Philosophy (Free Will)

Samuel Johnson

"All theory is against the freedom of the will; all experience is for it"

The dilemma argument against free will

1) Either determinism is true or its false (trivial) 2) If determinism is true, then you can never choose to perform one action instead of another (incompatibilism thesis) 3) If you can never choose to perform one action instead of another, then you don't have free will (from the definition of free will) 4) Therefore determinism is true, no one has free will (from 2,3) 5) If determinism is false, then some events are random (those not are determined (premise) 6) If you do something randomly, then it is not result of choice (premise) 7) Therefore, an action that is random is not the result of free will. 8) Therefore, if determinism is false there is no free will 9) Therefore, there is no free will

The regress of reasons argument against free will

1) you always act according to your greatest desire 2) Your desire and their relative strengths are outside your control 3) Therefore your actions are outside of your control 4) If your actions are outside of your control, then they are not the result of your choices. 5) Therefore your actions are not the result of your choices 6) If your actions are not the result of your choices then you have no free will 7) Therefore, you have no free will

Compatibilist reply

Actions that arise from your own character and authentic desire are free, coerced actions are not

Objection 2: Magic

Agent says that human beings can start new casual chains in the world, separate from the web causation that holds everything else together . Such causation looks like casting magic spells that affect the world but were caused by nothing outside our walls.

Objection 2: Aristotle's Answer

Aristotle insisted that there are no facts about the future. No statement about the future is either true or false. There are concrete facts about the present and the past, but the future is no more than a formless void Example: God knows (a) but doesn't (b) or (c) until tomorrow comes, there is nothing to know

The threat of determinism

Determinism states that there is exactly one physically possible future. If you have free will then you have a choice, you could either do action x or action y. If determinism is true, then the future is closed; there is only one way things could go no matter how much you felt like you could have done something else.

Objection 1: Atheism and agnosticism

Either deny that there is an omniscient God or refuse to have an opinion either way.

Incompatibilism

Either we have no free will or determinism is false. The view that free will and determinism are in conflict.

Randomness

Even if quantum randomness undermines global determinism, how will that save free will? It isn't going to make us free

Pieces of the puzzle

Free Will Determinism Incompatibilism

Compatibilist reply to too little freedom

Freedom comes in degrees you are more or less unfree depending on the extent to which you can act on your desires

Philosophers that defended agent causation

George Berkeley Thomas Reid Roderick Chisholm

Determinism

Given the laws of nature and a set of initial conditions, there is exactly one physically possible future. If determinism is true then the future is closed. There are only one way things could go. If you perform x, then that was the only thing that you could have done, no matter how much it felt like you could have done something else.

Will randomness make us free?

If any event is truly random, then it might not have occurred given precisely the same initial conditions and laws of nature. The regress of reasons argument against free will

Free Will and moral responsibility

If you're not free then there was never anything else you could do, no matter what you do. Either forces outside of your control determine every action you perform, in which case you never had a choice, or your actions are a result of randomness, in which case you never had a choice.

Response to dilemma argument

Libertarian free will Compatibilist free will

choice

Means effective choice. True choice is not idle.

Objection to agent causation

Mystery Magic

Why there is no free will, Part 1: Divine Foreknowledge

Objection 1: Atheism and agnosticism Objection 2: Aristotle's answer

Compatibilist reply to too much freedom

That arise from your own character and authentic desires are free coerced actions are not

Divine foreknowledge argument

The argument that there is no free will because God's infallible knowledge of the future precludes free choice.

Regress of reasons for acting argument

The argument that there is no free will because actions are the result of desires that one does not choose.

Dilemma argument

The argument that there is no free will because all behavior is either determined or random, and both preclude free choice.

Compatibilism

The belief that free will and determinism are compatible ideas, and that it is possible to believe both without being logically inconsistent.

Agent causation

The view that any willful agent can spontaneously begin a new chain of causation is the world, one that has no causal history prior to the act of willing. The Idea is that the alternative to determinism isn't randomness at all, but our own free will.

Previous Decisions vs Outside forces

There seem to be only two possible answers, namely that the explanation is rooted ultimately in you and your decision - making, or that the explanations is rooted outside of you in other forces and factors.

Frankfurt's argument against the "Principle of Alternate Possibilities"

There were cases in which one was intuitively still responsible for an action, even when one's action was completely unavoidable. One is not morally responsible for what one does if one does it only because one could not have done otherwise. Only addresses when one is not morally responsible for acts, and says nothing about omissions. A lack of free will kills moral responsibility.

Objections to Compatibilism

Too little freedom Too much freedom

Objection 1: Mystery

You act for reasons. Either (a) those reasons for acting are due to causes outside of you, or (b) you choose which reasons are important to you and to what degree. If (a), and your reasons for acting are the result of outside causes, then agent causation is obviously wrong.

Principle of alternate possibilities

You are morally responsible for an action x only if at the time you did x, there was alternate possible action y that you could have done instead.

Objections 1: Too little Freedom

You often can't do what you want, so you're still not free

Objection 2: Too much freedom

You're free no matter what. You freely did something more than any other action available to you.

The advantage of compatibilism

Your actions might be completely determined, but so long as you are doing what you want, your are still free, free will is compatible with determinism. Random action still wouldn't be free, since it is not the result of your beliefs, desires, and intentions.

Compatibilist free will

Your performance of an action is free just in case it is the result of your beliefs, desires, and intentions.

Previous Decisions

Your reasons for acting are the result of some previous decisions you made

Outside forces

Your reasons for acting somehow came from forces and influences outside of your mind (example: authority, family, society, environment, or innate biological instincts.)

Free Will

Your will is free just in case you can choose to perform one action instead of another.

Libertarian free will

Your will is free just in case you can choose to perform one action instead of another.