Court Cases for final
Wisconsin v. Yoder Supreme Court 1972
Amish people did not send kids to high school and were fined $5. Plead right because of Free Exercise Clause of 1st A. Amish children would be living in Amish community. Ruling; Both 1st and 14th A present state from compelling Amish to force h.s. till 16. Very narrow interpretation -- only Amish
Bob Jones University v. US, 1982
Bob Jones University was dedicated to "fundamentalist Christian beliefs" which included prohibitions against interracial dating and marriage. Such behavior would lead to expulsion. In 1970, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) changed its formal policy to adopt a district court decision that prohibited the IRS from giving tax-exempt status to private schools engaging in racial discrimination. The IRS believed that the University's policies amounted to racism and revoked its tax-exempt status. The University claimed that the IRS had abridged its religious liberty. This case was decided together with Goldsboro Christian Schools Inc. v. United States, in which Goldsboro maintained a racially discriminatory admissions policy based upon its interpretation of the Bible, accepting for the most part only Caucasian students. The IRS determined that Goldsboro was not an exempt organization and hence was required to pay federal social security and unemployment taxes. After paying a portion of such taxes for certain years, Goldsboro filed a refund suit claiming that the denial of its tax-exempt status violated the U.S. Constitution. The Court found that the IRS was correct in its decision to revoke the tax-exempt status of Bob Jones University and the Goldsboro Christian School. These institutions did not meet the requirement by providing "beneficial and stabilizing influences in community life" to be supported by taxpayers with a special tax status. The schools could not meet this requirement due to their discriminatory policies. The Court declared that racial discrimination in education violated a "fundamental national public policy." The government may justify a limitation on religious liberties by showing it is necessary to accomplish an "overriding governmental interest." Prohibiting racial discrimination was such a governmental interest. Hence, the Court found that "not all burdens on religion are unconstitutional."
Hunt v. St. Peter School, 1997
Catholic schools must provide "minor adjustments" as opposed to ADA's "reasonable accommodations" -- Catholic schools liable under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
Herx v. Diocese of Fort Wayne, South Bend, 2012
Declined to renew after IVF, had one round, told principal, after another round Msgr knew, Diocese made decision to not renew Filed based on Title VII, Pregnancy Discrimination, ADA Diocese said protected for religious reasons Huge sum awarded, Settled out of court Nearly $2 million in damages, and vindication, after the jury ruled that the Catholic Diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend discriminated against the former language arts teacher at St. Vincent de Paul Catholic School when they fired her for undergoing in vitro fertilization. (salary 28,000) While the total amount of $1,950,001 awarded to Herx was close to what she had asked, the jury of seven men and five woman awarded her only $1 in punitive damages. Closest to losing-- didn't want to set precedent
TITLE: BOE v. Rowley COURT: Supreme Court of the United States DATE: 1982
FACTS: After going through the Court of Appeals and District Court, the Rowley family, who have a daughter who is deaf, petitioned the Supreme Court to hear their case. Their daughter, Amy Rowley, had been placed in a normal kindergarten class in order to gage what she would need to succeed. After the trial period, Amy had done well enough in the class, and it was determined that the only accommodations needed for Amy was an FM hearing aid to magnify the voice of the teacher. When she successfully completed the year and was ready to move on to 1st grade, an IEP was created for Amy. While her parents accepted most of the IEP, they wanted a sign language interpreter with Amy in every class instead of some of the accommodations in the IEP. The school administrators disagreed that such an accommodation would be necessary because this type of interpreter was placed in her kindergarten class and reported that Amy was not in need of one. The parents viewed having this interpreter was a part of their daughter receiving a "free appropriate public education". DECISION OF THE COURT: The Court decided that the accommodation put forward by the respondents was not required by law, and thus, not granted. COURT'S RATIONALE: The Court believed that such accommodations were not in line with IDEA. IDEA states that school districts are only mandated to provide an IEP that helps the child to have access to a "meaningful" education. The demands of the parents were simply not required for their child to have access to a "free appropriate public education". PRECEDENT ESTABLISHED: A school district does not have to provide additional accommodations to the IEP created for a child with a disability.
