Ethnicity and Nationalism SOCANTH

David Cannadine 1983 The Context, Performance, and Meaning of Ritual: British Monarchy and the Invention of Tradition 1820-1977

David Cannadine analyzes the ceremony and pageantry of the British monarchy from the period 1820 to 1977, dividing it into four different eras of meaning. Overall, he says that royal traditions are either seen as integrative, demonstrating popular values, or are merely a mobilization of the bias of elites exploiting pageantry as propaganda. Cannadine claims he is providing a much-needed context for these ceremonial occasions, practicing Geertzean thick, not thin description, to read their meaning as a text. Even if the text, cultural form, remains unaltered, its meaning may change profoundly over time. A coronation could be a symbolic reaffirmation of national greatness, or could have characteristics of a collective longing for past glories. the manner in which a ceremony is produced may differ. Cannadine uses as his measures of analysis different features to perceive the meaning and context of traditions: the power of the monarch in relation to the government, his personal character and standing, the nature of the economic and social structure of the country, the extent and attitude towards the monarchy of media coverage, the prevailing state of technology and fashion, the self-image of the nation of its own international status, the attitude for ritual and pageantry of the capital city, the nature of how the ceremonial was performed, and the question of commercial exploitation of the ceremonials. Cannadine sees 1800s England as contemporary, modern, and industrial. He divides his analysis period into four distinct phases in the ceremonial image of the British monarchy: 1820-1870s, 1877-1914, 1918-1953, and from 1953-1977 (his present). The first period was one of profoundly inept management of the rituals, performed in what wsa still a preponderantly localized, pre-industrial, agricultural society. In 1877, Victoria was made Empress of India, and this was the heyday of invented tradition. Ceremonies stayed, with appeal present that was lacking earlier. From 1918 to 1953, Elizabeth II's coronation, the English convinced themselves that they were good at ritual because they always had been, an impression helped by a lack of other monarchies to compare themselves to, due to the Teutonics not having a monarchy. From 1953, England declined as a great power and the proliferation of technology including TV increases. The meaning of royal rituals changes, but Cannadine does not believe he is in any place to comment authoritatively on the new direction. Up to 1870, the monarchy was at its most significant in terms of real power. Monarchic further influence and aggrandizement was not allowed. the behavior of the monarch annoyed parliament and public alike from the early 19th century, and Victoria was not quiescent. By 1879, Commons was still saying that the influence of the crown had increased. During the 1st three-quarters of the 19th century, monarchs were not viewed overly favorably. George III's children were particularly unpopular, George IV especially. At this stage, the monarchy was neither impartial and above politics, nor was it Olympian and above society. Its ceremonial appeal was thus limited. In 1851, agriculture was still the primary employment of most brits, and local power and loyalty remained strong, not an Olympian monarch. The press itself was hostile to the monarchy, often targeting them in scathing editorials and insulting cartoons. The lack of photos meant that ceremonies were not widely shared among the public, so they were performed for the benefit of an elite few rather than the edification of the many. Transportation of the monarchs was also not considered extraordinarily grand, nor was London's architecture. In both transportation and architecture, a lack of concern about foreign rivalry in trivial matters coupled with a supreme confidence in their superiority in foreign affairs meant that England did not feel the need to show off and was proud of its lack of ostentation. It equated the grandeur of Paris, with the messy city of London, with its suburbs and railway stations and mean public buildings a testament to the wealth of the private individual and how its people were not enslaved by any authoritarian monarchy. The music used in the ceremonials was neither showy nor ostentatious, nor exhibiting national pride, as an anthem was not even sung at Victoria's coronation. Westminster Abbey itself was in a shambles, with a quiet organ, a poor choir, and no significant composer from England was around during this time. Monarchic ceremony was neither picturesque nor powerful. Monarchic influence and ceremony from the 1820s to the 1870s was seen as dangerous, and monarchs were personally unpopular. These ceremonies were thus more of a reaffirmation of group rights enacted behind closed doors, not a jamboree for the delight of the masses. No coherent ceremonial language as articulated, and the lack of ritualistic idiom and a syntax of spectacle characterized this period. Royal ceremonies tended towards either farce or fiasco; the undertakers at Princess Charlotte's 1817 funeral were drunk, and George IV's was so showy that it was a farce. Victoria's coronation was a squalid affair, and Albert's funeral embarrassing and outside of London. From 1860-1886, Victoria was invisible, only opening Parliament 6 times. She was not an effective symbol as to be significant, you must be seen. Gladstone himself said the queen was invisible and the Prince of Wales was not well respected, and thus the monarchy did not perform its symbolic duties. From 1870-1914, monarchic ritual appeal becomes splendid, public and popular. The monarchs retired from public life, and this helped. Other nations in Europe, Germany, Austria, and Russia, saw grandeur in ceremonies used to exalt the royal influence, but in England the grandeur was used for the opposite, to exalt the new political weakness of the monarch. The British monarchy had exchanged power in politics for popularity. Victoria and Edward VII were revered as matriarchal and patriarchal figures of the empire. In economics, urban life now asserted its importance over the previous agricultural side of things. Disorienting new technology, including electricity, steam engines, the tram, and telegram, and the railway, abounded. The news became more sensationalist, as seen in the appearance of the Daily Mail and the yellow papers. The liberal, intellectual press of the earlier period disappeared to be replaced by working-class appeal, and criticism of the monarchy stopped. Photography and printing meant that royal rituals became visible to more people. as trams, buses, and cars spread, the royal means of transportation, the carriage, became something special and significant, a romantic anachronism. These anachronisms called in memories of the old world to redress the shifting balance of the new, whereas before everyone had had a carriage and there was nothing particularly special about the one possessed by the British monarchs. From 1877, when Victoria was crowned Empress of India, royal occasions became imperial occasions, where the crown was an emblem of the British race. Victoria's jubilees and Edward's coronation were the high noon of England's age of empire, confidence and splendor of ritual, but can also be viewed as bombast and bravado, when real power was on the wane. The world was now a dangerous and increasingly global and entangled one, so the veneration of the monarchy was now possible and required where the monarch was a symbol of permanence and of national unity. In foreign affairs, England strove to be competitive during this period. The capital cities of other Great Powers were rebuilt, with monumental architecture used to show a grandeur: the Eiffel Tower in France, the grand buildings of the Ringstrasse in Vienna, Victor Emmanuel Monument built in Rome in 1911, the USA's impressive capital city monuments and office buildings. London's shabby appearance was no longer a symbol of cool remove, just one of a lack of prestige. It strove to catch up to its peers, and began the 20th century rebuilding London, as it wanted its own monumental ensemble. This was part of an international competition for measuring power by a showiness of monarchic displays. France invented Bastille Day in 1880, and even Republican regimes joined in. Alexander III, the tsar of Russia, had the most elaborate funeral ever seen in 1894. The music used in England became even more glorious and showy. Between 1890 and 1910, more arrangements for chorus of the national anthem than ever before were completed. The choirs became better, and Elgar became the first English composer of any renown since Purcell a century earlier. The English Church itself became much more obsessed with ritual display, installing new altars, new clothing for the choirs and the bishops, and using candles, all with the object of appealing to the working class, attempting to unite the populace. By Edward VII's coronation, English ceremony was at its highest state of pomp. The monarch was no longer just seen as a head of society, but also as a head of state, presented as a symbol of consensus and continuity. International relations were increasingly tense, adding incentive to the invention of tradition as a national rivalry was expressed in ceremonial competition. However, in England, as opposed to other nations, the substance of the power did not lie with the monarch. In 1887, Victoria finally participated in a public ceremony, her Golden Jubilee, and in 1897 had her Diamond Jubilee. Coronations and funerals during this period were much more smoothly executed. Edward VII loves pomp and royal displays of splendor. In his first act as king, he opens the parliament with pomp, and parades royally through the streets in his carriage. At his funeral, a new invention of lying in state at Westminster Hall was introduced. 250,000 people filed past his coffin. Elgar's "Pomp and Circumstance" new setting entered into concert hall repertoire as it was written for Edward's coronation. The public image of the British monarchy was thus transformed through the incorporation of new ceremonials and a reimagination of the old. commemorative medals were introduced that were to be worn on the left breast like campaign medals for the Queen's Golden Jubilee in 1887, and were subsequently emulated at all later coronations and jubilees. From 1877 to 1914 was the golden age of invented traditions, and the honors system was greatly enlarged. From 1914-1953, the monarchy's rituals transformed from a symbol of competitive inventiveness to an expression of continuity in a period of unprecedented change. It was grand but impartial, and repeated in a constitutional manner. the king maintained his political impartiality, and acted as a figurehead. The constitutional monarchy was completely in place. George V and VI were both personally conservative, but did not attempt to influence politics. the monarchy assumed a practice of private probity, having strong moral principles, honesty and decency, with public grandeur and pageantry. They had a grand attention to ritual in public but lived with the respectability of the middle class in private, as compared to Edward III's indiscreet private life, George VI was called "George the Faithful". the monarchy was a sign of consensus, stability, and community in changing times. The demise of the great aristocratic families left the crown isolated, and the General Strike, Great Depression, and Labour Party eclipsing the Liberal party meant that a rallying point of stability was found in the monarchy, as its most effective aspect was its restrained, anachronistic ceremonial grandeur. The media continued to treat the monarchy carefully, not insulting them. News photos and film reels were carefully edited. After George VI's coronation, the earl marshal and archbishop of Canterbury edited anything not fit for the public to see. The BBC was founded in this period, and enhances the image of the monarch as a father figure. The institution in 1932 of Christmas broadcasts let the monarch speak to his people from the comfort of their own homes, and pageants could be recorded so sounds could be heard, making state pageantry a family event. The anachronisms of royal rituals lent a comfort and familiarity in the age of technological change. The carriages and swords were the stuff of fairytales. When Elizabeth II was coronated in 1953, the royal family had to borrow coaches from a film company. In the international sphere, the royal grandeur was no longer competitive, but unique, by process of elimination. Other monarchies after WWI and WWIII turned into republics or communists states, whereas the British monarchy was seen as a continuation of tradition. The architecture of other capital cities was being rebuilt, as seen by Hitler and Speer, or Mussolini in Rome, the Req Square in Moscow, or Washington's Monuments. The buildings that were from 1910 and had previously been novel and an attempt to catch up became venerable. London was thought to be architecturally a sign of stability by the British. In contrast to the technology and emotional rapture practiced by fascist states in their public ceremonies, like the Nuremberg rallies, monarchical assemblies were dignified, with people lining up orderly. Malinowski saw dictators creating in a hurry their own symbolism and ritual and magical creeds, which contrasted with what he referred to as the "time-honored, historically-founded traditions of monarchy." The disorienting international times strengthened the appeal of strong displays of imperial power, portraying the comforting myth that England was still at the forefront in the world of great power politics. Malinowski writing about the meaning of the coronation of George V called it a public enactment of unity of empire, generating increased feeling of security, stability, and permanence of the empire. But although the empire crumbled, the commonwealth remained a reality, cohered together through the trappings of power represented by the monarchy, showing hope for the future. The meaning of ritual further developed in this period. Technology remained unaltered, and the monarch was still seen as the father of the people, and the ceremony still was splendid. Internal unrest gave to the monarchy a sense of continuity in style and tradition and permanence. The meaning changes of traditional ceremonials was again accompanied by new innovations, such as the Queens Consort taking a more significant role. Queen Mary in 1953 even lay in state, and attended the coronation of her son. Royal marriages were no longer small, private affairs, but instead involved parades through the streets of London, a ceremony and procession. Mary's wedding was not just her wedding, it was also the people's wedding, a royal wedding, in 1922. The Duke of York was the first prince to be married in Westminster Abbey for 500 years in 1923. The silver Jubilee of George V had no exact precedent, either, as nothing had been done for Victoria's 25th anniversary, but the event was a great success. People saw it as representing the Empire as a family, the monarchy was seen as a kind of secular religion. The crown was an emblem of continuity in a changing world, above sectional interests of politics and class animosities, a patriarch with probity and representation and embodiment of British values. when George VI died, the whole nation mourned, in contrast to the scathing editorial published criticizing his grandfather George IV's profligacy as monarch. Elizabeth II's coronation was the last great ceremony that conflated monarchy and empire. Her dress had embroidered emblems of dominion, and the PM's of the dominions and India were present, along with an assortment of heads of state. The attitude was that there was a new Elizabethan age coming for England, a spiritual buoyancy and belief in prestige. New commemorative items issued during this period included stamps and planting trees, innovating within a traditional mold of commemorative items. Since 1953, the meaning of royal rituals has again changed. Political power of the monarch was still limited, and most in England felt that the Queen was merely a figurehead, carrying on the traditions of ceremony, and characterizing the monarchy acting with private probity and public pageantry like a traditional Georgian monarch. the anachronistic glamor surrounding their activities still exists, and royal ceremony seems to be an antidote to and legitimation of social domestic change. The aristocracy is gone, people are no longer adhering to Christian morals, England is becoming more mixed race, people were becoming drug addicts, and more sexually promiscuous. In the face of these changing morals, the monarchy represents a symbol of national prestige and social continuity. In the international context, England had no more great world position. as its power waned, pride in the royal family grew, and it was a palliative to the loss of status, as well as a continuity with the days of British Greatness, retaining pride in the face of impotence in reality. A televized coronation shows their incorporation of modern technology. Elizabeth II was the first monarch to truly be crowned in sight of the people, an act of national communion. the television reporters still adopted a reverential attitude towards the monarchy, portraying the private probity and middle class lifestyles of the monarchy as well as the grandeur of their ceremonies. Pride in their royal ceremonies remained, but it was self-conscious of England's insignificance. Fewer international potentates came to events anymore. The decline, while real, did not matter, however, in the face of the continuation of these rituals. The British liking for pageantry since 1820 has only grown, as people convinced themselves that they are good at ritual because they always have been. Royal grandeur gave impressions of stability in periods of change, a legitimation of the status quo despite its changes. the dynamic dialogue between ritual and society will continue. The continuity which the 19th century invented traditions present themselves is illusory. The most important element of survival of traditions is a continuity unique to the UK from preserving re-WWI traditions. Innovation took place within a context of formula evolved before WWI. We must look at people and materials used to construct imaginative cultural forms to treat them as texts and interpret their meaning.

