Criminal Procedure I (Cases and Doctrines)

Katz v. United States (US 1967)

FACTS: FBI bugged the outside of a closed phone booth to listen to conversations. RULE: The Fourth Amendment protects a person from unreasonable searches and seizures when he/she has: (1) a subjective expectation of privacy, that (2) society deems objectively reasonable. (Harlan concurrence).

United States v. Jones (US 2012)

FACTS: Government placed bug on a drug dealer's wife's car (after warrant expired and outside jurisdiction). RULE: In Fourth Amendment application, ask first if there is a government trespass/invasion to obtain information, and then apply the Katz two-prong test.

Olmstead v. United States (US 1928)

FACTS: Government tapped the phones of of a bootlegger's home and office. RULE: The Fourth Amendment does not protect telephone wires and telephone calls, because there is no physical entry (trespass) into constitutionally protected space. [Old rule, replaced by Katz].

United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez (US 1990)

FACTS: Mexican drug dealer arrested in Mexica, taken to the U.S., and put on trial. U.S. police conducted warrantless search of his home in Mexico. RULE: The Fourth Amendment does not apply to a nonresident in a foreign country. No Fourth Amendment violation.

United States v. Carloss (10th 2013)

FACTS: Police conducted knock-and-talk on a house with multiple, detailed "No Trespassing" signs. RULE: Signs cannot revoke the implied license that allows police to conduct knock-and-talks. (Gorsuch)

United States v. Jones (7th 2000)

[Executing the Warrant—Scope of Execution] FACTS: Police used a flash-bang prior to search at a home, with knowledge that target's girlfriend and child were present. RULE: Scope of execution is determined by reasonableness. This was unreasonable, because of danger to innocents. (?)

Hummel-Jones v. Strope (8th 1994)

[Executing the Warrant—Unnecessarily Intrusive] FACTS: Police searched birthing clinic to determine if nurse had a valid license, including search mother who'd just given birth. RULE: The scope of execution is reasonableness. The video record of the birth was not evidence, and could not have been reasonably expected to have had evidence, so unreasonable search.

Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Association (US 1989)

[Investigations That Only Uncover Illegal Activity] FACTS: Case challenged drug testing of urine. RULE: Drug testing of urine is a search, so violation if without warrant. Unlike chemical search in Jacobson, urine test could uncover information such as pregnancy or prescription drugs.

Hudson v. Palmer (US 1984)

[Searches—Jails] FACTS: Prison officials searched and destroy inmate's personal property. RULE: No expectation of privacy in prison cell or in any papers or property in the cell.

United States v. Miller (US 1976)

[Third Party Doctrine—Financial Records] FACTS: Government issued subpoena for records of defendant's deposits at a bank. RULE: No reasonable expectation of privacy where records have been disclosed to a third party, here the bank.

Untied States v. Blake (11th 2017)

[Warrant—Particularity of Information on Facebook Account] FACTS: Police had probable cause that evidence of sex trafficking would be found on target's Facebook account. RULE: Warrant could have been limited to messages from a certain time period or messages to and from suspected customers. Since Facebook provides precise information requested, the exhaustive search is not necessary in this context. (However, court did not actually decide whether warrant was overbroad.)

United States v. Valez (2d 1986)

(Probable Cause to Arrest) FACTS: Officers obvious drug sale and gave fairly specific description (black coat, gray pants, comb, white shirt) to field team. Field team nevertheless arrests wrong man and finds drugs. RULE: The description wasn't really faulty, so there was probable cause to arrest Valez even though he wasn't the one in the sale. Only requirement is a fair probability to believe arrestee has engaged in crime.

United States v. Prandy-Binnett (DC 1993)

(Warrant—Quantity of Information) FACTS: Officer was in Union Station, saw a shift individual and stopped to question, evasive answers. Saw a small rectangular item wrapped in duct tape in his bag, believed it to be drugs and arrested man. RULE: The "fair probability" test was satisfied here. Probable cause is somewhere between "less than would justify conviction" and "more than bare suspicion." Notes three factors that tend to raise suspicion with "fair probability" that this was drugs (officer's familiarity with drug busts, rectangular shape of object, duct tape is preferred by drug dealers).

