Midterm Cases

Adamson v. California (1947)

Argument: Adamson was charged with first-degree murder but chose not to testify on his own behalf; the prosecutor then argued that this refusal to testify could be seen as an admission of guilt under a California statute that allowed the jury to infer guilt in such cases. On appeal, he argued that because the prosecutor had drawn attention to Adamson's refusal to testify, Adamson's freedom against self-incrimination had been violated. Ruling: While Adamson's rights may have been violated had the case been tried in federal court, the rights guaranteed under the Fifth Amendment did not extend to state courts based on the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; based on precedent of cases such as Palko v Connecticut Split: 5-4 against incorporation of protection against self-incrimination (Fifth Amendment) *state has to prove your guilt, can't draw inferences from your failure to take the stand

Smith v. Goguen (1974)

Argument: Goguen, a teenager from Massachusetts, was arrested by police for wearing a small cloth US flag on the seat of his pants. When arrested, Goguen was standing on the sidewalk, talking; he was not engaged in any demonstration. Goguen was convicted and sentenced to 6 months in jail for violating a flag desecration law encompassing anyone who treats the flag "contemptuously". Appeal on First Amendment grounds. Ruling: The Supreme Court sided with Goguen, and ruled that the statute was too vague. The Court partially relied on prior decisions which prohibited states from compelling people to salute the flag: "neither the United States nor any State may require any individual to salute or express favorable attitudes toward the flag." Split: 6-3 for First Amendment

Houston v. Hill (1987)

Argument: Hill observed a friend blocking traffic to allow a vehicle to enter traffic. Appellee also observed the police confronting his friend about his actions, and at that time Appellee yelled to the police to "pick on someone their own size." Appellee was then indicted, but never convicted under a Houston ordinance prohibiting verbal challenges to police officers. Appellee seeks to have that ordinance declared unconstitutional. Ruling: Houston's ordinance criminalizes a substantial amount of constitutionally protected speech, and accords the police unconstitutional discretion in enforcement. The ordinance's plain language is undoubtedly violated every day, yet only some individuals, chosen by the police at their discretion, are arrested. The ordinance is substantially overbroad and unconstitutional. Split: 8-1 for Hill, against the ordinance Ordinance prohibiting verbal challenges to police officers is unconstitutional based on the discretion of the officer

Martin v. City of Struthers (1943)

Argument: Martin was a Jehovah's Witness in Struthers, Ohio. She canvassed neighborhoods knocking on doors and ringing doorbells to distribute leaflets promoting a meeting. She was convicted and fined $10 for violating a city ordinance that prohibited a person who was distributing leaflets and other flyers from knocking on doors and ringing doorbells. She appealed her conviction in the Circuit Court of Mahoning County, alleging that the city ordinance violated her First Amendment free speech and free press rights. Ruling: Court acknowledged the city's interest in preventing crime and reducing nuisances. However, alternative solutions, such as trespassing laws, were also available that could achieve the city's purpose. Activities like Martin's were "so clearly vital to the preservation of a free society that, putting aside reasonable police and health regulations of time and manner of distribution, it must be fully preserved." The ordinance was overly restrictive on door-to-door distributors, and therefore unconstitutional. Split: 5-4 for the First Amendment

McDonald v. City of Chicago (2010)

Argument: Plaintiffs from Illinois argued that the Second Amendment should apply to states; in District of Columbia v Heller, the Supreme Court ruled that a D.C. handgun ban violated the Second Amendment, and so the appellants were arguing for incorporation of the Second Amendment against similar bans in Illinois Ruling: Fourteenth Amendment makes the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms for the purpose of self-defense applicable to the states Split: 5-4 for incorporation of the Second Amendment

Bush v. Gore (2000)

Argument: 2000 presidential election, Bush led Gore by small margin in Florida; automatic recount as mandated by state law, then allowed Gore to choose counties for manual recount; Bush appealed to Supreme Court on grounds that recount was unconstitutional Ruling: Recount was unconstitutional, violation of 14th amendment - recount in only certain counties is unequal treatment of votes after they have been cast; No time for proper recount in time remaining to declare winner of election Split: 7-2 upholding 14th amendment, 5-4 for insufficient time remaining to recount ballots Before this case was decided, political scientists believed the decision had to be unanimous in order to get involved in politics The court was so divided and still meddled in the political process View of the court was predicted to go down - LESS LEGITIMACY OF THE COURT Undermines perception of the court's legitimacy But actually, the legitimacy of the Court was not affected Quote from a dissenting judge - the "real loser" was the public who believed in an objective judiciary - mechanical jurisprudence

Cohen v. California (1971)

Argument: A 19-year-old department store worker expressed his opposition to the Vietnam War by wearing a jacket emblazoned with "**** THE DRAFT. STOP THE WAR" The young man, Paul Cohen, was convicted under a California statute that prohibits "maliciously and willfully disturb[ing] the peace and quiet of any neighborhood or person [by] offensive conduct." Appeal based on violation of First Amendment. Ruling: Court reasoned that the expletive, while provocative, was not directed toward anyone; besides, there was no evidence that people in substantial numbers would be provoked into some kind of physical action by the words on his jacket. Harlan recognized that "one man's vulgarity is another's lyric." In doing so, the Court protected two elements of speech: the emotive (the expression of emotion) and the cognitive (the expression of ideas). Split: 5-4 for First Amendment expletive, while provocative, was not directed toward anyone; the Court protected two elements of speech: the emotive (the expression of emotion) and the cognitive (the expression of ideas)

Nebraska Press Ass'n. v. Stuart (1976)

Argument: A Nebraska state trial judge, presiding over a widely publicized murder trial, entered an order restraining members of the press from publishing or broadcasting accounts of confessions made by the accused to the police. The judge felt that this measure was necessary to guarantee a fair trial to the accused. Ruling: The Court agreed with the trial judge that the murder case would generate "intense and pervasive pretrial publicity." However, the unanimous court held that the practical problems associated with implementing a prior restraint on the press in this case would not have served the accused's rights. Chief Justice Burger reasoned that "a whole community cannot be restrained from discussing a subject intimately affecting life within it." Held that the lower courts needed to determine whether alternative measures (in comparison to suppression of the press) were feasible considering the circumstances of the case. The Supreme Court found that there was no determination as to whether alternative measures would have protected the potential defendant and thus the restraining order was invalid as it was unnecessarily burdensome.The Supreme Court also noted jurisprudence, which stood for the proposition that pretrial publicity does not intrude on the right to a fair trial. Split: Unanimous for First Amendment, Nebraska Press Association

Hustler Magazine v. Falwell (1988)

Argument: A lead story in the November 1983 issue of Hustler Magazine featured a "parody" of an advertisement, modeled after an actual ad campaign, claiming that Falwell, a Fundamentalist minister and political leader, had a drunken incestuous relationship with his mother in an outhouse. Falwell sued to recover damages for libel, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Falwell won a jury verdict on the emotional distress claim and was awarded a total of $150,000 in damages. Hustler Magazine appealed. Ruling: Court held that public figures, such as Jerry Falwell, may not recover for the intentional infliction of emotional distress without showing that the offending publication contained a false statement of fact which was made with "actual malice." The Court added that the interest of protecting free speech, under the First Amendment, surpassed the state's interest in protecting public figures from patently offensive speech, so long as such speech could not reasonably be construed to state actual facts about its subject. Split: Unanimous for First Amendment, Hustler 1. Public figures like Falwell cannot recover damages for emotional distress unless it is proved that the publication acting with Actual Malice 2. Protecting free speech under the First Amendment was a stronger interest than protecting public figures from offensive speech

Amalgamated Food Employees v. Logan Valley (1968)

Argument: A shopping center owner barred union members from peacefully picketing outside the shopping center. The specific store being picketed in front of was a non-union store. The union challenged this exclusion, claiming it was a public function and that their First Amendment constitutional rights prevail. Appeal based on First Amendment. Ruling: Held that private property may in some instance be treated as public property for First Amendment constitutional purposes. Supreme Court also determined that the shopping center was open to the public. Thus, the state could not by way of trespass laws, hinder access to members of the public who wished to exercise their First Amendment rights. Specifically, those who wished to exercise their First Amendment rights for a purpose consistent with how the property is used. However, this access could be tempered by the state in that the state could regulate First Amendment speech to prevent interference with the normal use of the property by others. Split: 6-3 for First Amendment Logan valley ruling - public forum because it is open to the public

Masson v. New Yorker Magazine (1991)

Argument: After Jeffrey Masson was fired from his position at the Sigmund Freud Archives, Janet Malcolm interviewed him for an article in the New Yorker magazine. Malcolm's article included many long direct quotations from Masson. The article presented Masson as extremely arrogant and condescending; at one point, he was quoted as calling himself "the greatest analyst who ever lived." However, Malcolm fabricated many of the more distasteful quotations. Masson sued for libel. The District Court dismissed the case on First Amendment free speech grounds because Masson was a public figure. Ruling: Court ruled that the First Amendment's free expression clause could not protect the distortions in Malcolm's article. Justice Anthony Kennedy's majority opinion also explained when a direct quotation can be considered false, and therefore potentially libelous. The First Amendment limits libel suits by public figures. A report about a public figure cannot be considered "false" unless it is a gross distortion of the truth. Justice Kennedy's opinion explained that a direct quotation will qualify as such a distortion if the quoted words differ in their factual meaning from anything the public figure really said. Malcolm's fabrication qualified as a "gross distortion," and the Court granted Masson standing to sue. Split: Unanimous against First Amendment, for Masson Gross distortion - direct quotation will qualify as such a distortion if the quoted words differ in their factual meaning from anything the public figure really said

Street v. NY (1969)

Argument: After hearing a news report of the attempted murder of James Meredith, the defendant, Sidney Street, took a 48-star U.S. flag and burned it. Upon being questioned by police, he said, "Yes; that is my flag; I burned it. If they let that happen to Meredith, we don't need an American flag." He was convicted under a New York statute that outlawed defilement and contempt of the American flag. Appealed on First Amendment grounds. Ruling: Court held that the record lacked sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the trial court constitutionally convicted Street of flag burning. Justice Harlan first held that Street properly raised the issue of the constitutionality of the allegation's reference to Street's words. He applied the rule in Stromberg v. California, where the Court held that a conviction must be set aside if it could have been based on constitutionally protected speech; here, Justice Harlan could not determine from the record that Street's words were not an independent cause of his conviction. Justice Harlan rejected the Court of Appeals' characterization of the flag burning as an act of incitement, holding instead that Street's conviction furthered no government interest. Split: 5-4 for First Amendment

Branzburg v. Hayes (1972)

Argument: After observing and interviewing a number of people synthesizing and using drugs in a two-county area in Kentucky, Branzburg, a reporter, wrote a story which appeared in a Louisville newspaper. On two occasions he was called to testify before state grand juries which were investigating drug crimes. Branzburg refused to testify and potentially disclose the identities of his confidential sources. Similarly, in the companion cases of In re Pappas and United States v. Caldwell, two different reporters, each covering activity within the Black Panther organization, were called to testify before grand juries and reveal trusted information. Like Branzburg, both Pappas and Caldwell refused to appear before their respective grand juries. They refused, citing a privilege under the Press Clause, and were held in contempt. Ruling: The Court found that requiring reporters to disclose confidential information to grand juries served a "compelling" and "paramount" state interest and did not violate the First Amendment. Justice White argued that since the case involved no government intervention to impose prior restraint, and no command to publish sources or to disclose them indiscriminately, there was no Constitutional violation. The fact that reporters receive information from sources in confidence does not privilege them to withhold that information during a government investigation; the average citizen is often forced to disclose information received in confidence when summoned to testify in court. Split: 5-4 against First Amendment Under certain circumstances the court can force the release of "confidential" information from reporters - a "compelling" and "paramount" state interest

Sheppard v. Maxwell (1966)