TITLE: Irving Independent School District v. Tatro COURT: Supreme Court of the United States DATE: 1984
FACTS: Amber Tatro has spina bifida, which requires her to use clean intermittent catheterization (CIC) since she cannot control her bladder. The procedure is simple and can be performed in a few minutes by any trained person. The school district drew up an IEP for her academic, physical and occupational needs, but made no provision for school personnel to administer CIC. The Court of Appeals decided that this service was the burden of the school and the district appealed. DECISION OF THE COURT: Court of Appeals decision was affirmed. 1) CIC is a "supportive service" required to assist a handicapped child to benefit from special education, and 2) provision of CIC is not a "medical service" meaning that the school will offer Amber Tatro CIC. COURT'S RATIONALE: It was clear that without CIC services, Amber would not be able to attend school and thereby benefit from special education. CIC is a service that enables a handicapped child to remain at school during the day is an important means of providing the child with the meaningful access to FAPE that Congress envisioned. CIC qualifies as a "supportive service" required to assist a handicapped child to benefit from special education. CIC is also not a "medical service" since it is not a service given by a licensed physician. School nursing services are also not considered a medical service, and since any lay person who has been trained could administer the CIC, it would be considered a "related service" and not a "medical service." PRECENDENTS SET: Defined "medical service" as those services performed by a licensed physician. "Related services" for handicapped children include school health services that are services provided by a qualified nurse or other qualified persons. Services nec
TITLE: GOSS V. LOPEZ COURT: US SUPREME COURT DATE: 1975
FACTS: Nine appellees/students in the Columbus, Ohio Public School District were suspended from school for various reasons involving misconduct at school. The students said that they did not receive a hearing to defend themselves. The students felt they were being kept from their right to a free education. The case also is meant to decide if Section 3313.66 of the Ohio Law where principals can suspend a student for up to 10 days should be abolished, and the students wanted all references of suspensions removed from the records of said students. DECISION OF THE COURT: On Jan. 22, 1975, the US Supreme Court ruled that because of due process under the 14th amendment, public school students who face being suspended are entitled to notice and a hearing. Since the suspensions that happened in this case happened without a hearing, neither before or after the suspension, all suspensions were considered invalid Accordingly, the judgment was in favor of the students in this case. COURT'S RATIONALE: The Court found that because the students were suspended without any hearings before or after, the students were not provided their right to due process in the 14th amendment. PRECEDENT ESTABLISHED: Public schools cannot suspend a student without providing him/her a hearing to discuss the situation and to provide evidence.
TITLE: YANERO V. DAVIS COURT: SUPREME COURT OF KENTUCKY DATE: 2001
FACTS: Two students on a baseball team at Waggener High School decided to do some batting practice outside of official practice time. The student pitching hit the student, Yanero, in the head with the ball. Yanero was not wearing a helmet. Yanero brought the following complaints to the court: the Board of Education, the athletic director, two assistant coaches were negligent in not requiring players to wear helmets during batting practice or to seek medical attention after such an injury, that the state Athletics' Association (KHSAA) failed properly hire and train their personnel to provide for the safety of students, and that the Board and KHSAA were responsible for the negligence of the coaches who were not present during the incident. The students displayed ample knowledge of the dangers of batting without helmets during the court case. DECISION OF THE COURT: The Court sided with the Board and KSHAA citing governmental immunity since all parties were acting in their proper roles as government agents. COURT'S RATIONALE: All parties who were alleged to have been negligent were found to be officially immune because they were either a government agency (the Board), hired by said agency (the coaches and athletic director, or an organization delegated the task of carrying out the agency's work (KSHAA) which was provided qualified official immunity. This is so because they were found not be acting in bad faith, violating a constitutional, statutory, or other established right, or with a willful motive to cause harm. PRECEDENT ESTABLISHED: Government employees and associations appointed to carry out the work of the government are granted immunities from tort liability.