United States v. Shuck (10th Cir. 2013)

FACTS: Police visited trailer, smelled marijuana from pipe in trailer. RULE: Not a search under Jardines, because officers used 'normal route of access which would be used by anyone visiting this trailer.'

Florida v. Jardines (US 2013)

FACTS: Police went (without a warrant) to the porch of drug-dealer, used dog sniff to detect marijuana. RULE: License to knock on door was not license to begin gathering evidence; so dog sniff was a trespass and violation of Fourth Amendment.

Fourth Amendment

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but on probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

United States v. Grubbs (US 2006)

[Anticipatory Warrants] FACTS: Police obtained a search warrant to search a house by explaining that the warrant would only be executed after contraband arrived at a later date. RULE: The warrant is valid. An anticipatory warrant may be issued if: (1) a certain triggering condition will result in a "fair probability" that evidence of crime will be found, and (2) there is probable cause to believe that the triggering event will occur. [Scalia describes slightly differently].

United States v. Morales (5th 1999)

[Demonstrating Probable Cause] Explains the Gates Rule. Four Factors: (1) nature of the information, (2) whether there was opportunity for police to see or hear the matter, (3) veracity and basis of informant's knowledge, and (4) whether there has been independent police verification.

Aguilar v. Texas (US 1964)

[Demonstrating Probable Cause] FACTS: Anonymous informant [or unidentified informant] stated that Aguilar possessed drugs, police obtained warrant. RULE: Belief and suspicion alone are insufficient to allow a judge to find probable cause, and anonymous tips are untrustworthy. Faulty warrant, no probable cause. (Overturned by Gates)

United States v. Leake (6th 1993)

[Demonstrating Probable Cause] FACTS: Anonymous informant said drugs in basement of house. Police corroboration revealed nothing unusual and only the exist of the basement. RULE: There is no probable cause when an anonymous tip provides no details and police corroboration fails to produce anything (other than innocent activity, aka, a basement existing).

Illinois v. Gates (US 1983)

[Demonstrating Probable Cause] FACTS: Anonymous informant told police that couple would drive and fly to Florida, then drive back with drugs. Police corroborated by running plates and checking travel plans; obtained warrant for house and found drugs. RULE: The two-prongs of Aguilar/Spinelli is too technical. Judges must consider the totality of the circumstances in evaluating probable cause for a warrant. (Overturned Aguilar)

United States v. Peyko (2d 1983)

[Demonstrating Probable Cause] FACTS: Anonymous tip that Peyko received weekly delivery of drugs through FedEx packages. Police corroborated that Peyko received many FedEx packages and obtained a warrant. RULE: Correct under Gates. Under totality of the circumstances, even corroboration of perfectly innocent activity (receiving packages) lent "color to the tip," leading to a fair probability determination and finding probable cause.

United States v. Warner (8th 1990)

[Demonstrating Probable Cause] FACTS: Confidential informant and anonymous tip separately report firearm, police partially corroborate (checks firearm registry). RULE: Probable cause is satisfied when two tips are mutually corroborated and the police further corroborate.

Draper v. United States (US 1959)

[Demonstrating Probable Cause] FACTS: Informant said Draper would be returning on train with drugs, specifically describing the clothes Draper would wear. RULE: Partial collaboration can establish probable cause because it raises the assumption that the remaining part of the statement is true. The specificity (and later accuracy) and the correct prediction of a future event is also more trustworthy. (Before Spinelli, holding confined to these facts).

Spinelli v. United States (US 1969)

[Demonstrating Probable Cause] FACTS: Informant said defendant was an illegal bookkeeper and had two phone numbers. FBI confirmed the two phone numbers and sought warrant. RULE: To rely on paid informant, two prongs: (1) police must provide basis/details/circumstances of the knowledge to judge credibility of conclusions, and (2) police must show why informant is a credible or reliable source. Faulty warrant here, police did neither and only corroborated innocent details (two phones is not illegal).

United States v. Wilhelm (4th 1996)

[Demonstrating Probable Cause] FACTS: Unidentified informant gave tip of drugs in home and gave directions to the home. RULE: A defective tip cannot be sufficiently corroborated by run-of-the-mills details such as accurately giving directions to the house or accurately describing what marijuana looks like.

