Midterm

In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967)

15 year old Alleged that his friends made a prank phone call to a neighbor's home Sheriff arrived and put him into custody and detention without informing parents Ordered to attend juvy until he was 21 Were the procedures used to commit Gault constitutionally legitimate under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? No. The proceedings of the Juvenile Court failed to comply with the Constitution. The Court held that the proceedings for juveniles had to comply with the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. These requirements included adequate notice of charges, notification of both the parents and the child of the juvenile's right to counsel, opportunity for confrontation and cross-examination at the hearings, and adequate safeguards against self-incrimination. The Court found that the procedures used in Gault's case met none of these requirements.

Utah v. Strieff (2016 - Thomas)

A narcotics detective surveilling a house based on an anon tip about drug activity based on the number of people entering and leaving the home Edward Strieff left the home and was asked by police what he was doing in the house Police dispatch found that Strieff had an outstanding warrant for arrest for a traffic violation Was searched and found drugs Moved to suppress the evidence due to an illegal investigatory stop Trial court denied the motion and the appellate court affirmed Utah supreme court reversed and ordered the evidence to be suppressed On appeal, the state's SC decision was reversed by a 6-2 vote w Justice Thomas delivering the opinion Sotomayor dissents, joined in part by Ginsburg Q: Should evidence seized incident to a lawful arrest on an outstanding warrant be suppressed because the warrant was discovered during an investigatory stop later found to be unlawful? In the absence of flagrant police misconduct, the discovery of a valid, pre-existing, and untainted arrest warrant attenuated (weakened) the connection between the unconstitutional investigatory stop and the evidence seized incident to the lawful arrest, which allowed the evidence to be used against the defendant. Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion of the 5-3 majority. The Court held that evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment's protections should not be excluded from evidence when the costs of its exclusion outweighs its benefits. Exclusion is not justified when the link between the unconstitutional conduct and the discovered evidence is too attenuated. To determine whether the connection is attenuated, courts must examine the temporal proximity of the discovery of the evidence to the unconstitutional conduct, the presence of intervening circumstances, and the flagrancy of the police misconduct. Based on the analysis of those factors, when a valid warrant is discovered after an unconstitutional investigatory stop, the connection between the unconstitutional conduct and the discovery of evidence incident to a lawful arrest based on the warrant is sufficiently attenuated. Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote a dissent in which she argued that the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule was intended to prevent police officers from taking advantage of their own unconstitutional conduct, which was the case here. Because the initial unconstitutional stop was clearly calculated to procure further evidence, it was not an intervening circumstance that attenuated the connection between the misconduct and the discovery of evidence. Justice Sotomayor also argued that allowing the police such free rein essentially created a group of second-class citizens that could be subjected to police invasion of constitutional rights at a whim. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined in all but the last portion of the dissent. In her separate dissent, Justice Elena Kagan wrote that the discovery of the evidence was too closely connected to the unconstitutional investigatory stop for the valid warrant to attenuate the connection. Because the two events were closely connected in time, the warrant itself was not an intervening circumstance, and the police conduct was purposeful and flagrant, the exclusionary rule should apply in cases like this one. Justice Ginsburg joined in the dissent.

TLO v. NJ

A school in NJ caught her friends smoking cigarettes Taken to the assistant vice principal's office, Choplick, who demanded to see her purse and searched through it and found cigs, rolling paper, and marijuana and a list of people who owe her money. Lots of money in the purse Charged with possession Moved to suppress but was denied Superior court of NJ moved to suppress NJSC ruled to suppress on exclusionary rule SCOTUS 6-3 decision ruled in favor of NJ Justice White upheld that 4th amend applies to schools but only needs reasonable suspicion

U.S. v. Jones, et seq. (2012 - Scalia)

Antoine Joines was the owner of a DC nightclub that was the target of a drug trafficking investigation Used camera surveillance and a pen register The govt sought a warrant authorizing the use of PS tracking for Jones's wife's Jeep Installed on the 11th day (not in 10 days) and in MD (not DC) Moved to suppress evidence but was only suppressed in part First trial a hung jury Second trial found him guilty w life in prison Appeals court reversed due to warrantless use of GPS SCOTUS unanimously affirmed appellate court decision by Scalia Alito and Sotomayor concurred Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan join Alito's concurrence The Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court, and held that the installation of a GPS tracking device on Jones' vehicle, without a warrant, constituted an unlawful search under the Fourth Amendment. The Court rejected the government's argument that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in a person's movement on public thoroughfares and emphasized that the Fourth Amendment provided some protection for trespass onto personal property. Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote a concurring opinion, agreeing that the government had obtained information by usurping Jones' property and by invading his privacy. However, she further reasoned that the Fourth Amendment was not only concerned with trespasses onto property. She stated that a Fourth Amendment search occurs whenever the government violates a subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable, which is particularly important in an era where physical intrusion is unnecessary to many forms of surveillance. Justice Samuel Alito concurred in the judgment but criticized the framing of the question in terms of trespass to property. He believed that such a construction of the problem strained the language of the Fourth Amendment and that it would be better to analyze the case by determining whether the Government violated Jones' reasonable expectations of privacy.

Roper v. Simmons, et seq. (2005 - Kennedy)

At the age of 17, Christopher SImmons committed murder 9 months later, after he turned 18, he was tried and sentenced to death Premeditated act with accomplices who were 15 and 16 Simmons was tried as an adult Missouri SC affirmed conviction Stanford v CT upheld the execution of minors State SC decision affirmed by a 5-4 vote with Justice Kennedy delivering Stevens concurred O'connor and Scalia dissented joined by Rehnquist and Thomas Q: Does the execution of minors violate the prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishment" found in the Eighth Amendment and applied to the states through the incorporation doctrine of the 14th Amendment? Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court ruled that standards of decency have evolved so that executing minors is "cruel and unusual punishment" prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. The majority cited a consensus against the juvenile death penalty among state legislatures, and its own determination that the death penalty is a disproportionate punishment for minors. Finally the Court pointed to "overwhelming" international opinion against the juvenile death penalty. Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justices Antonin Scalia, Sandra Day O'Connor, and Clarence Thomas all dissented.

Katz v. U.S. (1967 - Stewart)

Charles Katz was convicted in fed district court for violating fed law for placing bets and wagers from a public telephone booth in LA to bookies in Boston and Miami FBI agents had placed a listening device outside the booth and recorded the conversations Fed appellate court rejected the appeal SCOTUS ruled 7-1 maj opinion by Stewart White, Harlan, Douglas concur joined by Brennan Black dissented Q: Does the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures require the police to obtain a search warrant in order to wiretap a public pay phone? Yes. The Court ruled that Katz was entitled to Fourth Amendment protection for his conversations and that a physical intrusion into the area he occupied was unnecessary to bring the Amendment into play. "The Fourth Amendment protects people, not places," wrote Justice Potter Stewart for the Court. A concurring opinion by John Marshall Harlan introduced the idea of a 'reasonable' expectation of Fourth Amendment protection.

Gideon v. Wainwright (1963 - Black)

Clarence Earl Gideon a 51 year old man was convicted of breaking and entering into a Poolroom in Panama City, Florida. Stated he was too poor for an attorney and requested one be provided The judge refused and he was convicted and sentenced While serving 5 years for petty larceny in Florida State Prison he mailed a petition to the SCOTUS Gideon was within the agenda of the Warren Court, seeking to overrule Betts special circumstance rule for counsel Unanimous decision delivered by Black Douglas, Clark, and Harlan concur The Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a right to assistance of counsel applies to criminal defendants in state court by way of the Fourteenth Amendment. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Hugo L. Black, the Court held that it was consistent with the Constitution to require state courts to appoint attorneys for defendants who could not afford to retain counsel on their own. The Court reasoned that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of counsel is a fundamental and essential right made obligatory upon the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Sixth Amendment guarantees the accused the right to the assistance of counsel in all criminal prosecutions and requires courts to provide counsel for defendants unable to hire counsel unless the right was competently and intelligently waived. Justice Douglas, while joining the Court's opinion, elaborated, in a separate opinion, the relation between the Bill of Rights and the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Riley v. California (2014 - Roberts)

David Riley was stopped for a traffic violation and arrested on weapons charges Riley's cell phone was seized incident to the arrest The officer accessed info on the phone and suspected gang related activity Riley was then charged with a gang related shooting District and state appellate court upheld the use of cell phone information and convicted Riley Brima Wurie was arrested after an officer observed him making a drug sale Seized a cell phone and traced a number to Wurie's apartment where a search warrant was obtained and they secured drugs and firearms Wurie was convicted by federal district court but the appellate court vacated the conviction by moving to suppress the evidence The SCOTUS reversed the state court's decision in Riley and affirmed the appellate court's decision in Wurie. CJ Roberts delivered the unanimous opinion Alito concurs Q: Was the evidence admitted at trial from Riley's cell phone discovered through a search that violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches? Yes. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. wrote the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court held that the warrantless search exception following an arrest exists for the purposes of protecting officer safety and preserving evidence, neither of which is at issue in the search of digital data. The digital data cannot be used as a weapon to harm an arresting officer, and police officers have the ability to preserve evidence while awaiting a warrant by disconnecting the phone from the network and placing the phone in a "Faraday bag." The Court characterized cell phones as minicomputers filled with massive amounts of private information, which distinguished them from the traditional items that can be seized from an arrestee's person, such as a wallet. The Court also held that information accessible via the phone but stored using "cloud computing" is not even "on the arrestee's person." Nonetheless, the Court held that some warrantless searches of cell phones might be permitted in an emergency: when the government's interests are so compelling that a search would be reasonable. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment in which he expressed doubt that the warrantless search exception following an arrest exists for the sole or primary purposes of protecting officer safety and preserving evidence. In light of the privacy interests at stake, however, he agreed that the majority's conclusion was the best solution. Justice Alito also suggested that the legislature enact laws that draw reasonable distinctions regarding when and what information within a phone can be reasonably searched following an arrest.

