Philosophy Final Terms
Libertarianism
(1) In metaphysics, a version of incompartibilism that rejects determinism, holding that (at least sometimes) humans have the power of contrary choice and that having this power is necessary for freedom and morally responsibility. (2) In political theory, the view that government should be small and that its primary responsibility is the protection of individual liberties. Libertarians strong oppose the redistribution of wealth by government.
The moral argument for God's existence
(1) Objective moral values exist, and it is implausible to suppose they exist in the absence of God. (2) We make judgments about some things being good, and other things being evil, and our capacity to make such discriminations is best explained by God's giving us that capacity. (3) The horror we feel when we observe or otherwise consider a particularly perverse case of evil is in some way tied to the fact that such an evil constitutes defiance of God. (1) is primarily a metaphysical argument: the existenceof objective values requires God's existence. (2) is primarily an epistemological argument: our knowledgeof objective values requires God's existence. (3) is primarily, for lack of a better term, an intuitiveargument for God's existence, that we can somehow 'see' that evil is evil because it is (ultimately) defiance of God.
Agent causation
A theory held by many libertarians which holds that personal agents are the direct, uncaused causes of their actions.
Hard determinism
A version of incompatibilism that affirms determinism and denies that humans are free or morally responsible.
Conceptualism
A view that attempts to steer a middle course between Platonism and nominalism by claiming that properties and other universals are mental concepts that we use to think about things.
Inductivism
A view thatcharacterizes science as the objective formation and confirmation of scientific theories through the process of (1) making theory-neutral observations that lead to inductive generalizations, (2) forming hypothesis to explain the observations, and (3) testing the hypothese by experimentation until they are falsified or satisfactory confirmed.
Universals
Abstract entities (i.e., not existing in space and time) that can by exemplified by more than one particular thing at the same time (e.g., being brown is had by the dog Fido and the Cleveland Browns' jerseys). They include properties, propositions, and relations. They purport to explain the resemblances between things and how we are able to predicate.
Uniformity of nature
The idea that the laws of nature will remain constant, thereby assuring that natural processes in the future will resemble those of the past.
Problem of induction
The problem of justifying inferences from observed phenomena to unobserved phenomen, especially those inferences invovling future events. The problem is that attempts to justify such inferences will have to assume the uniformity of nature, arguing that natural processes will continue as they have in the past. But this line of reasoning appears circular since it presupposes the very uniformity of natural processes that it seeks to prove.
Cultural relativism
The view that all moral values are merely the products of the customs, tastes, and standards of a culture and thereofre are neither objectively true nor universally binding.
Materialism
The view that all that exists is matter and the physical laws that govern its behavior. In this view, no immaterial substances (e.g., God, angels, soul) exist. One of the three broad approaches to the nature of the world.
Compatibilism
The view that freedom and determinism are logically compatible.
Moral subjectivism
The view that moral values are relative to each person's subjective preferences.
Theistic science
The view that theists who are scientists should take all of their knowledge into account when developing explanatory hypothesis, including their theological knowledge. This, then, allows for supernatural explanations in science, in contrasts to methodological naturalism, which only allows one to appeal to natural explanations.
Ethical relativism
The view that there are no objective, universally true moral values; all moral standards are a matter of cultural or personal preference.
Nominalism
The view that there are no universals (e.g., properties, propositions, and relations). The nominalist only admits the existence of particulars and claims that universal terms are simply names that we adopt by convention for things that appear similar to us. Extreme nominalism denies the existence of universals altogether. Moderate nominalism or trope theory admits the exisence of properties but claims that they are abstract particulars.
Platonism
The view that universals exist independently of particulars.
