criminal law

mpc 210

(1) ''human being'' means a person who has been born and is alive; (2) ''bodily injury'' means physical pain, illness or any impairment of physical condition; (3) ''serious bodily injury'' means bodily injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ; (4) ''deadly weapon'' means any firearm or other weapon, device, instrument, material or substance, whether animate or inanimate, which in the manner it is used or is intended to be used is known to be capable of producing death or serious bodily injury.

§ 210.1. Criminal Homicide.

(1) A person is guilty of criminal homicide if he purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently causes the death of another human being. (2) Criminal homicide is murder, manslaughter or negligent homicide.

2.01 MPC

(1) A person is not guilty of an offense unless his liability is based on conduct which includes a voluntary act or the omission(failure to act ((one walks by a crime and can report but does not))) to perform an act of which he is physically capable. (2) The following are not voluntary acts within the meaning of this Section: (a) a reflex or convulsion; (b) a bodily movement during unconsciousness or sleep; (c) conduct during hypnosis or resulting from hypnotic suggestion; (d) a bodily movement that otherwise is not a product of the effort or determination of the actor, either conscious or habitual. (3) Liability for the commission of an offense may not be based on an omission unaccompanied by action unless: (a) the omission is expressly made sufficient by the law defining the offense; or (b) a duty to perform the omitted act is otherwise imposed by law. (4) Possession is an act, within the meaning of this Section, if the possessor knowingly procured or received the thing possessed or was aware of his control thereof for a sufficient period to have been able to terminate his possession.

1.04 Classes of Crimes; Violations

(1) An offense defined by this Code or by any other statute of this State, for which a sentence of [death or of] imprisonment is authorized, constitutes a crime. Crimes are classified as felonies, misdemeanors or petty misdemeanors. (2) A crime is a felony if it is so designated in this Code or if persons convicted thereof may be sentenced [to death or] to imprisonment for a term that, apart from an extended term, is in excess of one year. (3) A crime is a misdemeanor if it is so designated in this Code or in a statute other than this Code enacted subsequent thereto. (4) A crime is a petty misdemeanor if it is so designated in this Code or in a statute other than this Code enacted subsequent thereto or if it is defined by a statute other than this Code that now provides that persons convicted thereof may be sentenced to imprisonment for a term of which the maximum is less than one year. (5) An offense defined by this Code or by any other statute of this State constitutes a violation if it is so designated in this Code or in the law defining the offense or if no other sentence than a fine, or fine and forfeiture or other civil penalty is authorized upon conviction or if it is defined by a statute other than this Code that now provides that the offense shall not constitute a crime. A violation does not constitute a crime and conviction of a violation shall not give rise to any disability or legal disadvantage based on conviction of a criminal offense. (6) Any offense declared by law to constitute a crime, without specification of the grade thereof or of the sentence authorized upon conviction, is a misdemeanor. (7) An offense defined by any statute of this State other than this Code shall be classified as provided in this Section and the sentence that may be imposed upon conviction thereof shall hereafter be governed by this Code.

§ 210.3. Manslaughter.

(1) Criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter when: (a) it is committed recklessly; or (b) a homicide which would otherwise be murder is committed under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable explanation or excuse. The reasonableness of such explanation or excuse shall be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the actor's situation under the circumstances as he believes them to be. (2) Manslaughter is a felony of the second degree.

§ 210.4. Negligent Homicide.

(1) Criminal homicide constitutes negligent homicide when it is committed negligently. (2) Negligent homicide is a felony of the third degree

§ 210.2. Murder.

(1) Except as provided in Section 210.3(1 )(b), criminal homicide constitutes murder when: (a) it is committed purposely or knowingly; or (b) it is committed recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life. Such recklessness and indifference are presumed if the actor is engaged or is an accomplice in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit robbery, rape or deviate sexual intercourse by force or threat of force, arson, burglary, kidnapping or felonious escape. (2) Murder is a felony of the first degree [but a person convicted of murder may be sentenced to death, as provided in Section 210.6].

Premeditation and deliberation can usually be proven with circumstantial evidence

(1) No provocation from the victim (2) The conduct and statements of the offender before and after the killing (3) Threats and declarations of the defendant before and during the course of the occurrence giving rise to the death of the victim (4) Ill-will between parties (5) The dealing of lethal blows after the deceased has been felled or rendered helpless Evidence that the killing was done in a brutal manner

5 situations where omission may constitute breach of a legal duty

(1) Statute imposes a duty (2) Relationship status (3) Contractual duty to care (4) Voluntarily assumed care and secluded persons to prevent others from rendering aid (5) Where a person creates a risk of harm to another

1.02 (2) the general purposes of the provisions on sentencing, applicable to all official actors in the sentencing system, are

(a) in decisions affecting the sentencing of individual offenders: (i) to render sentences in all cases within a range of severity proportionate to the gravity of offenses, the harms done to crime victims, and the blameworthiness of offenders (ii) when reasonably feasible, to achieve offender rehabilitation, general deterrence, incapacitation of dangerous offenders, restitution to crime victims, preservation of families, and re-integration of offenders into the law-abiding community, provided these goals are pursued within the boundariesof proportionality in subsection (a)(i) (iii) to render sentences no more severe than necessary to achieve the applicable purposes in subsections (a)(i) and (a)(ii) (iv) to avoid the use of sanctions that increase the likelihood offenders will engage in future criminal acts (a) In matters affecting the administration of sentencing system: (i) To preserve judicial discretion to individualize sentences with a framework of law (ii) To produce sentences that are uniform in their reasoned pursuit of the purposes in subsection (2)(a) (iii) To eliminate inequities in sentencing across population groups (iv) To ensure that adequate resources are available for carrying out sentences imposed and that rational priorities are established for the use of those resources (v) To ensure that all criminal sanctions are administered in a humane fashion (vi) To promote research on sentencing policy and practices including the effects of criminal sentencing on families and communities (vii) To increase the transparency of the sentencing and corrections system, its accountability to the public and the legitimacy of its operations as perceived by all affected communities

1.02 (1) = the purposes of provisions governing the definition of offenses are

(a) to forbid and prevent conduct that unjustifiably and inexcusably inflicts or threatens substantial harm to individual or public interests. (b) To subject to public control persons whose conduct indicates that they are disposed to commit crimes (c) To safeguard conduct that is without fault from condemnation as criminal (d) To give fair warning of the nature of the conduct declared to constitute an offense (e) To differentiate on reasonable grounds between serious and minor offenses

people v knoller class notes

- Common law has second degree murder - Knoller did not seem to care, reckless disregard for a substantial and unjustified risk.....she was warned by a vet, she was warned by Coumbs.....dogs were 150 and 130 lbs, bred for combat, ∆s have them in their 6th floor apartment, with 30 incidents about being out of control, there were complaints which were regarded callously if any regard was given at all by ∆s. one was bitten and ∆ said this was interesting, one dog jumped toward a pregnant woman's belly, ∆ said nothing of apology. - Ms. Berkmire Saw Whipple through the peephole with the dog on top of her, first responders came and found Whipple bloody and unclothed, she died shortly after reaching the hospital, had 77 discreet injuries, her larynx was crushed, she lost 1/3rd or more of her blood. - Bite injuries were consistent with the dog that weighed 150 lbs. - After the incident, ∆ did an interview and blamed Whipple on the attack, she said hat the dog thought her and Whipple were fighting, so the dog attacked. - She denied getting any warnings, or having any literature about the dangerous propensity of the dogs. - She was charged with 2nd degree murder, not first degree because not an intentional killing and without premeditation and deliberation. - Was this a malice killings? Yes, implied malice is with a depraved heart and no provocation, the circumstances attending the killing shows an abandoned and malignant heart, a conscious disregard for the value of human life. Finding implied malice requires a finding that the defendant was actually aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk of death (objective, because they must actually know and be aware). - Here, were they actually aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that those dogs would kill someone? Yes, literature, 30 incidents, coumbs warning that they were no domesticated pets, vet warning that he would be remised if he did not report the danger of them being in close proximity to others, they were trained in an inmate business that trained them for combat. the only negating factor would be her testimony that she had no idea. - So having that knowledge coupled with the conduct of continuing to keep them proves, a jury found she acted with malice and recklessness, it wasn't her conscious objective to kill Whipple, she did not act knowlingly either because that would have to be a substantial certainty that the dogs would kill Whipple, however, if California was an MPC jx, she would be convicted of murder, she knew about the substantial and unjustifiable risk, knew that keeping them in a multi-family dwelling, and having 30 incidents, but continuing to keep the dogs is a disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk, she manifested malice implied. So under common law it is implied malice, second degree murder under the common law of California who is not an MPC JX. - How risky must the conduct be to be considered murder and not manslaughter? - Both can be reckless, but the manslaughter can be from the mitigation of murder from the MPC provocation doctrine which is more broad, but under common law this would be 2nd degree murder because of implied malice extreme indifference to the value of human life. - Firing into a crowd, opening a lions cage at a zoo, placing a time bomb in a public space is all implied malice. - She caused the death of Whipple without premeditation and deliberation, but with extreme indifference to the value of human life and a conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that death is likely to occur. There was no provocation, there was no EED under MPC to bring this to manslaughter. - Under MPC she would be convicted of reckless murder, she was aware of a subj and unjust and proceeded with the risky conduct anyway - Ordinary reckless manslaughter that is so close to purposeful or knowing, then you are in the realm of murder, the fact finder must make the judgement of whether the risk taking was a conscious disregard for the value of human life, compare it to the enumerated offenses and see how similar they are. - At common law a person acts with malice when they act with the conscious objective to cause grievous bodily injury that is atleast recklessly because it is creating a substantial and unjustifiable risk and accidently kills them, then under the MPC , objective to cause grievous bodily injury that is atleast recklessly because it is creating a substantial and unjustifiable risk, this would be malice expressed reckless murder.

State in the Interest of M.T.S.

- Courts must avoid defining "force" in such a way as to make the establishment of a crime turn on the victim's behavior. That means that "force" can exist if the defendant performs sexual penetration without freely-given consent. In other words, unauthorized sexual penetration has been done with physical force, just as a battery can be established by the amount of force needed to create an offensive touching. Here, C.G. did not verbally consent to intercourse, and the jury concluded that she did not consent to intercourse by her conduct. A reasonable person would not assume that she had given affirmative permission to M.T.S. to have intercourse with her. The record provides reasonable support for the jury's decision. The appellate court is reversed, and the conviction reinstated. Rule of Law The element of physical force in a sexual-assault claim is satisfied by the act of non-consensual sexual penetration without any additional proof of extrinsic force. Facts The facts were disputed at trial. 15-year-old C.G. claimed that 17-year-old M.T.S. (defendant) came into her bedroom late at night and began to have sexual intercourse with her while she slept. She slapped him and told him to get off her, and he complied. M.T.S. claimed that he had entered C.G.'s bedroom with her consent, and the two of them were kissing and touching before he began to have sexual intercourse with her. She told him to stop, which he did, and then she slapped him, after which he left the room. In any case, the next morning, C.G. told her mother about the incident, and they filed a police report. The state charged M.T.S. with sexual assault. The trial court concluded that C.G. had consented to kissing and touching, but not to sexual penetration. The jury convicted M.T.S. of sexual assault, finding that C.G. had not consented to the sex. The appellate court reversed the conviction, finding that there was no force behind the sexual act and so the conviction was improper. The state appealed. Issue Is the element of physical force for the offense of sexual assault met by an act of non-consensual penetration involving no more force than necessary to accomplish the penetration? Holding and Reasoning (Handler, J.) Yes. The element of physical force in a sexual-assault claim is satisfied by the act of non-consensual sexual penetration without any additional proof of extrinsic force. The New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice defines sexual assault to include sexual penetration with physical force or coercion. There is no clear definition of force. Traditionally, courts considering rape cases required that there be some force in addition to carnal knowledge against the victim's will. Requiring the victim to resist was thought to add to the credibility of her claim not to have consented. During the 1970s, reformers worked to refute the belief that rape could not occur if the victim did not fight back, with the result that current law on sexual assault no longer requires the victim's resistance and instead focuses on the defendant's behavior. This leaves defining "physical force" to the courts. Courts must avoid defining "force" in such a way as to make the establishment of a crime turn on the victim's behavior. That means that "force" can exist if the defendant performs sexual penetration without freely-given consent. In other words, unauthorized sexual penetration has been done with physical force, just as a battery can be established by the amount of force needed to create an offensive touching. Here, C.G. did not verbally consent to intercourse, and the jury concluded that she did not consent to intercourse by her conduct. A reasonable person would not assume that she had given affirmative permission to M.T.S. to have intercourse with her. The record provides reasonable support for the jury's decision. The appellate court is reversed, and the conviction reinstated.

EXTREME EMOTIONAL DISTURBANCE

- Extreme emotional disturbance may be based upon a series of events rather than a single precipitating cause. - The MPC does not recognize partial defense of diminished capacity (defendant suffers from mental abnormaility not sufficient to plead the full defense of insanity) as a distinct category of mitigation. Evidence of mental disorder can serve to fully or partially exculpate a wrongdoer in an MPC Jx. - MPC's Manslaughter provision applies to persons suffering from an extreme mental or emotional disturbance and thus, mitigation is possible if a killer experienced anger, jealousy, fear, or any other extreme emotional reaction or suffers from an extreme mental disturbance, but one not sufficient to qualify as insanity. - MPC manslaughter provision is broader than the common law provocation doctrine - The appropriate test, the court posits, in determining the defendant's emotional reaction was reasonable is whether in the totality of the circumstances the finder of fact could understand how a person might have his reason overcome. - Court ruled that Cassassa's reaction was unreasonable even though he may have been acting under EED, that the explanation was to peculiar to him (sleeping in her bed naked, carrying around a knife, eavesdropping by breaking into an apartment below her). - Section 125.25 of the Penal Law provides that it is an affirmative defense to the crime of 2nd degree murder where the defendant acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse. Meant to punish less severely by reducing the crime to manslaughter in the 1st degree. - This defense replaced the rigid "HEAT OF PASSION" defense, made it more broad, no longer need an immediate reaction as a response to provocation without a cooling off period, because extreme emotional disturbance covers the possibility of long term abuse for example, that causes the EEDs over a long period of time. However, there is also the reasonableness of the defendant's emotional reaction. (MPC), from which the state's law was modeled, noted that (1) the particular defendant must have acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance, and (2) there must have been a reasonable explanation or excuse for such disturbance. - To determine "reasonableness," the court views the defendant's situation from both a subjective and objective stance. One requirement involves a determination that the particular defendant did act under extreme emotional disturbance and not a sham. - The other component involves a determination of whether there is a reasonable explanation or excuse for the emotional disturbance. The determination of whether there was a reasonable explanation or excuse involves both a subjective analysis, viewing the internal situation in which the defendant found himself and the circumstances as he perceived them to be however illogical or inaccurate, and an objective standpoint to determine whether the explanation for the disturbance was reasonable. - His emotional reaction from his point of view was reasonable, however, it is not all subjective under Cassassa's argued point as a defense. - so court looked at MPC 210.1.3(b) and found that reasonableness of was the defendant under a provoked under extreme and emotional disturbance state is subjective for the defendant's perspective of what he believed and the situation as he believed, however, after that info you must then ask if it was reasonable is objective reasonable standard (that is what the jury is instructed to do). - Common law provocation is narrow, MPC is more broad in provocation doctrine, MPC jury instruction for provocation would ask them if they would snap in the situation as the defendant believed it to be, so intentional killing, while EED is losing control, it's a heat of passion, no deliberation. - Here, you were obsessed with Victoria, you were upset, you were naked in her bed, break into apartment below her to eavesdrop, I know you were upset, but this was weird, too peculiar to you. - under common law he had a chance to cool off and Victoria did not do anything ulawful, under common law the provocateur must have done some unlawful act, here, under EED, would one lose control in the circumstances as the defendant described them? then ask the jury objectively was the reaction reasonable? in girourd it was her committing a battery, so he would get murder not manslaughter.

State v. Rusk (1981)

- From her own testimony, the jury could have reasonably believed that Pat was scared, without her keys, in an unfamiliar area of town, and after repeatedly refusing to comply with Rusk's demands, she was so frightened that Rusk intended to rape her she had to comply. The judgment of the court of special appeals is vacated. - He didn't appeal the assault this would create evidence of an immediate apprehension of violence. Rule of Law In a charge of rape, the lack of consent may be established by proof of resistance or by proof that the victim failed to resist due to a genuine and reasonably grounded fear. Facts Edward Rusk (defendant) was charged with second-degree rape of Pat, whom he met at a bar. At trial, the testimony of Rusk and Pat differed greatly. Pat testified that she and her friend Terry were at a bar when Rusk came up and said "hello." Terry responded, "Hi, Eddie." After talking for a while, Pat said she needed to go home and Rusk asked for a ride back to his apartment. Pat agreed because she believed Terry knew Rusk. On the way to her car, Pat told Rusk, "I'm just giving you a ride home," and nothing else. After reaching Rusk's apartment, which was in an unfamiliar part of town for Pat, Rusk asked her to come up to his apartment. Pat declined, but Rusk took her keys out of the ignition and kept them. At that point, Pat became scared and unsure of what to do, was afraid of the way Rusk was looking at her, so she complied with Rusk's request. Once inside his one-room apartment, Rusk told Pat to sit down while he left for a short period of time, during which, Pat did not make any noise and did not attempt to leave. When Rusk returned, he sat on the bed and pulled Pat by her arms to the bed and began to undress her. After they both were undressed, Pat testified that she was very scared and told Rusk, "[I]f I do what you want, will you let me go without killing me?" Pat said that Rusk answered "yes" and then she began to cry. At that point, Pat testified that Rusk placed his hands around her throat and began to lightly choke her. After they had sexual intercourse, Rusk gave Pat her car keys back and she left after agreeing to see Rusk again sometime. Pat reported the incident shortly thereafter. Rusk testified that Pat voluntarily turned her car engine off and willingly came into Rusk's apartment where they consensually had sexual intercourse. Rusk denied choking Pat or using any other force or threats of force to get Pat to have intercourse with him. Rusk was convicted by jury of second-degree rape and he appealed. The court of special appeals, sitting en banc, reversed, concluding that insufficient evidence of Rusk's guilt had been shown. The Maryland Court of Appeals granted certiorari to consider whether the court of special appeals correctly applied the law. Issue In a charge of rape, can the lack of consent element be established by proof of resistance or by proof that the victim failed to resist due to a genuine and reasonably grounded fear? Holding and Reasoning (Murphy, C.J.) Yes. State law holds that a person is guilty of rape in the second degree if the person engages in vaginal intercourse with another person: (1) by force or threat of force against the will and without the consent of the other person." In Hazel v. State, 157 A.2d 922 (Md. 1960), the court noted that a rape victim's lack of consent is generally established by proof of her resisting the aggression or by proof that the victim failed to resist because of fear including, but not limited to, a fear of death or serious bodily harm, or a fear so extreme as to preclude resistance, or a fear which would render her incapable of continuing to resist, or a fear that so overpowers her that she does not dare resist. Although Hazel clearly held that the victim's fear had to be genuine, it did not specifically determine whether a real, but unreasonable, fear of imminent death or serious bodily injury would suffice. Most jurisdictions require a victim's fear to be reasonably grounded in order to avoid a showing of actual force by the aggressor or physical resistance on the part of the victim. The court of special appeals erred because it substituted its own view of the evidence for that of the judge and jury. The reasonableness of Pat's apprehension of fear was solely a question of fact for the jury to determine. From her own testimony, the jury could have reasonably believed that Pat was scared, without her keys, in an unfamiliar area of town, and after repeatedly refusing to comply with Rusk's demands, she was so frightened that Rusk intended to rape her she had to comply. The judgment of the court of special appeals is vacated. Dissent (Cole, J.) Although courts no longer require a female to resist where to do so would be useless, courts do require an alleged victim's agreement to intercourse out of fear to stem from something of substance. She must resist unless the defendant has objectively manifested his intent to use physical force to accomplish his purpose. The way Rusk looked at Pat is not a substantial foundation to find "force," as required by the statute. Moreover Rusk's act of "lightly choking" Pat is not sufficient to meet the "force" element. When one of the essential elements of a crime, here being "force," is not proved beyond a reasonable doubt, there is no basis for a conviction.

malice

- Malice is express when there is a manifested deliberate intention to take the life. - Malice is implied when no considerable provocation appears, or when the circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart. Requires a defendant's awareness of the risk of death to another. Performed by a person who knows that his conduct endangers the life of another and who acts with conscious disregard for life.

