Exam 4 Moral Development (moral reasoning and values) Ch. 14
Recognize general similarities and differences between Piaget's and Kohlberg's theories of moral reasoning, and Eisenberg's theory of prosocial reasoning.
How children think about moral issues provides one basis for their moral or immoral behavior. Piaget delineated two moral stages—morality of constraint and autonomous morality—separated by a transitional stage. In the first stage, children regard rules as fixed and tend to weigh consequences more than intentions in evaluating actions. According to Piaget, a combination of cognitive growth and egalitarian, cooperative interactions with peers brings children to the autonomous stage, in which they recognize that rules can be changed by group consent and judge the morality of actions on the basis of intentions more than consequences. Aspects of Piaget's theory have not held up well to criticism—for example, children use intentions to evaluate behavior at a younger age than Piaget believed they could—but his theory provided the foundation for Kohlberg's work on stages of moral reasoning. Kohlberg outlined three levels of moral judgment—preconventional, conventional, and postconventional—each initially containing two stages (Stage 6 was subsequently dropped). He hypothesized that his sequence of stages reflected age-related discontinuous changes in moral reasoning and that children everywhere go through the same stage progression (although they may stop development at different points). Several aspects of Kohlberg's theory are controversial, including whether children's moral reasoning moves through discontinuous stages of development; whether the theory is valid for all cultures; and whether there are gender differences in moral judgment. Research on other types of moral judgment, such as prosocial moral judgment, suggests that children's concerns about the needs of others emerge at a younger age than Kohlberg's work indicates. However, with age, prosocial moral reasoning, like Kohlberg's justice-oriented moral reasoning, becomes more abstract and based on internalized principles.
Levels of Prosocial Behavior
Level 1: Hedonistic, self-focused orientation. The individual is concerned with his or her own interests rather than with moral considerations. Reasons for assisting or not assisting another include the prospects of direct personal gain or future reciprocation and whether one needs or likes the other person. (Predominant mode primarily for preschoolers and younger elementary school children.) Level 2: Needs-based orientation. The individual expresses concern for the physical, material, and psychological needs of others even when those needs conflict with his or her own. This concern is expressed in the simplest terms, without clear evidence of self-reflective role taking, verbal expressions of sympathy, or reference to such emotions as pride or guilt. (Predominant mode for many preschoolers and many elementary school children.) Level 3: Approval and/or stereotyped orientation. The individual justifies engaging or not engaging in prosocial behavior on the basis of others' approval or acceptance and/or on stereotyped images of good and bad persons and behavior. (Predominant mode for some elementary school and high school students.) Level 4a: Self-reflective empathic orientation. The individual's judgments include evidence of self-reflective sympathetic responding or role taking, concern with the other's humanness, and/or guilt or positive emotion related to the consequences of one's actions. (Predominant mode for a few older elementary school children and many high school students.) Level 4b: Transitional level. The individual's justifications for helping or not helping involve internalized values, norms, duties, or responsibilities. They may also reflect concerns for the condition of the larger society or refer to the necessity of protecting the rights and dignities of other persons. These ideals, however, are not clearly or strongly stated. (Predominant mode for a minority of people of high school age or older.) Level 5: Strongly internalized stage. The individual's justifications for helping or not helping are based on internalized values, norms, or responsibilities; the desire to maintain individual and societal contractual obligations or improve the condition of society; and the belief in the rights, dignity, and equality of all individuals. This level is also characterized by positive or negative emotions related to whether or not one succeeds in living up to one's own values and accepted norms. (Predominant mode for only a small minority of high school students.)
Given a vignette, generate examples of moral judgments to illustrate each of Kohlberg's 3 levels of moral reasoning.
On the basis of the reasoning underlying children's responses, Kohlberg proposed three levels of moral judgment—preconventional, conventional, and postconventional (or principled). Preconventional moral reasoning is self-centered: it focuses on getting rewards and avoiding punishment. Conventional moral reasoning is centered on social relationships: it focuses on compliance with social duties and laws. Postconventional moral reasoning is centered on ideals: it focuses on moral principles. Each of these three levels involves two stages of moral judgment (see Table 14.1). However, so few people ever attained the highest stage (Stage 6—Universal Ethical Principles) of the postconventional level that Kohlberg (1978) eventually stopped scoring it as a separate stage, and many theorists consider it an elaboration of Stage 5
Critique Kohlberg's theory using empirical research findings.