Yugoslavian Nationalism Vesna Pesic 1996

Dissolution of multinational communist federations and the ensuing armed conflicts have returned the national question to the forefront of debates...the relationship of a national or ethnic group to a state that includes multiple ethnic groups within its territory. A violent breakup of Yugoslavia in particular demonstrates the inability of the international community to rely on legal principles to avoid chaos. Yugoslavia was an attempt to addres a national question. Self determination demands of a nation asked if a national homeland where its people have experienced diaspora demand national unification and redrawing of its borders? It also addressed whether the rights of members of national minorities are able to resist the majority's formation of a new nationstate, either through seeking cultural or political autonomy, or by seceding in order to unite with their own national homeland. Yugoslavia showed that this multinational state could not resolve this question without a collapse of the state. It was a mosaic of different nations, but accommodated these differences. The interdependence of Serbs and Croats maintained Yugoslavia, but they imagined the borders of their respective states as overlapping and clashing. Bosnia-Herzegovina posed the greatest challenge to the peaceful dissolution of Yugoslavia, because both Serbs and Croats lived there in large numbers. Yugoslavia's peoples have been perceived as threats to other national groups. Croation separatists wanted an independent states, but the Serbians wanted to preserve the Yugoslavian state under Serbian rule and federalism. The Croats wanted a devolution of power for other national aspirations, including Slovenian, Macedonian, Albanian, and Muslim. The collapse of Yugoslavia in WWII could not pacify national ideologies and extreme methods became necessary to resolve the national questions. After the war, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia acted as a mediator amongst the quarreling ethnic groups. It promised subsumed national distinctions to the socialist framework. It would be national in form, but socialist in content like the rest of the Soviets. Conferring a sense of statehood on Yugoslavia's major ethnic groups started dissatisfaction with territorial integration. Serbians in particular were not happy with constitutional provisions that they saw as undermining their territorial integrity. Under the 1974 Constitution of Yugoslavia, Serbia was not included as a sovereign negotiating party. Slobodan Milosevic's Serbian Communist party clique joined forces to create a national revolution to create a unified Serbia. A nationalist movement mobilized Croatian serbs by helping to organize a meeting where they aired their demands for cultural and political autonomy. An advent of free elections in 1990 and the breakdown of the communist regime was a culmination of what had been going on for more than a decade following the death of Tito. The central state of authority was collapsing. Yugoslavia had large diaspora communities whose status would change when the state was dismembered. Serbs were the most populous group of Yugoslavia, but only composed forty percent of its total. Yugoslavian groups imagined they shared a common history of struggling to save their distinct identities and renew their lost medieval states. Pesic distinguishes between multinational and multiethnic states. Multinational states are composed of separate nations that want to establish their political autonomy in order to ensure the full and free development of their cultures. Nationalism was a weapon for power in the process of deconstructing Yugoslavia, and a prerequisite in the struggle for security among the new states that emerged from the country. After the breakdown of socialism, ressentiment occurred, a rejection of Yugoslavia as a confederation of independent states, and Yugoslavia Serbian nationalism pushed through violently. Tito died in 1980, and after this, there was a rapid acceleration during the breakdown of other communist regimes throughout eastern Europe. The balance between socialist universalism and ethnic particularism thus tipped in the favor of the latter. The national unity present in socialist Yugoslavia presumed that this multiethnic state could survive, and that the groups could live peacefully. The question of national independence was not one that ever went away, however. The Croation national question arose as soon as Yugoslavia became a state. Serbia took power after the Balkan Wars in 1912-1913, and Serbia did not agree to call the new state Yugoslavia. The name came under the dictatorship of King Alexander in 1929. Croatia wanted an independent Croatia, including Bosnia Herzeovina. Serbia entered WWI with the goal of bringing together all Serbs and Serbian lands, including those in B-H. Serbian nationalists wanted the rebirth of the mythical kingdom lost to the Ottoman Turks at the Battle of Kosovo in 1389. The dictatorship of King Alexander destroyed the liberal idea of national identity. During Yugoslavia's partition in WWIIm ethnoreligious war and genocide occurred in the fascist Independent state of Croatia, which included B-H and part of present-day Serbia. Croatian separatism and Serbian centralism have been the two central conflicts facing Yugoslavia. In post-WWII communist Yugoslavia, it was an ideological project based on a supranational ideology. Socialist Yugoslavia saw nations as a product of capitalism, and attempted to unite the groups of peoples through class. Yugoslavia used a concept of ethnonationality. The constitutive nations joined together under an ethnonational sovereignty that would later turn into the future ethnocracies. Under the Yugoslav Federation, the nations recognized included Croats, MAcedonians, Monetnegrins, Serbs, and Slovenes. B-H was recognized as a republic consisting of Serbs, Croats, and Muslims. Within the Serbian republic, Kosovo and Vojvodina were formed, both of which were granted statehood in 1974. This used two opposing principles of integration: territorial political, and ethnic. Members of other nations lived within borders of different regions, and abused the nation in the ethnopolitical sense. the serbians policy of attempting to unify all Serbs escalated conflicts in Croatia and B-H. In 1964 and the LCY Congress, Croatia denounes Yugoslavism as a chauvinist policy advanced by Serbian hegemonists. Tito held everything together wth his power. The 1974 constitution transfers power to republics, which were represented equally in the body. International relations were established within Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia precluded linking its identity with republics, calling itself an ethno-national federation. this was its first step towards dismemberment. In the 1960s, Serbia seized power and took elgislative, judicial, and executive powers not given to it constitutionally. Ivan Stambolic of the Serbian leadership in the 1980s tried to change an agreement where the Serbs were discussing with Albanians demanding republican status for Kosovo, which would then give them rights of self-determination. Kosovo threatened its territorial integrity. Kosovo was overwhelmingly Albanian, and was seen as the cradle of Serbian medieval culture, and the symbolic meaning of Kosovo had strength in arguments for changing Serbia's constitutional status. Serbians within Kosovo saw themselves threatened ethnically there, seeing Albanians escaping prosecution for raping, murdering, and killing Serbians. The serbs alleged that Albanians were ethically cleansing the Serbs, and they interpreted it as a genocide. Dispossession of ethnic Albanians and political terror is the Albanian interpretation. Kosovo demonstrated that ethnic conflicts could be invented and exacerbated through media and propaganda. In the confusion surrounding Ksovo, Yugoslavia was threatened by democracy as Gorbachev changes socialist union, and Slobodan Milosevic became the head of the Serbian communist party in 1987. There existed at the end of the 1980s in Serbia an antidemocratic coalition between nationalists from the Serbian orthodox church and communists with a nationalist army. Serbian leadership portrayed their ethnonation as being threatened by another, and this escalated tensions, trying to manipulate an ethnic threat. Reality was becoming more and more a daily fabrication based on mutual name calling and consciously crated lies. Serbia wanted a redivided Yugoslav space and created a powerful all-encompassing Serbian state. Serbian nationalism relied on cultural uniqueness, and a pervading sense of ressentiment, the dominant sentiment of being threatened and hated, in a repertoire of current and historical wrongs. It had key themes, ranging from a conspiracy against the Serbs by everyone from Tito to the Croats to the Comintern, dealing with its supposed economic exploitation by Croatia and Slovenia. the Serbs are losers because they do not have a state proper. The Serbs believed they had been exposed to genocide, and specific hatred from Yugoslav nations, and the orthodox priests inflated the number of Serbian WWII genocide victims in order to force the Croats to publicly deny these numbers. They wanted a national state, creating an identity from others' hatred, and this would make conflict inevitable. In 1991, Slobodan Milosevic acepted the right of all peoples to self-determination, but he did not accept the existing republican borders, and believed that serbs should live alone. He wanted to encourage a Serbian uprising, and from 1988 to 1889, revolutionary forces took shape. Mass meetings with millions of Serbian participants from Serbs from Kosovo participate in this nationalist and racist content. Serbia cannot get a majority of votes for presidency. the Slovenian and Croatian representatives walked out, ending Yugoslavia's communist party. Ethnic skirmishes were planned with the idea of tearing the republic apart along ethnic lines. Slovenia clashed with Milosevic, and the Serbs in Croatia were mobilized through a text published by the church that said Serbs in Croatia had it worse than Serbs in Kosovo. After communism broke down, national movements geared up, and balkanization was no longer a predictable outcome about old national questions. The breaking up of a region into smaller hostile regions. in 1990, Croatia and Slovenia did not want to participate in another Yugoslavia, while the Serbian Communist party tried to reinforce the communist regime holding Yugoslavia together. Yugoslavia's disintegration introduced political pluralism, stressing national goals over economic interests, and national states established along ethnic lines. the communists lost in a free election in April 1990, and the Serbians advocated pluralism without allowing multiple parties. Only in Serbia and Montenegro did the communist parties win these elections. In B-H, national communities did not vote for civic parties, but rather voted according to ethnic affiliation because they were afraid everyone else would do the same. Ethnicity was thus central to Yugoslavia's political life. the victorious nationalist parties spread beyond their borders, serving the interests of their conationals. Yugoslavia's last prime minister Ante Markovic had good economic reforms reducing inflation, increasing currency reserves, debt payments taking place on time, and went against nationalist politics. He just wanted a functioning state, but his arty formed too late, and was a symbol of ethnic diversity, but he failed in B-H, Serbia, and Montenegro because people were too scared to vote for someone outside of their own ethnic community. Within Kosovo, Serbia abolished autonomy, completely alienating the Albanian minority. The Yugoslav National Army intervened against demonstrators, and Albanians died. Serbia dismissed Kosovo's provincial assembly, and Albanians then held a secret referendum on Kosovo becoming its own country. Serbia prepared for a war to establish a Serbian national state, but not within existing communist borders. Federal agencies collapse, with withdrawal from the federal Assembly first by Slovenians and Croats and then by Bosnia-Herzegovina, The Yugoslavian presidency was reduced to a rump, composed solely of only Serbian and Montenegrin representatives. The war began in Slovenia, when they removed federal signs. The Yugoslavian national army came in, and the Slovenian Territorial Defense unit, then war breaks out in Croatia between rebellious Serbia and Croatian police guards, and the Yugoslavian National Army sided with the serbs and waged a war against Croatia, as it did in B-H. The right to self-determination mistakenly came to be equated with the right of ethnically defined nations and republics to secede from the federation, regardless of the mass violence such an act would entail.

Verdery 1993 Nationalism and National Sentiment in Socialist and Post-Socialist romania