Argument: After suffering a trial court conviction of second-degree murder for the bludgeoning death of his pregnant wife, Samuel Sheppard challenged the verdict as the product of an unfair trial. Sheppard, who maintained his innocence of the crime, alleged that the trial judge failed to protect him from the massive, widespread, and prejudicial publicity that attended his prosecution. On appeal from an Ohio district court ruling supporting his claim, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. When Sheppard appealed again, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. Ruling: Court found that Sheppard did not receive a fair trial. Noting that although freedom of expression should be given great latitude, the Court held that it must not be so broad as to divert the trial away from its primary purpose: adjudicating both criminal and civil matters in an objective, calm, and solemn courtroom setting. The Cleveland television media's repeated broadcasts of Sheppard confessing in detail to crimes he was later charged with, the blatant and hostile trial coverage by Cleveland's radio and print media, and the physical arrangement of the courtroom itself - which facilitated collaboration between the prosecution and present media - all combined to so inflame the jurors' minds against Sheppard as to deny him a fair trial. The Court concluded that the trial judge should have either postponed the proceedings or transferred them to a different venue. Split: 8-1 for Sheppard, Fifth Amendment

Hoffman Estates v. Flipside (1955)

Argument: An ordinance of appellant village requires a business to obtain a license if it sells any items that are "designed or marketed for use with illegal cannabis or drugs." Guidelines define the items (such as "roach clips," which are used to smoke cannabis, "pipes," and "paraphernalia"), the sale of which is required to be licensed. Appellee, which sold a variety of merchandise in its store, including "roach clips" and specially designed pipes used to smoke marihuana, upon being notified that it was in possible violation of the ordinance, brought suit in Federal District Court, claiming that the ordinance is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, and requesting injunctive and declaratory relief and damages. The District Court upheld the ordinance and awarded judgment to the village defendants. The Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that the ordinance is unconstitutionally vague on its face. Ruling: The ordinance here does not violate appellee's First Amendment rights, nor is it overbroad because it inhibits such rights of other parties. The ordinance does not restrict speech as such, but simply regulates the commercial marketing of items that the labels reveal may be used for an illicit purpose, and thus does not embrace noncommercial speech. With respect to any commercial speech interest implicated, the ordinance's restriction on the manner of marketing does not appreciably limit appellee's communication of information, except to the extent it is directed at commercial activity promoting or encouraging illegal drug use, an activity which, if deemed "speech," is speech proposing an illegal transaction, and thus subject to government regulation or ban. It is irrelevant whether the ordinance has an overbroad scope encompassing other persons' commercial speech, since the overbreadth doctrine does not apply to commercial speech. The ordinance is not facially overbroad or vague, but is reasonably clear in its application to appellee. Split: Unanimous against First Amendment

Elonis v. United States (2015)

Argument: Anthony Elonis was convicted under 18 U. S. C. §875(c), which criminalizes the transmission of threats in interstate commerce, for posting threats to injure several individuals on Facebook. The district court instructed the jury that a "true threat," which falls outside the scope of First Amendment speech protections, requires an objective (factual) intent to threaten. Elonis appealed and argued that "true threats" require a subjective (opinionated) intent to threaten. Subjective indicates that speaker meant for statements to be threats, not based on perception but on mental condition of speaker. Ruling: Court ruled that a conviction of threatening another person under 18 U. S. C. §875(c) requires proof of the defendant's subjective intent to threaten. An objective reasonable person standard does not go far enough to separate innocent, accidental conduct from purposeful, wrongful acts. The Court held that, in this case, an objective standard would risk punishing an innocent actor because the crucial element that makes this behavior criminal is the threat, not merely the posting. Split: 7-2 for Elonis; interpretation of statute must include subjective intent Subjective indicates that speaker meant for statements to be threats, not based on perception but on mental condition of speaker.

Herbert v. Lando (1979)

Argument: Anthony Herbert was a retired Army officer who served in Vietnam. While in Vietnam, he accused superior officers of covering up atrocities that American troops had committed. The Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) produced and broadcast a documentary of the petitioner's story. Herbert sued for libel arguing that the program falsely and maliciously portrayed his character, causing him financial loss. In order to prove libel under the "actual malice" standard, Herbert's attorneys deposed Lando as well as the producer and the editor of the documentary, attempting to deduce the editorial decisions that were made during the production of the program. Ruling: When a member of the press is alleged to have circulated damaging falsehoods and is sued for injury to the plaintiff's reputation, there is no privilege under the First Amendment's guarantees of freedom of speech and freedom of the press barring the plaintiff from inquiring into the editorial processes of those responsible for the publication where the inquiry will produce evidence material to the proof of a critical element of the plaintiff's cause of action. Split: 6-3 against First Amendment, for Herbert --Held that trial attorneys could question editors and reporters to prove actual malice 1. Members of the press had to testify in libel cases and answer questions about pre-publication decisions

Watts v. United States (1969)

Argument: At a political rally, Watts allegedly threatened the life of the President (LBJ), and was arrested and convicted under the federal statute forbidding the making of any threat to take the life of or to inflict bodily harm upon the President of the United States, the President-elect, the Vice President, or other officer next in the order of success to the office of President of the United States, or the Vice President-elect. Appeal based on the First Amendment Ruling: While the Court recognized that the aim of the statute under which the petitioner was convicted was a valid one - namely the protection of the nation's Chief Executive and allowing him to perform his duties without interference from threats of physical violence - a statute such as this, which criminalizes a form of pure speech, must be interpreted so as not to impinge on the right to freedom of expression: "What is a threat must be distinguished from what is constitutionally protected speech." The Court considered that, in order for a conviction under this statute to be lawful, the Government must prove a true "threat." Split: 7-2 upheld statute but stated that it had been applied wrongly to the case at hand *exaggeration of speech is not always a threat

Bethel School District v. Fraser (1986)

Argument: At a school assembly of approximately 600 high school students, Matthew Fraser made a speech nominating a fellow student for elective office. In his speech, Fraser used what some observers believed was a graphic sexual metaphor to promote the candidacy of his friend. As part of its disciplinary code, Bethel High School enforced a rule prohibiting conduct which "substantially interferes with the educational process . . . including the use of obscene, profane language or gestures." Fraser was suspended from school for two days. Appeal on First Amendment grounds. Ruling: The Court found that it was appropriate for the school to prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive language. Chief Justice Burger distinguished between political speech which the Court previously had protected in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District (1969) and the supposed sexual content of Fraser's message at the assembly. Burger concluded that the First Amendment did not prohibit schools from prohibiting vulgar and lewd speech since such discourse was inconsistent with the "fundamental values of public school education." Split: 7-2 for Bethel School District, against First Amendment

Morse v. Frederick (2007)

Argument: At a school-supervised event, Joseph Frederick held up a banner with the message "Bong Hits 4 Jesus," a slang reference to marijuana smoking. Principal Deborah Morse took away the banner and suspended Frederick for ten days. She justified her actions by citing the school's policy against the display of material that promotes the use of illegal drugs. Appeal on First Amendment grounds. Ruling: Court ruled that school officials can prohibit students from displaying messages that promote illegal drug use. Chief Justice John Roberts's majority opinion held that although students do have some right to political speech even while in school, this right does not extend to pro-drug messages that may undermine the school's important mission to discourage drug use. Split: 5-4 against First Amendment

Beauharnais v. Illinois (1952)

Argument: Beauharnais was arrested for distributing leaflets on Chicago street corners. TheFtim leaflets called "to halt the further encroachment, harassment and invasion of white people...by the Negro." Beauharnais was charged with violating an Illinois law making it illegal to distribute any publication that "exposes the citizens of any race, color, creed or religion to contempt, derision, or obloquy." Appealed with claim of violation of First Amendment. Ruling: Court concluded that Beauharnais' speech amounted to libel and was therefore beyond constitutional protection. Citing the racial tensions of the day, the Court characterized Beauharnais' speech as provocative and rejected the argument that the Illinois statute could be easily abused, stating, "Every power may be abused, but the possibility of abuse is a poor reason for denying Illinois the power to adopt measures against criminal libels sanctioned by centuries of Anglo-American law." Split: 5-4 against the First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment *libelous utterances are not within the area of constitutionally protected speech - overturned by Skokie

Virginia v. Black (2003)

Argument: Black was prosecuted because of burning a cross, and convicted of the same by a jury, under the cross-burning statute of Virginia which bans cross burning with the object of creating fear in a person or a group. Such an action is taken to be evidence, prima facie, of such an intention, under a section of the law. The Virginia Supreme Court upheld the decision and Black appealed. Ruling: A provision in a cross-burning statute of any state which declares that an incident of this nature is an expression of the intent to threaten or otherwise cause fear in another person or group is a violation of the constitution. While Virginia has the freedom to prohibit the burning of a cross with the intent to threaten, its statute cannot immediately assume any burning of a cross is obvious evidence (prime facie evidence) that there is an intent to threaten a group or individual. With this provision the jury may straightaway convict the defendant of the offense in any case where the defendant chooses not to offer a defense, as is his right under law, instead of having to weigh the evidence before them in the light of the law. The First Amendment does not allow feelings to be interpreted as an intent to perform unlawful actions. Split: 7-2 against provision in statute for prima facie, but for the state's ability to prohibit certain acts of danger

Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969)

Argument: Brandenburg, a leader in the Ku Klux Klan, made a speech at a Klan rally and was later convicted under an Ohio criminal syndicalism law. The law made illegal advocating "crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political reform," as well as assembling "with any society, group, or assemblage of persons formed to teach or advocate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism." Appealed on the basis that the conviction violated the First Amendment. Ruling: Ohio criminal syndicalism law was overturned as a violation of the First Amendment; Brandenburg, or Imminent Lawless Action, Test - speech can only be limited if it has three components: intent, imminence, and likelihood - speech can be prohibited if it is "directed at inciting or producing imminent lawless action" and it is "likely to incite or produce such action". Overruled the clear and present danger test. Split: Unanimous for First Amendment, incorporated to the states through Fourteenth Amendment Brandenburg test - intent, imminence, likelihood - overruled clear and present danger test Incites imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action

Public Utilities Co. v. Pollack (1952)

Argument: Capital Transit Company operated a street car and bus transit system in Washington D.C. and decided to start playing radio programs on its vehicles. Two protestors of the company, including Pollack, pushed for the Public Utilities Commission to find the playing of radio programs inconsistent with public convenience, which it did not. Court of Appeals for D.C. reversed and gave instructions for the district court to vacate the Commission decision. The Supreme Court then granted certiorari for consideration of case given its novelty and its importance to the public. Ruling: Music and occasional advertisements did not violate the First Amendment as there were no claims that the programming included objectionable propaganda, and the playing of music did not interfere with the conversations of the passengers. here was also no violation of the Fifth Amendment as the Due Process Clause did not guarantee a right of privacy in public transit equivalent to that in a person's own home or vehicle. As the liberty of each person in a public place or vehicle is subject to reasonable limitations in relation to the rights of others, the conclusion of the Public Utilities Commission that the playing of music on a transit system was "consistent with the public convenience, comfort, and safety" was upheld as meeting the requirements of both substantive and procedural due process. Split: 7-1 for the radio, First Amendment, and Fifth Amendment

Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire (1942)

Argument: Chaplinsky, a Jehovah's Witness, called a city marshal a "********ed racketeer" and "a damned fascist" in a public place. He was arrested and convicted under a state law for violating a breach of the peace. Appealed with claim of violation of First Amendment. Ruling: Some forms of expression--among them obscenity and fighting words--do not convey ideas and thus are not subject to First Amendment protection. In this case, Chaplinsky uttered fighting words, i.e., words that "inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace." Split: Unanimous against First Amendment *fighting words are face to face - to incite violence; but does go to hate speech

Kelo v. City of New London (2005)

Argument: City of New London, CT claimed private land under Fifth Amendment Eminent Domain to give to private developers. All land owners were justly compensated. Land owners sued city, with justification that the land was not being used for public use. Ruling: City's claim on land was constitutional, as the private developers would be adding to an economic development plan, serving the public. The Fifth Amendment did not require "literal" public use, the majority said, but the "broader and more natural interpretation of public use as 'public purpose.'" Justice Stevens: if i was al Split: 5-4 upholding city's claim under eminent domain

Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Arizona (2015)