The challenge of skepticism
a) Argument for knowledge skepticism i) SHpà~Kp [If there is a skeptical hypothesis for some belief pof mine, then I do not know p] ii) SHp [There is a skeptical hypothesis for p] iii) (3 dots)~Kp [Therefore, I do not know p.] b) The premises i) Premise (i) is about the consequencesof skeptical hypotheses: they rule out knowledge. Premise (ii) is about therealityof skeptical hypotheses: they are easy to construct. a) Definition of a 'skeptical hypothesis' i) "Any logically possible scenario that we apparently cannot rule out and would, if true, call most or all of our ordinary commonsense beliefs into question." ii) LP condition: The scenario must be "logically possible". iii) CRO condition: The scenario must be one that "we apparently cannot ruleout". iv) FB condition: The truth of the scenario would make our beliefs to be falsebeliefs. b) Types of skeptical hypotheses i) 'Recent creation' argument (fallibility of memory) - target our memory and testimony beliefs, not our current sensory beliefs. ii) Fallibility of senses argument - Descartes iii) Dreaming argument - possibility of lucid dreams iv) Evil demon argument v) 'Brain in a vat' / Matrix argument c) Significance of skeptical hypotheses i) They require only the possibility, not the actuality, that I am deceived. [LP condition] ii) They require the need for a 'sign' of some sort in our experience that would rule out the scenario, and therefore guarantee certainty. [CRO condition] They call into question entire categories of beliefs [FB condition]
Plantinga's 'naturalism defeated' argument
a) False beliefs can contribute to adaptive behavior i) Alvin Plantinga: "Suppose we oversimplify a bit and say that my behavior is a causal product just of my beliefs and desires. Then the problem is that clearly there will be any number of differentpatterns of belief and desire that would issue in the same action; and among those there will be many in which the beliefs are wildly false" (Warrant and Proper Function (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1993), p. 225). b) Therefore, naturalistic evolution gives us little reason to think that our cognitive faculties are reliable (i.e. giving us mainly true beliefs) i) Alvin Plantinga: "We must ask what sorts of belief-desire systems are possiblefor these creatures, given only that they have evolved according to the principles of contemporary evolutionary theory; clearly these gerrymanders are perfectly possible. So perhaps their behavior has been adaptive, and their systems of belief and desire are such as to fit that adaptive behavior; those beliefs could nonetheless be wildly wrong. There are indefinitely manybelief-desire systems that fit adaptive behavior, but where the beliefs involved are not for the most part true. A share of probability has to be reserved for these possibilities as well" (WPF, p. 227, my emphasis). ii) Objection: but maybe there can't be an adaptive account of false belief (Evan Fales, Naturalism Defeated?) (1) Evan Fales offers a challenge to Plantinga to "construct in detail" an adaptive account of false belief (51). (2) In response, Plantinga says that the "creaturely transform" (265) provides an adequate response to this challenge.
Solutions to the problem of induction
a) Hans Reichenbach's pragmatic justification of induction (Marc Lange, Brian Skyrms) i) The argument (1) Premise: Either nature is uniform (follow rules it has thus far) or nature is not uniform (random chaos). (2) Premise: If nature is uniform, then induction will make successful predictions about unexamined cases. (3) Premise: If nature is not uniform, then no method will succeed in predicting unexamined cases. (4) Conclusion 1: If any method will eventually make successful predictions about unexamined cases, then induction will do so. (5) Premise: Our goal is to make successful predictions about unexamined cases (likely to be true, why we engage in induction to begin with). (6) Conclusion 2: By using induction, we will come as close to achieving our goal as any method makes it possible to come. (7) Conclusion 3: We are justified in using induction (even if we are not justified in believing it is rational). This is a pragmatic not theological justification, for our policy, not philosophy ii) Reichenbach's conclusion (1) He is not justifying our beliefin the uniformity of nature. (2) Rather, he is justifying our policyof being guided by the uniformity of nature when making inferences about unexamined cases. (3) If our goal is to successfully predict the future, then we can't do worsethan trust induction. iii) Problem (1) We can run this argument for anypredictive method