After the end of the soviet union, communist movements end and national movements appear, to the astonishment of both Westerners and party leaders. Communism had not in fact resolved questions of nationality. The theory that the end of communism too the lid off of ancient hatreds is deemed an oversimplification, and the socialist period an aberration. Hatreds are standard. calling them ancient makes irrational tribal passions seem irrational, as asserting temporal distance is a technique used to make things seem inferior. The use of terms of tribalism and irrationality make ancient hatreds theory more of an ideology, not an actual analysis. The causes of history are not discounted as important by Verdery but the structure of socialist organization enhanced national consciousness, as well as new democracies and market entry and personal identity. Verdery defines a nation as linking a state, actual or potential, with subject. She identifies two types of nations, political, where a collective sovereign emanates from political participation, and ethnic, based on a common language, politics, and broader cultural identity. Citizenship only sometimes overlaps with ethnic meaning of nation. Ethnic nation is usually meaning meant in Eastern Europe, and nationalism is usually ethnic. Du to a lack of uniform ethnicity within each states, the political and ethnic meanings of nation are often at odds. The number of potential citizens exceed the membership of any particular nation, and the relationship between an ethnic nation and a citizenship relation affect democracy. Ethnic movements can also seek to include members of an ethnic nation living in other states. Exclusive nationalism is used to define borders and exclude people from citizenship and political exercises. Nationalism relevant in socialist and post-socialist ideas because it played a role in politics for over a century. In the 18th and 19th centuries, people saw ethnic movements as national, and people were excluded from citizenship status. From the 1920s-30s, nation was embedded in political discourse and institutions. Socialist internationalism tried to suppress nationalism, but it still crept back in, against the interests of Soviets or Russian domination.. The 19th and 20th century of East European states inculcated the national idea that years of the communist party rule could not completely get rid of. A nation is impossible to override as an idea in a world of nation states, as it is present in people's senses of self. The Soviet Union and Yugoslavia are each a federation, where the main national groups had their own republics, and the principal of national difference was constitutionally enshrined. The socialist party apparatus made the mistake of only allowing national organizations as the only alternative to organizing people other than the communist states, so it was an outlet for party resistance. As the central authority weakened, the power of the nationalities grew stronger. due to the destruction of other bases for political organization, the national was the only option left open. Tito and USSR bolsheviks reinforced ethnic difference and contributed to the break. Romania had many areas of mixed ethnic groups. Socialism here was a system of organized shortage. Increased centralization meant increased competition, in Romania and the USSR more so than Yugoslavia or Hungary. Personal ties, often ethnically based, and bribery, helped alleviate shortages. Ethnic preference, then, resulted in a tightening of boundaries for limited resource access and exclusion. For example, in the region of Transylvania, Romania's ethnic mix is the greatest, career is often determined by ethnicity. Hairdressing is a Hungarian specialization, and beauticians would give the limited resource of hair dye to their closest friends who happened all to be Hungarian. While this may not have been a conscious exclusion of Romanians, it resulted in lots of middle aged Romanian women with greying roots. Ethnonationalism was initially in resistance to socialism, analogue to the second black market economy. Exiting from socialism promoted national consciousness, or created or reinforced it. Party rule created political realities susceptible to symbols inherent in national appeals. Political and economic processes previously managed by socialists now put back in local hands. Land privatization, in place after socialism, resulted in making a status quo ante distribution possible. Romanians were returned land that had been given to them in 194 but prior to 1945 was owned by Germans, and Germans sued for ethnic discrimination, and won the case. It was also an important matter which ethnonation controlled the majority of the judicial apparatus, as judges would be more likely to rule in favor of their friends. As new constitutions and citizenship laws were developed, the sovereignty resided in a majority ethnonation, not with individual citizens. in 1992, one-third of citizens in Estonia were barred from participating in elections. Romanian and Hungarian minorities had conflict, as citizen rights were defined in ethnic terms, invoking performed ethnic identities of earlier nation-building and constitutional reification of nationality in the socialist period, under circumstances that obstructed the formation of civic or other countervailing identifications. The electoral process contributed to national rivalries, as nationalist organizations used xenophobic, anti-Semitic, anti-Hungarian, and anti-European rhetoric. These nationalist parties had natural allies in the former communist parties, and the main governing party, the Democratic National Salvation front, had moderate nationalist sentiments. The securitate and successor organizations sow discord among national groups, blaming Jews and Gypsies and Hungarians for all of the country's woes, instead of acknowledging the role of government policies. Labelling nationalists as communists his a way for their opposition parties to assert power and reconstruct political legitimacy and moral authority in favor of one's own more western party, but the link between nationalists and former communists was very real. Nationalists could not make a public opinion defense, so the language of marketization and reform was used by all other groups, so political opposition monopolizes it, leaving to apparatchiks the defense of the nation approach. The electoral process gave this rhetoric advantages in areas with large numbers of Hungarians. There was a high degree of political fragmentation. In the September 1992 elections, 144 parties competed. Ethnically Romanian politicians in areas with a high concentration of Romanians risked losing to a candidate from a minority Hungarian party. The Hungarians formed into blocs, and the Romanians would only be able to win if they could persuade all voters of their own ethnic group of the threat faced from the minority group. Extreme nationalist Romanian groups thus existed and originated in areas with larger populations of Hungarians. A reluctance to embrace economic reforms due to backwardness in these regions acting as a barrier resulted in a combination between nationalisms and ex communist apparatchiks. Opposition to market reforms equalled defense f national values. Members of the secret police remain strong in Romania, and the Caeusescu regime members were actually displaced. Intellectuals supported by the state, poets and artists and authors, were all supported by the state, and would not be able to keep supporting themselves without the state support, so they combined with ex-ruling apparatus to oppose democratization and support nationalism. Although the association between nationalism and privileged socialism does not necessarily hold in all countries. Nationalism does not come from an ancient plight. communist parties pursued policies to increase social homogeneity, measures to decrease income inequality, and efforts to increase pariah groups' assimilations, like the Gypsies. The Communist party wanted everyone to be dependent on the state handouts, and relied on morality as the basis of political community. The Party tried to represent the society as a whole, not different groups, the nation as an extended family with denied societal divisions. The People were portrayed as against an enemy, a simple dichotomization. the enemy could be at the border, the West, dissidents, proletarians vs kulaks, but it all boiled down into good and bad and establishing community boundaries to expel the enemy and maintain a morally pure community. After the downfall of socialism, dichotomization was still present, but in reverse. Opposition and resistance were seen as good, and the regime as bad. The grounds for community were still, however, moral, as both socialism and nationalist rule share an emphasis on the interests of the whole, an essentializing and totalizing impulse. A moral community is in this case defined by sameness rather than difference. The conception of post-socialist democracy was seen not as a western one of institutionalized peaceful disagreement, but rather as consensus, longing for pure unity. The nation, then, had become an ethnic idea, going from an us and them split to form privileged oppressors and hardworking victims, to different ethnic groups. In a socialist state, the us vs them split formed identities, and Verdery believes that a form of social bipolarity was necessary to exist: you could be one person at work, and your real self at home, defined in opposition to the party. After the diminution of socialist power, the old Them had vanished, so the identity needed reproducing, and a new enemy needed finding. Verdery cites in support of this theory of dichotomizing impulses Barth's work on us and them. The shift from socialist us vs them to ethnic us vs them was eased by seeing the communists, opposed to an ethnonation, linked with Russians and Jews, and a growing perception of the Party as a parasite, feeding into a search for a nation to expel. Nationality exists at a political level as well as at a level of individual identity. The personal identity of those in the regime involves dichotomizing the self against an other. Ethic sentiment and exclusion from a moral community were part of the Romanian self-actualization of opposition. National historiographies represented a nation of people as innocent victims, victimized by other nations. Romanians presented themselves as having been sacrificed to the Ottomans to preserve Western Christendom, as part of their lacrimogenesis. The Jews were seen as having brought communism in the first place and the Gypsies were seen as getting rich without working so hatred is for them a natural reaction. Hungarians' organization made the Romanians believe that they wanted to retake part of Transylvania. The experience of the self asa victim predisposed the Romanians to accept nationalist demagogy. Verdery saw a mere scapegoating as an explanation of nationalism as far too simplistic, instead seeing socialism as having been produced by a characteristic organization of the self, characterized by internal opposition to external aliens, compounded by a political arena where the rhetoric of stereotypes and scapegoats were useful to explain social problems. The hatred of Jews, Gypsies, and Hungarians are symbols for discussing particular kinds of social dislocation resulting in the exist from socialism. Gypsies were symbols of markets and the dislocations of social reform, as they had been successful in petty commerce, where staple goods had often been sold as at incredibly high prices. Romanians accused these Gypsies of having stolen the goods from storehouses, and after the fall of socialism, most Romanians got 2 or 3 jobs to make ends meet and were angry at the lazy, thieving Gypsies who appeared not to have any other work than black market business. The quick rates of economic change made people dislike the notion of theft, when it was actually govenrment pricing, tax policies, uneven markets, IMF austerities, privatization, and fewer subsidies that resulted in bad trade. Gypsies were htus a means of directing anger at market change. Anti0semitism existed even in Poland where almost no Jews lived. Jews were original communists, and made up a disproportionate share of the party leadership. To Romanians, Jews symbolized socialism and cosmopolitan westernism. Gypsies were just the symbols of market effects, but Jews wre seen as symbols of a western democracy and private property, as well as markets. It is easier to hate Jews than an international lending community or democracy. The hatred of Hungarians used the language of wanting to expel enemies to purify Romania. Transylvania had in part belonged to Hungary, and people exploited that as evidence that Hungarians would want to repossess the territory. Hungarians for the Romanians symbolized a loss of a feeling of wholeness that the end of party rule and their opposition to it symbolized. When the Hungarians demanded autonomy, that lapidified the feelings of fragmentation. Anti-Hungarianism symbolizes then a desire for the self and wholeness against fragmentation, which is a product of transition and a legacy of socialism. Nations entail internal homogenization and differentiating from other sovereign entities, and loyalties were created to make a population willing to go to war. The birth of a nation makes real the belief that it is a natural construction. A nation has had a variety of meanings over the history of the use of the term, from a feudal estate to a polity. Herder argues that it is not a unified political will, but a shared history, language, culture, and sentiment that should define a nation. To Herder, the nation should be a natural entity, rather than an official, or political constructed entity. Socialism thus reproduced, not caused, nationalism. communists believed that nationalities were just epiphenomena, and party rule enhanced the salience of a national idea. Nationalisms are quite different, and different phenomena are at work. The nation is a symbol and so is therefor multivocal. Wilson legitimized ethnic nation states and confused them with democracy.

Benedict Anderson Imagined Communities 1983

Anderson proposes a constructivist view of nationalism that sees it in relative contexts, as a mobile and constructed phenomenon. Anderson makes the claim that every successful revolution has defined itself in national terms since WWII, like the People's Republic of China, and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Old nations, too, can find themselves challenged by sub-nationalisms within their border. The end of nationalism, prophesied long ago by those who saw the future of globalization as assimilation, is not in sight, as it is still a universally legitimate value in political life. Anderson sees nationality and nationalism as a cultural artifact, created toward the end of the eighteenth century. It was a spontaneous distillation of a complex crossing of discrete historical forces, but that once created, they were capable of being transplanted in a variety of social terrains to correspond to a variety of political and ideological constellations. A common trait of nationalists is that believing their nations are ancient. In studying this phenomenon, we should treat it as if it belongs with kinship and religion, rather than another political ism like liberalism or fascism. The anthropological definition of a nation is that it is "an imagined political community, imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign." By imagined, Anderson means that most people will never know those in their nation, but they still see themselves as united, as all communities larger than face-to-face contact are imagined. Nationalism is not the awakening of nations "to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist." It is still a limited phenomenon, however, because even the largest nation has finite, if elastic boundaries, and beyond these boundaries are other nations. The boundaries are reminiscent of Barth's belief in ethnic boundaries. Anderson sees the nation as sovereign, because the concept was born in an age when the idea of a divinely ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm was being destroyed by the Enlightenment. The conception of a deep, horizontal comradeship that makes millions of people willing to die for these imaginings is significant. Nationalism has cultural roots, according to Anderson. The tomb of the Unknown soldier is deliberately empty, there may or may not be a body, but the tomb itself is saturated with the ghost of national imaginings. When the religious belief of the 18th century as the foundation for power ebbed, nationalism found its way in. Rulers used to be a different ethnic group than their people, but now everyone is the same, really. It is not however just a matter of a community of nations simply growing out of an replacing religious communities and dynastic realms. The confidence of the community of anonymity is the hallmark of modern nations arose when 3 fundamental cultural conceptions of longstanding lost their hold, script language offered access to the truth, and society naturally was supposed to be organized around and under high centers, and monarchs are on longer persons apart from others who ruled through cosmological dispensations. The advent of print capitalism let people rethink their place in the previous hierarchical conception of dynastic rulers. A Europe wide shortage of money led people to switch from just printing Latin, to cheap vernaculars. Latin itself became more Ciceronian instead of Church-based. The universality of the language, however, never had a universal political system, as it was fragmented. Print languages laid the basis for national consciousnesses, as they provided unified fields of exchange and communication below Latin and above different dialects of spoken vernaculars. The huge variety of dialects of French, or English, or Spanish or German etc were able to understand each other in print language, as the fixity that print provided helped build an image of antiquity. Print capitalism had this standardized language elevated to new eminence. The convergence of capitalism and print technology on the diversity of human language created the possibility of a new form of imagined community, although the formation of contemporary nation states is by no means isomorphic with the reach of particular print languages. Geography plays a role as well as commercial policies, and administrative organization can create meaning.

