environmental ethics first half of semester

utilitarianism

do the act that will bring about the best balance between satisfaction and frustration for everyone affected by outcomes

what do non-consequentialists add to optimization?

"deontological constraints"

Mary anne warren

"difficulties with the strong animal rights position"

carl Cohen

"the case for the use of animals in biomedical research"

Aldo leopold

"the land ethic"

Paul Taylor start of article thought experiment

"the last human": thought experiment -you're the last human -before you die, you think "it would be fun to burn down the last remaining sequoia" -would this be wrong? -if so, why?

how much, according to singer, does it take to save a life?

$200-$2000

give well's estimate for what it takes to save a life

$623-$2367

Anderson's case 1

*language rights -language for parrots and chips: disabled humans, chimps, and parrots all have a toddler's or a mentally disabled human's capacity for rights -Anderson thinks that it would be wrong not to attempt to teach disabled humans any language but it would not be wrong to not teach chimps or parrots -if our moral rights depend solely on our mental capacities, not on species membership, then parrots and chimps have right to language -that's absurd so moral rights depend on species membership -objection: chimps and parrots don't have interest in learning language where disabled human does

preference utilitarianism

doing the action that fulfill the desires and preferences of everyone involved

normative ethics

right thing/wrong thing; providing theory for what right thing is doing whatever provides the most happiness

overpopulation

-#of people succeeds capacity of place's resources -high in pollution, running out of resources, high in environmental degradation -is it true that it would be better for a larger number of people with lives barely worth living to exist than it would be for fewer people with a very high quality of life to exist?

summary of temkin

-1 environmental context: scarcity of food-millions of people, many who are kids, suffer and die from malnutrition -singer argues that we are obligated to donate large sums of money -a worry: donating money to charitable organizations does harm as well as good, more complicated than singer lets on

what we need to know (as potential donors, pummer)

-1st, how much good each of our acts is likely to bring about -for consequentialists, this is the only thing we need to know -2nd, if there is a risk of harm to what extent would we be engaging in intrapersonal rather than interpersonal risk balancing? -3rd, how serious are the risks? -finally, what are preferences of those who would be affected by our acts? (in particular, do they prefer the chance of benefit over the chance of harm?

2 world's (from parfit's paper)

-2 populations, A and B -width = # of people -height= happiness of each individual in population -A has a greater average of happiness while B has a greater total amount of happiness -note, everyone in each scenario has a very good life -which scenario is better?

mere addition paradox

-A>B -A+>A -only difference between A+ & A is the mere addition to A of an isolated group, each member of which has life that is well worth living -parfit's claim is even weaker: A+ is NOT worse than A -divided B>A+ -note that divided B=B *problem: *given 2 & 3, B>A (which contradicts 1) *given 1 & 2, A+>B (which contradicts 3) *given 1 & 3, A>A+ (which contradicts2 ) *so, we must give up either 1, 2, or 3 *giving up 1 leads to the repugnant conclusion *to avoid that we must give up 2 or 3

interpersonal

risk to those who do NOT stand benefit-more morally problematic

Anderson: the many values of animals

-Anderson claims each of three groups gets something right *animal suffering evokes our sympathy *animals independent points of view makes claim on us, evoking respect *animal glory evokes our admiration *Anderson says we should try to find the proper place for each of the views in our policies & concludes that there is no easy answer

Intrapersonal

risk to those who stand benefit-morally acceptable

god approach

say we have control so might as well get good at preserving species and helping other species flourish

intrinsic vs instrumental value (schmidtz)

-Is merely being alive a property that deserves respect at all? -after all, a tree doesn't care if we chop it down-from the tree's perspective, it makes no difference to it whether it lives or dies because it has no perspective -this is NOT to say that trees and other living things aren't valuable -it could be instrumentally valuable to preserve the trees since doing so will provide us with shade, O2, flourishing habitat -is there anything intrinsically valuable about trees? does anything intrinsically bad occur if I destroy a plant? -respect for nature and self respect-if and when we identify with a redwood in the sense we are inspired by it have respect for its size and so on

intrinsic value (sober)

-a monolithic ecocentric view says only species or ecosystems have intrinsic value -sober's reply: not enough common ground between common ethics and environmentalist monolithic ethic so dont even bother persuading -view fails the second task of the demarcation problem -explain why the properties had by the objects that matter morally are the ones that count -does not account for individuals mattering

equal respect for all TCLs

-Taylor is rejecting anthropocentrism -perhaps humans are superior in inherent worth -some suggestions for grounds of this: merit, greek definition of man, cartesian dualist vie, judo christian concept of great chain of being, mere fact of genetic makeup -rejecting the notion of human superiority entails its positive counterpart: the doctrine of species impartiality

teleological centers of life (Taylor)

-Taylor suggests that what is good for an organism is that it "realizes the full development of its biological powers" -eg it is good for an organism to be strong and healthy -but even plants have "well being" that can be promoted or harmed -TCLS are any being that we can harm or benefit in such a way that either diminishes or enhances its ability to flourish -definitely plants and animals but what about machines

moral right

-a moral claim that one can exercise against another (ex right to life, right to fair trial) -rights give rise to duties but not necessarily vice versa

repugnant conclusion

-according to total utility, not only is B better than A, but Z is better than B (& A) -Z is overcrowded world with 100 billion people and -because the total happiness in Z is better than B (& A) -because the total happiness in Z is greater than A or B, Z is the best

problem for singer's weakened argument

-aims to be compatible with non-consequentialism -problem: allowing vs imposing harm (pummer) -in the case of foreign aid, we risk imposing harm -it would appear that singer's argument presupposes consequentialism after all -premise 3, empirical, says we can prevent something very bad from happening without thereby sacrificing anything else morally significant -so, as long as premise 2 allows for deontological constraints against risking imposing harm on others, premise three will be false

singer's view on equality

-all individuals should be given equal consideration -cf the consequential commitment to impartiality -not everyone has the same needs but everyone's needs count

from inherent values to rights (Regan)

-all individuals with inherent value will have certain rights -contrast with utilitarianism-maximizing good, no focus on the individual -because experiencing subjects of lives have inherent value, may not treat them as Mere receptacles and they must be treated with equal respect -harm principle

claim 1 in Leopold's argument for his position

-an ecosystem is a complex interactive community (NOT a commodity) -land pyramid passage-links and chains

cohen's reply to singer

-animals can suffer and shouldn't suffer needlessly but doesn't follow that its always wrong to use them for research

singer's conclusion

-animals should be liberated -no more factory farming, harming animals for entertainment, etc -note that singer's argument does NOT involve rights

needs and interests (sober)

