LSJ 363 Final Exam
Military Commissions Act of 2006
Congress passed the MCA to eliminate the jurisdiction of federal courts to hear pending habeas applications from detainees who have been deemed enemy combatants under the Detainee Treatment Act. It stated that military commissions are the only way enemy combatants can get trials. The Courts responded to this in their Boumediene ruling, which argued that the MCA is unconstitutional.
Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF)
Congress passes AUMF to authorize the president to "use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or person he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks" of 9/11 ***AKA the starting point for GITMO/ enemy combatant tribunals/the Patriot act***
Cox v Voyle
Cox bought a used car; it was in her name, insured, and paid for by her. Her son borrowed it, and officers pulled him over claiming that the truck had stolen property on it. They seized the car, attempted to strongarm Cox's son into a confession, and told Cox that if she attempted to contest the seizure she would have to pay the state's legal fees. Cox claimed the AZ fofeiture laws were unconstitutional under the 1st, 4th, 5th, and 14th amendments because AZ creates an unfair system where people cannot afford the risk of defending their property. Q: Did AZ's forfeiture laws violate Cox's rights, and are they unconstitutional on their face and as applied to the seizure of Cox's truck? D: Violated 1 (prevented persons from petitioning for redress by making it to costly to do so), 4 (unreasonable seizure), 5 (due process violation by giving law enforcement an incentive to seize property), 14 (due process violation by punishing Rhonda for standing up for her property)
Detainee Treatment Act (DTA)
Created by Congress in response to Rasul ruling, intended to strip detainees of habeas corpus rights. The SC then responds to the DTA with their ruling in Hamdan. Congress responds with the Military Commissions Act of 2006.
Miller v. Alabama
F: 14 yo Miller and a CD killed a victim by beating him with a baseball bat and burning him alive in his trial. Miller was tried as an adult for capital murder during the course of arson, he was indicted and determined guilty. He was sentenced to LWOP. He argued that LWOP for a juvenile constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the 8th amendment. Q: Does the imposition of LWOP on a 14 yo child violate the 8th and 14th amendments prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment? D: The 8th amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment forbids mandatory sentencing of LWOP for juvenile homicide offenders. Children are constitutionally different from adults for sentencing purposes and while a mandatory LWOP for adults does not violate the 8th, for a child it is unconstitutionally disproportionate. There are psychological and scientific studies which show the difference between juveniles and adults, and law govern juveniles and adults differently Controlled by the court's ruling in Graham.
Graham v. Florida
F: 16 yo Graham had a history of armed burglary and robbery, when he was tried and convicted of armed robbery and sentenced to LWOP. On appeal he argued that LWOP of a juvenile violated the 8th amendment and constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Q: Does LWOP of a juvenile convicted of non-homicidal offenses violate the 8th amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment? D: Yes-- 8th amendment does not permit a juvenile to be sentenced to LWOP for a non-homicidal crime. The Court said that youth matters and the courts must consider both the age of the offender and the characteristics of the crime. Juveniles have diminished culpability and increased likelihood for reform so they are constitutionally different from adults. The Court: 1. considered objective indicia of society's standards and 2. determined whether the punishment in question violated the Constitution. They determined that 1 and 2 indicate that the punishment in question for the class in question was unconstitutional.
Loving v Virginia
F: 2 VA residents (BF, WM) married in DC. When they returned to VA, they were charged with violating the state's anti-miscegination statute, which banned interracial marriages. They were found guilty and sentenced to a year in jail or a suspended sentence if they left VA and did not return for 25 years. !Q: Did VA's anti-miscegination law violate the equal protection clause of the 14th amendment? D: Unanimous for Loving Yes-- the Court held the law's only purpose was racial discrimination. Though VA argued that it was legitimate because it applied equally to all races, the law was a violation of the Due process clause and equal protection clause of the 14th amendment. Warren: The freedom to marry or not marry a person of another race resides with the individual, and cannot be infringed upon by the State
Maqaleh v Gates
F: 3 petitioners were detained by the US at Bagram Air Field in Afghanistan and had been in US custody for more than 6 years. The petitioners challenged the legality of their detention through a writ of habeas corpus on the grounds that the MCA strips federal courts of the jurisdiction t hear habeas claims filed by aliens declared enemy combatants. The state responded that the MCA was constitutional because the petitioners had no right to invoke the Suspension clause. The Court of Appeals ultimately denied Maqaleh relief based on this reasoning. Q: Can the US hold and detain people beyond the law? D: Yes they can, the evidence is not enough. The Court utilized the Boumediene test, which Maqaleh failed. Though Bagram applicants had stronger claims than GITMO detainees because they were given less protections to seek relief, they failed the other aspects of the test because the nature of the Bagram air zone was inherently different from Guantanamo. Bagram was not under US sovereignty, and was an active war zone. Habeas litigations in an active war zone would divert military efforts and attention, the court is wary of interfering in direct military efforts, and enemy litigiousness would create conflict between the judiciary and the military. Nonetheless, the court modified the detainee review board procedures used to classify enemy combatants in Bagram to make sure detainees had more protections to address 1. of the test.