Argument: Clyde Reed, pastor of Good News Community Church (Good News), rented space at an elementary school in Gilbert, Arizona, and placed about 17 signs in the area announcing the time and location of Good News' services. Gilbert has an ordinance (Sign Code) that restricts the size, number, duration, and location of certain types of signs, including temporary directional ones, to prevent improper signage. After Good News received an advisory notice from Gilbert that it violated the Sign Code, Good News sued Gilbert and claimed that the Sign Code violated the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Ruling: The Court held that the restrictions were subject to strict scrutiny because they were content-based restrictions, or restrictions that were applied differently depending on the message of the sign. Because these restrictions were content-based on their face, the Court need not examine justifications or the government's motives in determining whether the restrictions are subject to strict scrutiny. The Court also held that the restrictions cannot survive strict scrutiny because they had no compelling interest in adding restrictions to only a certain type of sign. Split: Unanimous for First Amendment

Cohen v. Cowles Media (1991)

Argument: Cohen was a campaign associate in the 1982 Minnesota gubernatorial race. He gave court records concerning another party's candidate for lieutenant governor to the St. Paul Pioneer Press and the Minneapolis Star and Tribune. Though he had received a promise of confidentiality from the reporters, the papers identified Cohen in their stories. He was fired as a result. Cohen sued the papers in state court, alleging a breach of contract. At trial, Cohen won compensatory damages and the state appellate court upheld the award. But the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, ruling that Cohen's claim relied on state "promissory estoppel" law, a law that essentially prevented a promisor from breaking a promise. The court ruled that the First Amendment's free press guarantee prevented promissory estoppel from applying to the newspapers. Ruling: The Court held that the First Amendment did not bar a promissory estoppel suit against the press. The Court first affirmed that such a cause of action, though private, triggered the First Amendment's protection. But the Court went on to rule that the state's promissory estoppel law was generally applicable and did not target the press. The law's enforcement against the press thus did not require stricter scrutiny than would its enforcement against other individuals or institutions. Promissory estoppel being a state action, the Fourteenth Amendment applies, and hence the First Amendment is triggered. Deciding whether the claim under promissory estoppel was valid, and whether the state constitution shielded the press, was a matter for the Minnesota Supreme Court, and on that basis the request for reinstatement of damages was denied, and the case remanded to the inferior court. Split: 5-4 for Cohen, against First Amendment

United States v. O'Brien (1968)

Argument: David O'Brien burned his draft card at a Boston courthouse. He said he was expressing his opposition to war. He was convicted under a federal law that made the destruction or mutilation of drafts card a crime. Appeal by United States against First Amendment. Ruling: Court established a test to determine whether governmental regulation involving symbolic speech was justified. The O'Brien Test is thus: The law in question must: be within the constitutional power of the government to enact, further an important or substantial government interest, that interest must be unrelated to the suppression of speech (or "content neutral", as phrased in later cases), prohibit no more speech than is essential to further that interest. [W]e think it clear," wrote Warren," that a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is not greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest." Split: 7-1 for United States, against First Amendment *yes it's speech but it can only be regulated if it is not content-based and that it serves a specific government interest *When "speech" and "nonspeech" elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms. - SYMBOLIC SPEECH STANDARD

DeJonge v. Oregon (1937)

Argument: DeJonge was convicted in Oregon under its criminal syndicalism statute for addressing a public audience about jail conditions and an ongoing maritime strike as a representative of the Communist Party. He appealed for acquittal, stating that there was not enough evidence to warrant his arrest under said statute. Ruling: Acquittal was granted, overturning DeJonge's conviction and the Fourteenth Amendment. DeJonge was not advocating revolution or violent action against the government; his actions were protected by free speech and peaceable assembly, as well as due process, as part of the Fourteenth Amendment. Split: Unanimous in upholding the Fourteenth Amendment, incorporated due process due process - free speech and assembly cannot be restricted without first understanding the context in which it was presented - purpose of the meeting and meaning of the speaker's words

New York Times v. Sullivan (1964)

Argument: Decided together with Abernathy v. Sullivan, this case concerns a full-page ad in the New York Times which alleged that the arrest of the Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr. for perjury in Alabama was part of a campaign to destroy King's efforts to integrate public facilities and encourage blacks to vote. L. B. Sullivan, the Montgomery city commissioner, filed a libel action against the newspaper and four black ministers who were listed as endorsers of the ad, claiming that the allegations against the Montgomery police defamed him personally. Under Alabama law, Sullivan did not have to prove that he had been harmed; and a defense claiming that the ad was truthful was unavailable since the ad contained factual errors. Ruling: The Court held that the First Amendment protects the publication of all statements, even false ones, about the conduct of public officials except when statements are made with actual malice (with knowledge that they are false or in reckless disregard of their truth or falsity). Under this new standard, Sullivan's case collapsed. Sullivan test: Court held that a public official suing for defamation must prove that the statement in question was made with actual malice. In this context, the phrase refers to knowledge or reckless lack of investigation, rather than its ordinary meaning of malicious intent. Split: Unanimous for First Amendment and NY Times Actual malice test/Sullivan test: statements are made with the knowledge that they are false or in reckless disregard of their truth or falsity; official must prove actual malice Bad vehicle for actual malice test: NYT didn't actually write it, it was an ad, but it was "as if" NYT did write Sullivan is suing for libel, but they didn't mention his name NYT didn't check the ad for veracity Sullivan, elected Commissioner of Montgomery, Alabama, filed libel action against four black clergymen and against the New York Times for the publication of an ad he believed was aimed at his defamation. The Court ruled in favor of the NYT and created the Actual Malice/Sullivan Test - a public official can only recover damages if he can prove that the statements were made with actual malice, or the knowledge that they were false or in reckless disregard of their truth or falsity.

Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss (1985)

Argument: Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., (Petitioner) is a credit reporting agency. It sent a report to five lending institutions indicating that Greenmoss Builders, Inc., (Respondent) had filed for bankruptcy. When Respondent learned of this error, it requested the names and addresses of the five recipients of the report. Petitioner issued corrections to those issued the false report but refused to provide names to Respondent. A jury awarded Respondent $50,000.00 actual damages, plus $300,000.00 punitive damages. Ruling: The court balanced the state's interest in protecting and compensating private individuals for injury to their reputation against the First Amendment right to free speech. The court found that First Amendment interests were less controlling in matters of a purely private concern than matters which are a public interest. The Supreme Court did not overturn Vermont state law allowing awards of presumed and punitive damages absent a showing of "actual malice". Gertz was inapplicable to non-media defamation actions. Split: 5-4 for Greenmass Balancing test between compensation and first amendment rights The Court concluded that the First Amendment interest in protecting false statements was substantially less when the statements did not relate to matters of public concern. Of course, the decision in Dun & Bradstreet has the effect of requiring courts to draw a sometimes difficult line between statements relating and not relating to matters of public concern. Gertz did not apply here because the current case did not involve public speech

Terminello v. Chicago (1949)

Argument: Father Arthur Terminiello, in an auditorium in Chicago, delivered a speech in which he criticized various political and racial groups and viciously condemned the protesting crowd that had gathered outside the auditorium. Policemen assigned to the event were unable to prevent several disturbances by the "angry and turbulent" crowd. The police arrested Terminiello for "breach of the peace." He was then tried and convicted for his central role in inciting a riot. Appealed on violation of First Amendment. Ruling: Court held that the "breach of the peace" ordinance unconstitutionally infringed upon the freedom of speech. Noting that "[t]he vitality of civil and political institutions in our society depends on free discussion," the Court held that speech could be restricted only in the event that it was "likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest." Justice Douglas wrote that "a function of free speech under our system is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger." Split: 5-4 for First Amendment *Douglas writes the opinion - overturns the conviction and says "the very purpose of free speech is to invite dispute" *"every idea is an incitement"

Feiner v. New York (1951)

Argument: Feiner made an inflammatory speech on a street corner in Syracuse, New York. During the speech, Feiner made several disparaging remarks about local politicians, organizations, and President Truman. A crowd gathered, and several listeners began "muttering" and "shoving." One listener threatened Feiner. Two officers on the scene, fearing violence, asked Feiner twice to end his speech. After he refused, the officers arrested Feiner for inciting a breach of the peace. A trial court found Feiner guilty and sentenced him to thirty days in prison. On appeal, Feiner argued his arrest violated his right to free speech under the First Amendment. Ruling: Court applied the "clear and present danger" principle it originally articulated in Schenck v. United States (1919). According to the Court, Feiner's arrest was a valid exercise of "the interest of the community in maintaining peace and order on its streets. It is one thing to say that the police cannot be used as an instrument for the suppression of unpopular views, and another to say that, when as here the speaker passes the bounds of argument or persuasion and undertakes incitement to riot, they are powerless to prevent a breach of the peace." Split: 6-3 against First Amendment *ruling was not based on Terminello precedent *heckler's veto - his right to speak was taken away because someone, a heckler, was not happy with what he was saying *alternative to the heckler's veto is to arrest the guy complaining about the protestor

Brown v. Louisiana (1980)

Argument: For the purpose of peaceably protesting the denial of their constitutional right to equal treatment in a public facility, five African-Americans entered a segregated Louisiana library. Brown asked for a book, The Story of the Negro, which was later sent to him from the State library. After being served, he and the others were asked to leave, but in their silent demonstration, the five students refused. Petitioners were convicted for violating the Louisiana breach of the peace statute, which makes it a crime "with intent to provoke a breach of the peace, or under circumstances such that a breach of the peace may be occasioned thereby". Ruling: There was no evidence to support a breach of the peace, and the petitioners were protected in their expression of protest by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Libraries and other public buildings cannot punish people for implementing their constitutional rights. Split: 6-3 for First and Fourteenth Amendments *high point of support for African-American rights *public facilities are going to be held in a nondiscriminatory manner *they stood as "monuments of protest" *dissent - they WERE served, not denied * Black - do it OUTSIDE the library, you don't have a right to do it inside - the library should be used for library purposes *majority written by Fortas

Yates v. United States (1957)

Argument: Fourteen leaders of the Communist Party in the state of California were tried and convicted under the Smith Act. That Act prohibited willfully and knowingly conspiring to teach and advocate the overthrow of the government by force. This case was decided in conjunction with Richmond v. United States and Schneiderman v. United States. Ruling: The Court reversed the convictions and remanded the case back to district court for retrial. The Court interpreted the Smith Act in the following manner: First, the term "organize" was construed to mean the creation of a new organization, making the Act inapplicable to subsequent organizational acts. Second, the Court drew a distinction between the "advocacy and teaching of forcible overthrow as an abstract principle" and the "advocacy and teaching of concrete action for the forcible overthrow of the Government." The Court recognized that instances of speech that amounted to "advocacy of action" were "few and far between." Split: 6-1. The Smith Act does not violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution, as it does not punish mere advocacy and teaching of forcible overthrow as an abstract principle, but the Court set forth certain conditions for applying the Smith Act that made future convictions exceedingly difficult. Five convictions were remanded back to the courts for retrial. *abstract advocacy (abstract principle) v advocacy in action (actually acting) *Harlan - balancing approach - First Amendment freedoms were weighed against society's right of self-preservation

Palko v. Connecticut (1937)

Argument: Frank Palko had been charged with first-degree murder for killing police officers. He was convicted instead of second-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. The state of Connecticut appealed and won a new trial; this time the court found Palko guilty of first-degree murder and sentenced him to death. He appealed the decision based on due process, claiming that the second conviction violated the double jeopardy clause. Ruling: Court upheld his second conviction on the basis that protection from double jeopardy was not a fundamental right and thus not applied to the states through the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Split: 8-1 against incorporation of protection against double jeopardy (Fifth Amendment) *Incorporation wasn't a thing bruh *dissent - you should apply the bill of rights to the states *majority - if the principle is a fundamental right, then only would it be applied to the states; discretionary application

Gitlow v. United States (1925)

Argument: Gitlow, a socialist, publicly advocated for the overthrow of the government by "action of any form", or by violent means; he was convicted under a state anarchy law; he appealed the decision based on the argument that his words had brought about no action. Ruling: By virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment, the merits of the First Amendment do reach the states; however, the states do have the power to limit any speech that has a "dangerous tendency". As per the dangerous tendency test, a state legislature may decide that an entire class of speech is so dangerous that it should be prohibited, and a defendant will be punished even if his speech created no danger. Split: 7-2 against the First Amendment *first time the First Amendment is applied to the states - INCORPORATED *precedent was clear and present danger *Holmes dissented because there is no present danger so the conviction should not stand; he dissents because the Court doesn't even use the clear and present danger test *every idea is an incitement, it offers itself for belief and if believed it is acted upon UNLESS some other belief outweighs it or some failure of energy stifles the movement at its birth *"a single revolutionary spark may kindle a fire that, smoldering for a time, may burst into a sweeping conflagration" *come up with another test - dangerous/bad tendency - suppress anything just because it could have a bad effect somewhere *Justice Sanford disregards the clear and present danger test and creates his own - the chilling effect * clear and present danger does not apply because it has no application to the present, where the legislature has previously determined the danger of substantive evil arising from utterances of a specified character Dangerous tendency - a state legislature may decide that an entire class of speech is so dangerous that it should be prohibited, and a defendant will be punished even if his speech created no danger.