we want. (Could be used to justify crystal ball gazing or tea leaf reasoning if any method could be successful -some argue that he's conceding skepticism.) (2) In fact, isn't this just a concession to Hume's skepticism? (C/S 118) b) Moreland's 'synthetic a priori' solution i) The solution (1) There is a semanticdistinction among statements: analytic vs. synthetic. (a) Analytic: all bachelors are unmarried. - true solely by virtue of the meaning of terms used (b) Synthetic: all ravens are black. - true by any other means, have to examine the world (2) There is an epistemologicaldistinction among statements: a priori vs. a posteriori (a) A priori: 2+2=4. (b) A posteriori: SEBTS is in Wake Forest. (3) The uniformity of nature is a synthetic a priori claim, "a necessary truth that one simply knows by immediate rational intuition" (116). (a) "Something cannot be red and blue all over at the same time," "Everything that has a shape has a size," "There is a prime number being 50 and 55." (b) These truths are about the world(not just truths of language), but we can know them a priori(i.e., they're not inferred from experience of the world). Likewise for the uniformity of nature. ii) Problem (1) All these examples of synthetic a priori truths are necessarytruths. (2) But as far as we can tell, the uniformity of nature is a contingenttruth. c) A theistic justification of induction? i) The solution (1) The creation covenant (Genesis 8:21-22; 9:12-17) - references multiple kinds of patterns in the world that God will uphold - all needed for induction is probability- God has committed himself to upholding the universe and its fundamental features (2) God's providential ruling of the world (Hebrews 1:3) - "he upholds the universe by the word of his power" - ongoing, providential upholding and ruling of the universe, uses logos - implies logic, so baring miracles, the wisdom of God's providence means things will continue as they are (3) The necessity of Proverbial wisdom - throughout the book of proverbs, God calls us out to live out his life wisely in light of these patterns pointed out, cause and effect patterns are woven into nature and wisdom is recognizing them, presupposition of patterns we can rely on, presupposes the uniformity of nature (4) Conclusion (a) In light of these three truths, the much-needed "principle of the uniformity of nature" - which Hume believed could not have been rationally justified - isjustified within the Christian worldview. (b) This is a kind of 'transcendental' argument. You don't directlyargue from nature to God. Rather, you indirectlyargue for God: you argue that God must exist to provide the intellectual preconditions for arguing anything from nature. In this case, the Christian worldview is true because it accounts for the rationality of induction. ii) Cowan/Spiegel version (130-32) (1) Regularities in natureprovide good reasons for believing in the existence of an almighty and benevolent God. (2) The existence of an almighty and benevolent Godprovides good reasons for believing in the uniformity of nature. (3) This argument does not assume that the future will be like the past. Rather, it argues thatthe future will be like the past, because of the nature and character of God. iii) Problem (1) Don't we need to rely on induction, in order to come up with a theistic argument? (Cowen and Spiegel argument) (2) Don't we need to rely on induction, in order to properly interpret Scripture? (Prof's argument) (3) At the very least, however, we have seen that science itself cannot justify its own practice of relying on induction. Rather, the rationality of induction is a philosophical assumption that is brought to science from outside the discipline.
The problem of evil
a) Initial version (1) If God exists, then there is no evil. (2) There is evil. (3) So, God does not exist. b) Argument for premise (1) (Epicurus, Hume, Mackie) i) (1a) A perfectly good being wouldprevent evil as far as he can. ii) (1b) A perfectly powerful and knowledgeable being canprevent any evil. iii) (1c) God is perfectly good, powerful, and knowledgeable. iv) (1d) Therefore, if God exists, then there is no evil. c) Reason to doubt this defense of premise (1) i) (1a) above looks false, since maybe God has a good reasonfor permitting evil. d) New version of the argument (1) If God exists, then there is no evil, unless there is a reason that would justify him in permitting it. (2) There is evil. (3) There is no reason that would justify God in permitting evil. (4) So, God does not exist. e) Two ways to attack the argument i) Rebut premise (3): give a theodicy. Undercut premise (3): inscrutability of the divine purposes.
