International Security Midterm

Waltz and Sagan - The Spread of Nuclear Weapons

More may be Better: Waltz argues that... - prevalence of peace indicates a high ability of the post-war international system to absorb changes to contain conflicts. - States are not willing to run major risks, such as nuclear destruction, for minor gains. The costs of nuclear war are too high. - Deterrence is not achieved through the ability to defend, but rather the ability to punish (second strike nuclear forces). - States are deterred by the prospect of suffering. - The deterrent effect depends on CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS ***Three requirements of deterrent forces - the ability of part the of nuclear forces to be able to survive an attack and launch one of its own - survival of forces must not require early firing to what may be false alarms - command and control must be reliably maintained*** - Nuclear weapons make military miscalculation difficult and politically pertinent prediction easy - Waltz takes on and defends critiques: = Small nuclear forces are sufficient for destruction and therefore sufficient for deterrence = Waltz argues that capability is credibility because a nuclear first-strike is so unappealing = small chance of second-strike nuclear capabilities will deter = Nuclear weapons can be moved and hidden - states cannot guarantee they will take out all of another state's nuclear weaponry = No country will press a nuclear nation to the point of decisive defeat, or make them feel desperate. = if no state can launch a disarming attack with high confidence, strategic arms races are then pointless. = Arms races make sense only if a first-strike capability is within reach/ Nuclear weapons negate the advantages of conventional superiority the development of nuclear weapons is slow, takes time, and requires political stability. = Domestic instability would not be cause for nuclear detonation; regimes would not use nuclear weapons against their own people = Nuclear weapons in regional rivalries would balance and lead to greater stability = Radical regimes are still sensitive to the costs of nuclear warfare. Their goal is to stay in power. = military governments understand the costs of nuclear weaponry; they do not want to be destroyed - Waltz believes state leaders are rational enough to interpret and understand nuclear deterrence - The gradual spread of nuclear weapons has not opened the nuclear floodgates. - The alternative to nuclear proliferation may be conventional arms races and disastrous conventional wars More may be Worse: - Scott Sagan argues that professional military organizations display organizational behaviors that are likely to lead to deterrence failures and deliberate or accidental war (Because of common biases, inflexible routines, and parochial interest). He believes that future nuclear-armed states will lack the positive mechanisms of civilian control. - Within the rational deterrence framework, three major operational requirement for stable nuclear deterrence. - Sagan says that it is problematic that nuclear optimists believe that new nuclear powers will meet these requirements because it is in the states' obvious interests to do so Organizational theory challenges assumption that states behave in a self-interest, rational manner. = Large organizations are limited in their rationality. They develop standard operating procedures and organizational rules that govern behavior - Organizations commonly "satifice", or accept the first option that might not be the most satisfying. - They create filters that shape beliefs and actions, and can get fixated on narrow interests and lose focus of overall objectives. - Complex organizations will often have multiple, competing goals. - Sagan looks at the three major operational requirements for stable nuclear deterrence: = Preventative War in the Transition Period: the first state must not attack its rival in order to avoid the risk of a worse war later. Sagan argues that military officers are predisposed to view preventive war in a much more favorable light. = EX: After the Chinese military intervention in the Korean War in Nov 1950, both Truman's senior military and civilian advisors advised against the use of the atomic bomb, but senior U.S. military officers seriously advocated preventive-war options. - Eisenhower rejected the preventative war because he believed that a preventive nuclear attack on the USSR would be too costly politically, even if succeeded in narrow military terms. = This basic pattern - senior military officers favoring preventative war against new proliferators was repeated in other cases. - New nuclear powers must build invulnerable second-strike nuclear forces = Sagan argues that professional militaries will develop invulnerable nuclear forces if left to their own devices, contrary to Waltz. The history of US and Soviet Nuclear weapons programs strongly supports this = Example of Soviet nuclear history showed how organizational routines and practices have created vulnerabilities: the failure of the Soviet military to keep its 1962 missile deployment in Cuba a secret. - Nuclear arsenals are not prone to accidental or unauthorized use = with complex redundancies it might be hard to understand how a catastrophic failure would occur and could lead to a more catastrophic failure = some emergent nuclear powers lack the organizational financial resources to produce adequate safety devices, the covert nature adds complexities, new nuclear states will be in closer proximity of their adversaries making them more accident prone. - United States should maintain an active nuclear nonproliferation policy; should add intellectual persuasion to policy efforts. - Just because two nuclear states survived Cold War should not let us think other states can safely do the same.