Boumediene v. Bush
F: Boumediene and 5 other Algerian natives were seized by Bosnian police when US intelligence officers suspected their involvement in a plot to attack the US embassy, after they were cleared of these charged by a Bosnian court. The US classified them as enemy combatants in the war on terror and detained them in GITMO. Boumediene filed a habeas corpus claim, arguing that this violated the due process clause, common law, and international law. Due to the passing of the MCA, which stated that federal courts do not have jurisdiction to hear habeas applications from detainees who have been designated as enemy combatants, the government argued that Boumediene did not have a case. Boumediene argued that the MCA should not apply because it violated the Suspension Clause, which states that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it. Q: 1. Are detainees at GITMO entitled to protections of the 5th amendment right to not be deprived of liberty w/p due process of law and habeas corpus relief? 2. Is MCA an adequate substitute for habeas relief? 3. Can GITMO detainees be deprived of habeas relief and Geneva Convention protections? 4. Does the MCA violate the Suspension clause? D: Yes to each of these questions. The DTA is not an adequate substitute for writ of habeas corpus, so the MCA operates as an unconstitutional suspension of that writ. The detainees were not barred from seeking habeas corpus or invoking the Suspension clause merely because they had been designated as enemy combatants or held at Guantanamo Bay. Because the US has de facto sovereignty of GITMO , GITMO detainees had a right to habeas corpus petitions; MCA is unconstitutional. The constitution grants congress and the president the power to acquire, dispose of, and govern territory, but not the power to decide when and where its terms apply (political branches cannot switch the constitution on and off). Created the Boumediene Test: To determine if the Suspension Clause is violated, courts must consider 1) the citizenship and status of the detainee and the adequacy of the process through which that status determination was made, 2) the nature of the sites where apprehension and detention took place, 3) the practical obstacles inherent in resolving the prisoner's entitlement to the writ. Scalia dissent: The DTA offers sufficient protections that habeas corpus guarantees, and we cannot overrule the military's decisions in times of war. ***narrowly applied to GITMO detainees***
Rasul v. Bush
F: British/Australian/Kuwaiti citizens were captured by the US in Pakistan and Afghanistan during the US's War on Terror. The 4 men were transported to GITMO. Their families filed writs of habeas corpus and claimed that the gov's decision to deny the men access to attorneys and to hold them indefinitely w/o access to a court violated the 5th amendment's due process clause. The gov countered that federal courts had no jurisdiction to hear cases because the prisoners were not American citizens and were being held in territory over which the US did not have sovereignty (Cuba holds ultimate sovereignty). Q: Do US courts have jurisdiction to consider legal appeals filed on behalf of foreign citizens held by the US military in GITMO? D: Yes they do -- The degree of control exercised by the US over GITMO was sufficient to trigger the application of habeas corpus rights. The right to habeas corpus is not dependent on citizen status, and the detainees were free to challenge their detention as unconstitutional. Narrowly tailored only to GITMO. (Congress responded to this by creating the Detainee Treatment Act)
Nelson v Colorado
F: CO imposes monetary penalties upon persons convicted of a crime. Nelson and Madden were separately arrested and charged with sexual assault crimes. They were acquitted of their charges, and requested refunds from the state for the penalties that they had been charged. They were denied this request on the basis that under the CO Exoneration Act, an individual may only recover monetary losses from an arrest if they can prove by clear and convincing evidence that they were actually innocent. Q: Does CO's refusal to refund money from persons exonerated from convictions unless they can prove by clear and convincing evidence that they were actually innocent violate the Due process clause? D: CO's exoneration act is invalid under the due process clause of the 14th amendment, which they decided using the Eldridge test. They felt that 1) Nelson and Madden had an interest in getting their money back, 2) the exoneration act did not allow the defendant's to be presumed innocent, and 3) CO had no claim of rights to their funds
US v $124,700