The way of inscrutability
a) Rebutting vs. undercutting defeaters i) The previous theodicies were meant to be rebuttingdefeaters for the POE. They are meant to be reasons for showing one of the premises of the POE to be false. ii) But even if we can't rebuta revised premise (3) (show it false), perhaps we can undercutit (show that we have little reason to think it true). iii) This is the basic issue. Even if we can't rebut the "no justifying reason" premise, maybe we can undercut it. b) The evidential argument stated: (1) Factual premise: There is no reason that would justify God in permitting so much evil rather than a lot less. (2) Theological premise: If God exists, then there must be such a reason. (3) Atheistic conclusion: So, God does not exist. c) The 'noseeum' inference behind the factual premise i) The 'noseeum' inference: (1) So far as we can tell, there is no reason that would justify God. (2) So, it is very likely that there is no such reason. ii) Examples of good noseeum inferences: (1) "No milk in the fridge" (as I look inside). (2) "No way to get out of check" (Kasparov commenting on novice match). iii) Examples of bad noseeum inferences: (1) "No slug in distant garden" (as I look from my kitchen window). (2) "No way for Big Blue to get out of check" (beginner about Kasparov match) (3) "Nothing meaningful here to be grasped" (non-physicists commenting on a discussion between quantum physicists). iv) What makes the difference between good and bad noseeum inferences? (1) You have to "have what it takes to discern the sorts of things in question". (2) Thus, the 'noseeum' assumption: "We would very likely see or comprehend a reason, if there were one." d) Reasons to doubtthe truth of the noseeum assumption i) In general, we have good reason to believe we are in the dark about such matters. (1) Our cognitive capacities just aren't up to the task. (2) We can only guess about the territory beyond our capacities. (3) For all we know, we haven't developed the capacity to recognize any additional, complex, intrinsic goods. (4) Perhaps the goods are beyond our grasp because of their complexity. ii) Therefore, we have good reason to doubt that it's likely we would see a justifying reason, even if one were there. iii) If the noseeum assumption drives the noseeum inference, which in turn drives the argument from the amount of evil, then the force of that argument has been defeated.
Compatibilist free will
a) The argument (1) If determinism is true, then our actions are the consequences of the laws of nature and events in the remote past. (2) It is not in our power to change the laws of nature. (3) It is not in our power to change events in the remote past. (4) If our actions are the consequences of the laws of nature and events in the remote past, and it is not in our power to change these things, then we cannot do otherwise than what we do. (5) If we cannot do otherwise than what we do, then we are not free. (6) Therefore, if determinism is true, then we are not free. b) Two compatibilist responses to the consequence argument i) Traditional compatibilism(Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Edwards, Mill, Ayer, Skinner) (1) Challengepremise (4) of the consequence argumentwith a hypothetical analysis of 'can do otherwise'. (2) Thus, there is a sense in which we cando otherwise, even if determinism is true. (3) So we can have free will (FW) even if determinism is true. (4) Since we can have FW despite determinism, we can be morally responsible (MR). ii) Semi-compatibilism(Fischer and Ravizza) (1) Concedepremise (4) of the consequence argument but challengepremise (5)through Frankfurt counterexamples. (2) So given premise (4), determinism rules out alternate possibilities (AP) after all. (3) Thus, if determinism is true, then maybe we can't have FW (in the sense of AP). (4) But that's OK, since we don't need AP in order to have FW. (Deny premise (5).) Thus, we can be MR,whether or not determinism is true. Determinism is compatible with MR, even if it's not compatible with AP.