Massachusetts v. Upton (US 1984)

[Demonstrating Probable Cause] FACTS: Police receive anonymous tip about a trailer with certain stolen goods at Upton's house. Police responding by identifying her as Upton's girlfriend; she confirmed and said they'd broken up. Police obtained warrant. RULE: Correct under Gates. No single piece of tip need be conclusive, based on the totality of the circumstances the judge could determine a "fair probability" that evidence would be found, so probable cause existed.

Richard v. Wisconsin (US 1997)

[Executing the Warrant—Emergency Circumstances] FACTS: Police obtained warrant, went to hotel room and tried to hide their identity. Richards tried to flee so police kicked down the door. RULE: The general rule of knock and announce may be suspended for emergency circumstances on a case-by-case basis at the time the warrant is being executed, if there is a "dangerous situation" or "evidence could be destroyed."

United States v. New York Tel. Co. (US 1977)

[Executing the Warrant—Enlisting Unwilling Private Parties] FACTS: A private telephone company did not want to assist the government in installing pen registers. RULE: If a showing of probable cause, a judge can order private parties to assist with warrant if the burden is not unreasonable.

Bellville v. Town of Northboro (1st 2004)

[Executing the Warrant—Enlisting Willing Private Party] FACTS: Officer asked two employees to help search warehouse for stolen electronic goods that officer wouldn't have recognized. RULE: A civilian may participate in a search if they serve a "legitimate investigative function" and are "not participating to further their own personal ends." Here, the employees were serving a legitimate investigative function because police did not have the technical expertise to identify the property.

United States v. Weinbender (8th 1997)

[Executing the Warrant—Excessiveness & Destruction] FACTS: Police tore down drywall while looking for evidence (clothes), found weapons instead. RULE: Reasonableness inquiry. Here, it was reasonable, because the drywall was unfinished, it was a small area, and police knew target had hiding places.

Buckley v. Beaulieu (Maine 1908)

[Executing the Warrant—Excessiveness & Destruction] FACTS: Police tore out the walls of a house while searching for liquor. RULE: The scope of execution is determined under reasonableness standard. Here, unreasonable search because police could have searched in a way that did not damage walls.

United States v. Contreras-Ceballos (9th 1993)

[Executing the Warrant—Knock and Announce] RULE: Knock and announce requirement serves three purposes: (1) protects citizens & police from violence, (2) protects individual privacy rights, (3) protects against needles destruction of private property.

Wilson v. Arkansas (US 1995)

[Executing the Warrant—Knock and Announce] FACTS: Police executed warrant on Wilson without knocking. RULE: The knock and announce requirement is grounded in a constitutional basis. The constitutional hook of "reasonableness" includes the nature of the officer's entry. Although the requirement may be waived for countervailing circumstances such as hot pursuit, destruction of evidence, or safety of officers, it is still a default constitutional presumption unless the state proves these exigent circumstances.

United States v. Mendoza (8th 2002)

[Executing the Warrant—No Breaking] RULE: The prohibition behind knock & announce is actually on breaking the door; so there's no violation if the door is already open or if the police trick the occupant into opening the door.

United States v. Ramirez (US 1998)

[Executing the Warrant—No Knock Warrant] FACTS: Police had no-knock warrant, announced it on loudspeakers and simultaneously broke a window. RULE: Police may obtain a no-knock warrant when (1) probable cause that there is crime (or evidence?) in a certain location, and (2) reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing would be dangerous or futile. There is no higher standard of exigent circumstances for when property is damaged.

United States v. Moore (10th 1999)

[Executing the Warrant—Refused Admittance] FACTS: Officers broke down Knapp's door after waiting three seconds without a response. RULE: Police may forcibly enter to execute a warrant if refused admittance, and refused admittance may be implied from circumstances. This entrance was not reasonable, because the three-second wait was "virtually instantaneous" with the announcement, so could not be said that officers were refused admittance.

United States v. Knapp (10th 1993)

[Executing the Warrant—Refused Admittance] FACTS: Officers broke down Knapp's door after waiting twelve seconds without a response. RULE: Police may forcibly enter to execute a warrant if refused admittance, and refused admittance may be implied from circumstances. Reasonable entry here given the twelve-second wait and that officers knew Knapp was inside.