People v. Smith

- Merger limitation - because the legislature divided homicide into categories and if the felony is assaultive in nature then the underlying felony is murder. The merger doctrine disallows the application of the felony murder doctrine if the underlying felony merged into the murder. For example, a 2009 California State case, People v. Sarun Chun, disallowed the felony murder doctrine because the underlying felony, a drive-by shooting, was assaultive in nature. - People v Patrick Ireland - Second-degree murder, not felony murder, is the appropriate charge if a felony was an integral part of the homicide rather than a separate crime. He was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon and felony murder, overturned, now it becomes a homicide because they have the same underlying integral parts, the assault with a deadly weapon is inseparable from the homicide. - Throwing a plate at someone resulting in them slipping and breaking their neck is worthy of felony murder because it is so separate from a homicide. There can be no felony-murder charge when the underlying felony merges with homicide. - Smith was convicted of 2nd degree felony murder which was judicially created at the time. - Majority of judges in this case disfavored the felony-murder rule. If an integral part of the felony is similar to that of homicide and results in death, then merge it and it becomes homicide, if it is an integral part of homicide (an assaultive felony like assault with a deadly weapon with death occurring) then the felony merges with homicide. There is really no difference in one who assaults with a deadly weapon resulting in death and the elements of a homicide. - When there is a killing, the government can choose to prove the elements of the homicide, felony homicide relieves the government of having to prove the elements of a homicide, but if merger clause, then you must prove murder as a standalone offense and not the underlying felony. - You assault one with a deadly weapon and it ends in death, what is the difference between that and homicide? - In People v. Wilson, 1 Cal. 3d 431 (1969), this court examined a felony-murder charge based on the crime of burglary. In Wilson, the defendant broke in with the intent to assault his strange wife with a deadly weapon, he forcibly broke in, she said youre not welcome here, he came there with a weapon unwelcomed, thus he premeditated and deliberated not a heat of passion killing, this was a single course of conduct with a single intention, intent to assault with a deadly weapon, thus he is guilty of homicide. The purpose of the felony-murder rule is to deter negligent or accidental killing in the commission of a felony. Wilson's act was neither negligent or accidental. - The underlying act of something assaultive intended to kill or cause serious injury is not independent of homicide. - In both Ireland and Wilson, there was a single course of action with a single purpose, homicide must be proven instead of the underlying felonies, because they merge. - Look at the course of conduct leading to the killing, can that conduct be described any other way than one with an intent to kill or seriously injure? If you are establishing the elements of the underlying felony (enter the building with intent to assault with a deadly weapon and results in death) is no different than a homicide. - Sears case, he tried to assault wife, but daughter intervened and was killed, the felony of burglary with intent to assault with a deadly weapon is not independent of the felony he intended to commit against his wife, transferred intent, the underlying felony and homicide would merge, to combat this the government says the killing of the daughter was negligent or accidental so felony-murder. Court said sears had the same intent at Ireland and Wilson, but killed a different target, supreme court says this makes no sense. He didn't see the spouse and erupt in a rage, under common law this is first degree murder because he had a weapon on him so he premeditated and deliberated, with the common law transferred intent, and guilty of murder in the MPC, not felony-murder, because the murder merged with the assault he committed. Burglary with the intent to assault with a deadly weapon, felonious discharge of a fire arm has the intent to kill or cause serious bodily harm merges with homicide when it results in death. You cannot have the felony and then bootstrap murder on top of it, that makes it easy for the government for felony murder. The merger doctrine merges homicide with a felony that is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm. - Furnishing narcotics cut coke with fentanyl, someone dies, no felony murder because its not a single course of conduct with a single purpose, they are separate events from the death. - Throwing a plate at someone at the top of the stairs and then they fall to their death is independent of a homicide, it is accidental or negligent, didn't intend to kill. - One throws a party knowingly for underage, and one gets drunk, gets behind the wheel and dies, there wouldn't be a merger because the felony is independent of the murder, you are acting with conscious disregard of substantial and unjustifiable risk of a result that is likely, so recklessly - Driving inebriated, someone dies, independent felonious purpose, so no merger, felony-murder. - Throwing a snowball down at someone from an overpass, not a single course of action with a single purpose, no merger - People v. Burton, 6 Cal. 3d 375 (1971), this court allowed armed robbery to serve as the basis of a felony-murder conviction. Although assault is an element of armed robbery, the purpose of an armed robbery is not assault; it is to acquire money or goods. Because armed robbery has a felonious purpose independent of the assault, the felony-murder rule is applicable. The purpose of robbery is to take your stuff, not kill someone, maybe scare you into not resisting, but not kill you. Not a single course of conduct for a single purpose, it is to acquire goods. It does not merge, you have to ask did the homicide result from the purpose of the underlying felony, the purpose of Burton was to acquire goods, not to kill someone, he killed someone accidentally or negligently so felony-murder, death resulting from an independent felonious purpose. Must look at whether the purpose of the underlying felony was assaultive in nature, then merge, if no merger and a death results and the nature of the underlying felony that is not assaultive or homicide-like in nature, then felony-murder, government must prove the elements of the underlying felony and not the murder to convict for felony-murder. - In this case, there is no way to separate the battery with the killing of the 24-month old, there is a single course of conduct for a single purpose, so they merge in homicide because the underlying felony is assaultive in nature. Committing a battery against the 24 month old, abusing the child is the purpose, because inflicting bodily harm resulting in death is a single course of conduct with a single purpose. - Facts suggest she had implied malice, when the child didn't listen, she smacked her in the bedroom, the child was hit repeatedly by an adult to a 24 month old is evidencing a depraved heart, its EVIL! The scumbag also starting battering the 24 month old human being is torturing that child, and child was hit with such force that the child fell and died, she didn't have to express that she hated this human being, it was implied by her demonic behavior. Like Knoller case, 30 incidents and you didn't do anything and after veteraninarian opinion that you blew off and then the mauling occurred, they knew what would happen is also implied malice -limits on felony murder rule - Inherently dangerous Minority view of the inherently dangerous-if the underlying felony, viewed in the abstract is inherently dangerous, then felony cant be committed without creating a sunstantial risk that someone would die, viewed in the abstract. - Majority view- viewed in the facts that if it is foreseeable that someone would die, then the felony-murder rule would apply - Then there is the merger doctrine - People v Chun = There has been more refinement to merger, the underlying felony must be assaultive, viewed in the abstract, if the underlying felony like child abuse viewed in the abstract, if the underlying felony poses a threat of violent immediate injury, then merger. Ask did the conduct involve a threat of immediate violent injury, if so, then it merges. Both active and passive child abuse would not merge because both involve in the abstract, if the underlying felony poses a threat of violent immediate injury, then merger. - The MPC doesn't have a felony-murder rule, sort of like it in 210(1)(b) 1)(b) (felony-murder) committed recklessly under - extreme indifference to human life. - Recklessness and indifference presumed if actor is - engage or is an accomplice in the commission of, - or an attempt to commit, or flight after commiting or - attempting to commit robbery, rape, or deviate - sexual intercourse by force or threat of force, - arson, burglary, kidnapping or felonious - escape. Rule of Law A felony that is assaultive in nature cannot serve as the basis of a felony-murder charge unless the felony was committed with an independent felonious purpose. Facts Smith (defendant) lived with her two-year-old daughter. Her daughter one day refused to listen to Smith. In response, Smith took her daughter to the corner and began hitting her repeatedly. Smith knocked her daughter against a closet door and the daughter went into respiratory arrest. She died at the hospital. Smith was convicted of child abuse and second-degree murder based on a theory of felony-murder. Issue Can a felony that is assaultive in nature serve as the basis of a felony-murder charge? Holding and Reasoning (Mosk, J.) No. Generally, a felony that is assaultive in nature cannot serve as the basis of a felony-murder charge because the assaultive felony is said to merge with the murder. In People v. Ireland, 35 Cal. 3d 803 (1969), this court said that the felony-murder rule is inapplicable if the homicide resulted from an assault with a deadly weapon. This exception to the felony-murder rule is necessary because if the rule applies to all killings that result from an assaultive felony, the jury would be relieved of considering the issue of malice in the majority of murder cases. The ability of a jury to convict a defendant for murder based merely on the commission of an assaultive felony should be curtailed. In People v. Wilson, 1 Cal. 3d 431 (1969), this court examined a felony-murder charge based on the crime of burglary. In Wilson, the defendant broke in with the intent to assault someone with a deadly weapon. This court ruled that burglary could not serve as the basis for a felony-murder charge where the intended felony underlying the burglary is assaultive in nature. However, this court recognizes that the felony-murder rule is applicable if the felony is committed with an independent felonious purpose. In People v. Burton, 6 Cal. 3d 375 (1971), this court allowed armed robbery to serve as the basis of a felony-murder conviction. Although assault is an element of armed robbery, the purpose of an armed robbery is not assault; it is to acquire money or goods. Because armed robbery has a felonious purpose independent of the assault, the felony-murder rule is applicable. Here, the crime underlying the charge of felony-murder is child abuse. Child abuse is assaultive in nature and has no other independent felonious purpose. Smith's abuse of her daughter merges with the resulting homicide so that Smith cannot be charged with felony-murder. The jury must instead determine whether Smith possessed the requisite malice for a conviction of murder.

THE FELONY MURDER RULE

- One is guilty of murder if a death results from conduct during the commission or attempted commission of any felony. - Thus strict liability because if you are committing a felony and a murder occurs, even if you didn't try to commit murder, then you are liable. - One is guilty of murder if a death results from conduct during the commission or attempted commission of any felony, a murder conviction no matter what the underlying felony is. - Thus strict liability because if you are committing a felony and a murder occurs, even if you didn't try to commit murder, then you are liable. - In most states, felony murder is categorized as a first-degree murder. - Mallum in se and mallum in probitum - There is a wide range of felony-murder - Felony-murder rule is diluted with a long list of felonies that if the person in commission of or attempted commission of the felony causes the death of another is guilty of 1st degree murder felony-murder, without proving beyond a reasonable doubt the intent to kill. - Larceny-theft (or simply "theft") is defined as the unlawful removal of property. Burglary is defined as the unlawful entry into almost any structure with the intent to commit a crime inside. 1 Robbery, on the other hand, is the violent theft of property or money. - So burglary, arson, robbery, rape, mayhem, lewd acts with a minor and causes a death is guilty of 1st degree murder under felony-murder rule. - The government need not prove any elements of the homicide when there is a murder underlying the felony, but every jx has limits to it.

Voluntary Manslaughter

- The difference between murder and manslaughter is the presence or absence of MALICE - Voluntary manslaughter is an intentional homicide, done in a sudden heat of passion by adequate provocation before there has been reasonable time for the passion to cool.

Rusk v. State

- The resistance requirement. - Did Maryland law at the time require resistance, yes they had a common law resistance requirement that was codified. - Resistance is required unless it is futile unless there is a reasonable belief that violence would ensue if the victim resisted. - Was it reasonable that Pat didn't resist because she was afraid of ensuing violence, since she was assaulted, was there enough to inform the decision to the degree to which she did or did not resist. - Review the sufficienct of the evidence for the conviction of 2nd degree rape, did this court show fidelity to the other Rusk case? - 1908 michigan can, can a person be convicted of a crime due to an omission. - This case is assessing whether there was adequate force or threat of force enough to find whether pat's resistance was reasonable, because if there was a reasonable relief that violence would ensue then resistance is not required. - She didn't turn the car off after arriving at his residence and was asked to come up to his apartment which SHE REFUSED, he took her car keys and went to the drivers side and said now will you come up.......she said she was scared and they went to his bedroom, she didn't leave, he pulled her on to the bed and removed his clothing, she said she was still begging him to let him leave, she said he had a look in his eyes....she said if I do what you want will you let me go without killing me, he did not answer, she started to cry and he put his hands on her throat, he said yes after a second asking of the same question......the relevant time period was before they had sex the relevant question was whether she felt that violence would ensue if she resisted. After the sex, he asked for her phone number, she said ill just see you at the bar sometime, she went home, sat in the car, and then decided to find a police car to testify the events. - If there are 2 reasonable conclusions, then they must pay deference to what the trial court ruled. - There must be resistance that is overcome by force or threat of force, or if lack of resistance then the reason for not resisting must be a reasonable fear of violence, so this precedent shows that the lack of resistance must be because there was a reasonable fear of force. Appeals court is supposed to leave the fact finder's work alone unless there is an error. Its not the appeals court job to second guess the jury's decision. - Judgement of acquittal = motion for DV in Maryland. - Appeals court says no reasonable fear of force, so since she didn't resist then no charge, trial court was the inverse. - Sometimes trial courts mess up, the evidence is too one-sided, you can convince appellate courts of this. She said more than just fear of look in his eyes, she pleaded she wanted to leave then was choked "lightly" appeals says no it could have been a heavy carress....they say evidence is insufficient to convict Russ of rape. - A person is guilty of 2nd degree rape by forecully engaging in vaginal intercourse by force without consent. This is the evolution of rape law, that included a resistance requirement, if no resistance was put up, then not really reasonable fear of force would ensue......There are degrees of rape, aggravated rape by use of force would be more morally culpable, there must be proof of the use of or threat of force, hence the resistance requirement. This is under the hazel requirement, it mixes consent with threat of force. Rusk cases have been written about extensively, first appear in a trial court, then in Maryland appeals, then in the maryland court of final jurisdiction, the two appeals courts were renamed in Maryland, the court of special appells is now the appellate court of maryland, then the court of appeals to the supreme court of matyland. Rusk was convicted of 2 offenses, 2nd degree rape and assault. In the trial court, rusk raised a single issue in the appeal, he appealed only one of them, the rape conviction, his argument was the government's evidence was insufficient to authorize a jury to convict him of 2nd degree rape. - Appellate courts have standards of review that they wont disturb anything ruled in a trial court, an appeal is not a due over, the degree to which an appeal court will leave a trial court decision undisturbed is the DE NOVO standard, they will not disturb what the trial court did. Then there is an abuse of discretion review, an appeals court will leave a decision of trial alone, unless a party can show the trial court abused its discretion, the most deferential standard of review, clearly erroneous standard will leave trial court decision alone unless convinced that trial court got it wrong. - Rusk argued the decision be reversed and vacated, vacated because he argued evidence was insufficient, if court agrees, then government will not be able to retry due to 5th amendment double jeopardy. This argument is difficult, the standard of review for sufficiency of evidence argument, the appeals court will look most favorably on the party that prevailed in the trial court. Evidence is sufficient to establish a conviction when any rationale trier of fact (jury) can conclude that the government reasonably proved every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, deference (respect) toward trial court decision. In appeals, use only the record, no evidence, no testimony, if reasonable they respect what the trier of fact determined. - prosecutrix (plural prosecutrixes) A female prosecutor quotations ▼ A female victim of a crime on whose behalf the state is prosecuting a suspect quotations ▼ - The victim said that she did not resist Rusk inside the apartment because of the look in his eyes. She also testified that he began to lightly choke her. However, none of these factors make the victim's fear for her safety reasonable. Consequently, there is insufficient evidence to show that Rusk is guilty of rape. - The standard of review here is looking in favor of light of the prevailing party, the prosecution in a sufficiency of evidence standard of review - There no way he can argue that he did not commit assault so it would be a frivolous argument, he abandoned that argument and argued insufficiency of evidence of rape. Rule of Law In Maryland, a conviction of rape requires sufficient evidence that the victim resisted and that the defendant overcame her resistance by force or threat of force. Facts Edward Salvatore Rusk (defendant) met the victim at a bar where they had a short conversation. As the victim was about to leave, Rusk asked for a ride home. The victim agreed. When they arrived at his apartment, the victim parked but did not turn off the ignition. Rusk asked her to come inside but she refused. He removed her keys from the ignition and asked her to come in again. The victim later testified that she went inside with him because she was scared and did not know what else to do. In Rusk's room, he began to undress her. When she began crying, Rusk lightly choked her. She later testified that she was scared and complied because of the look in his eyes. They then proceeded to have sexual intercourse. Issue In order to justify a conviction of rape in Maryland, is it necessary to demonstrate that the victim resisted? Holding and Reasoning (Thompson, J.) Yes. In order to justify a conviction of rape, there must be sufficient evidence that either the victim resisted and the defendant used force to overcome her resistance or that the victim could not resist due to fear for her safety. The victim's fear for her safety must be reasonable. In this case, the victim did not resist. The victim states that she went into Rusk's apartment because he had her keys and she was scared. While Rusk may have prevented her from driving away, however, nothing prevented her from running to a neighbor or down the street. The victim said that she did not resist Rusk inside the apartment because of the look in his eyes. She also testified that he began to lightly choke her. However, none of these factors make the victim's fear for her safety reasonable. Consequently, there is insufficient evidence to show that Rusk is guilty of rape. Dissent (Wilner, J.) Consent is not the issue in this case. The issue concerns whether a sufficient amount of force was used. However, the issues of consent and force are often confused because of the idea that a victim must resist an attack. This requirement places the blame on what the victim fails to do, rather than what the defendant does. Nevertheless, the majority correctly states that evidence of resistance is necessary. However, it improperly replaces the trial judge and jury's judgment with its own. The judge and jury, who had the benefit of observing the witnesses and hearing their words, decided that there was a sufficient use of force by Rusk. The majority, which did not have such a benefit, should not have substituted its own judgment for that of the judge and jury. - Hazel rule - must be legally sufficient evidence for the jury to find the victim was reasonably in fear. - Under Maryland law, 2nd degree rape is: engaging in vaginal intercourse with another person by force or threat of force against the will and without consent of the other person. - In this case the question was whether there was sufficient force or threat of force. - Dissent says they focus too much on what the victim does (level of active resistance) and not enough on what the assailant does.