F: Gonzolez was driving in a rented car not rented in his name when he was pulled over for speeding. Gonzolez lied to the officers saying that he had not had a DUI conviction, and that he did not have any money in his car, and did not mention who else was involved in helping him get the car. He consented to a search of the vehicle and officers found $124,700 in a cooler in the backseat of his car. Gonzolez claimed that it was money being used to buy a car and he was in the rental because he thought it was illegal to fly with that amount of money. Q: Was the seizure of Gonzalez's assets legal and was there a substantial connection, by preponderance of the evidence, between the money and a drug trafficking offense? D: The evidence demonstrates a significant connection between the currency and drug trafficking. Bundling and concealing large amounts of currency, the strange travel pattern, the inability to identify key parties, unusual car rental papers, the canine alert to the money, and false statements to offcers lead to the inference that Gonzalez was involved in illegal drug activity.
Obergefell v. Hodges
F: Groups of same-sex couples sued in several states, to challenge the constitutionality of those states' bans on same-sex marriage or refusal to recognize legal same-sex marriages that occurred in jurisdictions that provided for such marriages. They argued the bans were vioolation of the Equal Protection clause of the 14th amendment. Q: Does the 14th require a state to liscens a marriage between same-sex couples? Does the 14th require a state to recognize a marriage between 2 people of the same sex that was legally licensed and performed in another state.
Hamdan v Rumsfeld
F: Hamdan, Osama bin Laden's alleged former chauffer, was captured by Afghan forces and imprisoned by the US military in GITMO. He filed a habeas corpus petition to challenge his detention. Before a court ruled on his petition, a military tribunal designated him an enemy combatant. The court determined he must first be given a hearing to determine whether he was a POW before he could be tried by a military commission. Q: May the rights protected by the Geneva Convention be enforced in federal court through habeas corpus petition? Was the military commission established to try Hamdan and others for alleged war crimes on the War on Terror authorized by the Congress or the inherent powers of the President? D: 5-3 for Hamdan. Yes and no. The SC held that neither an act of Congress nor the inherent powers of the Executive laid out in the Constitution expressly authorized the sort of military commission used in this case. Absent that express authorization, the commission had to comply with the ordinary laws of the US and the laws of war. The Geneva convention as a part of the ordinary laws of war, could therefore be enforced by the SC along with the statutory Uniform Code of Military Justice. Hamdan's exclusion from part of his trial violated this and therefore the trial was illegal. The President must conform with the Uniform Code of Military Justice/Geneva Convention, which generally provide for proceedings consistent with courts-martial. AUMF did not expand the president's authority to convene military commissions-- individuals have a right to be heard in federal court. ** Courts response to DTA, which basically said that non-citizen detainees still have a right to habeas corpus claims in federal court
Hamdi v Rumsfeld
F: Hamdi, an American citizen, was detained by the US in Afghanistan. He was accused of fighting for the Tailiban, declared an enemy combatant, and held in GITMO. They transferred him to a military prison in VA when they learned he was American, his father filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus and argued that his 5th amendment right to due process were violated by holding him indefinitely, and not giving him access to an attorney or trial. The US argued that he was an enemy combatant and that the executive branch has the right to hold him indefinitely under AUMF. Q: Can US citizens be deemed enemy combatants and denied due process rights? D: Yes and no. Although Congress authorized Hamdi's detention, 5th amendment due process right guarantees a citizen held in the US as an enemy combatant the right to contest that detention before a neutral decision maker. The plurality rejected the gov's argument that the separation of powers prevents the judiciary from hearing Hamdi's challenge. You can deem detainees enemy combatants, but you cannot deny US citizens rights to due process. A state of war is not a blank check that the president can use to deny 5th amendment rights of citizens
Lawrence v Texas