United States v. Myers (10th 1997)

[Executing the Warrant—Scope of Execution] FACTS: Police knocked & announced, then used a flash-bang grenade. Myers argued outside the scope of execution. RULE: Scope of execution is determined by reasonableness test. Here, reasonable, because Myers was a dangerous career criminal and police had reason to think flash-bang could disorient him.

United States v. Place (US 1983)

[Investigations That Only Uncover Illegal Activity] FACTS: Drug-sniffing dog detected drugs in luggage at airport. RULE: Legitimate privacy interests are only for legal activities, there is no privacy interest in illegal activity. Drug-sniffing dogs do not detect any innocent activity, so there is no risk of accidentally invading legitimate privacy interests. No search, no violation. (Here, detention while waiting for dog was wrong under Terry, though).

Illinois v. Caballes (US 2005)

[Investigations That Only Uncover Illegal Activity] FACTS: During routine traffic stop, drug-sniffing dog detected drugs in car, police searched car. RULE: Drug dogs only uncover illegal activity and so may be used at a routine traffic stop without cause. No expectation of privacy in illegal activities, no search, no violation.

United States v. Jacobson (US 1984)

[Investigations That Only Uncover Illegal Activity] FACTS: Federal agent used chemical field test on powder from a mailed package. RULE: A chemical test reveals either the presence of drugs (if positive) or nothing (if negative). So only illegal activity detected, no search, no violation. [But may be a physical search/seizure considering trespass application of Jones].

United States v. Dunn (US 1987)

[Katz Applied: Curtilage] FACTS: Police looked inside a barn located 50 yards beyond a fence surrounding Dunn's house. RULE: The Fourth Amendment protects the "curtilage" of a house from unreasonable searches. Curtilage depends on: (1) proximity to home, (2) inside/outside fence or enclosure, (3) nature of use, and (4) steps taken to protect privacy. Here, barn not in curtilage, no violation.

Oliver v. United States (US 1984)

[Katz Applied: Open Fields] FACTS: Police went to farm, walked around a gate with a "No Trespassing" sign. RULE: People have no legitimate expectation of privacy in an open field. Even if there is subjective steps (here, gate and sign), it's not one society would recognize as reasonable (after hundreds of years of common law rule).

Smith v. Ohio (US 1990)

[Katz Applied: Subjective Expectation] FACTS: Man threw a bag on the hood of his car, then tried to grab it away from police after they asked about it. RULE: No abandonment here, and man has clearly taken affirmative actions to maintain subjective expectation of privacy of what was in the bag.

United States v. Bellina (4th Cir. 1981)

[Katz Applied: Subjective Expectation] FACTS: Police used step ladder to peer into interior of a plane. RULE: There was no subjective manifestation of an interest in privacy, the pilot had taken no affirmative steps such as covering the windows.

Devenpeck v. Alford (US 2004)

[Probable Cause For Different Offense Than Arrest] FACTS: Officer stopped a man on suspicion that he was impersonating a police officer. During the stop, officer noticed man was recording the conversation with the officers (a state violation). Arrested him for statutory violation. [Claims dismissed, man filed civil suit for unlawful arrest because no probable cause]. RULE: The offense establishing probable cause does not have to be closely related to (or based on the same conduct as) the offense identified at the time of arrest.

Florida v. Harris (US 2013)

[Probable Cause for Arrest & Dog Sniffs] FACTS: During routine traffic stop, truck driver was visibly nervous and drug-sniffing dog "hit." A search revealed no drugs, but materials used to make meth. While Harris was released on bail, the same officer stopped him and the same dog alerted, but nothing was found. State did not maintain complete record of dog's performance, including false positives. RULE: If a bona fide organization has certified the dog, then the dog's alert provides probable cause to search. However, defendants can challenge the dog's reliability at a probable-cause hearing.

United States v. Kithcart (3d 1998)

[Probable Cause to Arrest] FACTS: Radio report of robbers, "black males in black sports car, possibly Camaro." Officer later pulls over black Nissan apparently driven by lone black (though two men in car). Finds firearms. RULE: Officer did not have probable cause to arrest. The reports did not justify the officer to arrest any black male driving a black car in the area, no fair probability.

