditure of state funds on transient nonresidents. C. Yes, because the law burdens the woman's fundamental right to health care. D. Yes, because the law burdens the woman's fundamental right to travel.

The correct answer is D—yes, because the law burdens the woman's fundamental right to travel. While SCOTUS has rejected the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment's use to incorporate Bill of Rights protections, it has applied the P/I Clause to protect U.S. citizens' fundamental right to travel in three ways as: (1) guaranteeing citizens the right to move freely between states; (2) securing the right to be treated equally in all states when visiting; and (3) securing the rights of new citizens to be treated like long-time citizens of a state. Here, the medical-benefits restriction on newly admitted state residents falls in the third category. In Saenz v. Roe, SCOTUS invalidated a CA statute limiting first-year residents' welfare benefits to level they would have received in origin state prior to move to CA.