The problem of induction
a) The basic structure of an inductive inference i) (Explicit) Premise 1: empirical observationsof past Fs being Gs. ii) (Implicit) Premise 2: uniformity of nature- future Fs will be like past Fs. iii) Conclusion:rational inference- therefore, future Fs will be Gs. b) Justifying the uniformity of nature i) The question: why is premise 2 justified? ii) Adeductivejustification of the uniformity of nature? (1) Premise: Nature has behaved a particular way in the past. (2) Conclusion: Therefore, nature will continue to behave that way. (i.e., nature is uniform) (3) But this cannot be a deductivelyvalid argument, because the conclusion could be false even if the premises are true. Surely it's possible for nature to behave differently in the future. iii) Aninductivejustification of the uniformity of nature? (1) Perhaps we can argue for the uniformity of nature (premise 2) in the following way: (a) In the past, the past has always been like the future. (b) Therefore, in the future, the past will be like the future. (2) But this assumesthat the past is a rule for inferences about the future. But that's what we're trying to prove: isthe past a rule for inferences about the future? c) This is 'the problem of induction' i) Summary (philosopher of science Marc Lange, UNC-Chapel Hill) (1) Premise: The only way to justify induction, to fill in the gap between the premise and the conclusion of an inductive argument, would be to give a deductive argument or to give an inductive argument. (2) Premise: A deductive argument cannot work - because evidence of examined cases is logically compatible with any claim about unexamined cases. (3) Premise: An inductive argument cannot work - because it would be circular. (4) Conclusion: Induction cannot be justified. ii) Cowan/Spiegel: "Problem of induction: The problem of justifying inferences from observed phenomena to unobserved phenomena, especially those inferences involving future events. The problem is that attempts to justify such inferences will have to assume the uniformity of nature, arguing that natural processes will continue as they have in the past. But this line of reasoning appears circular since it presupposes the very uniformity of natural processes that it seeks to prove" (461; cf. 109-111). David Hume: "It is impossible, therefore, that any arguments from experience can prove this resemblance of the past to the future, since all these arguments are founded on the supposition of that resemblance. Let the course of things be allowed hitherto ever so regular, that alone, without some new argument or inference, proves not that for the future it will continue so" (An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding, s. 4.2).
Libertarian free will
a) The need for alternate possibilities (AP) i) Premise (5) of the consequence argument: "If we cannot do otherwise than what we do, then we are not free." ii) So the key assumption is that AP defines genuine freedom. And AP is excluded by determinism. b) Defining AP i) The AP condition is sometimes called 'liberty of indifference'. That is, you have the power to act 'indifferently' to your circumstances. Nothing prior to you (past events, laws of nature) ensures which choice you are going to make. ii) Ice cream example. Notice that this is an alternative-sequencetheory of freedom. iii) Hasker: "N is free at T with respect to performing A = df It is in N's power at T to perform A, and it is in N's power at T to refrain from performing A (God, Time, and Knowledge, 66). Moreland and Craig: "P is a substance that had the power to bring about e; P exerted its power as a first mover to bring about e; P had the ability to refrain from exerting its power to bring about e; P had some reason R that was the end or final cause for the sake of which he did e" (Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview, 271).
The way of theodicy
a) Two assumptions behind all theodicy i) Logical premise: the goods require the evils (or at least their possibility) ii) Moral premise: the goods outweigh the evils b) Punishment: suffering is a result of God's just punishment of evildoers i) Problem: the Bible teaches this isn't a total explanation of evil. ii) Problem: why did God permit the evildoing in the first place? iii) Problem: what about non-human (animal) suffering? c) Counterpart: evil exists as the necessary counterpart to good i) That is, the existence of good requires the existence of evil. ii) Problem: theists can't use this theodicy. iii) Problem: the counterpart principle just seems false. iv) Problem: an epistemological interpretation doesn't help here. d) Free will: its value far outweighs any evil which may flow from its abuse i) Value judgment: world (1) is supposed to be obviously more valuable than world (2) (1) A world in which we are free to do evil as well as good. (2) A world in which all of our actions are determined. ii) So the value of FW depends on its giving one the ability to do evilas well as good iii) Problem: God could have blocked me from harming others. (1) I.e., God preserves my FW, but intervenes to keep its abuse from harming others. (2) However, this