Palko v. Connecticut (1937 - Cardozo)

Frank Jacob Palko was wanted for killing two police officers in Sept 1935 in Bridgeport, CT Later found in NY where he confessed. Indicted by a grand jury w first degree murder; tried before a jury; and sentenced to life Prosecution sought death penalty Under CT law, a criminal sentence could be appealed by the state if the trial judge made errors prejudicial to the prosecution and the judge granted permission for an appeal The state supreme court had found that the trial judge had erred - reversed conviction and ordered a retrial In the second trial, Palko's atty objected that it violated the 5th amend guarantee against double jeopardy Argued to the SCOTUS that the Bill of Rights was applicable to the states under the 14th amend Court ruled 8-1, the majority opinion by Cardozo. Butler dissented without opinion Q: Does Palko's second conviction violate the protection against double jeopardy guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment because this protection applies to the states by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause? The Supreme Court upheld Palko's second conviction. In his majority opinion, Cardozo noted that some Bill of Rights guarantees--such as freedom of thought and speech--are fundamental, and that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause absorbed these fundamental rights and applied them to the states. Protection against double jeopardy was not a fundamental right. Palko died in Connecticut's electric chair on April 12, 1938.

The Slaughterhouse Cases (1873 - Miller)

In 1869 pollution and the spread of cholera led to the LA passage of an act prohibiting all slaughtering of livestock in New Orleans Except for one slaughterhouse given exclusive franchise for 25 years Butchers' Benevolent Assoc challenged the constitutionality of the leg Claimed violation of 13 and 14 for depriving them of their livelihood State court and LASC upheld the law 5-4 decision by Justice Miller Field, Bradley, Swatne and CJ Chase dissent Q: Did the creation of the monopoly violate the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments? The Court held that the monopoly violated neither the Thirteenth or Fourteenth Amendments, reasoning that these amendments were passed with the narrow intent to grant full equality to former slaves. Thus, to the Court, the Fourteenth Amendment only banned the states from depriving black people of equal rights; it did not guarantee that all citizens, regardless of race, should receive equal economic privileges by the state. Any rights guaranteed by the Privileges or Immunities Clause were limited to areas controlled by the federal government, such as access to ports and waterways, the right to run for federal office, and certain rights affecting safety on the seas. Moreover, the Court held that the butchers bringing suit were not deprived of their property without due process of law because they could still earn a legal living in the area by slaughtering on the Crescent City Company grounds. Thus, the Court concluded that the Louisiana law was constitutional. Justice Stephen Johnson Field's dissent argued that the Fourteenth Amendment could not be construed as only protecting former slaves. Rather, he believed that it incorporated strands of common-law doctrine and needed to be interpreted outside the Civil War context. This position would later become widely accepted. Dissent as the basis for incorporation doctrine.

McDonald v. City of Chicago et seq.(2010 - Alito)

In 1983, the city of Chicago enacted an ordinance banning the possession of unregistered firearms Had to register with the police Residents challenged the act on the basis of DC v Heller A 3-judge panel of the Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit upheld the ordinances The appellate court's decision was reversed by a 5-4 vote Justice Alito delivered the opinion for the plurality Scalia and Thomas concur Justice Stevens and Breyer dissent joined by Ginsburg and Sotomayor Q;Does the Second Amendment apply to the states because it is incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges and Immunities or Due Process clauses and thereby made applicable to the states? The Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit, holding that the Fourteenth Amendment makes the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms for the purpose of self-defense applicable to the states. Justice Samuel A. Alito writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that rights that are "fundamental to the Nation's scheme of ordered liberty" or that are "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition" are appropriately applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court recognized in Heller that the right to self-defense was one such "fundamental" and "deeply rooted" right. The Court reasoned that because of its holding in Heller, the Second Amendment applied to the states. Here, the Court remanded the case to the Seventh Circuit to determine whether Chicago's handgun ban violated an individual's right to keep and bear arms for self-defense. Justice Alito, writing in the plurality, specified that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Second Amendment right recognized in Heller. He rejected Justice Clarence Thomas's separate claim that the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment more appropriately incorporates the Second Amendment against the states. Alito stated that the Court's decision in the Slaughterhouse Cases -- rejecting the use of the Privileges or Immunities Clause for the purpose of incorporation -- was long since decided and the appropriate avenue for incorporating rights was through the Due Process Clause. Justice Antonin Scalia concurred. He agreed with the Court's opinion, but wrote separately to disagree with Justice John Paul Stevens' dissent. Justice Clarence Thomas concurred and concurred in the judgment. He agreed that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Second Amendment against the states, but disagreed that the Due Process Clause was the appropriate mechanism. Instead, Justice Thomas advocated that the Privileges or Immunities Clause was the more appropriate avenue for rights incorporation. Justice John Paul Stevens dissented. He disagreed that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Second Amendment against the states. He argued that owning a personal firearm was not a "liberty" interest protected by the Due Process Clause. Justice Stephen G. Breyer, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Sonia Sotomayor, also dissented. He argued that there is nothing in the Second Amendment's "text, history, or underlying rationale" that characterizes it as a "fundamental right" warranting incorporation through the Fourteenth Amendment.

Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab (1989 - Kennedy)

In 1986, the United States Customs Service implemented a drug testing program for certain employees who either carry firearms, are involved in intercepting drugs as they enter the country, or are in high level positions involving classified information. 1986 implementation of urinalysis program The SCOTUS ruled 5-4 with maj opinion by Kennedy Marshall and Stevens dissented joined by Brennan and Stevens Q: Did the regulations violate the Fourth Amendment? No. The Court held that the "substantial interests" of the government in stifling the drug trade justified "departure from the ordinary warrant and probable cause requirements" associated with searches. The fact that customs personnel are the country's "first line of defense" against drug smugglers and they are exposed to a sometimes aggressive criminal element, places them in a unique and important position in which they have a "diminished expectation of privacy."

Minnesota v. Dickerson (1993 - White)

In 1989 two cops in an unmarked squad car noticed Timothy Dickerson leaving an apt building that was considered a "crackhouse" Dickerson evaded the cops Pat down search revealed ⅕ gram of coke Moved to suppress the evidence but denied in district court Reversed by appellate Affirmed by state SC SCOTUS ruled 6-3 with White announcing the majority opinion Scalia concurred Rehnquist concurred in part and dissented in part Joined by Blackmun and Thomas Q: When a police officer detects contraband through his or her sense of touch during a protective patdown search, does the Fourth Amendment permit its seizure and subsequent introduction into evidence? Was the police officer who frisked Dickerson adhering to the Fourth Amendment when he formed the belief, through his sense of touch, that the lump in Dickerson's jacket pocket was cocaine? Yes and No. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Byron R. White, the Court recalled that a police officer may seize contraband when it is in plain sight, and "its incriminating character is immediately apparent". It held that instances in which an officer uses the sense of sight to discover illegal goods are analogous to those involving the sense of touch. The Court also reasoned that the tactile detection of contraband during a lawful pat-down search does not constitute any further invasion of privacy, therefore warrantless seizure was permissible. The Court also concluded that the police officer frisking Dickerson stepped outside the boundaries outlined in Terry v. Ohio which requires a protective pat-down search to involve only what is necessary for the detection of weapons. In fact the officer was already aware that Dickerson's jacket pocket did not contain a weapon, when he detected the cocaine through further tactile investigation.