State v. Williams

- They were convicted of manslaughter, parents have a duty to care for their children, a failure to fulfill a duty that the law imposes (omissions) results in liability. - Different from the common law manslaughter doctrine, here its death caused by simple or ordinary negligence-the kind of care a person of reasonable prudence would exercise under the same or similar circumstance, a failure to exercise care is simple negligence, and negligence resulting in death is manslaughter. The act or failure to act must be the proximate cause of the social harm, but-for is not enough to convict, because proximate cause must take account of the causes that may be too remote and impose liability. - When did the duty arise to send the child to the medical professional, after the critical period of being able to save. - One can act without awareness of a substantial and unjustifiable risk, its negligence. Within the last week it would have been too late, so the critical period was before this time. - The native americans were in the midst of a racist program to put Indian kids with white parents. They feared that taking him in to see a medical provider, he would be taken - Washinton law required for manslaughter required simple or ordinary negligence, the reasonable person would understand that there is a substantial and unjustifiable risk, here the mens rea is ordinary or simple negligence.....guilty of manslaughter, in model penal code 210.4, negligence is one should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk. - Ordinary negligence was a tort-level, it is peculiar in Washington because this was convictable for a criminal manslaughter. They amended it to add that the negligence is criminal negligence. - What would they be guilty of under MPC 2.02, there is no ordinary negligence, under MPC when a mens rea is not specified (in this case because ordinary negligence in not MPC) then criminal negligence If an individual fails to take the kind of caution that a reasonable person would exercise under similar circumstances, regardless of his ignorance, good intentions and good faith, he is guilty of ordinary negligence. If such negligence proximately causes the death of another, then the individual is guilty of manslaughter - Must be a gross negligence breach and not just ordinary or simple negligence for conviction of involuntary manslaughter. - However, RCW 9.48.150 allows simple or ordinary negligence as sufficient for the cause if it proximately causes death. - Simple or ordinary negligence is a failure to exercise the ordinary caution that is necessary to make out the defense of excuseable homicide. - Ordinary caution is the caution that a man of reasonable prudence would exercise under the same or similar conditions, regardless of ignorance or good intention, if he fails to exercise ordinary caution he is guilty of ordinary negligence, if this neglice proximately causes death, the defendant is guilty of manslaughter. The issue of prox cause requires consideration of the question of when the duty to furnish medical care became activated. - If the duty did not arise until after it was too late to save the life of the child, failure to furnish medical care could not have prox caused the child's death. - In this case, had medical care been obtained in the week before the baby's death, such care would have been obtained too late to save the life. Infection had lasted about 2 weeks and gangrene odor would have been present 10 days before death. - Thus, the condition between sept 1 and sept 5 was the critical period for the purpose of determining whether in the exercise of ordinary caution the defendants should have provided medical care for the child - Husband noticed baby was sick 2 weeks before its death and during the aforementioned critical period testimony states baby was fussy and couldn't keep food down and cheek was swollen and turned a bluish color, parents didn't realize the gravity of the illness and administered baby asprin during the critical period and continued until the death. Testified that they didn't think a doctor or dentists would pull the tooth while it was swollen and also they were afraid they would take the baby away from them. However there was no evidence that they could not afford a doctor, or that the symptoms were not concerning during the critical period, thus, there is sufficient evidence in that applying the standard of ordinary caution , defendants were sufficiently put on notice of the concerning symptoms during that critical period to have required them to have obtained medical care for the child, the failure to do so is ordinary or simple negligence sufficient to support manslaughter. The carelessness required for criminal negligence requires that anyone in the community would see its seriousness. - MPC 2.02 (d) - Negligently. A person acts negligently with respect to a material element of an offense when he should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the actor's failure to perceive it, considering the nature and purpose of his conduct and the circumstances known to him, involves a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the actor's situation. - There is the objective standard-the standard of a reasonable person Rule of Law If a person commits ordinary negligence, i.e. fails to exercise ordinary caution that a reasonable person would exercise under the same or similar circumstances, and such negligence proximately causes the death of another, the person is guilty of involuntary manslaughter. Facts Native Americans Walter and Bernice Williams (defendants) were married. Walter was 24 years old, and Bernice was 20 years old. Before they were married, Bernice had two children. The younger child, William, became sick when he was about 17 months old. William had an abscessed tooth that developed into an infection of the mouth and cheeks. Walter and Bernice attempted to treat the problem using aspirin. William's cheek started swelling up, and he was not able to keep his food down. William's cheek also started turning a bluish color. William's tooth then became gangrenous, and his resistance was reduced due to malnutrition. After this, William suffered from pneumonia and died. Walter and Bernice did not take William to the doctor because they did not realize how sick he was. Walter did not believe that a doctor or dentist would pull the tooth when the cheek was swollen. Walter and Bernice were also afraid that if they went to the doctor, they would be reported to the welfare department, and William would be taken away from them. If William had received medical treatment soon after developing gangrene, which has a particular odor, then the doctors could have treated his abscessed tooth and saved his life. The State of Washington (plaintiff) charged Walter and Bernice with manslaughter for negligently failing to provide medical care to William. The trial court found Walter and Bernice guilty, and they appealed. Issue If a person commits ordinary negligence, i.e. fails to exercise ordinary caution that a reasonable person would exercise under the same or similar circumstances, and such negligence proximately causes the death of another, is the person guilty of involuntary manslaughter? Holding and Reasoning (Horowitz, C.J.) Yes. If an individual fails to take the kind of caution that a reasonable person would exercise under similar circumstances, regardless of his ignorance, good intentions and good faith, he is guilty of ordinary negligence. If such negligence proximately causes the death of another, then the individual is guilty of manslaughter. Here, Walter and Bernice failed to take the kind of caution that a reasonable person would exercise under similar circumstances. The remaining issue is whether their failed actions proximately caused the death of their child. If Walter and Bernice's duty to seek medical attention for the infant was not activated until after it was too late to save the infant's life, then failure to furnish medical care could not be said to have proximately caused the child's death. Timeliness in the furnishing of medical care also must be considered in terms of "ordinary caution." A reasonable amount of discretion is afforded to parents in conducting the welfare of their children. Parents do not need to seek medical attention for every sniffle. The standard is at what time would an ordinarily prudent person in the same situation deem it necessary to seek medical attention for an ill child. People v. Pierson, 68 N.E. 243 (1903). Here, the infant's infection lasted for about two weeks. During that period of time, Walter and Bernice had noticed that the child was fussy, could not keep food down, and that the child's cheek was swelling and eventually turned a "bluish" color. Walter and Bernice gave the child aspirin during this critical two-week period thinking that the swelling would go down. The evidence produced at trial showed that the Williamses did not understand the seriousness of the infant's symptoms. Further, there was no evidence that they were physically or financially unable to obtain the services of a physician to treat the child. There was, however, sufficient evidence to prove that Walter and Bernice were sufficiently put on notice concerning the child's symptoms and lack of improvement during the two-week period to have required them to obtain medical care for the child. Their failure to do so is ordinary negligence. The judgment of conviction is affirmed.

Utilitarian Approach

- Utilitarian Theorists believe that punishment should be developed based on what is best for the public as a whole. A major focus is on the deterrent effect of a criminal statute because if a criminal statute deters a criminal act then the public benefits because the crime does not occur. Utilitarian theorists are "forward looking" as opposed to retribution theorists, discussed below. The goal of utilitarian theorists is to prevent a crime from happening again. In a general sense this means that the punishment for a certain crime needs to be greater than the possible reward for committing the crime. A utilitarian theorist believes that if this appropriate level of punishment is met, most individuals will be deterred from committing the crime.

What makes a heart depraved or abandoned and malignant?

- Utter callousness towards the value of human life and a complete and total indifference, as to whether one's conduct will create the requisite risk of death of another. A willingness to act because one simply does not care whether grevious harm results or not and not just because one intends harm. - Firing into the crowd, opening the lion's cage at the zoo, placing a bomb in a public place - Usually poses a risk to groups of people, can be death resulting from a reckless act directed toward a particular individual could be a depraved-heart murder. Depraved heart is usually 2nd degree murder unintentional without premeditation and deliberation but with implied malice that requires defendant's awareness of the risk of death to another.

Deliberation-Premeditation formula

- a deterrence-based rationale for distinguishing premeditated and deliberate murders from those that are unpremeditated or nondeliberate. Whether or not intentional murderers who also premeditate and deliberate are the most dangerous and culpable killers, they are the most deterrable. - More importantly, because the value of punishment as a deterrent depends in large measure on the likelihood of swift punishment, crimes that are harder to detect and prosecute, all other things being equal, ought to be punished more severely. - Where a murder is premeditated and deliberate, it is much more likely that the murderer has not only thought out the crime itself but has developed a plausible means of avoiding, or at least delaying, detection. - The premeditation-deliberation formula thus seeks to identify those killers most likely to escape or significantly delay detection, apprehension, and punishment, requiring that punishment severity be maximized to offset the diminished certainty and swiftness of punishment for such culprits.

Martin v. State (1944)

-became intoxicated and began to beat his wife -he was dragged outside -the act of public intoxication was involuntary because the police took him outside-he has the freedom to be drunk in his own home 2.01 MPC = (1) A person is not guilty of an offense unless his liability is based on conduct which includes a voluntary act or the omission(failure to act ((one walks by a crime and can report but does not))) to perform an act of which he is physically capable. (2) The following are not voluntary acts within the meaning of this Section: (a) a reflex or convulsion; (b) a bodily movement during unconsciousness or sleep; (c) conduct during hypnosis or resulting from hypnotic suggestion; (d) a bodily movement that otherwise is not a product of the effort or determination of the actor, either conscious or habitual. (3) Liability for the commission of an offense may not be based on an omission unaccompanied by action unless: (a) the omission is expressly made sufficient by the law defining the offense; or (b) a duty to perform the omitted act is otherwise imposed by law. (4) Possession is an act, within the meaning of this Section, if the possessor knowingly procured or received the thing possessed or was aware of his control thereof for a sufficient period to have been able to terminate his possession.

Knowingly (MPC)

1) If it involves conduct or attendant circumstances, he is aware of his conduct of that nature or the circumstance. 2) Results: He is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result.

MPC 213.1 Rape and Related Offenses.

213.1. Rape and Related Offenses. (1) Rape. A male who has sexual intercourse with a female not his wife is guilty of rape if:(a) he compels her to submit by force or by threat of imminent death, serious bodily injury, extreme pain or kidnapping, to be inflicted on anyone; or(b) he has substantially impaired her power to appraise or control her conduct by administering or employing without her knowledge drugs, intoxicants or other means for the purpose of preventing resistance; or(c) the female is unconscious; or(d) the female is less than 10 years old. Rape is a felony of the second degree unless (i) in the course thereof the actor inflicts serious bodily injury upon anyone, or (ii) the victim was not a voluntary social companion of the actor upon the occasion of the crime and had not previously permitted him sexual liberties, in which cases the offense is a felony of the first degree. (2) Gross Sexual Imposition. A male who has sexual intercourse with a female not his wife commits a felony of the third degree if:(a) he compels her to submit by any threat that would prevent resistance by a woman of ordinary resolution; or(b) he knows that she suffers from a mental disease or defect which renders her incapable of appraising the nature of her conduct; or(c) he knows that she is unaware that a sexual act is being committed upon her or that she submits because she mistakenly supposes that he is her husband.

Owens v. State

A conviction may be based on circumstantial evidence alone if the circumstances are such that they are inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence. Rule of Law A conviction may be based on circumstantial evidence alone if the circumstances are such that they are inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence. Facts A police officer received a complaint about a suspicious truck in the area. Upon investigating, he found a truck matching the description parked in a private driveway with its lights on and the engine running. Owens (defendant) was asleep inside at the wheel with an open can of beer between his legs and two empty cans of beer in the backseat. Owens was in an incoherent state, and sobriety tests suggested he was intoxicated. He went to trial on the charge of driving drunk on a public highway. At trial, Owens did not dispute that he was drunk in the parked car but argued there was insufficient evidence to prove he had been driving drunk on a public highway. The trial court found him guilty. Issue Is circumstantial evidence alone legally sufficient to prove guilt at trial? Holding and Reasoning (Moylan, J.) Yes. In the absence of direct evidence, the jury must make reasonable inferences from circumstantial evidence to determine whether a criminal defendant is guilty. A jury should not rely solely on these inferences to convict a defendant unless the circumstances are incompatible with any reasonable theory of innocence. Here, the officer found Owens drunk and asleep in a parked car with the engine running and the lights on. From these circumstances, there are only two reasonable inferences one can make. Either Owens was already drunk when he entered the car but passed out before he made it out of his driveway, or he had driven drunk on the highway and passed out once he arrived in the driveway. If Owens had not yet left the driveway, he did not commit a crime; merely sitting in a car in a driveway is not against the law. On the other hand, if he had just arrived from elsewhere, he did commit a crime because driving drunk on a public highway is illegal. While it seems at first glance that both scenarios are equally likely, a closer look at the totality of the circumstances shows that a theory of Owens' innocence is incompatible with the evidence. In addition to the open can of beer found between Owens' legs, there were two empty beer cans in the backseat. It is very unlikely that Owens drank in the house, carried the empty beer cans into the car, and fell asleep with the lights and engine on. Rather, it is apparent that Owens had been drinking in the car. It is similarly unreasonable to suggest that Owens entered his car, turned on the lights and engine, then drank three beers and passed out. It is more likely that he had been drinking in his car before arriving at the driveway. Additionally, the fact that the officer received a complaint about the vehicle suggests that the car had been seen moving erratically. Although none of these inferences alone prove Owens' guilt, together they work to show that a theory of Owens' innocence is implausible. Because the circumstances in which the officer found Owens are inconsistent with any reasonable explanation of innocence, the lower court's conviction is affirmed.

Actus Reus

A guilty (prohibited) act. The commission of a prohibited act is one of the two essential elements required for criminal liability, the other element being the intent to commit a crime.

People v. Beardsley

A legal duty to care for another is only established under limited circumstances. It can be imposed by law or by contract. It can also arise in situations where one takes the role of guardian or protector, such as a mother towards her child or a husband towards his wife. If one is under a legal duty of care and fails to provide it, that person is criminally liable for any resulting harm. But if no such legal duty exists, one is at most morally culpable for failing to assist. Here, there was no statute or contract imposing a duty of care on Beardsley, nor was there a special relationship between Beardsley and Burns which required Beardsley to take measures to prevent Burns' death. Rule of Law One is not under a legal duty to care for a houseguest such that the failure to do so makes one criminally punishable for any resulting harm. Facts Respondent Beardsley (defendant) was a married man who arranged to meet with an acquaintance, Blanche Burns, at his apartment while his wife was away. Beardsley and Burns had known each other for a while and had spent the night together on two prior occasions. Burns arrived at his home on Saturday, March 18, 1905, and they began drinking. Burns stayed there continuously until the following Monday. Unknown to Beardsley, Burns asked a coworker of Beardsley's to purchase morphine tablets for her. Beardsley later saw her consume a few tablets and attempted to knock them out of her hand. Burns went unconscious and Beardsley could not revive her. Beardsley took her to a neighbor and asked him to look after Burns until she awoke. That night, the neighbor became concerned about Burns' condition and called the authorities. After an examination, Burns was proclaimed dead. At trial, the prosecutor (plaintiff) argued that Beardsley had a duty to care for Burns, that his failure to do so led to Burns' death, and that he was therefore culpable. The trial court convicted Beardsley of manslaughter. Issue Is one under a legal duty to care for a houseguest so that the failure to do so makes one criminally punishable for any resulting harm? Holding and Reasoning (McAlvay, C.J.) No. A legal duty to care for another is only established under limited circumstances. It can be imposed by law or by contract. It can also arise in situations where one takes the role of guardian or protector, such as a mother towards her child or a husband towards his wife. If one is under a legal duty of care and fails to provide it, that person is criminally liable for any resulting harm. But if no such legal duty exists, one is at most morally culpable for failing to assist. Here, there was no statute or contract imposing a duty of care on Beardsley, nor was there a special relationship between Beardsley and Burns which required Beardsley to take measures to prevent Burns' death. Burns was merely a guest in Beardsley's home. The fact that they had been acquaintances for a while or that she stayed in Beardsley's home for several days did not change the status of their relationship. Had Burns been a male drinking companion, it is unlikely anyone would impose a duty of care on Beardsley. The fact that Burns was a woman does not change the legal relationship between Burns and Beardsley. Beardsley at most had a moral duty to assist a guest in his home who was in danger of dying, and he is likely to meet reproach for his inaction. But there is no criminal liability for his failure to adequately care for Burns because Beardsley had no legal duty to care for her. The conviction is set aside and Beardsley is ordered released.

The doctrine of lesser included offenses

A less serious crime that is necessarily committed during the perpetration of a greater crime because the lesser crime contains some of the same elements of the greater crime. The greater crime cannot be proven unless all of the elements of the lesser crime are proven. For example, trespassing is a lesser included offense of the crime of burglary.

motion to dismiss

A pleading in which a defendant asserts that the plaintiff's claim fails to state a cause of action (that is, has no basis in law) or that there are other grounds on which a suit should be dismissed.

proximate cause (legal cause)

A test to determine among who that have satisfied but for causation should be held accountable for the resulting harm. Issues of proximate cause arise when there is an INTERVENING FORCE Intervening force = when some but-for causing agent comes into play after the defendant's voluntary act or omission and before the social harm occurs. Intervening forces can be: (1) An act of god (2) An act of an independent 3rd party (3) An act or omission of the victim that assists in bringing about the outcome An intervening cause that breaks the chain of proximate cause is a superseding cause the natural chain extending from the criminal act the the harmful result.