Title: Smith v. Archbishop of St. Louis Court: Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division Two Date: March 16, 1982
Facts: "This is an appeal by the Archdiocese of St. Louis from a jury verdict of $1,250,000 in favor of plaintiff, Sheila Smith, in her suit alleging negligent supervision." Sheila was an 8 year old second grader at Good Shepherd Elementary school whose teacher was Ms. Wiegand. Ms. Wiegand May 1, 1976 lit a candle for everyday that month in dedication to Mary. She didn't give any special instructions about candle safety, but states the students knew the candle was on the desk and not to wander by it. On May 18, as the class was getting ready for their play, Ms. Wiegand was assisting other students in the rear of the classroom, when it came to her attention that Sheila was on fire in her costume by the desk. Ms. Wiegand attempted putting the flames out numerous ways, but was finally successful by dousing her with water. Smith was hospitalized for 26 days in the burn unit. Her treatment continued after being released in the form of plastic surgery to try and regraft the burned areas. Smith also went through counseling through all of this recovery. Court's Ruling: The court found no manifest injustice in the award given to the Plaintiff. All judges concur. The plaintiff claimed damages resulting from defendant's negligent failure to exercise ordinary care, under the circumstances, in the supervision of plaintiff. (See Rationale below for how the court ruled in each of the defendants points). Court's Rationale: First point is the Archdiocese claims the court should have directed a verdict in its favor because plaintiff failed to make a submissible case on the issue of whether defendant breached its duty to supervise plaintiff. Court denies, data reveals ample evidence to support the jury's finding that defendant negligently supervised plaintiff. Ms. Wiegand failed to exercise reasonable care in the supervision of the young children under her charge. Second point that the trial court erred in giving plaintiff's verdict director because the instruction was not supported by substantial evidence of a breach of duty by defendant to supervise plaintiff. Court disposes of this point based on first point. Third point submission of the instruction was error because it did not require the jury to find that defendant knew or should have known the candle created an unreasonably dangerous condition in the classroom. Court denies, based on negligent supervision. Precedent Established: Comparable awards are, however, only one factor to be considered when reviewing an allegedly excessive verdict. Other factors include plaintiff's young age, the type of injury she has suffered, the permanency of her scars, and the rapidly declining purchasing power of the dollar.
Title: Morse v. Frederick Court: Supreme Court of the United States Date: 2007
Facts: A senior from Juneau-Douglas High School named Joseph Frederick was at a school-sponsored activity for the Olympic Torch Relay that was going through Juneau, Alaska in 2002. Frederick displayed a banner that said, "Bong Hits 4 Jesus." The principal of the school, Deborah Morse, asked Frederick to remove the banner because she believed people would interpret it to be endorsing drug use. He refused to put it away, and Morse took it away from him. Frederick was suspended from school for 10 days. He sued Morse and lost his case in district court, but he won in appellate court. The case was granted certiorari in 2007. Court's Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that the display of the "Bong Hits 4 Jesus" banner was not a form of protected free speech, and the school did not violate Frederick's rights by making him remove the banner. Court's Rationale: The court used two previous Supreme Court cases as backing for their decision. In Bethel v. Fraser the court said, "the constitutional rights of students at public school are not automatically, coextensive with the rights of adults." They also used the ruling of Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier which set the precedent that all student rights in a public school are subject to them being applied in the context of the school environment. With these precedents in mind, the school had the right to protect its students from messages that would promote illegal drug use without infringing on any of Frederick's First Amendment rights. The court noted that Frederick admitted that his actions were not meant to be a political statement, which meant that Tinker v. Des Moines wasn't a good case to use as precedent for this case. Precedent Established: Morse v. Frederick establishes the precedent that schools have the ability to protect their students from speech that might be construed as promoting drug use. This case highlights a very specific instance of a type of unprotected speech in the public school setting.
Spears v. Jefferson Parish School Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fifth Circuit. November 16, 1994
Facts: At Woodland Elementary School three kindergarten boys were in PE class. The three boys were being disruptive as they watched a movie on a rainy day. The PE teacher called the boys over to sit near him. When they continued being disruptive he told them they better behave or he would "kill them." The PE teacher then took two of the boys into his office to work on some paperwork. He asked the boys if they wanted to play a trick on Justin, the third boy. They agreed. The PE teacher then led Justin to believe that his two friends were dead. He told Justin that he had hung the boys by the neck and one of the boys was lying on the floor pretending to be dead. Justin saw the boy and became upset. The PE teacher said it was a joke and the boys were not dead. In the weeks following, Justin, a normal, well-adjusted kid, began to exhibit infantile behavior. He became very dependent and would no longer do things he had prior been able and willing to do - including going to the bathroom alone, wiping, and sleeping in his own room. He became extremely fearful and anxious. He would require years of therapy. Decision of the Court: Ruled in favor of the plaintiffs because the evidence indicated "this child has been effectively robbed of a normal, carefree childhood due to the careless actions of the coach". The district was liable for tort damages. The district appealed on three accounts, but in the end the decision was upheld. Rationale: The courts saw the compensation fitting due to the loss of consortium Justin had with his parents. The incident had a negative effect on the relationship Justin had with his parents. The found that the evidence was viable and the amount of compensation was justified. The situation also merited compensation for ongoing therapy required to treat the emotional disturbance Justin endured. Precedents Established: Loss of consortium can be due to emotional damages and will demand compensation. Emotional and psychological disturbances can result in damaged relationships which need to be righted in as much as possible.