Ewing v. California (2003 - O'Connor)

In 1990's about half the states enacted 3 strikes you're out laws - mandatory mins Cali's law provides that a defendant who has 2 or more prior convictions must receive an indeterminate term of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole after 25 years Judges discretion in wobblers (cases that are felonies or misdemeanors) In 2000, on parole from serving 9 years after 3 burglaries and a robbery, walked out of a golf shop with 3 clubs hidden in his pants leg Charged with grand theft for theft in excess of 400 Sought a life sentence but asked for a wobbler Judge ruled it a felony and was sentenced to 25-life 5-4 with Justice O'Connor delivering joined by CJ Rehnquist and Kennedy Scalia and Thomas concurred Stevens and Breyer dissented joined by Souter and Ginsburg Did Ewing's sentence of 25 years to life, in accordance with California's three strikes law, violate the Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment? No. In a 5-4 plurality decision authored by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court, relying heavily on its decision in Rummel v. Estelle (1980), concluded that Ewing's long history of legal offenses justified his conviction. In Rummel, the Court had ruled that a sentence of life with the possibility of parole was valid for three convictions of fraud, check forgery, and theft. In that case, the Court gave great deference to legislatures in mandating sentences for repeat offenders. Justice O'Connor writes that, as in Rummel, Ewing's conviction reflects "rational legislative judgment" and "is justified by the State's public-safety interest in incapacitating and deterring recidivist felons."

Kyllo v. U.S. (2001 - Scalia)

In 1992, federal agents suspected Danny Kyllo of growing marijuana Police used a thermal imager to scan the home and detect heat Deduced that Kyllo was growing marijuana because of relatively hot roof of garage and side wall of house Used informant tip and utility bills to deduce that he was growing marijuana Moved to suppress that the imager was an unconstitutional search but fed district court rejected the motion Affirmed by appellate court SCOTUS reversed appellate court in 5-4 vote by Scalia Stevens dissents, joined by CJ Rehnquist, O'Connor, and Kennedy In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that "[w]here, as here, the Government uses a device that is not in general public use, to explore details of the home that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a 'search' and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant." In dissent, Justice John Paul Stevens argued that the "observations were made with a fairly primitive thermal imager that gathered data exposed on the outside of [Kyllo's] home but did not invade any constitutionally protected interest in privacy," and were, thus, "information in the public domain."

Dickerson v. U.S. (2000, Rehnquist Court)

In 1997 Thomas Disckerson was arrested and indicted for robbery Agents failed to read Miranda rights Court of appeals reversed arguing that Miranda was not a const ruling and therefore Congress could determine the standard for voluntary confessions and admitted into evidence in fed courts SCOTUS ruled 7-2 with opinion by CJ Rehnqust Scalia dissented joined by Thomas During questioning about a robbery he was connected to, Charles Dickerson made statements to authorities admitting that he was the getaway driver in a series of bank robberies. Dickerson was then placed under arrest. The timing of his statement is disputed. The FBI and local detectives testified that Dickerson was advised of his Miranda rights, established in Miranda v. Arizona, and waived them before he made his statement. Dickerson said he was not read his Miranda warnings until after he gave his statement. After his indictment for bank robbery, Dickerson filed a motion to suppress the statement that he made on the ground that he had not received Miranda warnings before being interrogated. The government argued that even if the Miranda warnings were not read, the statement was voluntary and therefore admissible under 18 USC Section 3501, which provides that "a confession shall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given." The District Court granted Dickerson's motion, finding that he had not been read his Miranda rights or signed a waiver until after he made his statement, but the court did not address section 3501. In reversing, the Court of Appeals acknowledged that Dickerson had not received Miranda warnings, but held that section 3501 was satisfied because his statement was voluntary. The court held that "Congress enacted section 3501 with the express purpose of legislatively overruling Miranda and restoring voluntariness as the test for admitting confessions in federal court." May Congress legislatively overrule Miranda v. Arizona and its warnings that govern the admissibility of statements made during custodial interrogation? No. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that Miranda governs the admissibility of statements made during custodial interrogation in both state and federal courts. "Miranda has become embedded in routine police practice to the point where the warnings have become part of our national culture," wrote Rehnquist. "Miranda announced a constitutional rule that Congress may not supersede legislatively. We decline to overrule Miranda ourselves," concluded the Chief Justice. Dissenting, Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, blasted the Court's ruling, writing that the majority opinion gave needless protection to "foolish (but not compelled) confessions."

Florida v. Jardines (2013 - Scalia)

In 2006 William Predraja of the Miami-Dade police dept received an unverified tip that marijuana was being grown in the home of Joelis Jardines Brought a drug dog to the premise a month later who sat on the front door step after detecting an odor Used the drug dog's detection as a basis for a search warrant, where Jardines was arrested for trafficking marijuana. At the trial, Jardines moved to suppress the plants on the ground that the canine investigation was an unreasonable search The trial court granted the motion but state appellate court reversed FloridaSC held that the use of the trained narcotics dog was unsupported by probable cause, invalidating the warrant. SCOTUS granted review and affirmed the state SC decision by a 5-4 vote Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the court Kagan concurred, joined by Ginsburg and Sotomayor Alito dissent with CJ Roberts, Kennedy, and Breyer Q: Is a dog sniff at the front door of a suspected grow house by a trained narcotics detection dog a Fourth Amendment search requiring probable cause? Yes. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered a 5-4 opinion affirming the Florida Supreme Court's decision. The Court held that the front porch of a home is part of the home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes. Typically, ordinary citizens are invited to enter onto the porch, either explicitly or implicitly, to communicate with the house's occupants. Police officers, however, cannot go beyond the scope of that invitation. Entering a person's porch for the purposes of conducting a search requires a broader license than the one commonly given to the general public. Without such a license, the police officers were conducting an unlawful search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Justice Elena Kagan wrote a concurring opinion in which she argued that the case dealt with privacy issues as well as the property issues the majority opinion addressed. People have a heightened expectation of privacy in their homes and the areas immediately surrounding their homes, and in this case, the police violated that expectation. Because the police officers used a device (a drug-sniffing dog) not in public use to learn details about the home, Justice Kagan argued that an illegal search had been conducted. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined in the concurrence. Justice Samuel A. Alito dissented, arguing that the majority's interpretation of the public license to approach a person's front door is too narrow and should extend even to police officers collecting evidence against an occupant. The dissent argued that the common law of trespass does not limit the public license to a particular category of visitors approaching the door for a specific purpose. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, and Justice Stephen G. Breyer joined in the dissent.

Carpenter v. U.S. (2018, Roberts Court)

In April 2011, police arrested four men in connection with a series of armed robberies. One of the men confessed to the crimes and gave the FBI his cell phone number and the numbers of the other participants. The FBI used this information to apply for three orders from magistrate judges to obtain "transactional records" for each of the phone numbers, which the judges granted under the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. 2703(d). That Act provides that the government may require the disclosure of certain telecommunications records when "specific and articulable facts show[] that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of a wire or electronic communication, or the records or other information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation." The transactional records obtained by the government include the date and time of calls, and the approximate location where calls began and ended based on their connections to cell towers—"cell site" location information (CSLI). Based on the cell-site evidence, the government charged Timothy Carpenter with, among other offenses, aiding and abetting robbery that affected interstate commerce, in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951. Carpenter moved to suppress the government's cell-site evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds, arguing that the FBI needed a warrant based on probable cause to obtain the records. The district court denied the motion to suppress, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed. Q: Does the warrantless search and seizure of cell phone records, which include the location and movements of cell phone users, violate the Fourth Amendment? 5-4 DECISION FOR CARPENTER The government's warrantless acquisition of Carpenter's cell-site records violated his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The majority first acknowledged that the Fourth Amendment protects not only property interests, but also reasonable expectations of privacy. Expectations of privacy in this age of digital data do not fit neatly into existing precedents, but tracking person's movements and location through extensive cell-site records is far more intrusive than the precedents might have anticipated. The Court declined to extend the "third-party doctrine"—a doctrine where information disclosed to a third party carries no reasonable expectation of privacy—to cell-site location information, which implicates even greater privacy concerns than GPS tracking does. One consideration in the development of the third-party doctrine was the "nature of the particular documents sought," and the level of intrusiveness of extensive cell-site data weighs against application of the doctrine to this type of information. Additionally, the third-party doctrine applies to voluntary exposure, and while a user might be abstractly aware that his cell phone provider keeps logs, it happens without any affirmative act on the user's part. Thus, the Court held narrowly that the government generally will need a warrant to access cell-site location information. Justice Anthony Kennedy filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito joined. Justice Kennedy would find that cell-site records are no different from the many other kinds of business records the government has a lawful right to obtain by compulsory process. Justice Kennedy would continue to limit the Fourth Amendment to its property-based origins. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, emphasizing the property-based approach to Fourth Amendment questions. In Justice Thomas's view, the case should not turn on whether a search occurred, but whose property was searched. By focusing on this latter question, Justice Thomas reasoned, the only logical conclusion would be that the information did not belong to Carpenter. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined. Justice Alito distinguishes between an actual search and an order "merely requiring a party to look through its own records and produce specified documents"—with the former being far more intrusive than the latter. Justice Alito criticizes the majority for what he characterizes as "allow[ing] a defendant to object to the search of a third party's property," a departure from long-standing Fourth Amendment doctrine. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion in which he emphasizes the "original understanding" of the Fourth Amendment and laments the Court's departure from it.