Provocation Doctrine

All traditional common law forms of adequate provocation involve unlawful conduct by the provoker. 210.3.1(b) is broader than common law provocation doctrine, 210.3.1(b) rejects the words alone doctrine, the common law heat of passion (provocation) doctrine the reaction must be immediate, no cooling off, however under 210.3.1(b) rejects that says one can be provoked and exist in that state for a period of time. The provocation defense is an excuse defense serves to reduce an intentional killing from murder to manslaughter common law doctrine, not MPC, In general, words alone are not adequate provocation, although words may be sufficient if accompanied by conduct that demonstrates the intention and ability to cause bodily harm to the defendant. - COMMON LAW SCENARIOS THAT WILL GIVE RISE TO ADEQUATE PROVOCATION: factors constituting adequate provocation have included only extreme assault or battery upon the defendant, mutual fighting, the defendant's illegal arrest, injury or serious abuse of a close relative of the defendant, or the sudden discovery of a spouse's adultery. These acts mitigate murder to manslaughter. - there must have been adequate provocation, the killing must have been in the heat of passion, it must have been a sudden heat of passion meaning THE KILLING MUST HAVE FOLLOWED THE PROVOCATION BEFORE THERE HAD BEEN A REAOSNABLE OPPORTUNITY FOR THE PASSION TO COOL, there must have been a causal connection between the provocation, the passion, and the fatal act. - The traditional set of categories regarding provocation has been abandoned by many state legislatures and courts, more modern view is that the issue should be left to the jury. - Maryland legislature has abandoned the provocation category of "discovering a spouse in the midst of sexual intercourse with another besides the spouse" For provocation to be adequate to mitigate murder to manslaughter, the provocation must be calculated to inflame the passion of a reasonable person and tend to cause him to act for the moment from passion rather than reason. - Provocation defense will not stand if the killing occurred after a time when passion may cool because that reflects purposely and knowingly so it would be murder. AFTER A REASONABLE PERSON IN THE DEFENDANT'S POSITION WOULD HAVE CALMED DOWN.

Writ of Prohibition

An appellate court order preventing a lower court from exercising its jurisdiction in a particular case

Keller v. Superior Court

An unborn but viable fetus is not a "human being" under the law as to which someone may be charged with murder. Facts Robert Keeler (defendant) and his wife Teresa Keeler divorced on September 27, 1968. At the time, Mrs. Keeler was pregnant with another man's child. On February 23, 1969, Mrs. Keeler was driving on a narrow road when another car forced her to pull over. Mr. Keeler came out of the other car and confronted her about her pregnancy. Upon seeing her stomach, Mr. Keeler became angry and struck her in the stomach with his knee, intending to hit the fetus out of her. After he left, Mrs. Keeler called for assistance and underwent a Caesarian section. The fetus was stillborn, with a skull fracture cited as the cause of death. An investigation showed that the skull fracture could have been due to Mr. Keeler's attack to Mrs. Keeler's stomach. Evidence at the time showed the fetus was viable on the day of attack. Mrs. Keeler and her doctor had previously detected fetal movement, and at the time the fetus was stillborn, it weighed five pounds and was 18 inches long. An expert estimated that had the fetus been born prematurely on the date of its death, it would have had a 75 percent to 96 percent chance of surviving. Mr. Keeler was charged with the murder of the fetus. In California, Penal Code § 187 criminalizes the murder of a "human being." Mr. Keeler moved to set aside the information. The lower court denied his motion, and he petitioned for a writ of prohibition from the Supreme Court of California. Issue Is an unborn but viable fetus a "human being" under the law as to which someone may be charged with murder? Holding and Reasoning (Mosk, J.) No. Penal Code § 187 provides that "murder is the unlawful killing of a human being, with malice aforethought." If the fetus which Mr. Keeler is charged with killing is not deemed a "human being" under the statute, he cannot be charged with murder. Penal Code § 187 does not specify whether the term "human being" applies to an unborn fetus. If a statutory provision is ambiguous, courts must refrain from interposing their own interpretations and adhere to the legislative intent behind the provision. It is therefore necessary to examine the intent of the legislature that drafted this provision. As written, the provision has its origins in the Crimes and Punishments Act of 1850 and has not been amended since. Thus, this court relies on the intent of the Legislature of 1850. In the mid-nineteenth century, common law required proof that a baby was born alive in order to prosecute the killing of that baby as murder. It is therefore likely that the Legislature of 1850 implicitly intended to include the requirement that a baby be born alive in its murder statute. This, in addition to the state's policy of interpreting ambiguous criminal statutes in favor of the defendant, leads to the conclusion that the legislature intended § 187 to apply only to a baby that is born alive. Here, although the fetus was viable, it was not born alive. Therefore, the fetus does not fall within the meaning of "human being" under § 187. It is true that much has changed since the enactment of this statute, including scientific advancements that increase the odds that a viable fetus can survive outside the womb. Consequently, the requirement of an actual birth may be viewed as archaic. Nevertheless, even if a legislature's intent is outdated, courts are not at liberty to substitute a more modern interpretation of a statute for two reasons. First, the doctrine of separation of powers requires that courts leave the task of defining crimes to the legislative branch. Thus, even though some may consider the killing of a viable fetus to be as grave a crime as the killing of an infant, courts must still defer to the intent of the legislature. The second reason the court cannot reach beyond the apparent legislative intent is the constitutional guarantee of due process. No person may be punished for a crime for which he did not receive fair warning. For this reason, legislatures may not pass ex post facto laws, that is, laws that criminalize behavior retroactively. Enlarging the definition of a "human being" to include an unborn fetus would have the same effect as an ex post facto law because the defendant would have had no notice that the killing of a fetus could amount to murder. Here, there is no decision from California courts that places Mr. Keeler on notice that his attack on the fetus could fall within the meaning of § 187. Accordingly, the court adheres to the original intent of the 1850 legislature in holding that § 187 does not apply to the killing of an unborn fetus. The petition for a writ of prohibition is granted, and the lower court is restrained from conducting any further proceedings on the information.

Fisher v. State

Child abuse an inherently dangerous felony in the abstract, that is looking at the elements of the offense and considering whether "the felony cannot be commit without creating a substantial risk that one might be killed." - D find v sleeping with his spouse, d stabs v in a rage, - under the common law is D guilty of any offense in relation to the death of V, citing Girourd, there is adequate provocation under common law, killing before a reasonable time to cool off, killed in the throes of passion not judgement. - Is d guilty of any offense under the model penal code? Yes, manslaughter one acted under EED with a reasonable explanation not peculiar to him. Per Model Penal Code Section 210.3: (1) Criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter when: (b) a homicide which would otherwise be murder is committed under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable explanation or excuse. - In felony murder? Yes, because it is inherently dangerous and cannot be committed without creating a substantial risk that one would be killed. This is the court of final jx in the state of Maryland, cases arrive here because they were convicted of 2nd degree felony murder, they appealed to Maryland intermediate apellate court, the court and affirmed the convictions. They filed a writ, an order from one court to another court, parties must petition the court to hear their cases, they grant that petition and send a writ to the other court to hear the case. - Writ from the Court of special appeals to the court of appeals of maryland - First degree in common law Maryland is deliberate, premeditated, and willful killing by lying in wait (ambush), poison, offenses enumerated in another area of the Maryland's code, or in the commission, or attempted commission of a felony arson, rape, burglary, robbery, all others fall into second degree murder. - They were convicted of 2nd degree felony murder (2nd degree is a catch all provision because their felony was not enumerated in the 1st degree murder list) - Child abuse resulting in the death of a nine-year old child, a series of physical abuses. - They were convicted of child abuse, but because it resulted in death, the state would have to prove every element of the convicted felony, transforms the murder into a strict liability offense. - Maryland has 2nd degree murder as statute, but 2nd degree felony murder doesn't exist in Maryland code, was one of the defendant's arguments. The killing must occur during the perpetration of or attempted perpetration of the felony specified, It can't just be any felony because every felony where a person dies would subject the defendant to a murder conviction no matter what the felony is. if john cheek deposited his fraudulent tax return in the mail and a mailman was killed by a dog, then cheek would be convicted of murder. - This court added to the list of felonies, they should be limited to felonies under the common law, at common law all felonies were punishable by execution, there were way less felonies at common law: rape, arson, robbery, burglary. - What does it mean for a felony to be inherently dangerous? - Maryland's felony murder rule is the common law felony murder rule made by Maryland courts that would subject one to felony-murder prosecution, which has been refined by legislature to include other felonies, the already established murder should be murder in the first degree. - Maryland's law is a nod to the common law, they say common law evolution with refinements to Maryland's felony-murder doctrine is from judge-made decisions. - Maryland's FM rule is not limited to the enumerated felonies in the statute, the legislature says these too constitute FM combined with Maryland's appellate common law offenses made by the Maryland appellate judges, just like the mailbox rule came from the courts. - This case is in the book because, limit the application of the FM rule to those that are inherently dangerous - inherently dangerous if the felony viewed in the abstract, not according to the facts, it is not possible to commit the offense without creating a substantial risk that someone would be killed. The person who committed that felony will be guilty of murder when the government can prove every element of that underlying felony beyond a reasonable doubt, otherwise they cannot be convicted under the FM doctrine, they would be charged with murder, not felony murder, and then they would have to prove the elements of criminal homicide, FM relieves the government of having to prove the elements of criminal homicide, only have to prove the underlying elements of the felony for FM. - Is there anyway to discharge a firearm in a crowd of people without creating a substantial risk that one might be killed, in the abstract, no, so it is an inherently dangerous felony and they will be subject to a FM prosecution. John cheek did not create a substantial risk that someone might die. - If not inherently dangerous, then if one dies, then still charged with murder, just not strict liability FM prosecution. Burglarly can be committed, in the abstract, without creating a substantial risk of someone dying, Armed Robbery creates a substantial risk because of the force and the presence of a fire arm. · Maryland rejected the abstract inherently dangerous, they say did the defendant foresee that committing this felony could result in death (you assumed this risk and you proceed nevertheless, you are accountable for that, this is the Maryland view, if the death was a foreseeably reasonable consequence, then they had the malice required for FM). · They wouldn't be 1st degree because there was no premeditation or deliberation, so 2nd degree felony murder. · You at least acted recklessly and you proceeded anyway, you may have been a click away from it was your conscious objective to kill, this was the malice underlying according to Maryland's view. · Inverse of the abstract, is looking at the facts of the case (the manner in which the felony was carried out for example) · inherently dangerous if the felony viewed in the abstract, not according to the facts, it is not possible to commit the offense without creating a substantial risk that someone would be killed. Difference between FM and 2nd degree murder is the presence of implied malice (people v knoller) a reckless indifference to the value of human life. · Negligent homicide - one throwing snowballs down off an overpass onto oncoming traffic, causes the car to swerve and hit a median and it kills all passengers. Could be recklessly as well, this is not callous recklessness, so manslaughter. Could be felony murder, because there is no way to do that without possibly creating a substantial risk that one might be killed because it is inherently dangerous. Rule of Law The second-degree felony-murder rule applies to deaths that occur during the perpetuation of an inherently dangerous felony as determined by the circumstances of the specific case. Facts In 1997 Rita Fisher, a nine-year-old child, died of dehydration and malnutrition. An autopsy revealed that Rita was neglected and physically abused before her death. Rita's mother, Mary Utley (defendant), and sister, Rose Mary Fisher, were charged with child abuse and second-degree felony murder. At trial, the jury found Utley and Rose Mary guilty. The Maryland Court of Special Appeals, the state's intermediate appellate court, affirmed Utley's and Rose Mary's convictions. Utley and Rose Mary appealed their convictions, making three arguments. First, Utley and Rose Mary asserted that the felonies that could underlie felony murder in Maryland were limited to those listed in Article 27, §§ 408 to 410 of the Maryland Code, which included arson, rape, robbery, burglary, and kidnapping. Second, Utley and Rose Mary asserted that any additional felonies that could underlie felony murder beyond those listed in the statute were limited to felonies that were recognized at common law. Third, Utley and Rose Mary asserted that if felonies that did not exist at common law could underlie felony murder, they were limited to those that were inherently dangerous to life according to the elements of the crime in the abstract, rather than the circumstances of the specific crime in the case at issue. Issue Does the second-degree felony-murder rule apply to deaths that occur during the perpetuation of an inherently dangerous felony as determined by the circumstances of the specific case? Holding and Reasoning (Rodowsky, J.) Yes. The second-degree felony-murder rule applies to deaths that occur during the perpetuation of an inherently dangerous felony as determined by the circumstances of the specific case. Felony murder is a common-law doctrine under which a person who participates in the commission of a felony may be convicted of murder for any death that occurs in the course of the felony. Sections 408 to 410 provide examples of felonies that may support a conviction for first-degree murder if a death occurs during their commission. However, those enumerated felonies are not the only felonies that may underlie felony murder in Maryland, and felony murder is not limited to first-degree murder. Further, though felony murder is a common-law doctrine, it is not limited to felonies that were recognized at common law. Rather, any inherently dangerous felony may underlie felony murder if a death occurred during its perpetuation. An inherently dangerous felony is one that creates a foreseeable risk of death. Whether a felony is inherently dangerous depends on both the nature of the crime generally and the circumstances of the crime that was committed in the case at issue. Here, Utley and Rose Mary were convicted of second-degree felony murder based on their child-abuse conviction. Child abuse may underlie felony murder if it is committed to such a degree that the risk of death is foreseeable. The jury reasonably found that the facts of the case supported a conviction for child abuse and second-degree murder based on that child abuse. The judgment of the court of special appeals is affirmed.

Recklessly (MPC)

Consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct. Involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct of a law-abiding person would observe in the actor's situation.

Manslaughter (MPC)

Criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter when: (a) it is committed recklessly; or (b) a homicide which would otherwise be murder is committed under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable explanation or excuse. The reasonableness of such explanation or excuse shall be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the actor's situation under the circumstances as he believes them to be. (2) Manslaughter is a felony of the second degree.

Negligent Homicide (MPC)

Criminal homicide constitutes negligent homicide when it is committed negligently. (2) Negligent homicide is a felony of the third degree

Barber v. Superior Court

Disconnecting life-support machines is comparable to withholding manually administered injections or medications. Therefore, the use of nutrition and hydration administered intravenously is the same as the use of a respirator or other forms of life-support. There is no criminal liability for failure to act unless there is a legal to duty to do so. Here, Barber had no legal duty to continue to provide treatment to Herbert once it was proved to be ineffective or futile in the opinion of qualified physicians. However, determining who has the authority to make the decision to withdrawal life-sustaining support is unclear. There are no precise guidelines to guide a court in that respect. The patient's interests and desires are of paramount importance. If Herbert was incapable of making a medical decision for himself due to incapacity, his wife was the proper person to act as his surrogate with the authority to decide issues regarding further treatment. There is no evidence that there was any disagreement between the wife, children, and the physicians. Nor is there evidence that the family was motivated by anything other than the best interests of Herbert. Barber's omission to continue life-sustaining treatment to Herbert under the circumstances, though intentional and with knowledge that Herbert would die, was not an unlawful failure to perform a legal duty. Rule of Law A physician is under no legal duty to continue futile life-sustaining support absent objection from a spouse and the withdrawal of such life-sustaining support with the consent of a spouse does not support a charge of murder. Facts Following a surgical procedure, Clarence Herbert suffered a cardio-respiratory arrest while in the recovery room. A team of physicians, including Barber (defendant), were able to revive Herbert and place him on life support. Over the following three days, it was determined that Herbert suffered permanent brain damage, leaving him in a permanent vegetative, coma-like state. Herbert's physicians informed his family that Herbert's chances for recovery were very poor. Herbert's family drafted a written request to hospital personnel requesting that all life-support equipment be removed. Barber and another physician complied with the family's request and removed the respirator and other life-sustaining equipment. Herbert continued to breathe on his own, but showed no other signs of improvement. After two more days had elapsed, the physicians consulted Herbert's family and subsequently removed the intravenous tubes providing Herbert with hydration and nutrition. Herbert later died. Barber and the other physician were charged with murder and conspiracy to commit murder which a magistrate dismissed. The superior court set aside the magistrate's order and reinstated the complaint. Barber and the other physician then petitioned the court of appeal for review of the superior court's decision. Issue Is a physician under a legal duty to continue futile life-sustaining support absent objection from a spouse and does the withdrawal of such life-sustaining support with the consent of a spouse support a charge of murder? Holding and Reasoning (Compton, J.) No. Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought. Malice is presumed regardless of motive if Barber unlawfully and intentionally killed Herbert. The term "unlawful" generally is meant to distinguish a criminal homicide from those homicides society deems "excusable." Euthanasia is not an excusable homicide in California. However, whereas euthanasia is an affirmative act to cease life, the cessation of "heroic" life support measures is not an affirmative act to cease life. Rather, it is a withdrawal or omission of further treatment. Disconnecting life-support machines is comparable to withholding manually administered injections or medications. Therefore, the use of nutrition and hydration administered intravenously is the same as the use of a respirator or other forms of life-support. There is no criminal liability for failure to act unless there is a legal to duty to do so. Here, Barber had no legal duty to continue to provide treatment to Herbert once it was proved to be ineffective or futile in the opinion of qualified physicians. However, determining who has the authority to make the decision to withdrawal life-sustaining support is unclear. There are no precise guidelines to guide a court in that respect. The patient's interests and desires are of paramount importance. If Herbert was incapable of making a medical decision for himself due to incapacity, his wife was the proper person to act as his surrogate with the authority to decide issues regarding further treatment. There is no evidence that there was any disagreement between the wife, children, and the physicians. Nor is there evidence that the family was motivated by anything other than the best interests of Herbert. Barber's omission to continue life-sustaining treatment to Herbert under the circumstances, though intentional and with knowledge that Herbert would die, was not an unlawful failure to perform a legal duty. The superior court erred in determining that the evidence against Barber and the other physician supported charges of murder and conspiracy to commit murder.

The inherently dangerous felony limitation

If a felony can be committed w/o endangering human life, then it is not inherently dangerous and thus cannot be used for felony-murder. (fisher v state)

§ 210.0 Definitions.