F: Houston police entered Lawrence's private home following a reported weapons disturbance, and found him engaging in private, consensual sex with another man. They were arrested and convicted of deviate sexual intercourse in violation of a TX statute forbidding 2 persons of same sex to engage in intimate sexual conduct. Q: Do the criminal convictions of Lawrence and Garner under the Texas "Homosexual Conduct" law, which criminalizes sexual intimacy by same-sex couples, violate the 14th amendment guarantee of equal protection? Do their criminal convictions violate their vital interests in liberty and privacy protected by the Due process clause of the 14th amendment? Should Bowers v Hardwick be overruled? D: 6-3 for Lawrence No, yes, yes. The Statute violates the due process clause. People are entitled to private, consensual sexual conduct without intervention from the government. The TX statue furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual. Cited Loving-- protecting traditional marriage is not a legitimate state interest. Bowers was overruled
Girswold v Connecticut
F: In 1879, CO passed a law banning the use of any drug, medical device, or other instrument in furthering contraception. A gynecologist at Yale opened a birth control clinic in conjunction with Griswold (who was the head of Planned Parenthood). They were arrested and convicted of violating the law. They argued that the law was a violation of the 14th amendment. Q: Does the Constitution protect the right to martial privacy against state's restrictions on a couple's ability to be counseled in the use of contraceptives? D: 7-2 for Griswold A right to privacy can be inferred from several amendments in the Bill of Rights, and this right prevents states from making the use of contraception by married couples illegal. While the Constitution does not create a general right to privacy, it does create prenumbras that establish a right to privacy. The 1st, 3rd, 4th, 9th amendments create the right to privacy in marital relations, so the CO statue conflicted with this and was null. CO must prove that its rule is compelling and absolutely necessary to overrule the right to privacy.
Whole Women's Health v Hellerstedt
F: In 2013, TX passed HB2 which contained several provisions related to abortions (physicians had to have admitting privileges at a hospital within 30 miles of the clinic, clincs must comply with standards for a surgical center). This bill would have resulted in all but 6 clinics being shut down. Q: Should a Court's substantial burden analysis take into account the extent to which laws that restrict access to abortion services actually serve the government's stated interest in promoting health? D: 5-3 for Whole women's health In applying the substantial burden test, the court must weigh the extent to which the laws in question actually serve the stated governmental interest against the burdens they impose. HB2 provides undue burdens that do not actually protect women
Madison v Alabama
F: Madison was facing a death penalty for killing a police officer but he had dementia and couldn't remember his crime. Q: Is it cruel and unusual punishment to sentence a man to death if they can't remember their crimes? D: A faulty memory or mental illness alone does not trigger the 8th amendment. What matters is that someone holds a rational understanding of the crime they have committed and can comprehend the judgement of society. If they can't understand this, then the punishment has no retributive purpose and violates human decency. The death penalty is unconstitutional in this case.
Planned Parenthood v Casey
F: PA legislature amended its abortion control laws, and required women to have informed consent, and a 24 hour waiting period prior to the procedure. A minor seeking an abortion had to have parental consent, and a married woman had to seek her husband's permission. Q: Can a state, without violating their right to abortions as guaranteed by Roe v Wade, require women who want an abortion to obtain: informed consent and if minors, obtain parental consent? D: 5-4 for Planned Parenthood The court upheld Roe, but they also upheld most of the PA provisions. The judges created the undue burden test: does a state abortion regulation have the purpose or effect of imposing an 'undue burden' (defined as a substantial obstacle) in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability? The only provision to fail the undue-burden test was the husband notification requirement
Roe v Wade
F: Roe, a Texas resident, sought to terminate her pregnancy by abortion. TX law prohibited this except to save a pregnant woman's life. Q: Does the Constitution embrace a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy by abortion? D: 7-2 for Roe The Court held that a woman's right to an abortion fell within the right to privacy recognized in Griswold, protected by the 14th amendment. The court created the trimester system, where women and their doctors have total autonomy over the pregnancy during the 1st trimester, where states can regulate abortion in reasonable ways as it relates to the health of the mother in the 2nd trimester, and where states can regulate or prohibit abortion except in cases where the mother's life is in danger in the 3rd trimester. The State has a legitimate interest in protecting the health of women, which increases per trimester.