-another proposal is that species and ecosystems have "interests" or "needs" that must be taken into account -hedonistic utilitarianism vs preference utilitarianism *sober's reply: what is required for an object to have needs -proposal: the object will go out of existence without the needed thing--problem: this is true of cars too-applies to things environmentalism doesn't;t care about -applies to everything -moreover, these things do not want to continue to exist so even preference utilitarianism does not imply that they have interests

stewardship (russow)

-as rational custodians of the planet we temporarily occupy, we have a duty to be good stewards or caretakers -russow accuses this view of begging the question -one has a duty to be caretaker only when there is something of value to be cared for -this suggestion assumes that species are something of value but that's the very thing under dispute

demarcation problem (sober)

-as sober uses the term, species and ecosystems ought to be preserved and not merely because of their instrumental value -ecocentrism, holism *the demarcation problem: in order to be plausible environmentalism must: 1. identify which objects matter and which do not 2. explain why the properties had by those objects are the ones that count (ie why those properties give rise to our moral duties toward the objects that have them) 3. this must not result in the conclusion that we have moral obligations toward all things *sober thinks environmentalism can't do all three things

speciesism

-assuming that the needs or interests (especially the suffering) of a certain species are less important than the needs of another species -evidence we are speciesist: mealtimes, treatment of animals while they are alive -problem: human suffering does not matter more than the suffering by other animals -speciesism is a mere prejudice analogous to racism -equal consideration of interests

argument by analogy

-begin with claim about rightness/wrongness -proceed to claim that some further action is morally on par with the first -arguments then conclude that second action is also right/wrong

Pummer's assessment

-believes several effective charities do well in both consequentialist and non-consequentialist criteria -giving to organizations like AMF is not without risk, but looks like case of intrapersonal balancing -even when giving to an organization may risk harm to wider groups, they also bring chances of benefit to those wider groups -even if giving foreign aid is too risky, we may still have obligations in the area (ie save money, let it grow, will have more info later and can give more effectively, or promote charity research)

ecofeminism in practice (gaard and Gruen)

-case study: ecofeminism and factory farming -liberal feminist perspective: women are fully rational (but animals aren't) so there should be an equitable distribution of animal protein -socialist feminist perspective: problems with the patriarchal capitalist nature of the industry -environmentalist perspective: factory farming is environmentally destructive though there's nothing wrong with eating animals per se -3rd world analysis: factory farming contributes to overconsumption in the north -animal liberation perspective: factory farming is immoral in itself

Anderson case 3: care for dolphins

-case where animals and disabled humans do have the same interests and the situation is not dependent on the individuals social relations with other individuals -starving dolphin in the wild that will die without our help -surely the disabled humans have the right to food, shelter, etc, but if this is solely because of their capacities then the dolphins also have the right to our aid -this cannot be right because in general Anderson thinks that animals living in the wild do not have a moral right to our direct protection and provision even if they need it to survive -some rights do depend on species membership

attempt 3 at denying norcross's analogy

-casual impotence: if I refrain from eating meat, it won't make a difference -norcross's reply: 1. chocolate mousse a la bama 2. it's false that you won't make a difference, "tragedy of the commons mentality," and even if the chance of your making a difference is slim, the harm that is risked is enormous

parfit's response to perfectionism

-certain types of goods (creative activity and aesthetic experience) are superior to other goods -so even though B has greater average utility and a greater total amount of utility than does A+, it doesn't;t follow that divided B>A+

way 7 aid might harm form wenar's article: socio-cultural impacts

-choosing who you give aid to elevates those groups -can highlight conflicts or discrepancies in culture -ex. hire translator can send message that speaking English gives more power -ex. if aid donors have guards, sends message that guns are needed for the good life

hard to get reliable information

-common sources of information about the effectiveness of aid are biased -promotional materials from charitable organizations -media presentations that over simply & just show good with no side effects -easier to give initial facts and harder to look at resultant effects -even the expert aid literature may be problematic-gigantic and diverse-hard for individuals to navigate, hardly ever takes up the donor's question, and highly contentious -evaluation of the effects of foreign aid rarely happens & is poorly done when it does -lack of checking mechanisms for foreign aid

way 5 aid might harm form wenar's article:aggregation effects

-counteract each other's effects -short term project of giving food to one place draws people away from another place where another group has a developmental project

texan's challenge

-different type of response: deny norcross's starting point -if purchasing factory farmed meat is morally analogous to what Fred does to puppies and if purchasing factory farmed meat is not morally wrong than neither is what Fred does to puppies -crucials: this by itself is insufficient-we also need some reason for thinking that purchasing factory farmed meat is not morally wrong

attempt 1 at denying norcross's analogy

-direct vs indirect harm: Fred did the torture whereas we don't -norcross's response: we can alter Fred's story -what if Fred was squeamish and had someone else toruture the puppies. would we have thought any better of Fred?

worries for effective altruism (temkin)

-doing the most good might require donating money to needy in developed countries -a worry for "doing the best that you can" *5k watch, ruin watch diving in to save child or sell watch later and donate money to save multiple lives -temkin thinks there's something morally problematic about this reasoning -seems to be variant of a standard problem case for consequentialism

2 approaches to restoration from radiolab

-eden approach -god approach

pig or potato (schmidtz)

-even if killing to save our lives is morally permissible, biocentrism implies that it wold be no worse to kill a pig than kill. a potato -all living things deserve equal respect -a pig deserves no more respect than a potato -in case of competing claims, killing a pig to eat it is morally on par with killing a potato to eat it -does this conclusion seem right?

environmentalism as a feminist issue

-examples showing that planetary health and global ecological destruction are feminist issues: women have to carry water further, -oppressions of humans and natural world are mutually reinforcing -if the underlying problem is an oppressive cultural framework, then to address problems of environmental degradation you will also have to address problem of oppression of women, minorities, and other marginalized groups

consequentialism

-family of ethical theories -basic structures: optimization 1st: specify intrinsic goods/bads 2nd: define what is right in terms of maximizing intrinsic good/minimizing intrinsic bad NOTE: optimization is impartial -right conduct is what maximizes good/minimizes bad for everyone effected

Feminist ethics: background

-feminism and feminist ethics in particular is a family of approaches -feminist ethics is sometimes defined in terms of commitment to the following claims 1. women are the moral equals of men 2. the experience of women deserve consideration 3. traits traditionally associated with women are at leas as important as traditionally masculine traits 4. traditionally feminine ways of moral reasoning are often superior to traditionally masculine ones