In Articles 210-213, unless a different meaning plainly is required: (1) ''human being'' means a person who has been born and is alive; (2) ''bodily injury'' means physical pain, illness or any impairment of physical condition; (3) ''serious bodily injury'' means bodily injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ; (4) ''deadly weapon'' means any firearm or other weapon, device, instrument, material or substance, whether animate or inanimate, which in the manner it is used or is intended to be used is known to be capable of producing death or serious bodily injury.

motion for a directed verdict

In a jury trial, a motion for the judge to take the decision out of the hands of the jury and to direct a verdict for the party who filed the motion on the ground that the other party has not produced sufficient evidence to support her or his claim.

How does recklessness that constitutes murder differ from that of manslaughter

In a prosecution for murder, there must be a finding that the actor's disregard of the risk manifests a extreme indifference to the value of human life. - The MPC states the difference between reckless manslaughter and reckless murder is on the basis of the concept of extreme indifference to the value of human life.

Lenity Doctrine

Judicial interpretation of ambiguous statutes should be biased in favor of the accused.

indicia

Legislative intent is to be ascertained by legislative history, prior judgement, the purpose appearing from the statute taken as a whole, prior state constructions of the statute.

MPC 2.03

MPC 2.03 IS response to the frowned upon transferred intent doctrine - SECTION 2.03. CAUSAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONDUCT AND RESULT; DIVERGENCE BETWEEN RESULT DESIGNED OR CONTEMPLATED AND ACTUAL RESULT OR BETWEEN PROBABLE AND ACTUAL RESULT - (1) Conduct is the cause of a result when: - (a) it is an antecedent but for which the result in question would not have occurred; and - (b) the relationship between the conduct and result satisfies any additional causal requirements imposed by the Code or by the law defining the offense. - (2) When purposely or knowingly causing a particular result is an element of an offense, the element is not established if the actual result is not within the purpose or the contemplation of the actor unless: (Default rule) - (a) the actual result differs from that designed or contemplated, as the case may be, only in the respect that a different person or different property is injured or affected or that the injury or harm designed or contemplated would have been more serious or more extensive than that caused; or - (b) the actual result involves the same kind of injury or harm as that designed or contemplated and is not too remote or accidental in its occurrence to have a [just] bearing on the actor's liability or on the gravity of his offense. - (3) When recklessly(conscious risk creation) or negligently causing a particular result is an element of an offense, the element is not established if the actual result is not within the risk of which the actor is aware or, in the case of negligence(inadvertent risk creation), of which he should be aware unless: - (a) the actual result differs from the probable result only in the respect that a different person or different property is injured or affected or that the probable injury or harm would have been more serious or more extensive than that caused; or - (b) the actual result involves the same kind of injury or harm as the probable result and is not too remote or accidental in its occurrence to have a [just] bearing on the actor's liability or on the gravity of his offense. - (4) When causing a particular result is a material element of an offense for which absolute liability is imposed by law, the element is not established unless the actual result is a probable consequence of the actor's conduct.

MPC 2.02

Minimum Requirements of Culpability. Except as provided in Section 2.05, a person is not guilty of an offense unless he acted purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently, as the law may require, with respect to each material element of the offense.

Penal code 1.05(1)

No conduct constitutes an offense unless it is a crime or violation under this code or another statute of the state.

model penal code 1.12(1)

No person may be convicted of an offense unless each element of such offense is proved beyond a reasonable doubt, in the absence of such proof, the innocence of the defendant is assumed.

Purposely (MPC)

One acts purposely when it is his conscious objective to engage in certain conduct or cause a certain result.

manslaughter

Recklessness (conscious creation of substantial and unjustifiable risk and awareness of the substantial and unjustifiable risk) a person is guilty when they recklessly cause the death of another

People v. Casassa

Rule of Law A New York defendant may reduce a charge of murder to manslaughter if he is able to show "extreme emotional disturbance" and that there was a reasonable explanation or excuse for his actions as determined by the court from both a subjective and objective analysis. Facts Victor Casassa (defendant) lived in the same apartment complex as Victoria Lo Consolo. Shortly after they met, they began dating socially for a brief period. After Lo Consolo told Casassa that she was not "falling in love" with him, Casassa became devastated and undertook bizarre acts such as breaking into her apartment while she was away and lying in her bed naked for a while. During the break-in, Casassa was in possession of a knife "because he knew that he was either going to hurt Victoria or Victoria was going to cause himself to commit suicide." After Lo Consolo rejected Casassa's last attempt to win her over, he took out a knife and stabbed her several times. Casassa then dragged her body into the bathroom and submerged her in a tub full of water to "make sure she was dead." Casassa was charged with second-degree murder and waived his right to a jury trial. The sole issue at trial was whether, at the time of the killing, he acted under the influence of "extreme emotional disturbance." Defense counsel presented one witness, a psychiatrist who testified that Casassa became obsessed with Lo Consolo. The prosecution produced several rebuttal witnesses including a psychiatrist who said that although Casassa was emotionally disturbed, he was not under the influence of "extreme emotional disturbance." The trial court concluded that the appropriate test to determine whether Casassa was under the influence of "extreme emotional disturbance" was to examine the totality of the circumstances from the perspective of Casassa as well as from the point of view of a reasonable person. The court found Casassa's emotional reaction at the time of the killing was so peculiar that it could not be considered reasonable so as to reduce the charge of second-degree murder to manslaughter. Casassa was convicted of second-degree murder and he appealed. Issue May a New York defendant reduce a charge of murder to manslaughter if he is able to show "extreme emotional disturbance" and that there was a reasonable explanation or excuse for his actions as determined by the court from both a subjective and objective analysis? Holding and Reasoning (Jasen, J.) Yes. Under New York law it is an affirmative defense to the crime of second-degree murder if a defendant can prove that he "...acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse." An individual acting under "extreme emotional disturbance" does not necessarily mean that a defendant engaged in a spontaneous action. Rather, it is quite possible that significant mental trauma affected a defendant's mind over a period of time. In People v. Patterson, 39 N.Y.2d 288 (1976), the court noted that while the extreme emotional disturbance defense is permitted if a defendant shows that his actions were caused by a mental infirmity not reaching the level of insanity, not all mental infirmities constitute extreme emotional disturbance. The drafters of the defense as stated in the Model Penal Code (MPC), from which the state's law was modeled, noted that (1) the particular defendant must have acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance, and (2) there must have been a reasonable explanation or excuse for such disturbance. To determine "reasonableness," the court views the defendant's situation from both a subjective and objective stance. One requirement involves a determination that the particular defendant did act under extreme emotional disturbance and not a sham. The other component involves a determination of whether there is a reasonable explanation or excuse for the emotional disturbance. The determination of whether there was a reasonable explanation or excuse involves both a subjective analysis, viewing the internal situation in which the defendant found himself and the circumstances as he perceived them to be however illogical or inaccurate, and an objective standpoint to determine whether the explanation for the disturbance was reasonable. Here, the trial court correctly applied the objective and subjective tests to Casassa's extreme emotional disturbance defense. The judge accepted that Casassa killed Lo Consolo while under the influence of "extreme emotional disturbance." Then the court considered other mitigating factors offered by Casassa, but found that the excuse was so peculiar to him that it was unworthy of reducing the charge of murder to manslaughter. The judgment of conviction is affirmed.

State v. Forrest

Rule of Law A conviction for murder in the first degree requires substantial evidence of premeditation and deliberation, which may be proven through circumstantial evidence. Facts On December 22, 1985, John Forrest (defendant) admitted his father to the hospital. Forrest's father was deemed terminally ill shortly thereafter. On December 24, Forrest went to visit his father. While alone with him, Forrest began crying and told his father he loved him. His father began coughing and made gurgling noises. Forrest then removed a pistol from his pocket and fired it against his father's head. He fired the gun a total of four times, cocking the gun each time before firing. Forrest then walked out of the room and dropped the gun, crying and appearing distressed. He openly admitted to shooting his father and said he promised his father he would not let him suffer. After trial, the jury convicted Forrest of first degree murder. Forrest appeals, arguing that the court should not have submitted the issue of first degree murder to the jury because there was insufficient evidence on premeditation and deliberation to reach a jury. Issue Does a conviction for murder in the first degree require substantial evidence of premeditation and deliberation? Holding and Reasoning (Meyer, J.) Yes. Premeditation and deliberation are essential elements of the crime of first degree murder, and both must be proven by substantial evidence. However, premeditation and deliberation are mental processes, and direct proof is difficult to acquire. Premeditation and deliberation are typically proven through circumstantial evidence. There are six factors a court looks to in order to determine whether a killing was premeditated and deliberate. These include: (1) a lack of provocation from the victim; (2) the actions and words of the defendant before and after the killing; (3) any threats on the part of the defendant before or during the killing; (4) whether the victim and the defendant had a poor history; (5) whether there was an additional lethal attack after the victim was already helpless; and (6) evidence of brutality. Here, there was substantial evidence that Forrest killed his father with premeditation and deliberation. Just prior to the killing, the father did nothing to provoke Forrest to kill him. The father was merely lying in his hospital bed when Forrest shot him. Furthermore, Forrest shot his father four times with a gun that required him to cock the gun each time before firing. Forrest's own words after the killing are particularly revealing. He said he had previously considered killing his father to end his suffering, and that he had promised his father he would not allow him to suffer. Based on Forrest's statements and other circumstantial evidence, there was enough evidence on premeditation and deliberation to support the court's decision to submit the issue of first degree murder to the jury.

In re Banks (1978)

Rule of Law A criminal statute is not void for vagueness if it gives fair notice of the criminalized conduct and provides sufficient guidance to judges and defending lawyers, and is not void for overbreadth if there is an available interpretation that does not inadvertently criminalize permissible actions. Facts North Carolina established a Peeping Tom statute, G.S. 14-202, that proscribed peeping into a female's room with the intent to invade privacy. Respondent Banks (defendant) challenged this law on the grounds that it was unconstitutionally vague, since different people would have to speculate as to its meaning and arrive at different interpretations. Banks also argued the law was unconstitutionally overbroad because it criminalized actions beyond the scope of what the legislature meant to criminalize. Issue Is a Peeping Tom statute that criminalizes the secret peeping into a female's room with the intent to invade privacy void for vagueness or overbreadth? Holding and Reasoning (Moore, J.) No. G.S. 14-202 is neither void for vagueness nor overbreadth. As long as a criminal statute gives fair notice of the specific conduct that the statute criminalizes and provides a guiding standard for the interpretation and application of that crime by judges and defending attorneys, it is not void for vagueness. Statutes are not required to be as specific as possible. It is only necessary that statutes are sufficiently detailed so that there is little uncertainty as to what conduct is criminalized. In Kahalley v. State, 48 So. 2d 794 (1950), the Alabama Supreme Court invalidated a Peeping Tom statute because it did not require the peeping to be done in secret. This omission made it difficult to determine what type of conduct the statute prohibited. However, G.S. 14-202 explicitly refers to those who peep secretly. This court previously interpreted the term "secretly" in State v. Banks (1965), and said it clearly refers to the act of spying on someone with the wrongful intent to invade privacy. The inclusion of the term "secretly" adequately notifies the public as to what type of conduct the statute prohibits, and gives sufficient guidance to a judge or defending lawyer to determine whether the defendant has violated the statute. It is therefore not void for vagueness. The statute is not void for overbreadth, as well. As long as the statute does not criminalize acts that the legislature did not intend to criminalize, the statute is not overbroad. Therefore, if there is an interpretation of the statute that does not inadvertently criminalize permissible conduct, the statute is not void for overbreadth. In Lemon v. State (1975), the Supreme Court of Georgia said its Peeping Tom statute was not overbroad because the requirement of a wrongful intent narrows the applicability of the law. It eliminates the possibility that the law might punish someone who is lawfully in a location where he accidentally observes a woman in her room. G.S. 14-202 similarly avoids such a possibility because it includes a requirement of wrongful intent. This statute is therefore not overbroad, and its constitutionality is upheld.

People v. Knoller

Rule of Law A finding of implied malice requires that one act with a conscious disregard to human life. Facts Marjorie Knoller (defendant) and her husband Robert Noel were attorneys who acquired four large dogs from a client. A veterinarian who examined the dogs for Knoller warned her that the dogs lacked any training or discipline and that they would be dangerous to keep at a home. He also implied that the dogs might attack humans. Despite the warnings, Knoller and Noel picked up the dogs from their former owner. While with the former owner, two of the dogs had attacked and killed the owner's sheep and cat, and another ate his own doghouse. The former owner expressed her concern about all the dogs and suggested that two of them be shot. On April 30, 2000, Knoller and Noel brought two of the dogs to stay at their apartment. On January 26, 2001, the dogs attacked and killed Diane Whipple, who lived on the same floor. Between the date Knoller and Noel brought the dogs home and the date of Whipple's death, there were approximately thirty incidents in which the dogs were out of control or displayed threatening behavior. Knoller was charged with second degree murder. The jury convicted Knoller based on a theory of implied malice. Knoller moved for a new trial and the trial court granted the motion. The trial court held that implied malice required a finding that Knoller was aware of the high probability that her conduct would cause another's death, and ruled that Knoller lacked this awareness. The Court of Appeal reversed the decision granting a new trial, holding that implied malice only requires a conscious disregard of the risk of serious bodily injury to another, not an awareness that another person would likely die. The Court of Appeal ordered the trial court to reconsider its decision on Knoller's motion for retrial in light of its definition of implied malice. Knoller appealed the Court of Appeal's decision. Issue Does a finding of implied malice require one to act only with a conscious disregard for the risk of serious bodily injury to another rather than with a conscious disregard for human life? Holding and Reasoning (Kennard, J.) No. A murder conviction requires a finding of malice, which can be express or implied. A finding of implied malice requires that one act with a conscious disregard for human life. The Court of Appeal erroneously ruled that implied malice only requires a conscious disregard for the risk of serious bodily injury. It based its definition of implied malice on People v. Conley, 411 P.2d 911 (1966), in which this court said an act that is likely to cause either serious injury or death demonstrates malice. However, the ruling in Conley dealt with a defendant's action, whereas implied malice concerns a defendant's mental state. Therefore, Conley is not applicable to the issue of what type of mental state a defendant must possess for a finding of implied malice. This court has consistently stated in cases before and after Conley that implied malice requires an awareness of a risk to human life, not merely of serious bodily injury. Thus, the trial court properly required that the defendant act with a conscious disregard to human life. Nevertheless, the trial court still erred in defining implied malice. The proper test for implied malice is laid out in People v. Phillips, 414 P.2d 353 (1966). The Phillips test requires that a defendant have awareness of engaging in conduct that endangers the life of another. Here, the trial court set the bar too high and required that a defendant have an awareness that her conduct had a high probability of resulting in death. The Court of Appeal set the bar too low and permitted a conviction of second degree murder where the defendant knew his or her conduct risked causing death or serious bodily injury. Under the proper test (that is, the Phillips test), malice is implied when a defendant acts with conscious disregard for life. Because it based its order granting a new trial on an erroneous definition of implied malice, the trial court must reconsider its order granting a new trial in accordance with this court's opinion.

Desertrain v. City of Los Angeles (2014)

Rule of Law A municipal law prohibiting the use of automobiles as living quarters is unconstitutionally vague in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if the law fails to explicitly state what conduct is punishable. Facts The City of Los Angeles (City) (defendant) enacted a municipal code prohibiting individuals from using parked vehicles as living quarters overnight, day-to-day, or otherwise. Cheyenne Desertrain and six other homeless individuals (plaintiffs) were arrested or cited for violating the law based on various activities, namely eating food inside a car; having a sleeping bag, canned goods, and books in a vehicle; talking on a cell phone in a car; and staying in a car to get out of the rain. Many other times, the plaintiffs had not been cited for conduct that could fall under the purview of the law. The plaintiffs filed suit in federal district court against the City and individual police officers (defendants), claiming that the law was unconstitutionally vague on its face because it failed to provide sufficient notice of the penalized conduct and promoted arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court denied the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The plaintiffs appealed. Issue Is a municipal law prohibiting the use of automobiles as living quarters unconstitutionally vague in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if the law fails to explicitly state what conduct is punishable? Holding and Reasoning (Pregerson, J.) Yes. A municipal law prohibiting the use of automobiles as living quarters is unconstitutionally vague in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if the law fails to state explicitly what conduct is punishable. The purpose of providing citizens with fair notice of what conduct a criminal law penalizes is to enable the citizen to conform his or her conduct to the law's requirements. However, a criminal law cannot require the public to speculate as to its meaning. In this case, the City has provided no guidance on the types of conduct that the ordinance prohibits. Further, the law is unduly broad, as the ordinance states that no person may use a vehicle as living quarters overnight, day-to-day, or otherwise, but fails to define the terms "living quarters" or "otherwise." Here, some of the plaintiffs were not cited for violating the law after sleeping in vehicles overnight, but were cited for violations based on actions such as talking on a cell phone in a car or keeping books and personal belongings in a vehicle. The law is broad enough to cover any driver in Los Angeles who eats foods or transports belongings in a car. However, the defendants seemingly targeted homeless individuals when enforcing the law. Thus, the City's law is unconstitutionally vague and promotes arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement that targets the homeless. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is reversed.