Ethnic Groups and Boundaries Fredrik Barth 1998

Culture is a way to describe human behavior. Ethnic units correspond to culture; on this point Barth agrees with Gellner. Boundaries between cultural groups persist despite a flow of personnel across them. Culture thus exists separate of identity of membership, so exclusion and incorporation maintain the discrete categories. Stable, persisting, and often vitally important social relations are maintained across such boundaries, and are frequently based precisely on the dichotomized ethnic statses. Cultural differences persist despite interethnic contact. Ethnic groups are formed from categories of ascription and identification by the actors themselves. Ethnic groups are largely biologically self-perpetuating, sharing fundamental cultural values, realized in overt unity in cultural forms, and making up a field of communications which is a category distiguishable from other categories of the same order. Nature in times of ethnic unities--When we classify ethnic groups based on the objective facts of culture and ethnohistory, the nit discussed is not an ethnic group. Members of the same ethnic group exhibit regional cultural divergences, as seen in the distribution of Pathan local social systems. A southern Pathan from a homogeneous lineage organized mountain area will find the behavior of Swat Pathans different from and reprehensible to their own values that they did not believe that the northern pathans were really pathan, but when the explained circumstances of the north were realized, we can no longer regard overt institutional forms as constituting the same cultural features which at any time distinguish an ethnic group. A categorical ascription is an ethnic ascription when it classifies a person in terms of his basic identity. There is no one to one relationship between ethnic units and cultural similarities and differences. Features taken into account are just the ones which actors themselves regard as significant. These include diacritical features like dress, language, house, lifestyle, value orientations, and standards of morality and excellence by which performance is judged. One cannot predict from the first principles which kind of cultural features will be made organizationally relevant. The continuity of ethnic units depends on the maintenance of a boundary. Cultural features that signal the boundary may change, and the cultural characteristics of the members may likewise be transformed, and even the organizational form of the group may change, but the fact of continuing dichotomization between members and outsides allows us to specify the nature of continuity. Ethnic boundary defines a group, not the cultural stuff that it encloses. Ethnic groups are not necessarily based on the occupation of exclusive territories, not by a once and for all recruitment, but by continual expression and validation. Ethnic groups share evaluation criteria, and highlighting differences for a judgment of value and performance. It provides rules governing inter ethnic social interactions. Prescribed relevance of codes make relations between groups stable, but also proscription to prevent confrontation and modigication. Plural society: a poly ethnic society integrated into the market place under the control fo a state system dominated by one of thee groups, but leaving large areas of cultural diversity in the religious and domestic sectors of activity. ethnic identity constrains what roles an individual is allowed to play/ Dichotomization of basic ethnic categories encourages proliferation of cultural differentieae, or social identities that will have a tendency towards canalization, and boundaries will emerge. A complex poly ethnic system, on the other hand, entails the existence of extensively relevant value differences. The complexity is based on existence of important, complementary cultural differences, which must be standardized within ethnic groups, so that ethnic interaction can be based on ethnic identities. Cultural characteristics of each ethnic group must be stable, so that the complementary differences on which the systems rest can persist in the face of close interethnic contact. Ethnic groups may have limited interdependence depite coresidence, due to a lack of competition, they may monopolize separate territories, involving resource competition, and occupy reciprocal niches. For a poly ethnic system to emerge, there have to be a relatively high stability in the cultural features associated with ethnic groups, a high degree on rigidity in interactional boundaries, and they do not imply a similar rigidity in the patterns of recruitment or ascription to ethnic groups. The Yao people in the southern fringe of the Chinese area are organized in clans and villages in extended family households, and ancestor worship is important. People can be bought and adopted to kin, then ritually assimilated, or Han Chinese men can marry into Yao families and uxorilocally remarry. 6 to 8 people are the best for maximizing the household as a productive unit. Pathans become Baluch and not vice versa, and this transformation can take place with individuals but more readily with whole households or small groups of households. Economics play an important part. The tribal council, the jirga, is the main stage for the display of hospitality, and when Pathans become Baluch they may spill into Kohistani area. Baluch clients cannot speak in tribal councils, so declaring oneself Pathan guarantees failure in performance. Assuming Kohistani or Baluch identity lets someone become more socially relevant. The Fur in Afghanistan in Darfur. The agricultural Fur in the Sudanese desert become nomadic cattle herding Arabs, a process again based on economics, due to a lack of investment opportunities for capital in the village economy in contrast to the possibilities among the nomads. Accumulated capital and the opportunities for its managemenet and increase provide the incentive for Fur households to abandon their fields and villages and change to the life of the neighboring Baggara, economics again driving culture. In the Middle East, property and production is private transferrable property, but in Darfur, land is allocated to a member of the comunity, so the owner and cultivator distinction is not as easy to make. Fur agriculture then requires village ethnic identity. Grazing rights are not allocated and monopolized, even as between Baggara tribes. Access to Baggara jams up grazing monopolizations, so everyone can graze their animals, and a man can access production by practicing a certain way of life, either Fur or Baggara. The Fur and Baggara are not in a stratified system since they utilize different niches, but in Pathan areas, stratification exists based on land control. Polyethnic stratified systems exist where groups are characterized by differential control of assets that are valued by all groups. In India, there is a stratified polyethnic caste system, where individual failures lead to outcating and not downcasting. Hierarchy can be downcast, but sanscritization, when lower castes emulate rituals and practices of upper castes to achieve social change, can occur, and critical value scales defining their position in the hierarchy of ritual purity and pollution is the only change of values to become an indian caste. Ascription is not conditional on asset control, but on criteria of origin and commitment, where performance in the status, and the adequate acting out of the roles requires assets. To back up ethnic claims you need its tools and resources. Differences and cultural variations show that the typological schematism may be difficult, but the continued use of ethnic labels and the overall difference is what matters--what is surprising is not the existence of some actors that fall between these categories, but the fact that variations cluster at all. Minorities are a preestablished cultural contrast that is brought into a conjunction with a preestablished social system, and is made relevant to life there in a diversity of ways. Pariah groups are rejected through condemned behavior. Gypsies are breakers of basic taboos, as their identity represented an inescapable disability that prevented them from assuming the normal statuses involved in other definitions of the situation of interaction. Pariah boundaries are maintained by exclusion of the host population, and minority situations only have a trace of active rejection, but the general feature of all minority situations lies in the organization of activities and interactions. Minority has access to only some. Minority member is given no basis for action. A drastic reduction of cultural differences does not correlate with a reduction in the organizational relevance of ethnic identities. New elites in industrialized groups with more dependence and access to goods, becoming incorporated in reestablished industrial society, accepting minority status, emphasize ethnic identity, using it to develop new positions and patterns. Contemporary ethnic forms are prominently political. Proliferation of dichotomizing ethnic groups show the importance of ethnic forms, and opposed parties become structurally similar, differentiated only by a few clear diacritica. Much of the activity of innovators is concerned with codification of idioms and selecting signals for identity and the assertion of value for cultural diacritica, and suppressing or denying the relevance of other differentiae, and some historical traditions can be justified and glorified. colonial regimes have administration divorced from locally based social life, so there is ethnic contact that doesn't need shared understandings, and these ethnic boundaries have differentiated and complementary values. he existence of genetic nationalism is wrong, and is functionalist. However, specific boundaries prevent the interchange of genetic material so people can insist reproductive isolate is the unit. The continued organizational existence with boundaries mark it off as a continuing unit, but phyletic lines should still be able to be drawn for ethnic groups.

Anthony D Smith Nationalism 2010

Ethnic identities and communities constitute a large part of the historical and social background of nations and nationalism. Nationalism and the existence of nations is a taken for granted structure of international relations. It is ubiquitous and ever-present, and can hold people in millions of places. It inspires people and resonates in ways that only religions had previously captured, paying attention to symbolic elements. Nationalism goes back to Herder at the end of the 18th century. Its first use was in 1836 in English, but was rather equated with national egotism. Nationalism is defined as a "process, formation, or growth, of nations, a sentiment or consciousness of belonging to the nation, a language and symbolism of the nation, and a sociopolitical movement on behalf of the nation." IT emphasizes cultural gestation and representation, requiring 'rediscovery and reimagining of its history', vernacular language, literature, arts, and crafts, as seen in frequent cultural and literary renaissances associated with the nationalist movement. It has tangible and vivid characteristic signs, whose meaning is not for outsiders, like flags, and anthems, coins, passports, academies. These show that the symbolism of nationalism is based on global comparisons and a drive for parity in a visual and semantic world of nations. The ideology of nationalism within ideology is important, as the nation's wellbeing, autonomy, unity, and identity define it. Nationalism is an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy. It can, however, be seen without nations, as in postcolonial states. It is not always just about independence, but also a link to cultural and societal preservation. Nationalism highlights popular sentiments, such as a lived community, and it is thus performative as much sa imaginative, requiring action as well as history, study as well as philosophy. Celebrating national heroes or soldiers is a common signal. The substance and endurance of a nation lie in its repeated consequences. The objective factors like language, religion, customs, territory, and institutions, and subjective factors, like attitudes, perceptions, and sentiments are relevant. Stalin says that the nation is a historically constituted stable community of people formed on the basis of common language, territory, economic life, and psychological makeup manifested in a common culture, which is an objective view. Benedict Anderson has a subjective, constructivist view, seeing a nation as an "imagined political community--and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign".

Ethnicity Lecture Notes

Ethnicity has its influence in Victorian social science. Important thinkers include Frederick Barth. Ethnicity had a ubiquitous presence from 1972, when it was first featured in the OED, as it was used quite commonly to refer to what was often viewed before as cultural or tribal, including processes and well-instituted institutions and categories, now an instituted administrative category in many states. It is sort of common sense in that different places are inhabited by different people who have distinctive cultures, clothings, lifestyles, religions. In the victorian conception, early and primitive societies were rooted in biological kinship. As HEnry Maine put it, the history of political ideas begins in fact with the assumption that kinship in blood is the sole possible ground of community in political functions. Marx wrote about the basis of social organization evolving from blood to soil, kinship groups to a territorial arrangement. Until reorganized by the state, distinctive people lived in different places, with their own cultures, languages, religions, etcetera organized by kinship. So cultures were seen as bounded, self-contained systems, described as tribes. From tribe to ethnic group in early to mid 20th century, anthropologists were concerned with studying tribal societies. The word tribe was used by colonial administrations for all sorts of groups and categories. It became clear that theories of primitive society then could not be applied to these varied groups, and by the end of the 20th century, the word tribe came to be sen as a self-fulfilling orientalist prophesy in which vague notions of outsiders are essentialized, according to southall. Anthropologists were on the lookout for a term that would work with the varying groups described for tribe, a terms that could do the same intellectual work, and ethnic group became a substitute term, popping up in Barth's seminal work "Ethnic Groups and Boundaries". An ethnic group is a largely biologically self-perpetuating group sharing the fundamental cultural values, and forming a field of communciation and interaction. Memers identified by themselves and others as belonging to a distinguishable category. These groups are a unit, exclusive others, but the model actually prevents us from understanding ethnic groups because it acts as a natural barrier, although it is actually not. Barth wrote about the Yao, an officially recognized minority, several distinct languages within the group. 10% of the Yao population actually comes from the nearby Han Chinese population. The Yao and the HAn mix to bring the number of workers up to optimum levels, and this happens by the adoption of children from han families, and men marrying in by uxorilocal marriage where the man moves into the woman's locality. Barth also wrote about the Fur and the Baggara in Darfur and Sudan. The Sudanese civil war dates back to the 1980s, and the warfare was waged by ethnic militias. The Sudanese Liberation Army was largely composed of the Fur, the agriculturalists, and the Janjaweed was composed of the Baggara. The Baggara were pastoralists. Previously, Fur had been able to become Baggara by accumulating enough cattle and moving into a Baggara area, an economic identification. The qualifiers necessary, were to speak Arabic and to intermarry and attach themselves to Baggara encampments. The Pathans, or the Pashtun, are a quite varied widely spread out group, considered an elite category in Afghanistan who own land. It has no distinctive language, as lots of other ethnic groups speak the same language. They live largely in the north of Afghanistan, and the Baluch live largely in southern Afghanistan. Pathans could become Baluch because it is easier to become the dependent of a Baluch ruler rather than trying to remain an independent Pathan, as it was not always easy to retain the trace of nobility that a Pathan was supposed to have ,so a Pathan might swear fealty to a Baluch nobleman. Ethnicity in our heads is a very particular and rather contrived for construction, and historical cases force us to question our assumptions about a definition of ethnicity. Barth wants to emphasize the content of ethnic categories changing as personnel shift from one group to another, and cultural traits as well that might be associated with the category also change. Barth's point is the content, the cultural characteristics, of ethnic categories is changeable. People and items often flow between the groups. Members may be more dissimilar than similar, but the boundaries between group A and group V remain. Cultural boundaries remain, the ethnic boundary defines the group, not the cultural stuff that it encloses. The ethnic boundary canalizes social life. Interaction both requires and generates a congruence of codes and values. Once you have the cultural boundaries, people are supposed to act within certain cultural expectations. Barth's approach is pragmatic and instrumentalist. There are practical consequences to reifying a social category because membership entails access to certain relationships and resources. We should look to the interests of actors to see why they might emphasize or overlook boundaries. Control of resources is generally political "when political groups articulate their opposition in terms of ethnic criteria, much of the activity of political innovators is concerned with the codification of these idioms: the selection of signals for identity and the assertion of value for these cultural diacritica, and the suppression or denial of relevance for other differentiae". It would be in the interest of political leaders to emphasize cultural traditions, and so the interest lies behind the recruitment and attachment. Since 169 there has been a growing interest in the political processes that make categories ethnic, and their boundaries. Still, though, these are merelt social constructions, but they are objectively important. Looking at Yugoslavia, from Pesic's history, Yugoslavia was part of the Ottoman empire from the 15th to the 19th century. Both Muslims and Christians lived in Bosnia, and the Austrian occupation occurred in 1878. Bosnia became part of Yugoslavia in 1918. Tito's Yugoslavian republic had six countries in it: Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia, Montenegro, Macedonia and Bosnia Herzegovina. Within the Yugoslav state, there were three official classifications of people, the narodi, Serbs, orthodox Christians, who were descended from Austrains. Croats Roman Catholic Christians. The Muslimani, or the Muslim Yugoslavs, turned a religious category. The village of Dolina from 1978-1988 was observed by Tone Bringa. In her ethnography, she questions the easy answers as to why ethnic conflict broke out, pointing to the mixed attitudes to question serb, croat, and muslim identity. The elderly generation attached some importance to different ethno-national identities, but the middle generation believed that the ethnic identity was unimportant. The Younger generation, however, saw the attitude becoming increasingly important. In the town, the city children's knowledge of the ethnicity and nationality of schoolmates was a new concept. The Croat HVO military started shelling the village, and some Catholic Croat villagers started to turn on their Muslim neighbors. Bringa points out that ethnicity was a state socialist administrative category that took on a new form of Post-Tito politics. Political leaders pressing for separate republics, ethno-national identity becomes central in the new conflict over control of territory and land, and new ideas of ethnicity are attached to idea of territory and land. In Dolina, language was shared, but religion was different. The particular ethnicities were historical administrative products. Ours is now a long globalized world where wide networks of trade and communication have expanded through neolithic times. The old style of victorian social taxonomy goes out of fashion in the 20th century, and the ridiculousness of the mode of thought becomes apparent. The formulation of an alternative paradigm is rather slow and emerging. Cultural identities are just names attached to groups of people, and states are influential in attaching these names. Once something is formalized and legal consequences attached to something, it is incredibly powerful, and the state is one of the most powerful agents in instituting arbitrary social constructions and making rules that make them anything but arbitrary and constructed.