Anderson case 2: Alzheimer's patients and dogs

-first case: your friend is a monster for keeping their grandma like that and yet in the second your friend is not a monster -objections: human beings are part of a species, the norm for which is to be civilized, clean, and clothed whereas dogs are not -treatment of grandma is undignified but the same treatment for dogs is not -moreover, there can be undignified treatment of dogs

ethical relativism is false because

-forbids condemning other cultures no matter how heinous their practices -provides no basis for condemning one's own culture -makes moral progress impossible

warren's objection to regan's view on inherent value

-having inherent value does NOT guarantee having moral rights (Grand Canyon, mountains, rivers, redwood trees) -if all inherent value individuals deserved equal respect, then there must be a sharp line between those individuals and individuals that are not inherently valuable (warren considers drawing line at mammals, including reptiles) (warren thinks that subject hood comes in degrees)

claim 2 in Leopold's argument for his position

-humans are members, not masters, of the ecosystem -the conqueror role: Leopold points out that we tend to view the land as something to be tamed or conquered -cf, master/slave mentality -slavery persisted through the centuries but now we view it as a moral atrocity of our past -ethics has helped us get rid of master slave mindset

objection 3 to singer's argument: size of the problem

-if I donate to famine relief, I might save a life but thousands more will still die today *singer: true, but still obligated to do what we can -ex: suppose 1000 kids are in a lake drowning, even if you can only save a few, it would be wrong to do nothing

is singer guilty of sentientism?

-if he was guilty of any prejudice, it would be this -not morally problematic though -non-sentient things don't have interests -stone vs rabbit example-rabbit has interest in not being kicked along the road but the stone doesn't

objection 4 to singer's argument: too demanding

-if singer's conclusion is right, wouldn't that make it morally too demanding? -we need to distinguish between obligation and charity -singer: should be criticism at our ordinary standards of behavior, not the conclusion -conclusion would not seem so extraordinary at other times and places -singer notes weaker premise would still be able to establish the conclusion

does biocentrism entail pacifism? (david schmidtz)

-if we give equal rights to all living things what do we do when there are competing claims? -eg I will die if I don't eat but I will have to kill a plant or an animal in order to eat -it might seem like biocentrism entails pacifism *consider the following cases -killing in self defense: someone is coming at you with a gun trying to kill you, as it happens you also have a gun and can shoot them first -falling down a well: you're working at the bottom of a well and a person is falling; you have an atomizer that would annihilate them, killing them but leaving you unharmed

intrinsic values of ecosystems themselves (Leopold)

-leopold's ecocentrism is committed to the claim that ecosystems themselves have an intrinsic good (namely their flourishing) -an ecosystem can be thought of as a complex organism and just as biocentrists argue that stability, self preservation, and flourishing are good for living things, the ecocentrism argues that these things are good for ecosystems -source of intrinsic value: integrity, stability, diversity, beauty

objection 1 to singer's argument: proximity

-in the shallow pond case, the child is right in front of me, but famine relief concerns people who are far away *singer's response: we cannot discriminate against someone merely because they are far away -ex: video feed & button: you stumble upon a stream of a person starving in Yemen -next to screen is a button that will give food to the starving instantaneously -it would be wrong not to press the button despite the distance

aesthetic value and individuals (russow)

-individual members of species have aesthetic value not the species themselves; bengal tigers and zebras; explains our stronger feelings about endangered species; rarity increases value; we care about being individual members of a certain species in the future

treatment of the environment

-industrialized countries (North) vs third world (south) -25000 kids under 5 die every day due to easily preventable causes -the average US citizen consumes 10-20 times more meat than the average person in Africa or Southern Asia -the world's richest 20% consume about 75% of the world's energy while the world's poorest consumes only 1.5 -the middle 60% consumes about 21.9% -US alone (5% of global population) uses about 1/3 of world's non-renewable resources -effects: harms to fresh water supplies, forests, etc

attempt 4 at denying norcross's analogy

-intention: fred intends puppy suffering as means whereas animal suffering that results from eating factory farmed meat is a merely foreseen side effect -doctrine of double effect: norcross: no good that is sufficient to outweigh the bad -alter Fred's story again-even if Fred merely foresees the puppy torture, his behavior is no less wrong

moral duty to respect nature (Taylor)

-it follows from Taylor's view about the inherent value of TCLs that we have a duty to respect nature

claim 4

-it is intrinsically good for an ecosystem to be healthy, ie in some stable, robust equilibrium

warren on inherent value

-it is mysterious and defined almost all in negative terms -we are not told really what inherent value is

attempt 2 at denying norcross's analogy

-knowledge: Fred knows puppies are harmed whereas many of us are unaware of animals suffering in factory farms -norcross: challenge is to those who are aware, which now includes us

way 4 aid might harm form wenar's article: economic effects

-make it hard to for people to support their family by selling items because bringing stuff in drives down prices -having aid workers there can raise living costs -cause third world gentrification

way 2 aid might harm form wenar's article: participation

-make sure your aid fits in with country's customs or culture; can have clashing of norms -ex: female literacy-some places would not be on board

needs and interests of animals (singer)

-many people assume that the needs and interests of non-human animals are less important than human needs and interests -reasons sometimes cited: animals aren't intelligent, can't reason, aren't capable of language, etc -as singer points out, many humans aren't intelligent, can't reason, can't talk, etc

temkin's background

-member of "clean plate club" -advocate for signer's solution to world poverty -only recently convinced that pond situation is unlike real world

way 3 aid might harm form wenar's article: resource diversion

-money doesn't get where it's supposed to be because it is paid to or stolen by war lord -militia groups take over aid camp for supplies causing prolonged conflict

can we use arguments to prove anything in ethics?