Oxendine v. State

Rule of Law A non-lethal injury inflicted after a lethal injury is the cause-in-fact of a victim's death if it accelerates the victim's death. Facts Jeffrey Oxendine (defendant) lived with his girlfriend, Leotha Tyree, and six-year-old son. On January 18, 1984, Tyree pushed the child into the bathtub, causing his stomach to hemorrhage. The next morning, Oxendine beat his son, causing the child's stomach to hemorrhage again. The child's abdomen swelled later that day and he stopped breathing. He died shortly afterwards. Oxendine and Tyree were charged with manslaughter. As part of its case-in-chief, the State (plaintiff) called medical examiners Dr. Inguito and Dr. Hameli to the stand. They both agreed that the child had suffered two distinct injuries, the first attributable to Tyree and the second attributable to Oxendine. Dr. Inguito testified it was possible that both injuries contributed to the child's death, but was unable to determine which injury actually caused his death. Dr. Inguito did not discuss whether the second injury accelerated the child's death. Dr. Hameli testified that the first injury was lethal and was the cause of death. He stated that the second injury could have contributed to the child's death, but he was unable to state with medical certainty whether the second injury accelerated the time of the child's death. After the State made its case, Oxendine moved for a judgment of acquittal. The Superior Court denied his motion. Subsequently, Tyree called another medical examiner, Dr. Hofman, who testified that if a child suffered two separate instances of blunt force trauma to his abdomen, the second instance would accelerate the child's death. At the close of trial, Oxendine again moved for a judgment of acquittal. The trial court denied the motion. On the issue of causation, the trial court instructed the jury that Oxendine's conduct could be the cause-in-fact of the child's death if it caused the child to die any sooner than he otherwise would have. The jury convicted Oxendine of manslaughter. Oxendine appealed, arguing that his motion for judgment of acquittal should have been granted because the State failed to produce sufficient evidence in its case-in-chief to prove Oxendine's conduct accelerated the child's death. Issue Is a non-lethal injury inflicted after a lethal injury a cause-in-fact of a victim's death if it causes the victim to die sooner than he otherwise would have? Holding and Reasoning (Horsey, J.) Yes. Causation is an essential element of a crime. Where an injury is inflicted on a victim who is already dying from an earlier injury, issues of causation arise. According to the acceleration theory of causation, the second injury is said to be a cause-in-fact of the victim's death if it causes the victim to die any sooner than he otherwise would have, even if the second injury were non-lethal. Here, the State attempted to prove causation based on a theory of acceleration, but failed to produce enough evidence supporting the theory in its case-in-chief. Both Dr. Inguito and Dr. Hameli were unable to testify with medical certainty that the injury inflicted by Oxendine accelerated the child's death. Dr. Inguito did not testify at all as to acceleration and Dr. Hameli was unable to give an opinion on the issue. Clearly, the State did not have a prima facie case of acceleration at the conclusion of its case-in-chief. Although the State may have had a prima facie case of acceleration after Dr. Hofman's testimony, that testimony was given after the State had concluded its case-in-chief. It therefore came too late to sustain the State's burden of proof during its case-in-chief. Since the State failed to produce enough evidence that Oxendine accelerated the child's death, the judgment of manslaughter is reversed. Nevertheless, the trial court properly denied Oxendine's motion for judgment of acquittal because even though the State's evidence was insufficient to prove manslaughter, it was sufficient to convince a reasonable juror that he was guilty of the lesser included offense of assault in the second degree. Therefore, the conviction of manslaughter is reversed and the case is remanded to the trial court for judgment and resentence for assault in the second degree.

People v. Rideout

Rule of Law A superseding intervening cause does not need to be the only cause of a victim's injury to break the chain of causation such that the defendant's conduct is not the proximate cause of the injury. Facts On November 23, 2003, Rideout (defendant) was driving while intoxicated and turned into the path of Jason Reichelt's car. Reichelt's car hit Rideout's car and spun out onto the centerline of the road. Neither Reichelt nor Jonathan Keiser, his passenger, was seriously hurt. They went to speak with Rideout on the side of the road, where Rideout's car had stopped. Reichelt then became concerned that because it was dark and his headlights were not working, oncoming cars might hit his car. Reichelt and Keiser went back to Reichelt's car in the center of the road to check if the flashers worked. While standing next to the car, an oncoming car fatally hit Keiser. Rideout was subsequently convicted of causing death as a result of driving while intoxicated. Rideout appealed, arguing that the trial court improperly instructed the jury on causation and that the prosecution failed to produce enough evidence to establish that Rideout caused Keiser's death. Issue For an incident to be a superseding cause of an injury, must the incident be the sole cause of the injury? Holding and Reasoning (Sawyer, J.) No. When proving causation, the prosecution must prove both factual causation and proximate causation. Although proving factual causation is fairly straightforward, demonstrating proximate causation is not. Determining proximate causation is essentially making a policy judgment as to whether a defendant should be held criminally liable. A defendant's action can be a cause-in-fact of an injury but it can be so remote a cause that it would be unfair to hold the defendant liable. In order to find proximate causation, the prosecution must demonstrate that the victim's injury is a direct and natural result of the defendant's action. An injury is not a direct and natural result if there is an intervening cause that supersedes the defendant's conduct. However, not every intervening cause supersedes the defendant's conduct. If an intervening cause is reasonably foreseeable, it does not supersede the defendant's conduct. For instance, if a defendant injures a victim and the victim is subsequently given negligent medical care that contributes to the victim's death, the defendant has still proximately caused the death because negligent medical care is reasonably foreseeable. In contrast, gross negligence or intentional misconduct is not reasonably foreseeable and would be considered a superseding cause that relieves the defendant of liability. In this case, the jury received extensive instructions on factual causation, but no instruction on proximate causation. The jury was therefore improperly instructed on the issue of causation. Though this finding alone is sufficient to require a new decision, there is no need to remand the case because the State failed to proffer enough evidence to support a finding of proximate cause. Two particular factors lead to the conclusion that Rideout's conduct was not the proximate cause of Keiser's injury. The first factor encompasses the apparent safety doctrine, which states that once a victim endangered by a defendant's conduct reaches a place of apparent safety, the defendant is no longer responsible for any subsequent harm. Here, Rideout endangered Keiser by causing Reichelt's car to spin out to the center of the road but Keiser reached a place of apparent safety at the side of the road. Keiser then willingly went back onto the road, at which point he was hit by the oncoming car. The second factor involves that of voluntary human intervention. When a victim makes a free and deliberate decision that contributes to his death, that decision should relieve the defendant of liability. Here, Keiser made the free and deliberate decision to return to the car, aware of the danger of standing in a dark roadway with no lights. These two factors support the conclusion that Rideout's conduct was too remote a cause to justify holding Rideout criminally liable. In light of these factors, the State has failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that Rideout's conduct was the proximate cause of Keiser's death. The conviction is vacated.

Commonwealth v. Mochan (1955)

Rule of Law Any unlawful act which directly injures or tends to injure the public morals or health of the community is indictable. Facts Michael Mochan (defendant) was charged with making numerous telephone calls to the home of Louise Zivkovich at all times of day and night where he referred to her in a "lewd, immoral and lascivious" manner and used other profane language to incite her to commit adultery to the "great damage, injury and oppression" of Zivkovich. Mochan was tried before a judge without a jury and convicted of a misdemeanor. Mochan appealed, arguing that the offense he was charged with did not constitute a misdemeanor at common law. Issue Is any unlawful act which directly injures or tends to injure the public morals or health of the community indictable? Holding and Reasoning (Hirt, J.) Yes. Although the indictment charging Mochan with committing unlawful acts is based in the common law and not included in any statutory text, Commonwealth v. Miller, 94 Pa. Super. 499, 507 (1928), held that "the common law is sufficiently broad to punish as a misdemeanor...any act which directly injures or tends to injure the public to such an extent as to require the state to interfere and punish the wrongdoer, as in the case of acts which injuriously affect public morality...." Mochan's criminal intent was shown by his overt acts beyond the mere verbal solicitation of adultery to Zivkovich. Mochan's language and statements injuriously affected public morality because the operator or anyone else on Mochan's four-party telephone line could have heard what he was saying. Undoubtedly, at least two individuals at Zivkovich's house heard the conversation. The charges in Mochan's indictments identify the offense as a common law misdemeanor and the testimony established his guilt. The judgment of conviction is affirmed. Dissent (Woodside, J.) Despite Mochan's reprehensible conduct, his actions do not constitute a crime punishable under the law. The majority declares something to be a crime which was not previously considered to be a crime in the Commonwealth. The majority states that anything which openly outrages decency or is injurious to the people is a misdemeanor. However, the legislature determines what "injures or tends to injure the public," not the court. There would be no reason for the legislature to enact any criminal laws if the courts delegate to themselves the power to determine what does and does not injure the public. The common law plays an important role in the Commonwealth; however, the majority's decision invades a field which should belong solely to the legislature. The conviction should be reversed.

People v. Conley

Rule of Law Criminal intent may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding a crime. Facts William J. Conley (defendant) was charged with aggravated battery after attacking Sean O'Connell outside a party. Conley demanded that O'Connell's friend Marty Carroll give him a can of beer. When Carroll refused, Conley attempted to hit Carroll with a wine bottle. Carroll ducked and Conley instead hit O'Connell. As a result, O'Connell sustained a broken upper and lower jaw and four broken bones. He lost one tooth and underwent surgery on ten other damaged teeth. His damaged teeth are expected to last only two-thirds the lifetime of an undamaged tooth. Other permanent injuries include partial numbness in one lip. The relevant statute defines permanent disability or disfigurement as aggravated battery. It requires a person to intentionally or knowingly cause such injuries. The trial court found Conley guilty of aggravated battery and Conley appealed. Issue May a court infer the intent to commit a crime based on surrounding circumstances? Holding and Reasoning (Cerda, J.) Yes. The relevant statute requires that a person intentionally or knowingly inflict permanent disability or disfigurement. The statute defines intent as having the purpose to do something. It defines knowledge as being almost certain that something will occur as a result of an action. Thus, this statute requires that someone act with the intent to inflict the requisite harm or be almost certain that the requisite harm will occur. Although proving intent may be difficult, courts can rely on the presumption that a person intends the likely consequences of his actions. Intent to harm can thus be inferred from the circumstances surrounding a person's actions, such as the words spoken or weapons used. Conley argues that there is insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he intended to cause or knew he would cause permanent disability or disfigurement. However, judging from his use of a wine bottle, his lack of warning and the force with which he hit O'Connell, it was reasonable for the jury to infer that Conley intended to cause permanent disability. There was sufficient evidence to prove that Conley had the requisite intent. Notes to Conley - Conley convicted of aggravated battery, based on the victim's permanent disability, after a fight occurred at a party where 200 HS students paid admission to drink unlimited beer. - Sean O'Connel attended the party with friends who were approached by 20 others who thought O'Connel's group had said something derogatory, they didn't want trouble and left, while walking to the car O'Connel with a friend Marty Carrol was approached by Conley who demanded a beer from marty who refused, Conley swung a wine bottle and missed Marty but hit O'Connel and severely damaged his face and teeth - Sec 12-4(a) of 1961 Illinois criminal code: a person, who in committing a battery, intentionally or knowingly causes great bodily harm , or permanent disability or disfigurement commits aggtavated battery. - The defendant argued that the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that O'Connel incurred a permanent disability because there was no testimony of any tasks that can no longer bbe performed as a result of these injuries. However, appellate court determined that for an injury to be deemed disabling, all that must be shown is that the victim is no longer whole such that the injured bodily portion or part no longer serves the body in the same manner as it had before the injury, so Sean's injuries constitute a permanent disability. - The defendant next argued that the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he intended to inflict any permanent disability by using 12-4(a) "a person must intend to bring about the particular harm defined by the statute." States that it can be inferred from his conduct that he intended harm, but not that he intended to cause permanent disability. State says that it is not necessary that the defendant intended to bring about the injuries that resulted, only that he intentionally struck Sean is required. - The appeals court returns to the statute to describe the requisite mental state, the statute statute employs the terms "intentionally or knowingly" to describe the required mental state. - The relevant statute states: (1) INTENT = a person intends, or acts intentionally, or with intent, to accomplish a result or engage in conduct described by the statute defining the offense , when his conscious objective ro purpose is to accomplish that result or engage in that conduct. (2) KNOWLEDGE = a person knows or acts knowingly, or with knowledge of the result of his conduct , described by the statute defining the offense , when he is consciously aware that such result is practically certain to be caused by his conduct Sec 12-4(a) of 1961 Illinois criminal code: a person, who in committing a battery, intentionally or knowingly causes great bodily harm , or permanent disability or disfigurement commits aggtavated battery. - Because the offense is defined in terms of result, the state has the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had (1) a conscious objective to achieve the harm defined or (2) that he was consciously aware that the harm defined was practically certain to be caused by his conduct. This can be alleviated by the fact that he intended the consequences of his action no matter how severe, he acted with intent to harm and the specific result he intended does not matter. - Intent can be inferred from the surrounding circumstances, the offender's words, the weapon used, and the force of the blow and the use of bottle, lack of warning, and force of the blow can allow the jury to reasonably infer the intent to cause permanent disability - Thus, there is sufficient circumstantial evidence for a finding of intent to cause permanent disability beyond a reasonable doubt.

State v. Miles (2017)

Rule of Law Drug crimes require the accused to know he or she possessed an illegal drug, but not which specific drug. Facts Sheriff's agents suspected a FedEx package contained illegal drugs. They conducted a controlled delivery to the address listed and saw Lance Miles (defendant) retrieve it. Miles admitted there were drugs inside but did not know what kind. The prosecution charged him with drug trafficking because the box contained more than four grams of oxycodone. The judge instructed that the prosecution had to prove that Miles knowingly brought into the state, and knowingly possessed or attempted to possess, the oxycodone. The jury asked, "Does the [S]tate have to prove that the defendant knowingly brought into the state four grams or more of [o]xycodone or just any amount of illegal drugs in order to consider this trafficking?" The judge responded, "the State does not have to prove that the defendant knew that the drugs in the package were [o]xycodone, just that he knew that the package contained illegal drugs." Miles appealed his conviction, arguing the prosecution had to prove he knew he possessed oxycodone. Issue Do drug crimes require the accused to know he or she possessed an illegal drug, but not which specific drug? Holding and Reasoning (Hill, J.) Yes. Drug crimes require the accused to know he or she possessed an illegal drug, but not which specific drug. The South Carolina drug-trafficking statute provides that "Any person who knowingly . . . brings into this State, . . . or who is knowingly in . . . possession of: . . . four grams or more of [opiate-based drugs], is guilty of a felony . . . known as 'trafficking in illegal drugs.'" Miles argues "knowingly" applies to each element of the offense. Interpreting a statute begins and ends with its text, unless it is ambiguous. Courts often grapple with "knowingly" in criminal statutes. Some courts apply it only to the first verb it precedes. The United States Supreme Court sometimes reads a statute that begins with "knowingly," then lists the elements of a crime as requiring each element to have been committed knowingly—but not always. Different elements of a crime can require different levels of intent. Construing the text of a statute often requires considering its context. The text usually provides the best evidence of legislative intent, but it must be read in a manner consistent with its intended purpose and context. Here, the legislature did not intend to require the accused to know what specific drug he or she trafficked. The South Carolina Supreme Court has found that all the prosecution need prove is that the accused knew he possessed a "controlled substance." Not even knowledge of an amount sufficient to constitute trafficking is required. Charges for possession and trafficking differ only in the quantity possessed. No language suggests intent to require knowledge of the specific substance. The subsection title is "trafficking in illegal drugs." Other jurisdictions agree that knowledge of the specific drug is not required for controlled substance offenses. Last, courts must strictly construe statutes absent ambiguity that must be resolved in the accused's favor. The key is that people must know where the line for illegal conduct is drawn. However, there is no ambiguity here. The line for crimes involving illegal drugs is vividly clear. The only requirement is that the accused knew the substance was contraband. The legislature can amend the statute if it intended to require knowledge of the drug trafficked. Therefore, the judge correctly instructed the jury as to the requirements to convict. Miles's conviction is accordingly affirmed.

Velazquez v. State

Rule of Law Even where a defendant's conduct is a cause-in-fact of a prohibited result, it is not the proximate cause if the prohibited result is beyond the scope of the defendant's conduct, or it would be unjust to impose criminal liability. Facts On April 23, 1988, Velazquez (defendant) and an acquaintance, Alvarez, agreed to race against each other in a drag race. They set the start line at the beginning of the road, near a guardrail overlooking a canal, and set the finish line a quarter-mile away from the canal. Velazquez and Alvarez completed the agreed-upon course. Alvarez then turned his car around and began racing towards the start line. Velazquez followed closely behind. Both were unable to apply their brakes in time to avoid crashing through the guardrail. Alvarez's car went over the canal and he died instantly. Velazquez landed in the water and escaped to safety. At trial, the defendant was convicted of vehicular homicide. Issue Is a defendant's conduct the proximate cause of a prohibited result where the result is beyond the scope of the defendant's conduct or it would otherwise be unjust to impose criminal liability? Holding and Reasoning (Hubbart, J.) No. Even where a defendant's conduct is the cause-in-fact of a prohibited result, it is not the proximate cause if the prohibited result is beyond the scope of the defendant's conduct or it would otherwise be unjust to hold the defendant criminally responsible. Traditionally, courts have employed the "but for" test to determine whether a defendant's action caused a particular result. Under this test, if the result would not have occurred "but for" the defendant's conduct, then the defendant is not the cause-in fact. However, there is a situation where the "but for" test fails. This is when the independent actions of two different actors are each sufficient to cause the specified result. Consider a scenario where two people each shoot a victim and both shots are sufficient to kill the victim. Neither actor is the "but for" cause because even if one person had not shot the victim, the victim would still have died from the other person's shot. In these situations, courts employ the substantial factor test. If a defendant is a substantial factor in producing the specified result, then they are each a cause-in-fact of the result. In J.A.C. v. State (1979), this court held that a driver in a drag race was not the proximate cause of a passenger's death because the passenger's reckless act of grabbing the steering wheel was a superseding cause of his own death. The passenger had effectively killed himself by his own recklessness and it would have been unjust to hold the defendant criminally responsible. Similarly, it would be unjust to hold Velazquez criminally responsible for Alvarez's death. Velazquez was indeed a cause-in-fact of Alvarez's death. If Velazquez had not agreed to participate in the drag race, Alvarez would not have died from driving his car over the guardrail. However, Alvarez effectively killed himself through his own recklessness. The drag race was over when Alvarez independently extended it back to the finish line. No one forced him to continue the race or to drive at a reckless speed. Because Alvarez primarily caused his own death, it is unfair to hold Velazquez criminally responsible for Alvarez's death. Velazquez is therefore not the proximate cause of Alvarez's death. The conviction is reversed.