Barnard and Spencer Ethnicity by Sergey Sokolovskii and Valery Tishkov

Ethnicity was not mentioned in anthropological literature or defined until the 190s. It is now given more currency due to rise of ethnic minority activism, used to explain phenomena like social and political change, race relations and nation-building. Three understandings of ethnicity include primordialist, instrumentalist, and constructivist. Primordialists see it as deep attachment to group or culture. Instrumentalist approaches see ethnicity as something that leaders can exploit to further their own political interests. Constructivists see the fluidity of it, specific to a social and/or historical context. Primordialist theories are objectivist, nad believe it is real, either as a biological phenomenon or as a product of culture and history. Evolutionism sees it based in genetic and geographical factors. Inclusive fitness describes altruism as reducing individual fitness, one's genetic transmission to the next generation, while increasing kin group's fitness, helping more of one's relatives to reproduce. his tendency to favor kin over non-kin is nepotism, or kin selection. Reciprocity is cooperation amongst distantly/unrelated people where when nepotistic behavior won't work, will enhance genetic fitness and transmission. Ethncitiy is a comprehensive form of natural selection and kinship connections, is present still in industrial societies, according to van den Berghe. Explicit primordialism used in Soviet and Russian anthropology. Herder's neo-romantic concept of the Volk, a unity of blood and soil (Marx) was seen in Shirokogorov's work as defining ethnos as a group of people who speak the same language, admit common origin, have a set of customs and a life style preserved and sanctified by tradition, which distinguishes it from others of the same kind. Primordialism thus sees an ethnos forming due to myths and geography. Instrumentalist approaches to ethnicity see it as remnant of preindustrial society decreasing in significance. The advance of the modern state and assimilation would overcome it. Ethnicity was until 1970s defined structurally, through linguistic, religious, and racial characteristics, treated as givens, or bases of ethnicity. The objective and perceived differences between the various groups in a society served as a basis for production of a distinctive group identity, which created space for relations to other groups and political mobilization. Was thus defined in terms of cultural structure of society, and the common observation that not every cultural group develops an ethnic identity could be accounted for in the concept of latent or silent ethnicity. this is seen in the works of AD Smith. This has its roots in sociological functionalism, ethnicity is a product of political myths created and manipulated by cultural elites in pursuit of advantages and power, with cultural forms as resources for elites in competition for power, symbols and referents to create an identity. Sometimes it was a means of recovering lost ethnic pride, defeating alienation and alleviating emotional stress as a therapy for trauma, and have utilitarian values. The psychological instrumentalist approach can be seen in Michael Stewart's the time of the Gypsies, and the political approach can be seen in Gellner and Eriksen. Constructivist theories treat ethnicity as an ascription classifying a person in terms of most general and inclusive identity determined by social organization, manipulation of identities and situational character, allowing anthropologists to concentrate upon situational and contextual character of ethnicity, ad seeing more clearly its basis for political dimensions and structuring intergroup relations and serving as basis for political mobilization and social stratification. Barth in 1969 formalized this relationship, and Verdery continued it. Postmodern constructivist paradigms see ethnicity as negotiating multiple subjects over group boundaries and identity. In the process of renewed sensitivity to the dialects of the objective and the subjective in the process of ethnic identity formation and maintenance, the negotiable character of ethnic boundaries was stressed as too reminiscent of objectivist tendency to reification. Barth suddenly is seen as still connoting a fixed identity, using terms like group, category, and boundary. Cohen defines it as "a set of sociocultural diacritics, physical appearance, name, language, history, religion, nationality, which define a shared identity for members and non-members' and 'a series of nesting dichotomizations of inclusiveness and exclusiveness'". Constructivist theories are sensitive to context, and let us study ethnicity within contexts of different levels and horizons, transnational, nation-state, between and within groups, as seen in Wallerstein for transnational and Barth for between groups in ethnic boundary maintenance. The specific experience of the post-communist world contains a plethora of examples of constructed and mobilized ethnicity, so an integration of the constructivist and instrumentalist perspectives is called for. The understanding of ethnic sentiment as an intellectual construct engendered on the basis of historical differences in culture, as well as myths, conceptions, and doctrines that are formed from the deliberate efforts of elite strata to convert myths and mass emotions into programs for sociopolitical engineering is a synthesis of instrumentalist and constructionist perspectives.

Ernest Gellner Nations and Nationalism 1983

Gellner is a classic theorist of nationalism, and one of the primary thinkers of the modernist tradition. "Nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that political and national unit should be congruent". Nationalist sentiment is the feeling of anger aroused by the violation of the principle, or the feeling of satisfaction aroused by its fulfillment. A violation could include the presence of foreigners, a boundary that doesn't include everyone, or a diaspora. Ethnic boundaries within a given state should not separate the power holders from the rest. Gellner sees the possibility for a large number of potential nations, but not all such nations present viable states. Territorial and political units can only become ethnically homogenized if they kill, expel, or assimilate non-nationals. Max Weber's belief that there is an agency within society which possesses the monopoly of legitimate violence. Ethnocentric implications include a well-centralized western state, which constitutes a division of labor. Nationalism does not arise for stateless societies. Nationalism is based on an accepted definition of the state, and arises only when the existence of the state is taken for granted. The problem of nationalism arises only for some states. Modern man sees its contingency, but can visualize the state of nature. Nations, like states, are a contingency, not a universal necessity. Two men are of the same nation if they have the same culture, where culture" means a system of ideas and signs and associations and ways of behaving and communicating, and if and only if they recognize each other as belonging to the same nation, a category of persons or language speakers or territorial occupiers become a nation when they recognize rights and duties to each other in virtue of their shared membership." Gellner believes neither definition is accurate. We cannot adequately account for the aetiology of the subject, the investigation or attribution of the cause or reason for something, often expressed in terms of historical or mythical explanation. Industrial society is the only society ever to live by and rely on sustained and perpetual growth, on an expected and continuous improvement. High productivity requires a complex and defined revision of labor, and men located within the system cannot generally rest in the same niches all their lives, and they can only seldom rest in them, so to speak over generations, and positions are not transmitted from father to son. The illusion of social mobility is provided. Agricultural labor systems, are, hoewver, more complex than industrial societies, because industrial societies have interchangeable laborers, and a major part of the training in industrial society is generic, not specifically connected with the highly specialized professional activity. It is the most universally standardized education system. Specialization in industrial society rests on a common foundation of unspecialized and standardized training. One-to-one socialization occurs face to face in industrial society, turning infants into adults similar to those in the preceding generation. This segmentary in anthropology reproduces independently. The segment is simply a smaller variant of the larger society, in anthropology. Modern industrial society, on the other hand, exo-educates, so that everyone becomes the universal norm. In modern industrial society, no sub community that lacks its own independent educational system can any longer reproduce itself. The level of literacy is so high that it cannot be provided by the kin or local units, but only by something resembling a modern national educational system. The monopoly of legitimate education is nor more important and more central than the monopoly of legitimate violence. When this is understood, then the imperative of nationalism, its roots, not in human nature as such, but as a certain kind of pervaisve social order, can also be understood. Nationalism does not have a deep rooted existence in human psyche, but is rather the organization fo human groups into large, centrally educated, culturally homogeneous units. The age of modernization is an age of universal high culture. The educational system which guarantees mobile social achievement has become large and is indispensable. A man's education is by far his most precious investment, and in effect confers his identity on him. Modern man is not loyal to a monarch or a land or a faith, but to a culture. Culture is now the necessary shared medium within which alone the members of society can breathe and survive and produce. Only the state can create this machine of cultural education. The age of transition to industrialism was bound to be an age of nationalism, according to Gellner. Nationalism does not always work out. Its attempts are to endow a culture with its own political roof, but GELLNER DOES NOT DEFINE A CULTURE ADEQUATELY TO MAKE THIS JUSTIFICATION. For every effective nationalism, there are infinite potential ones of groups defined either by shared culture inherited from the agrarian world, or by some other link. Nationalism recognizes cultural homogeneity. Poor newcomers are almost always spurned, but their children might not be. Cultures dissolve geneticism. The misguided claim of nationalists is that nations are there in the very nature of things, only waiting to be awakened. It really is the new form of social organization, based on deeply internalized, education-dependent high cultures, each protected by its own state. It uses some of the pre-existent cultural traits but it cannot use them all. The idea of nations as a natural, God-given way of classifying men, is a myth, that sometimes invents preexisting culture, invents a culture, or obliterates preexisting cultures. Ethnic or cultural groups are used interchangeably, and are just units constructed on the principles corresponding to the new division of labor. Nations will persist as communities, but education transmitted ethnicity exists. Ethnicity enters the political sphere as nationalism when an economic basis requires homogeneity, and cultural class differences are not tolerated. Useful nationalism can be constructed to establish a model of power. Education and modern high culture are treated as interchangeable. In trying to define culture, he just says that it is the distinctive style of conduct and communication of a given community. Diacritical marks between one ethnicity/culture and others are visible and acentuate the differences in educational access and power, and sometimes when they inhibit the free flow of personnel across the loose lines of social stratification. Gellner identifies three essential factors for nationalism: power, education, and shared culture. These are folk cultures which with a good deal of effort and standardized with sustained propaganda, can be turned into a rival new high culture.

Alan Patten Herder and Nationalism 2010

Herder is considered a cultural nationalist by most, but is also a political nationalist. He identifies nationalism and is the first to use the word, seeing it as a strong attachment to one's own nation that turns into prejudice against others. He defends the rights of all nations and condemns nationalist aggression, and believed in the point of having an own language and culture. Isaiah Berlin alleges that Herder's nationalism was never political, and that people can and should determine its own cultural path, but he did not draw political commitments. Herder did not claim that every nation should have its own state, but he does call for a nationally bounded state. Collective decision making within a state iworks best when citizens share similar views of individual happiness, which to Herder works best in nations as nations have their own mode of representing things. He makes a mistake, however, in that nationalism is handed down from father to son, meaning that nations are natural arrangements and not culturally constructed. He uses objective factors of environments, economy, climate, and social isnitutions to provide a clustering of individuals with similar beliefs in what is required for happiness that then form into nations. Herder saw a man's identity connected by a spiritual genesis and education from parents and with all his countrymen. Herder also attached importance to language, letting the vernacular awaken the nationalist sentiment inherently present within us. This awakening is directly contradicted by Gellner. Language also acquired through learning, and is a transmission mechanism for intergenerational transfer of ideas. Language for Herder defines a nation and he believes it is separating features of nations. He also associates nations with a traditional territory, not necessarily the one that they are resident at the time of nationalism, but an original territory that imprints itself in people's early sensibility thought, and language, and this get passed on from generation to generation. Herder addressed national hatreds and prejudices, and believed that European imperialism would awaken national feelings of resentment among subjugated peoples. The nation was not, for Herder, defined by a desire for self-government, but is rather a unit of tradition, passing on a language, character, thought process, and set of myths. It is a space for socialization.