Title: Bethel (Bethel School District v. Fraser) Court: The United States Supreme Court Date: 1986
Facts: At a school assembly of approximately 600 highschool students (most of which were 14 years old), Mathew Fraser, a senior at Bethel High School (Bethel, WA), spoke to a school assembly to nominate a classmate for an office in student government. His speech was filled with sexual references and innuendos. Fraser was suspended from the school for three days and removed from the list of students who were eligible to make graduation remarks. As a part of its disciplinary code, Bethel High School enforced a rule prohibiting conduct which "substantially interferes with the educational process...including the use of obscene, profane language or gestures." Fraser was second in his class at that time. His parents appealed the school's disciplinary action. Court's Ruling: The Court of Appeals for the 9th circuit affirmed the judgement of the district court. The court explicitly rejected the school districts argument that the speech had a disruptive effect on the educational process. The school board then appealed the case to the U.S. Supreme Court. In the case, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed with the school district. The court found that it was appropriate for the school to prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive language. The judgement of the court of appeals is reversed. Court's Rationale: Chief Justice Burger pointed out that political speech, as protected by the courts in Tinker v. Des Moines, and the supposed sexual content of Fraser's speech at the assembly, could not be analyzed equally. He defended this argument by saying that while the First Amendment might permit someone to use an offensive form or expression by an adult to emphasize a point, that same form of expression is not permitted to children in a public school. Precedent Established: The precedent was established although students have the right to free speech because of the FIrst Amendment, school rules and regulations still apply when speaking to an audience of children
Title: Hosanna-Tabor v EEOC Court: The United States Supreme Court Date: 2011
Facts: Cheryl Perich taught secular classes and Religion at Hosanna Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School. In 2004 she was unable to start the school year and was on disability because she had developed narcolepsy. In January 2005 she said she could come back to work in February with no restrictions. The school had already filled her position and eventually fired her. She filed suit with the EEOC. Court Ruling: The district court sided with the school, but the US tour of appeals overturned the case siding with the EEOC and Perich. The US Supreme Court led by Chief Justice Roberts unanimously sided with Hosanna Tabor. Roberts said that the school has the First Amendment right of ministerial exception which allows the hiring and firing without interference from the courts. Court Rational: Roberts agreed that Perich did teach secular classes, but her religious duties outweigh those. She is different from lay teachers because she was considered a minister. Perish also accepted the formal call to be a minister. Precedent Established: Roberts stated that the minster exception is not limited to the hiring and firing of ministers for religious reasons.
Endrew F v. Douglas County School District Supreme Court of the United States Decided: March 22, 2017
Facts: Endrew, a child with autism, attended a public school until the end of 4th grade. At the end of 4th grade his parents rejected the proposed 5th grade IEP because they felt it was the same as the year before. They felt Endrew's academic and functional progress had stalled. His parents pulled him from the public school and enrolled him in a private school specializing in educating children with autism. Endrew's parents sought reimbursement for the tuition of the private school from the school district. The U. S. District Court did not grant them the reimbursement nor did the Tenth Circult Court of Appeals. His parents argued that the IEP was mostly unchanged from previous years in which he made "minimal progress". The Tenth Circuit rejected on the belief that Endrew did receive FAPE (free appropriate public education) through the IEP, because they were written to provide educational benefit that is merely more than de minimis (more than trivial or minor). Endrew's parents appealed the case to the US Supreme Court who remanded it. Decision of the Court: The court ruled in favor of the parents on the fact that the IEP must be written not merely de minimis and overturned the Tenth Circuit's decision. Rationale: Court stated in order for a school to meet its obligation under the IDEA, the IEP must be reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the child's circumstances. The Court rejected the standard made by the Tenth Circuit court, "merely more than de minimis".
Honig v. Doe Supreme Court of the United States Decided: January 20th, 1988
Facts: John Doe was a 17-year-old student in the SFUSD. He had an emotional disability making it difficult to control his impulses. After being teased by another student he responded by attacking the student and kicking out a window. He was suspended indefinitely and then the placement committee recommended expulsion. Jack Smith was another student who had a similar situation where he was suspended indefinitely pending expulsion hearings and joined Doe's suit. The Education of the Handicapped Act contains the "stay-put" provision ensuring that children with a handicap remain with his/her current education placement pending completion of any review proceedings, unless the parents and state or local educational agencies agree to removal. Under this Act, the students asked that an order be made allowing the students to return to their own schools. Decision of the Court: The court ruled in favor of the students determining that the "stay-put" provision would be enforced. However, Doe was 24 at the time of the legal proceedings and his case was considered moot due to the fact that the law is for those from 3 to 21 years of age. Smith, however, was age 20 so his case was not considered moot. Rationale: The Supreme Court upheld the lower courts explaining that if a behavior is a result of the students disability they cannot be removed from the free and appropriate education and the stay-put mandate covers these situations. Precedents Established: A school cannot take a student with disabilities outside of the determined educational setting as a result of behavioral issues resulting from the disability.