Maryland v. Pringle (US 2003)

[Probable Cause, Mistaken Arrest, & Probabilities] FACTS: Police conducted routine traffic stop, noticed a large wad of money in glove compartment, conducted search and found drugs. All three occupants claimed ignorance, so police arrested all three. Pringle later confessed the drugs were his. RULE: Probable caused existed for these arrests, and is not undermined by the fact that there are multiple possible people who could have committed the crime.

Whiteley v. Warden (US 1971)

[Probable Cause—Collective Knowledge] Rule: Once one officer has demonstrated to a magistrate probable cause sufficient for an arrest warrant, all other officers can make the arrest on the assumption that the probable cause is valid. (This rule applies to warrantless probable cause arrests and also to searches).

New York v. P.J. Video (US 1986)

[Probable Cause—First Amendment] FACTS: Warrant to seize tapes supported by probable cause that tapes were pornographic. Store claimed this violated First Amendment. RULE: Probable cause to search/seize materials that presumptively are protected by the First Amendment are evaluated under the same standard as all other probable cause questions.

United States v. Farmer (4th 2004)

[Probable Cause—Staleness of Information] FACTS: Police had nine-month old probable-cause level information of a large-scale counterfeiting operation. RULE: The nature of the suspected offense made the information not stale, it was "unlike to have been suddenly abandoned" since it was a large and long-time operation.

United States v. Spikes (6th 1998)

[Probable Cause—Staleness of Information] FACTS: Police had probable cause of drug activity four years before warrant issued. RULE: Corroboration by more recent information leads to fair conclusion that target is still engaged in drug operations.

United States v. Harris (11th 1994)

[Probable Cause—Staleness of Information] FACTS: Police had probable cause to arrest drug dealer in 1988, but warrant wasn't issued until 1990. RULE: For old ("stale") information challenges, consider factors such as (1) the maturity of information; (2) nature of the suspected crime (single crime or ongoing conspiracy); (3) habits of the accused; (4) character of the items sought; and (5) the nature of the premises. Here, the factors lead to a "fair probability" that Ford was still drug dealing two years later.

Hudson v. Michigan (US 2006)

[Remedy for Knock & Announce Violation] FACTS: Hudson sought to exclude evidence after police violated the knock & announce requirement. RULE: A violation of the knock and announce requirement does not justify exclusion of the evidence found in the subsequent search of the premises. Defendants may only file a civil suit for Fourth Amendment violations.

Illinois v. Andreas (US 1983)

[Searches—Controlled Deliveries] FACTS: Agents conducted customs search of crate (which was legal) and found drugs. Resealed the crate, followed it, then researched without a warrant. RULE: The initial intrusion was legal & not a Fourth Amendment violation; the resealing does not restore the now-gone privacy interest, so there is no longer a reasonable privacy interest and so no search, no violation.

United States v. Barona (9th 1995)

[Searches—Foreign Officials] RULE: (Dicta) Foreign officials' searches are never violations, except can be a violation when so severe as to shock the conscience (not grounded in Fourth jurisprudence, but preservation of criminal justice system); or when the action is functionally a joint venture between US and foreign officials.

Walther v. United States (US 1980)

[Searches—Govt. Investigation After Private Action] FACTS: Airline employee brought package to government after government encouraged him to. RULE: Divided Court. Although the package was already opened, the government still need a warrant to view the tapes inside. A partial invasion of privacy by a private individual cannot justify a total invasion. But what was observed in plain view was properly observed (preserving Burdeau).

Burdeau v. McDowell (US 1921)

[Searches—Investigation by Private Citizens] FACTS: Private office safes were blown opened and desks broken into, private papers turned over to government. RULE: The Fourth Amendment limits government actors, not private citizens. There is no search here, so no violation.

Bell v. Wolfish (US 1979)

[Searches—Jail] FACTS: Prisoners were strip searched and body-cavity searched after contact visits. RULE: At most, prisoners have a "diminished" privacy expectation against strip searches and body cavity searches, but reasonable here under circumstances.

United States v. Walther (9th 1981)

[Searches—Mixed Public & Private Actors] FACTS: Airline employee brought package to government after government encouraged him to. RULE: The Fourth Amendment is still violated when government officials enlist private individuals to do (search) what the government officials cannot.