Adderly v. Florida (1966)

Argument: Harriet Louise Adderley and a group of approximately 200 others assembled in a non-public jail driveway to protest the arrests of fellow students and the state and local policies of racial segregation which included segregation in jails. Adderley and thirty-one others were convicted in a Florida court on a charge of "trespass with a malicious and mischievous intent" for their refusal to leave the driveway when requested to do so. Appeal on First and Fourteenth Amendments. Ruling: The Court found that there were no constitutional violations in this case. The language of the Florida statute was clearly defined and applied, argued Justice Black, which prevented it from imposing broad infringements on speech and expression rights. The decision argued that states may protect their property and withhold its use from demonstrators for nondiscriminatory reasons such as protection from damage. Split: 5-4 against First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment *Black writes majority - can't protest wherever you want! *Douglas writes dissent - as long as protests are peaceful, they should not be barred as normal citizens do not have control of the media and thus have little connection to their legislators *the world is different now, people know everything through the Internet *Heumann says there's no distinction between the driveway in this case and the library in Brown

Christian Legal Society v. Martinez (2010)

Argument: Hastings College of Law, represented by Dean Martinez, required that recognized student organizations allow students to participate regardless of the student's status or beliefs. One student organization, the Christian Legal Society (CLS), required members to subscribe to a "Statement of Beliefs" and refrain from certain proscribed behavior. Hastings denied the CLS recognition as a student organization. The beliefs and behavior at issue were those of LGBT students; neither those students, nor those who advocated for them, were allowed to become voting members. The CLS sued, arguing that the university, as a public institution, could not restrict the group's rights to freedom of speech, association, and religion. FREE EXERCISE Ruling: Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit, holding that the college's all-comers policy is a reasonable, viewpoint-neutral condition on access to the student organization forum; and, therefore, did not transgress First Amendment speech or free exercise limitations. With Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that the same considerations that have led the Court to apply a less restrictive level of scrutiny to speech in limited public forums, counseled the same result in this case. The Court further reasoned that, considering this constitutional inquiry occurs in the education context, Hasting's all-comers policy is reasonable and viewpoint neutral; "it is... hard to imagine a more viewpoint-neutral policy than one that requiring all students groups to accept all corners." Split: 5-4 for Martinez

Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins (1980)

Argument: High school students seeking support for their opposition to a United Nations resolution against Zionism set up a table in PruneYard to distribute literature and solicit signatures for a petition. A security guard told them to leave since their actions violated the shopping center's regulations against "publicly expressive" activities. Appeal on First Amendment rights. Ruling: Since the California Constitution protected "speech and petitioning, reasonably exercised, in shopping centers even when the shopping centers are privately owned," PruneYard could not prevent the students from soliciting on its property. The Court argued that it was within California's power to guarantee this expansive free speech right since it did not unreasonably intrude on the rights of private property owners. Split: Unanimous for First Amendment/ California State Consitutition

Gertz v. Robert Welch (1974)

Argument: In 1968, Elmer Gertz, a lawyer, represented the family of a victim killed by a police officer in civil action against the officer. A publication of the John Birch Society ran a series of articles alleging the existence of a Communist conspiracy to discredit local police agencies One of those touched on Gertz's case, making strong allegations about Gertz. It claimed that he had orchestrated Nuccio's conviction and that he was a member of various communist front organizations. It further implied that he had a lengthy criminal record himself and used various anti-communist terms of abuse ("Leninist", "Communist-fronter") to describe him. Gertz filed suit in federal court against Robert Welch, Inc. (the John Birch Society's legal name), claiming its article had defamed and injured his reputation as a lawyer. The John Birch Society argued that Gertz was a public figure under the Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts standard, which applied the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan standard to anyone who was sufficiently public, not just government officials. Thus, their statements about him would have to demonstrate actual malice. However, the magazine's editor admitted in an affidavit filed with the motion that he had made no independent effort to verify the claims in the article and had simply relied on the author's reputation and previous work. Ruling: Gertz's rights had been violated. Justice Powell argued that the application of the New York Times v. Sullivan standard in this case was inappropriate because Gertz was neither a public official nor a public figure. In the context of the opinion, Powell advanced many lines of reasoning to establish that ordinary citizens should be allowed more protection from libelous statements than individuals in the public eye. First, the recklessness standard applies only to defamation of public figures or public officials. Second, even for private individuals, states may not impose strict liability on news media. And third, any standard of fault less then recklessness limits private persons to actual injury. Split: 5-4 against First Amendment Gertz standard/negligence test - Private individuals don't have to prove actual malice, but rather negligence; strict liability is no longer constitutional - in what turned out to be a major victory for the media - the Court ruled that in the absence of a showing of actual malice, private plaintiffs are limited by the First Amendment--at least with respect to comments about a matter of public concern-- to recovery only for actual damages, and not for punitive or presumed damages.

Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence (1984)

Argument: In 1982, the National Park Service issued a renewable permit to the Community for Creative Non-Violence to conduct a demonstration in Lafayette Park and the Mall in Washington, D.C. The C.C.N.V. demonstration was intended to represent the plight of the homeless, and the demonstrators wished to sleep in tent cities set up in the park. Citing anti-camping regulations, the Park Service denied the request to sleep in the park. Appeal based on First Amendment grounds. Ruling: Court held that the regulations did not violate the First Amendment. The Court noted that expression is subject to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions, and that the manner of the protest was at odds with the government's interest in maintaining the condition of the parks. The Court argued that the Park Service did not attempt to ban all sleeping in public parks (only in certain areas), and that the protesters had alternative means of communicating their message. Split: 7-2 against First Amendment

Texas v. Johnson (1989)

Argument: In 1984, in front of the Dallas City Hall, Gregory Lee Johnson burned an American flag as a means of protest against Reagan administration policies. Johnson was tried and convicted under a Texas law outlawing flag desecration. He was sentenced to one year in jail and assessed a $2,000 fine. After the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the conviction, the case went to the Supreme Court., with Texas arguing that its statute did not violate the First Amendment. Ruling: Court held that Johnson's burning of a flag was protected expression under the First Amendment. The Court found that Johnson's actions fell into the category of expressive conduct and had a distinctively political nature. The fact that an audience takes offense to certain ideas or expression, the Court found, does not justify prohibitions of speech. The Court also held that state officials did not have the authority to designate symbols to be used to communicate only limited sets of messages, noting that "[i]f there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the Government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable." Split: 5-4 for First Amendment *Brennan wrote majority decision *says it isn't even symbolic speech so O'Brien test doesn't apply - it is pure speech so strict scrutiny is applied; very hard to restrict pure speech *it was content based to prohibit burning the flag so it could not be upheld *Kennedy concurs and says sometimes you have to defend people's rights even if you don't like it *dissent calls it a "regrettably patronizing civics lesson" *high point of allowing free expression

United States v. Eichman (1990)

Argument: In 1989, Congress passed the Flag Protection Act which made it a crime to destroy an American flag or any likeness of an American flag which may be "commonly displayed." The law did, however, allow proper disposal of a worn or soiled flag. Several prosecutions resulted from the Act. Eichman set a flag ablaze on the steps of the U.S. Capitol while protesting the government's domestic and foreign policy. Another prosecution (United States v. Haggerty) resulted from a flag-burning in Seattle protesting the passage of the Flag Protection Act. Both cases (Eichman's and Haggerty's) were argued together. Ruling: Court struck down the law because "its asserted interest is related to the suppression of free expression and concerned with the content of such expression." Allowing the flag to be burned in a disposal ceremony but prohibiting protestors from setting it ablaze at a political protest made that clear. Split: 5-4 for First Amendment

Hurley & South Boston Illinois War Veterans Council v. Irish American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston (1995)

Argument: In 1993, the South Boston Allied War Veterans Council was authorized by the city of Boston to organize the St. Patrick's Day Parade. The Council refused a place in the event for the Irish American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston (GLIB). The group attempted to join to express its members' pride in their Irish heritage as openly gay, lesbian, and bisexual individuals. The Massachusetts State Court ordered the Veterans' Council to include GLIB under a state law prohibiting discrimination on account of sexual orientation in public accommodations. The Veterans' Council claimed that forced inclusion of GLIB members in their privately-organized parade violated their free speech. Ruling: Court held that the State Court's ruling to require private citizens who organize a parade to include a group expressing a message that the organizers do not wish to convey violates the First Amendment by making private speech to the public accommodation requirement. Such an action "violate[s] the fundamental First Amendment rule that a speaker has the autonomy to choose the content of his own message and, conversely, to decide what not to say." Split: Unanimous for Hurley's First Amendment rights as a private citizen

Hutchinson v. Proxmire (1979)

Argument: In early 1975, Senator William Proxmire implemented what he called the "Golden Fleece Award of the Month." The award was given out to governmental agencies which sponsored programs and research that Proxmire found to be a waste of tax dollars. One Golden Fleece went to federal agencies sponsoring the research of Ronald Hutchinson, a behavioral scientist. Proxmire detailed the "nonsense" of Hutchinson's research on the floor of the Senate, in conferences with his staff, and in a newsletter sent to over 100,000 of his constituents. Hutchinson sued for libel, arguing that Proxmire's statements defamed his character and caused him to endure financial loss. Ruling: The Court affirmed the decision of the lower court and held that Proxmire's statements in his newsletters and press releases were not protected by the Speech and Debate Clause. However, in upholding this ruling, the Court also found that Proxmire's statements were not made with "actual malice" and thus, were not libelous. Chief Justice Burger, relying on the Court's finding in Doe v. McMillan (1973), concluded that while speeches in Congress and discussions with staff were protected by Section 6, statements in newsletters and press releases were not because they were not "essential to the deliberations of the Senate" nor were they part of the legislature's "deliberative process.". Petitioner is not a "public figure" so as to make the "actual malice" standard of proof of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan applicable. Split: 8-1 for Hutchinson

Buckley v. Valeo (1976)

Argument: In the wake of the Watergate affair, Congress attempted to ferret out corruption in political campaigns by restricting financial contributions to candidates. Among other things, the law set limits on the amount of money an individual could contribute to a single campaign and it required reporting of contributions above a certain threshold amount. The Federal Election Commission was created to enforce the statute. Ruling: First, it held that restrictions on individual contributions to political campaigns and candidates did not violate the First Amendment since the limitations of the FECA enhance the "integrity of our system of representative democracy" by guarding against unscrupulous practices. Second, the Court found that governmental restriction of independent expenditures in campaigns, the limitation on expenditures by candidates from their own personal or family resources, and the limitation on total campaign expenditures did violate the First Amendment. Since these practices do not necessarily enhance the potential for corruption that individual contributions to candidates do, the Court found that restricting them did not serve a government interest great enough to warrant a curtailment on free speech and association. Split: 7-1 for FEC/Buckley Restrictions on individual contributions are constitutional; restrictions on independent expenditures by campaigns or candidates DO VIOLATE first amendment

New York Times v. United States (1971)

Argument: In what became known as the "Pentagon Papers Case," the Nixon Administration attempted to prevent the New York Times and Washington Post from publishing materials belonging to a classified Defense Department study regarding the history of United States activities in Vietnam. The President argued that prior restraint was necessary to protect national security. This case was decided together with United States v. Washington Post Co. Ruling: Court held that the government did not overcome the "heavy presumption against" prior restraint of the press in this case. Justices Black and Douglas argued that the vague word "security" should not be used "to abrogate the fundamental law embodied in the First Amendment." Justice Brennan reasoned that since publication would not cause an inevitable, direct, and immediate event imperiling the safety of American forces, prior restraint was unjustified. Split: 6-3 for First Amendment Did not overcome the heavy presumption against the constitutionality of prior restraint publication would not cause an inevitable, direct, and immediate event imperiling the safety of American forces, prior restraint was unjustified. Grave and irreparable damage