Title: Board of Directors of Lawton-Bronson v. Davies Date: 1992 Court: Supreme Court of Iowa
Facts: Kathleen Davies was an elementary school teacher in the Lawton-Bronson Community School District. She was arrested for shoplifting in November 1989. In January 1990 the superintendent gave Davies notice of a recommendation to terminate her employment. Davies said that her shoplifting was due to a mental illness. The school board said that shoplifting was indisputable and affected her ability to be a role model to students and thus decided to hold a hearing for her termination. There was testimony from coworkers and parents expressing concern about her teaching and ability to be a role model. Davies was terminated following the hearing. Court Ruling: The court sided with the school district saying the board had just cause to terminate Davies. Court Rationale: The court concluded that due to the small school district and now widespread knowledge of her arrest, she would not be able to be a good role model for her students. Davies was also given a fair hearing and the district found substantial evidence for her termination so it was justified.
Title: Owasso v. Falvo Court: Supreme Court of the United States Date: 2002
Facts: Krista Falvo brought a class action suit against the school district of Owasso (Tulsa, OK) claiming that peer grading violated the FERPA Act of 1974. Three of Falvo's children attended the school district where the teachers used peer grading on a daily basis. This meant that students were allowed to score each others test, papers, and assignments as the teachers would explain correct answers to the entire class. Falvo felt this practice was unnecessary because it embarrassed her children. It was noted that when the teacher calls for the score the student gave their own score by either calling it out or walking up to the teacher to show him or her. Court's Ruling: 1. OK District court ruled in favor of the School District. 2. Overturned in the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals. 3. The US Supreme Court reversed the decision with a unanimous rule in favor of the School District. Court's Rationale: The 10th Circuit Court of Appeals felt that the grades marked by the students were educational records protected under the FERPA Act, so the very act of grading was an forbidden release of information by the student who was grading the paper. The supreme court reversed the decision on the basis that peer graded items did not constitute education records protected by FERPA until a teacher collected the grades on the students papers and recorded them in the teachers grade book. The court noted that peer graded items were not maintained within the meaning of FERPA, as the student graders only handled the items for a few moments. In addition, the court stated that each student grader by grading assignments did not constitute a person acting for an educational institution within the guidelines of FERPA
Title: Pickering v. Board of Education Date: 1968 Court: Supreme Court of the United States
Facts: Marvin Pickering was a teacher in Township High School District in Illinois. Pickering wrote a letter to a local newspaper that was argued against actions the school board and superintendent had taken recently. It was critical of the school board's allocation of funds and stated the superintendent was trying to prevent teachers from opposing issues presented to the board. The school board felt the letter was harmful to the operation of the school district and fired Pickering. Pickering sued saying his letter was protected under free speech of the First Amendment. Court Ruling: The Supreme Court decided that Pickering's termination violated his First Amendment right to free speech. Court Rationale: Although Pickering had some false statements in his letter, he did not knowingly publish them. Speech similar to this is protected, so a teacher's speech should be protected as well. The court also decided that the letter did not affect the operation of the school district or Pickering's teaching ability. Since Pickering was a citizen, he was able to express his thoughts on matters of public concern. Precedent Established: This case helped to establish a balance between what it meant to be a citizen speaking on public concern and employees promoting the work that companies perform.
Title: Keefe (plaintiff) v. Geanakos Court: United States Court of Appeals First Circuit Date: 1969
Facts: Mr. Keefe gave a copy of the Atlantic Monthly magazine for reading. This magazine was supplied by the school department. In class, Mr. Keefe discussed the article and the context of the "dirty" word and the reasons the author had included the word. Mr. Keefe stated that any students who were offended by the reading could have an alternate assignment. The next evening, Mr. Keefe was asked to explain the use of the "dirty" word and was asked not to use that word again in his class. He replied that he could not in good conscience agree but stated that he has not used the word again. No formal action was taken at the meeting but later he was suspended and it was proposed that he be discharged from the school district. Mr. Keefe sought preliminary injunction to prevent Geanakos from holding the meeting. The district Court denied Keefe's motion, and he appealed to the Court of Appeals. Court's Ruling: The Court found the article in question to be scholarly, thoughtful, and thought provoking, not pornographic. The court also recognized that although the word in question may be offensive, it is important to the development and conclusions of the author. The case was reversed and was remanded for further proceedings. Court's Rationale: The court found that students were able to gain access to the "dirty" word in the school library. Therefore, the teacher should not be punished for discussing similar content found in the Atlantic Monthly magazine used in class. The court stated "This inconsistency on the part of the school is fatal." Precedent Established: "Dirty" words, when used to further an academic objective, are permissible within the school classroom.