Mearsheimer "Anarchy and the Struggle for Power"

Assumptions of offensive realism... - anarchy - all states have offensive capability - others' intentions never certain - states primarily seek security and survival Great powers are rational, and fear one another... - self help system offers incentives to be selfish - Alliances are temporary, convenient Can ensure survival by being hegemon... - leads to power maximizing behavior - zero-sum mentality (one's gain is another's loss) - Immanuel Kant influences - state's actions are limited by its capabilities - security dilemmas will exist as long as anarchy exists - best defense is good offense (proactive offense) - only status quo power if it's the only regional hegemon in the world - they would then go to considerable lengths to ensure no rivals (other regional hegemons) rise up

Price and Tannenwald "Norms and Deterrence"

- Nukes still a part of core military doctrine, but in A LOT more narrow circumstances - normative taboos explain it,... - not only deterrence - deterrence can't explain non-use alone - it's not just about destructiveness of weapons... - EX. US had a monopoly on nukes and didn't use them (there was no fear of retaliation for using them, but they still didn't EVEN THOUGH it would've been helpful) - gradual post-war process - nukes unacceptable - grass-roots movement that constrained the state - gradual fear of public outrage - especially after Cuban Missile Crisis - cause: long practice of non-use, self-conscious effort because didn't want to use because could be damaging - "luck, contingency, iterated behavior, and moral concerns" - Nukes unfairly lethal, not moral 'civilized states don't use nukes' - military still kept planning for it though - stabilize deterrence between great powers today

Daalder and Lindsay "Democracies of the World, Unite"

- bring together the states that actually share the same interests and values, more likely to act on issues - states that are most capable militarily, politically, and economically and most able to cooperate - Democracies know how to limit and overcome disagreements. Ex: NATO, a regional concert of democracies - The UN often responds with too little too late. Ex: Security Council needs full agreement to act UN focuses on external actions of states, doesn't involve itself in domestic affairs, where the modern problems are - Multilateral cooperation is needed for these problems that cross borders, US can't do it alone (terrorism) - Excludes spoilers like Russia and China. Always very keen to emphasize/protect sovereignty of states. - States that aren't legitimate domestically will not be given legitimacy internationally - Democracies will be more willing to work cooperatively to solve internal problems and threats that matter to all other states. - As the concert of democracies becomes more institutionalized and respected, it can be a significant enticement for non-members to democratize - The Concert would help democracies confront their mutual security challenges - The Concert would promote economic growth and development (Constitute a large voting bloc in the WTO)

Nye "The Future of American Power"

If US is declining, it's only relative... - China appears to be the main contender to challenge US power (economy projected to pass US in 2030, but not equal in power [less modern and developed], growth rates will likely slow down) - Domestic decay is not occurring in the United States American social problems aren't getting worse in any consistent manner - Debt, education, and weakened political institutions pose some threats to absolute US power, BUT CAN BE ADDRESSED and aren't causing absolute decline currently. - The US will maintain advantages in military and soft power for a long time, even as China's economy grows - American power is based in NETWORKS AND ALLIANCES rather than colonies (Japan will continue to seek US support as China grows in power)

Wolfers "'National Security' as an Ambiguous Symbol"

National interest/security... - doesn't explain state behavior - not a guide for policy - IS means to ANOTHER END GOAL (like justice, peace, liberty) - useful as rhetoric, like to justify a foreign policy decision - State interests vary widely/in depth, not universal - states pursue interests outside of vital interests - some states are more threatened by some threats than other states... ...and thus, will respond differently - EX. Europe during the rise of Hitler (France: inaction, Britain: appeasement, United States: neutrality) based on capabilities, geography, etc.