Near v. Minnesota (1931)

Argument: Jay Near published a scandal sheet in Minneapolis, in which he attacked local officials, charging that they were implicated with gangsters. Minnesota officials obtained an injunction to prevent Near from publishing his newspaper under a state law that allowed such action against periodicals. The law provided that any person "engaged in the business" of regularly publishing or circulating an "obscene, lewd, and lascivious" or a "malicious, scandalous and defamatory" newspaper or periodical was guilty of a nuisance, and could be enjoined (stopped) from further committing or maintaining the nuisance. Ruling: The Supreme Court held that the statute authorizing the injunction was unconstitutional as applied. History had shown that the protection against previous restraints was at the heart of the First Amendment. The Court held that the statutory scheme constituted a prior restraint and hence was invalid under the First Amendment. Thus the Court established as a constitutional principle the doctrine that, with some narrow exceptions, the government could not censor or otherwise prohibit a publication in advance, even though the communication might be punishable after publication in a criminal or other proceeding. Split: 5-4 for First Amendment - prior restraint doctrine - courts could only restrict press in advance if publications were obscene or pertained to national security - heavy presumption against the constitutionality of prior restraint

Barron v. Baltimore (1833)

Argument: Lawsuit filed by John Barron against the city of Baltimore, claiming that the city had deprived him of his property in violation of the Fifth Amendment, which provides that the government may not take private property without just compensation - wharf!!! Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that the Constitution's Bill of Rights restricts only the powers of the federal government and not those of the state governments, Bill of Rights was created by people to apply to the government created by the Constitution, the federal government Split: Unanimous, 7-0 against incorporation *Marshall argues that the Bill of Rights was created and written only to be applied to the federal government

Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn (1975)

Argument: Martin Cohn was the father of a seventeen-year old girl who was raped and killed in Georgia. After obtaining information from the public record, a television station broadcast the name of Cohn's daughter in connection with the incident. This violated a Georgia privacy statute which prevented members of the media from publicizing the names or identities of rape victims. Ruling: The Court held that the Georgia statute violated the Constitution. Justice White recognized the primacy of issues of privacy and press freedom, but he also identified compelling reasons why the press should not be restricted in this case. First, the news media is an important resource for citizens which allows them to scrutinize government proceedings. The commissions and adjudication of crimes are issues relevant to the public interest. Second, in the development of the privacy right, the Court has held that the interests of privacy "fade" in cases where controversial "information already appears on the public record." Restricting the media as the Georgia law did was a dangerous encroachment on press freedom, argued White, as it "would invite timidity and self-censorship." Split: Unanimous for First Amendment and Cox

Time Inc. v. Firestone (1976)

Argument: Mary Alice Firestone was married to Russell A. Firestone, Jr., an heir to the Firestone Tire and Rubber Company family fortune. Mary filed for divorce, and Russell submitted a counterclaim on the grounds of extreme cruelty and adultery. The judge granted the divorce but discounted much of the evidence concerning extramarital affairs. Nevertheless, Time, Inc., publisher of the weekly news magazine Time, ran an article one week after the divorce was granted, mentioning the alleged affairs. In the "Milestones" section of Time, the news of the Firestones' divorce was published as follows: "DIVORCED. By Russell A. Firestone Jr., 41, heir to the tire fortune: Mary Alice Sullivan Firestone, 32, his third wife; a onetime Palm Beach schoolteacher; on grounds of extreme cruelty and adultery; after six years of marriage, one son; in West Palm Beach, Fla. The 17-month intermittent trial produced enough testimony of extramarital adventures on both sides, said the judge, 'to make Dr. Freud's hair curl.'" Following the publication, Mary Firestone filed suit in a Florida state court against Time, Inc., seeking $100,000 in damages for libel. Ruling: Respondent was not a ''public figure'' for the purpose of determining the constitutional protection afforded petitioner's report of the factual and legal basis for her divorce. Therefore, the Gertz analysis applies, and Defendant cannot claim a defense on the basis of a lack of actual malice. Split: 6-2 for Time Inc. Respondent was not a "public figure," since she did not occupy "[a role] of especial prominence in the affairs of society," and had not been "thrust . . . to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved."

McCullen v. Coakley (2014)

Argument: Massachusetts' Reproductive Health Care Facilities Act, originally passed in 2000, was amended in 2007 to create a 35-foot buffer zone around reproductive health care facilities. The Act was challenged by protesters at the Planned Parenthood in Worcester, Massachusetts under the First and Fourteenth Amendments . Ruling: Court held that the statute was content-neutral on its face but was not tailored succinctly enough to serve a significant government interest because it places too great a burden on the petitioners' First Amendment Rights. By denying the petitioners the ability to engage in conversation and leafleting on public streets and sidewalks, the law prevents the petitioners from engaging in exactly the transmission of ideas the First Amendment is meant to protect. The Court also held that, in enacting the law, Massachusetts overlooked other options that could serve the same interests without placing an undue burden on historical avenues of speech and debate. Split: Unanimous for First Amendment Roberts says that the law was technically content-neutral but it was not narrowly tailored enough to survive strict scrutiny

Rankin v. McPherson (1987)

Argument: McPherson was a clerical employee in the Harris County, Texas constable's office. After hearing on the office radio that there had been an attempt to assassinate President Ronald Reagan, McPherson stated "if they go for him again, I hope they get him." Another co-worker overheard the comment and reported it to the Constable, Walter H. Rankin. Rankin subsequently fired McPherson. Ruling: Court held that Rankin's interest in discharging McPherson was outweighed by her rights under the First Amendment. The Court held that McPherson's statement, when considered in context, "plainly dealt with a matter of public concern." The Court found that there was no evidence that McPherson's speech interfered with "the efficient functioning of the office" and that her private comment had not discredited the office. The Court also noted that McPherson did not serve a "confidential, policymaking, or public contact" role, diminishing the impact of her speech on the agency's proper functioning. Split: 5-4 upholding First Amendment

Milkovich v. Lorain (1990)

Argument: Milkovich was the wrestling coach at Maple Heights High School in Ohio. During the 1974 season, the team was involved in an altercation at a home match, during which several people were injured. After the altercation, the Ohio High School Athletic Association (OSHAA) placed the team on probation. Then, several parents and students sued the OSHAA, in the Court of Common Pleas, seeking a restraining order of the probation, on the grounds that due process had not been afforded to the members of the team. The court overturned the conviction and, the next day, Respondent published an article alleging that Petitioner had lied so the probation would be overturned. Petitioner brought suit, alleging defamation. Ruling: After recounting the case history and the court's recent rulings in libel cases, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the majority that the statement from Gertz was not "intended to create a wholesale defamation exemption for anything that might be labeled 'opinion'" since "expressions of 'opinion' may often imply an assertion of objective fact." Diadiun's column, it found, strongly suggested that Milkovich perjured himself and was not couched hyperbolically, figuratively or in any other way that would mean the writer didn't seriously mean it. And since that statement could easily be found true or false by comparing Milkovich's statements at the OHSAA hearing with his court testimony (which the column did not do), it was moot whether it was intended as opinion or not since it asserted a matter of objective fact. "The connotation that petitioner committed perjury is sufficiently factual to be susceptible of being proved true or false," the Court concluded. Split: 7-2 for Milkovich, against First Amendment

Ward v. Rock Against Racism (1989)

Argument: New York City, responding to complaints of high-decibel concerts adjoining residential neighborhoods, mandated the use of city-provided sound systems and technicians for concerts in Central Park. Members of rock group claimed that the inability to use their own sound equipment and technicians in a concert in a public forum interfered with their First Amendment rights of expression. Ruling: The Court upheld the ordinance, giving broad deference to the government's interest in maintaining order. As long as "the means chosen are not substantially broader than necessary to achieve the government's interest," a regulation will not be invalidated because a court concludes that the government's interest "could be adequately served by some less-speech-restrictive alternative." Split: 6-3 for ordinance

U.S. v. Kokinda (1990)

Argument: New York City, responding to complaints of high-decibel concerts adjoining residential neighborhoods, mandated the use of city-provided sound systems and technicians for concerts in Central Park. Members of rock group claimed that the inability to use their own sound equipment and technicians in a concert in a public forum interfered with their First Amendment rights of expression. Ruling: The Court upheld the ordinance, giving broad deference to the government's interest in maintaining order. As long as "the means chosen are not substantially broader than necessary to achieve the government's interest," a regulation will not be invalidated because a court concludes that the government's interest "could be adequately served by some less-speech-restrictive alternative." Split: 6-3 for ordinanceArgument: Kokinda was a volunteer for the National Democratic Policy Committee. She set up a table on the sidewalk outside a post office where she intended to sell books and solicit contributions for the organization. She were charged and convicted of violating 39 CFR 232.1(h)(1)(1989), which prohibits "soliciting alms and contributions ... on postal premises." Kokinda appealed the convictions, arguing that they violated the Free Speech clause of the First Amendment. U.S. then sought to reverse the appeal. Ruling: Court ruled that the prohibition was not unconstitutional. Justice O'Connor, wrote that the sidewalk on postal property was not a public forum. "Regulation of speech activity on governmental property that has been traditionally open to the public for expressive activity, such as public streets and parks, is examined under strict scrutiny. ... But regulation of speech activity where the Government has not dedicated its property to First Amendment activity is examined only for reasonableness." The need to prevent solicitors from interrupting postal business satisfied this "reasonableness" test, so the convictions were constitutional. Split: 5-4 for United States

Keyishian v. Board of Regents (1967)

Argument: New York state had laws that prohibited state employees from belonging to any organization that advocated the overthrow of the US government, or any organization that was "treasonous" or "seditious". The regents of the State University of New York also required teachers and employees to sign an oath that they were not members of the Communist Party. Some faculty and staff of the University were terminated for refusing to sign the oath. They appealed to the Supreme Court. Ruling: The Court overturned the New York state laws prohibiting membership in seditious groups because it was too vague and was overbroad; Mere party membership cannot suffice to justify criminal punishment, nor may it warrant a finding of moral unfitness justifying job removal. Party association may not be proscribed. Therefore, the provisions making membership to the Communist Party reason for dismissal are unconstitutional. Split: 5-4 against the law; unconstitutional based on First and Fourteenth - association *Clark's dissent stated that the state has the right to preserve itself *overturned Adler v BOE of City of New York provisions making membership to the Communist Party reason for dismissal are unconstitutional

Mass v. Oakes (1989)

Argument: Oakes was convicted of violating a Massachusetts statute prohibiting adults from posing or exhibiting minors "in a state of nudity" for purposes of visual representation or reproduction in any publication, motion picture, photograph, or picture. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court reversed the conviction. After holding that Oakes' photos were speech for First Amendment purposes, the court struck down the statute as substantially overbroad under the First Amendment without addressing whether § 29A could be constitutionally applied to Oakes. The state of Massachusetts appealed on the notion that the statute was not too overbroad. Ruling: The statute was ruled as constitutional without overbreadth, as the statute had been amended to include a requirement of lascivious intent. Split: 6-3 for Massachusetts, allowing the statute to limit speech through visual representation as it had no overbreadth Massachusetts statute prohibiting adults from posing or exhibiting minors "in a state of nudity" for purposes of visual representation or reproduction in any publication, motion picture, photograph, or picture; was not overbroad for inclusion of "lascivious intent"

Wisconsin v. Mitchell (1993)

Argument: On October 7, 1989, Todd Mitchell, a young black man, instigated an attack against a young white boy. He was subsequently convicted of aggravated battery in the Circuit Court for Kenosha County. According to Wisconsin statute, Mitchell's sentence was increased, because the court found that he had selected his victim based on race. Mitchell challenged the constitutionality of the increase in his penalty, but the Wisconsin Court of Appeals rejected his claims. However, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed. Ruling: The Court found that the Wisconsin statute paralleled antidiscrimination laws which had been found to comply with the First Amendment. It also determined that the consequences for the victim and the community tended to be more severe, when the victim of a crime was chosen on account of his or her race. Thus, when the Wisconsin statute increased the sentence for such crimes, it was not punishing the defendant for his or her bigoted beliefs or statements, but rather the predicted ramifications of his or her crime. Finally, the Court concluded that the Wisconsin statute did not violate the right to free speech because the occasion in which an average person's racist comments would be used against him or her in a court of law would arise so rarely that he or she would not feel forced to suppress them. Split: Unanimous for Wisconsin *conduct not speech