U.S. v. Leon and Massachusetts v. Sheppard (1984 - White)

In August 1981 a confidential informant told a police officer in Burbank CA that two people known as Armando and Patsy were selling cocaine and mathaqualone Staked out the residences of Armando Sanchez and Patsy Stewart Officers observed the car of Richardo Del Castillo who had previously been arrested for marijuana Checking Del Catillo's records led to Alberto Leon The two were found with small amounts of marijuana after returning from Miami at the airport Officer Cyril Rombach applied for a warrant to search the residences of Stewart, Sanchez, and Leon Search found a large quantity of drugs Part of the evidence was suppressed at district court due to a lack of probable cause The court ruled that Officer Rombach had acted in good faith but rejected the govts argument that 4th amend exclusionary rule should not apply where evidence was seized by police who reasonably and in good faith rely on search warrants Court of Appeals for 9th circuit affirmed, finding the officer's affidavit failed to meet two pronged test from Aguilar v Texas and Spinelli v US The SCOTUS upheld the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule 6-3 decision in Leon and 7-2 decision in Sheppard w maj opinion by Justice White Justice Blackmun concurred Justice Brennan, joined by Marshall dissented Stevens dissented in Leon and concurred in Sheppard The justices held that evidence seized on the basis of a mistakenly issued search warrant could be introduced at trial. The exclusionary rule is not a right but a remedy justified by its ability to deter illegal police conduct. In Leon, the costs of the exclusionary rule outweighed the benefits. The exclusionary rule is costly to society: Guilty defendants go unpunished and people lose respect for the law. The benefits of the exclusionary rule are uncertain: The rule cannot deter police in a case like Leon, where they act in good faith on a warrant issued by a judge.

Hurtado v. California (1884 - Matthews)

In February 182, Joseph Hurtado assaulted Jose Estuardo in Sacramento California He was arrested and scheduled for trial but the city attorney was unable to appear, postponing the trial and releasing Hurtado Promptly after, Hurtado shot Estuardo 3 times If Hurtado had been tried in federal court, he would have been indicted by a grand jury before being tried for his crime The 5th amendment requires indictment by a grand jury before a person accused of a capital offense may be tried On appeal, Hurtado's atty challenged the case on 5th amend and 14th due process grounds 2 state courts upheld the conviction Appealed to SC for writ of error 7-1 decision announced by Justice Matthews Justice Harlan dissent Fields did not participate No, this was not a violation of due process. Any legal proceeding that protects liberty and justice is due process. The majority opinion, authored by Matthews, reasoned that the Constitution cannot be locked into static conceptions bound by time and place. The Court also took the position that nothing in the Constitution is superfluous. Since the Fifth Amendment contains both a guarantee of grand jury proceedings and a guarantee of due process, the latter cannot embrace the former. Harlan's Dissent Due process of the law is synonymous with law of the land per the Magna Carta

Atkins v. Virginia (2002 - Stevens)

In Ford v Wainwright the Court held that the 8th amend bars the execution of death row inmates who are insane In Penry v Lynaugh a bare maj upheld the execution of someone who is developmentally disabled In 1998 Daryl Renard Atkins had an IQ of 59 and was convicted and sentenced to death for participating in the robbery and murder of a Virginia airman VASC affirmed his sentence SCOTUS reversed VASC in a 6-3 vote - Stevens with maj opinion Rehnquist and Scalia dissent, joined by Thomas Q: Is the execution of developmentally disabled persons "cruel and unusual punishment" prohibited by the Eighth Amendment? Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that executions of mentally retarded criminals are "cruel and unusual punishments" prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. Since it last confronted the issue, the Court reasoned that a significant number of States have concluded that death is not a suitable punishment for a mentally retarded criminal. Moreover, the Court concluded that there was serious concern whether either justification underpinning the death penalty - retribution and deterrence of capital crimes - applies to mentally retarded offenders, due to their lessened culpability. "Construing and applying the Eighth Amendment in the light of our 'evolving standards of decency,' we therefore conclude that such punishment is excessive and that the Constitution 'places a substantive restriction on the State's power to take the life' of a mentally retarded offender," wrote Justice Stevens. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice Antonin Scalia filed dissenting opinions. Justice Clarence Thomas joined both. "This newest invention promises to be more effective than any of the others in turning the process of capital trial into a game," argued Justice Scalia.

Davis v. U.S. (2011 - Alito)

In Greenville, AL, Willie Davis was arrested during a routine vehicle stop for giving a false name Police searched the car and found a revolver Convicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm Moved to suppress Meanwhile, SCOTUS announced a new rule on automobile searches incident to arrests per Arizona v Grant Court of Appeals for 11th Circuit held that under grant the vehicle search did violate the 4th but declined to suppress evidence and upheld the conviction SCOTUS affirmed appellate court decision 7-2 by Justice Alito Sotomayor concurred Breyer dissents joined by Ginsburg Q: Does the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule apply to a search that was authorized by precedent at the time of the search but is subsequently ruled unconstitutional? Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court order in an opinion by Justice Samuel Alito. "Searches conducted in objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent are not subject to the exclusionary rule," Alito wrote. Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined in the judgment only. Meanwhile, Justice Stephen Breyer dissented, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. "The Court finds a new 'good faith' exception which prevents application of the normal remedy for a Fourth Amendment violation, namely, suppression of the illegally seized evidence," Breyer notes, adding: "At this point I can no longer agree with the Court. A new 'good faith' exception and this Court's retroactivity decisions are incompatible."

Herring v. U.S. (2009, Roberts Court)

In July 2004 police investigator Mark Anderson learned that Bennie Dean Herring had gone to Coffee County's Sheriff's Dept to retrieve something from his impounded truck Herring had an active warrant for his arrest in neighboring Dale County for a felony charge He was pulled over after leaving the impound lot and a search revealed methamphetamine and a pistol There was a mistake on the warrant - the warrant was recalled months earlier Moved to suppress the evidence because the warrant had been rescinded Denied because of good faith The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the conviction, stating that illegally obtained evidence should only be suppressed when doing so could "result in appreciable deterrence" of future police misconduct. In his petition, Herring pointed to an Arkansas case with nearly identical facts that had come out the other way, noting that "as policing becomes ever more reliant on computerized systems, the number of illegal arrests and searches based on negligent recordkeeping is poised to multiply." Court of appeals affirmed for the 11th circuit SCOTUS affirmed appellate court in a 5-4 vote CJ Roberts delivering opinion Ginsburg and Breyer dissent Joined by Stevens and Souter Q: Does a court violate the Fourth Amendment rights of a criminal defendant by introducing evidence obtained through a police search based on an arrest warrant that should have been recalled, but was negligently allowed to remain active, at the time of the search? No. In a 5-4 decision with Chief Justice John G. Roberts writing for the majority and joined by Justice Antonin G. Scalia, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, Justice Clarence Thomas and Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr., the Supreme Court affirmed the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. It held that a criminal defendant's Fourth Amendment rights are not violated when police mistakes that lead to unlawful searches are merely the result of isolated negligence and "not systematic error or reckless disregard of constitutional requirements." Evidence obtained under these circumstances is admissible and not subject to the exclusionary rule. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg dissented and was joined by Justice John Paul Stevens, Justice David H. Souter, and Justice Stephen G. Breyer. Justice Ginsburg argued that an intact exclusionary rule provides a strong incentive for police compliance with respect to the Fourth Amendment and its erosion in this case was not warranted. Justice Breyer also filed a separate dissenting opinion and was joined by Justice Souter. He argued that the Court should move away from its reliance on analyzing the degree of police culpability when determining whether the exclusionary rule applies, but rather draw a bright line between errors made by record keepers and those made by police officers.

Illinois v. Lidster (2004 - Breyer)

In Lombard, Illinois, a 70 year old bicyclist was killed in a hit and run A week later, police set up a highway checkpoint at the same time and place Robert Lidster approached the checkpoint while intoxicated, and swerved, nearly hitting an officer Atty challenged lawfulness of the arrest under 4th amend claims Trial court dismissed the challenge IL State SC under the ruling of Indianapolis v Edmond found that it violated 4th SOTUS reversed in a 6-3 bote with Breyer delivering maj opinion Stevens, joined by Souter and Gibsburg, concurred and dissented in part Q; Does Indianapolis v. Edmond, which dealt with the Fourth and 14th Amendment prohibitions of unreasonable searches and seizures, prohibit checkpoints organized to question motorists about a previous offense and arrest motorists for drunk driving? No. In an opinion delivered by Justice Breyer, the Court held 6-3 that the Illinois checkpoint did not violate the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures and was constitutional. It ruled that the checkpoint was reasonable because it advanced a "grave" public interest - "investigating a crime that had resulted in a human death" - and interfered minimally with Fourth Amendment liberty. The Court distinguished Illinois's "information-seeking" checkpoint from the "crime control" checkpoint struck down in Edmond. Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg - while agreeing that Edmond does not invalidate the Illinois checkpoint - dissented from the majority's decision granting constitutional approval to the checkpoint. They argued that the case should have been remanded to the Illinois courts.