Paris "Human Security"

According to UNDP...types of security: - economic - food - health - environmental - personal (physical) - community (cultures) - political - individual as the main focus, because sometimes states can be the problem (humans used as tools to reflect state interest...becoming victims of war) - not about the state protecting itself from external threat - individuals being protected from threat - too broad to be used as a standard for policymaking though

Kupchan and Kupchan "The Promise of Collective Security"

Both forms of external balancing. Collective security... - peace is indivisible, - highly institutionalized, - peacetime, - nearly universal membership -unknown enemy Collective defense - attack against one is an attack against all - not universal membership - Warsaw Pact, NATO - should be temporary and disappear with threat (NATO is a counter-example) - known enemy Why CS is preferable?... - MORE EFFECTIVE BALANCING AGAINST AGGRESSORS (can work against force greater than yours): - eliminates security dilemma - can devote less resources to survival and more to welfare - universal membership, desire to preserve world order benefitting each of them - if CS only works a little, aggressor still faces force stronger than them - worst-case scenario is CS looks like balancing under anarchy and non-directly threatened states defect - Failure would come in stages, not in one catastrophic wave - BUILT IN ENVIRONMENT THAT FOSTERS TRUST AND COOPERATION: - mitigate self-help world - confidence of others' intentions - concentrate on absolute rather than relative gains because less fearful - facilitates further cooperation and reduces the chance of conflict by weakening the security dilemma in a way balancing does not. - CS institutions also can help states define their national interests in ways that boost international security. For example, in post-Cold War Europe, NATO encourages and enable Germany to define its interests in European terms.

Friedberg "Bucking Beijing" CHINA PESSIMIST.

CHINA PESSIMIST. Current US strategy of engaging and balancing China is not working... - Engagement: integrating China into global trade & institutions, incentivize it to be a "responsible stakeholder," and discourage it from challenging the status quo - Balancing: maintaining regional stability and deterring aggression - Relations between China & US are not stable because their fundamental interests are very different (China seeks regional hegemony, US does not want this; China's economic growth will cause conflict and there is no such thing as a peaceful transition) - The US needs to balance China with substance and not just talk - Our deterrence needs to provide ways for escalating vertically (with bigger weapons and higher stakes) and also horizontally (involving allies, the economy, etc.) - Bilateral trade with China is lopsided in their favor (China holds a huge portion of American debt) - China's aggressive behavior might cause its neighbors to balance against it, but a lack of US balancing could also cause those same countries to bandwagon with China instead - US should seek to "mellow" Chinese power

Waltz "Nuclear Myths and Political Realities"

Capability trumps credibility - Nuclear deterrence only really works against large threats/aggressors - Nuclear deterrence is extremely credible because nuclear war outcomes are much easier to predict than conventional ones—nuclear weapons will destroy whatever they hit - In the context of conventional warfare, focus is on escalation - In the context of nuclear warfare, focus is on de-escalation - Alliances are pointless in a world of second-strike nuclear forces BECAUSE NUKES ARE ENOUGH to guarantee a country's security - "The efficacy of nuclear deterrence, however, does not depend on anyone's accepting it." - Unlike conventional weaponry capabilities which can be inflated and hard to predict, nuclear capabilities are definite and easy to predict - The power of nuclear weapons is so absolute, even a very low chance of a country using them is enough to deter

Pape "Soft Balancing Against the US"