Miami Herald v. Tornillo (1974)

Argument: Pat Tornillo was Executive Director of the Classroom Teachers Association and a candidate for the Florida House of Representatives in Dade County, Florida. The Miami Herald published two editorials criticizing Tornillo and his candidacy. He demanded that the Herald publish his responses to the editorials. When the Herald refused, Tornillo sued in Dade County Circuit Court under Florida Statute Section 104.38, which granted political candidates criticized by any newspaper the right to have their responses to the criticisms published. The Herald challenged the statute as a violation of the free press clause of the First Amendment. The Circuit Court ruled that the statute was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court of Florida reversed this decision. Ruling: Court reversed the Supreme Court of Florida and held that Florida's "right to reply" statute violated the freedom of press found in the First Amendment. In an opinion written by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, the Court recognized the risks posed to the "true marketplace of ideas" by media consolidation and barriers to entry in the newspaper industry. However, even in that context, "press responsibility is not mandated by the Constitution and...cannot be legislated." The statute was an "intrusion into the function of editors," and imposed "a penalty on the basis of the content." Chief Justice Burger relied on New York Times v. Sullivan in that the "right to reply" statute "limits the variety of public debate," and was therefore unconstitutional. The Supreme Court found the statute to be invalid, noting that it exacted a penalty based on the content of the newspaper, which could serve to suppress the free speech protected by the Appellant's First Amendment constitutional rights. Split: Unanimous for First Amendment Burger says to give the right to reply would be a form of censorship

Elrod v. Burns (1976)

Argument: Republicans who are non-civil service employees of the Cook County, Ill., Sheriff's Office, brought this suit as a class action for declaratory, injunctive, and other relief against petitioners, including the newly elected Sheriff, a Democrat, and county Democratic organizations, alleging that, in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments and various statutes, including the Civil Rights Act of 1871, respondents were discharged or (in the case of one respondent) threatened with discharge for the sole reason that they were not affiliated with or sponsored by the Democratic Party. Ruling: Patronage dismissals severely restrict political belief and association, which constitute the core of those activities protected by the First Amendment, and government may not, without seriously inhibiting First Amendment rights, force a public employee to relinquish his right to political association as the price of holding a public job. Patronage dismissals cannot be justified by their contribution to the proper functioning of our democratic process through their assistance to partisan politics, since political parties are nurtured by other methods that are less intrusive. More fundamentally, any contribution of patronage dismissals to the democratic process does not suffice to override their severe encroachment on First Amendment freedoms. Split: 5-3 for First Amendment

McDonald v. Smith (1985)

Argument: Respondent filed a libel action against petitioner in a North Carolina state court under the common law of that State, alleging that while respondent was being considered for the position of United States Attorney, petitioner wrote two letters to President Reagan (and sent copies to other Government officials) containing "false, slanderous, libelous, inflammatory and derogatory statements" concerning respondent, and that petitioner knew that the statements were false and maliciously intended to injure respondent by undermining his prospect of being appointed United States Attorney. Seeking compensatory and punitive damages, respondent also alleged, inter alia, that the letters had their intended effect, resulting in his not being appointed, and that his reputation and career as an attorney were injured. Ruling: The Court decided that the right to petition was subject to the same legal limitations that the rights to speech and the press are as previously decided in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. Therefore, claims made in the original letter, or in any similar petition, were and are subject to libel lawsuits to be judged on their merits. A petition to a Government official was actionable if prompted by "express malice," which was defined as "falsehood and the absence of probable cause," and nothing has been presented to suggest that that holding should be altered. Nor do the Court's decisions interpreting the Petition Clause in contexts other than defamation indicate that the right to petition is absolute. The Clause was inspired by the same ideals of liberty and democracy that resulted in the First Amendment freedoms to speak, publish, and assemble, and there is no sound basis for granting greater constitutional protection to statements made in a petition than other First Amendment expressions. Split: Unanimous against First Amendment, for Smith The right to petition was subject to the legal limitations on the rights to speech and press decided in NYT v. Sullivan. Claims made in the petition were subject to libel lawsuits.

United States v. Washington Post Company (1982)

Argument: Respondent filed a request with petitioner United States Department of State under the Freedom of Information Act for documents indicating whether certain Iranian nationals held valid United States passports. The State Department denied the request on the ground that the requested information was exempt from disclosure under Exemption 6 of the Act, which provides that the Act's disclosure requirements do not apply to "personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." Pending an ultimately unsuccessful administrative appeal, respondent brought an action in Federal District Court to enjoin petitioners from withholding the requested documents, and the court granted summary judgment for respondent. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that, because the citizenship status of the individuals in question was less intimate than information normally contained in personnel and medical files, it was not contained in "similar files" within the meaning of Exemption 6, and that therefore there was no need to consider whether disclosure of the information would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. Ruling: The citizenship information sought by respondent satisfies the "similar files" requirement of Exemption 6, and hence the State Department's denial of the request should have been sustained upon a showing that release of the information would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. Although Exemption 6's language sheds little light on what Congress meant by "similar files," the legislative history indicates that Congress did not mean to limit Exemption 6 to a narrow class of files containing only a discrete kind of personal information, but that "similar files" was to have a broad, rather than a narrow, meaning. Exemption 6's protection is not determined merely by the nature of the file containing the requested information, and its protection is not lost merely because an agency stores information about an individual in records other than "personnel" or "medical" files. Split: Unanimous for U.S., against First Amendment Government can restrict the information it gives to the press based on substantial interest

Branti v. Finkel (1980)

Argument: Respondents, both Republicans, brought suit in Federal District Court to enjoin petitioner, a Democrat, who had recently been appointed Public Defender of Rockland County, N.Y. by the Democrat-dominated county legislature, from discharging respondents from their positions as Assistant Public Defenders. Finding that respondents had been satisfactorily performing their jobs and had been selected for termination solely because they were Republicans, and that an assistant public defender is neither a policymaker nor a confidential employee, the District Court held that petitioner could not terminate respondents' employment consistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and granted injunctive relief. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Ruling: The First and Fourteenth Amendments protect respondents from discharge solely because of their political beliefs. To prevail in this type of action, there is no requirement that dismissed government employees prove that they, or other employees, have been coerced into changing, either actually or ostensibly, their political allegiance. Rather, it was sufficient for respondents here to prove that they were about to be discharged "solely for the reason that they were not affiliated with or sponsored by the Democratic Party. The issue is whether the hiring authority can demonstrate that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the office. Under these circumstances, it would undermine, rather than promote, the effective performance of an assistant public defender's office to make his tenure dependent on his allegiance to the dominant political party. Split: 6-3 for First and Fourteenth Amendments

Garcetti v. Ceballos (2006)

Argument: Richard Ceballos was an employee of the Los Angeles District Attorney's office. When he found that a sheriff had wrongly presented the facts in an affidavit for a search warrant, he made the matter known to the prosecuting attorneys in the case. They agreed with him that the affidavit was likely not correct. However, the D.A.'s office refused to dismiss the case. Following this, he revealed his belief to the defense counsel, and was subpoenaed by the defense. Later he sued the D.A.'s office on the ground that the D.A.s in his office were treating him badly in repayment for his cooperation with the defense, which cooperation formed part of his right to freedom of speech under the First Amendment. The district court found for the D.A. under the plea of qualified immunity, but this decision was reversed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which held that qualified immunity did not apply since the speech by Ceballos concerned matters which concerned the public and was therefore protected by the First Amendment. Ruling: The Supreme Court held that speech by a public official is only protected if it is engaged in as a private citizen, not if it is expressed as part of the official's public duties. Ceballos's employers were justified in taking action against him based on his testimony and cooperation with the defense, therefore, because it happened as part of his official duties. "The fact that his duties sometimes required him to speak or write," Justice Kennedy wrote, "does not mean his supervisors were prohibited from evaluating his performance." Split: 5-4 against First Amendment

Frisby v. Schultz (1988)

Argument: Sandra Schultz and Robert Braun both strongly opposed abortion and gathered like-minded citizens together to picket in front of the home of a local doctor who performed abortions. In response, the city of Brookfield, Wisconsin passed a law against all picketing in front of residential homes. The city appealed to uphold its ordinance. Ruling: Court held that since the street constituted a traditional public forum, the ban must satisfy strict standards in order to remain. Since the ban is "content neutral," "leaves open ample alternative channels of communication," and serves a "significant government interest," the Court ruled that it passed the strict standards and could remain. The city government had a legitimate purpose in protecting the homes of its residents, and did so without favoring one idea over another or eliminating the ability to communicate an idea. Split: 6-3 for ordinance

Schenck v. United States (1919)

Argument: Schenck publicly advocated peaceful public boycott of the conscription process; he was charged with conspiracy to violate the Espionage Act by attempting to cause insubordination in the military and to obstruct recruitment. Ruling: Schenck's actions and words, while recognized as speech, were a "clear and present danger" to the state of the Union; the Court stated that in wartime, utterances that are tolerated in peacetime can be punished. Split: Unanimous against the First Amendment *Holmes: clear and present danger of a harm or evil that Congress has the right to prevent; question of proximity and degree *Court doesn't say anything about political speech specifically *example: free speech does not protect someone falsely shouting fire in a crowded theater is a clear and present danger *character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done Clear and present danger test; Congress has the right to prevent the clear and present danger of a harm or evil

Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization (1939)

Argument: Several individuals gathered at the headquarters of the Committee for Industrial Organization (CIO) in Jersey City, New Jersey to initiate a recruitment drive and discuss the National Labor Relations Act. Acting on the orders of Mayor Frank Hague, police seized the group's recruitment materials and refused to allow the meeting to take place. Hague argued that he was enforcing a 1930 city ordinance that forbade gatherings of groups that advocated obstruction of the government by unlawful means. Hague referred to CIO members as "communists." Arguing that the ordinance violated the First Amendment protection of freedom of assembly, the group filed suit against several city officials, including Hague. A District Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit agreed and invalidated the ordinance. Ruling: Court concluded that the actions taken by police clearly violated the First Amendment, as applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. "Citizenship of the United States would be little better than a name if it did not carry with it the right to discuss national legislation and the benefits, advantages, and opportunities to accrue to citizens therefrom." Relying on the Court's previous ruling in the Slaughter House Cases, Justice Roberts wrote that freedom of assembly is "a privilege inherent in citizenship of the United States" and that no "contrary view has ever been voiced" by the Court. Split: 5-2 for First Amendment

R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul (1992)

Argument: Several teenagers allegedly burned a crudely fashioned cross on a black family's lawn. The police charged one of the teens under a local bias-motivated criminal ordinance which prohibits the display of a symbol which "arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender." Appeal based on First Amendment. Ruling: The justices held the ordinance invalid on its face because "it prohibits otherwise permitted speech solely on the basis of the subjects the speech addresses." The First Amendment prevents government from punishing speech and expressive conduct because it disapproves of the ideas expressed. Under the ordinance, for example, one could hold up a sign declaring all anti-Semites are bastards but not that all Jews are bastards. The Court concluded, "Let there be no mistake about our belief that burning a cross in someone's front yard is reprehensible. But St. Paul has sufficient means at its disposal to prevent such behavior without adding the First Amendment to the fire." Split: Unanimous for First Amendment *hard to suppress hate crimes

McCutcheon c. FEC (2014)

Argument: Shaun McCutcheon is an Alabama resident who is eligible to vote. In the 2011-2012 election cycle, he donated to the Republican National Committee, other Republican committees, as well as individual candidates. He wished to donate more in amounts that would be permissible under the base limit but would violate the aggregate limit. The base limit placed restrictions on how much money a contributor—defined broadly as individuals, partnerships, and other organizations—may give to specified categories of recipients. The aggregate limit restricted how much money an individual may donate in a two-year election cycle. The limits were periodically recalibrated to factor in inflation. McCutcheon and the other plaintiffs sued the Federal Election Commission, arguing that the aggregate limit violated the First Amendment by failing to serve a "cognizable government interest" and being prohibitively low. Ruling: The four-justice plurality held that the aggregate limit did little to address the concerns that the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act was meant to address and at the same time limited participation in the democratic process. Because the aggregate limit fails to meet the stated objective of preventing corruption, it does not survive the "rigorous" standard of review laid out by previous precedent dealing with campaign contributions from a First Amendment perspective and is therefore unconstitutional. The aggregate limit also prevents a donor from contributing beyond a specific amount to more than a certain number of candidates, which may force him to choose which interests he can seek to advance in a given election. The plurality held that the collective interest in combating corruption can only be pursued as long as it does not unnecessarily curtail an individual's freedom of speech, and in this case the aggregate limit is not sufficiently closely tailored to accomplish this goal. The plurality also noted that there are many other means by which the government may fight election corruption without setting an aggregate limit on campaign contributions. Split: 5-4 for First Amendment

Hudgens v. National Labor Relations Board (1976)

Argument: Striking union members picketed in front of a retail store that was located within a shopping mall. The general manager of the mall threatened the picketers with arrest for trespassing if they would not leave. Appeal by union members under First Amendment. Ruling: Because a shopping mall is not the functional equivalent of a town, it may restrict First Amendment rights based solely on the content of the speech. It is privately-owned property and thus manageable by a private individual. Split: 6-2 against First Amendment Because a shopping mall is not the functional equivalent of a town, it may restrict First Amendment rights based solely on the content of the speech. It is privately-owned property and thus manageable by a private individual.