-moral arguments concern what we ought to do or what is morally good (or bad) -the premises of such arguments may not rely on tangible data (such as number people that live in certain cities) but they may be supported on cases (intuition) or by reason (ex. transplant case)

how is rationality a morally relevant difference? (warren)

-morality is necessary for persons because it allows for cooperation and nonviolent problem resolution -rationality also makes us potentially more dangerous -moreover we cannot extend this mutual recognition of equality over to other creatures (cannot reason with a rat in your house)

AMC & Anderson's view

-most humans have morally relevant capacities that no animal has -some humans lack those capacities but nevertheless have equal rights with other humans -these rights are grounded in other capacities (sentience, will) that animals share -therefore, animals have the same rights Anderson's response: rights depend on social membership -Anderson ultimately defends a very qualified form of speciesism -while species membership makes a moral difference, animals that aren't members of our species still have certain rights

average utility vs total utility

-most people think A is better than B -this supports the average utility principle -the people that think B is better than A support the total utility principle

singer meets mengzi

-most people wold save kid, but not many would give money to the distant needy -why treated differently -mengzi (mencius), confucian anad chinese philosopher -king xuan and the ox, xuan saw the ox but not the sheep, similarly, xuan didn't extend his heart to innocent people -child drowning is near and would evoke natural sympathy -starving are far away -mengzi's solution: extend our hearts- familiarize yourself with plight of those starving (read articles, watch videos)

natural vs unnatural (sober)

-natural species and habitats are of greater value than unnatural ones -thus domesticated chickens are not nearly as valuable as wild chickens -question: how do we understand the term "natural" 1. natural = whatever occurs in nature *problem: we are part of nature so anything we do will count as natural 2. natural=no human intervention *problem: implies that attempting to prevent "natural" death of disease is bad and that environmentalist "restoration" projects would be fundamentally misguided

3 main subfields in ethics?

-normative ethics -metaethics -applied ethics

inherent worth (Taylor)

-not only do TCLs have a good of their own but they also have inherent worth inherent worth has 2 components: 1. moral consideration: from the moral point of view, a TCLs good must be taken into account whenever it is affected for better or worse by the conduct of rational agents 2. intrinsic value: this means that a TCLs good is prima facie worthy of being preserved or promoted as an end in itself and for the sake of the entity whose good it is

do animals have less value? (Regan)

-objection 1: animals don't have intrinsic value, only humans do -regan's reply: infants, mentally incapacitated-marginal agents -objection: perhaps animals have some intrinsic value but less than human beings -regan's reply: avoid perfectionism-appeals to marginal agents-intrinsic value cannot be rated

objections to perfectionism (parfit)

-objection 1: perfectionism is elitist: the kinds of experience part thinks are threatened by overpopulation are upperclass activities -objection 2: pick a higher good and a lower good: no amount of the lower good is better than the higher good

objection to singer's species argument

-objection: speciesism is NOT prejudice since there is some rational basis for counting animal suffering less than human suffering -problem: for any proposal, there will be some human lacking that characteristic and yet we do not think that the interests of this human being therefore count for less

wear's response to singer

-once we take into account all the ways our giving may affect those in need, it's less clear that singer's ethical and empirical premises are both true -wenar: principle draws attention to only one kind of negative effect of contributing to aid-that we may have less disposable money or time. Principle doesn't acknowledge that aid can contribute to some people being made worse -aid will possibly harm as well as help -global poverty is not like child drowning in a shallow pond -wenar's alternate scenario is saving a child running down a dock with no rails

sentience (sober)

-one reason to protect nature is that by failing to do so suffering will occur -for instance, destroying ecosystems causes animals to suffer and die *sober's reply: this is not the environmentalists concern -first, much of the environment cannot feel pain yet environmentalists promote their preservation

wenar's response to singer

-our situation with respect to the needy is unlike the example of a child drowning in a shallow pond -difficult for donors to get reliable info about the effectiveness of aid -challenges/complexities of giving aid

intrinsic value of individuals (Leopold)

-perhaps our obligation to preserve the ecosystem stems from our obligation to protect individual members of the biotic community -since harming ecosystems harms the individuals who make up the ecosystem, we have a duty to preserve ecosystems -objections on this view: it would be wrong to destroy any species (invasive or other) that is harming the stability of the ecosystem but the ecocentrism will typically judge the destruction of these individuals to be a good thing

way 6 aid might harm form wenar's article: weakened government and dependency

-population feels less dependent on government and more dependent on aid organizations -make government feel like they don't have to give as much -people get too much aid and government will no longer see role

eden approach

-problem is that it is too late to step back and let it restore to natural state alone

problems with give well

-problem is that this uses estimates like others that look at immediate, not long term or compounding effects -insufficient data to answer donor's question, give well only took into account such data as the probability that bed nets would be used, probability that they would save lives, and the budget of the project ^^ missing data, whether other organizations would supply bed nets, how much of budget empowered actors involved in corrupt government

pummer's response

-pummer argues that even non-consequentialists should be fine with imposing certain kinds of risks -1st risk of harm harm as a means to good result is risk of harm as side effects of doing good *non-consequentialists tend to think the latter is less morally problematic than the former -2nd: the way in which the risks are distributed makes a difference

attempt 5 at denying norcross's analogy

-puppies are special, puppy suffering is worse than chicken suffering, pig suffering, etc -norcross: no morally relevant difference between puppies and farm animals to ground such a claim -even so, suppose Fred only tortured stupid -if anything, we care more about putties than about farm animals but this psychological fact does not ground a moral difference between puppies and pigs

temkin's view on singer's case

-real world is more like different case *to cross bridge, you must pay toll *toll money will be used to buy bullets *those bullets would be used to kill 10 kids -singer's case is too simple *only involves 2 people *no one is harmed by saving the child

complications to risk balancing

-risks to ill and risks to healthy were simplified and unrealistic -real life cases including case of foreign aid are likely to be mixed -even in a pure case of interpersonal risk balancing, it could be that some potential beneficiaries prefer not to have that risk -in such a case, intervening anyway would disrespect the wishes which may seem morally problematic

2 key claims from cohen

-sentient animals do not have equal moral standing *"I am speciesist" -the sum benefits from using animals in research far outweighs the suffering caused to animals

problem of predation (Anderson)

-singer and Regan argue that we have obligations to animals as moral agents -probelms: there is a lot of preventable animal suffering in the wild (eg predators causing pain and suffering before killing prey, animals killed when sparring with each other -singer/regan type views seem to entail we have moral obligation to prevent gratuitous suffering in the wild (eg kill prey painlessly and feed it to predators)

the donor's question

-singer's premise implies that saying lives is relatively cheap and straightforward -this brings the donor's question to light: how will each dollar I can give to aid or each hour I can devote to campaigning for aid affect the long term well being of people in other countries? -clarification: don't expect a precise answer, giving aid vs campaigning for aid

singer vs regan

-singer: animal interests ought to be taken into consideration-in particular, human suffering does not matter more than animal suffering -regan-because they have inherent value animals have the right not to be harmed

rights and reciprocity (Anderson)