California v, Acevedo (1991 - Blackmun)

In October 1987, Santa Ana police received a phone call from a DEA agent in Hawaii that seized a package of marijuana headed to Santa Ana - waited to see who would claim the package upon arrival Jamie Daza claimed the package but threw out the box and paper that contained the marijauana An officer left the scene to obtain a warrant Before the officer returned, Richard St. George left the apartment with a blue knapsack that appeared to be half full Later, Charles Acecedo was stopped after leaving the apt and putting a brown paper bag in his trunk. Searched without warrant, officers found marijauna Moved to suppress the evidence Denied at trial court Appellate court used US v Chadwick to argue that a warrant was needed to search the back of the car CASC denied review SCOTUS ruled 6-3 with Justice Blackmun announcing the majority Scalia concurred White and Stevens dissent, joined by Marshall Q: Under the Fourth Amendment, may police conduct a warrantless search of a container within an automobile if they have probable cause to believe that the container holds evidence? Yes. In a 6-3 decision authored by Justice Harry Blackmun, the Court reversed the Court of Appeal and ruled that the "automobile exception" to the Fourth Amendment's general search-warrant requirement is broad enough to cover a situation where the police only have probable cause to believe there is evidence in a specific movable container within the car. The Court noted that the warrant requirement previously had depended on a "curious line between the search of an automobile that coincidentally turns up a container and the search of a container that coincidentally turns up in an automobile." In place of that uncertain distinction, the Court adopted a single rule: "The police may search an automobile and the containers within it where they have probable cause to believe contraband or evidence is contained." Justices White, Stevens, and Marshall dissented.

Powell v. Alabama (1932 - Sutherland)

In Scottsboro AL Ozie Powell and 8 other black youths were arrested, charged, and tried before and all white jury for raping two girls traveling on a train Each tried separately without assistance of counsel and were sentenced to death ALSSC affirmed their convictions Justice Sutherland announced the 7-2 decision Butler and McReynolds dissent Nine black youths -- described as, "young, ignorant, and illiterate" -- were accused of raping two white women. Alabama officials sprinted through the legal proceedings: a total of three trials took one day and all nine were sentenced to death. Alabama law required the appointment of counsel in capital cases, but the attorneys did not consult with their clients and had done little more than appear to represent them at the trial. This case was decided together with Patterson v. Alabama and Weems v. Alabama. Before the train reached Scottsboro AL a sheriff seized the defendants Under guard by the militia Q: Did the trials violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? Yes. The Court held that the trials denied due process because the defendants were not given reasonable time and opportunity to secure counsel in their defense. Though Justice George Sutherland did not rest the Court holding on the right-to-counsel guarantee of the Sixth Amendment, he repeatedly implicated that guarantee. This case was an early example of national constitutional protection in the field of criminal justice.

Chimel v. California (1969 - Stewart)

In Sept 1965 3 officers arrived at Ted Chimel's house in Santa Ana Warrant for arrest for burglary of coin shop Chimel's wife allowed for the cops to wait until he returned from work where they then served the arrest warrant and asked to search the house Chimel refused but the cops said they could conduct a search on the basis of a lawful arrest Important to note that they had a warrant for an arrest, not a warrant to search Seized coins, medals, and tokens which were used at evidence in trial Chimel lost in both the district and appellate state court, in addition to CASC SCOTUS ruled 7-2 with the majority opinion by Justice Stewart, reversing the appellate court Harlan concurred Justice White, joined by Black, dissented Q; Was the warrantless search of Chimel's home constitutionally justified under the Fourth Amendment as "incident to that arrest?" The Court held that the search of Chimel's house was unreasonable under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court reasoned that searches "incident to arrest" are limited to the area within the immediate control of the suspect. While police could reasonably search and seize evidence on or around the arrestee's person, they were prohibited from rummaging through the entire house without a search warrant. The Court emphasized the importance of warrants and probable cause as necessary restraints against government abuse.

Atwater v. Lago Vista (2001 - Souter)

In TX, a passenger must wear a seatbelt and a child must be secure in the front In March 1997, Gail Atwater was driving her pickup with her two children, aged 3 and 5, without seatbelts Did not have her id or insurance because her purse had been stolen the day prior Was taken to the police station where a "mug shot" was taken and her effects were secured She pleaded no contest to the misdemeanor and paid a $50 fine Argued that her right to be free from unreasonable seizure ad been violated City moved the suit from fed district court which deemed the 4th amend claim "meritless" Court of appeals reversed But sitting en banc, the appellate court vacated that decision and affirmed the district court's judgement for the city SCOTUS affirmed the appellate court's decision in a 5-4 vote w Justice Souter delivering O'Connor dissented joined by Stevens, Gisburg, and Breyer Q: Does the Fourth Amendment, either by incorporating common-law restrictions on misdemeanor arrests or otherwise, limit a police officer's authority to arrest without warrant for minor criminal offenses? No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment does not forbid a warrantless arrest for a minor criminal offense, such as a misdemeanor seatbelt violation punishable only by a fine. "If an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender," wrote Justice Souter for the Court. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's dissenting opinion argued that the Court's decision "neglects the Fourth Amendment's express command in the name of administrative ease" and thus "cloaks the pointless indignity that Gail Atwater suffered with the mantle of reasonableness."

Barron v. Baltimore (1833, Marshall Court)

John Barron inherited and was a co-owner of a wharf in Baltimore City improvements led to large deposits of sand accumulated around the wharf and its usually deep waters The water became too shallow for ships to access the wharf and Barron had major financial losses Barron sued the mayor and city council for damages Based in 5th amendment right to just comp for taking of private prop Trial court awarded Barron 4500 in damages Reversed by appellate court Appealed to Supreme Court Q: Does the 5th amend apply to states and give the court jurisdiction? Writing for the unanimous Court, Chief Justice Marshall found that the limitations on government articulated in the Fifth Amendment were specifically intended to limit the powers of the national government. Citing the intent of the framers and the development of the Bill of Rights (the first 10 amendments) as an exclusive check on the federal government, Marshall reasoned that the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction in this case since the Fifth Amendment was not applicable to the states. This meant that Barron was not entitled to damages for his property loss from the city under the Fifth Amendment provision on just compensation for a government taking.

McCleskey v. Kemp (1987 - Powell)

McCleskey, a black man, was convicted of murdering a police officer in Georgia and sentenced to death. In a writ of habeas corpus, McCleskey argued that a statistical study proved that the imposition of the death penalty in Georgia depended to some extent on the race of the victim and the accused. The study found that black defendants who kill white victims are the most likely to receive death sentences in the state. Filed a writ of habeas corpus in fed district court of northern district of GA 5-4 decision by Powell Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens dissent joined by Marshall Illustrated disparity with the Baldus study Q: Did the statistical study prove that McCleskey's sentence violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments? The Court held that since McCleskey could not prove that purposeful discrimination which had a discriminatory effect on him existed in this particular trial, there was no constitutional violation. Justice Powell refused to apply the statistical study in this case given the unique circumstances and nature of decisions that face all juries in capital cases. He argued that the data McCleskey produced is best presented to legislative bodies and not to the courts.

Arizona v. Hicks (1987 - Scalia)

On April 18th, 1984 bullet was fired through the floor of Hicks's apartment which injured a man in the apartment below. To investigate the shooting, police officers entered Hicks's apartment and found three weapons along with a stocking mask. During the search, which was done without a warrant, an officer noticed some expensive stereo equipment which he suspected had been stolen. The officer moved some of the components, recorded their serial numbers, and seized them upon learning from police headquarters that his suspicions were correct. Moved furniture and components to reveal the serial numbers (not in plain sight) But moving the stereo equipment was an additional search, the appellate court reasoned, which lacked a warrant and was unrelated to the purpose the police were in Hicks' apartment to begin with. Q: Was the search of the stereo equipment (a search beyond the exigencies of the original entry) reasonable under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments? No. The Court found that the search and seizure of the stereo equipment violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Citing the Court's holding in Coolidge v. New Hampshire (1971), Justice Scalia upheld the "plain view" doctrine which allows police officers under some circumstances to seize evidence in plain view without a warrant. However, critical to this doctrine, argued Scalia, is the requirement that warrantless seizures which rely on no "special operational necessities" be done with probable cause. Since the officer who seized the stereo equipment had only a "reasonable suspicion" and not a "probable cause" to believe that the equipment was stolen, the officer's actions were not reconcilable with the Constitution. Court ruled 6-3 with a majority opinion by Scalia White Concurred Justice O'Connor, joined by Rehnquist and Powell, dissented

Miranda v. Arizona (1966, Warren Court)