O'Connor v. Ortega (US 1987)

[Searches—Public Employees] FACTS: State officials entered office of government psychiatrist and seized items from desk and file cabinets. RULE: Public employees have reasonable expectation of privacy for desk and cabinets (declined to answer about office). However, can still be searched under reasonable suspicion standard, no warrant requirement.

New Jersey v. T.L.O. (US 1985)

[Searches—Public Schools] FACTS: School officials searched a student's bag for cigarettes. RULE: Schools are not prisons, so students can have a privacy interest in personal property. But at the same time, school officials can have a reasonable suspicion that justifies certain searches. So only reasonableness requirement, not warrant.

Kyllo v. United States (US 2001)

[Technology Enhanced Investigation—Thermal Imaging] FACTS: Police used thermal-imaging device to detect high-intensity lamps inside house (drug operation). RULE: Use of sense-enhancing technology to see details of a house that would not be discoverable without otherwise entering house is a search, so violation if without warrant. These details are not freely observable by the public.

United States v. Knotts (US 1983)

[Technology Enhanced Investigation—Tracking Devices] FACTS: Police placed a tracker in a container that was purchased by Knotts, followed him to his cabin. RULE: Visual observation from along the public roadway would have revealed the same information, so this is not a search.

United States v. Karo (US 1984)

[Technology Enhanced Investigation—Tracking Devices] FACTS: Police placed tracker in container sold to defendant, but here both followed him to his property and continued to monitor where it was taken within his house. RULE: Use of the tracker along the public roadway was not a search, but using the tracker to monitor inside multiple private places was a search.

Florida v. Riley (US 1989)

[Third Party Doctrine—Aerial Surveillance] FACTS: Police flew helicopter at 400 feet to see into greenhouse in curtilage. RULE: No FAA law against flying at 400 feet, so Ciraolo applies and no reasonable expectation of privacy when it could be viewed by public. No search, no violation. CON/DIS: Test should be whether public ordinarily have access/do access information in this way, not whether it's theoretically possible for them to.

California v. Ciraolo (US 1986)

[Third Party Doctrine—Aerial Surveillance] FACTS: Police flew over house at 1000 feet and photographed drugs inside the curtilage (otherwise hidden by a tall fence). RULE: No reasonable expectation of privacy since any member of public could have flown over and looked in. No search, no violation.

Carpenter v. United States (US 2018)

[Third Party Doctrine—Cell Phones] FACTS: FBI obtained cellphone data including date and time of calls, location when calls made, and location of phones at points in time. RULE: This is a search and violates the Fourth Amendment. Expectations of privacy in the digital age do not fit neatly into existing precedents, this is intrusive and third party doctrine is not extended.

Bond v. United States (US 2000)

[Third Party Doctrine—Manipulation of Bags in Public Transit] FACTS: Officer boarded bus and squeezed a canvas bag, felt a brick-like object (drugs). RULE: Public could easily manipulate the canvas bag and feel the brick, so no reasonable expectation of privacy. No search, no violation. DISSENT: Officer did not manipulate in the manner the public would.

Smith v. Maryland (US 1979)

[Third Party Doctrine—Pen Registers] FACTS: Police used pen register device to record all numbers called by defendant. RULE: No legitimate expectation of privacy in information turned over to third party (phone company), so no search.

United States v. White (8th 1989)

[Third Party Doctrine—Public Areas] FACTS: Officer peered into public bathroom stall and saw criminal activity. RULE: Limited expectation of privacy in public bathrooms, no violation because no reasonable expectation here given construction of the stall and the ability to see in by the officer 'without being in a position unexpected by occupant.'

United States v. White (US 1971)

[Third Party Doctrine—Recorded Conversations] FACTS: White spoke to government informant who wore a wire, allowing agents to overhear conversation. RULE: Disclosing information to another party breaks expectation of privacy, Fourth Amendment does not protect against misplaced trust.

California v. Greenwood (US 1988)

[Third Party Doctrine—Trash] FACTS: Police found evidence of drug use in trash bags placed outside for garbage collector. RULE: Public has access to trash bags outside the house, so no reasonable expectation of privacy.