-so far we've seen Anderson's case for speciesism -because animals are capable of entering into reciprocal relations with humans, she thinks animals have some rights as followed 1. possibility of coexistence as a pre requisite for animal having rights is that the animal must be able to coexist as humans (eg vermin whose interest are essentially opposed to ours and who are incapable of reciprocal accommodation with us) 2. actual co-existtence: a prerequisite for animals having rights to life and care is that the animal ism actually co-existing in human society (pets, zoo, animals) 3. a right to co-existence: an animal has a right to be incorporated into human society when they need to be incorporated into society in order to survive 4. a right against co-existence: an animal has a right not to be incorporated into human society when such incorporation would be bad for it

slippery slope (sober)

-some environmentalists claim that the destruction of species is a kind of slippery slope 1. suppose each species matters only a little 2. then the extinction of one particular species matters only a little and so could be easily justified 3. but now, repeat thousands of times and the result is an impoverished bios[here 4. so we should reject the initial supposition and believe that each species matters a lot *sober's reply: no need to draw a line -example: vagueness in the case of balding

potential harms of foreign aid (temkin)

-some foreign aid supports agents who intentionally cause harm -eg warlords, corrupt government officials -there are also lesser known intentional harms -eg aid organizations will siphon best workers away from doing other good, workers paid for by aid organizations will leave needy homelands when aid moves -upshot: global poverty is just too dissimilar to singer's initial shallow pond example

response 1 (pummer)

-some have suggested that A+ is not better than A -collection of extremely good, basically perfect, things. Is it obviously true that adding some additional only somewhat good things to that collection always makes it a better collection? -arguably not. In fact, the result seems to be a worse collection -relies on average utility principle: if the addition of people from A to A+ brings down the average utility, this is why A+ is worse than A -objection: this implies that we could make the world better (raise the average utility) by killing off the worst individuals -parfit's reply: appeal to egalitarian principles instead of the average utility principle -everyone is equal in A but A+ has inequality

instrumental value (russow)

-species have instrumental value so we ought to preserve them -anthropocentric. version: she dies have instrumental value for us -potential scientific benefits (medicines) -potential indicators of danger to us (eg California condors and DDT) -non-anthropocentric version: species have value for the complex system which they are parts -"keystone species" *russow's response: -only some species required for anthropocentric instrumental value -often various sub-species are roughly equivalent in terms of potential for scientific benefit -moreover, we can take calculated risks -some non-keystonespecies do not provide any of these things of value (snail darter)

marginal utility

-the point at which by giving more, one would cause oneself and one's dependents as much suffering as one would prevent -the premise also allows for "deontological constraints" that prohibit us from violating certain moral rules (like killing)

intrinsic value (russow)

-species have intrinsic value so we ought to preserve them -many of us are adamantly opposed to extinction even when the species in question has no instrumental value -this is an indication that we view species as having intrinsic value -in what virtue do species have intrinsic value: diversity and aesthetics (same reason art has intrinsic value) *russow's response: diversity is not intrinsically valued-if it were, then we would have an obligation to create more and more species through selective breeding and genetic engineering merely for the sake of creating more diversity -aesthetics has a limited application as not all species are aesthetically pleasing; deeper problem: an endangered species is no more valuable than a non-endangered species of the same aesthetic significance

ethics

-subfield of philosophy -study of goodness & badness, rightness & wrongness, reasons for acting one way or another

well being (Taylor)

-subjective accounts of well being -consider the following 2 cases -a normal happy life where everything you believe is true -the very same experienced life (including some happiness) but in which your "friends" actually hate you and your loved ones are unfaithful to you -if the first life is better then its possible to lead a worse life without any change in your mental states *ie this implies that well being is not merely grounded in mental states -ie this implies that well being is not merely grounded in mental states -perhaps then we need an objective account of well being

singer's background for his argument for point 2

-support: child drowning in a pond scenario-your sacrifices aren't of comparable moral importance (bob's Bugatti from different article, saves for years, destroy car or save kid) -is there a limit? *yes, the point of

who has rights (Cohen)

-the only individuals that have rights are those who can exercise claims against one another -animals are not capable of making moral claims against one another so they have no rights -since humans are only beings of making claims against others, only humans have rights (if there are other intelligent species with relevant capacity that species would also have rights on this definition) -it does not follow that we can do whatever we want to animals (rights vs obligations)

warren's weak animal rights view

-the rights of animals vary in strength -key claim: "people are at least sometimes capable of being moved to action or inaction by the force of reasoned argument whereas nonhumans lack this capacity -rationality is what sets us apart (note: if any non-human animals have this capacity (ex great apes) then they are persons too)

radiolab "galapagos"

-the tortoise and the goats -various species of tortoises native to the Galapagos -goats were brought to the islands -goats multiplied incredibly fast and tortoises came very close to extinction -lonesome george

Regan's background

-unlike singer, Regan claims that animals have rights -basic idea: animals have inherent values just like us and thus have the right not to be threatened in certain ways

rationality and marginal cases for norcross

-various views but common denominator is human interests and or rights are stronger or more important than those of animals because humans possess a kind and level of rationality not possessed by animals -challenge of marginal cases -wherever the bar is set will be lacking in some humans and present in some animals -1st reply: marginal humans have equal status with other human's but animals don't -norcross's objection: reply says that some feature has so much moral significance that its presence or lack thereof makes a difference to whether something is morally justified or not -2nd reply: marginal humans have inferior status but we have reasons for treating them as if they had equal status -norcross's objection: this view won't be acceptable if you think marginal humans deserve equal considerations; what outrages human sensibilities is a very fragile thing

warren's view on regan's article

-warren rejects 2&3 from regan's view (all individuals that are experiencing subjects of life have inherent value & all individuals that are inherently valuable deserve equal respect and have the right not to be harmed) -warren does think that animals have rights -sentient non-persons (animals) have rights but weaker rights than people -inherent values are only defined by what its not

temkin: singer's argument, remix

-we can create argument from cases used to support it -2 assess this argument, nee to ask if it is really an analogous situation

why study ethics?