One criticism is that Kohlberg did not sufficiently differentiate between truly moral issues and issues of social convention (Nucci & Gingo, 2011) (we examine this differentiation on pages 563-565). Another criticism pertains to cultural differences. Although children in many non-Western, nonindustrialized cultures start out reasoning much the way Western children do in Kohlberg's scoring system, their moral judgment within this system generally does not advance as far as that of their Western peers (e.g., Nisan & Kohlberg, 1982; Snarey, 1985). This finding has led to the objection that Kohlberg's stories and scoring system reflect an intellectualized conception of morality that is biased by Western values (E. L. Simpson, 1974). In many non-Western societies, in which the goal of preserving group harmony is of critical importance and most conflicts of interest are worked out through face-to-face contact, issues of individual rights and civil liberties may not be viewed as especially relevant. Moreover, in some societies, obedience to authorities, elders, and religious dictates are valued more than principles of freedom and individual rights. Another criticism has to do with Kohlberg's argument that change in moral development is discontinuous. Kohlberg asserted that because each stage is more advanced than the previous one, once an individual attains a new stage, he or she seldom reasons at a lower stage. However, research has shown that children and adults alike often reason at different levels on different occasions—or even on the same occasion (Rest, 1979). As a consequence, it is not clear that the development of moral reasoning is qualitatively discontinuous. Rather, children and adolescents may gradually acquire the cognitive skills to use increasingly higher stages of moral reasoning but also may use lower stages when it is consistent with their goals, motives, or beliefs in a particular situation. For example, even an adolescent who is capable of using Stage 4 reasoning may well use Stage 2 reasoning to justify a decision to break the law for personal gain. A hotly debated issue regarding Kohlberg's theory is whether there are gender differences in moral judgment. As noted previously, Kohlberg developed his conception of moral-reasoning stages on the basis of interviews with a sample of boys. Carol Gilligan (1982) argued that Kohlberg's classification of moral judgment is biased against females because it does not adequately recognize differences in the way males and females reason morally. Gilligan suggested that because of the way they are socialized, males tend to value principles of justice and rights, whereas females value caring, responsibility for others, and avoidance of exploiting or hurting others (Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988). This difference in moral orientation, according to Gilligan, causes males to score higher on Kohlberg's dilemmas than females do. Contrary to Gilligan's theory, there is little evidence that boys and girls, or men and women, score differently on Kohlberg's stages of moral judgment (Turiel, 1998; L. J. Walker, 1984, 1991). However, consistent with Gilligan's arguments, during adolescence and adulthood, females focus somewhat more on issues of caring about other people in their moral judgment (Garmon et al., 1996; Jaffee & Hyde, 2000). Differences in males' and females' moral reasoning seem to be most evident when individuals report on moral dilemmas in their own lives (Jaffee & Hyde, 2000). Thus, Gilligan's work has been very important in broadening the focus of research on moral reasoning and in demonstrating that males and females differ somewhat in the issues they focus on when confronting moral issues.
Preconventional Level
Stage 1: Punishment and Obedience Orientation. At Stage 1, what is seen as right is obedience to authorities. Children's "conscience" (what makes them decide what is right or wrong) is fear of punishment, and their moral action is motivated by avoidance of punishment. The child does not consider the interests of others or recognize that they differ from his or her own interests. Examples of reasoning for (pro) and against (con) Heinz's stealing the drug for his wife are as follows: Pro: If you let your wife die, you will get in trouble. You'll be blamed for not spending the money to save her and there'll be an investigation of you and the druggist for your wife's death. Con: You shouldn't steal the drug because you'll be caught and sent to jail if you do. If you do get away, your conscience would bother you thinking how the police would catch up with you at any minute (Kohlberg, 1969, p. 381). Stage 2: Instrumental and Exchange Orientation. At Stage 2, what is right is what is in one's own best interest or involves equal exchange between people (tit-for-tat exchange of benefits). Pro: If you do happen to get caught, you could give the drug back and you wouldn't get much of a sentence. It wouldn't bother you much to serve a little jail term, if you have your wife when you get out. Con: He may not get much of a jail term if he steals the drug, but his wife will probably die before he gets out so it won't do him much good. If his wife dies, he shouldn't blame himself, it wasn't his fault she has cancer (Kohlberg, 1969, p. 381).
Conventional Level
Stage 3: Mutual Interpersonal Expectations, Relationships, and Interpersonal Conformity ("Good Girl, Nice Boy") Orientation. In Stage 3, good behavior is doing what is expected by people who are close to the person or what people generally expect of someone in a given role (e.g., "a son"). Being "good" is important in itself and means having good motives, showing concern about others, and maintaining good relationships with others. Pro: No one will think you're bad if you steal the drug, but your family will think you're an inhuman husband if you don't. If you let your wife die, you'll never be able to look anybody in the face again. Con: It isn't just the druggist who will think you're a criminal, everyone else will, too. After you steal it, you'll feel bad thinking how you've brought dishonor on your family and yourself; you won't be able to face anyone again (Kohlberg, 1969, p. 381). Stage 4: Social System and Conscience ("Law and Order") Orientation. Right behavior in Stage 4 involves fulfilling one's duties, upholding laws, and contributing to society or one's group. The individual is motivated to keep the social system going and to avoid a breakdown in its functioning. Pro: In most marriages, you accept the responsibility to look after one another's health and after their life and you have the responsibility when you live with someone to try and make it a happy life (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987b, p. 43). In the revised coding manual, Colby and Kohlberg (1987b) provide virtually no examples of Stage 4 reasoning supporting the decision that Heinz should not steal the drug for his wife. However, they provide reasons for not stealing the drug for a pet: Heinz should not steal for a pet because animals cannot contribute to society (p. 37).