On March 3rd, 1963 an 18 year old was kidnapped and raped in Phoenix, AZ. 10 days later police arrested Ernesto A. Miranda After being identified in a lineup, police took Mirana into a separate room and interrogated him Mirando initially denied his guilt but later admitted to the crime Miranda's attorneys appealed on the grounds that his confession was coerced by violation of his 5th amend rights Court 5.5 to 3.5 by CJ Warren In part concurring and dissenting by Clark Harlan, White, joined by Stewart dissented The Fifth Amendment requires that law enforcement officials advise suspects of their right to remain silent and to obtain an attorney during interrogations while in police custody. Chief Justice Earl Warren delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority, concluding that defendant's interrogation violated the Fifth Amendment. To protect the privilege, the Court reasoned, procedural safeguards were required. A defendant was required to be warned before questioning that he had the right to remain silent, and that anything he said can be used against him in a court of law. A defendant was required to be told that he had the right to an attorney, and if he could not afford an attorney, one was to be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desired. After these warnings were given, a defendant could knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer questions or make a statement. Evidence obtained as a result of interrogation was not to be used against a defendant at trial unless the prosecution demonstrated the warnings were given, and knowingly and intelligently waived. Justice Tom C. Clark wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the majority's opinion created an unnecessarily strict interpretation of the Fifth Amendment that curtails the ability of the police to effectively execute their duties. He wrote that the state should have the burden to prove that the suspect was aware of his rights during the interrogation, but that statements resulting from interrogation should not be automatically excluded if the suspect was not explicitly informed of his rights. In his separate dissenting opinion, Justice John M. Harlan wrote that the judicial precedent and legislative history surrounding the Fifth Amendment does not support the view that the Fifth Amendment prohibits all pressure on the suspect. He also argued that there was no legal precedent to support the requirement to specifically inform suspects of their rights. Justices Potter Stewart and Byron R. White joined in the dissent. Justice White wrote a separate dissent in which he argued that the Fifth Amendment only protects defendants from giving self-incriminating testimony if explicitly compelled to do so. He argued that custodial interrogation was not inherently coercive and did not require such a broad interpretation of the protections of the Fifth Amendment. Such an interpretation harms the criminal process by destroying the credibility of confessions. Justices Harlan and Stewart joined in the dissenting opinion.

Mapp v. Ohio (1961 - Clark)

On May 23, 1957 three Cleveland police officers arrived at the Dollree Mapp's residence after receiving information that a person was hiding out in the home, who was wanted for questioning in a recent bombing. The officers attempted to enter the home of Dollree Mapp, but could not enter without a warrant so they surveilled the home instead The officers then broke into the home and held up a "warrant" A struggle ensued in validating the piece of paper and Mapp was handcuffed for being belligerent Officers then searched the belongings of the appellant, looking through photo albums, personal papers, and other effects Ultimately discovered obscene material Q: Were the confiscated materials protected from seizure by the Fourth Amendment? Justice Tom Clark ruled in a 6-3 decision Justice Black and Douglas concur Black: incorporates the idea of the 5th amend right from self-incrimination Stewart issued a memorandum Justice Harlan dissented Joined by Frankfurter and Whittaker Discusses the common law non-exclusionary rule In an opinion authored by Justice Tom C. Clark, the majority brushed aside First Amendment issues and declared that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment is inadmissible in a state court. The decision launched the Court on a troubled course of determining how and when to apply the exclusionary rule.

California v. Ciraolo (1986, Burger Court)

On Sept 2nd, 1982 Santa Clara PD received an anonymous tip about marijuana being grown in a backyard but 6 and 10 foot fences prevented cops from observing Used a private plane to identify plants The officers obtained a search warrant on the basis of an affidavit describing the anonymous tip and their observations, including photo evidence from the plane Trial court denied motion to suppress evidence Court of appeals reversed saying the warrant violated the 4th amend SCOTUS ruled 5-4 w majority opinion by CJ Burger Powell's dissent was joined by Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun Q: Did the warrantless, aerial observation of Ciraolo's back yard from an altitude of 1,000 feet constitute an illegal search and violate the Fourth Amendment? The divided Court found that the observation did not violate the Constitution. Chief Justice Burger reasoned that the Fourth Amendment protections regarding the home had never been absolute: for example, police officers are not obligated to shield their eyes when passing homes on public streets or sidewalks. Since the observations of the Santa Clara officers was "nonintrusive" and "took place within public navigable airspace," their actions were consistent with the Fourth Amendment. "Any member of the public flying in this airspace who glanced down could have seen everything that these officers observed," concluded Burger. The dissenters, led by Justice Powell, argued that this decision was a significant departure from the Court's holding in Katz v. United States (1967) which established a two-part test to evaluate privacy claims.

Collins v. Virginia (2018 - Sotomayor)

On two occasions, a particular unique-looking motorcycle evaded Albemarle police officers after they observed the rider violating traffic laws. After some investigation, one of the officers located the house where the suspected driver of the motorcycle lived and observed what appeared to be the same motorcycle covered by a tarp in the driveway. The officer lifted the tarp and confirmed that it was the motorcycle (which was also stolen) that had eluded detainment on multiple occasions. The officer waited for the suspect to return home, at which point he went to the front door to inquire about the motorcycle. Initially the suspect denied knowing anything about it but eventually confessed that he had bought the motorcycle knowing that it had been stolen. The officer arrested the suspect for receipt of stolen property. At trial, the defendant sought to suppress the motorcycle as evidence on the grounds that the police officer conducted an illegal warrantless search (by lifting the tarp covering the motorcycle parked in the driveway) that led to its discovery. The trial court held that the search was based on probable cause and justified under the exigent circumstances automobile exceptions to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement and convicted the defendant. The appeals court affirmed on the grounds of exigent circumstances, and the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed as well, but under the automobile exception only. The Virginia Supreme Court reasoned that the automobile exception applies even when the vehicle is not "immediately mobile" and applies to vehicles parked on private property. Q: Does the Fourth Amendment's automobile exception permit a police officer without a warrant to enter private property in order to search a vehicle parked a few feet from the house? The Fourth Amendment's automobile exception does not permit a police officer without a warrant to enter private property to search a vehicle parked a few feet from the house. In an 8-1 opinion authored by Justice Sonia Sotomayor, the Court held that its own Fourth Amendment jurisprudence regarding the home and the "curtilage" of one's home (the area immediately surrounding it) clearly prevents officers from entering and searching without a warrant, even if the object searched is an automobile. The Court found that the area searched (the back of the driveway) was indeed the curtilage of the defendant's home, and thus the Fourth Amendment's highest degree of protection applies there. Although warrantless searches of automobiles are permissible in limited circumstances, the warrantless search of an automobile parked within the curtilage of one's home is not permissible. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a concurring opinion to express doubt about the Court's authority to impose the exclusionary rule on the states. Justice Samuel Alito wrote a dissenting opinion in which he opined that the automobile exception should apply in this case and that the search was in no way "unreasonable."

Safford Unified School Dist. No. 1 v. Redding (2009 - Souter)

Savana Redding, an eighth grader at Safford Middle School, was strip-searched by school officials on the basis of a tip by another student that Ms. Redding might have ibuprofen on her person in violation of school policy. Ms. Redding subsequently filed suit against the school district and the school officials responsible for the search in the District Court for the District of Arizona. She alleged her Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable search and seizure was violated. The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissed the case. On the initial appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. However, on rehearing before the entire court, the court of appeals held that Ms. Redding's Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable search and seizure was violated. It reasoned that the strip search was not justified nor was the scope of intrusion reasonably related to the circumstances. The Court affirmed the 9th district on the grounds that a strip search violated the 4th amend but reversed the appellate court's holding that the school officials did not enjoy qualified immunity from a suit for damages Justice Souter delivered the opinion Stevens, Ginsburg, and Thomas dissent and concur in part Q: 1) Does the Fourth Amendment prohibit school officials from strip searching students suspected of possessing drugs in violation of school policy? 2) Are school officials individually liable for damages in a lawsuit filed under 42 U.S.C Section 1983? The Supreme Court held that Savanna's Fourth Amendment rights were violated when school officials searched her underwear for non-prescription painkillers. With David H. Souter writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, and Justices Antonin G. Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy, Stephen G. Breyer, and Samuel A. Alito, and in part by Justices John Paul Stevens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court reiterated that, based on a reasonable suspicion, search measures used by school officials to root out contraband must be "reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction." Here, school officials did not have sufficient suspicion to warrant extending the search of Savanna to her underwear. The Court also held that the implicated school administrators were not personally liable because "clearly established law [did] not show that the search violated the Fourth Amendment." It reasoned that lower court decisions were disparate enough to have warranted doubt about the scope of a student's Fourth Amendment right. Justice Stevens wrote separately, concurring in part and dissenting in part, and was joined by Justice Ginsburg. He agreed that the strip search was unconstitutional, but disagreed that the school administrators retained immunity. He stated that "[i]t does not require a constitutional scholar to conclude that a nude search of a 13-year old child is an invasion of constitutional rights of some magnitude." Justice Ginsburg also wrote a separate concurring opinion, largely agreeing with Justice Stevens point of dissent. Justice Clarence Thomas concurred in the judgment in part and dissented in part. He agreed with the majority that the school administrators were qualifiedly immune to prosecution. However, he argued that the judiciary should not meddle with decisions school administrators make that are in the interest of keeping their schools safe.