-we care about living a good life -our actions have consequences and sometimes we're unaware of the ethical implications until we've thought seriously about them -thinking about and discussing moral problems can help us to better articulate our own views and to understand others ethical commitments -more generally, thinking critically and carefully about fundamental concepts, questions, and principles are beneficial

cruelty kindness view

-we have direct duty to be kind to animals and a direct duty not to be cruel to them -we have direct duty to be kind to animals and a direct duty not to be cruel to them -perhaps a natural thought but not a full fledged view -regan's objection: one can be kind of cruel without doing the right or wrong thing (ex, kind racist or not-cruel abortionist)

motivation for consequentialism

-we often seem to presuppose that morality requires doing what brings about the best result -morality should require impartiality -in cases where common moral rules disagree, consequentialism provides guidance-eg, keep promise to friend or help stranger in need

wenar's solution

-we should be "agnostics" about the efficacy of foreign aid (the confidence from singer's articles is gone) -what NOT to do: deny the facts about aid, paralysis of analysis -what TO do: spend time investigating an aid project in depth to learn its overall impact, or alternatively, to support someone else who does this, give incentives to aid agencies to make reforms

ignorance (sober)

-we should protect ecosystems and species because we don't know which may provide great value to us -even if we cannot now point to any particular benefits of a certain species or ecosystem, there is a chance that by failing to preserve them we will lose some great benefit *sober's reply: it is irrational to believe that we ought to protect something when we have no reason to think doing so would be beneficial -mroeover, if the ignorance point is taken seriously, then we also have no idea what benefits may result from the extinction of a species of ecosystem

big questions in ethics:

-what sorts of things are good in themselves? -what makes a right act right? -how do I live virtuously?

discrimination

-whenever we assume that the needs or interests of some individuals are less wroth of consideration, we engage in discrimination, prejudice -racism, sexism, ableism

oppressive conceptual framework (gaard and gruen)

-why do we treat the environment so terribly? -historical roots: scientific revolution, change in deities, evolutionary development or, leopold's point that we view the land as something to be tamed or conquered and ewe take the master slave mentality toward it -human society is immersed in the mindset of an oppressive conceptual framework that makes relationships of domination and subordination seem normal, natural, and/or unquestionable 1. value hierarchical thinking 2. value dualisms: male female, white/black, straight/gay 3. logic of domination

objection 5 to singer: practical uncertainties

-will the money I donate really reach the people who need it? -admittedly, some won't *charitable organizations require some money *some aid will be lost or stolen before reaching its intended destination -we can allow for this when we calculate how much it will cost to save a life -even if it was a 50% chance that your money will save a life, wouldn't it still be worth it? (compare with a 50% of saving a drowning child)

objection 2 to singer's argument: group responsibility

-wouldn't it be unfair for me to have to donate substantial amounts of money -if everyone gave a little, there would be no need to give so sacrificingly -if government gave more, burden would be more evenly distributed *singer's response: our obligations depend on what's happening, others aren't giving so we are obligated to give substantial amounts -if others gave more, we'd be obligated to give less -just because others aren't fulfilling doesn't;t mean that we are excused from obligations

sample of argument by analogy

-x is morally bad/wrong -y is just like x in these relevant aspects -therefore y is morally bad/wrong

base of singer's argument

-you see a child drowning? should you save it? *yes of course -now suppose you will ruin your clothes and phone *yes! child's life is more valuable than the clothing and phone -next day, same situation in new clothes with new phone *child's life is always worth more than the clothes and the phone -continues on, always save child -according to singer, we are in a morally similar scenario -about 3.1 million kids under five die from malnourishment (8500 a day, one every 10 seconds)

utilitarianism

1 specific consequentialist theory: maximize happiness, minimize pain

objections to consequentialism

1. common problem cases for consequentialism: peeping tom, transplant, Lynch mob 2. consequentialism is too demanding: kidney to strangers 3. impartiality seems wrong in some cases: lifeboat to family vs strangers

2 ways to respond to arguments of analogy

1. deny the analogy (ie find a morally relevant difference) 2. reject the starting point

Taylor's concliusion:

1. each living thing (TCL) has an objective good of its own 2. if something has an objective good of its own then it should be given moral consideration (ie morally its ends deserve some degree of respect 3. the objective good of one living thing is no more inherent moral worth than that of any other living thing (to think otherwise is a kind of prejudice) 4. therefore we should treat all living things (TCLs) with equal respect

summary for regan's views

1. most non-human animals are experiencing subjects of life 2. All individuals that are experiencing subjects of life have inherent value 3. all individuals that are inherently valuable deserve equal respect and have a right not to be harmed 4. therefore, most non-human animals have the right not to be harmed

premise one from singer's argument

1. suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are very bad

norcross's argument

1. what Fred does to the puppies is seriously wrong 2. purchasing factory farmed meat is morally analogous to what Fred does to the puppies 3. therefore purchasing factory farmed meat is also seriously wrong

is ethical relativism true or false?

FALSE

utility monster

If a monster has a pleasure multiplier of 1000, compared to a person who has 1. We should only supply the monster with pleasure as to maximize total utility.

"Poverty if No Pond"

Leif Wenar

does Taylor reference rights?

NO

additional types of philosophy

action, history, language, law, mind, race, religion, science, technology, feminist, political

what's distinctive about environmental ethics?

addresses ethical issues concerning our ecological contexts

wenar

agnosticism

Peter singer

all animals are equal

ethical relativism

an act is morally wrong for a person if and only if and because that person's culture believes it is wrong

"Risky Giving"

Theron Pummer

ecocentrism (Leopold)

an action is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community and wrong when it tends otherwise

give well

an organization that figures out how to get most change for your dollar

metaphysics

appearance & reality, mind vs bodies, space, time, causation, god, free will, morality

non-consequentialism

denies that morality always requires optimization

agnostics

a person who believes that nothing is known or can be known of the existence or nature of God or of anything beyond material phenomena

argument

a series of sentences the last of which is the conclusion and the rest of which are premises

ethics

the good in life, right vs wrong action, kinds of value, how to act virtuously, how to think of people, etc

what argument method does Alastair nor cross use?

argument by analogy

sentientism

assuming that needs or interests of non-sentient individuals are less important than needs or interests of sentient individuals

aesthetics

beauty, aesthetic taste, and its standards, the nature and value of art, etc

cohen's animal ethics perspective:

both the strong animal rights and the weak animal rights strategies fail

famine, affluence, and morality

by singer

moral agents

can act morally; rationality is required for this

ecofeminism

central claim: industrial countries activities that negatively affect the environment stem from the mutually reinforcing oppression of humans and the natural world Gaard and gruens project has several stages: 1. identify negative impacts on the environment 2. Investigate the underlying cause of the problems 3. show that the underlying cause is the same as leads to the oppression of women 4. argue that a feminist framework is best for analyzing problems

holism (or ecocentrism)-LEOPOLD'S VIEW

collections or groups of organisms are the fundamental bearers of moral value/standing -according to holism, each species is akin to an organ in a body -explains why we think invasive species are bad

animal welfare perspective

concerned with animal suffering

animal rights perspective

concerned with animals having rights

environmentalism perspective

concerned with ecosystems

what kind of philosopher is singer?