EEOC v Abercrombie and Fitch
F: Samantha Elauf, a practicing Muslim, applied for a job at Abercrombie and Fitch. During the interview, neither her nor the interviewer mentioned her head scarf. After the interview, she was marked down for failing to mention that she would need an accomodation for her headscarf, which would be in violation of the Look Policy which states that no employees may wear a black cap. Because she was marked down, she was not hired. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission sued and claimed the company violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act by refusing to hire Elauf for her headscarf. Q: Can an employer be held liable for refusing to hire an applicant based on a religious observance or practice if the individual did not inform the employer? D: 8-1 for EOCC To hold an employee liable under Title VII, an applicant only needs to show that her need for an accommodation was a motivating factor in the employer's decision not to hire her. Title VII does not demand mere neutrality, instead it creates an affirmative duty to accommodate religious practices.
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
F: The Affordable Care Act required employment based group health care plans to provide certain types of contraception. There were exemptions for non-profit religious organizations, but not for for-profit institutions such as Hobby Lobby. The Green family (that owned Hobby Lobby) believed that contraception was a form of abortion and wanted an exemption from providing it to employees. They argued that it violated their 1st amendment right to free exercise and the Religious Freedom Act of 1993. Q: Does the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 allow for a for-profit company to deny its employees health coverage of contraception to which the employees would otherwise be entitled based on the religious objections of the company's owners? D: 5-4 for Hobby Lobby. Congress intended for the RFRA to be read as applying to corporations since they were composed of individuals who use them to achieve desired ends. The contraception requirement forces religious corporations to go against their religion or face significant fines, and this creates a substantial burden that is not the least restrictive method of satisfying the government's interests. The less restrictive option would be to provide the exemption Dissent: Sotomayor-- religious beliefs or observances must not impinge on the rights of third parties. There is no violation of the freedom of religion when an infringement on that right is merely an incidental consequence of an otherwise valid statute. Why are some religious claims deemed unworthy of accommodation while this one is allowed? Religious organizations exist to foster the interests of persons subscribing to the same religious faith, this is not true for for-profit corporations.
Lukulmi Babalu Aye v City of Hialeah
F: The Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye practiced Santeria, which uses animal sacrifice as a form of worship. After the announcement of the establishment of a Santeria church in Hialeah, Florida, the city council adopted several ordinances addressing religious sacrifice that prohibited possession of animals for sacrifice or slaughter, with specific exemptions for state-licensed activities. The laws banned animal sacrifice on the basis that it violated public morals, public safety, and animal cruelty. Q: Are the city laws directed at animal sacrifice as part of the Santeria religion a violation of the 1st amendment free exercise clause? D: Unanimous decision for Lukumi The ordinances were neither neutral nor generally applicable. The ordinances had to be justified by a compelling governmental interest and they had to be narrowly tailored to that interest. The ordinances applied exclusively to the church, and suppressed more religious conduct than was necessary to achieve the stated ends. Religious beliefs do not need to be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible in order to merit 1st amendment protections.
Timbs v Indiana
F: Timbs plead guilty to one charge of felony dealing and one charge of conspiracy to commit theft, he was sentenced to 1 year and had to pay $1200 in fees. The State then sought to forfeit his $42,000 Land Rover. Timb contested this, as the maximum statutory fine for his charge was $10,000, and his car was worth more than that. Indiana claimed that because the excessive fines clause hadn't been incorporated in the states, the seizure was acceptable Q: Has the 8th amendment's excessive fines clause been incorporated against the states under the 14th amendment, and was the seizure excessive and in violation of the 8th amendment? D: Unanimous for Timbs The 8th amendment excessive fines clause is an incorporated protection applicable to the states by way of the 14th amendment. It is fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty and deeply rooted in the nations history and traditions.