Title: New Jersey v. TLO Court: The United States Supreme Court Date: 1985
Facts: On March 7, 1980 at Piscataway High School in Middlesex County, New Jersey, a teacher caught two freshman smoking in the bathroom which was against school rule. TLO and her companion were taken to the office to speak with Assistant Vice Principal Theodore Choplick. When asked if they were smoking in the bathroom, TLO's companion admitted to doing so. TLO however, denied smoking in the bathroom and also said that she does not smoke at all. Choplick took TLO into a private office. He took TLO's purse and looked inside where he saw a pack of cigarettes. He also noticed rolling paper, which in his experience is used for marijuana. He continued to search through her purse and found small bags, marijuana, and a list of names of people who owed money to TLO. Court's Ruling: The lower courts sided with the school, saying that 4th amendment rights were not violated. The case was appealed to the New Jersey Supreme Court where the decision was Reversed. The case was taken to the US. Supreme Court where it was reversed back to the lower courts ruling. The US Supreme Court agreed with the school, saying that they did have the right to search TLO's purse and it was not a violation of her constitutional rights. Court's Rational: Justice White said that the 4th amendment does apply to students because of the 14th amendment. A student cannot be searched for no reason. However he goes on in saying that there needs to be a balance between student's privacy and maintaining order and security in schools. The argument that student's should not be bringing private personal items to school is not valid because things such as money, wallets, and keys are needed. They may not directly relate to education, but they are still needed. Justice White leans towards the school on this ruling because there was "reasonable suspicion" to look inside TLO's purse, regardless of if cigarettes were found or not. Precedent Established: Students are protected by the 4th amendment, however this protection isn't equivalent to the protection outside of a school. Searches can be done if there is "reasonable suspicion"
Title: Titus v. Lindberg Court: The Supreme Court of New Jersey Date: 1967
Facts: On October 25, 1963 at 8:05 A.M. The school did not open until 8:15. Robert Titus rode his bike into the parking lot around the school towards the bike rack. As he turned the corner he was hit in the eye by a paper clip shot by Richard Lindberg, a student from Thompson School. Fairview was used as a pick up and drop off spot for other schools in the area. Principal Smith was in charge of supervising drop off in the morning. He would also supervise the milk truck deliveries and watch students in the immediate range. He did not witness the event. Courts Ruling: The court found that Principal Smith was negligent, Richard Lindberg was liable for the injury. The school board would pay Principal Smith's half while Lindberg would have to pay the other half. The damages came to $44,000. Court's Rational: Judge Jacobs gave the opinion of the court. He said that Principal Smith was indeed negligent for the following reasons. He knew that student's show up at school earlier than when the doors open, he never gave them standards of what their behavior should be at this time, and he never put teachers in charge to supervise. The court agreed that Principal Smith was the proximate cause because this event could have been avoided if he were supervising. The court also found that Lindberg was liable as well because he shot the paper clip. The court decided that the damages to be paid should not be split three ways among school board, principal, and Lindberg because Lindberg was the one who shot the paper clip. The court ruled that 1/2 be paid by Lindberg.
Title: Safford Unified School District v. Redding Court: U.S. Supreme Court Date: 2009
Facts: Savana Redding,13, was stripsearched by a school nurse when the assistant principal was concerned that she was providing prescription-strength ibuprofen and other over-the-counter medicine to other students, based on their testimony. She was asked to pull her bra and underwear away from her skin by the nurse to check the waistband. Her mother sued the district, saying Savana's Fourth Amendment rights had been violated. Court's Ruling: The Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit's decision in part, reversed it in part, and remanded the case. The search of Savana, due to its "embarrassing, frightening, and humiliating" nature, violated her Fourth Amendment rights. The qualified immunity of school officials was upheld; however, the court remanded the case to consider the school district's liability. Precedent Established: A strip search is a distinct category of search. School authorities need "distinct elements of justification" to search more than the outer clothes and possessions of a student.