consequentialist

consequentialists could require animal suffering for a greater good

consequentialist view on animal sufferign

Regan's objection to contractarianism

contractarianism implies that we have merely INDIRECT duties to young children and animals but this is false -when we harm a child we directly wrong the child and anyone with interest in child not being harmed -thinks duty view is not satisfactory

objection 1 to leopold's ecocentrism

ecocentrism fails to respect individual rights -suppose that humans are choking the life out of an ecosystem; if it is morally permissible to destroy kudzu to save the southern ecosystem, then it is morally perimissible ti kill human beings reply: bite the bullet -we already think it is morally right to kill animals for the greater biotic good so perhaps it is our duty to thin the herd of animals for the greater biotic good

singer dualism

either you are sentient/can suffer or you cant

Cohen dualism

either you'er a member of a species that can exercise moral claims or you aren't

Regan dualism

either you're a subject of life or you're not

are ethical claims objective?

ethical relativism-in this view, morality is subjective because it is dependent on what society believes is right or wrong versus objective which would mean they are independent of what anyone thinks is right/wrong

egalitarian principle

everyone's interests count and similar interests must be counted as having similar weight or importance

applied ethics

figuring out what being a certain thing (ie utilitarian) would mean in certain settings; putting normative ethics in various contexts

definition of repugnant conclusion

for any population full of very happy people, there's some much larger possible population full of vast numbers of people with lives barely worth living

what is it for a concept, question, or principle to be fundamental?

fundamental in the sense that we use them all the time and could hardly do without them but don't typically reflect on them-in other words, we all rely on them implicitly but philosophy discusses them explicitly

4 times; 50-200 times; 14.5%

how many more fossil fuels does it take to produce one calorie of meat than it does grain? & how much H2O? what percent of all global greenhouse emissions?

objection 2 to warren's claim about rationality

if animals aren't our moral equals, why ascribe rights to them? -why not duties to animals without rights like singer? -warrnen's reply: practical considerations (eg we tend to express moral claims in terms of rights)

premise 2 from singer's argument

if it is in our power to stop something bad from happening without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral significance, we ought, morally to do it

average utility principle

if other things are equal, it is better if people are on average, happier

total utility principle

if other things are equal, it's better if there is a greater total sum of happiness

validity

impossible for other premises to be true while conclusion is false

claim 3 in Leopold's argument for his position

in most parts of the world, we are doing things to the ecosystems 1. we are shortening the biotic chains by removing many of the links due to environmental destruction or even purposefully 2. we are introducing foreign species into the system due to an increase in transportation, exportation, etc -change has always been a part of nature but for the first time in history, it is happening extremely rapidly and is shortening the chains of the pyramid -tools have enabled us to make changes of unprecedented violence rapidly and ingrate scope

individualism

individual organisms are the fundamental bearers of moral value/standing

objection 4 to leopold's ecocentric view

intrinsic good -is it really intrinsically good for an ecosystem to be healthy? -this claim was based on the idea that it is intrinsically good for humans to be healthy but is health itself an intrinsic good? -2 people: 1 deemed in "poor health" & the other healthy -suppose that nonetheless their lives contain equal amounts of happiness, desire, satisfaction, etc -if health is intrinsically good, then the healthy person's life is better even though it makes no difference to their lives or mental states etc

holist

is Leopold an individualist or a holist

problems to cohen's modified view

is it tenable? -problem: something way above norm -cow that is way above marginal utility cases and is as smart as a 5 year old -or post apocalypse -secret experiment

what about disagreement under ethical relativism?

it does not follow from the fact that people disagree about ethical matters that such matters are not objective

premise 3 from singer's argument

it's in our power to prevent suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance by donating substantial amounts of money

epistemology

knowledge, justification, belief, certainty, and doubt, different ways of knowing the limits of knowledge, etc

development aid

long term aid, helping poor group become more self sufficient

objection 2 to cohen's view of rights

many humans lack capacity required for moral rights and yet those humans have moral rights -problem of marginal cases again Cohen responds by modifying his view: -as a species, humans have potential for things animals could never have -individual has rights if he/she members of a species that in general are capable of exercising moral claims against others -since humans in general are capable of these things, infants and mentally disabled inherit these rights too

2 components of inherent worth

moral consideration and intrinsic value

why might someone be an ethical relativist?

moral disagreement, appeals to promote tolerance

contractarianism

morality consists of a set of rules that individuals voluntarily agree to abide by as we do when we sign a contract -not an actual contract

effective altruism

mostly consequentialists, movement that attempts to take wenar's concerns to heart in addressing global poverty -core idea: do the most good you can -doing the most good you can requires knowing how to best help, including which organizations are most effective

holism

not individuals that matter but organized wholes -the view that species matter is a type of holism

objection 2 to leopold's ecocentrism

objection: ecocentrism ise too demanding -on this view, many uses of natural resources would be wrong -examples: logging just one forest -any activity which damages or interferes with an ecosystem -having children would often be morally wrong

objection 3 to leopold's ecocentrism

objection: identity of ecosystems -perhaps ecosystems that become overrun with invasive species don't get "less healthY" but instead become new, thriving ecosystems. -changes to ecosystem can be viewed in 2 ways 1. the old, healthy ecosystem is made worse off 2. the old, healthy ecosystem is replaced with a new, healthy ecosystem -underlying problem: what are the identity conditions and boundaries of ecosystems -reply: mere flourishing is. not the only important factor; stability of an ecosystem matters morally as well -most invasive species alter ecosystems in ways that prohibit flourishing in the long run and a robust diversity makes ecosystems more stable and better able to flourish longer 1. this objection misses the point: we are worried about stability in the long run 2. we are worried about biodiversity and invasive species takes this away making them bad

warren

weak animal rights perspective

individualism

only bearer of value is individuals -according to this view, our obligations are simply toward individuals so it would be equally wrong to kill a common turkey vulture and a California condor

pummer

optimism

biocentrism view

our moral obligations extend to all teleological centers of life

animal welfare/animal rights view

our moral obligations extend to animals

ecocentrism (Leopold)

our obligations extend to ecosystems -on Leopold's view, an action is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community and wrong when it tends otherwise

instrumental value (Leopold)

perhaps we should preserve ecosystems because this is necessary for human flourishing which we have a duty to promote -leopold sometimes suggests that their nature is instrumentally valuable -also speaks of preservation of ecosystems as helping to maintain the integrity and stability of biotic systems and one reason this may be good is that it is good for us to have a thriving ecosystem *objection: then this is not really ecocentrism anymore but rather only an anthropocentric and pragmatic reason to preserve ecosystems