Girouard v. State

Rule of Law For provocation to be adequate to mitigate murder to manslaughter, the provocation must be calculated to inflame the passion of a reasonable person and tend to cause him to act for the moment from passion rather than reason. Facts Steven Girouard (defendant) and his wife Joyce had been married for about two months when they got into a heated argument. During the argument Joyce, who was just over five feet tall and weighed 115 pounds, repeatedly insulted Steven, who was over six feet tall and weighed over 200 pounds. Joyce told Steven she did not love him and had never wanted to marry him, and she demanded a divorce. Joyce also informed Steven that she had filed charges against him for abuse with his commanding officer in the Army and told him he would probably be court-martialed. Steven lunged at Joyce with a kitchen knife and stabbed her 19 times, killing her. Steven was immediately distraught at what he had done. When the police arrived, they found Steven wandering around outside his apartment building stating that he could not believe what he had done. At trial, a psychologist testified that Steven had mental issues including an inability to understand his own capacity to express hostility and a need for acceptance and love. Steven was convicted of second-degree murder. He appealed, arguing that Joyce's provocation should mitigate his murder conviction to manslaughter. Issue For provocation to be adequate to mitigate murder to manslaughter, must the provocation be calculated to inflame the passion of a reasonable person and tend to cause him to act for the moment from passion rather than reason? Holding and Reasoning (Cole, J.) Yes. Voluntary manslaughter is an intentional homicide committed in a sudden heat of passion, caused by adequate provocation, before a reasonable opportunity for the passion to cool. Some factors may mitigate murder to manslaughter because they constitute adequate provocation. For provocation to be adequate to mitigate murder to manslaughter, the provocation must be calculated to inflame the passion of a reasonable person and tend to cause him to act for the moment from passion rather than reason. Under the reasonable-person standard, the defendant's individual mental issues may not be taken into account in determining whether provocation was adequate. Traditionally, factors constituting adequate provocation have included only extreme assault or battery upon the defendant, mutual fighting, the defendant's illegal arrest, injury or serious abuse of a close relative of the defendant, or the sudden discovery of a spouse's adultery. In general, words alone are not adequate provocation, although words may be sufficient if accompanied by conduct that demonstrates the intention and ability to cause bodily harm to the defendant. In this case, although Joyce provoked Steven, the provocation was insufficient to cause a reasonable man to stab his provoker 19 times. Under the reasonable-person standard, Steven's unique mental issues are irrelevant to whether the provocation was adequate. Furthermore, even assuming that words may constitute adequate provocation if accompanied by the intent and ability to cause the defendant physical harm, the size disparity between Joyce and Steven indicates that she did not have the ability to harm him. It cannot be the case that one spouse may kill the other to end a verbal dispute and be convicted only of manslaughter. The judgment of conviction is affirmed.

United States v. Cordoba-Hincapie

Rule of Law If a defendant introduces evidence at sentencing of his mistake of fact about the type of drugs involved in a narcotics offense, the burden shifts to the prosecution to prove the defendant's mens rea regarding drug type. Facts Maria Theresa Cordoba-Hincapie and Libardo Buelvas-Castro (defendants) separately smuggled heroin into the United States from Colombia. Both were charged with federal offenses carrying statutory minimum sentences, and both pled guilty to lesser charges with no mandatory sentences. At their sentencing hearings, the defendants credibly testified that they believed that the drug was cocaine, not heroin. Cocaine-based offenses are punished less harshly than heroin-based offenses under the United States Sentencing Guidelines. Issue Should a criminal defendant's mistake of fact about the type of drugs involved in a narcotics offense be considered when the court is determining the appropriate sentence for the offense? Holding and Reasoning (Weinstein, J.) Yes. If a defendant introduces evidence at sentencing of his mistake of fact about the type of drugs involved in a narcotics offense, the burden shifts to the prosecution to prove the defendant's mens rea regarding drug type. Historically, English law based punishment on acts alone. However, this approach changed over time. Blackstone's Commentaries made clear that guilt depended upon the concurrence of a guilty act and intent. The concept of mens rea is now fundamental, and modern criminal law recognizes an ethical basis for differentiating between levels of mental culpability. There are situations in which intent should not be required. For example, strict-liability crimes, such as public welfare offenses, impose criminal liability and light punishment for committing an act even without intent. The middle ground is imposing liability for negligence, but the standard is more subjective in the criminal context than the civil. The Model Penal Code presumes that a person must act at least negligently with respect to each element of a crime and incorporates the mistake-of-fact defense. The defense is unavailable if the conduct would still be a crime if the facts were as the defendant believed. Then, the mistake will reduce the charge. Mens rea applies to determinations about both liability and sentencing. The Sentencing Guidelines have created sometimes inequitable results, as judges no longer have as much discretion in sentencing. Here, the issue is whether the defendants' mistake of fact should affect the sentence. Neither Congress nor the Commission has provided guidance on whether mental state must be proven for sentence enhancements. Courts should presume that the defendant knew the relevant facts, but defendants should have a chance to rebut the presumption. If they can do so, the burden should then fall on the prosecution to prove mens rea. This burden-shifting scheme is supported by tradition, the Constitution, the rule of lenity, traditional sentencing standards, deterrence, the seriousness and severity of the crime and punishment involved, and fundamental fairness. The defendants here proved that they believed they were carrying cocaine, not heroin, beyond a reasonable doubt. Both defendants should be sentenced as if they had been carrying cocaine. Notes to Cordoba case - Mens rea means a guilty mind, look to the wrongdoers mind to determine the punishment, the requirement of a guilty state of mind had been developed by the time of COKE. It is the mental state the criminal must have with regard to the social harm elements laid out in the offense, not guilty if she lacks any mental state specified in the definition of the crime. If the definition of the crime states X is done intentionally, then if she does it recklessly because the specific state of mind for the offense is intentionally.

People v. Marrero (1987)

Rule of Law One who violates a statute may not raise a good faith mistaken belief as to the meaning of the law as a defense. Facts Marrero (defendant), a federal corrections officer, was arrested in Manhattan at a social club for unlicensed possession of a loaded .38 caliber pistol in violation of state law. Penal Law § 265.02(a)(1)(a) expressly exempted "peace officers," from the statute. The term "peace officers" was defined by the statute to include "correction officers of any state correctional facility or of any penal correctional institution." Marrero's pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment was granted by the trial court on the ground that he was a "peace officer" as defined under the law. The appellate division reversed and reinstated the indictment, holding that Marrero was not a "peace officer" within the meaning of the exemption. Marrero was thereafter tried by jury and found guilty. The trial court rejected Marrero's request for a jury instruction that would have allowed the jurors to consider his reasonable belief that the statutory exemption for peace officers applied to him as a defense. The appellate division affirmed the conviction and Marrero appealed. Issue May one who violates a statute raise a good faith mistaken belief as to the meaning of the law as a defense? Holding and Reasoning (Bellacosa, J.) No. In Gardner v. People, 62 N.Y. 299 (1875), the defendants misread a statute and mistakenly believed that their conduct was legal. The court insisted that defendants' "mistake of law" was not a defense to their criminal conduct. Shortly thereafter, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes noted, "[I]t is no doubt true that there are many cases in which the criminal could not have known that he was breaking the law, but to admit the excuse at all would be to encourage ignorance where the lawmaker has determined to make men know and obey, and justice to the individual is rightly outweighed by the larger interests on the other side of the scales." Holmes, The Common Law, at 48 (1881). Drafters of New York's law adhered to this logic when it rejected a mistake of law defense in § 15.20(2) of the penal law, which states: "[A] person is not relieved of criminal liability for conduct because he engaged in such conduct under a mistaken belief that it does not, as a matter of law, constitute an offense, unless such mistaken belief is founded upon an official statement of the law contained in (a) a statute...(d) an interpretation of the statute..." Marrero argues that his mistaken belief about his conduct was founded upon an "official statement" of the law contained in the statute itself. Marrero argues that his mistaken interpretation of the statute was reasonable in view of the ambiguous wording of the "peace officer" exemption and that his "reasonable" interpretation of an "official statement" is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of (2)(a). The prosecution argues that Marrero cannot claim a mistake of law under the exemption simply by misconstruing the meaning of the statute, but rather, must establish that the statute relied on actually permitted his conduct and was only later found to be erroneous or invalid. Citizens should be encouraged to read and rely on official statements of the law and not to have individuals personally question the validity and interpretation of the law and act on that basis. If the statute was later held to be invalid, a person who mistakenly relied on the authorizing statute would be relieved of criminal liability. If the court accepted Marrero's argument, mistakes about the law would be encouraged. There would be an indefinite number of mistake of law defenses which could be devised from a good-faith, perhaps reasonable but mistaken, interpretation of criminal statutes. Such would not serve the ends of justice. The order of the appellate division is affirmed.

Midgett v. State

Rule of Law The crime of first degree murder generally requires the killing to be premeditated and deliberate. Facts Appellant Midgett (defendant) was charged with the first degree murder of his eight year old son. At trial, Midgett's daughter testified that several days before the son died, Midgett had been heavily drinking and began beating the son in the stomach and back with a closed fist. She had witnessed Midgett choking the son on several prior occasions. She attributed bruising on the son's body over the past six months to Midgett. On the day of the son's death, Midgett took the body to the hospital. The medical examiner concluded that the son died due to an abdominal hemorrhage caused by blunt force trauma. The trauma was consistent with injuries caused by a human fist. Midgett was convicted of first degree murder. Midgett appealed. Issue Does the crime of first degree murder require the killing to be premeditated and deliberate? Holding and Reasoning (Newbern, J.) Yes. Generally, a defendant may not be convicted of first degree murder unless he has killed with premeditation and deliberation. In some jurisdictions, legislatures have made exceptions. These jurisdictions allow convictions for first degree murder when death results from child abuse, even if the death is not premeditated or deliberate. But unless this jurisdiction's law is amended to forego the elements of premeditation and deliberation, this court must require them. Here, there was sufficient evidence to show that Midgett had been abusing his son for at least six months. This evidence demonstrates that Midgett intended to abuse the child. It may even demonstrate that he developed an intent to kill the son while in a drunken rage as he disciplined the child. But the evidence in no way demonstrates that Midgett killed the child with premeditation and deliberation. There was thus insufficient evidence to sustain Midgett's conviction of first degree murder. There was, however, sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction of second degree murder, based on Midgett's intent to cause serious physical injury.

Regina v. Cunningham (1957)

Rule of Law The term malice in a criminal statute does not mean general wickedness; it means either (1) an actual intention to do the particular kind of harm that was in fact done or (2) reckless disregard of a foreseeable risk that the harm would result. Facts Roy Cunningham (defendant) ripped off the gas meter in the cellar of an unoccupied home and stole the money inside. Cunningham did not turn off the gas, which seeped into an adjacent house where an elderly woman named Sarah Wade was sleeping. Wade was partially asphyxiated. Cunningham pleaded guilty to the charge of larceny for stealing the gas meter and the money. In addition, Cunningham was indicted under § 23 of the Offenses against the Person Act, 1861, which provides that it is a felony to "unlawfully and maliciously" give or cause another person to take poison in a manner that endangers his or her life or causes serious injury. The trial judge instructed the jury that the term "malice" in the statute meant "wicked," and that a person acted maliciously if he did "something which he has no business to do and perfectly well knows it." Cunningham was convicted, and he appealed to the Queen's Bench. Issue Does wickedness satisfy a criminal statute's mens rea requirement for malice? Holding and Reasoning (Byrne, J.) No. The term malice in a criminal statute means that the person acted with either (1) an actual intention to do the particular kind of harm that was in fact done or (2) reckless disregard of a foreseeable risk that the harm would result, meaning the person was aware of the risk of harm and did the act anyway. In this context, malice does not mean mere wickedness as it does colloquially. In this case, the mens rea required by the statute was malice. The trial judge erred in defining malice as wickedness in his jury instruction. The judge basically instructed the jury to convict Cunningham of a felony for poisoning Wade and endangering her life if the jury determined that Cunningham behaved wickedly when he stole the gas meter. There is no doubt that Cunningham behaved badly when he took the gas meter. However, the real issue here is whether Cunningham foresaw that taking the gas meter could seriously harm someone but did it anyway. That question should properly have been submitted to the jury. There is no way to know whether a reasonable jury, instructed on the correct definition of malice, would have convicted Cunningham. As a result, Cunningham's appeal is allowed; the conviction is quashed. Notes to Regina case - 1957 case, the appellant was convicted under sec 23 of the 1861 Offenses against the person act which charged that he unlawfully and maliciously caused to be taken by Sarah Wade a certain noxious coal gas to endanger the life of Sarah Wade. The appellant was to be married and a house was readied for them next to his prospective mother-in-law who was tenant. The house was one at one point but was divided with a wall to divide the two cellars. On jan 17th appellant went to mother-in-law house and went to the cellar and took the gas meter off the wall and stole 8 shillings. He stated that he was short on money and had been out of work for 3 days, he did not turn off the gas and a large volume escaped from it and asphyxiated Wade who was sleeping next door. - Prosecution said there was no case to go to the jury, but the lower court judge, correctly in higher court opinion, rejected prosecutor's opinion. - The act was unlawful, but, the question for the jury was whether it was "malicious" within sec 23 of the 1861 Offenses against the person act (whoever unlawfully or maliciously administer to or cause to be administered or taken by any other person any poison or any other noxious thing, so as to endanger the life of such person or to inflict grievous bodily harm, shall be guilty of felony) - Counsel argues judge instructed the jury incorrectly on the meaning of the word "maliciously" - Professor Kenny states that malice should not be taken in the old vague sense of "wickedness," instead it should be taken as (1) actual intention to do the particular harm that was done, or (2) recklessness as to whether the harm should occur or not (the accused has foreseen the aprticular harm that can be done and continues the act despite this knowledge) so the definition does not require any "ill-will" toward the victim, it requires either intent or reckless disregard that the harm may occur. - The court allowed this appeal and quashed the conviction.

State v. Guthrie

Rule of Law To constitute first-degree murder, the defendant must have had some period between the development of the intent to kill and the actual killing to indicate that the act was premeditated and deliberate and not impulsive. Facts Dale Edward Guthrie (defendant) worked as a dishwasher at a restaurant. One evening, several of his co-workers began poking fun at him, including Steven Todd Farley who snapped Guthrie with a dishtowel several times. After Farley snapped Guthrie in the nose with the dishtowel, Guthrie became enraged, took a knife out of his pocket and stabbed Farley in the neck, killing him. Guthrie suffered from a host of psychiatric problems, including panic attacks, chronic depression and borderline personality disorder. Guthrie's father testified that his son also obsessed about his nose and would stand in front of a mirror on a daily basis staring at his nose. Guthrie testified he suffered an "intense" panic attack immediately before the stabbing. The trial judge instructed the jury in instruction 8 that "...to constitute a willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing, it is not necessary that the intention to kill should exist for any particular length of time prior to the actual killing; it is only necessary that such intention should have come into existence for the first time at the time of such killing, or at any time previously." Also, the judge gave jury instruction 10 which stated "...in order to constitute a "premeditated murder an intent to kill need exist only for an instant." Jury instruction 12 stated "[w]hat is meant by the language willful, deliberate, and premeditated is that the killing be intentional." The jury convicted Guthrie of first-degree murder and he appealed, arguing that the collection of instructions was improperly given to the jury. Issue To constitute first-degree murder, must the defendant have had some period of time between the development of the intent to kill and the actual killing to indicate that the act was premeditated and deliberate and not impulsive? Holding and Reasoning (Cleckley, J.) Yes. The jury instructions given by the trial judge failed to adequately inform the jury of the difference between first-degree murder, which requires premeditation and deliberation, and second-degree murder, which may only require an intent to kill. To allow the prosecution to prove premeditation and deliberation by only showing that the intent came "into existence for the first time at the time of such killing" eliminates the distinction between the two degrees of murder. Although there is no specifically-defined period of time which distinguishes between the two, there must be a period of time between the formation of the intent to kill and the actual killing to constitute first-degree murder. Such period of time indicates the killing was calculated and by design. There must be an opportunity for some reflection on the intention to kill after the intent is formed by the accused. An elaborate plan or scheme is not needed for first-degree murder, only that there be evidence that the defendant considered and weighed his decision to kill. Any other spontaneous, but intentional, killing is second-degree murder. The judgment of conviction is reversed, and the matter is remanded for a new trial.

People v. Fuller

Rule of Law Under the felony-murder rule, a death resulting from the commission of a dangerous felony is murder. Facts On February 20, 1977, Fuller (defendant) and an accomplice participated in the burglary of an automobile parked in a car lot. They broke into four vans on the lot and took spare tires from each of them. An officer observed Fuller and his accomplice rolling the tires to their car. The officer approached them to investigate. Fuller and his accomplice got into their car and sped away. While fleeing, they ran a red light and hit another car, causing the other driver's death. Fuller was charged with murder under the felony-murder rule. The trial court struck the murder charges. Issue Is a death resulting from the commission of a dangerous felony considered to be murder? Holding and Reasoning (Franson, J.) Yes. Under the felony-murder rule, if a killing results from the perpetration or attempted perpetration of certain felonies enumerated by statute, the perpetrator is guilty of first degree murder, even if the killing is negligent or accidental. In California, such felonies include arson, rape, robbery, burglary, mayhem, and lewd acts with a minor. This court does not believe the felony-murder rule should apply to the facts of this case because Fuller did not participate in an inherently dangerous crime. He stole tires from an empty van on an empty car lot. He carried no weapons and did not anticipate resorting to violence. Nor did he intend to cause the victim's death. But the felony-murder rule governs, and the applicable statute expressly designates burglary as a felony within the felony-murder rule. Fuller and his accomplice were committing a burglary when they caused another's death. Fuller's actions are therefore punishable as first degree murder. The trial court should not have stricken the murder charges against Fuller.

State v. Nations (1984)

Rule of Law Where a statute requires knowledge of a fact as an element of a crime, it is insufficient to prove the defendant was aware of the high probability of that fact's existence, unless the statute provides otherwise. Facts Police observed a young girl dancing for tips at a club owned by Sandra Nations (defendant). Upon questioning, Nations said she had checked the girl's identification when she hired her that day, and that the girl was not underage. The police also questioned the girl. She had no identification and ultimately revealed she was sixteen. Nations was charged with endangering the welfare of a child younger than seventeen-years-old. The relevant criminal statute requires the State (plaintiff) to prove the defendant knew that the girl was underage. The jury convicted Nations for the crime charged. Issue When a statute requires knowledge of a fact as an element of a crime, is it sufficient to prove the defendant was aware of the high probability of that fact's existence? Holding and Reasoning (Satz, J.) No. The term "knowledge," unless otherwise defined by statute, means actual knowledge. When a criminal statute requires knowledge of a fact as an element of a crime, the defendant must have had actual awareness of the fact to satisfy that element. This definition of "knowledge" differs from the one adopted by the Model Penal Code (MPC). Under the MPC, actual knowledge is not required. Instead, an awareness of the high probability of a fact's existence is sufficient to demonstrate knowledge, unless the defendant actually believed the fact to be untrue. This broad definition of knowledge encompasses situations where a person ought to know a fact but is willfully blind to it. Notably, the MPC's expanded definition of knowledge is absent from this jurisdiction's criminal code. This demonstrates that our legislature has rejected the MPC's definition of knowledge and requires proof of actual knowledge to satisfy the knowledge element of a crime. This case involves the crime of endangering the welfare of a child younger than seventeen. One element the State must prove is that Nations knew the child was younger than seventeen. It is insufficient for the State to prove that Nations should have known or was willfully blind to the girl's age. It must prove that Nations actually knew. At trial, the State succeeded in proving that Nations did not know the girl was of legal age, since the girl did not have her identification with her that day. But it failed to show that Nations knew for a fact that the girl was underage. At most, the facts suggest that Nations purposefully chose not to know. This is insufficient to prove knowledge as defined by this jurisdiction's criminal code. Therefore, the State failed to show Nations had the knowledge required for this crime. Judgment is reversed.