West Virginia Board of Education v Barnette
F: WVBE required public schools to include salutes to the flag by teachers and students as a mandatory aspect of school activities. The children in a family of Jehovah's witnesses were sent home from school for non-compliance and were threatened with reform school used for criminally active children, and parental prosecution for causing juvenile delinquency. Q: Did the compulsory flag-salute for public schoolchildren violate the 1st amendment right to free exercise? D: Yes! The court overruled their decision in Minersville v Gobitis and held that compelling public schoolchildren to salute the flag was unconstitutional. The 1st amendment cannot enforce a unanimity of opinion on any topic, and national symbols like the flag should not receive a level of deference that trumps constitutional protections. Curtailing or eliminating dissent is an improper and ineffective way of generating unity. "If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official can prescribe what shall be orthodox"
US v Windsor
F: Windsor's spouse, Spyer, passed away and left her estate to Windsor. Windsor was then charged $363,000 in federal estate taxes, because their marriage was not recognized by the federal government under DOMA. DOMA states that marriage and spouse refer to legal unions between one man and one woman. Though their marriage was valid in their state, it was not recognized by the federal government. Q: Does DOMA deprive same sex couples who are legally married under state laws of their 5th amendment rights to equal protection under federal law and is thus unconstitutional? What is the proper balance between the federal government and the states? D: 5-4 for Windsor States have the authority to define marital relationships and DOMA denies same-sex couples the rights that come from federal recognition of their marriage, which are available to other couples. The purpose and effect of DOMA is to impose a disadvantage, a separate status, and a stigma on same-sex couples in violation of the 5th amendment's guarantee to equal protection. If a state legalizes gay marriage, than the federal government has to validate that marriage in those states.
Miller Dissent (Roberts)
Federal courts should not be making moral decisions for states, LWOP for juveniles is something many states do.
Geneva Convention's relation to torture
Geneva Convention protects POW from torture and being held indefinitely, establishes that POW must be a clear enemy
Why is it a problem that civil asset forfeiture exists in civil court and not criminal court?
In civil court, property owners have no right to counsel, the owner does not have to be charged or convicted of a crime to lose property, and the burden of proof lies with the owner to prove the innocence of their property. Seized property is thus extremely difficult to get back, and incentives asset forfeiture for law enforcement
Military Order of November 13, 2001
Intended to prevent enemy combatants from bringing habeas corpus claims to the US/ from being tried in federal court where they would be given rights and could not be tortured. Basically used to ensure that any info obtained through interrogation is legitimate and can be used and you cannot see the evidence provided by prosecution. 1. Military tribunals have exclusive jurisdiction with respect to offense by the individual and 2. The individual shall not be privileged to seek any remedy or maintain any proceeding directly or indirectly, or to have any such remedy or proceeding sought on the individuals behalf in (court of the US, court of a foreign national, international tribunal)
Habeas Corpus
Literally, "produce the body"-- filing a petition to be seen by a different court due to some sort of factual error in another court, present a new judicial body
Bruce Jessen and James Mitchell
Psychologists who devised CIA's interrogation techniques (shortly became unrecognized by all psychological associations) and received vast amounts of money for doing so
Boumediene Dissent (Scalia)
The MCA provided sufficient habeas protections, should be used for detainees and federal courts should not hear the cases.
Obergefell Dissent (Roberts)
The court was creating new rights that didn't exist, they are
Hobby Lobby Dissent (Ginsburg)
The religious freedom laws were made to protect individuals, not corporations. This decision is favoring Christianity because the Court wouldn't make the same decision in similar situations for other religions (gelatin, blood transfusions, etc)
West Virginia Dissent (Frankfurter)
There is a compelling government interest in creating national unity which is provided by saluting the flag.
Precedent established in Matthews v Eldridge
To determine if the Due process clause of the 14th amendment is violated, the court must look at: 1. The private interest affected 2. The risk of erroneous deprivation of the defendant's interests if the exoneration act is their only remedy 3. What is at stake for the government (applied in Nelson v Colorado)
Torture Memos
Yoo: in matters of war, the Commander-in-chief does not need to answer to Congress for necessary action and has the right to detain indefinitely during times of war, terrorists are alien/unlawful combatants (Unlawful enemy combatants are persons in countries that do not follow the Geneva Convention and thus are not given the same protections) Yoo/Bybee Extreme Interrogation: Examined laws intended to restrict nation's capacity for torture and realized GITMO might be a legal loophole because the US technically did not have sovereignty over it and the US constitution and laws don't technically apply on GITMO because of this. They also argued that cruel, inhuman, degrading treatment is not torture under the law because torture is only an extreme act that will cause organ failure, impairment of bodily function, death, or prolonged mental harm that lasts for months or years