Elliott sober

philosophical problems for environmentalism

Larry temkin

philosophy bites

hedonistic utilitarianism

pleasure and pain are all you need to take into account when making decisions; pleasure is the only intrinsic good and pain is the only intrinsic bad; do anything you can to bring more pleasure over pain

which part of singer's argument is most controversial?

point 2 (if we can stop stuff without sacrificing anything of comparable moral significance, then we ought do it) is the most controversial

characteristic of good argument

premises attempt to establish the truth of the conclusion and thus lend some support for the conclusion and give us reason to accept it

humanitarian aid

reactionary, short term

logic

reasoning, different kinds of argument, valid and sound arguments, logical language, etc

singer's background for his argument for point 3

recall previous statistics: we spend money on luxury, not on anything of comparable moral importance to health and life of those suffering

what does Taylor's view have in common with regan's argument for animal rights?

regan: because they're experiencing subjects of life they have inherent value Taylor: don't need cognitive capacity, just have to be alive to have inherent worth

what about tolerance outside of in ethical relativism?

rejecting ethical relativism does not require being intolerant

schmidtz on Taylor's argument

seems like Taylor is saying: 1. all living thing have property X (where X=telelogical centers of life) 2. Property X is morally important 3. therefore, all living things have equal moral importance According to schmidtz, this argument is invalid -it could be that there are some species that have properties Y & Z which are also morally important For instance: -X vegetative species are teleological centers of life -X+Y animal species are TCLs and capable of suffering) -X+Y+Z rational species are TCLS and capable of suffering and more (eg capable of reason, understanding and exercising moral claims, worthy of moral praise and blame)

singer's background for his argument for point 1

singer takes this assumption as accepted and presumably we do accept it

temkin

skepticism

objection 1 to cohen's view of rights

some animals are smart too -animals reason, communicate with each other, care for young, have desires and preferences, etc -thus there is no moral distinction between humans and animals Cohen's reply: objection misses the point -none of the capacities listed are relevant for possession of moral rights -actors subject to moral judgment and capable of grasping the generality of animal ethical premise in a practical syllogism

moral patients

someone whose moral rights deserve consideration; rationality is not required for a full moral status-being a moral patient does not preclude having full moral status

sober's alternative

species and ecosystems have aesthetic value -original "last human" vs "last human with art" -if there are moral reasons to preserve nature for its own sake then perhaps these are the same reasons we have to preserve famous works of art (namely because they are all beautiful) *parallels between art and nature: 1. more valuable experience to see an original work of art rather than a copy; more valuable to see animal in the wild instead of in the zoo 2. aesthetic value of an art increases with rarity; aesthetic value of an ecosystem increases with rarity 3. human interests override aesthetic values in both cases *sover does NOT specify between individuals and species having aesthetic value: general aesthetic value

regan

strong animal rights perspective

metaethics

study of what goes on in normative ethics

egalitarianism

the best thing is for people to be equal

Tom Regan

the case for animal rights

Paul taylor

the ethics of respect for nature

carl cohen's view for 2 strategies in animal ethics

welfare strategy and rights strategy

deontological constraints

the morality of an action should be based on whether that action itself is right or wrong under a series of rules, rather than based on the consequences of the action; transplant: we think that there are constraints on what is permissible for doctor to do -singer's weakened argument allows for these

premise 4 from singer's argument

therefore, we ought morally to donate substantial amounts of money

philosophy

thinking critically and carefully about fundamental concepts, questions, and principles

arguments

thinking critically and carefully about fundamental concepts, questions, and principles -philosophers use these to support claims

how can the controversiality of 2 be worked on?

this principle can be avoided all together and create an argument just from the cases used to support it: -not saving the drowning child is seriously morally wrong -ignoring kids who are dying due to starvation is morally analogous to not saving the drowning kid -so, ignoring the kids who are dying due to starvation is also seriously morally wrong

way 1 aid might harm form wenar's article: time, management, and coordination challenges

time: -developmental aid: funding dry up, become obtuse with time, reach a skill and eventually no need because of time or population shifts -humanitarian: emergency-everyone rushes, overlap or extra-some groups left out & some excess, waste management: -short term: people lack skills to use aid effectively (volunteers) -paid workers-siphon off and taken from working elsewhere in area, when you leave people might want to come with you & cause a brain drain coordination: -pay for nets where given free, redundancy -challenge between humanitarian and developmental aid: humanitarian aid could draw people away from developmental projects

cohen's view on rights

to comprehend any genuine right we must know who holds the right, against whom it is held, and to what is it a right

example of normative ethics

utilitarianism

soundness

valid argument with all true premises-you can say argument is invalid or unsound -way to object to argument

anderson's animal view

various camps on animal ethics get something right so we should try to find the proper place for each of these perspectives in our policies to take seriously all the reasons these attitudes make salient to us

Regan's objection to utilitarianism and egalitarianism

we are not mere utility receptacles

individualism/holism hybrid

we have a moral duty to maintain healthy ecosystems and we have duties to the particular individuals within those ecosystems

harm principle

we have direct prima facie duty not to harm beings who have inherent value

biocentrism (Taylor)

we should treat all living things (TCLs) with equal respect

rights strategy

we shouldn't harm animals because it violates their rights

welfare strategy

we shouldn't harm animals because it wrongly imposes avoidable suffering (singer's view)

objection 1 to warren's claim about rationality

what about non-rational human beings? -"marginal agents" are not rational in warren's sense warren's reply: -non-rational humans do not have strong rights normal human adults have but we have emotional and practical reasons for protecting them -similarly when we care for animals in a similar way (pets) we extend protections to them -not direct rights-protections because of our practical and emotional rights

Lilly Marlene russow

why do species matter

environmentalists typically claim that it is worse to kill a member of an endangered species than a non-endangered one

why doesn't individualism work for environmentalists

objection to Taylor's view

worry: when we talk about plant's goals aren't we simply anthropomorphizing -we seem to be acting as if plants have a perspective when arguably they don't -reply: Taylor says that a conscious perspective is irrelevant; what matters is that each TCL is a unified system of goal oriented activities directed toward their preservation and well-being *worry for this reply: by consider the "behavior" of salt crystals, oxygen atoms, and even magnets -many things exhibit tendencies but this does not make them "goal-oreinted" nor does it make the fulfillment of those tendencies in some sense "good" for that thing -to think otherwise is to personify that thing

anderson

writes about animal welfare, animal rights, and environmentalism; ultimately thinks each of perspectives get something right but each view is too simple