Pleasant Grove City v. Summum (2009)

Argument: Summum, a religious organization, sent a letter to the mayor of Pleasant Grove, Utah asking to place a monument in one of the city's parks. Although the park already housed a monument to the Ten Commandments, the mayor denied Summum's request because the monument did not "directly relate to the history of Pleasant Grove." Summum filed suit against the city in federal court citing, among other things, a violation of its First Amendment free speech rights. Ruling: Court ruled against Summum and explained that a municipality's acceptance and acquisition of a privately funded permanent monument erected in a public park while refusing to accept other privately funded permanent memorials is a valid expression of governmental speech, which is permissible and not an unconstitutional interference with the First Amendment's guarantee of free speech. "The display of a permanent monument in a public park" is perceived by an ordinary and reasonable observer to be an expression of values and ideas of the government, the owner of the park and the monument, even though the particular idea expressed by the monument is left to the interpretation of the individual observer. Alito made a clear distinction between forms of private speech in public parks, such as rallies and temporary holiday displays (Christmas trees and menorahs), and the government speech represented by permanent monuments. Split: Unanimous for Pleasant Grove City and governmental speech

Loyd v. Tanner (1972)

Argument: Tanner was a Vietnam War protestor who was distributing anti-war handbills inside Lloyd Center Mall. The handbills were unrelated to the operations of Lloyd Center. Lloyd Center was privately owned by Lloyd Corporation, which prohibited the distribution of handbills inside the mall. Tanner and other protestors were informed by mall security that they should stop their distribution or be subject to arrest. The protestors ended their distribution, left the mall, and filed suit against Lloyd Corporation in United States District Court for the District of Oregon alleging their First Amendment right to free speech had been violated. Ruling: Tanner was not entitled to distribute handbills within Lloyd Center. Writing for the majority, Justice Powell contrasted this case with Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, which allowed protestors to picket a shopping center when their picketing was "directly related" to the shopping center and no "reasonable opportunities to convey their message...were available." Here, Tanner's were unrelated to the operations of the mall, and the protestors had an alternative on the sidewalks immediately outside the mall, which were owned by the City of Portland. Powell characterized equating public property with private property intended for public use - such as the mall - as "reach[ing] too far." Split: 5-4 against First Amendment This speech would only be allowed if it was sufficiently related to the actual business of the mall

Edwards v. South Carolina (1963)

Argument: The 187 petitioners in this case, all of whom were black, organized a march to the South Carolina State House grounds protesting the policies of segregation in their state. The march was peaceful, did not block traffic, and was conducted in an orderly fashion on public property. Approximately thirty police officers confronted the group and ordered its members to disperse or to submit to arrest. The marchers did not disperse, and instead began singing religious and patriotic songs like the Star Spangled Banner. They were arrested and later convicted on a charge of breach of the peace. Ruling: Court held that in arresting, convicting and punishing the petitioners, South Carolina infringed on the petitioners' rights of free speech, free assembly and freedom to petition for a redress of grievances. The Court stated that these rights are guaranteed by the First Amendment and protected by the Fourteenth Amendment from invasion by the States. Split: 8-1 for First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment *didn't use clear and present danger standard *statute is too vague - overturned - "hokey legal stuff" *Court was sympathetic to minorities *a state cannot make criminal the expression of unpopular views; the marchers' exercise of their rights was in their most pristine and clear form

Citizens United v. FEC (2010)

Argument: The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (known as BCRA or McCain-Feingold Act) prohibited corporations and unions from using their general treasury to fund "electioneering communications" (broadcast advertisements mentioning a candidate) within 30 days before a primary or 60 days before a general election. Citizens United sought an injunction against the Federal Election Commission in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to prevent the application of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) to its film Hillary: The Movie. The Movie expressed negative opinions about whether Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton would make a good president. television advertisements for Hillary: The Movie violated the BCRA restrictions of "electioneering communications" within 30 days of a primary. Though the political action committee claimed that the film was fact-based and nonpartisan, the lower court found that the film had no purpose other than to discredit Clinton's candidacy for president. Ruling: The Supreme Court overruled Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce and portions of McConnell v. FEC. (In the prior cases, the Court had held that political speech may be banned based on the speaker's corporate identity. The majority held that under the First Amendment corporate funding of independent political broadcasts in candidate elections cannot be limited. The majority maintained that political speech is indispensable to a democracy, which is no less true because the speech comes from a corporation. The majority also held that the BCRA's disclosure requirements as applied to The Movie were constitutional, reasoning that disclosure is justified by a "governmental interest" in providing the "electorate with information" about election-related spending resources. The Court also upheld the disclosure requirements for political advertising sponsors and it upheld the ban on direct contributions to candidates from corporations and unions. Split: 5-4 for Citizens United

Board of Airport Commissioners v. Jews for Jesus (1987)

Argument: The Board of Airport Commissioners of Los Angeles adopted an ordinance which prohibited all "First Amendment activities" in the Los Angeles International Airport (LAX). Alan Snyder, a minister with Jews for Jesus, was instructed by an airport officer to refrain from distributing free religious literature on a walkway in the central terminal of LAX. Appealed on claim of violation of First Amendment Ruling: Using the "First Amendment overbreadth doctrine," which allows a party to whom the law may constitutionally be applied to challenge the statute on the ground that it violates the First Amendment rights of others, the Court found that the ordinance violated the Constitution. Justice O'Connor argued that the rule was vague, overly broad, and would have effectively prohibited activities such as reading, talking, or wearing expressive shirts or political buttons in the LAX terminal. Allowing such an ordinance, which touched "the universe of expressive activity" in its totality, would have caused LAX to become a "First Amendment Free Zone," according to O'Connor. Split: Unanimous for the First Amendment rule was vague, overly broad, and would have effectively prohibited activities such as reading, talking, or wearing expressive shirts or political buttons in the LAX terminal

Whitney v. California (1927)

Argument: The California Criminal Syndicalism Act prohibited any person to knowingly become a member of any organization that advocates "Criminal Syndicalism." The Defendant, Anita Whitney, was affiliated with an organization that adopted a "Left Wing Manifesto" and therefore convicted under the act. Conviction was appealed on grounds that it violated due process and equal protection under the First and Fourth Amendments. Ruling: Because united and joint action involves even greater danger to the public peace and security than does single utterances and acts of individuals, it is not an unreasonable or arbitrary exercise of the police power of the State to prohibit the type of activity prohibited by the Act. Split: Unanimous against the First and Fourteenth Amendment; Brandeis' concurring statement - Although the right to free speech is fundamental, it is not absolute. The right is subject to such restrictions as are required to protect the public from IMMINENT CLEAR AND PRESENT dangers. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) has not yet fixed a standard by which to determine when such a degree of danger exists, but it has articulated the following guidelines: (1) fear of serious injury alone cannot justify suppression of free speech and assembly; (2) Even imminent danger cannot justify prohibitions on speech, unless the dangers apprehended are relatively serious. - ONLY AN EMERGENCY CAN JUSTIFY REPRESSION no danger flowing from speech can be considered clear and present if there is full opportunity for discussion

First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti (1978)

Argument: The First National Bank of Boston is prohibited by state statute from spending "for the purpose of influencing the vote on any question that does not affect the corporation directly." The bank wanted to publicize a view of a constitutional amendment that would allow state legislation to impose graduated tax on income of individuals. Ruling: It is unconstitutional to restrict corporate speech to items that are "materially affecting" its business. A corporation should not be treated differently than private persons. The corporation may freely discuss government affairs. They do not otherwise control or drown out the voices of individuals. Split: 5-4 for First National Bank of Boston

Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project (2010)

Argument: The Humanitarian Law Project sought to help the Kurdistan Workers' Party in Turkey and Sri Lanka's Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam learn how to peacefully resolve conflicts; this violated the USA PATRIOT Act's prohibition on providing material support to foreign terrorist organizations. The Humanitarian Law Group challenged the prohibition on providing four types of material support — "training," "expert advice or assistance," "service," and "personnel"— asserting violations of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause on the ground that the statutory terms are impermissibly vague, and violations of their First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and association. Ruling: As applied to the plaintiffs, the law is not unconstitutionally vague; the group is prohibited in providing material resources to the two aforementioned terrorist groups. It concluded that Congress had intended to prevent aid to such groups, even if for the purpose of facilitating peace negotiations or United Nations processes, because that assistance did fit the law's definition of material aid as "training", "expert advice or assistance", "service", and "personnel". The finding was based on the principle that any assistance could help to "legitimate" the terrorist organization, and free up its resources for terrorist activities. Split: 6-3 decision against the plaintiffs, as well as First and Fifth Amendments principle that any assistance could help to "legitimate" the terrorist organization, and free up its resources for terrorist activities

Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights (2006)

Argument: The Solomon Amendment, 10 U.S.C. 983(b)(1), withholds some federal funding from colleges and universities that deny U.S. military recruiters the same access to students that other employers are given. The Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights challenged the law, arguing that it violated the schools' First Amendment rights to expressive association by requiring them to assist in military recruitment. The district court rejected the suit, but a Third Court of Appeals panel reversed. It held that, while the schools still had the right to forfeit funds so as to avoid unwanted endorsement of military policy under the amendment, forcing the schools to make such a decision was unconstitutional. Congress could not require them to forfeit a constitutional right in order to receive federal funds. Ruling: The Supreme Court held that the Solomon Amendment regulated conduct, not speech, and was therefore constitutional. Including military recruiters in receptions and interviews does not necessarily indicate university endorsement of the recruiters, so requiring their inclusion does not constitute compelled speech in violation of the First Amendment. This would be true even if Congress had decided to make the requirement direct, rather than making it indirect as a condition for receiving federal funds. Roberts wrote, "Because the First Amendment would not prevent Congress from directly imposing the Solomon Amendment's access requirement, the statute does not place an unconstitutional condition on the receipt of federal funds." Split: Unanimous for Solomon Amendment

Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeir (1988)

Argument: The Spectrum, the school-sponsored newspaper of Hazelwood East High School, was written and edited by students. In May 1983, Robert E. Reynolds, the school principal, received the page proofs for the May 13 issue. Reynolds found two of the articles, concerning teen pregnancy and divorce, in the issue to be inappropriate, and ordered that the pages on which the articles appeared be withheld from publication. Cathy Kuhlmeier and two other former Hazelwood East students brought the case to court. Ruling: Court held that the First Amendment did not require schools to affirmatively promote particular types of student speech. The Court held that schools must be able to set high standards for student speech disseminated under their auspices, and that schools retained the right to refuse to sponsor speech that was "inconsistent with 'the shared values of a civilized social order.'" Educators did not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the content of student speech so long as their actions were "reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns." The actions of principal Reynolds, the Court held, met this test. Split: 5-3 against First Amendment, for school district

Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans (2015)

Argument: The Texas division of the Sons of Confederate Veterans (Texas SCV), a non-profit organization that works to preserve the memory and reputation of soldiers who fought for the confederacy in the Civil War, applied to have a new specialty license plate issued by the Texas Department of Motor Vehicles (TDMV). The TDMV had a policy stating that it "may refuse to create a new specialty license plate if the design might be offensive to any member of the public." The board in charge of approving new specialty plates received multiple negative comments from the public regarding this plate and ultimately voted to deny Texas SCV's application. Texas SCV sued in federal district court claiming their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated. The TDMV argued that the Free Speech Clause did not apply in this case because license plates are a form of government speech; therefore, they were within their rights to choose which messages and views they wanted to express on the plates. The district court disagreed and held that the plates were private, non-governmental speech, and that the TDMV's denial was a reasonable, content-based restriction of speech in a non-public forum. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and held that TDMV's denial was a form of viewpoint discrimination that "discriminated against Texas SCV's view that the Confederate flag is a symbol of sacrifice, independence, and Southern heritage." Ruling: The Court held that the government choosing the content of its speech is not unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination because that expression is the product of the democratic electoral process. Based on the analysis from Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, Texas's specialty license plate is an example of such government speech (as opposed to a forum open for private expression) because Texas and other states have long used license plates to convey messages. Moreover, the public associates license plates with the State. Finally, Texas maintains direct control over the messages on its specialty plates from design to final approval. Split: 5-4 for government speech

Watchtower v. Stratton (2002)

Argument: The Village of Stratton promulgated an ordinance that prohibits canvassers from entering private residential property to promote any cause without first obtaining a permit from the mayor's office. The Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc., a congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses that publish and distribute religious materials, brought an action for injunctive relief, alleging that the ordinance violates their First Amendment rights to the free exercise of religion, free speech, and freedom of the press. Ruling: Court held that the ordinance's provisions making it a misdemeanor to engage in door-to-door advocacy without first registering with the mayor and receiving a permit violate the First Amendment as it applies to religious proselytizing, anonymous political speech, and the distribution of handbills. The Court reasoned that the village's interest in preventing fraud could not support the ordinance's application to the religious organizations, to political campaigns, or to enlisting support for unpopular causes. Split: 8-1 for First Amendment

Rust v. Sullivan (1991)

Argument: The case concerned the legality and constitutionality of Department of Health and Human Services regulations on the use of funds spent by the U.S. federal government to promote family planning (Title X). With Title X of the Public Health Service Act, Congress prohibited the funds from being "used in programs where abortion is a method of family planning." In 1988, the Republican-appointed Secretary of Health and Human Services issued new regulations that prohibited projects receiving these funds from not only providing abortions, but also counseling, advising, or promoting the idea that a woman seek an abortion. These regulations were challenged on the grounds that they were not permissibly within the scope of the statute and that they violated the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Ruling: The Court ruled that the regulations did not violate the legislation in question or the Constitution. The majority found that the regulations were a permissible construction of statutory law, that they do not violate the First Amendment free speech rights of the recipients, and that they do not violate the Fifth Amendment right of women to choose whether to terminate a pregnancy as established in Roe v. Wade. The use of public provided funds (subsidies) by the Government to support one viewpoint over another is not considered "discrimination" simply by the Government taking a particular viewpoint over another. Split: 5-4 for Title X

Snyder v. Phelps (2011)

Argument: The family of deceased Marine Lance Cpl. Matthew Snyder filed a lawsuit against members of the Westboro Baptist Church who picketed at his funeral for their belief in America's increasing tolerance of homosexuality. The family accused the church and its founders of defamation, invasion of privacy and the intentional infliction of emotional distress for displaying signs that said, "Thank God for dead soldiers" and "Fag troops" at Snyder's funeral. U.S. District Judge Richard Bennett awarded the family $5 million in damages, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the judgment violated the First Amendment's protections on religious expression. Ruling: The Court held that the First Amendment shields those who stage a protest at the funeral of a military service member from liability. "What Westboro said, in the whole context of how and where it chose to say it, is entitled to 'special protection' under the First Amendment and that protection cannot be overcome by a jury finding that the picketing was outrageous." Split: 8-1 for First Amendment

Village of Skokie v. National Socialist Party (1977)

Argument: The leader of National Socialist (Nazi) Party of America, announced the party's intention to march through Skokie, Illinois a predominantly Jewish area. Originally, the NSPA had planned a political rally in Marquette Park in Chicago; however, the Chicago authorities blocked these plans by requiring the NSPA to post a public safety insurance bond and by banning political demonstrations in Marquette Park. On behalf of the NSPA, the ACLU challenged the injunction issued by the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois that prohibited marchers at the proposed Skokie rally from wearing Nazi uniforms or displaying swastikas on the basis that it violated the First Amendment. Ruling: Court ruled that the Nazi Party could not be prohibited from marching peacefully because of the content of their message. The justices held that Illinois must provide strict procedural safeguards, including appellate review, to deny a stay for an injunction depriving the Nazi Party of protected First Amendment rights. Split: 5-4 for First Amendment

Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District (1969)

Argument: Tinker was a high school student who joined his parents in protesting the Vietnam War. The form of protest was to wear a black armband for a period of two weeks during the holiday season. When Petitioner arrived at school he was told to remove the armband or be suspended. He took the suspension and did not return to school until after the protest period ended, New Year's Eve 1965. Appeal on First Amendment grounds. Ruling: The Supreme Court held that the armbands represented pure speech that is entirely separate from the actions or conduct of those participating in it. The Court also held that the students did not lose their First Amendment rights to freedom of speech when they stepped onto school property. In order to justify the suppression of speech, the school officials must be able to prove that the conduct in question would "materially and substantially interfere" with the operation of the school. In this case, the school district's actions evidently stemmed from a fear of possible disruption rather than any actual interference. Split: 7-2 for First Amendment *Black dissents *Fortas writes for majority - akin to pure speech, symbolic act, not disruptive, "It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate." *could use Feiner as a precedent to keeping this speech out - disruptive standard

Gannett v. DePasquale (1979)

Argument: Two suspects charged with murder, robbery, and grand larceny requested that the public be excluded from a pre-trial hearing concerning the admissibility of evidence. They argued that an "unabated buildup" of adverse publicity had jeopardized their ability to receive a fair trial. The request was granted by the judge, and no objections were made at the time. The judge then denied press access to the pre-trial hearing and refused to immediately release the transcript of the proceedings. The case was argued and decided with Marshall, Secretary of Labor v. American Petroleum Institute et al. Ruling: The Court held that members of the public had no right to attend criminal trials under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court noted that judges had "an affirmative constitutional duty" to minimize the effects of prejudicial pretrial publicity, and that closure of pretrial proceedings was an effective method to do so. The Court found that the Sixth Amendment, while granting defendants the right to a public trial, did not imply a public right of access to trials. The Court added that since the suppression of the transcript was only temporary, no violation of the First Amendment had occurred. Split: 5-4 against First, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments/for DePasquale Overturned by Richmond newspapers

Snepp v. US (1980)

Argument: Upon accepting employment in the CIA in 1968, Snepp signed an agreement with the Agency that he would not publish any information during or after his term of employment relating to the Agency's activities without first obtaining Agency approval. Snepp published a book about CIA activities in South Vietnam without first submitting his manuscript to the Agency for review. A lower court denied Snepp royalties from his book for his failure to secure approval. Ruling: The Court upheld the lower court's ruling and agreed that Snepp had breached the "constructive trust" between him and the government. That was especially significant in this case since this type of violation by a former agent "impairs the CIA's ability to perform its statutory duties" and potentially jeopardizes the safety of current government operatives and Snepp himself. The Court reached this decision without hearing oral argument by the parties. Split: 6-3 for U.S., against First Amendment Snepp had breached the "constructive trust" between him and the government Chilling effect

Gooding v. Wilson (1972)

Argument: Wilson was convicted of violating a statute that provided that "[a]ny person who shall, without provocation, use to or of another, and in his presence . . . opprobrious words or abusive language, tending to cause a breach of the peace . . . shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." On appeal, Mr. Wilson argued that the statute violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Ruling: The Supreme Court held that the Georgia statute was unconstitutional. With Justice William J. Brennan writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that the statute was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Quoting Speiser v. Randall, the Court noted that "the separation of legitimate from illegitimate speech calls for more sensitive tools than (Georgia) has supplied." Split: 5-2 for First and Fourteenth Amendments separation of legitimate from illegitimate speech calls for more sensitive tools than (Georgia) has supplied

Madsen v. Women's Health Center (1994)

Argument: Women's Health Center Inc. operated several abortion clinics throughout central Florida, including the Aware Woman Center for Choice in Melbourne, Florida. In 1992, in response to anti-abortion protesters, a state court prohibited the protesters from physically abusing those entering or exiting the clinic, or otherwise interfering with access to the clinic. About 6 months later, Women's Health Center Inc. expressed a need to broaden the court order. The state court agreed, banning demonstrators from entering a 36-foot buffer-zone around the clinic, making excessive noise, using images visible to patients, approaching patients within a 300-foot radius of the clinic, and protesting within a 300-foot radius of staff residences. Petitioner Judy Madsen and her fellow protesters claimed that these restrictions violated their First Amendment right to free speech, but the Florida Supreme Court disagreed, upholding the court order. Ruling: The Court found that the state of Florida could only restrict protesters to the extent necessary to allow the clinic to run and the staff to live in their homes without interference. Thus, the majority approved of the 36-foot buffer zone around the front of the clinic because it was essential to allow patients and staff to enter and leave the building freely, but disapproved of the 36-foot buffer zone along the back and side of the building because it found no indication that protesting in these areas interfered with the function of the clinic. The Court also determined that the limitations placed on noise-making were necessary to insure the well-being of the patients, whereas those placed on images were not because they were easier to ignore. Finally, the Court concluded that both 300-foot radius rules were too broad, thus restricting the protestors more than was necessary. Therefore, the decision of the Florida Supreme Court was affirmed in part and reversed in part. Split: 6-3 in part for and in part against the First Amendment *restrictions on protestors' speech must be evaluated for "content neutrality" and must not burden protestors' speech more than necessary to achieve the government's legitimate interests, as well as be framed in the narrowest possible terms

Duncan v. Louisiana (1968)

Duncan was sentenced to 60 days in prison and fined $150. Duncan's request for a jury trial was denied. Ruling: Court held that the Sixth Amendment guarantee of trial by jury in criminal cases was "fundamental to the American scheme of justice," and that the states were obligated under the Fourteenth Amendment to provide such trials. Petty crimes, defined as those punishable by no more than six months in prison and a $500 fine, were not subject to the jury trial provision. Split: 7-2 upholding the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, furtherance of incorporation *Frankfurter and Black argue about what should and should not apply *opposite conclusion as prior decisions

Dennis v. United States (1951)

unlawful to knowingly conspire to teach and advocate the overthrow or destruction of the United States government. Conviction was appealed with claim of violation of the First Amendment. Ruling: The Smith Act did not inherently violate the First Amendment, as advocacy of communist philosophies creates a "clear and present danger" to the American government; Court held that success or probability of success was not necessary to justify restrictions on the freedom of speech. Split: 6-2 against the First Amendment *used Schenck as precedent, use "clear and present danger" to convict them but the danger wasn't present * "Chief Judge Learned Hand (from the lower court), writing for the majority, interpreted the phrase as follows: "In each case, [courts] must ask whether the gravity of the "evil," discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger." We adopt this statement of the rule. As articulated by Chief Judge Hand, it is as succinct and inclusive as any other we might devise at this time. It takes into consideration those factors which we deem relevant, and relates their significances. More we cannot expect from words." *THIS IS NOT CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER BUT HAND SAYS THAT IT IS AND THE COURT USES THIS INTERPRETATION - this distortion looks like the bad tendency test that is being used to suppress speech *clear and present danger is a balancing technique and an evolutionary technique whether the "gravity of evil" of the speech justifies the invasion of free speech to avoid the danger suppress speech just because it could lead to something "evil"