Title: Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District Court: Supreme Court of the United States Date: 1969
Facts: Siblings John, Mary, Hope, and Paul Tinker chose to wear black armbands at their respective schools in Des Moines, Iowa as a way of protesting the Vietnam War in 1965. The principals at each of the children's schools learned about the protest ahead of time and made it their official policy to ask students who were wearing one of the armbands to remove it immediately upon entering the school. Students who did not comply with this policy would be suspended until they agreed to comply with the policy. The Tinker and Eckhardt families filed a lawsuit against the school district with the support of the ACLU that cited the students' rights to free speech, but the district and appellate courts stood by the district's decision. Court's Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that the wearing of the black armbands was a form of constitutionally protected speech under the First Amendment. Court's Rationale: The court's decision was based on the idea that the wearing of the armbands was "pure speech," and that the wearing of the armbands did not interfere with the rights of other students nor did it interfere with the work of school. Precedent: Material/substantial disruption
Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier Supreme Court 1988
Facts: Students in a Journalism II class wrote an article about teen pregnancy and divorce describing two situations in the school that had occurred. Names were change for the sake of anonymity. The principal of the school did not allow these articles to be printed in the paper and felt the subjects were inappropriate. The principal felt the divorce article needed to allow the father's perspective and simply changing the names of students did not fully protect their anonymity. Journalism students were upset and felt that by not allowing the articles to be published, their First Amendment Rights to freedom of speech were being violated. Decision of the Court: While the lower court did rule that the principal was in violation of the students first amendment rights, the Supreme Court reversed the decision by a 5-3 vote stating the paper was sponsored by the school, and as such a school has a right to deem the articles inappropriate for publication. Court's Rationale: A school paper is not established to be a public forum of student opinion. It is a limited forum for students in the class and as a class requirement, the school has a right to edit and establish acceptable criteria for student submissions.
Ansonia BOE v. Philbrook, Supreme Court 1986
School Board Has Met Its Obligation Under Title VII When It Has Offered Reasonable Accommodation of Teacher's Religion Petitioner Ansonia Board of Education has employed respondent Ronald Philbrook since 1962 to teach high school business and typing classes in Ansonia, Connecticut. In 1968, Philbrook was baptized into the Worldwide Church of God. The tenets of the church require members to refrain from secular employment during designated holy days, a practice that has caused respondent to miss approximately six school days each year. We are asked to determine whether the employer's efforts to adjust respondent's work schedule in light of his beliefs fulfills its obligation under § 701(j) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j), to "reasonably accommodate to an employee's . . . religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business."Since the 1967-1968 school year, the school board's collective-bargaining agreements with the Ansonia Federation of Teachers have granted to each teacher 18 days of leave per year for illness, cumulative to 150 and later to 180 days. Accumulated leave may be used for purposes other than illness as specified in the agreement. A teacher may accordingly use five days' leave for a death in the immediate family, one day for attendance at a wedding, three days per year for attendance as an official delegate to a national veterans organization, and the like. . . . With the exception of the agreement covering the 1967-1968 school year, each contract has specifically provided three days' annual leave for observance of mandatory religious holidays, as defined in the contract. Unlike other categories for which leave is permitted, absences for religious holidays are not charged against the teacher's annual or accumulated leave. The school board has also agreed that teachers may use up to three days of accumulated leave each school year for "necessary personal business." Recent contracts limited permissible personal leave to those uses not otherwise specified in the contract. This limitation dictated, for example, that an employee who wanted more than three leave days to attend the convention of a national veterans organization could not use personal leave to gain extra days for that purpose. Likewise, an employee already absent three days for mandatory religious observances could not later use personal leave for "[a]ny religious activity," . . . or "[a]ny religious observance." . . . Since the 1978-1979 school year, teachers have been allowed to take one of the three personal days without prior approval; use of the remaining two days requires advance approval by the school principal. But unpaid leave is not a reasonable accommodation when paid leave is provided for all purposes except religious ones. --> Remanded back to District Court
Montoy v. State of KS