Payne v. Tennessee (1991, Rehnquist Court)

Pervis Payne was a developmentally disabled man with no previous record who was tried and convicted of stabbing a 28 yo woman and her 2 yo daughter to death, also attempted to murder her 3 yo son. Payne was sentenced to death but his atty appealed the sentence on the grounds that the prosecution used victim-impact statements which contradicted the ruling in Booth v MD and SC v Gathers Court ruled 6-3 w CJ Rehnquist announcing the maj opinion O'Connor, Scalia, and Souter concurred Blackmun joined dissents by Marshall and Stevens Q: Does the Eighth Amendment prohibit a capital sentencing jury from considering the impact that a victim's death had upon surviving family members? No. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist delivered the opinion for a 6-3 court. The Court overruled Booth v. Maryland and South Carolina v. Gathers which prohibited the submission of evidence relating to the harms caused by the victim's death. The Court reasoned that since "virtually no limits are placed on the relevant mitigating evidence a capital defendant may introduce concerning his own circumstances," the prosecution must be allowed to submit similar counter evidence. Evidence regarding the "assessment of the harm caused by the defendant has long been an important factor in determining the appropriate punishment, and victim impact evidence is simply another method of informing the sentencing authority about such harm."

Bd. of Ed. of Ind. School Dist. No. 92 v. Earls (2002 - Thomas)

Required all middle and high school students in participate in extracurricular activities consent to random drug search Lindsay Earls, a member of choir and band challenged the const Fed district court rejected the claim Court of Appeals for 10th circuit reversed SCOTUS reversed appellate on 5-4 vote w Thomas delivering opinion Breyer concurred O'Connor and Gisburg dissent, joined by Stevens and Souter Q: Is the Student Activities Drug Testing Policy, which requires all students who participate in competitive extracurricular activities to submit to drug testing, consistent with the Fourth Amendment? Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that, because the policy reasonably serves the School District's important interest in detecting and preventing drug use among its students, it is constitutional. The Court reasoned that the Board of Education's general regulation of extracurricular activities diminished the expectation of privacy among students and that the Board's method of obtaining urine samples and maintaining test results was minimally intrusive on the students' limited privacy interest. "Within the limits of the Fourth Amendment, local school boards must assess the desirability of drug testing schoolchildren. In upholding the constitutionality of the Policy, we express no opinion as to its wisdom. Rather, we hold only that Tecumseh's Policy is a reasonable means of furthering the School District's important interest in preventing and deterring drug use among its schoolchildren," wrote Justice Thomas.

McCoy v. Louisiana (2018 - Ginsburg)

Robert McCoy was arrested on May 9, 2008, for the first-degree murders of the son, mother, and step-father of his estranged wife in a May 5, 2008, shooting. On May 15, 2008, McCoy was found to be indigent and appointed a public defender. Throughout his representation by the public defender and his subsequent representation by retained counsel McCoy maintained his innocence and repeatedly stated his desire to plead not guilty. In December 2009, McCoy moved for his public defender to be removed due to his belief that the public defenders were doing nothing to assist him in proving his innocence. The court granted McCoy's motion to represent himself until he could find substitute counsel. McCoy subsequently found new counsel to represent him, and his counsel advised him to take a plea. When McCoy refused to take a plea, his counsel notified him that he intended to concede guilt, after which time McCoy moved to discharge him. The court denied McCoy's motion to discharge his attorney as untimely. His counsel proceeded to concede McCoy's guilt and argued for verdicts of second-degree murder on a theory of diminished capacity. The jury returned a verdict of first-degree murder on all three counts and recommended the death penalty. The Louisiana Supreme Court denied the appeal and affirmed the convictions and the sentence, reasoning that defense counsel's failure to follow McCoy's direction not to concede guilt did not deny Mr. McCoy the assistance of counsel or create a conflict of interest because it did not completely abdicate the defense. Rather, the decision to concede guilt was a strategic choice by counsel. Does it violate a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel if defense counsel concedes the defendant's guilt over the defendant's express objection? 6-3 DECISION FOR MCCOY MAJORITY OPINION BY RUTH BADER GINSBURG The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant's right to choose the objective of his defense and to maintain his innocence. Inherent in the Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel is the autonomy right of a criminal defendant to choose the objective of his defense and insist that counsel not admit guilt, even if the counsel's experience-based view is that admitting guilt offers the best chance of avoiding the death penalty. In a 6-3 opinion authored by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court distinguished decisions that may be made by counsel and those reserved to the client. Counsel may make decisions described as "trial management" such as whether to call a particular witness or raise certain objections to evidence. Reserved exclusively to the client are decisions including whether to plead guilty, waive the right to a jury trial, testify in one's own behalf, and forgo an appeal. Whether to assert innocence as a defense is also within those decisions reserved to the client. Because the issue presented in this case involves client autonomy, not effectiveness of counsel, the error is considered "structural error" and is not subject to harmless-error review. Justice Samuel Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuch joined. In the dissent's view, the Court's holding arbitrarily distinguishes between counsel's conspicuously omitting discussion of one element of a crime and expressly conceding that element. The dissent further criticizes the majority for reaching an overly broad holding despite the unusual circumstances of the particular case before it.

Olmstead v. U.S. (1928, Taft Court)

Roy Olmstead was convicted in fed district court for illegally importing and selling liquor in violation of the Natl Prohibition Act Prosecutors used wiretapped phone lines as evidence Olmstead insisted that the tapping was a violated 4th and 5th amend protection from being compelled to testify against oneself Appellate court affirmed conviction SCOTUS ruled 5-4 w majority by CJ Taft Brandeis, Holmes, Stone, and Butler dissented Q: Did the use of evidence disclosed in wiretapped private telephone conversations, violate the recorded party's Fourth and Fifth Amendments? No. The Court held that neither the Fourth nor Fifth Amendment rights of the recorded parties were violated. The use of wiretapped conversations as incriminating evidence did not violate their Fifth Amendment protection against self incrimination because they were not forcibly or illegally made to conduct those conversations. Instead, the conversations were voluntarily made between the parties and their associates. Moreover, the parties' Fourth Amendment rights were not infringed because mere wiretapping does not constitute a search and seizure under the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. These terms refer to an actual physical examination of one's person, papers, tangible material effects, or home - not their conversations. Finally, the Court added that while wiretapping may be unethical no court may exclude evidence solely for moral reasons. When criticized for his opinion, Justice Taft mocked his foes as he wrote to a friend: "If they think we are going to be frightened in our effort to stand by the law and give the public a chance to punish criminals, they are mistaken, even though we are condemned for lack of high ideals." This case was reversed by Katz v. U.S. (1967).

Bond v. U.S. (2000, Rehnquist Court)

Steven Dewayne Bond was a passenger on a Greyhound bus that was stopped by Border Patrol Agents Inspected the luggage above the seats, finding a brick of meth Moved to suppress the charges due to illegal search District court found him guilty Appeals court rejected the argument SCOTUS reverses with majority opinion by CJ Rehnquist Breyer dissents Joined by Scalia Q: Does a law enforcement officer's physical manipulation of a bus passenger's carry-on luggage violate the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches? Yes. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that "Agent Cantu's physical manipulation of petitioner's carry-on bag violated the Fourth Amendment's proscription against unreasonable searches." The Court concluded that Bond "possessed a privacy interest in his bag," and that such an expectation of privacy is reasonable. "Physically invasive inspection is simply more intrusive than purely visual inspection," Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court, a bus passenger "does not expect that other passengers or bus employees will, as a matter of course, feel the bag in an exploratory manner." Justice Stephen G. Breyer, joined by Justice Antonin Scalia, dissented, seeing no "reasonable expectation" that strangers would not manipulate luggage in a bus.

Terry v. Ohio (1968 - Warren)

Terry was convicted of carrying a concealed weapon and sentenced to 3 years Terry and two other men were observed by a plain clothes policeman in what the officer believed to be "casing a job, a stick-up." The officer stopped and frisked the three men, and found weapons on two of them. Terry was convicted of carrying a concealed weapon and sentenced to three years in jail. Observed suspicious activity as the three men approached a store. Officer McFadden approached the men, identified himself as a police officer, and frisked Terry. Upon finding a pistol he frisked the other men McFadden had reasonable grounds to believe the petitioner was armed and dangerous Search not a comprehensive search - brief frisk for weapon at hand Stop not an arrest - so not seizure 8-1 decision by the SCOTUS upholding a police officer's stopping and frisking individuals who he had a reasonable suspicion might be contemplating a robbery Q: Was the search and seizure of Terry and the other men in violation of the Fourth Amendment? In an 8-to-1 decision, the Court held that the search undertaken by the officer was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and that the weapons seized could be introduced into evidence against Terry. Attempting to focus narrowly on the facts of this particular case, the Court found that the officer acted on more than a "hunch" and that "a reasonably prudent man would have been warranted in believing [Terry] was armed and thus presented a threat to the officer's safety while he was investigating his suspicious behavior." The Court found that the searches undertaken were limited in scope and designed to protect the officer's safety incident to the investigation.