Classic Balance of Power theory (Offensive Realist perspective)... - when threatened, states work to check the aggressor state - main goal to preserve the status quo, not necessarily peace (b/c sometimes war is necessary) - can do this through hard or soft balancing ROBERT PAPE ARTICLE soft balancing... - Not to be confused with soft POWER (using IDEAS/CULTURE to get others to act a certain way) - LAYS FOUNDATION FOR FUTURE HARD BALANCING IF NECESSARY - indirect challenge to aggressor state - nonmilitary - goals (delay, undermine, frustrate aggressor) - EXAMPLE: 2nd US intervention in Iraq ~2003 - opposing states used... - international institutions, - economic tools, - and diplomacy to show their opposition. GENERAL EXAMPLES - ad-hoc maneuvers - territorial denial - economic or diplomatic entangling Why it's different from internal/external balancing (hard balancing)... - not about military buildup (like internal balancing is) - alliances meant for war (like external balancing is) - strategic exchange of military technology (like external balancing is) - because military buildup wouldn't be super duper effective unless REALLY needed - costly (for individual states) - risky (states in alliance might not act in unison)

Ikenberry's "The Rise of China and the Future of the West"

- But the international order today is "hard to overturn and easy to join" - integrative and expansive, open, rule-based , wide and deep political foundations - Nuclear revolution has made great power war an inappropriate mechanism of change - If the Western-order is managed properly, it will survive China's rise - China should be incentivized to invest more in the international system - Let it act less like a client and more like a stakeholder, give China more responsibility - Differences of modern Western order with historic imperial orders = Economically inclusive: nondiscrimination, market openness, low barriers to entry, high potential benefits = Coalition style leadership among advanced liberal democracies = Rules and institutions = But the US historically has been "ambivalent about binding itself to international law and institutions" - US' most power strategic weapon: shaping the international order = US needs to "reaffirm the political values of [security] alliances" like NATO = Renewed US leadership = Integrate rising developing countries into institutions = China will overtake the US, but unlikely it will overtake Western order - China is a (rising) status quo power because of economic integration = Incentive to work within the system that allowed it to become powerful = Defensive realists argue that if we treat China like a threat (i.e. overreacting), it will behave like a threat

KAGAN, COHEN, AND DORAN "Is Major War Obsolete? An Exchange"

- Donald Kagan's response = agrees the present moment in history provides a better opportunity for achieving long-term peace, but he does not believe war is obsolete yet. = This is not the first time people have thought they have arrived at this moment. = Argues that Mandelbaum discussion the Taiwan Straits and the Russo-Ukrainian border as places where wars may break out - this undermines his thesis. = Argues the unpredictability to historical trends and democracy. = Cites the rise and strength of Athenian democratic power in Greece, who then lost the Peloponnesian War. Democracy didn't re-appear for a while after. = War is unfashionable, but this did not just happen. It occurred because of the power and will of the United States and like-minded nations - Eliot Cohen's response: has a problem with his usage of the words 'major', 'war', and 'obsolete' = The wars that Madelbaum describes are what are typically called 'total' wars, but major wars such as the Vietnam War and the Gulf War do not meet his definitions. Wars can still occur that affect the lives of millions without it fitting his definition. = objects to Madelbaum calling the Cold War a war - Charles Doran's response = The end of the Cold War is the first time a peaceful transformation of the international system has occurred, but transformation will continue and there will be junctures. = Madelbaum says there is a decline in the probability of war, but obsolescence of major war would be to say the probability is virtually zero, which it is not. = Argues the proliferation of nuclear weapons has only made nuclear war impossible for states with second-strike capability. = The characteristics of future major war will change and therefore the probability of major war declines for some states but increases for others.

