F Problem of Evil
Counter response: Every evil leads to development
This argument only works against both the logical and evidential problems if every evil leads to development, but this is evidently not the case. For example, animals appear to suffer unnecessarily, and in general the cost still appears to be too great with the innocent suffering.
The logical problem
This is a deductive argument which claims that the existence of evil is incompatible with the attributes of God.
The evidential problem
This is an inductive argument which claims that the amount and distribution of evil is good evidence that God does not exist.
But
if God intervened like this then there would be no freedom, because whenever the consequence would be bad he could intervene, and so we could not have done otherwise and consequently freedom would be an illusion. Thought: If this is so then is the price of freedom (like genocide) too high? Is the suffering of the innocent worth the price of freedom?
Counter-Response: Plantinga's Free- will defence
A theodicy attempts to preserve God's existence in the face of evil, but Plantinga suggests that we can not know why God allows evil. He considers that what we need to do to counter the logical problem is not to attempt to prove that God and evil both exist, but to show that we can at least conceive of the possibility of their co-existence. In other words, to show that evil is logically consistent with the existence of God. For Plantinga this is therefore a defence, rather than a THEODICY. Plantinga gives the following explanation to show how free will causes evil: To be free is to be able to do or refrain from some action To be significantly free is to be free to do or refrain from morally significant actions. A morally significant action is one which it is either right or wrong to perform. Moral evil is evil resulting from the actions of significantly free creatures when they choose the wrong action to perform. Plantinga then offers the following argument: A world containing creatures that are significantly free is better than a world containing no free creatures. God can create significantly free creatures. To be significantly free is to be capable of both oral good and moral evil. If significantly free creatures were caused to do only what is right, they would not be free. C1: Therefore, God cannot cause significantly free creatures to do only what is right. C: Therefore, God can only eliminate the moral evil done by significantly free creatures by eliminating the greater good of significantly free creatures. Plantinga does not wish to assert the truth of the possibility of the conclusion. He simply wants to show that it is a possibility and thus there can be no incompatibility between evil and the existence of God. Plantinga also seeks to explain the presence of natural evil which is not accounted for by the free- will defence. He borrows heavily from Augustine who considered that natural evil was a result of moral evil.
Response to Plantinga: We react to atrocity, why can't God?
Could God not interfere with free-will when it was for the greater good. For example, if we see someone about to commit an atrocity we do not marvel at the presence of free- will, but intervene to prevent the consequence, if we react like this why can God not?
The Logical Problem of Evil:
Evil is logically incompatible with the existence of God. In other words, the following claims cannot all be true: (i) God is supremely good. Omnibenevolent. (ii) God is omnipotent. (iii) God is omniscient. (iv) Evil exists. If God has the desire and ability to prevent Evil because he is omnipotent and omniscient, why does he allow evil?. If any three of the claims are true, the fourth must be false. One way to overcome this logical problem is to deny evil exists. However, there are other common responses to the problem. These are the Theodicies. A theodicy is a defence of God in the face of evil.
Response: Beings that can always choose right
However, a problem with this theodicy is as follows: why could God not make beings who always freely choose what is right? Mackie argues: -It is possible to freely choose what is good on one occasion. -If it's possible to freely choose what is good on one occasion, then it is logically possible to freely choose what is good on every occasion. -God can create any logically possible world. -Therefore it is possible for god to create a world in which creatures are free and freely chose only what is good. -God would eliminate evil that is not necessary for a greater good. -Second- order evil is not necessary for a greater good. -Second- order evil exists. -C: Therefore, God does not exist.
Theodicy 1: Good cannot exist without evil.
If it is Logically impossible for good to exist without evil, then the logical problem of evil does not challenge God's omnipotence. We aren't asking god to do anything logically impossible like making a square triangle, this is not possible it is pseudo- challenge. Good existing without evil is potentially as illogical as trying to make a square triangle. So we Suppose that God can not create a world in which good exists without evil, suppose that evil is in some sense necessary for good. Augustine considered that evil was a privation - the absence of good, it does not exist in the positive sense. But, could God as an omnipotent being not simply create a world which was wholly good, with no absence of good to allow evil? (sock without a hole)
Plantinga: This is the best possible world
It is possible that there is not a better balance of moral good and evil that is capable of being realised, and thus this is the best possible world. If this is the best possible world, then the evidential problem above is no longer valid. Plantinga considers that the amount of evil on its own does not show that a better balance of good and evil is possible, and thus the evidential problem can not show that is is implausible to believe in God.
Theodicy 2: Evil is due to human free- will
Man is morally imperfect and thus in his decision- making sometimes brings about evil. However, the greater good of being persons with freedom outweighs the evil produced.
Criticism: Argument from ignorance based on logical fallacy
Plantinga argues that there is no evidence against the claim that there is no better balance of good and evil. But this argument from ignorance demands a good reason for the claim no better balance is possible. An argument from ignorance, also known as appeal to ignorance, is a fallacy in informal logic. It asserts that a proposition is true because it has not yet been proven false. Therefore, one cannot rely on Plantinga's response to the evidential problem of evil because his response is based upon a logical fallacy.
Counter- response: Irenaeus' Theodicy/ John Hick
Regarding the price of freedom being too high, John Hick responds with the claim that in a world where we could not do evil, we could neither do good, and considers that the cost of suffering is worth it in his '"Vale of Soul-Making" theodicy. Suffering is the cost of transforming immature beings into morally responsible ones, and this is superior to a host of automata with no suffering. Hick's theodicy also accounts for natural evil as there has to be an objective environment in which genuine choices with genuine consequences can occur.
Moral Evil
The actions and intentions of beings considered to be wrong in the extreme. Murder, rape, genocide.
The Evidential Problem:
The claim here is not that the existence of evil makes the existence of God impossible, but that it makes the existence of God implausible, or unlikely. It appears that who suffers and how much they suffer is unfair: the amount of and distribution of suffering are unjust. It appears that a better world than this one is possible, a world with freedom and necessary suffering but not to the extent of this one. Surely if God existed, then this better world would also exist. However, this better world appears not to exist, so then it is likely that God does not exist.
Natural Evil
The events of the world which produce suffering. Earthquakes, tsunamis, and the predation of animals on each other
Response: Evil produces further evils
The logical problem of evil assumes that God desires to eliminate all evil, but this is not true if evil is necessary for the greater good. Some of the virtues such as courage and sympathy require suffering to exist. The evil of suffering makes the virtue of courage possible. The emphasis on the virtues here misleads. There are also vices which stem from suffering such a cowardice and cruelty. So the argument that the universe is better for evil because evil produces virtues which would not be present without it fails. The evil also produces further evils and the world would be better without both of them.
Hick's "Vale of Soul Making" in response to the evidential problem of evil
We are immature beings who require an objective environment and freedom in order to develop into morally responsible beings.The combination of freedom and an objective environment necessarily entail suffering. Both natural and moral evil are necessary. The world is a vale of soul-making, and could not be realised without the inherent suffering.
Hick's response
this is a typical faith position in which he claims that there needs to be an EPISTEMIC DISTANCE between us and God, so that our cognitive freedom to choose to believe in him is not compromised. Thus we must be in a situation where it is possible to not believe in him, and this is afforded by the objections above; the unexplained suffering must remain a mystery. Faith and hope both depend upon uncertainty and unpredictability, so it must look as if the amount and distribution of evil is unfair.