Veronia School Dist. 47J v. Acton (1995 - Scalia)

The parents of James Acton, a 12 yr old 7th grader, challenged the constitutionality of the Vernonia School District's drug-testing policy All athletes must sign a form and consent to testing w written consent of their parents Fed district court rejected the parents' claims that the school violated 4th amend Court of Appeals for the 9th circuit reversed SCOTUS ruled 6-3 w opinion by Scalia O'Connor dissented joined by Stevens and Souter Q: Does random drug testing of high school athletes violate the reasonable search and seizure clause of the Fourth Amendment? No. The reasonableness of a search is judged by "balancing the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the promotion of legitimate governmental interests." In the case of high school athletes who are under State supervision during school hours, they are subject to greater control than over free adults. The privacy interests compromised by urine samples are negligible since the conditions of collection are similar to public restrooms, and the results are viewed only by limited authorities. Furthermore, the governmental concern over the safety of minors under their supervision overrides the minimal, if any, intrusion in student-athletes' privacy.

Illinois v. Wardlow (2000 - Rehnquist)

Two uniformed police officers noticed William Wardlow holding an opaque bag William then fled down an alley Officers searched Wardlow and found a handgun in the bag Wardlow's atty said the officer lacked reasonable suspicion under Terry Trial court disagreed State appellate court reversed conviction State Supreme Court reversed by SCOTUS in 5-4 decision Opinion by Rehnquist Stevens concurs in part Joined by Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter Q: Is a person's sudden and unprovoked flight from identifiable police officers, patrolling a high crime area, sufficiently suspicious to justify the officers' stop of that person? Yes. In an opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held, 5 to 4, that the police officers did not violate the Fourth Amendment when they stopped Wardlow, because the officer was justified in suspecting that the accused was involved in criminal activity and, therefore, in investigating further. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the majority that, "[n]ervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion" to justify a stop. The Chief Justice noted that "flight is the consummate act of evasion." Stevens, joined by three other justices, concurred in avoiding a per se rule but dissented from the majority holding. Reasonable suspicion: to stop and search Probable cause: arrest after the search

Kentucky v. King et seq. (2011 - Alito)

Undercover string for cocaine in Lexington, KY The officers couldn't see which apartment the suspect entered,so they entered an apartment that smelled of marijuana Discovered Hollis King and guests smoking, searched the premises and found drugs and paraphernalia Sentenced to 11 years KY Court of appeals affirmed KYSC Reversed Justice Alito's opinion Ginsburg dissents The court reversed in an 8-1 vote Q: Does the exclusionary rule, which forbids the use of illegally seized evidence except in emergency situations, apply when the emergency is created by lawful police actions? The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the lower court order in a decision by Justice Samuel Alito. "The exigent circumstances rule applies when the police do not create the exigency by engaging or threatening to engage in conduct that violates the Fourth Amendment," Alito wrote for the majority. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg dissented, contending that "the Court today arms the police with a way routinely to dishonor the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement in drug cases. " Exigent circumstances justify the entry

Nix v. Williams (1984)

Upheld an inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule On Dec 24th, 1968, 10 yr old Pamela Powers disappeared from a YMCA in Des Moines, Iowa A 14 year old boy had seen Williams carrying a large bundle wrapped in a blanket with legs sticking out Williams' car was found 160 miles from Des Moines Powers' clothes were found at a rest stop in Grinnell This led to a search by the Iowa Bureau of Criminal Investigation Meanwhile, Williams surrendered to the local police where he was arraigned The police asked Williams where he had left the body and Williams confessed Moved to suppress the evidence because it was the "fruit" of Williams' statements made during the car ride Williams was arrested for the murder of a ten-year-old girl who's body he disposed of along a gravel road. State law enforcement officials engaged in a massive search for the child's body. During the search, after responding to an officer's appeal for assistance, Williams made statements to the police (without an attorney present) which helped lead the searchers to the child's body. The defendant's Miranda rights were only read to him after his arrest. Q: Should evidence resulting in an arrest be excluded from trial because it was improperly obtained? No. The Court relied on the "inevitable discovery doctrine," as it held that the exclusionary rule did not apply to the child's body as evidence since it was clear that the volunteer search teams would have discovered the body even absent Williams's statements.

Dunn v. Madison (2018 - Per Curiam)

Vernon Madison is a 66-year-old man on death row in Alabama for the murder of a police officer over thirty years ago. Madison has suffered strokes resulting in significant cognitive and physical impairments, and his lawyers argue that he is mentally incompetent to be executed under the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in Ford v. Wainwright and Panetti v. Quarterman. At a competency hearing held by an Alabama trial court, Madison's lawyers presented testimony from a doctor that Madison's strokes caused him not to remember committing the murder and that he does not understand why the state is seeking to execute him. The State presented a different doctor's expert testimony that Madison was able to accurately discuss his legal appeals and legal theories with his attorneys and thus that he has a rational understanding of his sentence. The trial court decided that Madison was competent to be executed, but the Eleventh Circuit reversed, finding that facts in the record were insufficient to support the trial court's decision and that the trial court erroneously applied the test for competency established in Panetti. Was the state court objectively unreasonable in concluding that Madison was competent to be executed? The state court was not objectively unreasonable in concluding that Madison was competent to be executed. In a per curiam opinion, the court held that because the state court's determinations of law and fact were not "so lacking in justification" as to give rise to error "beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement," Vernon Madison's claim to federal habeas relief must fail. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg filed a concurring opinion, in which Justices Stephen Breyer and Sonia Sotomayor joined, pointing out that the issue whether a state may administer the death penalty to someone who cannot remember committing the capital offense is a substantial question not addressed by the Court, but which is foreclosed in this case by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. Justice Breyer wrote a separate concurrence to highlight the extensive delays involved in the death penalty and calling upon the Court to consider the constitutionality of the practice.

Arizona v. Fulminante (1991 - White)

While serving time in federal prison for another crime, Oreste Gulminante made an incriminating confession to Anthony Sarivola who was an informant for the FBI Confessed he murdered his stepdaughter Fulminante's atty appealed to AZSC who overturned the conviction Ruled 5-4 and 5-3 with opinion by White 1. Did the Arizona Supreme Court properly apply the totality of circumstances test when considering whether a suspect's confession to murder was coerced? 2. Did the Arizona Supreme Court properly apply harmless error analysis when considering whether the suspect's coerced confession influenced the trial outcome? Yes and yes. Justice Byron R. White and Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist delivered parts of the opinion, both majorities by a 5-4 vote. The Court held that Fulminante was coerced to confess in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court found that "it was fear of physical violence, absent protection from his friend Sarivola, which motivated Fulminante to confess." This motivation invalidated his confession. Since Fulminante's confession to Donna Sarivola was closely tied to his first coerced confession, the Court dismissed both. The Court also found that the confessions played a determinative role in the trial. It maintained that a "successful prosecution depended on the jury's believing the two confessions." Because the confessions were critical to the outcome of the trial, the fact that they were obtained coercively could not be dismissed as a harmless error. Four justices dissented to using harmless error analysis for coerced confessions on the ground that confessions always significantly affect a trial's outcome.

Furman v. Georgia (1972 - Per Curiam)

William Furman was convicted and sentenced to death for murder; Lucious Jackson was sentenced to death for rape; Elmer Branch was senteced to death for rape Furman was burglarizing a private home when a family member discovered him. He attempted to flee, and in doing so tripped and fell. The gun that he was carrying went off and killed a resident of the home. He was convicted of murder and sentenced to death After unsuccessful appeals to GA and TX SCs The SCOTUS struck down GA and TXs laws for imposing capital punishment 5-4 per curiam opinion Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, White, and Marshall concur CJ Burger, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist dissent Q: Does the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty in these cases constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments? Yes. The Court's one-page per curiam opinion held that the imposition of the death penalty in these cases constituted cruel and unusual punishment and violated the Constitution. In over two hundred pages of concurrence and dissents, the justices articulated their views on this controversial subject. Only Justices Brennan and Marshall believed the death penalty to be unconstitutional in all instances. Other concurrences focused on the arbitrary nature with which death sentences have been imposed, often indicating a racial bias against black defendants. The Court's decision forced states and the national legislature to rethink their statutes for capital offenses to assure that the death penalty would not be administered in a capricious or discriminatory manner.