Brooks and Wohlforth "American Primacy in Perspective"

- US is distinguished from other historical great powers because it is dominant in all the dimensions simultaneously. use BALANCE OF THREAT THEORY to EXPLAIN THE ABSENCE OF BALANCING AGAINST the US... - US has relatively benign intentions, not a threat - contrasts with land grabbing hegemons of the past: Habsburgs, Napoleonic France, USSR. - Instead states have chosen to BANDWAGON - If the US does act more aggressively, they would encourage balancing Role of geography... - weak and friendly neighbors to the north and south, oceans to east and west - they'll be constrained by regional balancing efforts if they make a run at the United States America's path to power, how it became unipolar... - Came to be the sole power not because it was trying to rise to the top, but because its rival the USSR unexpectedly gave up. - Beneficiary of a power vacuum. - balancing is has always been a strategy to preserve the status quo - now balancing would be an aggressive or revisionist strategy to change the status quo, to unseat the existing polar power. No precedent for this. - most major powers currently are allies of America, would have to forgo benefits of relations with them if they went against them. Size of the power gap (it's very large)... - Is both big and rich, past hegemons have been one or the other. - outspent next 15+ states in defense in 2003 - only has to spend a small percentage of GDP to do this - There is no feasible combination of states that exist that could align to overtake US power - Forming a large multi-regional alliance would be very HARD TO COORDINATE - States within the treaty would have to worry about their own geopolitical position - China upping military significantly to balance the US would face opposition in Asia

Mead "The Return of Geopolitics"

- Westerners have misread international relations since the fall of the Soviet Union, believing that the zero-sum issues of geopolitics have been replaced with win-win issues like governance, liberalization, nonproliferation, human rights, etc. - China, Iran, and Russia never bought the post-Cold War geopolitical settlement - The fall of Soviet Union meant the decline of communism—not the decline of hard power or geopolitics - This misreading has caused the US to believe the world will continue to liberalize and prosper even if it cuts spending and decreases its international involvement - relations between the three (China, Russia, Iran) are similar in that (a) the US is the biggest obstacle preventing them from achieving their goals and (b) they don't want to attack the status quo head on - These are REVISIONIST STATES and they want to undermine the status quo by indirectly challenging norms and institutions - China has set off historical rivalries with neighbors and conflicting territorial claims has caused military build up throughout the region - China wants regional hegemony - Eastern Europe is full of geopolitical conflict because Russia has been throwing around its weight—stable and effective governance is nearly impossible in non-EU states - Russia wants the return of Russian influence - Governance has eroded in the Middle East as Iran grows increasingly powerful - Iran wants regional hegemony - All of this in light of declining American involvement in international affairs and decreased spending (because of budget crises)

Mandelbaum "Is Major War Obsolete?"

- major war is obsolete, if terms are defined correctly - Major war (not any war in general) is obsolete, but it is not unthinkable - It is obsolete because a dramatic increase in the price of fighting a major war due to mass destruction capabilities, and a steep decline in the rewards of winning one - The Vietnam War was both an illustration and a cause of the change in US attitude towards warfare - Democracy is also conducive to common security. - China's power is growing while Russia's is weakening, but both countries are the most like to start a major war = Neither is fully or irreversibly democratic, and they are large and powerful enough to do so = The norms of warlessness have not reached these states, yet they seem to be focused inward on economic matters. = The mismatch between the location of borders and the location of people could be dangerous to both nations: SECESSION AND IRREDENTISM = SECESSION is a group seeking to escape a state and ... = IRREDENTISM is a state seeking to incorporate a group [Secession is the most common reason for war in the post-Cold War era, but conflicts have not always risen to violent conflict, and the violent conflicts have remained local and not consequential for great powers.] - When the world is integrated, power countries can justify fighting weak adversaries on the grounds of self-defense. - The practice of war is becoming a tactic of the weak - The barriers to war could weaken and war could shift from being obsolete - he suggests this could happen due to democracy becoming less robust, occasional nuclear crises, or obsolescence of war undercut by "unk-unks" or unknown unknowns - A warless world would be safer, but would be a poorer place because of the social cohesion and economic progress that often comes with war.