produces massive deception (contrary to the goodness of God). (3) It might also produce 'meaningless' relationships. iv) Problem: what about evil that results from natural disturbances? (1) Reply: natural evil results from angelicabuse of free will? (2) Reply: natural evil results indirectlyfrom the need for meaningful choices. v) Problem: can we do the proper calculations in order to get this value judgment? vi) Problem: is the value judgment even true? (1) The reckless chemist (2) What if God restricted the range (but not the consequences) of our free will choices?So there are really threeoptions here: (a) A world in which we are free to do evil as well as good. (b) A world in which all of our actions are determined. (c) A world in which we are free to choose among only good alternatives. vii)Problem: can the value judgment be applied to God himself? Or to the saints in heaven? e) Pain as God's megaphone: natural evil gets our attention i) Asupplementto the free will theodicy ii) Problem: the suffering of nonhuman animals iii) Problem: why so muchnatural evil? f) Natural law: natural evil results from the laws of nature presupposed in any meaningful exercise of free will i) The value of natural laws being in place ii) The unfortunate consequences of natural laws being in place iii) Problem: God could have made a world with different natural laws iv) Problem: God could have prevented a lotof natural evil w/o undermining freedom v) Problem: aren't Eden and Heaven stable environments without natural evil? g) Higher-order goods: some goods requireevil to exist i) Five such higher-order goods: (1) "Showing sympathy, compassion, and generosityto the sick, the poor, and the marginalized" (DHS 98). (2) "Forgivingwrong done to us, making compensationfor having wronged others, showing gratitudefor help received, rewardingthose who have done well through serious adversity." (3) "Since these goods are of such tremendous value and they require evil, they justify God's permission of evil." ii) Problem: do these goods require realevil to occur? iii) Problem: can we make the value judgment in question? iv) Problem: shares a weakness with utilitarianism? (treats persons as means, not ends) h) Summary i) We have been trying to rebut premise (3). ii) However, do these theodicies give justifying reasons for allthe evil in the world? (1) What about the amountof evil in the world? (2) What about particularly horrendousinstances of evil? (3) What about nonhuman(animal) suffering? So the atheist can always reword premise (3) as "There is no reason that would justify God in permittingso much[or such horrible] evil."
The consequence argument for incompatibilism
a) van Inwagen's version of the consequence argument (An Essay on Free Will[OUP, 1983], 16)"If determinism is true, then our acts are the consequences of the laws of nature and events in the remote past. But it is not up to us what went on before we were born; and neither is it up to us what the laws of nature are. Therefore the consequences of these things (including our own acts) are not up to us." b) The consequence argument formalized (Cowan/Spiegel 228) (1) If determinism is true, then our actions are the consequences of the laws of nature and events in the remote past. (2) It is not in our power to change the laws of nature. (3) It is not in our power to change events in the remote past. (4) If our actions are the consequences of the laws of nature and events in the remote past, and it is not in our power to change these things, then we cannot do otherwise than what we do. (5) If we cannot do otherwise than what we do, then we are not free. (6) Therefore, if determinism is true, then we are not free. c) The consequence argument illustrated i) Solar flare example (1) 100 years ago, the universe was in a particular state P. (2) 100 years ago, and continuing through tomorrow, cause and effect in the universe is governed by the laws of nature LN. (3) Given P and LN, there will be a solar flare (SF) tomorrow at noon. (determinism) (4) There's nothing we can do about P or LN. (5) There's nothing we can do about P or LN entailing SF. (6) Therefore, there's nothing we can do about SF occurring. It is inevitable. We have no power to make it anything other than what it will be: an event at noon tomorrow. ii) Now run the argument again, but talk about human actions rather than solar flares. d) Two incompatibilist responses to the consequence argument i) Libertarianism(Reid, Kant, van Inwagen, Kane, O'Connor, Clarke, McCann) (1) Free will is incompatible with determinism. (2) But we can have free will since determinism is false. (3) Since we can have free will, we can be morally responsible. ii) Hard Determinism(Spinoza, d'Holbach, Priestley, Honderich) (1) Free will is incompatible with determinism. (2) But since determinism is true, we cannot have free will. Since we cannot have free will,we cannot be morally responsible.
Problem of evil
the problem of the apparent incompatibility between the existence of God and the existence of evil.
Incompatibilism
the view that human freedom and moral responsibility are incompatible with determinism.