United States v. Gonzalez (9th 2003)

[Third Party Doctrine—Video Surveillance] FACTS: Police installed hidden video camera in a public mailroom to catch a drug deal. RULE: White rule of third-party disclosure applies to video surveillance. No expectation of privacy to be free from video surveillance in a public mailroom.

Johnson v. United States (US 1948)

[Warrant Requirement] FACTS: Police received tip about opium in hotel. Went to hotel and smelled opium. Knocked on door and were admitted in, searched the room. RULE: Even if police have probable cause, they still need a specific search & seizure warrant from a neutral magistrate before they can search an individual's premises, unless an emergency/exigent circumstances.

Zurcher v. Stanford Daily (US 1978)

[Warrant: Location & Search of Third-Party Premises] FACTS: Police had probable cause to believe a newspaper photographer had photos of when demonstrators attacked a group of police. Police obtained warrant to search office for photos and negatives. RULE: The Fourth Amendment asks if there is probable cause to believe that evidence of a crime will be found in the place searched, whether or not that the owner is a third party who did not participate in the crime. This search was reasonable. [Builds from Warden].

United States v. Lalor (4th 1993)

[Warrant: Location of Evidence] FACTS: Police had probable cause to suspect Lalor sold drugs on the street. Obtained warrant to search his house. RULE: Location of Evidence. There must be specific probable cause that the evidence will be on the property searched, not merely that the owner was involved in crime. Here, no clear link between street and house to establish fair probability of finding evidence.

Warden v. Hayden (US 1967)

[Warrant: Probable Cause, Specificity, & Reasonableness] FACTS: Police received call that a robber had just entered a private house (his). Wife consented to search, police found Hayden, gun, and clothing that matched description of what the robber wore. Hayden challenged seizure of clothing. RULE: Scope of Seizure. The Fourth Amendment permits officers to seize mere evidence of a crime that is neither the fruit or instrumentality of a crime or contraband.

Winston v. Lee (US 1985)

[Warrants—Limitations on Reasonableness] FACTS: Lee was shot while committing a robbery. The state obtained a warrant to force Lee to have a surgery to remove the bullet to be used as evidence. RULE: Although there was probable cause, this search was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.

United States v. Brown (10th 1993)

[Warrants—Severability of Overbroad Clauses] FACTS: Police obtained a warrant to search a chopshop that specifically mentioned over forty items and a catchall of "any other item [believed to be] stolen." RULE: The catchall clause was overbroad and not limited, but is severable so the defect will not taint the evidence seized that fit into the forty categories described with particularity.

United States v. Patterson (4th 1998)

[Warrant—Accomplices & Probable Cause] FACTS: Two men robbed a bank, one was arrested and confessed who his partner was. Police obtained warrant to search partner's car. RULE: The confession of an accomplice is sufficient to establish probable cause, no corroboration needed. (After all, the same statement is sufficient to convict the defendant).

United States v. Evans (7th 1996)

[Warrant—Breadth of Search: Containers ] RULE: Police are generally authorized to search any container in the premises that is large enough that the sought evidence might be inside. "If [the police] are looking for an adolescent hippopotamus, they can search the living room or garage but not the microwave." (Posner)

United States v. Earls (10th 1994) & United States v. Kyles (2d 1994)

[Warrant—Breadth of Search: Premises] Rule: Police are generally authorized to search anything contained within the largest definition of the entire premises described, so an unattached garage & office that fell within home's curtilage (Earls), or a locked bedroom of another tenant inside a single apartment (Kyles).

United States v. Blount (5th 1997)

[Warrant—Citizen Informant & Probable Cause] FACTS: Police were given information from identified neighbor of the defendant and had not reason to question her motives. RULE: Statements from identified citizen informants can provide probable cause without corroboration. Unlike paid informants and anonymous tips, there is no obvious reason to think these statements may be unreliable. (Point also made in Spinelli and Gates].

Andreson v. Maryland (US 1976)

[Warrant—Describing the Things to Be Seized] FACTS: Police obtained a warrant to search and seize documents showing real estate fraud "together with other fruits, instrumentalities and evidence of crime." Challenged as a general warrant. RULE: The Fourth Amendment requires search warrants to specifically list and describe to be seized and limits seizures to those items. However, addition of a catchall phrase does not transmute the warrant to a general warrant if it is limited by the language of the warrant to a general area relating to a specific crime and the other objects mentioned.