Postconventional or Principled Level
Stage 5: Social Contract or Individual Rights Orientation. At Stage 5, right behavior involves upholding rules that are in the best interest of the group ("the greatest good for the greatest number"), are impartial, or were agreed upon by the group. However, some values and rights, such as life and liberty, are universally right and must be upheld in any society, regardless of majority opinion. It is difficult to construct a Stage 5 reason that justifies not stealing the drug. Pro: Heinz should steal the drug because the right to life supersedes or transcends the right to property (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987b, p. 11). Pro: Heinz is working from a hierarchy of values, in which life (at least the life of his wife) is higher than honesty....Human life and its preservation—at least as presented here—must take precedence over other values, like Heinz's desire to be honest and law abiding, or the druggist's love of money and his rights. All values stem from the ultimate value of life (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987b, p. 54). Stage 6: Universal Ethical Principles. Right behavior in Stage 6 is commitment to self-chosen ethical principles that reflect universal principles of justice (e.g., equality of human rights, respect for the dignity of each human being). When laws violate these principles, the individual should act in accordance with these universal principles rather than with the law.
Identify several factors that affect the development of conscience.
children actually develop a conscience slowly over time. By age 2, toddlers start to show an appreciation for moral standards and rules and begin to exhibit signs of guilt when they do something wrong (Kopp, 2001; R. A. Thompson & Newton, 2010; Zahn-Waxler & Robinson, 1995). These two components of conscience—the desire to comply with rules and feelings of guilt when failing to do so—are quite stable in their early development from 22 to 45 months of age (Aksan & Kochanska, 2005; Kochanska et al., 2002). Children's growing understanding of others' emotions and goals, and their increasing capacity for empathic concern, are likely contributors to the development of conscience (R. A. Thompson, 2012). As they mature, children are more likely to take on their parents' moral values, and to exhibit guilt for violating those values, if their parents use disciplinary practices that deemphasize parental power and include rational explanations that help children understand and learn the parents' values (Kochanska & Aksan, 2006; Laible et al., 2008; Volling et al., 2009). Children's adoption of their parents' values is also facilitated by a secure, positive parent-child relationship, which inclines children to be open to, and eager to internalize, their parents' communication of their values (Bretherton et al., 1997; Kochanska et al., 2005; Kochanska et al., 2008). Children may develop a conscience in different ways according to their temperament. Toddlers who are prone to fear (e.g., who are fearful of unfamiliar people or situations) tend to exhibit more guilt at a young age than do less fearful children (Kochanska et al., 2002). Moreover, for those infants who are prone to fear, the development of conscience seems to be promoted by the mother's use of gentle discipline that includes reasoning with the child and providing nonmaterial incentives for compliance (Kochanska & Aksan, 2006). When mothers use gentle discipline, fearful children do not become so apprehensive and anxious that they tune out their mother's messages about desired behavior. Gentle discipline arouses fearful children just enough that they attend to and remember what their mother tells them (Kochanska, 1993). In contrast, gentle discipline seems to be unrelated to the development of conscience in fearless young children, perhaps because it is insufficient to arouse their attention (Kochanska, 1997a). What does seem to foster the development of conscience in fearless children is a parent-child relationship characterized by secure attachment and mutual cooperation (Kochanska, 1995; Kochanska & Aksan, 2006). Fearless children appear motivated more by the desire to please their mother than by a fear of her (Kochanska, 1997b). Unfortunately, research on this topic seldom has been conducted with fathers, so it is not known whether the findings for the effects of mothers' discipline also generalize to fathers' discipline. The effects of parenting on children's conscience also vary with their genes, which, as discussed in Chapter 10, affect temperament. This can be seen in the dynamic between maternal responsiveness—the mother's acceptance of, and sensitivity to, the child—and the child's genotype for the serotonin transporter gene, SLC6A4. As discussed in Chapter 11 (pages 436 and 437), a particular allele variant of SLC6A4 is believed to make children especially reactive to their rearing environment. For children with this allele variant, high maternal responsiveness is associated with high levels of conscience at 15 to 52 months of age. Conversely, for children with this same variant, low maternal responsiveness is associated with low conscience. For children with a different genotype for SLC6A4, their level of conscience is unrelated to their mother's responsiveness (Kochanska et al., 2011). This pattern is an example of differential susceptibility, whereby some children are more reactive than others are to the quality of parenting they receive, be it high or low quality. The early development of conscience undoubtedly contributes to whether children come to accept the moral values of their parents and society. Indeed, in a longitudinal assessment of children's behavioral and affective expression of guilt (in which they were led to believe that they had broken a valuable object), the children's levels of guilt at 22 and 45 months of age predicted their morality at 54 months of age (e.g., their violating rules about touching prohibited toys, cheating on tasks, and expressing selfish and antisocial themes when discussing vignettes with morally relevant topics) (Kochanska et al., 2002). This, in turn, predicted whether they engaged in hurtful or problematic social behavior at 67 months (Kochanska et al., 2008). In a related study, children's internalization of parental rules at 2 to 4 years of age predicted their self-perceptions as being moral at 67 months (Kochanska et al., 2010). Therefore, the nature of early parent-child disciplinary interactions sets the stage for children's subsequent moral development.