Ethnicity and Nationalism Thomas Hylland Eriksen 1993

Weber believed that nationalism and ethnicity would disappear as a result of modernization, industrialization, and individualism, but after the second world war, they have only been increasingly important, as seen as internal conflicts in Sri Lanka, Rwanda, Congo, and Bosnia. Eriksen cites the Huntington in saying that future conflicts would take place in the fault lines between civilizations, which are similar in conception to a nation. Not all ethno-nationalist struggles are violent, such as the Quebecois movement. Nation building is high on the political agenda of former colonies. Ethnic minorities within Europe and North America due to labor movement and refugees, as well as indigenous populations, are politically organizing. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, issues of nationhood came out with unprecedented force. Nationalism in the EU sees social cohesion increasing, but right wing nationalist parties are gaining traction at the European elections in 2009. Europeans are afraid of cultural standardization and a loss of national identity. A Pan European identity was propounded during the Danish referendum on the Maastricht Treaty establishing the EU in 1992, showing that personal identities were ultimately linked with political processes and that social identities for example as danes or Europeans were not given once and for all but were subject to negotiations. Ethnicity first showed up as a term in the OED in 1972. Ethnos, its origin, was used until the mid 19th century to refer to racial characteristics, and in the US it came to describe settlers after WWII. In the relations between ethnicity and race, race is deliberately placed in commas to see that it is not a scientific term. Due to so much interbreeding between human populations, the distribution of physical traits follows no clear racial boundary, and there can be greater genetic variation within a supposed racial group than there is systematic variation between the two groups. However, concepts of race still inform actions. Race exists as a cultural construct, whether it has a biological reality or not. The object of study is the notion that race exists, in other words, its social construction of race. According to Pierre van Den, Race is a special case of ethnicity, but others see ethnicity as about capturing a conception of one's own group, an 'us', whereas race is about capturing a 'them', a negative term of exclusion. Ethnicity, however, is not necessarily any more benign of a classificatory term than race is, as Yugoslavian and Rwandan categories are ethnic. Ethnic identity relates to language and appearance. IF someone looks different from a dominant group, an ethnic identity becomes an imperative status. Ethnic differentiation entails the notion of inborn group differences, and can also exist without racial differences. Muslims, Catholics, and Orthodox in Bosnia maintain their ethnic differences without reference to separate racial origins. Ethnic groups, however, can change ethnicity and culture more easily than race and can ultimately become assimilated into a dominant group. Genetic difference thought is stronger in racist thought, but cultural uniqueness notions are stronger in ethnic categorizations. Nationalism stresses the cultural similarity of its adherents, believing that the political boundaries should be coterminous with cultural boundaries. Most ethnic groups do not demand control over a state, and when they do, this ethnic movement turns to a nationalist movement. There is no necessary foundation for national identity however rooted in ethnicity. Ethnicity differes from social class, and Marx saw that economic classes defined different groups, whereas Weber saw status groups rather than classes as fighting, and ethnicity does not necessarily refer to rank and may be egalitarian. Ranking can, however occur due to ethnicity as a result of imputed cultural differences, so there could be a correlation between ethnicity and class. Certain jobs could be only open to members of a certain ethnic group, and ethnic groups could potentially be ranked hierarchically in societies. Ethnic groups can be ambiguous, relying on language, political organization, and territorial continguity, but ethnicity can be different. Ethnicity can't be defined with reference to objective cultural features, but is rather emic, a category of self-ascription or a native point of view. Ethnicity can also be etic, referring to analyst's concepts, descriptions, and analyses. For ethnicity to arise, groups need to have contact with other groups and must entertain ideas of each other as being culturally different. Ethnicity is thus an aspect of a relationship, not a property of a group, and requires definition of others as separate. Protonations are ethnonationalist movements, including the Tamils, Kurds, Sikhs, Basque, Quebecois, Brittany, etc, and are territorially based and are differentiated according to class and educational achievement from the main group within their nations. Eriksen defines ethnicity as an application of systematic distinctions between insiders and outsiders, us and them, an institutionalized relationship between differentiated categories whose members consider each other to be culturally distinctive, but the characteristics and categorizations are fluid. Eriksen distinguishes between ethnic groups and cultural groups. Shared culture is not necessarily the basis of ethnicity, but rather social interaction and organization than the cultural content. Eriksen supports Barth's model of putting the focus on the boundaries that delimit a group, and not the cultural stuff that those boundaries enclose. Boundary maintenance is not unproblematic but does not involve racial, cultural, social separation and language barriers or organized enmity. Focusing on uniqueness of ethnic groups wrongly supposes that groups are isolated. Barth believes that ethnic study must account for maintenance and consequences of the boundaries. The groups must be defined from within from the perspective of the members, choosing categorical ascriptions that need to be acknowledged by the agents themselves, so the discontinuity between ethnic groups is social, not cultural. Barth believes that the boundaries too are a social product that can change through time, and cultural differences are thus relevant only if we choose to make them so. The Yugoslavian civil war shows the relativity of ethnic boundaries. Since 1945, there was peace between Serbs and Croats, and the rate of intermarriage was high. They did however us a different script for writing, Cyrillic and Latin for Serbs and Croats respectively. The Croats claimed the Serbs were imperialist, and the Serbs claimed the Croats were fascist. Ethnic boundaries that had been dormant for decades were activated, and the presumed cultural differences which were previously considered irrelevant were remembered. National borders between Croats and Serbs resulted after the break up of Yugoslavia. Eriksen quotes Gellner in saying that "Nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist". The study from tribe to ethnic group relativizes an us/them dichotomy, since ethnic groups can exist amongst selves and others, whereas tribes do not require another group to exist. Distinguishing nations from ethnic categories is necessary. Eriksen defines Gellner in linking an ethnic group to a political boundary, ethnic ideology claiming their group should dominate a boundary. Nation states would thus use ethnic markers of identity like language or religion. The nation in Benedict Anderson's vie is an imagined political community, imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign. It is imagined in that people who define themselves as embers of a nation may not need to meet people to feel that they are in community with them. Anderson is compatible with Gellner because both of them stress that nations are ideological constructions trying to forge a link between self defined cultural groups and state, and they create abstract communities of a different order from those dynastic states or kinship based communities. Anderson does not to the same extent as many thinkers discuss ethnicity, but instead primordial loyalties and solidarity based on common origins and culture. Socialist states tend to be nationalist, but Anderson uses polyethnic countries are his examples. Ethnic identities, however, tend to attain their greatest importance in situations of flux, resource competition, and boundary threats, so it makes sense that political movements associated around loyalties and solidarity are strong in societies undergoing modernization. Eriksen draws parallels between ethnicity and nationalism in that both are not natural, and the assumption of links between ethnicity and objective culture are constructions. Anderson claims that nationalism gets its force from a combination of political legitimation, and emotional power through creating loyalty and a feeling of belonging. Multivocal symbols are amenable to different interpretations and can both divide populations and unite them. Both Gellner and Anderson stress that nations are a modern idea. Nationalism relies on supposed ancient traditions shared by the ancestors of a nation, but that does not guarantee the recreation of that tradition. Eriksen details Norwegian nationalism as a process of myth creation. It led to a separation from Sweden in 1905, moving peacefully to full independence. Norwegian nationalism began in the urban middle class; in a kind of Arcadian atavism, the bourgeoisie went to remote valleys in search of 'authentic' culture, and they popularized folk costumes, painted floral symbols, traditional music, and peasaant food. City dwellers reified aspects of peasant culture as national culture and the heroic history was thus established. National arts and music is a typical projection of national identities. Edvard Grieg popularized folk tunes, or Wagner in Germany. Peasant culture was reinterpreted and put into a context that Nowegian culture wsa distinctive, that Norwegians were a people on par with others, erecting ethnic boundaries between them and culturally similar Swdes and Danes, thereby emphasizing urban and rural Norwegians belonged to the same culture and political interests. Urban-rural solidarity is characteristic in nationalism, and the idea that the aristocracy now belongs to the same group and culture as peasants, a solidarity between propertyless and capitalism, is stressed. Standardized educational systems, industrialization, enlightenment, ad its romantic counter reactions are all mentioned in connection with the deevelopment of nationalism. "Small words rather than grand memorable phrases" according to Michael Billig make up the stuff of national belonging for a great number of people: coins, stamps, turns of phrase, a banal nationalism that continuously strengthens and reproduces people's sense of national belongings. Vernacularization was also an important tool of new nationalist movements. Nynorsk was based on Norwegian dialects instead of Danish. Floral patterns were mediterranean, fiddle music came from central Europe in origin, and the typical folk costume was actually designed by the nationalists. The meaning of reified practices changes presumedly typical ethnic symbols in nationalism and this is intended to stimulate a feeling of nationhood. Ntionalism is an attempt to construct bounded cultural objects. the dDanish prince who became king of Norwy was rechristened Haakon VII as a way of creating a sense of continuity twith the dynasty of kings that ruled Norway before the collapse of the medieval Norwegian state. Nationalism is often seen as emerging as a reaction to industrialization and uprooting people from local communities according to Gellner. Economics and policies replaced kinship, feudalism, and religion, in an Andersonian large-scale imagined community. Again according to Gellner, the new industrial system of production required the facility to replace workers, making cultural homogenization a thing, due to standardized skills. Nationalism was useful as a tool to create cohesion and loyalty among individuals participating in social systems on a huge scale. In America, cultural homogenization occurred as traits were identified as American, but ethnic groups still survived. Nationalist ideology must be politically effective to survive. On a large-scale, it should make people feel a moral duty to the survival of their country. Communications technology facilitates standardization of knowledge and representations. Anderson emphasizes print capitalism as an important condition for nationalism. Newspapers, television, and radio played a crucial part in standardizing representations and language. The internet, however, Eriksen does not believe has contributed to global cultural homogenization, bt rather contributed to long distance nationalism involving secessionist and diasporic groups, as bonds can be forged between people who would be otherwise isolated. Maps can be a concise and potent symbol of the nation, as country maps present it as bounded, observable, and an abstraction of something which has a physical reality. AD Smith argued that nationalism has profound roots in earlier ethnic communities or ethnies but it would be misleading to claim that there is an unbroken continuity from pre-modern communities or cultures to national ones. In a study of violence and Nationalism in Sri Lanka and Australia, Bruce Kapferer describes nationalism as an ontology, a doctrine about the essence of reality, drawing on religion and myth for symbolism, which is often violent. Like other ethic ideologies, nationalism lays claim to symbols which have great importance for people, and argues that these symbols represent the nation state. Viewing people who die in war as martyrs shows that nationalism can be a kind of symbolic religion. Nationalism appropriates symbols and meanings from cultural contexts which people will understand, and is depicted as a form of kinship, offering security and continuity. Successful nationalisms imply linking an ethnic ideology with a nation state. Where the boundaries that should be coterminous with a culture is a difficult question. Nationalism can occur in opposition to a state, with a minority inventing its own nation. Linguistic standardization through the spread of the official French language was an important part of hte project of creating equal rights and opportunities after the Revolution, but linguistic minorities like Breton were threatened during the dominant French language. It is simplistic to say that language forms a part of an identity, but the Breton language was used as an anti-French political strategy. It was illegal to speak Breton in public, and now it is not. By using Breton in public, the Breton were signifying that they did not acquiesce to the French political domination. The Breton did not demand independence like Catalans in Spain, who are the wealthiest. Nationalism is constituted in relation to others, as the idea of a nation presupposes that there are people who are not members of that nation. Kapferer wrote about Sri Lankan ethnic violence. The Sinhalese-Tamil conflict made use of Sinhalese myth in cosmology and in every day life. The Vijaya myth and the Dutugemunu legends is the main Sinhala myth of origin: a prince comes from India and slaughters a lot of demons to conquer Sri Lanka. and the Dutugemunu from a later period tell of a Sinhalese leader who conquers the Tamils. The Sinhalese dominance over the Tamil minority is thus based in foundation, where the Sinhalese are a dominant nation and the Tamils are inferior. The nation can be born out of a rite of passage where it must fight adversaries, another or the enemy within. The cosmological origin myths of the Sinhalese served as a rationalization for the use of force. The importance of the Other is demonstrated by Kapferer in the formation of ethnic identity, and illuminating the mediating role of symbols in ethnic ideologies. The other allows for the justification of the power structure and the motivation to make sacrifices for the nation. The problems of ethnic boundary maintenance are usually studied in relation to minorities. Nationalist ideologies hold that social and cultural boundaries should be unambiguous and binary, congruent with spatial, political boundaries. Ethnic cleansing in Yugoslavia and Rwanda is an attempt to eradicate anomalies from these deviations. Nationalism without ethnicity can exist, as seen ni Mauritania, which is a pluralist society. Mauritanian nationalism is specifically non-ethnic in character, as its mosaic of cultures has been reified in the identity politics of the island. Every main ethnic group on its independence today presents a typical song or dance from cultural repertoire, so the imagined nation is a mosaic, and the school system has pupils learning their own language as a foreign language. The nation is imagined thus as a supra-ethnic community, transcending rather than endorsing ethnicity. English was selected as Mauritius's national language as a supra ethnic compromise. The selection of boundary markers is arbitrary in that only some features of a culture are singled out. Ideologists always try to select and reinterpret aspects of a culture and history that help legitimize are particular power constellation. African nationalism had no precolonial state to be revived, and the only African state to have ever collapsed institutionally, Somalia, is also one of the few mono ethnic ones. Shared ethnic identity is thus not sufficient to build nationhood. In polyethnic states, some degree of compromise between constituent groups is needed. Nations often tend to be dominated y ethnic groups that deny their ethnic identity, instead presenting themselves simply as citizens or humans, and either relegate others to a minority status or assimilating them. Polyethnic societies can occur where nationalism is present as a universalistic ideology based on bureaucratic principles of justice. Nationalism can thus be frequently presented as a supraethnic ideology guaranteeing formal justice and equal rights for everybody. The duality between the nationalism of dominating and a dominating ethnic group can result in hegemonic group being percceived as a universalist rather than a particularist ideoolgy. the Janus face of nationalism is such that a conflict between ethnicity and nation often arises.

Barnard and Spencer Nationalism Jonathan Spencer

Nationalism is the political doctrine that believes humanity can be divided into separate discrete units, nations, and that each nation should constitute a separate political unit, as a state. A nation is defined with people with a shared culture, ethnicity, language, sometimes religion and history. These people have a political claim of self-determination. Nationalism begun with Herder, a neo-Romantic German poet who was active in the second half of the 18th century. Herder and Ficthe are the original German Romantic philosophers who propose the idea of nationalism, and also developed the proposition of culture. Nationalism acs as a reminder of the idea that people can be naturally classified as belonging to discrete bounded cultures, boundaries as developed by Barth, has serious political ramifications, especially the natural aspect. Boas acknowledged the influence of Herder and attempted to do battle against the conception of race, but his method of doing so as inadequate. He tried to substitute culture and did not question that people naturally belong to only one culture. Marx and Weber treat nationalism as a self-evident feature of the world as they assume that states exist. Anthropologists did not really consider nationalism as a topic until the 1980s. the growth of nationalist separatist movements in peripheral areas of the West, including Scotland, Quebec, Brittany, and Basque country, as well as civil war and violent separatist movements replacing nation building in former colonies, in India, Sri Lanka, Southeast Asia, and East and Western Africa saw that postcolonial nationalism must be addressed. The later collapse of Soviet rule in Eastern Europe that was followed by nationalist and separatist conflict, incredibly violent in the former Yugoslavian republics, also necessitated its study. Gellner's Nations and Nationalism, published in 1983, remains especially important for the study of nationalism He links nationalism and modernity, as he see that industrial society is based on a necessary cultural homogeneity that allows for continuous economic growth. In order to guarantee this homogeneity, the state controls the process of cultural reproduction through mass schooling. Nationalism for Gellner is the argument for the political preeminenece of culturally homogenous unit. Gellner is however critiqued as being a positivist. Benedict Anderson's Imagined Communities, also published in 1983, sees nationalism as a modern phenomenon, but more focused on nationalism as a mode of political imagination, needing analysis like religion or kinship. His thoughts had the most notable impact on anthropology. Nationalism, to Anderson, is imaginary. Often nationalism's rituals and symbols are more analyzed than nationalism itself as a phenomenon to mobilize people in modern societies. Anthropologists should not however use relativism to conceal their political engagement with the subject of the study.