Cheek v. United States

Rule of Law Whether a purportedly good-faith misunderstanding of the law will negate the specific intent requirement of willfulness under criminal tax laws is a question of fact for the jury; there is no legal requirement that the belief be objectively reasonable. Facts John Cheek (defendant) was involved with an anti-tax advocacy group that claimed that federal tax laws were unconstitutional. Based on the group's advice, Cheek stopped filing federal tax returns. Cheek was charged with several counts willfully failing to file a federal income tax return for a number of years in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7201 and 26 U.S.C. § 7203(1), which are specific intent crimes. At trial, Cheek's defense rested on his sincerely held belief that he owed no taxes on his wages. The trial judge instructed the jury that an "honest but unreasonable belief is not a defense and does not negate willfulness." The jury was also instructed that a "persistent refusal to acknowledge the law does not constitute a good faith misunderstanding of the law." Cheek was convicted, and he appealed. The court of appeals affirmed his conviction, and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review. Issue Must a purportedly good-faith misunderstanding of the law be objectively reasonable to negate the specific intent requirement of willfulness under criminal tax laws? Holding and Reasoning (White, J.) No. There is no requirement that a good-faith mistake about federal tax laws be objectively reasonable to negate the willfulness requirement. Ignorance or a mistake of the law is generally no defense to criminal prosecution. The complexity of federal tax regulations has made it difficult for average citizens to keep up. Consequently, Congress made specific intent to violate the law an element of criminal offenses. A defendant will satisfy the willfulness requirement if she made a "voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty." This means that the defendant must (1) know about the duty and (2) purposely violate it. The issue of whether a good faith but mistaken belief about the law will negate the knowledge requirement is a question of fact for the jury. The belief need not be objectively reasonable, as this would convert the issue into a question of law. That said, a jury is less likely to find that the defendant was unaware of a duty if the belief is outrageous or unreasonable. Here, Cheek argues that his good faith belief that the federal tax laws were unconstitutional negates the willfulness requirement needed for a criminal conviction. Such a finding is completely inappropriate here. Cheek knew about the duty and ignored his obligation. The purpose of the specific intent requirement was to ensure that taxpayers who attempted to comply with the tax code would not be convicted of crimes for innocent mistakes, not to allow taxpayers to ignore known duties imposed by the tax code. Cheek was free to challenge the law, but he chose not to file returns instead. A trial judge may instruct a jury that it should not consider claims like Cheek's that the tax code is unconstitutional. Cheek's beliefs that wages did not constitute income and that he was not a taxpayer should have been put to the jury. The judgment of conviction is vacated, and the matter is remanded. [On retrial, the jury was instructed to consider "whether the defendant's stated belief about the tax statute was reasonable as a factor in deciding whether he held that belief in good faith." Cheek was convicted. United States v. Cheek, 3 F.3d 1057 (7th Cir. 1993)]. Since he sincerely believed tax laws were unconstitutionally enforced and thus he had acted without willfulness required for conviction as the specific intent

Negligently (MPC)

Should be aware of substantial and unjustifiable risk that a material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that failure to perceive it involves a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the actor's situation.

provocation (cornell)

The act of provoking or inciting someone to do something. Generally, provocation does not act as a complete defense, but it can mitigate damages or culpability. - Homicide - "Provocation" is that which causes, at the time of the act, reason be disturbed or obscured by passion to an extent which might render ordinary persons, of average disposition, liable to act rashly or without due deliberation or reflection, and from passion, rather than judgment. In other words, provocation is something which causes a reasonable person to lose control. - In criminal law, the crime of murder may be reduced to manslaughter if the defendant acted in response to provocation. - Situations that typically constitute adequate provocation: - Adultery. A spouse who discovers their partner having sex with another is reasonably provoked, so that if, in the heat of passion, the spouse intentionally kills their partner or the partner's lover, the homicide will be held to be voluntary manslaughter rather than murder. - Mutual Combat. Where two parties willingly enter a fight, and during the fight one of the parties kills the other, if the intention to kill was formed during the struggle, the homicide will be held to be voluntary manslaughter rather than murder. - Assault and Battery. A deadly or severe assault, or a strike with the fist that causes substantial pain or injury, may be sufficient to establish reasonable provocation. A minor blow is not sufficient to constitute a reasonable provocation. - Words - Almost universally, the courts have rejected words alone as providing adequate provocation for a homicide unless accompanied by conduct indicating a present intention and ability to cause bodily harm. - Mistake as to Provocation - If a defendant kills another with the mistaken, but reasonable, belief that the victim injured or attempted to injury them, then provocation may be adequate to reduce a murder to manslaughter. This is illustrated in the case Howell v. State. - Additional Examples of Provocation in Law - In a fault divorce, provocation may act as a defense to the divorce, preventing the fault divorce from being granted. For example, where a husband sues for divorce claiming that his wife abandoned him, the wife could defend the suit on the grounds that the husband's cruel and inhuman treatment toward her provoked her departure. - Actions against an owner of an animal for injuries inflicted by the animal may be defeated where the owner can show that the animal was provoked. For example, in Minnesota, a plaintiff-victim is not entitled to recover for a dog attack that is the result of provocation.

Attendant Circumstances

The facts surrounding a criminal event that must be proved to convict the defendant of the underlying crime.

merger limitation to felony murder

The merger doctrine disallows the application of the felony murder doctrine if the underlying felony merged into the murder. For example, a 2009 California State case, People v. Sarun Chun, disallowed the felony murder doctrine because the underlying felony, a drive-by shooting, was assaultive in nature.

1.02(3) MPC

The provisions of the Code shall be construed according to the fair import of their terms but when the language is susceptible of differing constructions it shall be interpreted to further the general purposes stated in this Section and the special purposes of the particular provision involved. The discretionary powers conferred by the Code shall be exercised in accordance with the criteria stated in the Code and, insofar as such criteria are not decisive, to further the general purposes stated in this Section.

State v. Utter (1971)

To find a defendant guilty of murder, a jury must find both the requisite actus reus and mens rea. The actus reus is the physical component of the crime, while the mens rea is the state of mind behind the crime. But actus reus also has a mental component in that the murder defendant must have voluntarily willed the act to occur. For this reason, an involuntary muscle spasm that results in the death of another person would not qualify as the actus reus for murder. The act must be committed voluntarily and consciously Rule of Law A defendant's act occurring during an unconscious or automatistic state is not a basis for criminal liability. Facts On the day of his son's death, Appellant Utter (defendant) had been heavily drinking in his apartment. Witnesses saw the son enter Utter's apartment and heard him cry out. The son came out and collapsed, having been stabbed in the chest. He told witnesses that his dad stabbed him. He died shortly afterwards. Utter was charged with murder in the second degree. He has no recollection of what happened with his son. During trial, Utter argued that his actions were the result of a conditioned response. He submitted expert testimony explaining that a conditioned response is an automatic response to a particular stimulus. Utter said that due to his training and time served in World War II, he was programmed to respond violently to people who unexpectedly approached him. The trial court rejected Utter's defense of conditioned response, holding that it was the same as the defense of irresistible impulse, which Washington courts do not recognize. Accordingly, the trial court instructed the jury to disregard any evidence regarding conditioned response. The jury convicted Utter of manslaughter, and he appealed. Issue Is a defendant's act occurring during an unconscious or automatistic state a basis for criminal liability? Holding and Reasoning (Farris, J.) No. A defendant's act occurring during an unconscious or automatistic state is not a basis for criminal liability. To find a defendant guilty of murder, a jury must find both the requisite actus reus and mens rea. The actus reus is the physical component of the crime, while the mens rea is the state of mind behind the crime. But actus reus also has a mental component in that the murder defendant must have voluntarily willed the act to occur. For this reason, an involuntary muscle spasm that results in the death of another person would not qualify as the actus reus for murder. The act must be committed voluntarily and consciously. Here, Utter submitted the defense of conditioned response, which would show that he could not have committed the requisite actus reus. The trial court disregarded this defense, equating it to a defense of irresistible impulse, which this jurisdiction does not recognize. However, conditioned response is distinct from irresistible impulse. Conditioned response revolves around the question of consciousness. If Utter's act was a conditioned response, he lacked the consciousness required to commit a voluntary act, and he could not have had the requisite actus reus. Importantly, even if Utter did succeed in proving conditioned response, the defense might not be absolute, since unconsciousness voluntarily brought on by excessive drinking is not an absolute defense to murder. With every valid defense, the defendant must present substantial evidence in order for the defense to reach a jury. Here, Utter failed to submit enough evidence in support of the defense of conditioned response. Because there was insufficient evidence to prove whether Utter stabbed his son due to his conditioned response, this defense should not have reached the jury.

Rape under the Model Penal Code

Under the Code, rape is defined as sexual intercourse by a man with a woman who isn't his wife under the following circumstances: One, the man compels the woman by force or threatens imminent death, serious bodily injury, pain, or kidnapping to be inflicted on anyone; Two, the man has substantially impaired the woman's ability to control the woman's conduct by unknowingly giving the woman drugs or intoxicants in order to prevent resistance; Three, the woman is unconscious; Four, the woman is under 10 years old. If the rape charge is based on a victim being under 10, strict liability applies, meaning that the defendant can't argue that he didn't know the victim was under 10 or that he reasonably believed the victim to be older than that. The Model Penal Code's definition of rape, you may have noticed, excludes marital rape. The Code specifies that unmarried couples who live together as man and wife are also subject to the exemption, but that a married couple who doesn't live together under a judicial decree of separation is not subject to the exemption. A first-degree rape charge applies if the man inflicted serious bodily injury on anyone or if the woman was not his voluntary social companion when the crime took place and had not permitted him sexual liberties in the past (in other words, if it wasn't date rape). Otherwise, a second-degree rape charge applies. Rape A crime at common law defined as unlawful sexual intercourse with someone without their consent and by means of fear, force or coercion.

Independent Felony Limitation

What is the merger rule? The merger doctrine holds that felony murder may not be predicated upon a felony that "is an integral part of the homicide" and is "an offense included [i]n fact within the offense charged." People v. Ireland, 70 Cal.2d 522, 539 (1969) (applying this principle where the felonious assault and the homicide were committed against the same victim; holding that defendant could not be convicted of felony murder for killing his wife by assaulting her with a deadly weapon). What is the rationale for the rule? The merger doctrine exists to prevent every felonious assault that results in a person's death from rising to the level of first-degree murder. Without the doctrine, a defendant's intentional assault of another with a deadly weapon resulting in the victim's death would constitute first-degree murder—regardless of whether the defendant intended to kill the victim. Courts have applied the merger rule to prevent this sort of "bootstrapping," id., which would negate "lesser homicide charges such as second-degree murder and manslaughter Most states recognize some form of "independent felony" or "collateral felony" limitation. That is, the felony-murder rule only applies if the predicate felony is independent of, or collateral to, the homicide. If the felony is not independent, then the felony merges with the homicide and cannot serve as the basis for a felony-murder conviction. For example, most jurisdictions hold that felonious assault may not serve as the basis for felony-murder. so if you assault someone with a deadly weapon and they end up dying then this merges with homicide and the assault would drop out, because felony-murder is harsh, can be 1st degree, so it would deny any other form of homicide.

People v. Nelson

charged with tele harassment, he has tourettes with OCD for last 30 yrs. 2010 he called 84 year old Lois Miller by finding a random number in a phone book, he stated "come see me" and "im just pulling one off." 2 weeks later he called Lois again and said "im ted long from Victoria's Secret and you've won a bra and panty set." - At Nelson's trial: he testified on his own behalf that he was unemployed, living with parents, and collecting disability, that he was diagnosed with tourettes and OCD at 10 years old. He is obsessed with certain actions like making phone calls, motor tics he cant control like kicking arms and legs, and verbal tics where he says the word "feet" repeatedly, also has vocal tics where he says racial slurs and obscenities, and premonitory urges related to his OCD which is an urge to perform a motor activity if he doesnt do it he may get so anxious that he vomits. - He denied he had the intent to abuse or harass lois miller (lacks mens rea the mental state required for conviction, but admitted that he knew his statements might offend or scare and elderly woman. - Dr. Fields, Nelson's psych, state that his tics are not possibly to cognitively control, nelson said "feet" 3 times while Fields was testifying. Without meds, fields stated that when he is medicated his tics drastically decrease, nelson said he was not taking his meds around the time of the phone calls to lois miller, fields stated that nelson ran out of his meds and couldn't make it back to get another prescription. Trial court convicted nelson, appeals reversed due to Dr. Fields's testimony

Result Crimes

crimes that require actual harm, like murder, statute is there to prevent the result

Murder (MPC)

criminal homicide constitutes murder when: (a) it is committed purposely or knowingly; or (b) it is committed recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life. Such recklessness and indifference are presumed if the actor is engaged or is an accomplice in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit robbery, rape or deviate sexual intercourse by force or threat of force, arson, burglary, kidnapping or felonious escape. (2) Murder is a felony of the first degree [but a person convicted of murder may be sentenced to death, as provided in Section 210.6].

excuse doctrine

focuses on the actor, this person is a wrongdoer but is less morally blameworthy than otherwise. the defendant admits wrongdoing but asserts that he should not be punished because he is not morally blameworthy for the harm, a focus on the actor (the insane killer avoids punishment not because there was no harm in the killing, but because his mental disease renders his conduct morally blameless. Provoker is partly responsible because he roused a violent passion in me so it wasn't me acting of my own accord.

Specific Intent

is a crime that contains in its definition a special mental element above and beyond any mental state required with respect to the actus reus of the crime. The special mental element having 3 categories: (1) intention to commit some future act separate from the actus reus of the offense (possession of drugs with the intent to sell), (2) a special motive or purpose for committing the actus reus (offensive contact upon another with the intent to cause humiliation, and (3) awareness of an attendant circumstance (intentional sale of obscene literature to a person known to be under the age of 18).

general intent

is an offense that does not contain in its definition one of those specific intent 3 types of special mental states and only contains the mental state that relates solely to the social harm of the offense (an intentional application of force upon another, here this is general intent because the mental state is contained in the definition ((intentionally))).

Collateral consequences

legal and regulatory restrictions that limit or prohibit people convicted of crimes from accessing employment, business and occupational licensing, housing, voting, education, and other rights, benefits, and opportunities.

Criminal Homicide

murder, manslaughter, negligent homicide. A person is guilty of criminal homicide if he purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently causes the death of another human being.

Statutory clarity

people be given notice of what to avoid is under the 14th amendment due process = fair treatment under the judicial system. 3 reasons for statutory clarity: (1) the construction of the statute be intelligible to the ordinary person, (2) to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply them, and (3) a vague statute inhibits due process clause of the 14th amendment.

Retributivist

people deserve it for committing a crime, beliefs could be summed up as "an eye for an eye." A retribution theorists looks at the suffering of the victim to determine the level of punishment. The punishment of the criminal offender should be proportional to the suffering of the victim.

justification doctrine

society deems it necessary, self-defense is a justification, something done on with the law's approval, society decides that homicide is not an undesirable one or represents a lesser harm. society indicates its approval of the conduct, for murder could be self-defense, a focus on the act, ive been abused for years and I retaliated.

conduct crimes

statute in place to prevent the conduct, Crimes that are complete when the criminal act and criminal intent concur. There is no requirement for resulting harm.

Due process requires that

statutes put the person on notice of the prohibited conduct, a vague statute does not. An ambiguous statute is that you know what it means, but there is more than one reasonable meaning, with vague statutes you don't know what the F it means. Courts rarely accept a vagueness argument, because the court will narrowly interpret it.

Mens Rea

the intention or knowledge of wrongdoing that constitutes part of a crime, as opposed to the action or conduct of the accused.

conscious objective or desire

the intentional desire to carry out the criminal act

1.02 (3)

the provisions of the code are to be construed according to fair import of their terms but when the language is susceptible to differing constructions it shall be interpreted to further the general purposes stated in this section and the special purposes of the particular provision involved

2nd degree murder

the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought but without the additional elements of willfulness, premeditation, and deliberation, that would support a conviction of 1st degree murder.

Criminal Battery

unlawful application of force to the person of another, even the slightest unlawful touching, if offensive satisfies the ACTUS REUS of the offense. The MENS REA is less clear and some courts require the unlawful touching be intentional, but criminal negligence can suffice. Aggravated battery is a statutory felony

The Queen v. Dudley and Stephens (1884)

was there a defense of the necessity? Ship wreck kill the cabin boy to save 3 lifes. Sentence was brought down to 6 months instead of death - Dudley and stephens were indighted for murder on the seas of a 17-18 year old boy. - They were in a storm and no supply of food or water - Lots cast as to who would be sacrificed for the rest - Cut the boys throat and ate him - A case of criminals feeling superior and justified in offending another. - No potable water and only 2 pounds of turnips - July 6,7,8this was their subsitence - July catch a turtle and subsist on it a few days - July 17th to 25th 1884, 4 persons had no food or water, only rainwater they caught - July 23 had gone 1 week without food and 5 days without water - What does succor mean? - Someone suggested that they sacrifice themselves to save the rest. - Parker took no part, Brooks dissented - Dudley, stephens, drew straws, shortest straw loses, parker and brooks refused to join in, there was no drawing of straws - Dudley and stephens are considered prsioners in this case, they are appealing. - Brooks was not a defendant in this case because he did not participate in this killing, he dissented the entire time - Dudly and stephens killed Richard parker, so the remaining could have sustenance until they are discovered and rescued - Thomas Dudley proposed that if there was no rescue the next day they would eat parker, stephens agreed to the sacrifice along with Dudley, brooks said no dnt do it. Richard parker was younger and in the weakest state and did not assent to the terms - Dudley prayed for forgiveness and him and stephens killed parker. - Homicide-one human causes the death of another human being, we care about 3 criminal homicides: murder, manslaughter, and negligent homicide - Stephens, brooks, and Dudley subsisted on stephens, when rescued they were in a prostrated state (laying down) - Rescued, Dudley and stephens were rescued and convicted of murder - Parker would have died anyway is a question, it is uncertain - Unless 1 of the 4 sacrificed, the others would have died - Jury found dudley and stephens guilty of murder Notes Should Dudley and Stephens have been punished? They unlawfully took another's life, applying a retributivist theory, an eye for an eye, yes they should. With utilitarian, it would make sense to save the lives of the others, natural human instinct to survive