Schools For Fair Funding, a coalition of 74 Kansas school districts representing 168,018 school children, together with Salina U.S.D. 305 and Dodge City U.S.D. 443, filed a motion with the Kansas Supreme Court today asking that the Court re-open the Montoy vs. State of Kansas lawsuit concerning school finance. The case had been dismissed in 2006 upon Legislative adoption of a three-year plan to increase school funding. The motion asks that the case be re-opened and remanded back to the trial court to determine two issues: (1) Was the unconstitutional school finance system remedied by the Kansas legislature's funding increases in 2005 and 2006? and (2) Are the current education funding cuts constitutional? In 1999 the school districts filed the Montoy case against the state alleging that the Kansas Constitution required greatly increased funding for schools. The case was tried in 2003 and won at trial with a finding that the school finance system was "blatantly unconstitutional." The Kansas Supreme Court then heard and affirmed the case in five trips to the Supreme Court over an 18 month period. The Kansas Legislature responded by increasing school funding in 2005. The court found that school funding should be determined by an analysis of what it actually costs to provide the education that is required by state and federal mandates. Once the actual costs are determined, the legislature must consider those costs in allocating funding for schools. The Legislature then chose to do a new cost study on what level of funding should be provided. The Legislature's own new cost study in 2006 then showed that massive amounts of new money were required to meet the requirements imposed upon schools. The 2006 legislative session then adopted a three-year funding plan to bring the funding scheme into constitutional compliance and the Supreme Court dismissed the lawsuit. --> Cuts in FY2009, 2010, 2011
Brown v. Topeka 1954, Supreme Court
Separate-But-Equal Facilities Are Inherently Unequal These cases come to us from the States of Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia, and Delaware. They are premised on different facts and different local conditions, but a common legal question justifies their consideration together in this consolidated opinion. In each of the cases, minors of the Negro race, through their legal representatives, seek the aid of the courts in obtaining admission to the public schools of their community on a nonsegregated basis. In each instance, they have been denied admission to schools attended by white children under laws requiring or permitting segregation according to race. This segregation was alleged to deprive the plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment. In each of the cases other than the Delaware case, a three judge federal district court denied relief to the plaintiffs on the so-called "separate-but-equal" doctrine announced by this Court in Plessy v. Ferguson.
Pierce v. Society of Sisters Supreme Court 1925
Society of sisters owned orphan home. Pierce alleges the Oregon Compulsory Ed Act of 1922 states all children must be educated in public school between ages 8-16 uneless not "normal", have completed 8th grade, have parent as teacher, or live outside district. Sisters and Hill Military Would have been loss of ability to do business State has power to regulate schooling but not determine a particular school Power of state is limited to compelling interest
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 2002
Vouchers - used in the past to get around Brown • a Cleveland program that provides parents with financial support to exercise choice in K-8th grades (even at a parochial school). Also provides tutorial aid for those remaining in public school. *** DOES NOT VIOLATE
Engle v. Vitale, 1962
• New York Board of Regents approved a "nondenominational prayer" to be read each morning in the public schools of the state. *** VIOLATES the establishment clause - clearly not a secular purpose Prayer & Bible Reading
Geraci v. St. Xavier High School, 1978, Ohio
• courts may intervene in Catholic school disciplinary cases if "the proceedings do not comport with fundamental fairness." (had a pie thrown in face of teacher, expelled, claimed state action argument) In Catholic Schools, students "rights" are based on a contract: The School Handbook Catholic Schools are not bound to provide the whole panoply of procedural due process protections that public schools must provide. However, they are expected to be fair- and should act in a Christian manner. Courts expect that every Catholic school has a Handbook, containing written rules so that students and parents have a reasonable idea of the expectations of the school. When penalties are suspension or expulsion, more extensive procedures should be taken.
Flint v. St. Augustine High School, 1975 (Lousiana)
• courts may intervene in Catholic school disciplinary cases if "the proceedings do not comport with fundamental fairness." (smoking, caught 3rd time, expelled) In Catholic Schools, students "rights" are based on a contract: The School Handbook Catholic Schools are not bound to provide the whole panoply of procedural due process protections that public schools must provide. However, they are expected to be fair- and should act in a Christian manner. Courts expect that every Catholic school has a Handbook, containing written rules so that students and parents have a reasonable idea of the expectations of the school. When penalties are suspension or expulsion, more extensive procedures should be taken.
Wallace v. Jaffree, 1985
• schools were allowing a one-minute period of silence for meditation or silent prayer ***VIOLATES the establishment clause - clearly not a secular purpose Prayer and Bible Reading
Lee v. Weisman, 1992
• schools were inviting members of the clergy to offer prayer at graduation exercises ***VIOLATES the establishment clause - clearly not a secular purpose Prayer and Bible Reading
Lemon v. Kurtzman 1971
• state laws in Pennsylvania and Rhode Island were attempting to give public funds to parochial schools (reimburse/supplement teacher's salaries, textbooks, instructional materials in secular subjects *** VIOLATES the establishment clause due to excessive entanglement Lemon Test: 1. Is purpose of law secular ? 2. Is primary effect of law neither to advance nor inhibit religion (neutral)? 3. Does it create excessive entanglement in government enforcement?
