PH160 Two Dogmas of Empiricism

Truths of Reason

-Truths of reason are supposed to hold in all possible worlds -they are necessary -They are true in every counterfactual scenario

The two dogmas

-the analytic/synthetic distinction -reductionism

Quines problem with the first dogma

-there is no way for an empiricist to believe in meanings of the kind required to be able to distinct between analytic and synthetic truths -There would have to be an empirical theory of meaning in which a person knows the truth of a statement if and only if they understand the meanings of the words composing the statements

Dogmas

-unquestioned assumptions that lack justification.

The analytic/synthetic distinction

-An "analytic" sentence, such as "Ophthalmologists are doctors," has historically been characterized as one whose truth depends upon the meanings of its constituent terms (and how they're combined) alone -a "synthetic" sentence, such as "Ophthalmologists are rich," whose truth depends also upon the facts about the world that the sentence represents, e.g., that ophthalmologists are rich.

Quine's Conclusion on first Dogma

-Empiricists cannot embrace a notion of analyticity -There can be no science of word meanings or synonymy -there is no empirical basis for distinguishing between sentences that are true in virtue of meaning and sentences that are true because of how the world is

Dogma #2

-The verification theory says is that statements are synonymous if and only if they are alike in point of method of empirical confirmation and information -so.. A and B are synonymous if the evidence that verifies A is identical with the evidence that verifies B

Interchangeability Salva Veritate

-W1 is synonymous with W2 if and only if W1 can always be interchanged with W2 without changing the truth value of S -if truth is determined by extension only interchangeability saliva overstate is not sufficient to guarantee synonymy: ex: "bachelors are unmarried" "unmarried men are unmarried" "Bachelors are human" "unmarried men are human"

The first Dogma

-claims that there is a clear distinction between analytic and synthetic statements -there would have to be an empirical theory of meaning

General problem for empiricism

-if all knowledge is justified by experience, then where does the knowledge of math come from? -Quine calls these the "truths of reason"

synonymy

-instead of appealing to a class of things meanings, the next suggestion is appealing to relations between words -"no bachelor is married" is analytically true because "bachelor" is synonymous with "unmarried man" -if we are going to explain synonymy is terns of some further things, then we might as well just make the further explanation into our theory of analyticity

What epistemological puzzle is analytical and synthetic distinction supposed to solve?

-it supposed to solve the problem of things only being considered science if there is empirical evidence

Meaning as reference

-meaning should not be identified wit naming or referencing to something -the morning star=the evening star; this based on astronomical observation -however, in order to make the claim morning star= evening star this is analytic because you the meaning of the phrase is dependent on the meaning of the words composing it

Logical Empiricist Solution

-statements on math, morality and other "truths of reason" are analytic -truths of reason are given by analytic statements that a re known by understanding the words that compose those statements -analytic statements don't need to correspond to facts about the world in order to be true

Reductionism

-the belief that each meaningful statement is equivalent to some logical construct upon terms which refer to immediate experience -Every statement S is equivalent to statement O of the observable evidence that confirms S

Definition

-the definition which is the personas report of an observed synonymy cannot be taken as the ground of the synonymy -definitions rests on synonymy rather than explaining it -a good definition makes synonymy explicit, but the synonymy exists prior to the definition, so definition can;t explain synonymy

According to Quine, why does reductionism rely on the analytic synthetic distinction?

-the idea that statements can be confirmed one at a time entails the analytic synthetic distinction because it entails a division between synthetic statements and analytic statements -if we reject the analytic synthetic distinction then we can't empirically decide whether a sentence is true in virtue of its meaning or in virtue of corresponding to some non-semantic fact

Quine's conclusion

-there is no analytic synthetic distinction -any statement can be re-evaluated in light of new evidence, even the ones we would have called "analytic" -No particular piece of evidence is necessarily relevant to the confirmation of any particular statement

Truths of Fact

-truths of fact are contingent (subject to change) -they are the facts that we can observe in the world -traditional empiricism maintains that these are the only truths there are

Meanings are ideas

-we cannot obtain empirical evidence of the existence of mental or platonic ideas -an empiricist theory can only appeal to the existence of things for which we have empirical evidence -therefore an empiricist theory cannot appeal to the existence of mental or platonic ideas

Possibilities that are unacceptable for empiricist as evidence against the first dogma

1.Meaning as reference 2.meanings are ideas 3. synonymy 4.Definition 5.Interchangeability Salva Veritate

Explain the connection between analyticity and meaning

Analyticity gives a statement a meaning through the meanings of the words that make up the statement

Analytic vs. Synthetic Distinction

analytic: those that are true purely in virtue of meaning synthetic: those are not true in virtue of meaning but true in virtue of corresponding to the facts

Why, according to Quine, can't empiricists identify meanings with mental or Platonic ideas?

because mental and platonic ideas have no empirical evidence since they are internal

Empiricism

the theory that all knowledge is derived from sense-experience. Stimulated by the rise of experimental science -: the view that all knowledge is justified by experience, observation, and science. i.e. all knowledge is a posteriori