Walt "Alliance Formation and the Balance of Power"

Balancing - how states create stability - prevent another state from becoming too threatening (too much power) - main goal to preserve the status quo, not necessarily peace (b/c sometimes war is necessary) - states ally against dominant side (aggressors face much more opposition) Classic BOP Theory - one state getting power is a threat to the status quo so states work to preserve it, check aggressor state - join alliances to project power and respond decisively to changes in power (agility) that will disappear when threat is gone - ad hoc - flexible ASSUMPTIONS OF BOP THEORY... - states self-interested - wary of cooperating EXCEPT in the face of threatening state - vigilant (constantly paying attention to the distribution of power) - mobile (must be able to adjust) - no bandwagoning - no handicaps to alliance (willing to align with ANY state) - moderate war aims (don't want anyone to be destroyed in the end, actors must be able to re-enter the system) Balance of Threat Theory... - critique to BOP - states align with least threatening side way states respond depends on LEVEL of threat... - threatening state's aggregate power (total resources) threatening state's proximity (if nearby, it's easier to project their power) - offensive capability (ability to project power) - offensive intentions (don't only need to have power to be a threat!!! UNLIKE BOP THEORY) Balance of Interest Theory - two types of states... - status quo - revisionist - Bandwagon or balance? Decision based on whether state has shared interests with the dominating power - Revisionist states may bandwagon too WALT - Balancing is the dominant strategy because... - preserves more of a state's "freedom of action" - state intentions can change - risk their own survival if they don't curb rising hegemon before it's too late - admirance from vulnerable states for having chosen them to be in an alliance with

Schelling - Arms and Influence

Coercion (diplomacy of violence) - bargaining based on some common interest (ex: avoidance of mutual damage, hostage situations) - Can include the threat of hurting something of value, but is not weakened by the opposition's ability to hurt in return - Has to be anticipated and avoidable by accommodation - More successful when held in reserve (unlike brute force) - Works to restructure motives - Measured by "the suffering it can cause and the victims' motivation to avoid it" - Cannot usually accomplish goals directly, but is more versatile than brute force Brute force... - forcible action to overcome the opposition's strength - ex: eliminating a military obstacle - Unilateral, 'undiplomatic' - Measured relative to the strength of the opposition, but capabilities can cancel each other out if both sides have relatively equal capabilities - doesn't require collaboration Brute force & coercion can both be present in a situation... - ex: bombing of London in 1940 - To the people, the bombs were brute force because of their destruction & pain; the people had no ways to make the bombs stop - To the government, the bombs were coercion because they caused inefficiency and fear; the government had a way to make the bombs stop (negotiate with the Germans) Deterrence - prevent an adversary from undertaking an undesirable behavior by threatening punishment - setting a "trip wire" and waiting, it is up to the opposition to decide if they will push the trip wire - Strong connection between threat and undesired action - To be successful, relies on our reaction Deterrence by punishment - the cost of undesired action is much higher than the benefit - Ex: a robber demands your wallet so you pull out a grenade in response (deterrence by punishment) Deterrence by denial - if they attack, you will deny them success (you will fail if you try) Defense vs. deterrence - States can deter without defending via deterrence by denial (you will fail) - States can defend without being able to deter (ex: Russia burning fields as others invade, leaving the aggressor nothing behind) - The nuclear world is only a world of deterrence and not defense - Deterrence and compellence both depend upon a credible threat and the capability to follow through with the threat Compellence - threatening engagement - inducing enemy action - Definite in timing - too little time & the cooperation is impossible, too long time & cooperation is unnecessary - Threat only communicates general expectations for cooperation - To be successful, relies on our commitment to take action - Can either aim to get them to start doing something desirable or... - stop doing something undesirable - Ex: you want your roommate to clean the kitchen so you put all the dirty dishes on their bed to raise the cost of ignoring the dishes - Ex: Kevin Bacon from Footloose: Wins the tractor duel (?) by displaying more resolve (shoelace got caught)