Nationality lecture notes

There is a common sense view of nationality and importance. Nationality is an important concept. An estimated 5 million people have died in the DRC, showing that it can have very real concept. The nation state and its ideology became incredibly important. Starting with the French Revolution, a new political construct for the legitimacy of the state is the French Revolution, overthrowing feudalism in the name of the people. The French decided that the Gauls represent the people. Herder was a Romantic thinker, who separates nations. He saw the nation as an aspiration, writing, Speak German, O you German! He comes up with a notion of separate nationalities, saying that "providence has wonderfully separated nationalities, not only by woods and mountains, seas and deserts, rivers and climates, but by languages, characters, and cultures.". In Germany in the 1750s, Herders' time, the Holy Roman Empire included a range of people speaking different Germanic languages and dialects, many mutually incomprehensible. Hochdeutsch, or high German, was learned almost as a foreign language and was only widely spoken in the 19th century. there was no united homogenous political German nation to correspond to these proto-nationalist sentiments. Until relatively recently, the misquote of Holy Roman Emperor Charles V was "I speak Spanish to God, Italian to Women, French to Men, and German to my horse". It shows that in Europe amongst the upper echelons, multilinguality was incredibly common. Language was early on the clear and obvious sense of what nation and nationality might mean. The construction of the nation was in part a project. The German nation was in part a response to the rise of Napoleon. History became the story of nations. Ernest Gellner wrote nationalism and nation states. He said they appeared i the modern industrial society, which was not a coincidence. Before modern industrial societies, a hereditary literary elite that was different from the agricultural producers who might speak a range of dialects. In the pre-industrial agrarian society, the more differentiated in style of kinds of the various strata are, the less friction and ambiguity there will be between them. Genetic and cultural differences are attributed to what were in fact merely strata differentiated by function. To gel along, the difference increased The most important factor of the agro literate society is that almost everything in it militates against the definition for political units in terms of cultural boundaries. The people would be different from the rulers. In the traditional milieu then, an idea of a single over-riding cultural identity makes little sense. You weren't one nationality, and different cultures were within one real. Gellner argues that industrialization led to nationalism. You want homogeneity in an industrial society. Workers need to all be able to d the same kind of tasks and be able to read the same manual. They wanted an interchangeable, trainable, and mobile workforce who is loyal directly to the state. Vast, anonymous cities existed. What Gellner argues is that a system of cultural diversity and local loyalties is moved to a system of cultural uniformity with national loyalty and national languages. Education and mass literacy increase the loyalty to the state and enforce uniformity. Students in a system of mass education could be made to read and write in a national language, filtering ideas nationally instead of locally. High culture selected the features of the national culture. The elite strata of the modernizers may choose a language related to an elite, and may select on cultural features that the agrarian society uses. The modernizing elites may identify an alien ruling class, and the ancient regime may be rejected by this new up and coming elite. Through the processes of education the new elite push down their culture and ideas. The elite forms such as Hochdeutsch and the King's English are examples. Nationalism is about entry to, participation in, identification with, a literate high culture which is coextensive with an entire political unit and its total population, according to Gellner in 1983. Nationalism is a political principle which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent with Gellner in 1983. Nationalism is not the awakening of an old latent dormant force it is in reality the consequence of a new form of social organization. A.D. Smith proposes a new theory of ethnic origins, the ethnie as a proto national unit. Under certain conditions, ethnic communities evolve nationalism, which is a statement of a common sense proposition. Gellner came up with a fictional European countyr of Ruritania, in a fictional empire of Meglomania. Peasants who live there speak a range of dialects, aristocracy and officials speak language of Megalomanian court. Industrialization and population growth occurred. Peasants are drawn into factories and towns, giving them a relative disadvantage. as rustics speaking an obscure language. The newly educated elite become journalists and teachers. They develop a Ruritanian nationalism, a standard language, and a writing system. Although sincere, their nationalism resulted in better positions for them in an independent Ruritania. Although sincere, their nationalism resulted in beter positions in them for an independent Ruritania. The 20th century repubcli of ruritania would be a state socialist government, with an official history showing a glorious fake history, a rural hero, a national hero, a national artist, a national anthem, and is a formula for nationalism in Europe. Post-Soviet states have undergone a process of nation state formation under Soviet guidance. The states all have former rebel leades as well as national artists. Katherine Verdery, writing about Romania and post-socialism in Eastern Europe writes about ethno nationalism, combining Gellner and AD Smith into her theory. After the collapse of the state socialism, a new politics of exclusionism emerges, we don't want to share resources and national categories, as they have political significance because of past administrative practice. With collapse of the state socialist system, land was privatized and sold to individuals and families. Land was divided up and returned to Romanian families, not earlier German owners, but just passport holders of Romanians. As Verdery says "the essence of ethnic identities is a dichotomization into us and them through a process analogous to moral dichotomization in socialism". In Romania now, Gypsies, Jews, and Hungarians have been identified. Even when Caecescu

Hobsbawm 1983 The Invention of Tradition Intro

This book details the effects of invented traditions in different nations. Hobsbawm defines invented tradition as a set of practices governed by overtly and tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature which seek to inculcate certain values and norms by repetition, automatically implying continuation with the past. Revolutions, as well as nation-states, might have their own relevant past, but could have a cut-off date, like 1789. The historic continuity with invented traditions is largely factitious. Responses to new situations which establish their own past by quasi-obligatory repetition. The purpose of invented tradition is a constant changing and innovation of the modern world, and these traditions are attempts to achieve certain things as unchanging. Traditions strive for invariance, and to appear fixed and formalized. Hobsbawm distinguished between tradition and custom, saying that custom can have changes, and is an established practice that is given the sanction of perpetuity to defend it. Custom, he writes, is what judges do, whereas tradition is the paraphernalia and ritualized practices surrounding the substantial action. Some practices aren't invented traditions, but still require invariance which gets in the ay of flexibility. Well-known weakness of routinization or of bureaucratinization is that these can change quite easily. Traditions and pragmatic conventions are inversely related, changing an army hat when one provides more protection counts as a pragmatic change, but changing hunting garb to a non-pink jacket would be a tradition. Inventing traditions is a process of formalization and ritualization characterized by reference to the past, if only by imposing repetition. This includes Nazi symbolism, and Nuremberg party rallies. IT is not just a conscious selection of traits, but can also evolve informally over time. It often occurs when rapid transformation of society weakens or destroys social patterns that old traditions were suited to. Old models can be reinvented for new purposes, thus novelty disguises itself as antiquity. These are novel constructions, for novel purposes, but built from ancient materials, providing an elaborate language of symbolic practice. Ritual complexes are often constructed, including festival pavilions, flag display structures, monuments and temples, which are the locations of different types of ceremony practices. These practices themselves could include dinners, toasts, delegations, or other baroque forms of celebration display and pomp. Many institutions that we think of today as historically continuous had their stories invented by semi-fiction, such as Boadicea, or by outright forgery. A national anthm, England's is the earliest in existence, from 1740. National flags, are all variations on the French revolutionary tricolor from 1790-94. The nation personified in a symbol or image, such as uncle Sam, is another invention. Other topoi, formal themes or tradition, selected, include carols by the English middle class. Carols stopped being created in the 17th century, but were revived but church collectors, and sung by boys on the streets. These carols thus had a new meaning from old materials. Even traditionalist movements thus have novelty. 19th century liberal ideology of social change tried to set itself apart from tradition. Thus, it systematically failed to provide for social and authority ties that were taken for granted. Rejecting the old ways too quickly is not necessarily good. Hobsbawm distinguishes between three types of overlapping invented tradition, those established or symbolizing social cohesion or group membership, real or artificial communities, those establishing or legitimizing institutions, status or relations of authority, or those whose purpose was socialization and inculcation of beliefs and behavioral events. Traditions can serve different purposes for different groups. Some see invented traditions as letting some feel more equal than others, like the pre-bourgeois ruling groups, or the moralized gentry of British public schools, whose mandarinate esprit de corps was reinforced and developed by esoteric distinctions. Hobsbawm draws a difference between old practices and invented practices. Old practices were specific strongly binding social practices, and the latter are unspecific and vague as to the nature of values, rights, and obligations of group membership. Even if the concept of Britishness, or Americanism is ill-defined, the practices are compulsory, such as standing up for the anthem or the pledge of allegiance. These are examples of the invention of emotionally charged objects and signs of membership. However, invented traditions occupy a small space in the place of old societal traditions. The idea of conforming entirely to "what is done" structures our lives much less now than external compulsions of bureaucracy, economy, and technology that don't rely on or develop tradition. There is no weakening of tradition in the civil service, or in citizens' membership of states. Situations where we are conscious of our own citizenship, like flag raisings, elections, or images and music, are invented. Vernacularizations of the mother tongue is merely a metaphorical imagining of this mother tongue, as standardizing the language smoothed out traditional regional dialects and variations, contradiction the national claim to be a natural entity. Hobsbawm believes we should study invented traditions because it shows our human relation to the past as it is used as a legitimator of action. Revolutionary movements attach a status to the past. Invented traditions are relevant to the contemporary innovation of the nation and nationalism, and are deliberate and innovative social engineering. Israeli-Palestinian nationalism must therefor be novel, despite long-standing Judeo-Islamic tensions. Hobsbawm believes this concept would be novel because the idea of states in their region was un-thought-of, and not a prospect until World War I.

Pathan Identity and its Maintenance Frederik Barth 1969

The Pathans have a segmentary state system without centralized institutions in adjoining areas of Afghanistan and West Pakistan, over a large ecologicaly diverse area. Limited knowledge of other peoples within their group and adequate information cannot be disseminated, so the aggregate is not an undivided and distinvtice single ethnic group. The Pathans have different traits in the different regions they live in. The Pathans live in agricultural villages, irrigation villages, and have castes of servile and tenants. Some are nomadic, and some practice labor migrations. Diversities do not impair the Pathan self-image as a characteristic and distinctive ethnic unit with unambiguous social and distributional boundaries. The Pathans care about patrilineal descent, Islam and Pathan custom, the Pashto language, and a necessary and diacritical feature, living by a code complementary to Islam, male autonomy and egality, self-expression and aggressiveness in a syndrome which might be easily summarized under the concept of honor. The Pathan self image has three domains of activities, melmastia, hospitality, jirga, councils, and purdah, seclusion, or the organization of domestic life. Hospitality has a specific place, and shows that the host can exhibit his management, surplus, and his responsibility. Wealth for the Pathans is not for amassing but through hospitality, converting to influence over other man and commanding their respect by seeming honorable. This influence can be exercised in the jirga, a meeting of men that makes common concern decisions. It is an egalitarian assembly without a speaker of leaders and demonstrates the voluntary nature of the Pathan social contract. Seclusion, or purdah, stresses the virility and primacy of male society. A male is dependent on and vulnerable through his woman, so a seclusion of the females occurs. Ethnic identity remains one that is highly valued by members also in contact situations. The Southern Pathan boundary is one where Pathan descent groups face Baluch tribes along a territorial border. no significant ecological difference in territory. Baluch tribes operate in their political system under a contract of political submissions with chiefs and sub chiefs. Assimilation from Pathan to Baluch can take place through clientship, and Pathans assume a serf status. The Baluch, however, do not become Pathans, as it is a one-way process and people do not want to be Pathans. Any Pathan who loses his property and through war or crime is torn loose from social moorings will be drawn into a Baluch political structure, and the Baluch like this because they can collect influence as chiefs having more followers. The participation of Pathans in this Baluch structure results in a loss of Pathan identity because a diacritical feature of that identity is participating in the egalitarian political contract. In the west, the Pathans move their agricultural farms and animals into the Hazara area, and have established themselves as a dominant landholding group in a poly ethnic system. There are groups of dependent castes. In the barren southern hills, it dos not seem to make sense to have dependent serfs, but in the richer agricultural areas, it does. This motivates western Pathans to act as landowners and patrons. Political autonomy in these circumstances is founded on land ownership. When these Swat Pathans lose their land, they also lose their position. Pathans thus integrate into other groups in a political system without assimilating them. this multifaceted integration reduces the us vs them divide, Pathan vs dependent dichotomy. Pathans move from the East into the Indus population, and establish themselves as landlords. In doing so, they lose their Pathan identity as the plains are under the sway of centralized governments, and for geographical and tactical reasons they can be controlled by armies directed from urban civilizations there. Pathan landlords can only come truly to terms with such superior powers of these governments by destroying what represents the basis of their social identity, the councils and the autonomy that is the basis for Pathan self-respect. Without participating in the jurgah, a Pathan is not really a Pathan at all. North of the Pathan territory is the Kohistani area. Several groups escaped from southern territories into the Kohistan region, and in doing so, Pashto disappears and they become Kohistani. Kohistanis seclude their women more, but also have autonomous councils, dress differently, and all have long hair. Pathan who are driven off their lands can go to Kohistan and become land owners there. These Pathan are not as hospitable as the traditional Southern Pathan, so they change to having a Kohistani identity because it is easier not to be judged as a Pathan. Superficially, it is true that ethnic groups are distinguished by a number of cultural traits which serve as overt signals of identity which persons will refer to as criteria of classification, such as clothing or geography, but in reality, ethnic dichotomies do not depend on these. "Ethnic identities function as categories of inclusion and exclusion and of interaction, about which both ego and alter must agree if their behavior is to be meaningful". The most important Pathan trait is autonomy, which can manifest itself differently. Individual boundary crossing and change of identity, takes place where a person's performance within one ethnic category is poor and alternative identities are within reach. In most cases actors change their own label to avoid the costs of failure. Only a few are in a position where they cling to their old ethnic label under adverse circumstances. When the Rom who could not act as Rom moved into the chicken yard, where they were to act as Christian Hungarians, the Magyars, those who did not give up their Rom identity felt shame and were isolated from both groups.