Lyons v. Robinson (8th 1985)

[Warrant—Location & Wrong Address] FACTS: Warrant listed address as 325 Adkinson Street; target's actual address was 325 Short Street on the corner of Adkinson & Short. RULE: Warrant application was not faulty and warrant still valid at time of issuance; the address was not so wrong as to make it likely that another premise would be searched.

Maryland v. Garrison (US 1987)

[Warrant—Location to be Searched] FACTS: Police had probable cause to suspect drug activity in apartment on third floor of building, thought that there was only one apartment on the floor. Obtained a warrant to search a "third floor apartment," entered a second apartment on the floor and found contraband. RULE: An application for a warrant must state the location of the place to be searched with "reasonable particularity." But this is judged in light of the information available to the police at the time of application, what they knew or should have known. Here, the warrant was valid at the time of issuance, and even when the search began the mistake was still both reasonable and understandable.

United States v. Johnson (7th 1994)

[Warrant—Location to be Searched] FACTS: Police obtained a warrant to search an entire duplex occupied by members of suspected drug conspiracy. RULE: The location described in a warrant application is not overbroad if the police know that there are multiple units and has probable cause to search each unit (multiple suspected criminals or suspected criminals have access to all units).

Moore v. United States (DC 1972)

[Warrant—Location to be Searched] RULE: A single warrant cannot describe an entire building when probable cause is shown for searching only one apartment.

Coolidge v. New Hampshire (US 1971)

[Warrant—Neutral Magistrate] FACTS: Attorney general issued warrant in his capacity as officer of the peace. RULE: An executive branch official who heads law enforcement cannot be the neutral and detached magistrate required by the Constitution.

United States v. Brown (7th 1987)

[Warrant—Neutral Magistrate] FACTS: Magistrate judge regularly approved hundreds of simply form applications. RULE: This alone does not clearly demonstrate that the magistrate is rubber-stamping applications, it could be efficiency from experience.

United States v. McKeever (5th 1990)

[Warrant—Neutral Magistrate] FACTS: Magistrate judge was formerly a police officer, maintained reserve officer status, and married to deputy. RULE: Troubling, but not enough to show lack of neutrality.

Connally v. Georgia (US 1977)

[Warrant—Neutral Magistrate] FACTS: Magistrate judge was paid a fee if he issued a warrant but no fee if he denied a warrant. RULE: The monetary influence renders this magistrate not neutral and detached.

Shadwick v. City of Tampa (US 1972)

[Warrant—Neutral Magistrate] FACTS: Municipal clerks who were not lawyers were authorized by city to approve warrant applications. RULE: No requirement of legal education, the clerks can still be neutral and detached without a law degree.

United States v. Richards (6th 2011)

[Warrant—Particularity Applied to Searches of Electronic Devices] FACTS: Police searched entire computer because there was probable cause that Richards had child pornography. RULE: Not a violation. So long as the search is limited to a search for the evidence explicitly authorized in the warrant, it is reasonable for the officer to open various types of files on the device where evidence might be hidden.

United States v. Faagai (9th 2017)

[Warrant—Probable Cause] FACTS: Officers obtained texts about meeting at a Costco to buy "food", and at a Costco 20 miles further than the nearest. RULE: Officers were justified in treating these factors as suspicious, and in totality there were enough circumstances to establish "fair probability" of finding evidence of criminal activity.

United States v. Fuccillo (1st 1987)

[Warrant—Reasonable Particularity] FACTS: Police had a detailed list of stolen articles, but obtained a warrant that stated only to seize "stolen clothing." RULE: The particularity description with respect to items to be seized is one of reasonableness. Given the information the police had at the time of application, this description was unreasonable.

United States v. Strand (8th 1985)

[Warrant—Reasonable Particularity] FACTS: Police suspected Strand, a mail carrier, of stealing mail and obtained a warrant for "stolen mail." RULE: The particularity description with respect to items to be seized is one of reasonableness. The term here was sufficiently definite to be reasonable. However, the search itself was overbroad, as some of the items seized from Strand's home did not clearly fall into "stolen mail."