Jervis "From Balance to Concert"

Concert system... - peacetime security cooperation b/w states - informal, non-binding (non-institutionalized), regular meetings to talk frequently about security threats Lessens security dilemma b/c... - O-D balance favors defense - increased costs of noncooperation/increased benefits from coop - decreased exploitation fears because decreased benefits from exploitation - comradery increase b/c transparency - lots of communication, low risk of defection, warning system Emerge because... - rare conditions, after hegemonic war, world is doubly safe (defense favored) - comradery because states just fought a bad guy together - if powerful reason to think others will cooperate, then you'll cooperate - You know how your allies handled the victory - higher transparency Once balance of power assumptions come back, concert systems go away because... - memories lapse, more intention uncertainty - Because war a possibility again, ties between allies aren't as strong anymore - ALTHOUGH concert systems CAN change behavior of states, they still don't have enough influence to last

Jervis "The Utility of Nuclear Deterrence"

Mutual second-strike capability... - ability of a state to fire a nuclear warhead on another state even after suffering a nuclear attack - deterrent for nuclear war (b/c rapid escalation and Mutually Assured Destruction) Stability-instability paradox... - nuclear weapons keep the general peace but they facilitate lower levels of conflict - Mutual second-strike capability is a prerequisite for this paradox - Each state is free to act as they please on the conventional level because they can hide behind their nuclear weapons (and the strong norm against nuclear war) - Ex: India & Pakistan engage in very risky and aggressive behavior on the conventional level despite their nuclear power Stability-instability paradox does not apply to nuclear-armed states.. - Unlike conventional weapons, nuclear weapons allow for extended deterrence - Mutual vulnerability makes both nuclear war and lower levels of violence undesirable - doesn't take into account the full risk of nukes 1. The risk of human error or sudden escalation with nuclear weapons is far too high to allow for lower levels of conflict - potential speed for escalation prevents instability - Modernization has increased the costs of war 2. Nuclear taboo (more on this in the following question) - Civilized countries do not use nuclear weapons because they are bad or immoral - If both states are status-quo states, they will work to maintain the peace (given that they both have mutual second-strike capabilities)

Morgenthau "Another 'Great Debate'"

National survival is... - moral principle/good. - knowable - same across time and space - valuable guide for policymaking Resources are scarce, so... - vital interests: - acquired by logic - state security and survival (minimum) - values, culture, institutions, and territory - variable interests: - acquired by circumstance - abortion, etc. things subject to bipartisan national disagreements

Jervis "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma"

security dilemma.... - core: misperception - measures a state takes to increase its own security usually decrease the security of other states... - states seek same goal (peace) but GAINS OF DEFECTING so high so states will likely defect - when all defect, everyone is worse off - states FEAR that they will be left worse off than their peers and so they try to mitigate that risk - One state's GAIN IN SECURITY can threaten others, starting security dilemma chain reaction - security dilemma is most intense: war Affecting variables... - Whether defensive weapons & policies can be distinguished from offensive ones (Differentiation would allow status quo powers to identify each other and reduces misperception) - Whether defense or offense has the advantage (When defense has the advantage, status-quo powers can scrutinize others without threatening them; Factors that affect it are... - Geography: the further the distance, the less vulnerable - Technology: immobile (defensive) vs. mobile (offensive)) Great power wars most likely to occur when... - offense is dominant - offensive weapons & policies cannot be distinguished from defensive ones - When offense is dominant, preemptive and preventive wars more likely Defensive realism (Jervis)... - Most states are status quo - security and not power-seeking - Security is often plentiful, not scarce - states not always afraid - War is most common when offensive advantage, and O&D weapons not distinguishable Offensive realism (Mearsheimer)... - Most states revisionist - states seek power out of fear, b/c all states have offensive capabilities - Fear is constant and intense Similarities b/w O&D realism... - anarchy - all actors are rational