AD Smith 1986 The Ethnic Origins of Nationalism

The most important variations between nations are determined by historic experiences and by deposits left by collective experience. Importance is attached to myths, memories, symbols and values so explicated. Roots of nations are found in historic models of ethnic communities. Nationhood can mean wanting equal recognition in international relations, but new states could want to claim ethnic legitimacy. This can be done by 'rediscovering submerged or lost ethnic roots in the mists or immemorial time'. We take our nationality to be self-evident, but it is really made up of populations bounded in political space. There is no collective purpose possible without myth. ethnic communities are solid and insubstantial at the same time. To look at the foundations of a nation requires treating them as more precise. A nation is not primordial and outside of time, nor is it a wholly modern phenomenon. Myths and symbols form its corpus, and these from preindustrial time can take on new meanings. Objective factors like population size, economic resources, communications systems, and bureaucratic centralization help create foundations that influence states that help mold nations. The qualities and character of the national community that emerges also need subjective factors, like the permanent cultural attributes of memory value, myth, and symbolism. Religious conditions were necessary for the perpetuation of a culture. Nations need a history and a destiny to overcome death and futility, relying on legends of a golden age and past to let the nation locate itself. Monuments of nature and history and a hero cult keep disenchantment at bay and shape a new nation through maps and moralities. Between ethnies and modern nations, the means have changed, as the continuing relevance of reinterpreted past of ethnic identity in the maintenance of nations demonstrates. The historical and sociological framework for the study of nations is important, as national identities exist within a long history of group identities. Structural approaches don't work from ethnicity or natural sentiments, and meanings also change. The nation is often treated as a human constant, but a rise of states that would not necessarily be termed nations by classical definitions, like India and Nigeria, as well as tribal assimilation challenges, results in doubt over nationalisms, and national sentiments. The danger that nation states of small or medium size will be overpowered by multinational companies and technological and military transformations is a real and potent issue. A nation is a contingent phenomeon, a product of developments like capitalism. The modern view of nations sees it dating just to teh 2nd half of the 18th century. the Wallerstein world systems theory says the creation of strong states within the world system was a historical prerequisite to the rise of nationalism, both within strong states and in the periphery. Wealthy western European states conquered African and Asian states, imposing a peripheral ontrol through economics and politics resulting in resistance, and within home-state boundaries, ethnic hinterlands as well as peripheries were taken advantage of, explaining Basque, Welsh, and Quebecois nationalisms today. Another theory of modernism, a more political and instrumental version than Wallerstein's, sees ethnic and national units as offering sites for generating mass support in the universal struggle of elites for power and wealth and in a world of scarce resources and high levels of communication, ethnic symbols and boundaries evoke greater commitment. Barth supports this instrumental modernist view, combining economic and political goals with cultural affect. Ethnic and national communities are often superior to classes in providing resonant bases for mobilizing and coordinating mass action to pursue policies or power. Border guards and boundary mechanisms separate and differentiate social groups in attitude and perceptions. Anderson is a modernist. He believes that communication mechanisms under the novel technology of print capitalism have made it both possible and necessary due to the decline of religion and the rise of the written word to imagine a nation as a sovereign and limited community. This sense of nation evolkes a sense of immortality and community for people who can imagine themselves connected to millions of others they will never meet, and this serves psychological as well as economic needs under the modern conditions of secular capitalism. Gellner, yet another instrumental modernist theorist of nationalism, believes that agro-literate societies had no place for nationalism, and that elites and the producers were separated along cultural lines. Modern societies need cultural homogeneity to function, and the mass education system, that is both public and compulsory, socializes us into a workfore of interchangeable cogs. The industrialization and modernization processes proceed unevenly, uprooting villages, eroding traditional structures, and placing people in urban environments with competition for scarce resources and class conflict. During this process of uprooting and urban socialization, visible and persistent diacritical marks surface during that time period that result in protracted and often violent skirmishes. These marks include race and religion. Gellner and Anderson both believe in the contingency of nationalism. Nations and nationalisms are offshoots to them of modernity and modern civilization. They cite this ideology as dating from the 18th century, and AD Smith agrees. Nation states were not brought into being until the 19th century, and the national character was not an idea until the romantic era in the late 17th century, although there were parallels in ancient egypt referring to the nubians as well as the greeks and romans and mesopotamians talking about different peoples. Primordialists such as shils believes that nations are ethnic communities based on language, religion, race, ethnicity, territory, and other such natural units of history. ethnicity is an extension of kinship, is the sociobiological version. Language, religion, race, ethnicity, territory are basic organizing principles of nations and are primordial because naturally they preced more complex political formations and allow a foundation for the construction of a antion. Primordialists see nothing modernabout nationalism as the traits will continue to divide us. Smith distinguishes between two claims of primordialism, that nations are perennial, and that they are natural. He says that nations can be perennial without being natural. Nations to him are just expansions of earlier traits, like kinship and group belonging. Perennialism does not do an adequate job of explaining nationalism. Once can concede collective cultural ties existed in antiquity without, however, assimilating them into a continuum from collective culture to nation. symbolism and mythology are what Smith wishes to stress as important. Smith acknowledges that a historical base of nationalism is important, as the themes and forms of nationalism have been prefigured in earlier periods. Herejects however a break in sentiments proposed by modernists and an enlargement proposed by perennialists, the ethnie, or the ethnic community and its symbolism. He believes that changes of form and collective units and sentiments occurred within a context of a framework of loyalties and identities, which conditioned the changes as much as they have influenced the framework. The ethnie states that collective cultural units and setiments of previous eras, modern national units and sentiments. The form, identiyt, myth, symbol and communication are distinguished as important. A form can have changes in meaning and symbolic content, but the mode of expression remains the same. Molds of form and expression typically remain constant and within an ethnie. Identity is the collective self as seen through history and myth and symbols of a community's heritage, situational ethnicity, socialization experience. Myth/symbol/communication holds that shared meanings and experiences and crystallizations as sacred languages and texts, religious shrines, art and architecture, laws, hierarchy (political, civil, and military) and a whole range of crafts are important. The symbols Barth would emphasize include border guards dichotomizing us and them. Many modern ethnies are transformed into nations. cultural forms like sentiments and perceptions are expressed and codified in myths, memories, values, and symbols. The core of ethnicity to Smith is myths, memories, values and symbols, and in characteristic forms or styles and genres of certain historical configurations of populations. the emphasis is laid on the myth symbol complex, and the myth of the ethnic polity. Myths and symbols are the main substance of an ethnicity, not military or class or geogrpahy, summarized as the yth symbol copmlx, mechaniss of diffusion throughout a population, and transmission to future generations, if one ants to graps the special character of ethnic identities. Ethnie is a fairly durable construct and can persist under the vicissitudes of time, forming molds within which all kinds of social and cultural processes can unfold. Only in exceptional circumstances do ethnic vehicular forms break down, and this is more common for the ethnie to alter qualities of ethnicity so that community change may be inferred or for both internal and external cleavages and pressures of assmiliation and absorption. Demographic change causes cultural change, such as a new population as a ruling majority, or a radical break with a mythomoteur complex overwhelming the old culture. Modern nationalisms often seek to revise myth-symbol complexes, defining ethnicity, and suggesting a continuity that is thus greater than instrumentalists thought. Historical ecidence suggests the ubiquity of the ethnie, but this may be just because the special interests of the literatie in preindustrial periods could be to promote ethnic causes. In order to forge a nation, Smith believes it is vital to create ethnic components. Mdern nations and older ethnies can combine, as well as nations emergine on the basis of an enduring ethnie, or using cultural markers from nearby where not ethnie exists. Durkheim agrees that older types of social structure and culture persist within most contemporary modes of social organization and culture. nations can be based on ethnies tansformed, or ethnies can have nations constructed with an invented pedigree. Nationalism is wholly modern as an ideology and movement, even if the mdoern nation incorporates several features. Ethnic roots must be respected by elites in order to achieve short-term objectives, and cultural forms determine to an extent our goals as well as the means we have of achieving them.

The Politics of Nationalism in Quebec Hudson Meadwell Notes 1993

The nationalist movement in Quebec is one of the most powerful nationalist movements developed in the west, better than the Welsh or Scottish nationalist movements. The entrenched use of French language has been more successful than other language movement,s and have weakened a cultural division of labor. The case of Quebec is distinguished by combination of popular support for territorial decentralization and the institutional capacity to translate this support into meaningful political pressure. the leaders of the nationalist movements were excellent at mobilizing popular support up to and including independence from the constitutional status quo in Canada. The Parti Quebecois (PQ) formed in 1968, Initially, the Roman Catholic Church defined Canadian French nationalism, glorifying rural life and la patrie as the natural community. the Canadian state pursued an accommodationist rather than an assimilationist policy toward French Canadians. Certain limited powers returned to the province of Quebec. English Canada retained control of Quebec commerce. The Quebec elite was effectively able to control cultural and political resource through the 1940sand 1950s, but a new political class emerged that questioned the cooptive arrangement underlying the Canadian confederation. In the 1970s and 1980s, national mobilization cut across class lines. The Francophone labor is more of a pillar than a segment, so independence was thus a more popular option. The new emerging middle class supported nationalist politics, as it was a strategy securing a niche in the provincial public sector for this class, which found upward mobility blocked in the private sector due to discrimination by English Canadians. The strengthening of the provincial state must at least be a by-product of nationalism. Nationalism appealed to all parties. For the PQ and other nationalists, language symbolized their cultural identity. The PQ was not successful, however, in persuading people to separate entirely. The 1985 election brought to power a liberal party even more moderate than the PQ. The regulation of culture present a French face to immigrants. The Quebecois are second class citizens fo Canada, and the constitutional framework of Canada does not allow them to be a part of Canada as Quebecois. The symbolism draws on collective identity of the Francophone Quebeckers, and downplays economic class. The Francophones argued that they were both culturally and economically exploited. Ethnic mobilization is easier to accomplish to the extent that leaders can fashion interpretations of the situation of the group that build on structures of meaning embodied in collective identities. Activists resocialize and recognize that preference formation and identity are tied together, and it is easier to achieve to the extent that individuals are less exposed to cross pressures and alternative identities. The enabling condition of mobilization is identity formation. The higher the degree of identification with the group, the greater the degree of support for decentralization from the federal Canadian government. 62% of Quebec Francophones were Quebecois. Self-identification is important--the Quebecois may identify with Canada because they don't have the history of repression that Basque country does. The Canadian state was built on the military conquest of the French. The Church initially supported French Canadian nationalism, and an informal devolution of authority was embedded in a federal state, and political power was located in the provincial state that became in the 1950s the primary site for a modernizing coalition of intellectuals. The distinctive feature of Quebecois nationalism was an informal devolution of authority to the church. Federalism had a fundamental effect on the self-understanding of the Quebecois. It was Quebecois nationalism and not French Canadian. The problem of nationalist economic viability exists. Quebec wanted to substitute trade with America for trade with Canada, but only 7% of business leaders wanted independence from Canada. The Parti Quebecois lost ground in 1985. The Meech Lake Accord failed to ratify, and Manitoba did not ratify it in 1990. the Meech Lake Accord lay in constitutional negotiations that led to the Constitution Act of 1982, that asked voters to give the provincial government the mandate to negotiate a proposed agreement between Quebec and Canada that would enable Quebec to acquire the exclusive power to make its laws, administer its taxes, and establish relations abroad. This was effectively something that would have allowed them an economic association with Canada based on a common currency, but the referendum failed. The Meech Lake would have extended to Quebec constitutional recognition as a distinct society, a right to opt out of national shared-cost programs, constitutional recognition of bilateral Quebec-Ottawa agreements on immigration, and a limited veto over constitutional amendments. The failure of the Meech lake accord made more people supportive of Quebec independence, and public opinion moved more towards support of the Parti Quebecois. The model of mobilization emphasized the interplay of counter-hegemony and the problem of economic viability. Ethnic mobilization is distinguished in literature on ethnic nationalism. When the position of the nationalist organization is more extreme than individual opinion, or when individual is more extreme than the program.